Administrative United Kingdom

RB v The Secretary of State for the Home Department

Official source

First-tier Tribunal

(Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Appeal Number: PA/87443/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Heard at Columbus House, Newport

On 5 October 2026

Before

first-tier tribunal JUDGE BOWEN

Between

RB

(anonymity direction Made)

Appellant

and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT

Respondent

Representation:

For the Appellant: Ms Patel, Counsel, instructed by NLS Solicitors

For the Respondent: Ms Jones, Home Office Presenting Officer

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The Appellant, a citizen of Uganda, appeals under the provisions of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 against the Respondent’s decision, dated 15 August 2025, to refuse her protection claim made on 1 April 2025. As such, ss30-39 of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 (‘the 2022 Act’) apply.

ANONYMITY DIRECTION

2. I have decided to make an anonymity direction because the importance of facilitating the discharge of the obligations of the United Kingdom under the Refugee Convention in the circumstances of this case outweighs the principle of open justice.

BACKGROUND

3. The background to this appeal is set out in the documentation contained on myHMCTS.

4. The Appellant asserts that she would be at risk on return due to membership of a particular social group or alternatively that she is entitled to humanitarian protection.

Immigration History

5. The Appellant successfully applied for a Temporary Worker visa on 24 February 2025, stating that she intended to be a backing vocalist for a band. She subsequently left Uganda on 28 March 2025, flying to London Heathrow via Doha. The Appellant arrived in the UK on 29 March 2025 and claimed asylum on 1 April 2025.

The Appellant’s Claim and the Reasons for Refusal Letter (‘RFRL’)

6. The Appellant’s full account is contained in the documentation contained on myHMCTS, to include her screening and asylum interviews and witness statements. In brief terms, the Appellant asserts:-

i) She identifies as lesbian.

ii) The Appellant had a female partner, NL, in Uganda – with their relationship starting when the Appellant was aged 17. The relationship was kept secret.

iii) Due to suspicions that her family had about her sexuality, a marriage was arranged for her with a man. The Appellant informed her husband about her sexuality, but he agreed to continue with the marriage in order to protect the Appellant from further suspicion. The Appellant had four children between 2010 and 2018.

iv) In the summer of 2024, the Appellant received adverse attention as a result of NL kissing her in public in front of approximately 30 people. The Appellant says this led to her being punched in the eye and rumours starting to spread, but she experienced no other direct issues before coming to the UK.

v) On 31 March 2025, shortly after arriving in the UK, the Appellant was contacted by her husband. He told her that the police were looking for her. NL had been badly beaten and that incriminating photographs of the Appellant and NL had been found on NL’s phone. The Appellant has had no contact with NL since. The Appellant’s family members have blocked and threatened her.

vi) The Appellant’s husband was questioned by the police about the Appellant’s whereabouts. The Appellant’s oldest child has also been bullied.

vii) The Appellant has attended LGBT events in the UK and has had further same-sex relationships.

viii) The Appellant fears being imprisoned or subjected to violence by her family/community if returned to Uganda.

7. Within the RFRL dated 15 August 2025, the Respondent rejected the Appellant’s account of her sexuality and the adverse attention she claims to have received. The Respondent considered that the Appellant had provided an inconsistent account which lacked detail and was “vague” in some respects, to include the Appellant’s account of the realisation of her sexuality and her account of her relationship with NL. The Respondent further considered that the Appellant had engaged in Section 8 behaviours. The Respondent concluded that the protection claim should fail and that refusal did not breach the Appellant’s Article 8 rights.

HEARING AND ISSUES IN DISPUTE

8. The hearing was recorded and that recording shall stand as the record of proceedings.

Preliminary issues

9. At 13:00 the day before the hearing, the Appellant had uploaded a witness statement from MN, who claims to be the Appellant’s current partner. It was established at the outset of the hearing that person was not attending to give evidence. In accordance with the Practice Direction of 1 November 2024, Ms Patel applied for the Appellant to be able to rely on the late evidence. Ms Patel explained that the relationship was relatively new and that the Appellant had not initially disclosed details of the asylum claim to her partner – but that when she had belatedly done so, the partner had been keen to assist.

