Civil United Kingdom
Uflex Europe Limited v Anup Sachdeva & Ors
Neutral Citation Number: [2026] EWHC 2770 (KB)
Case No: KB-2024-000899
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
KING'S BENCH DIVISION
Royal Courts of Justice
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL
Date: 28th October 2026
Before:
THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE KIMBLIN
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Between:
UFLEX EUROPE LIMITED
Claimant
– and –
(1) MR ANUP SACHDEVA
(2) ANUP SAKSHI SACHDEVA (HUF) T/A SS ENTERPRISES
(6) SKYHIGH MARKETING & BUSINESS SOLUTIONS LIMITED
(9) MS ABHA SRIVASTAVA
(11) MRS SAKSHI SACHDEVA T/A SAKSHI S CREATIONS
(13) SEASONS OF INDIA RESTAURANT AND VENTURES LIMITED
(14) GREENEDGE ECO SOLUTIONS PRIVATE LIMITED
Defendants
Adam Solomon KC and Stuart Sanders (instructed by Penningtons Manches Cooper LLP) for the Claimant
Simeon Thrower (Direct access)for the ninth, sixth and thirteenth Defendants
Trial dates: 29th June to 10th July 2026
Draft Circulated: 26th October 2026
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Judgment
MR JUSTICE KIMBLIN
CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION 4
The Core Claim and the Claimant 4
Sachdeva Defendants 4
Srivastava Defendants 5
Linc Defendants 5
The alleged transactions in overview 6
The proceedings 7
Mr Sachdeva’s Appearance 8
Trial materials 10
THE PARTIES’ PLEADED CASES 11
The Sachdeva Defendants 12
The Linc Defendants 13
Skyhigh 13
Green Edge 14
TRIAL 14
The model and reality 14
UEL’s Case 15
The witnesses 15
The unchallenged evidence 15
Mr Rakesh Malhotra 20
Mr Chaturvedi 21
Mrs Srivastava’s Case 23
Documents 26
Records and missing records 32
Unauthorised Payments to Mr Srivastava 36
LAW 37
FINDINGS 40
Fiduciary duty 40
Justification 43
Bribery 44
Unjust Enrichment 45
Dishonest Assistance and Conspiracy 45
Mrs Srivastava, Skyhigh, Seasons of India (D9, D6, D13) 45
Mrs Sachdeva (D11); 50
Green Edge (D14) 51
Other Claims 53
Unauthorised payments – Mr Srivastava 53
Latest & AAMC 54
AMOUNT 54
[a] The detail of the Claimant’s claim 55
[b] Proof of losses 56
[c] Liability of particular defendants 62
[d] Effect of Settlement Sums 63
[e] Limitation 63
INTEREST 66
CONCLUSION 68
INTRODUCTION
The Core Claim and the Claimant
1. Was there a conspiracy to defraud the Claimant of some £6.5M by unlawful means? If there was, did the remaining defendants who have not settled with the Claimant take part? Those are the central questions which the Court has to answer in this case.
2. Packaging materials are the Claimant’s (‘UEL’) stock in trade. The parent company, Uflex Limited (‘UL’), is a substantial business in India with markets abroad including in the UK. The operations in the UK required storage, facilities for its staff when in the UK and also people on the ground as a UK presence. These needs resulted in business relationships with individuals and with companies.
3. UEL’s claim against the defendants is an invoice fraud. UEL’s essential case is that the defendants either individually or together charged UEL very large sums between 2013 and 2023 for services which were never performed nor needed, including the provision of warehouse space, consultancy and management of a guest house for staff and guests.
Sachdeva Defendants
4. Mr Sachdeva (D1) was a director of UL Limited and of UEL (from 2008 to 2016). He was based in India. He was in charge of the exports of packaging. He resigned from UL Limited in 2023.
5. A Hindu Undivided Family (‘HUF’) is an unincorporated familial unit with a free-standing legal personality (D2). It is connected to and headed by Mr Sachdeva. Mrs Sachdeva is married to Mr Sachdeva (D11).
6. I gave permission for Greenedge Eco Solutions Private Limited (‘Greenedge’) to be added as a defendant (D14) in my order dated 10th June 2026. Mr Sachdeva is the Director of Greenedge.
7. I will, of course, consider the cases against each defendant on their own merits, but it is helpful at times to refer to D1, D2, D11 and D14 together as the ‘Sachdeva defendants’.
Srivastava Defendants
8. Mr Srivastava was a director of UEL from July 2009 until 12th June 2023. He was the third defendant (D3). At the pre-trial review, Mr Srivastava was represented by Mr Hornett and Mr Stratton of counsel. They provided a full and detailed skeleton argument. However, he settled with UEL just before trial, on 24th June 2026, without admission of liability and on the basis that it was a commercial settlement. The claim against him is stayed. The agreement was to pay £3.5m plus UEL’s costs on the standard basis.
9. Mrs Srivastava (D9) is married to Mr Srivastava. Mrs Srivastava took an active part in the trial, appearing by Mr Thrower of counsel. She was the only defendant who both did not settle and advanced a case which was supported by evidence.
10. Skyhigh Marketing & Business Solutions Limited is Mrs Srivastava’s company (D6; ‘Skyhigh’). The company was represented by Mr Thrower who provided a short skeleton argument. However, their defence was not actively pursued and no evidence was called on its behalf.
11. Seasons of India Restaurant and Ventures Limited was a restaurant (D13; ‘Seasons’). Its director was Mrs Srivastava. The company took no active part in the trial.
12. I also mention AA Marketing and Consultancy Limited (‘AAMC’). It is not a defendant, but it is now a dissolved company of which Mrs Srivastava was the sole director and shareholder. It is prominent in parts of the case.
Linc Defendants
13. Linc Warehouse Services Limited (‘LWS’ or ‘Linc’) was the seventh defendant. It, along with D4, D5, D8 and D10 were referred to in the pleadings as the ‘Linc defendants’. They comprise Linc and the directors and officers of Linc, Neutral Express Services (‘NES’), and the dissolved entity Stour Valley Storage Limited (‘SVS’). I approved a Tomlin order in respect of the Linc defendants, dated 24th March 2026, as a result of which the Linc defendants took no further part in the proceedings.
14. The Claimant appointed Mr Noble as its agent for the marketing and sale of its products in the UK. He was the twelfth defendant. He settled by agreement with UEL during March 2026. He made a witness statement dated 23rd April 2026 and was called by UEL to give evidence at the trial.
The alleged transactions in overview
15. UEL contends that fraudulent transactions were made via a combination of means and financial routes and all ultimately against UEL’s business in the UK. In overview, the transactions are said to arise in this way.
16. First, UEL’s business gave rise to a need for storage. Linc was the main supplier of warehousing to UEL. Through a succession of contracts between 2017 and 2022 with NES and with SVS, UEL paid a total of c.£3.4m to those companies. UEL says that those sums were fraudulently charged for services which were not provided, and also that sums charged by Linc for warehousing were dishonestly inflated above market rates to the extent of about £1.2m.
17. Second, payments were then made from the Linc entities to the Srivastava and Sachdeva defendants. These payments, described variously as secret commissions, bribes or kickbacks, were made via several of the defendants. The alleged payments are substantial: £806,850 in respect of Sachdeva defendants and £4,410,224.69 in respect of Srivastava defendants.
18. Third, Mr Srivastava dishonestly overpaid himself amounts from UEL by way of purported payments of salary and benefits, but which exceeded his contractual entitlement, including payment for expenses which it is inferred were not incurred, such as for mileage and travel expenses during Covid lockdowns, totalling c.£600,000 of unauthorised payments.
19. Fourth, between 2012 and 2018, regular monthly payments, totalling about £370,000 were made by UEL to Mrs Srivastava’s company, AAMC, for unspecified consultancy services. AAMC also received c£334,000 from Linc and NES for the benefit of Mr Srivastava as secret commissions.
20. Fifth, Mr Noble sent invoices for services under a consultancy or agency agreement for services which were never provided to UEL. As I shall come to, Mr Noble gave evidence at trial stating that significant sums were paid by UEL into his personal bank account for which he would generate a retrospective invoice as directed by UEL/Mr Sachdeva. He would withdraw cash from the bank and hand it to Mr Sachdeva and/or Mr Srivastava.
21. Sixth, payments of c.£40,000 were made by UEL to an accountancy firm, Latest Consultancy (UK) Ltd (‘Latest’), in respect of services which were not provided to UEL.
22. Seventh, I mention a part of the case which relates to warehousing. UEL paid for warehousing costs of a particular customer of UL’s, Kolak Snack Foods (‘Kolak’), in respect of whom no such warehousing costs should have been borne by UEL. This aspect of the claim has settled.
The proceedings
23. By a claim form issued on 8th April 2024, UEL claimed damages in excess of £6.5M, or alternatively an account of profits. Between 28th March 2024 and trial there were 20 orders which regulated the proceedings and the preparation for trial. I am grateful to Master Armstrong for his substantial contribution in that regard.
24. There is a worldwide freezing injunction in operation, made by Goose J and continued on the return date by Mr David Pittaway KC, sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge, on 12th April 2024.
25. On 1st August 2025, Master Armstrong ordered the Claimant to pay into Court an aggregate sum of circa £600k as security for the costs of D3, the Linc defendants and D12, and to pay their costs of the applications.
26. A costs budget was set on 15th October 2025.
27. On 24th March 2026 I made a Tomlin Order which stayed the proceedings between the Claimant and the Linc defendants, save for the purposes of enforcing the terms of a settlement agreement.
28. On 10th June 2026 I held a pre-trial review (‘PTR’) and ordered that:
a. The Claimant had permission to add Greenedge Eco Solutions (D14) to the Claim Form with consequential orders for amendment of the Particulars of Claim and for D1, D2 and D11 to file and serve amended Defences;
b. The Claimant had permission for seven of its witnesses to give evidence via video link subject to filing and serving evidence of the reasons for reliance on that permission, if it was to be relied upon;
c. A witness summons for Ashok Chaturvedi to produce certain electronic or hard copy documents;
d. Specific disclosure of documents by D3, D6, D9 and D13;
e. Specific disclosure of documents by the Claimant;
f. The costs of the PTR and applications be reserved.