10. Ms Jones confirmed that she was in a position to deal with the late evidence. In considering the full circumstances of the case and the principles set out in Maleci (Non-admission of late evidence) [2024] UKUT 00028, I took account of the importance of compliance with directions and Practice Directions. I determined that the documents were directly relevant to the issues in dispute and was mindful of the principle of anxious scrutiny, in the context of this being a protection appeal. I ultimately determined that it would be fair and compatible with a proper consideration of the issues for the late evidence to be admitted. I emphasise that in making that determination, I was clear that the question of whether late evidence should be admitted and, if so, what weight should be given to that evidence are distinct questions. It does not follow therefore that the mere fact that permission was given to rely on the documents means that I am bound to find that evidence is of significant probative value.

Issues in dispute

11. Ms Jones confirmed that if the Appellant’s account were accepted, that risk on return would be conceded. Ms Patel confirmed that the Appellant was not pursuing a standalone Article 3 or 8 claim.

12. The sole disputed issue before me is effectively the credibility of the Appellant’s account (both as regards her claim to be a lesbian and to have come to adverse attention as a result).

Evidence and Submissions

13. I heard evidence from the Appellant, who adopted her witness statement and was cross examined by Ms Jones. I then heard submissions from Ms Jones and Ms Patel. I reserved my decision.

LEGAL FRAMEWORK

14. To succeed in an appeal on asylum grounds, the Appellant must show a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason (race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, political opinion). The burden of proof rests on the Appellant. As the asylum claim was made on or after 28 June 2022, pursuant to s32 of the 2022 Act, in considering whether the Appellant qualifies as a refugee, I must apply a two-stage test. As per the guidance from JCK (s.32 NABA 2022) Botswana [2024] UKUT 00100, I must first determine the following matters on the balance of probabilities:

(a) Taking the Appellant’s claim at its highest, is there a Convention reason?

(b) Does the Appellant fear persecution for that Convention reason?

15. If so, I must go on to determine whether it is reasonably likely that:

(c) The Appellant would be persecuted for that Convention reason;

(d) There would not be sufficient protection available; and

(e) The Appellant could not internally relocate.

16. To succeed on an appeal on humanitarian protection grounds, the Appellant must not be a refugee; they must show substantial grounds for believing that they would face a real risk of suffering serious harm in their country of origin. The burden of proof rests on the Appellant.

FINDINGS

Appeal on Asylum Grounds

17. In coming to my conclusions in this appeal, I have considered all the evidence submitted by both parties.

18. In HJ (Iran) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] UKSC 31, Lord Rodgers found that:

“when an applicant applies for asylum on the ground of a well-founded fear of persecution because he is gay, the tribunal must first ask itself whether it is satisfied on the evidence that he is gay, or that he would be treated as gay by potential persecutors in his country of nationality. If so, the tribunal must then ask itself whether it is satisfied on the available evidence that gay people who lived openly would be liable to persecution in the applicant's country of nationality. If so, the tribunal must go on to consider what the individual applicant would do if he were returned to that country. If the applicant would in fact live openly and thereby be exposed to a real risk of persecution, then he has a well-founded fear of persecution – even if he could avoid the risk by living "discreetly". If, on the other hand, the tribunal concludes that the applicant would in fact live discreetly and so avoid persecution, it must go on to ask itself why he would do so. If the tribunal concludes that the applicant would choose to live discreetly simply because that was how he himself would wish to live, or because of social pressures, e g, not wanting to distress his parents or embarrass his friends, then his application should be rejected.”

19. As I have set out above, the parties agree that the first central issue for me to determine in this appeal is the question of the credibility of the Appellant’s account, such that I am therefore concerned only with the first part of the test set out in HJ (Iran).

20. I remind myself that the assessment of credibility is a holistic exercise of judgment which requires the Tribunal to consider all the relevant evidence in reaching a conclusion. An assessment of credibility can only be properly made against the background evidence. An individual’s account must also be assessed on the basis of its cultural and societal context.

21. The approach to the assessment of future risk is a single-stage process of evaluating all the evidence for what it is worth (Karanakaran v Home Secretary [2000] 3 All ER 449). The approach to the evidence as set out in that case does not entail the decision maker purporting to find ‘proved’ facts, whether past or present about which it is not satisfied on the balance of probabilities, but means that it must not exclude any matters from its consideration when it is assessing the future, unless it feels that it can safely discard them because it has no real doubt that they did not in fact occur.

22. In KB & AH (credibility-structured approach) Pakistan [2017] UKUT 00491 (IAC), the Upper Tribunal held that the ‘Credibility Indicators’ identified in the Home Office Asylum Policy Instruction, Assessing credibility and refugee status Version 3.0, 6 January 2015 (which can be summarised as comprising sufficiency of detail; internal consistency; external consistency; and plausibility), provide a helpful framework within which to conduct a credibility assessment. However, they are merely indicators, not necessary conditions; they are not an exhaustive list; assessment of credibility being a highly fact-sensitive affair, their main role is to help make sure, where relevant, that the evidence is considered in a number of well-recognised respects; making use of these indicators is not a substitute for the requirement to consider the evidence as a whole or ‘in the round’.

Objective and Background Evidence

23. I have been referred to the CPIN: Sexual Orientation and gender identity and expression, Uganda, March 2025. I do not propose to comment upon this CPIN in significant detail as it is publicly available, but briefly note:-

i) LGBT+ people are likely to face persecution or serious harm in Uganda. Same-sex sexual acts are illegal for both men and women and punishable with up to life imprisonment. A new Anti-Homosexuality Act came into force in 2023, which prescribes the death penalty for serial offenders. [3.1.1-3.1.2, 9.1.1]

ii) LGBT+ people are arrested and sometimes prosecuted under the anti LGBT+ laws but convictions and imprisonment are uncommon.Exact numbers of cases are limited amongst the sources consulted. The USSD observed that NGOs reported ‘numerous’ arrests of LGBT+ people [3.1.4]

iii) State officials, religious leaders and the media use homophobic rhetoric which has reinforced anti-gay sentiment. Societal homophobia remains widespread and societal stigmas are “pervasive” – with the Afrobarometer survey finding that 97% of people surveyed consider homosexuality was incompatible with societal norms and should remain illegal and 95% of people stating they would report a family member to police. Family members are said to be among the top violators of rights [3.1.5-3.1.6, 10.4.4, 11.1.7, 13.1.3]

iv) Family members of LGBT+ people are often treated in a similar manner to the LGBT+ person themselves – particularly if they have failed to take their own direct or reporting action against the person. There is societal pressure for the family to “take the law into their own hands.” [14.1.1]

v) LGBT+ people face various violations including physical and mob attacks, corrective rape and forced marriages. The Respondent accepts that the position is significantly worse than described in the evidence before the tribunal in JM (homosexuality: risk) Uganda CG [2008] UKIAT 00065, such that there are strong grounds supported by cogent evidence to depart from the existing caselaw [3.1.7, 3.1.11, 13.4.1]

vi) A person who has a well-founded fear or persecution or serious harm from either the state or a non-state actor is unlikely to obtain effective protection. LGBT+ people are often reluctant to seek assistance from the police for fear of arrest or reprisal. Internal relocation is unlikely to be available [4.1.1, 4.1.2, 5.1.1].

24. I give weight to the CPIN, considering it has been compiled using a wide range of factual sources and organisations, which are all explicitly referenced within the body of the document itself. I have also taken account of and give weight to the Appellant’s Country Information Evidence Schedule – which contains various reports and articles, to include reports from some of the NGOs referred to in the CPIN. I comment upon these only insofar as relevant, but confirm that I find the position set out across the documents broadly consistent with that contained in the CPIN.

25. Taking account of the CPIN and the wider background evidence relied upon by the Appellant, I find that various aspects of the Appellant’s account are potentially externally consistent with the objective evidence. These aspects include her claim to have not revealed her sexuality widely due to social stigma and fear, that her family sought to arrange a marriage in light of their suspicions and the claimed response to both NL kissing her and the alleged discovery of incriminatory pictures on her phone.

The Appellant’s Evidence

26. The Appellant has provided photographs of a mirtazapine prescription and boxes of that medication – as well as an earlier photograph of sertraline. From the limited documents before me, it is apparent that the Appellant was referred to the community mental health team in July 2025. An email from Mind dated 3 September 2026 also refers to her attending two group sessions. Whilst no formal application was made for the Appellant to be treated as a vulnerable witness, I give such weight as I can to her mental health difficulties and vulnerability. I also bear in mind that the Appellant was without representation for a period of time. I observe, however, that there are limited records before me and no evidence of any expert opinion which clearly sets out the impact of the Appellant’s difficulties on her functioning or which indicate that the cogency of the Appellant’s account of her ability to recount events would have been impacted by her mental health difficulties.