Mr Sachdeva’s Appearance
29. Very shortly before the PTR, I received an application for Mr Sachdeva to be represented by lawyers in India, who proposed to appear on his behalf at the trial, via video link. On receipt of that application, I caused a link to be sent to Mr Sachdeva and such email addresses as appeared on the application so that he and, or, his advisors would be able to attend by video. That was shortly before the pre-trial review commenced. He did not appear. I refused the application and indicated that I would give my reasons in my judgment.
30. In a renewed application dated 19th June 2025 it was explained that the video link was not received by Mr Sachdeva until approximately one hour after the PTR had been called on. He struggled to follow the PTR proceedings.
31. Mr Sachdeva appeared by video at the trial. With notable courtesy, he renewed his application for Indian Counsel to represent him. I refused that application for the same reasons which I refused the application at the PTR. I indicated that he could appear in person and there was no bar on him receiving assistance in the presentation of his case from whatever source he chose. He confirmed that he did not wish to call any evidence and did not wish to give evidence himself. He was given the same opportunity to make submissions at the end of the trial as was given to other parties. In the event, he chose not to do so.
32. The right of audience before the High Court is a reserved legal activity to which s. 12 Legal Services Act 2007 (‘the 2007 Act’) applies: see s. 12(1)(a). It is an offence for a person to exercise a right of audience when not entitled to do so: s. 14(1). In the High Court, rights of audience are held by counsel and solicitors with higher courts advocacy qualifications.
33. Counsel are regulated by a licensing authority, an approved regulator under s. 18 of the 2007 Act, namely the Bar Standards Board (‘BSB’). The BSB may provide an authorisation to practise if its conditions are met, which include training, character and insurance requirements. The purposes of those requirements is to protect the litigant and to ensure standards of advocacy and professional ethics and delivery of justice in an adversarial process.
34. In his affidavit and application, Mr Sachdeva provided no evidence about the person or persons who would represent him. There is a stamp on pleadings which are signed by Mr Sachdeva which give the name of ‘Satya Dev (Advocate) and ‘Juris. Extd’. Whole India’ and a registration number. I understood that his counsel did not have an authorisation to practise in England and Wales and have seen no evidence to the contrary. For this main reason it was clear that it was neither lawful nor appropriate to grant the application.
35. My further reasons were as follows. Firstly, the application was made at the last moment, at the pre-trial review and without any substantial rationale or argument to deal with the hurdle of being represented by lawyers without rights of audience. The other parties had little to engage with. It was not the mere lateness which troubled me, but the overall position in the case. None of the Sachdeva defendants had provided disclosure. None of them had filed and served any witness statements. The application at the PTR was therefore to enable lawyers outside the jurisdiction, not authorised to appear in the High Court in England and Wales, to participate in a trial in which the structure of the litigation process had been ignored since filing a defence.
36. I would have preferred a situation in which the Sachdeva defendants had participated properly in the proceedings and did appear by counsel who had had an opportunity to prepare and conduct Mr Sachdeva’s defence. That is what should have happened. However, it is not unfair to refuse Mr Sachdeva’s application. To have allowed it would have caused severe disruption to the trial such that it was highly likely that it would have caused it to be adjourned. Such difficulty as presented itself to Mr Sachdeva in being without any evidence at trial in proceedings which commenced over two years earlier is a difficulty of his own making.
37. Secondly, the proposal was to appear by video. For the reasons which I explained in respect of the attendance of witnesses, I ruled that contested evidence would be given in person, in court. Similar points apply in respect of appearance by counsel. For a four-week trial with a disputed timetable for nine days of oral evidence, I took the view that I would be best assisted by the presence of parties and witnesses in court. I foresaw significant difficulties and potential unfairness in parties appearing before me on different footings. This was not a generalised view, but one which I formed having regard to the number of parties, witnesses, issues and consequences for all parties of succeeding or not succeeding.
38. During the course of the trial, even though it shortened by reason of Mr Srivastava’s settlement, nothing occurred which pointed to any different conclusion or approach.
Trial materials
39. The Claimant’s solicitors filed trial bundles in accordance with the detail of the PTR directions. The materials available to me were:
(i) Bundle A – Claim Form and Statements of Case (345 pages)
(ii) Bundle B – Trial Documents (155 pages)
(iii) Bundle C – Witness Statements and Affidavits (178 pages)
(iv) Bundle D – Orders and Applications (218 pages)
(v) Bundle E – Contemporaneous Documents (4,338 pages)
(vi) Bundle F – Financial Documentation (8,465 pages)
(vii) Bundle G – Publicly Available Information (672 pages)
(viii) Bundle H – Inter Partes Correspondence (338 pages)
(ix) Bundle I – Core Bundle (817 pages)
(x) Bundle J – Confidential Documents (226 pages)
(xi) Bundle K – Related Proceedings (55 pages)
(xii) Bundle L – Late Inserts (219 pages)
40. Mr Solomon KC and Mr Sanders provided a skeleton argument and closing submissions on behalf of the Claimant. Mr Hornett and Mr Stratton provided a skeleton argument and a supplementary skeleton argument on behalf of Mr Srivastava, but their case settled and so those arguments were not ventilated. Mr Thrower provided a skeleton argument and closing submissions on behalf of Mrs Srivastava and also appeared on behalf of Skyhigh and Seasons, but, as I have indicated, did not advance a positive case in the absence of evidence.
THE PARTIES’ PLEADED CASES
41. Of the fourteen defendants, seven settled in advance of trial. They were the Linc defendants who operated warehouses, Mr Noble who provided consultancy to UEL and Mr Srivastava. The Sachdeva defendants filed defences but no evidence. Mrs Srivastava filed a defence which was echoed by the companies of which she was a director.
42. Therefore, the pleaded defences are the only material before the court for:
a. Mr and Mrs Anup Sachdeva (D1, D2 and D11)
b. The former Linc defendants (D4, D5, D7, D8 and D10)
c. Skyhigh (D6)
d. Greenedge (D14)
43. In contrast, the case for the Claimant, Mr Srivastava and Mrs Srivastava have all moved on in the sense that they have filed evidence and skeleton arguments. Seasonscase is similar to that of Mrs Srivastava. I shall therefore summarise these four cases briefly now and then turn to the cases which I heard at trial.
The Sachdeva Defendants
44. Mr Sachdeva had no financial authority in respect of UEL, nor did he have day-to-day management control. That was with Mr Srivastava after April 2016 when Mr Chaturvedi ceased to be a Director. The UK business substantially improved when Mr Sachdeva was the head of packaging and exports.
45. There was no fraud and the dispatch reports show genuine use of warehouse facilities known as the Essex Warehouse and the Park Royal Warehouse. Mr Sachdeva was not informed about the results of the investigation in April 2023, despite his diligent service of the company for more than 25 years.
46. SSE provided marketing and consultancy services and the payments made were legitimate and for work actually done. Mr Noble was genuinely employed. The tenor of the SSE defence is captured by this denial:
“Paragraph 48 is denied. The contracts between the 2nd Defendant and SVS were independent of any contracts between the Claimant and SVS or any other entity. They governed an independent commercial relationship which was never in conflict with 1st Defendant’s roles and responsibilities as an employee of UL. In any case, and without prejudice to the above, Mr. Ashok Chaturvedi was always kept posted and informed by 1st Defendant about his personal initiatives and he had never objected to the same but was rather encouraging. As has been detailed in 1st Defendant’s defence, Mr. Ashok Chaturvedi and the 1st Defendant shared an exceedingly cordial relationship, and the 1st Defendant had informed Mr. Ashok Chaturvedi of his own entrepreneurial pursuits. The fact that ‘Uflex’ domain email ID was used by the 1st Defendant to communicate with the existing/prospective clients of his entrepreneurial venture, i.e. the 2nd Defendant, is by itself demonstrative of the fact that he had no mala fide intention of hiding these activities from anybody at UL, least of all Mr. Ashok Chaturvedi.”
47. Mrs Sakshi Sachdeva is an independent consultant and designer of jewellery. She denies any fraud or conspiracy. Monies received from Mr Noble related to attendance at a family wedding in India. In particular, her case is:
“Mrs. Sachdeva admits having received £10,000 on two occasions from Mr. Noble in the bank account of the 11th Defendant, i.e. total £20,000. Those payments were received on 01 December 2015 and 30 November 2015.
In December 2015, Mr. Noble along with a friend travelled to India to attend the wedding festivities of Mrs. Sachdeva and First Defendant's son, Mr. Uday Sachdeva. For this purpose, Mrs. Sachdeva and the First Defendant had made arrangements for Mr. Noble's stay at 'The Leela Ambience Gurugram Hotel Residences' from 04 December 2015 to 08 December 2015.
Their son's wedding was on 07 December 2015. After attending the wedding festivities, Mr. Noble and his friend travelled to Goa for leisure. Mr. Noble had sent the abovementioned payment to the Mrs. Sachdeva for making arrangements for his visit including reservations of the hotel as mentioned above, for buying dresses which were worn by himself and his friend and for buying certain jewellery. The balance amount had been returned back to him in cash which was utilised by him during his stay.
Separately, during his stay in India, Mr. Noble also developed some health issues requiring medical attention, for which Mrs. Sachdeva and the First Defendant made all arrangements, including paying for them in full.”
48. No alternative case is advanced by any of the Sachdeva defendants which contradicts the Claimant’s case on quantum/amount.
The Linc Defendants
49. On the alleged warehouse fraud, that is denied. The storage space genuinely existed and was reserved for UEL. In time, extra space was needed and justified by the changes brought about by Brexit. Therefore the agreements were real and the payments made were for fair amounts. Penny Curtis had only an administrative role and had no knowledge of the matters alleged.
Skyhigh
50. There was neither fraud nor conspiracy. The payments received were for genuine consultancy work. No alternative case is advanced which contradicts the Claimant’s case on quantum.
Greenedge
51. Greenedge’s defence objects to its late involvement in the case by reason of an application which was made at the PTR. It says that it is a distinct legal personality, not involved in either fraud or conspiracy.
TRIAL
The model and reality
52. The theory of civil litigation is a series of steps towards trial and judgment. The three essential steps towards a trial are stating a case, disclosing documents which support or undermine that case and providing factual and expert evidence with a statement that it is true. If a preparatory step has not been taken, such that available evidence is omitted from the trial process, the course of the trial changes accordingly. That is the very basic model and it applies to each party equally. A party may step off the road to trial if their dispute is resolved but otherwise the court resolves the issues on the evidence which the active parties present.
53. With those steps having been completed, the trial enables the factual cases to be explained, explored and tested by questions. As points in the case gain or lose strength during the trial, the cases refine and are summarised as they stand at the end of the trial, in the relevant legal framework as identified or argued by the advocates.
54. The reality of this case differs from the basic model because:
a. The Sachdeva defendants provided no disclosure. As will become clear below, some parts of relevant documents have been disclosed by the Linc defendants but their counterparts which were held by the Sachdeva defendants have not;
b. The Sachdeva defendants have not filed any witness statements. The only documents which they have filed which contain a statement of truth are defences, and in respect of D1 and D2 only, affidavits served in response to the freezing injunction;
c. Two of the main actors in the alleged wrongdoing have settled: Linc defendants and Mr Srivastava. Mr Srivastava filed and served a witness statement and detailed skeleton arguments, but settled with the Claimant by way of a Part 36 Offer, and so did not participate in the trial. Therefore, the Court has a full written picture of his case but it was never put to the Claimant’s witnesses nor argued. It is left hanging and incomplete;
d. Mrs Srivastava filed and served little or no evidence in support of her own witness statement and oral evidence. For example, she relied on the actions of her accountant, Mr Sanchetti, but there is no evidence from him. Her evidence is that Mr Srivastava made all of the running and she had little involvement, but Mr Srivastava was not called to give evidence to that effect nor to have the Claimant’s case put to him.
55. The result is therefore incomplete both as to documentary evidence in the trial and as to the witness evidence. I return to the significance, if any, of these features after analysing the evidence which the Court does have, and the findings which I have made.
UEL’s Case
The witnesses
56. Mr Thrower indicated that he wished to cross-examine Mr Ashok Chaturvedi who is UL’s Chairman and most senior executive, and Mr Rakesh Malhotra (Senior Vice President of Corporate Accounts). UEL called all of its other witnesses to confirm the truth of their witness statements, but no party sought to ask any questions of them.
The unchallenged evidence
57. Mr Rajiv Malhotra (to be distinguished from Mr Rakesh Malhotra, whose evidence was not agreed and to which I turn below), is the Assistant Vice President in the Commercial Team of UL. He has worked for UL since 2000, now primarily dealing with exports from India, including contact with Mr Srivastava in respect of UEL, but reporting to Mr Sachdeva at UL. Mr Sachdeva’s approval was necessary for all major decisions. Mr Srivastava was responsible for the supply chain once the material had been delivered to the UK. He arranged storage in the UK. This evidence is consistent with that of Katarzyna Stefanczak and Klaudia Sokolowska, UEL’s Supply Chain Executives.
58. Mr Rajiv Malhotra gives evidence to the effect that charges made by Linc were high. The rate of charges for broken or mixed pallets was higher than expected. When challenged after the UL investigation in 2023, Linc reduced its rates and more competitive alternatives were available and subsequently taken.
59. Mr Sheopuri is the Vice President of International Marketing at UL in India. Mr Sachdeva was the Head of Exports and Mr Sheopuri reported to him until 2023 when Mr Sachdeva left the company. Mr Sheopuri’s evidence questions Mr Srivastava’s actions in contracting with Linc. In his view, there was no real need for either the extent or the nature of the facility and services provided by Linc. There was much more storage space than would realistically be required. Services such as express dispatch and the checking of products were unnecessary and, in any event, Linc was not well equipped to undertake product checks.
60. Mr Bhushan is the Vice President of the Finance Division of UL in India. He raised queries about customer and financial data with both Mr Sachdeva and Mr Srivastava. He found that when he asked for information about stock or the payment of expenses without supporting receipts, Mr Srivastava was very reluctant to provide it. He would then speak to Mr Sachdeva who would often provide an excuse. In short, he found it difficult to obtain any information from either of them, whether separately or collectively. As an illustration, Mr Bhushan produced an email string from November 2021 until New Year’s Eve of that year in which he sought explanations for the years over which stock had been stored in large quantities. He received no adequate response.
61. In May 2023 Mr Bhushan was despatched to the UK to investigate the financial affairs of UEL. When he reviewed bank statements, he discovered payments to SVS and NES which were previously unknown entities to him. His questions of Mr Srivastava produced unsatisfactory explanations which comprised no more than that Mr Sachdeva had approved the expenses.
62. Mr Chandan Chattaraj is the Global Head of Human Resources at UL in India. Mr Chattaraj had a meeting with Mr Srivastava in February 2017 at which Mr Srivastava’s basic salary was increased from £4000 to £6000 per month. There was also a variable element which was performance-related. Mr Chattaraj made it very clear that this was the totality of the compensation, which was agreed, albeit that mileage rates were not discussed.
63. Mr Chattaraj gave a detailed and specific account of the finalisation of the agreement with Mr Srivastava which is consistent with the contemporary documents.
64. Mr Noble was the twelfth defendant until March 2026 when he reached a settlement with the Claimant. He retired in 2021. He had been employed or worked on a self-employed basis for UL or UEL or its predecessor companies since 2003. He was largely engaged in sales and marketing in the UK and Europe and reported to Mr Sachdeva.
65. Mr Noble describes the importance of the UEL contract with Kolak, the value of which increased to more than £10M per year. Between 2013 and 2016 £750k was paid by Kolak into Mr Noble’s bank account. How did this come about and what happened to the money? Mr Noble explains arrangements like this:
“From 2013, invoices would be raised by Uflex India to Kolak, with my UK bank account details contained on them for payment. Kolak made payment of these invoices directly to my bank account. I also produced some of these Invoices. At the time, I did not do internet or online banking. I would only find out about receipts from Kolak into my bank account at the end of each month when I received a bank statement from my bank.
Mr Sachdeva instructed me to raise invoices to Kolak, which I sent to Kolak via email to either Mr Lakhani or the accounts team at Kolak (I do not recall which email address it was sent to but I note that my interactions with Kolak were generally through Mr Lakhani). The reference contained within the invoice would be "Cylinders", as requested by Mr Sachdeva. I note that Kolak did not use a type of packaging that required cylinders (as cylinders are only required for gravure printing, whereas flexographic printing required a rubber plate to be made, which Kolak was using). Mr Sachdeva would then instruct Kolak to pay the funds to me directly. Payment would be made via electronic transfer from Kolak to my bank account. All instructions from Mr Sachdeva to me would be sent via text or phone call. I would never raise invoices to Kolak without being told to do so by Mr Sachdeva.
I was instructed by Mr Sachdeva to hold these monies in my bank account and he would later inform me what he wanted me to do with the money. I would receive confirmation prior to Mr Sachdeva visiting London as to how he wanted the funds split. He would instruct me to transfer monies from Kolak to himself and to others, or to withdraw cash and hand it over to him (or others as specified by him) during his visit. These Instructions would be given to me by Mr Sachdeva via text messages he sent to my mobile phone.”
66. The destinations of those funds included Mrs Sachdeva’s business (Sakshi, D11), the CEO of Kolak and a friend of Mr Sachdeva.
67. In addition, from early 2016, funds were received by Noble from UEL which monies he was instructed to pay out on his direction, either by text or phone. Those payments were made in cash, up to around £10K, when Mr Sachdeva was in the UK. The total payments out to Mr Sachdeva were over £700k by 2020. Mr Noble believed these payments to be authorised by Mr Srivastava.
68. The payments by Kolak and UEL, and the payments out, have been carefully set out in a spreadsheet by Mr Noble. It is detailed and frankly marked up. Where Mr Noble is unsure of a matter, he says so. I am able to put significant weight on this account.
69. Mr Noble commented on the Sachdeva and Srivastava defences. He did not accept that Mr Sachdeva had limited control of UEL or its finances. It was wrong for Mr Sachdeva to deny receipt of money from Mr Noble. It was also wrong of Mr Srivastava to say that he did not know about the ‘sham invoices’. He was copied into relevant emails and received large sums in cash from Mr Noble.
70. Mr Noble did not accept Mrs Sachdeva’s defence as set out at paragraph 47 above. He paid for himself to go to her son’s wedding. He is clear and definitive in his witness statement:
“I did attend the wedding of Mrs Sachdeva’s son but it is not correct to say that she paid for or supplied my outfit, clothing or jewellery. That is totally incorrect. Also, I did not visit Goa on that trip, so she cannot have paid for that, as she states. I did not receive any jewellery from her, nor did I receive any money from her.
I did fall ill on that trip and had medical attention. However, all my medical tests were done in Mumbai not Delhi and I paid for these myself. No money for or on my behalf was paid by Mrs Sachdeva, so there was nothing to reimburse.”
71. Was there anything in this for Mr Noble? He says:
“Mr Sachdeva did tell me that if there was any money left over from the payments into my account after the transfers or cash withdrawals, I should retain them as being towards the monies which I consider were owed to me by Uflex India for unpaid commission. The leftover sums in a transfer might equate to approximately £1,000, although such surplus was not available for each and every transfer.”
72. But, he did not profit from receiving monies from UEL, as the beginning and ending balances of his bank account show.
73. Mr Pillai is the President of the Packaging Division of UL. He is a long-term employee of UL. In respect of Mr Noble, he states that he received information by text and at a meeting during August-September 2023 outlining Mr Sachdeva’s instructions to him and the payments which had been made. During the investigation which UL staff, including Mr Pillai, undertook during 2023 no incentive or remuneration for Mr Noble’s involvement in those payments was identified.
74. Mr Sachdeva was the business head. Mr Srivastava reported to Mr Sachdeva. Mr Srivastava was responsible for the administrative and financial performance of UEL. He, with Mr Sachdeva, was not subject to any formal approvals process. They made the decisions in respect of the business, which always performed badly, until they left their employment. UEL now performs well.