27. Before turning to consider the specifics of the Appellant’s actual evidence, I confirm that I also find that in circumstances where the Appellant has lived in a country where stigma and societal discrimination is prevalent until the age of 33, her experiences may well have impacted the way she speaks about her sexuality, as reflected in the Respondent’s own Sexual Orientation in Asylum Claims guidance of 2016, which states:-

“Recognising, understanding and accepting one’s own sexual orientation, if it differs from mainstream social expectations, can be a long and or painful process, and in some instances, may only come in later stages of life. In such cases this must not be seen as undermining the ’genuineness’ of an individual’s claim. Many claimants may come from cultures which shun any open discussion of sexual orientation and it should be noted that LGB activity and identity will be often be surrounded by taboo, stereotypes and prejudice and be seen as being contrary to the fundamental moral, religious and political values of many societies. Discussing matters such as sexual orientation will for many, in the official context of an asylum interview, be extremely daunting. It is to be expected that some LGB asylum seekers may struggle to talk openly about their sexual orientation and find it difficult to disclose material information in a coherent or detailed manner.”

28. As set out above, I consider that some aspects of the Appellant’s account have been externally consistent with the objective evidence. I have carefully considered the Appellant’s evidence across her interviews, statement and oral evidence. Aspects of the Appellant’s account have also, in my view, been broadly internally consistent across the Appellant’s screening interview, asylum interview, written and oral evidence.

29. I give limited or no weight to some of the matters raised in the RFRL, Respondent Review and submissions:-

i) When viewed through the lens of the matters raised in Paragraph 27, I do not accept that the Appellant’s account of her realisation of her sexuality is materially lacking in emotional depth or detail, The Appellant has provided a broadly consistent account of her age when she realised her sexuality and her age when her relationship with NL commenced. It is unclear what the Respondent considers to be a “reasonable degree” of emotional depth and detail. I find that the Appellant provided a reasonable account of how she was unable to talk to anybody about her feelings whilst a teenager and how she felt guilty given societal and religious expectations (AIR66, 69, 75, 93), and how she no longer felt alone when NL first approached her (AIR67). I do not accept the fact that the Appellant described herself as feeling “proud and good….that this is me” after realising her claimed sexuality, despite the wider societal stigma, weighs against her account. When read in totality, the Appellant has given a reasonably detailed account of her worry, shame and guilt, of her realisation that she was “different” and the internal comfort that she still took from that.

ii) The RFRL raises that given the Appellant and NL’s awareness of the risks posed to LGBT+ people in Uganda, that the Appellant had not “sufficiently substantiated” why NL would kiss her in public. Firstly, I make the rather obvious point that an Appellant cannot be expected to know the reasons or motivations for a third party’s actions. The Appellant has never suggested that she initiated or invited the kiss herself and she clearly views it as an event capable of putting her at risk in Ugandan society. It would similarly appear to be out of character, given the steps it is suggested that were taken to keep the relationship secret over a number of years. It is the case, however, that people regularly commit acts which are objectively foolish or which may place them at risk. The Country Evidence Schedule confirms examples of lesbians kissing in public and the response this has led to from law enforcement agencies and the very fact that the Ugandan penal code addresses acts committed in public or private, demonstrates that events such as this are sometimes liable to occur notwithstanding the prevailing situation. I also bear in mind that the Appellant was not challenged on her assertion in her latest witness statement that she believes NL had been drinking and I accept that alcohol would be capable of impairing judgment and leading to disinhibition.