Mr Rakesh Malhotra
75. Mr Rakesh Malhotra qualified as a chartered accountant in 1995 and was in practice until 2008 when he joined UL in India. He looks after the books.
76. Mr Srivastava and Mr Malhotra were in their respective posts at the same time, from Mr Srivastava’s appointment in 2009. They met several times on visits to both India and to the UK. Mr Malhotra’s experience was:
“Whilst Mr Srivastava was happy to make polite conversation, he was reluctant to provide information relating to the Claimant when asked. There were many occasions during the consolidation process where we had to proceed without his input – eventually, we would obtain the information from him but he was slow to provide this.
For the period in which Mr Srivastava was the manager of the Claimant, the company continually made losses – the amount would vary but it could range from £100,000 to millions of pounds. When questions were asked of Mr Srivastava as to why the Claimant had continued incurring losses, he would blame factors other than his mismanagement of the company, such as transfer pricing (a method used to set prices for the goods exchanged between entities within the same company group, which treats these internal transactions as if they had occurred between independent parties, ensuring tax compliance in the relevant jurisdictions). At the time that questions were asked of Mr Srivastava, this seemed to be a valid explanation. We presumed that the only way to make profit in UEL is to provide more margins to UEL to cover their costs but, with the benefit of hindsight, I realise that the most likely reason for the Claimant's losses was the fraud that was ongoing. I did not have the benefit of this information at the relevant time.”
77. The authorisation of expenditure by UEL was through Mr Srivastava for day-to-day expenses. Mr Sachdeva’s approval was needed to enter a contract for warehousing.
78. Mr Malhotra conducted an investigation of UEL’s financial performance during the spring of 2023. The investigation included a visit to Linc premises. Linc staff confirmed that all of UEL materials which were received were stored at Linc premises and none were sent on to NES for storage. In other words, no storage was provided by Neutral. Mr Srivastava’s desktop computer contained no files or folders. When control was taken of Mr Srivastava’s email account, files were recovered which were not present on his desktop.
79. When Mr Malhotra had concerns about the costs associated with Bilton Towers Guest House (‘Bilton Towers’), he went to the Chairman, Mr Chaturvedi. Mr Chaturvedi intervened and required his approval to be sought for such costs.
80. Mr Malhotra gave cautious answers in cross-examination. When Mr Thrower asked about the concern which must have been raised when a small component of UL was losing significant sums of money, he characterised himself as responsible for accounting numbers and little more. The consequences of the audit results were for others. As an accountant, the provision of a support letter had little consequence, notwithstanding that the Claimant now alleges very significant fraud within UEL. It was not his duty to find out why the company always lost money; that was Anup Sachdeva’s responsibility. It was not his job to ask questions. In any event, said Mr Malhotra, UL is big and can sustain losses of millions of pounds per year.
81. He was asked about the costs and expenses associated with Bilton Towers. In 2022 Mr Malhotra noticed an increase in expenditure from an earlier rate of about £30k per quarter to about £100k per quarter. He asked Mr Srivastava about that and for the supporting documents, which were promised but never provided. But Mr Malhotra still settled all of the expenses in the sum sought and did not refuse any with the sole exception of the cost of tickets for a cricket match in the sum of £30,800. He knew nothing about the purchase of a Bentley for £250k.
Mr Chaturvedi
82. The material points from Mr Chaturvedi’s witness statement include that he founded Flex Industries in 1985, which became UL. The company is now large with 18 subsidiaries in India and overseas. The managers and CEOs of those companies are entrusted to make decisions in the best interests of those companies. He is not involved in their day to day running. He is not involved in financial scrutiny.
83. On his relationship with Mr Sachdeva, it had been a long professional relationship but he knew nothing of his other companies nor those of Mrs Sachdeva.
84. Mr Chaturvedi recalled little of the appointment of Mr Srivastava, nor the variation of his contract and conditions during 2017. Neither he nor his wife was expected to look after Mr Chaturvedi’s family or guests when the UK. He has no recollection of any meeting at which he agreed to pay Mrs Srivastava nor her companies for her assistance with the company’s properties in London. When problems were flagged to Mr Chaturvedi, he decided to go to London with Mr Malhotra and Mr Pillai and he met with Mr Srivastava on 22nd May 2023. He put the point frankly to Mr Srivastava, namely that he was stealing from the company.
85. On a similar theme, Mr Chaturvedi knew very little about Mr Noble.
86. Mr Chaturvedi was cross-examined by Mr Thrower. The first point was to contrast his evidence with that of Mr Malhotra who was clear that Mr Chaturvedi was ‘hands on’ and whose authorisation was needed by Mr Malhotra before payments could be made to Mr Srivastava. Were the Bilton Towers monthly accounts sent to India for approval? No, ‘It was never coming to me.’ I did not find his answers to be convincing.
87. On Mr Srivastava’s salary and terms, Mr Chaturvedi accepted that he had written a note, by hand, which set out the broad terms of Mr Srivastava’s employment. His further explanation of the origin and purpose of the document was difficult to follow, both during the hearing and subsequently when trying to decipher the transcript. Mr Chaturvedi became noticeably less coherent in his answers to questions at this point.
88. The core of Mrs Srivastava’s case is that she was properly engaged in work for the benefit of UEL and those staying at Bilton Towers. This was put to Mr Chaturvedi who disputed it to the extent that she had never been seen at Bilton Towers by any guest. He was emphatic: “The crux of the point [is] was she doing any service of doing any duty of giving any work for Bilton Towers? The answer is no.” Later, he said: “ She never worked for Bilton Towers at all.”
89. There was a late attempt by Mr Thrower to rely on the evidence of a Mr Patel. The thrust of that evidence was that Mrs Srivastava showed him how to look after Bilton Towers and that she was seen by him visiting Bilton Towers. I deal below with the weight which can be given to that evidence, but it was put to Mr Chaturvedi that young men who were studying in the UK were helping out at Bilton House. This was accepted.
Mrs Srivastava’s Case
90. Mrs Srivastava’s witness statement explains that after her husband joined the company in 2009, she started to help manage Bilton Towers. She went to shops to collect competitor products. She checked that the property was in order. She made sure the staff were properly trained. She shopped for Mr Chaturvedi’s family.
91. Mrs Srivastava was asked about: (i) her work for UEL; (ii) her knowledge and understanding of the alleged fraud and the position which she and her family had taken on it; (iii) the evidence of her involvement in companies which had benefited from payments from UEL.
92. She was steadfast in her evidence that she had worked to facilitate the accommodation and service to guests at Bilton Towers. It was the core of her positive evidence. It was true that there was an absence of documentary support in the form of a contract or agreement, timesheets or invoices. But the arrangement was informal and she was clear that she had a role in managing guest accommodation; arranging shopping; organising supplies; helping guests; arranging appointments; assisting UL-related visitors and executives, and undertaking various administrative and hospitality functions.
93. The arrangement was entirely through her husband – ‘Everything through Pradeep.’ She agreed that Mr Chaturvedi had not asked her to do any work and they had not discussed it, though they had met.
94. The June 2023, Mr and Mrs Srivastava’s family home was transferred into Mrs Srivastava’s sole name for no consideration. This occurred after investigations had commenced. She denied that this was intended to shield assets from creditors and enforcement. The possibility of transferring the property at Downing Drive had been discussed within the family for years and was motivated by family concerns, including her security and her husband’s health. The property was gifted and no payment was made.
95. Again, there was a lack of documents in support. There was no correspondence from solicitors, and no disclosure of any contemporary notes or family records. Again, the response was one of informal agreement.
96. Skyhigh is the sixth defendant. Mrs Srivastava is shown on documents from Companies House to be a person with significant control. She denied this in cross-examination, then said that she was confused, and then accepted the position. There were multiple contradictions as between her affidavits in respect of the freezing order, her pleadings and her oral evidence. Her response was frequently to refer to her husband and her accountant at a firm called Latest as those who were making the decisions. When the transfers of shares and ownership which had taken place were put to her, she said that they dealt with these matters and she knew little about it. She was not involved ‘too much’. They were ‘doing all the work.’
97. NES and SVS were said to be sham structures which were used to move funds. But Mrs Srivastava came to the same position as in respect of Skyhigh: she was not involved and denied knowledge.
98. AAMC is a consultancy company. Mrs Srivastava is the sole director and the person with significant control. She opened the relevant bank account. The Claimant’s pleaded case is that she used the company to receive secret commissions. From her witness statement, her evidence about Kaliste Ltd (‘Kaliste’) and AAMC is:
“It was around 2011 Uflex decided I should be paid as a consultant for my hard work and responsibilities. I believe that was after a meeting between Pradeep, Mr Sachdeva and Mr Chaturvedi and reflected their happiness with the services I was providing and the fact that the use of the flat was increasing.
I believe the details were mainly discussed between Pradeep and Anup Sachdeva and it was agreed that I would render monthly invoices based on the hours I worked plus expenses. I left it to Pradeep to agree the rates of pay with Uflex Limited/Uflex Europe Limited and any increases were I believe because of the hard work I put in and praise from guests.
Initially I was paid through Kaliste, a company set up for me by Uflex auditors Parker and Lloyd. Later AAMC was formed on 3 September 2012 and payments then went to AAMC. An accountant Mr Mayur Sancheti (Latest Consultancy) raised monthly invoices for my work and the invoices were paid through Uflex. Examples Exhibit 7. I believe that the holding company was fully appraised of the arrangement and payments particularly the Chairman Mr Chatuverdi who had proposed the arrangement and helped getting Calista set up.
It was around the end of 2017 that Pradeep informed me that Mr Ashok Chaturvedi had met with him in the Uflex London office and had decided to discontinue my services to Uflex from March 2018.
As far as Seasons of India is concerned I know of no circumstances where the Claimant made unjustified payments to or for Seasons in particular with respect to accountancy services provided Latest Consultancy [sic]. Work done by Latest for Seasons was paid for by Seasons. As set out in my amended Defence Mr Mayur Sanchetti, the founder and Director of Latest has confirmed to the Claimant that all payments by the Claimant to Latest were for work carried out for the Claimant. This also deals with the claim against Skyhigh Marketing.”