30. Whilst I have found that the above factors do not weight against the Appellant, I have found that there are wider inconsistencies in her account of events in Uganda which do. These include:-

i) The extent to which her family and the wider community had actual knowledge of her sexuality. In interview, the Appellant was clear that whilst her family suspected she liked girls, she had never confirmed to them that she liked women (AIR 89-91). I refer to the weight I give to the statutory declaration from the Appellant’s aunt in greater detail below. However, the position as described by the Appellant is directly at odds with that declaration – which refers to the Appellant having identified as a lesbian from her teenage years, leading to her being expelled by her family and clan to face stigma, isolation and shame. The Appellant has not ever suggested that she was subjected to such treatment or that either her family or wider community had actual knowledge of her sexuality whilst she remain in Uganda (with her case being that it was only discovered after her departure to the UK).

ii) The extent to which her family were aware of the claimed relationship with NL. Whilst the Appellant has described only her husband as having direct knowledge of the relationship, the aunt again refers to actual knowledge of her same-sex relationship in Uganda.

iii) The adverse attention she claims to have received after the public show of affection by NL. In her asylum interview, the Appellant suggested that she was punched in the eye, but experienced no other issues prior to her departure (AIR107). After the refusal, the Appellant raised for the first time that she was reported to the authorities after the public kiss, but that after she and NL denied everything, they were released without charge. In oral evidence, the Appellant maintained that she was taken to the police and argued that she had said this at asylum interview. I am unable to give any real weight to that assertion. The transcript does not suggest she said this at asylum interview (indeed she specifically referenced having no other issues) and no amendments were made to the asylum interview. I consider the suggestion that the Appellant had previously faced direct investigation by the police about her sexuality to be a significant evolution in her evidence. This is directly relevant to the adverse attention she claims to have received in the past and is directly relevant to her suggestion that a case was “reopened” against her or whether, as she has also suggested, the catalyst for NL coming to police attention after the Appellant’s departure was NL being found with another woman.

iv) The Appellant’s account of the adverse attention she says she received after the discovery of the photographs on NL’s phone. I consider that the Appellant’s account of the verbal abuse and threats she says she received after the discovery of the photographs lacks any real detail. Still more fundamentally, the Appellant has consistently stated that she was in the UK when the photographs were found. However, in her first written statement (written before her current Solicitors were acting for her), the Appellant described how after the discovery of the photographs, she was “physically assaulted by family members, my clothes were torn and I was publicly humiliated…after this unknown people began coming around my home. I lived in fear, stayed indoors and returned home early to avoid harm”. Self-evidently, the Appellant could not have been attacked by her family or indeed anybody else in Uganda when she was already in the UK. The Appellant was unable to provide a reasonable explanation for this discrepancy in her account. I find that it represents a significant internal inconsistency which substantially weighs against her account. I do not accept that the mere fact that the Appellant was unrepresented at the time she made these comments accounts for the factual inaccuracy.

v) The Respondent purports that there is an inconsistency between the Appellant describing herself as bisexual in the screening interview and subsequently, at asylum interview and beyond, identifying as lesbian. I do not accept that this weighs significantly against the Appellant’s account. I am mindful that on the Appellant’s own account, she is married to a male with whom she has had four children – such that objectively, it could be possible for some people to view her as bisexual (as she suggests her husband does in AIR20). Nevertheless, in circumstances where the Appellant is stated to have conducted relevant research whilst still a teenager, to have so clearly identified as a lesbian thereafter and to be relying on evidence from an aunt who says the Appellant has identified as a lesbian since her teenage years, I do consider there is something of a shift in the Appellant’s evidence (which notably postdates her apparent involvement and interactions with LGBT groups and other asylum seekers). It is a factor to which I give only extremely limited weight in my holistic assessment.

31. I deal with the weight that I give to the various pieces of evidence that the Appellant has given of her LGBT activities in the UK when considering the documentary evidence below. The Appellant claims to have had at least two relationships whilst in the UK – one which had ended a matter of months before her last witness statement and another which had started (and in which she remains) by the time of that statement. I find that the Appellant’s account of these relationships is limited and lacks specificity of detail. There is limited explanation of how the Appellant met her purported partners, the time they spent together and limited corroboration (when I find that corroborating evidence in the UK ought to have been easily obtainable) – with much of the evidence that has been produced not having been explained or covered in the Appellant’s witness statement.

Section 8

32. I have applied Section 8 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants etc) Act 2004, which requires me to take into account, as adversely affecting the credibility of the Appellant’s account, any behaviour which I consider was designed or likely to result in concealment of information or to mislead or delay consideration of a claim. I emphasise that my consideration of Section 8 is not the starting point of my credibility assessment, but rather forms part of the overall holistic assessment.

33. The Respondent contends that the Appellant delayed the handling of the asylum claim having arrived in the UK on a creative worker visa on 29 March 2025 and claimed asylum on 1 April 2025. The assessment of Section 8 is at some level intertwined with what I consider to be the confusing account of the actual knowledge and claimed adverse attention she had received prior to coming to the UK.

34. On her own core account, the Appellant’s family had some suspicions of her sexuality over 15 years ago, but she had kept her relationship with NL secret from all but her husband (who at the time supported her) and save for some transient issues shortly after a public show of affection, she experienced no other issues before coming to the UK. She suggests that situation changed drastically within 48 hours of her arrival in the UK, when incriminating photographs were found which led to her husband’s arrest and that she went on to claim asylum within 24 hours of the same. If that account were accurate, the Appellant could arguably not be criticised for any delay, as she may have had no reason to think she was at direct risk until 31 March 2025. I would not therefore have found that Section 8 factors ought to weigh against the Appellant on the evidence available at the time of the original decision.

35. The evolution in the Appellant’s evidence does, however, change that assessment. Since the refusal, she has suggested that she had previously been questioned by the police about her relationship with NL and (whilst internally inconsistent on timing) she also alleges having been assaulted by family members and having had her clothes torn, events which could have only taken place whilst she was in Uganda. It is also her aunt’s evidence that she had already been disowned by her family and clan some time ago. In those circumstances, I reject the suggestion that the Appellant would have only identified an inability to return to Uganda after arrival in the UK. I find therefore that on the basis of the totality of her account as it now stands, she did in engage in Section 8 behaviours.

36. I bear in mind that Section 8 does not dictate that relevant damage to credibility inevitably results and the weight to be attached to the behaviour is a matter for the Tribunal in the overall assessment of credibility on the particular facts (JT (Cameroon) [2008] EWCA Civ 878, [2009]. The delay is extremely modest, with the Appellant having claimed asylum within days of arrival and I accordingly find that only very limited weight can be given to that delay in making an asylum claim.

Documentary Evidence

37. I turn next to the documentary evidence provided by the Appellant, both during the course of the original application and this appeal. I acknowledge there can be no direct definitive documentary or photographic proof of sexuality in an asylum claim, but background documentary evidence can and should be taken into account in my overarching assessment.

38. In considering the documents, I have adopted the approach in Tanveer Ahmed v SSHD [2002] Imm AR 318. Documentary evidence along with its provenance needs to be weighed in the light of all the evidence in the case. Documentary evidence does not carry with it a presumption of authenticity. It is for the Appellant to show that they can be relied upon. What is required is its appraisal in the light of the evidence about its nature, provenance, timing and background evidence and in the light of all the other evidence in the case, especially that given by the Appellant.

39. The Appellant has provided a number of photographs, both before and after the RFRL, which I deal with briefly in turn:-

i) I give no real weight to the photograph that is said to show injuries to the Appellant’s daughter following bullying at school. There is no wider evidence before me to demonstrate that the person pictured is in fact the Appellant’s daughter, the date of the photograph or how facial injuries were sustained. Furthermore, there is no clear evidence of how this photograph was provided to Appellant (for example, an audit trail of messages).

iii) I similarly give no real weight to the photograph of the Appellant’s eye injury. The photograph is not dated and no meta data has been provided which may otherwise shed light on when it was taken. There is no clear explanation of how this photograph remained in the Appellant’s possession, particularly given the lack of wider corroborating evidence of claimed events in Uganda. The Appellant had originally stated she was hit in eye after NL’s public show of affection. I accept that the image appears to show the Appellant with a swollen left eye but the annotation on the photograph refers to “day I was bitten on a friend’s birthday”.

iv) I find that the probative value of the photographs of the Appellant at various LGBT+ events, such as London Pride and at events with Born this Way is limited. Whilst I accept that these show the Appellant’s attendance at the various events, there is no evidence before me to suggest that such attendance was restricted to homosexual people.

v) Similarly, I give little weight to the photographs that are stated to be of the Appellant and her partner (Pages 17-24). I acknowledge that the person in those photographs bears some resemblance to MN (who has provided a statement claiming to be the Appellant’s partner). The photographs are not commented upon or introduced in the Appellant’s witness statement. There is no clear definitive explanation of who the photographs show, the context in which they were taken or the dates of those photographs. The images are not, in my view, probative of sexuality in any event.