99. As a matter of fact, there is no properly pleaded nor evidenced response to the Claimant’s claim in this regard. Her witness statement does not grapple nor touch upon the quantum of payments of AAMC, nor Kaliste despite them being her companies. The pleaded receipts of AAMC total £64,100. The pleaded receipts for Kaliste total £347,744. When this was put to Mrs Srivastava as a complete failure to produce any document in support of a defence the answer was to rely upon the involvement of her husband and her accountant at Latest, Mr Sancheti.
100. Mr Srivastava has settled his claim with the Claimant for a sum of circa £3.5M plus costs. Mrs Srivastava’s evidence was that she was unaware of this. She had no idea about the claim against her husband. She only knows about herself.
Documents
101. The warehousing fraud claim involves Mr Sachdeva, Mr Srivastava and the Linc defendants. The allegation is that these defendants conspired to set up a scheme via which the Claimant would contract with and pay Linc for services that were not needed and were not provided. In return, payments were made to Mr Sachdeva and Mr Srivastava and companies connected to them.
102. Mr Srivastava filed a skeleton argument on 22nd June 2026, a week before trial. It extends to 253 paragraphs plus a detailed table which shows the matrix of claims. Having settled, the contents of that skeleton argument were never canvassed. However, there are some features which should be noted.
103. First, it is common ground that the contracts for warehouse storage at NES and SVS were entered into as alleged. It is further accepted that no goods were ever stored.
104. Second, the skeleton argument realises that the court will no doubt ask why these contracts were needed if no products were being stored. The answer, from Mr Srivastava is that he was simply doing as he was told by Mr Sachdeva and it was not for him to question those instructions. But there were good commercial reasons in terms of new contracts which were sought and Brexit uncertainties.
105. Third, it is agreed that large majority of NES’ and SVS’ turnover comprised the payments made by the Claimant for the storage, which was never used. The Heads of Agreement between Uflex Limited and SVS of 1st September 2017 was a simple agreement for SVS to hold 2500 pallet spaces for £15,000 per month. Mr Srivastava signed the agreement. It, like other such agreements, is apparently a heads of terms for a future contract but as a matter of construction is a contract and I find that each of them was acted upon as such.
106. Mr Srivastava also signed the Heads of Agreement with NES, dated 1st April 2019. That is for 2000 pallet spaces and for monthly payment for which the price is not fixed.
107. These contracts are then followed by two contracts dated 1st October 2020; one with SVS and one with NES. Each is for 1500 pallets and each is at an agreed rate of £20,000 per month. Mr Sachdeva was asked by Mr Srivastava to sign and return these contracts. Mr Sachdeva did so by a one-word email dated 26th November 2020: “Approved”.
108. In just the same style and format as the other agreements to which I have referred, there was an agreement between SVS and SS Enterprises, of Gurgaon, India, a city to the southwest of New Delhi. This is Mr Sachdeva’s address for service, as set out in the Particulars of Claim. This agreement is also dated 1st October 2020. It is for the provision of “national and international Consultancy work, business development and any other mutually agreed service.”. The remuneration was agreed to be the payment of invoices to the value of £15,000 on a monthly basis. It was signed by Mrs Sachdeva.
109. SS Enterprises (‘SSE’), is admitted by Mr Sachdeva to be an unincorporated entity owned by the Hindu Undivided Family (‘HUF’) which has a separate legal personality from its constituent natural persons. The second defendant has a bank account in its own name.
110. These three October 2020 contracts were known of and agreed by Mr Srivastava because he signed them. He received them at an email address which was known to Mr Curtis, formerly the D4, as “Pradeep-A. Consultancy”. Mr Srivastava forwarded those emails to himself using his Uflex email address (timed at 11:20 and 12:03:49 for the revised version, respectively). It was in that way that the Claimant obtained possession of the email, because it was then on their email server.
111. The result is evidence that Mr Curtis, Mr Srivastava and Mr Sachdeva each knew of these contractual arrangements. They all saw the contracts and they all expressly agreed and approved them.
112. There were further rounds of agreement on 1st December 2021 and 1st October 2022 by which time the contracts were worth £38,500 per month in favour of NES. As in previous years, Mr Sachdeva gave approval to the agreement. The 2022 agreement was justified by reference to Brexit and a need for more storage in separate warehouses. The email exchanges do not grapple with the fact that large monthly payments were already being made for apparent warehouse space which was neither needed nor used.
113. SSE sent invoices regularly to SVS and to NES. Over the relevant period, the amounts were typically in the bracket £3000 to £20,000, and at least monthly. The payments from UEL to SVS did not go unnoticed. Mr Rakesh Malhotra asked questions of Mr Srivastava to which he replied:
“Stour Valley: Fixed monthly cost for the goods stored for the UK customers.
Linc: Goods stored for the European customers, mainly Netsle. [sic]”
114. It is now accepted and common ground that no goods were stored for any customer.
115. The pleaded position of the Linc defendants was that they never met or had any dealings with Mr Sachdeva. Given the email exchange of contracts for consultancy to be provided by Mr Sachdeva’s HUF, to which Mr Curtis was a party, this pleaded position would have come under some pressure if it had been pursued to trial.
116. The contracts for the provision of pallet storage by SVS and NES were prepared and entered into in pursuit of a fraud against the Claimant. The contract with Mr Sachdeva, trading as his HUF called SSE was also fraudulent. The payments made under those contracts were fraudulent. I find that:
a. Each of the contracts which I describe in paragraphs 105 to 108 is in the same drafting style and format. They are a proforma which has been adapted by the same or overlapping parties;
b. The storage provision is not justified on the face of the contracts, is conceded as not being used and was superfluous;
c. The uncontested evidence of the Claimant’s witnesses is that the storage space was neither needed nor authorised;
d. The provision of consultancy services by Mr Sachdeva’s HUF is in respect of vague and broad terms which encompass almost any sort of consultancy, undertaken anywhere for any purpose;
e. Their payment for such consultancy is for a notable sum of £15,000 per month;
f. These circumstances are such that a convincing answer is called for to explain the bare arrangements to pay notable monthly sums for no apparent service or facility. No such convincing answer has been provided;
g. The Claimant paid SVS for a facility which it neither needed nor used and then SVS paid Mr Sachdeva for consultancy which was neither needed nor provided;
h. Mrs Sachdeva’s signature on the consultancy agreement implicates her in the fraud;
i. No evidence or submissions have been made to counter the Claimant’s case as to the fraudulent payments which it was caused to make to SVS and NES, nor the onward destination of funds to Mr Sachdeva.
117. Both Mr Srivastava and the Linc defendants have now settled with the Claimant.
118. The total payments made under these contracts from 2017 to 2023 was about £3.4M and that is the quantum of the alleged fraud in respect of the NES and SVS payments. It is helpful at this stage to turn to the Claimant’s pleaded case on the quantum of the fraud, by reference to the origins and destinations of funds.
119. The Particulars of Claim, as amended pursuant to my Order of 10th June 2026 sets out the quantum of the Srivastava secret commissions as follows:
62A. Disclosure from these proceedings has revealed that over the period January 2013 to April 2023, LWS, NES and SVS made payments totalling £4,812,295.33 to companies connected to Mr Srivastava (“the Srivastava Secret Commissions”). Full particulars of those payments are set out at Schedule 1 to these Re-Amended Particulars of Claim, however in summary:
(a) LWS paid a total of £2,470,466.88 to companies connected to Mr Srivastava, being:
(i) £1,217,579.72 to AA Restaurant and Business Ventures Ltd (formerly known as Reliable Warehousing and Business Solutions) (“AARB”);
(ii) £64,100 to AAMC;
(iii) £347,744 to Kaliste;
(iv) £31,200 to Networker UK Limited (“Networker”);
(v) £216,650.40 to Seasons;
(vi) £593,192.76 to Skyhigh
(b) NES paid a total of £1,255,059.25 to companies connected to Mr Srivastava, being:
(i) £264,000 to AARB;
(ii) £270,229.25 to AAMC;
(iii) £14,400 to Kaliste;
(iv) £18,000 to Seasons;
(v) £688,430 to Skyhigh.
(c) SVS paid a total of £1,086,769.20 to companies connected to Mr Srivastava, being:
(i) £646,260.00 to AARB;
(ii) £225,409.20 to Kaliste;
(iii) £21,600 to Networker;
(iv) £120,000 to Seasons;
(v) £48,000 to Skyhigh;
(vi) £25,500 to Eljay Engineering India PVT Ltd (“Eljay”)
120. As I shall come to, there was an application for a late amendment to some of those amounts, but the Claimant’s case on these companies is unchanged in that:
a. AA Restaurant and Business Ventures Ltd (‘AARB’) (formerly known as Reliable Warehousing and Business Solutions) is a company which was dissolved on 14th May 2024. Mr Srivastava was its sole director for substantially the entirety of its existence, with Mrs Srivastava also being appointed as a director for a single day. Further, from incorporation the company was wholly owned by Mr Srivastava until the entire shareholding of the company was transferred to Mr Srivastava’s son on 28th March 2019, who remained the sole shareholder until dissolution;
b. AAMC is a company which was dissolved on 25th September 2018. Mrs Srivastava was the sole director and shareholder throughout its existence;
c. Kaliste is a company which was dissolved on 29th December 2020. Mrs Srivastava was a director for substantially the entirety of Kaliste’s existence, and Mr Srivastava a director between 27th July 2011 and 12th July 2017 (other than for a period of less than a month upon incorporation, there were no other directors). Mr Srivastava was the sole shareholder from 27th July 2011 until July 2017 and Mrs Srivastava was the sole shareholder thereafter;
d. Networker is a company of which Mrs Srivastava was director from 31st March 2006 to 6th March 2024, and Mrs Srivasatava’s sister, Ms Jyoti Asthana, is currently a director. Ms Asthana is the majority shareholder of Networker. Mrs Srivastava’s responsibility for Skyhigh was the subject of confused answers in her cross-examination: see paragraph 96 above;
e. Eljay is a company incorporated under the laws of India. Ms Asthana is a director and majority shareholder of Eljay.
121. As I shall come to in respect of an amendment to the schedule to the particulars of claim, the revised total on this aspect of the claim is £4,907,345.41.