40. The Appellant has provided a chain of WhatsApp messages with a person who is said to be her ex-partner. The Appellant does not specifically comment on these messages in her witness statement. There is no clear explanation or account of her relationship with this person, when it took place or how they met. The messages are dated March 2026 and cover a 5 day period. In August 2026, the Appellant referred to having had a previous relationship in the UK which ended when the person found out she was claiming asylum. Whilst the messages contain references to matters such as “coming over” and buying chocolates, given the lack of contextual information, I do not consider the Appellant has demonstrated that they represent reliable evidence in relation to the disputed issues. I am able to give them only minimal weight.

41. The Appellant has provided various letters of support. I do not comment upon those pertaining purely to volunteering activities. I find as follows:-

i) The letter from the Volunteer Coordinator of Bristol Hospitality Network states the Appellant identifies as a lesbian. The wider letter, however, talks about volunteering work, but demonstrates no personal knowledge about sexuality. I find that such assertions as are in the letter are based on what the author was told by the Appellant.

ii) I have also considered the letter from Mr Daly of Bristol Pride Without Borders Group. I have noted the background to Mr Daly’s contact with the Appellant after another gay Ugandan asylum seeker, introduced her within weeks of the Appellant’s arrival in the UK. I find that Mr Daly’s account of the Appellant’s circumstances in Uganda is necessarily dependent upon what he had been told by the Appellant (with there being conflicting evidence before this Tribunal as to that account of which Mr Daly is unaware). I also bear in mind that Mr Daly’s contact with the Appellant was transient, given her subsequent relocation to Swansea. Whilst it is clear that Mr Daly spent some time with the Appellant and spoke to her, this was demonstrably over a short period rather than a concerted or consistent period of contact. I do not consider that the letter is of significant probative value and give only limited weight to the evidence.

iii) I make similar findings in relation to the letter from Born this Way. Whilst the letter cites that the Appellant had described persecution in Uganda for being a lesbian, there is no detail of what the author had been told about that persecution. Whilst the letter references attendance at various activities arranged by the group, I do not consider the letter to be strongly probative on the question of sexuality.

iv) The letter from LK refers to how good a friend the Appellant is and where they met, but does not offer any insight or comment on her sexuality.

v) A letter was provided from MN, who claims to be the Appellant’s current partner the day before the hearing, which refers to “sharing intimacy” as a couple. I give extremely limited weight to this evidence. There is no clear account of where and when the couple met or the progression of their relationship, beyond the bare assertion that they met on a dating site. I bear in mind that the letter was disclosed only the day before the hearing, with limited explanation for why that was – whilst I bear in mind the Appellant says her previous partner left her after she disclosed why she was claiming asylum, there is no clarity on when MN learnt of the reasons for the Appellant claiming asylum. I view the late provision of the evidence through the lens of Hoxha & Others (Tanveer Ahmed, fraudulent applications, procedure) [2026] 00378 (IAC). Still more fundamentally, the weight I am able to give to MN’s evidence is further impacted by the fact that she did not attend to give oral evidence and there was no opportunity for the Respondent to cross examine or otherwise test her evidence.

42. I have already explained that I consider that there are internal consistencies between the Appellant’s account and the contents of her aunt’s statutory declaration. These include the aunt’s suggestion that the Appellant identified as a lesbian from her teenage years, her family’s positive knowledge of her sexuality (as opposed to mere suspicion) and the Appellant’s expulsion from her family and clan. Applying the principles of Tanveer Ahmed, these inconsistencies impact my assessment of the reliability of the declaration. I further note that despite being dated November 2025, some months after the Appellant’s arrival in the UK, there is no specific reference to the claimed events involving NL, the discovery of the incriminating photographs or active police interest . I similarly give limited weight to the suggestion that the aunt has now effectively withdrawn her support – in circumstances when on the aunt’s own account, she was prepared to act against societal expectations and support the Appellant following her expulsion previously.