122. There are then the payments to Latest, accountants, for VAT consultancy. The Claimant’s case is that between June 2010 and March 2023, Mr Srivastava procured UEL to pay £68,764.80 to Latest.
123. I turn now to the entities connected to Mr Sachdeva. The secret commissions before amendment comprises the payments made by NES and SVS of circa £807k, being:
a. Payments made by NES of £363,500 to SSE (D2) and £202,500 to Greendedge (D14);
b. Payments made by SVS of £241,850 to SSE.
124. As I shall come to in respect of an amendment to the schedule to the particulars of claim, the revised total is £974,490. Taking the case on the Srivastava and Sachdeva secret commissions together, as amended, yields a total of circa £5.9M. That suffices to describe the transactions which are said to be fraudulent. I now review some of the surrounding material, including a review of documents which I would expect to see, but have not.
Records and missing records
125. There are eight documents amongst the many thousands which particularly strike me either individually or when considered together.
126. First, the early relationship between Linc and Mr Srivastava, in 2013, included the provision of personal email addresses. Mr Curtis had two personal email addresses for Mr Srivastava and advised Mr Goodman that it was probably best to use his BT internet account. It is not clear from the documents why these exchanges were taking place other than through Uflex email accounts. However, I do note Mr Srivastava’s Defence to the effect that use of personal email addresses was not unusual because of problems within UEL which meant that their email addresses often did not work. The problem with that is that amongst the emails produced within a bundle of 4000 pages of contemporaneous documents, one finds that Uflex employees do indeed use a company rather than personal email address. So much is also supported by the unchallenged evidence of Katarzyna Stefanczak and Klaudia Sokolowska, UEL’s Supply Chain Executives, who did not recall any material problems with the Claimant’s IT systems and were not aware of any employee using their personal email address.
127. Second, Martin Goodman (D5) wrote to Paul Curtis (the D4); each being one of the Linc defendants) on 16th June 2017 to show him an email string. The email string of interest is between Mr Mayur Sancheti of Latest, Mr Goodman and Mr Srivastava. Both Mr and Mrs Srivastava have referred to Mr Sancheti in the context of their businesses for whom he provided accountancy services. He asks Mr Goodman to raise invoices in favour of Kaliste of £6500 per quarter and AAMC of £11500 per month. There are two points which are instructive. The first is that Mr Goodman explained that the invoices related to international freight and so VAT was not chargeable. There is no evidence that either of these companies were involved in international freight, the failure to pay VAT is not explicable. The second is that Mr Goodman makes this observation to Mr Curtis: “Looking at the below it is clear he is getting bungs from elsewhere also or was”. Mr Goodman was of the view that the payments were, or included, secret payments; bungs.
128. Third, in an email exchange on 12th June 2018 between Mr Srivastava and Linc, he instructs Linc as follows:
“Please discard us invoices and pay 18k to networker Uk.
Kaliste shall raise invoice for 12K today Regards”.
129. Mr Srivastava is directing Linc on invoicing. Without an explanation, that appears to be unusual and the wrong way around. The entity providing the service usually decides what to invoice, based on what it has done or provided. A contemporaneous internal Linc email chain raises the second obvious point about this instruction as to “Networker” which was a new entity Mr Srivastava had not used before:
These internal communications do reveal “This is a new company, wonder where he got this one from?”
“Not sure I want to know fortunately it is not up to us to check ha ha”
“see no evil…”
130. The Linc defendants do not show any genuine surprise at being asked to pay an entirely new company for services which are not described. Rather, they recognise and collaborate in Mr Srivastava’s modus operandi. That mode of operation is further explained in an internal Linc email which sets out the mechanics and quantum of the arrangement so far as NES was concerned:
“NES will invoice Uflex on the 1st of each month a fixed warehouse cost of £26,667.00.
NES will accrue and pay against an invoice a monthly sales commission to one of the above companies of £12,000.00
NES will accrue an additional amount of £2,000.00 for the first three months which will eventually be paid to Pradeep against an invoice as his commission. This figure may change in either direction depending on how the volume of business settles in the first three months.
NES will charge £150.00 per month as a service fee.
After all of the above there is a balance left of £12,517.00 each month. LWS will raise an invoice on NES on the 1st of each month, starting 1st May for this amount.”
131. In short, UEL pays £26k, Mr Srivastava’s company takes £12k plus ‘commission’ and Linc takes the balance.
132. The mode of operation is one of control of the flow of funds amongst the entities involved and without reference to the value of anything done or provided, such as an email which he sent on 3rd January 2020 to Linc which approves what Linc has done in one respect but instructs a switch of invoicing in another, all without any accompanying rationale:
“1. Stour invoice is okay.
2. Please cancel Neutral Express invoice for £30k, but raise £30 K invoice from Linc to uflex for £30k plus vat.”
133. Fourth, in October 2020, there was correspondence between Linc and Mr Srivastava as to the price to include in the NES agreement. The agreed price increase for NES was to £30k per month and SVS to £22k per month on the basis of growing administrative services and C’s apparent requirement for further warehouse space. Internally, Linc was concerned that such higher charges might attract attention and that new payment arrangements might avoid that:
"I think we may perhaps consider an additional service company with another bank just in case there is a spook".
134. Fifth, Mrs Srivastava owned and controlled Seasons Restaurant. On 5th July 2021, Mr Srivastava emailed an invoice from Seasons to Linc for £99,600 including VAT. This prompted WhatsApp messages between Linc defendants:
“Does it matter that a restaurant company is billing us commission?”
…
“I'm gonna tell Pradeep in the morning that the invoice has to come from sky high or reliable. Don't think we can pay a restaurant company! [laughing with tears emoji]”.
135. Sixth, the Linc defendants showed that they could see the limits on the means via which funds could be moved between the actors in the scheme, without it being completely obvious and to beg questions. A month later, in an internal Linc email dated 4th August 2021, the reality of the transactions was revealed in respect of NES invoices:
“Pradeep has asked me to change the NES address on the attached invoice as he doesn’t want it to match the same address as anything to do with Linc (Anup in India is trying to get greedy).”
136. Two points emerge here. Mr Srivastava is manipulating the invoicing to avoid enquiry. Mr Sachdeva is identified as greedy and so is understood and known to profiting personally.
137. Seventh, by 4th March 2022, there is evidence that the Linc defendants knew that the scheme had been pushed to the point at which it would be uncovered. Mr Curtis sent a WhatsApp message:
“Hi Pradeep,
I will do it this one time. Please make sure Anup understands that we cannot continue. I have given Martin my word that I would only stick to the agreed amounts this year as he is under a great deal of pressure from the authorities to explain why the commission/ consultancy is so very high in last years accounts. Now I am out in a position that I have to break my word to Martin which I did not want to do and also risk big problems.”
138. The scheme could not continue. The amounts billed without explanation were so very high in the accounts. As these proceedings show, it did result in big problems. So, eighth, on 9th May 2023 the Claimant’s team visited the Linc warehouse, which prompted this WhatsApp exchange which speaks of concealment:
“Text me they are right near me”
“Just say ‘I’m sorry I have no idea about NES’”
“They have stoped [sic] asking anything about nes now stour was never mentioned”.
139. I repeat my observations on the gaps in the evidence at paragraph 54 above. The absence of evidence from key actors in the case and the disclosure failures are features of the case which are nevertheless relevant. I will turn to the proper inferences which may be drawn, and whether it is necessary to rely on them, after summarising the relevant law for each of the relevant legal bases on which the Claimant advances its case.
Unauthorised Payments to Mr Srivastava
140. Through a variation in his employment contract in 2017, Mr Srivastava’s salary and remuneration was varied such that his “consolidated compensation per month will be £6000/- (British Pound Six Thousand only) all inclusive. You will be responsible for all the taxation on this compensation as per the UK prevailing laws.” Those terms superseded his previous terms and conditions. He was also potentially eligible for a variable bonus of £4,000 to £6,000, if approved by the Chairman based on performance. But none was approved.
141. Despite this, Mr Srivastava effectively paid himself significant sums in addition to his salary, namely:
a. Pension of £281,495.46;
b. Insurance of £171,585.18;
c. Sundry other payments of £168,592.07.
142. These matters did not figure in the trial because they were not in issue: Mr Srivastava has settled, albeit without admitting liability. The fact of these payments is however evidence in the trial and that evidence contributes to the facts and circumstances from which I may make findings and may contribute the relevant parts of the analysis.
LAW
143. There were no issues of law between the Claimant and Mrs Srivastava. No issues of legal principle arose from the pleadings. I received considerable assistance from Mr Sanders, junior counsel for the Claimant, on the legal basis for the claims. The claims are based in:
a. Breach of fiduciary duty and dishonest assistance with those breaches;
b. The tort of bribery;
c. Knowing receipt of the Claimant’s property;
d. Unlawful means conspiracy in respect of the above;
e. Breach of contract for breach of implied duties of fidelity and implied obligation to use reasonable skill and care;
f. Unjust enrichment;
g. Claim for an account.
144. What is a fiduciary duty? The Claimant relied on the frequently cited passage of Millet LJ in Bristol and West Building Society v Mothew [1998] Ch 1 at p18, identifying the distinguishing obligation of a fiduciary as the obligation of loyalty, noting that this was approved by the Supreme Court in Hopcraft v Close Brothers Ltd [2025] UKSC 33; [2025] 3 W.L.R. 423 at [89-90]. The fiduciary must not put himself in a position where his interests conflict with those of the beneficiary and he must not receive a personal benefit from his position, subject to the principal’s informed consent. As the authors of Fiduciary Duties: Directors and Employees point out, equity has its place in protecting the beneficiary. Such was identified by the Privy Council in Arklow Investments Ltd v Maclean [2000] 1 W.L.R. 594 as a legitimate expectation which equity will recognise. A fiduciary may not use his or her position in such a way which is adverse to the interests of the principal.
145. Once a fiduciary duty is established and it has been found that a payment has been made or authorised by or to the fiduciary, the burden moves to the fiduciary to show that the payment accorded with his or her fiduciary duties to the principal: GHLM Trading Ltd v Maroo [2012] EWHC 61 (Ch) at [149] per Newey J. Similarly, if the transaction calls into question the relationship between the fiduciary and a recipient party, such as a close personal relationship or business relationship, then the burden is on the fiduciary to explain and to justify: Newgate Stud Company v Penfold [2004] EWHC 2993 (Ch) at [240], per David Richards J, as he then was.
146. Assistance in the context of dishonest assistance with breach of fiduciary duty is a question of fact. Dishonesty is assessed objectively. See Baden v Societe Generale pour Favoriser le Developpement du Commerce et de I'Industrie en France SA [1993] 1 WLR 509, Peter Gibson J held at [246]; Royal Brunei Airlines Sdn. Bhd. v Tan [1995] 2 A.C. 378 at [389B–E].
147. The tort of bribery is a free-standing cause of action: Hopcraft, supra. A bribe consists of the payment of a secret commission to a person acting for another, made with knowledge of that agency relationship and without disclosure to the principal: Industries & General Mortgage Co Ltd v Lewis [1949] 2 All ER 573, cited in Hopcraft at [111].
148. Liability does not depend upon proof of dishonesty, actual influence or loss. Once a bribe is established, the court irrebuttably presumes that the fiduciary was influenced by it, reflecting equity’s strict approach to discouraging bribery: Hovenden & Sons v Millhoff [1900-03] All ER Rep 848; Hopcraft at [122].
149. The doctrine is not confined to formal relationships of principal and agent. It extends to other fiduciary relationships, the essential concern being the existence of fiduciary obligations and the risk of divided loyalties: Hopcraft at [127].
150. Three further consequences follow. First, both the payer and the recipient of the bribe are liable, and recovery against one does not reduce the liability of the other: Salford Corpn v Lever [1891] 1 QB 168; FM Capital Partners Ltd v Marino [2021] QB 1; Hopcraft at [116]. Secondly, bribes and secret commissions are held on constructive trust for the principal: FHR European Ventures LLP v Cedar Capital Partners LLC [2015] AC 250; Hopcraft at [71].
151. Thirdly, the only defence is fully informed consent. The burden lies on the payer or recipient to prove full disclosure of all material facts, and it is insufficient merely to place the principal on inquiry: Hopcraft at [211].
152. The authorities further establish that a payment amounts to a bribe whenever it places a fiduciary in a position where duty and personal interest might conflict. It is unnecessary to prove a dishonest motive, actual influence, loss, or any connection with a particular transaction. The touchstone is the possibility of conflict, unless there has been full disclosure and informed consent: Otkritie International Investment Management Ltd v Urumov [2014] EWHC 191 (Comm) at [67]-[70]; Fiona Trust & Holding Corporation v Privalov [2010] EWHC 3199 (Comm); Hopcraft at [226].
153. As to the liabilities of the defendants and as between them, the law assumes that the price of the purchase is increased by at least the amount of the bribe: Hopcraft at [235-236].
154. Knowing receipt is simply the receipt of assets, or traceable proceeds, from a breach of fiduciary duty, with knowledge which makes it unconscionable to receive those assets or proceeds: Bank of Credit and Commerce International (Overseas) Ltd v Akindele [2001] Ch. 437 per Nourse LJ with whom Ward and Sedley LLJ agreed.
155. The tort of unlawful means conspiracy is: “A conspiracy to injure by unlawful means is actionable where the claimant proves that he has suffered loss or damage as a result of unlawful action taken pursuant to a combination or agreement between the defendant and another person or persons to injure him by unlawful means, whether or not it is the predominant purpose of the defendant to do so.” Kuwait Oil Tanker Co SAK v Al-Bader (No.3) [2000] 2 All E.R. (Comm) 271 described at [108]. It is sufficient if two or more persons combine with a common intention, or, in other words, that they deliberately combine, albeit tacitly, to achieve a common end.
FINDINGS
Fiduciary duty
156. The fact of payments between the parties and entities involved in this case is not in dispute. Quantum is not disputed. The disclosure of invoices and bank records is not quite complete but it is substantially so overall, with some particular gaps. For these reasons, I can be and am sure that the sums which are said to be fraudulently obtained or procured were paid by the Claimant, as I explain in respect of my assessment of quantum below.
157. With that starting point, I then turn to who was involved in those payments, as either natural or legal persons; the individual defendants and the corporate defendants.
158. Mr Srivastava admits that he owed fiduciary duties to the Claimant. Mr Sachdeva is less clear in his defence, contending that his role was lesser than Mr Srivastava’s role. I accept the evidence called by the Claimant from several of its most senior officers and employees. Mr Srivastava was in charge, on the ground and ran UEL in the UK, making decisions which were supervised actively by Mr Sachdeva. That position is clear from the witness evidence and the correspondence. I find that both employees owed fiduciary duties to the Claimant by reason of: (i) Mr Srivastava’s admission; (ii) Mr Sachdeva’s pleaded service of 25 years to the company; (iii) their positions of control of substantial contracts, funds and management in the company.
159. I am sure that Mr Sachdeva (as D1 and D2) had a role which required him to show loyalty to UEL and to avoid conflicts. I accept Mr Noble’s evidence in this regard. He read and contradicted Mr Sachdeva’s defence. He supported that by a detailed and comprehensive history of instructions which he had received from Mr Sachdeva. It is clear that Mr Sachdeva was in charge by reason of his financial control, which went unchecked for a period measured in years. Mr Sachdeva was somebody who, on his own case, had direct contact and interactions with the Chairman of UL, Mr Chaturvedi, which suggests a senior role. The emails which he sent to approve contracts had the effect of causing the Claimant to expend substantial sums. Those are the actions of an employee of some significant seniority.
160. I then take these two basic facts together: substantial payments caused and authorised by Mr Srivastava and Mr Sachdeva over a period measured in years with admitted or evident fiduciary duties. I find that there was a strong imperative for each of them to disclose and announce to UL exactly what they were doing so that it was clear, transparent and resulted in the express approval of their line management at UL, because:
a. For an employee to cause his or her employer to make a payment to a company owned or controlled by that employee or by a person closely connected with the employee is prima facie the sort of transaction which calls for particular transparency and justification, regardless of the sum involved;
b. The corporate entities to which payments were made in this case had no or little apparent function or activity other than to receive payments from the Claimant;
c. The sums paid in any one month were significant in comparison to the employee’s remuneration, and the annual sums considerably exceeded the employee’s salary.
161. Neither of them made any such disclosure. Rather, they concealed these actions and payments which were for their own benefit or the benefit of people closely connected to them.
162. These three reasons are not marginal or sophisticated. Rather, they are basic and obvious. It is unnecessary to go further. There is therefore no doubt that Mr Srivastava and Mr Sachdeva were in breach of their fiduciary duties to the Claimant. It was evidently disloyal to cause payments to be made by their employer for no benefit other than their own benefit. Put another way, it was a breach of the duty not to profit. The actions were not reasonable actions of an employee who is tasked with promoting his or her employer’s business. The actions were the antithesis of such reasonable care.
163. I find that both Mr Srivastava and Mr Sachdeva were in breach of their fiduciary duties in respect of each of the payments made to the companies listed at paragraph 119 above.
164. I have expressed myself as being sure on these points, though a balance of probabilities would have sufficed. As I shall come back to in respect of other defendants, I find that anybody who directed their mind to these circumstances would realise that there were basic and obvious duties to make sure that the Claimant knew all of the relevant facts and approved of them and that it would be dishonest to fail to do so. To do otherwise would obviously fail to resolve the conflict between the fiduciary and the beneficiary, which in this case was often one and the same: see paragraphs 144 to 145 above as to these duties.
165. A part of the case which was principally directed to the Linc defendants is concerned with the amounts of their storage and related charges. This case relates to the market rates, charging for ‘premium’ services which were not required, and doing quality checks which could not in fact be performed. This part of the case was not ventilated during the trial because the Linc defendants had settled. So far as either Mr Srivastava and, or, Mr Sachdeva were concerned, I do not find any breach of fiduciary duty to have been established in this regard. The tenor of the evidence from UL’s witnesses was that the rates were too high and UEL could do better elsewhere. However, in my judgment that is insufficient to establish that UEL’s officers had failed their principals in UL. I accept that UEL found a more competitive alternative, but lower prices do not necessarily mean better value. That depends on what the needs are. I have no evidence about what was provided, where and to what standard, as the alternative. I therefore do not accept the warehouse overcharging element of the case so far as it is said to operate against the remaining defendants, i.e. those who have not settled.
Justification
166. Mr Sheopuri and Mr Bhushan gave uncontradicted evidence. As Vice Presidents in respect of International Marketing and the Finance Division respectively, they were well placed to give evidence on the need or otherwise for the need storage and financial outcome for UEL. I accept their evidence. This was admitted by Linc. I find that there was no justification for the additional warehouse storage with Linc and pursuant to the contracts with NES and SVS. Neither Mr Srivastava nor Mr Sachdeva has discharged the burden which is on them to justify the costs to UEL which resulted from the additional warehouse storage. Though shortly stated, that is sufficient to establish the Claimant’s claim in breach of fiduciary duty as against both Mr Srivastava and Mr Sachdeva which flowed from the unjustified warehouse storage.
167. If it were necessary, this finding could be made good by other means. First, though Mr Srivastava made no admission of liability in his settlement with the Claimant, I accept the Claimant’s submission that a settlement of £3.5M plus a large sum in costs is not a commercial settlement to avoid the risks and disturbance of a trial. That sum is simply too large to amount to a commercial settlement. It is about half of the total claim.
168. Second, Mr Sachdeva gave no disclosure. I draw an adverse inference in that respect. I can accept that some classes of document may no longer be available to him to disclose. Without making a finding on the point, I could see that he may have difficulty in obtaining WhatsApp messages which have been deleted. But he has disclosed nothing. I do not accept that he had nothing to disclose because other parties in the case have been able to disclose substantial numbers of documents, including documents which are adverse to their interests; the Linc defendants being a good example in that regard. The adverse inference which I draw is that Mr Sachdeva is likely to have had access to material which would tend to show that the warehouse payments were not justified.