43. I have also considered the “Uganda Police Release on Bond” which purports to require the attendance of the Appellant’s husband at a police station, in relation to a charge of obstruction/aiding a suspect to escape. I bear in mind that the details for the husband match those contained on the Appellant’s original visa application. I have found above that it would be potentially externally consistent for the husband to come to the attention of the authorities for “covering” a wife who he knew to be lesbian. The Respondent has identified no particular features of concern on the face of the document, which has been stamped. In considering the provenance of the document, however, there is no clear audit trail of how this document came to be in the Appellant’s possession and disclosed only after the refusal (particularly given that the information from the husband is said to have been the catalyst for the asylum claim). The document does not name the Appellant or make any reference to her wider circumstances. Given my concerns as to the provenance of the document and taking account of the Appellant’s wider evidence, I find that only limited weight can be given to the document. The Appellant has not demonstrated that it is reliable evidence. I find that there is no clear or cogent explanation before me as to why the husband who was purportedly prepared to shield her for 15 years of marriage, who was purportedly prepared to send evidence of police interest to the Appellant, would no longer be prepared to assist the Appellant.

44. It will be apparent from the foregoing that I give only limited evidence to the documentary evidence provided. I consider the majority of the evidence is of limited probative value and some aspects actively contradict the Appellant’s own account of claimed events in Uganda.

Credibility Conclusion

45. I have reminded myself of the burden and standards of proof that apply to this appeal. I have considered the evidence in the round. I have accepted that the objective evidence and information in the CPIN and other background documents weighs in favour of the credibility of the Appellant’s account. I have found that the Respondent’s criticisms of the Appellant’s account of how she came to realise her sexuality and of her claimed relationship with NL, are too simplistic and that the Appellant’s evidence on these aspects does not detract from her account.

46. I have given such weight as I can to the Appellant’s vulnerability and mental health challenges, but the medical evidence before me is limited. There is no cogent basis upon which I can conclude that those challenges can account for what I consider to be the fundamental inconsistencies in the Appellant’s overarching account of events in Uganda, to include her family’s knowledge of her sexuality, of her relationship with NL and of the adverse attention she claims to have received whilst still in the country. These central inconsistencies include the fact that she claims she was physically assaulted by her family after NL’s photographs of them were discovered, despite claiming that she was in the UK at this time. I have also found that aspects of her account lack specificity.

47. I have found that only limited weight can be given to the documentary evidence relied upon. Much of the evidence that has been provided is of limited probative value in terms of the central question in this appeal – to include the attendance at various LGBT events and activities. There are inherent limitations in the provenance of some documents. I have found that the Appellant’s credibility is further undermined by the significant discrepancies in her own account, compared to that of her aunt.

48. I have also found that the Appellant’s account of her activities and relationships in the UK lacks specificity and detail. There are, in my view, real limitations in her account of her claimed relationships in the UK. In circumstances where the Appellant’s current purported partner provided a statement only the day before the hearing and did not attend to give oral evidence, I have found that the wider supporting written evidence does not overcome these shortcomings. I have also found that the Appellant has engaged in Section 8 factors, albeit this is matter to which I given only modest weight.

49. I remind myself that just because an Appellant may have been found to be dishonest about a single issue, does not mean that their whole account is untrue, but when viewing the evidence holistically in the round, I find that the Appellant’s claimed account of her sexuality is not credible, even to the lower standard. It follows therefore that I find that the balance of probabilities standard has also not been met. I am not satisfied that the Appellant is a lesbian (or indeed bisexual as she first described herself), or that she would be treated as such by potential persecutors in Uganda.

Protection Claim – Summary

50. As I have not found, on the balance of probabilities, that the Appellant has a characteristic which would cause her to fear persecution for a Convention reason, it follows that the asylum claim must be dismissed. Given my findings above as regards the credibility of the Appellant’s claim on the lower standard, the humanitarian protection claim is also dismissed. No standalone Article 8 claim has been pursued.

NOTICE OF DECISION

The appeal on asylum grounds is dismissed.

The appeal on humanitarian protection grounds is dismissed.

ANONYMITY DIRECTION

Unless and until the Tribunal, the Upper Tribunal, or, a Court orders otherwise, pursuant to rule 13(1)(b) of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Rules 2014, the Appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal either directly or indirectly any information, including their names or their addresses, that is likely to lead members of the public to identify them. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

TO THE RESPONDENT

FEE AWARD

I have dismissed the appeal and therefore there can be no fee award.

Signed Judge J Bowen Date 28 October 2026

First-tier Tribunal Judge Bowen

For advice on a matter of this kind in France, contact our immigration lawyer.


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