169. Thirdly, Mr Sachdeva chose not to give or call any evidence. This is a case which called for an explanation both as a matter of law in respect of a fiduciary and as a matter of fact. Mr Sachdeva was given the opportunity to give evidence notwithstanding the lack of any witness statement from him. It is a natural inference from those circumstances that he either could not justify his actions as a fiduciary or considered himself at risk in some other respect.
170. Fourthly, the key documents to which I have referred at paragraphs 116 and 125 to 138 above demonstrate active deception of UL. I explain my findings further in respect of bribery below, but incorporate the same points here in respect of fiduciary duty.
Bribery
171. Did Mr Srivastava and, or, Mr Sachdeva (as D1 and D2) knowingly make or receive secret commissions without telling UEL? I turn firstly to the contracts with NES, SVS and SSE to answer that question (‘the contracts’).
172. The contracts for storage were set up to cause payments to be made by UEL to NES, SVS and SSE and it is common ground that many such payments were actually made by UEL as a result of invoices which both Mr Srivastava and Mr Sachdeva caused to be issued and paid by UEL. There are many documents which show this, such as the email of 12th June 2018 from Mr Srivastava (see paragraph 128).
173. The payments were secret in several ways. They were secret in the sense that they were for a nominal purpose which did not exist, namely storage which was not required. They were secret in the sense that they were payments to shell entities which did nothing save for receiving, holding and paying funds. They were secret in the sense that there was an undisclosed side-agreement to split the proceeds in the manner which is exemplified at paragraph 130: invoice Uflex; NES pays out £12k plus a £2k commission and the balance to Linc. I find that none of this was disclosed to nor known by the Claimant. Moreover, the concealment was active and deliberate.
174. The concealment was active and deliberate because the invoicing was manipulated in a way to avoid questions and detection. The address of NES was changed to avoid detection. This was known and expressly referred to by those involved who considered use of another bank in case there is a spook. The limits of secrecy were understood and by 2022 it was appreciated that Mr Sachdeva had to understand that we cannot continue.
175. The cases in respect of fiduciary duties and bribery are closely related. The payments which are at issue in this case put UEL’s employees in a position which demanded transparency in what they were doing and its financial consequences for UEL. In fact, these employees’ actions were the opposite of transparent because they were designed to conceal and mislead their principal, for their gain and for the gain of others who participated in their scheme.
176. I find that the Claimant was neither informed about the commissions nor consented to them. This is established by the Claimant’s witnesses who struggled to obtain answers to their questions about UEL’s losses when those questions were put to Mr Srivastava and Mr Sachdeva. Moreover, they were actively misled by Mr Srivastava’s answer to Mr Malhotra’s question about the purpose of the payments (paragraph 113 above). There were no goods stored by SVS but Mr Srivastava said that there were. He knew that was false. Neither Mr Srivastava nor Mr Sachdeva can rely on any consent by UEL as a defence to the Claimant’s bribery case.
Unjust Enrichment
177. I have found fiduciary duties to have been owed and breached. For the same reasons as I have just given, I find that Mr Sachdeva and Mr Srivastava were unjustly enriched at the expense of the Claimant, to the same extent in respect of the secret commissions in the sense explained in Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale Ltd [1991] 2 AC 548 at [578]. I have not found any reason within any of the defences to conclude that it would be unjust to allow restitution in this case. There is no innocent third party who has figured in the evidence or in any submissions.
Dishonest Assistance and Conspiracy
Mrs Srivastava, Skyhigh, Seasons (D9, D6, D13)
178. In their closing submissions, counsel for the Claimant provided a matrix of the claims, and said:
“C’s principal and overarching claim is in unlawful means conspiracy. Ds 1, 2, 9, 11 and 14 are all alleged to have been co-conspirators and dishonest assisters in relation to the entire fraud, and the breaches of fiduciary duty, torts of bribery and other wrongs that such fraud entailed (save for D14 who is sued in dishonest assistance, but not conspiracy), while Ds 6 and 13 are alleged to be co-conspirators in relation to the Srivastava Secret Commissions and payments to Latest. That conspiracy is at the heart of C’s claim, albeit it brings a number of different legal claims as set out in the matrix.”
179. The case against Mrs Srivastava overlaps in fact and law with the cases against Skyhigh and Seasons because the two companies are said to be her means of channelling funds from the Claimant to her and to her husband. That, it is said, was either or both of dishonest assistance with the breach of fiduciary duty which I have found against Mr Srivastava or a conspiracy with him. There is also a claim for unjust enrichment which I will turn to at the conclusion of this section of the judgment.
180. The overlap is not a complete overlap. On the one hand, the Claimant’s case is that Mrs Srivastava gave dishonest assistance with Mr Srivastava’s wrongdoing. On the other hand, the Claimant’s case is that Mrs Srivastava obtained a separate set of payments on a false basis, namely by invoicing for work which was not in fact done in respect of Bilton Towers and vaguely described consultancy.
181. The Claimant’s closing submissions rehearse Mrs Srivastava’s cross-examination in an attack on her credibility. The purpose of doing so is to undermine her case on knowledge. If Mrs Srivastava can establish that she knew nothing of her husband’s actions in breach of his fiduciary duties, then she could not have assisted him, could not be dishonest and could not be part of a conspiracy. Conversely, if she did have sufficient knowledge in that regard, then the Claimant would succeed as against each of D9, D6 and D13.
182. I do not accept this analysis. If I were to find that Mrs Srivastava’s evidence to be confused or even to be dishonest in some respect, those findings may inform my assessment of her state of knowledge of her husband’s actions, but it would not be conclusive. There are many reasons that a witness may give confused or contradictory answers which damage their credibility, some of which may go to the real issue in the case and some of which may not. In this case, there are factors which I consider need to be taken carefully into account.
183. Mrs Srivastava gave her evidence in English and did so without difficulty. However, her English was not honed and adapted to the technical language of corporate transactions and the elements of civil litigation. Mr Solomon KC was fair, clear and generally accommodating. Nevertheless, I consider that I should give some leeway for the position that Mrs Srivastava found herself in.
184. I also bear in mind the difference in the capacities of legal representation on the Claimant’s side and Mrs Srivastava’s side which was noticeable in terms of the number of participants. The Claimant instructed leading and junior counsel, assisted by several solicitors and with several client representatives in attendance. All of that is to be expected in a case of this type, but it was a contrast to just Mr Thrower and Mrs Srivastava on the other side of the court. It was, no doubt, a testing time for Mrs Srivastava.
185. As in other respects in this case, I turn firstly to those matters which are both clear and not in dispute. The first is the quantum of the payments made to Mrs Srivastava’s companies for her services. It will be recalled that Mrs Srivastava was the sole director and shareholder of AAMC which received c.£334,000 from Linc and NES. The Claimant’s case is that those were secret commissions for the benefit of Mr Srivastava. The Claimant also paid £371,569.92 directly to AAMC between 2012 and 2018, in exchange for what AAMC invoices simply recorded as “Consultancy services” or “Consultancy fees”.
186. Mrs Srivastava’s evidence is that she managed Bilton Towers, did shopping and kept things in order. I accept that there was a meeting in June 2009 which resulted in a hand-written document from Mr Chaturvedi which recorded Mr Srivastava’s proposed remuneration. I have no reason to doubt that some element of assistance from Mrs Srivastava in the management of Bilton Towers was discussed at that meeting and then some assistance was provided.
187. However, I did not find her witness statement nor her oral evidence persuasive as to the extent of her involvement. Her involvement at Bilton Towers appeared to me to be much more superficial than the quantum of the payments made properly indicate. The payments over four years from late 2015 to October 2019 exceed £400k. I would expect a more detailed account or good specific examples of what she did for such sums. I would expect some sort of record or documentary support. None of this was forthcoming during her evidence, written or oral.
188. The resultant impression and my finding is that Mrs Srivastava did indeed undertake some work associated with the Bilton Towers and for its guests, but it was not substantial. To that extent I prefer her evidence to that of Mr Chaturvedi.
189. On the extent of Mr Chaturvedi’s involvement in the day-to-day affairs of the company, I preferred Mr Malhotra’s evidence who was clear and consistent in his evidence that Mr Chaturvedi had to give approvals. I do not accept that Mr Chaturvedi has the limited role which he sought to portray. Mr Chaturvedi’s actions indicated that he was heavily involved in the detail of his companies’ operations. This is supported by the fact that it was Mr Chaturvedi who came to the UK to address the financial problems which had been detected. He did not just rely on others. He would sort it out. Similarly, he evidently had a role in causing these proceedings to be issued, made a detailed witness statement and flew overnight to London in order to give evidence in person. Taken together, it is not possible to reconcile this behaviour with that of a person who is ‘hands off’. To this extent, I reject Mr Chaturvedi’s evidence. His evidence was tailored to a narrative which he considered would assist the Claimant’s case.
190. If this case turned exclusively and simply on my assessment of Mr Chaturvedi’s oral evidence, then the Claimant would have failed. But it does not because the case is very much broader and deeper than the issue of Mrs Srivastava’s contribution to the running of the Bilton Towers. On this issue, I find that Mrs Srivastava did some unquantifiable level of work, but she has not shown that she undertook any substantial duties or work. That work is not quantifiable because she has failed to provide the evidential means to do so, even at a broad level.
191. The evidence of Mr Patel, a man who was a student in the UK at the time he was said to be working at Bilton Towers attracts no weight because:
a. It contains no statement of truth;
b. He did not attend to give evidence;
c. It was unsupported by any document or detail;
d. It was not served in accordance with the Order of Master Armstrong dated 26th March 2026 extending the date for service of witness statements to 27th March 2026, but four months later, at trial;
e. The Claimant had no real opportunity to investigate or respond to the evidence.
192. Mrs Srivastava’s evidence was that the invoices rendered by AAMC and Kaliste (as set out in the Schedule to the Particulars of Claim) were dealt with by her husband and her accountant. Mr Thrower submitted, in closing:
“Mrs Srivastava may have been a director and/or shareholder of companies which allegedly received fraudulent payments but her clear evidence was that the financial aspects of her business were controlled by her husband with the assistance of Mr Mayur Sancheti – the principal accountant of Latest Consultancy.”
193. I do not accept this submission.
194. I find that the Mr Srivastava knew that there was conflict with his fiduciary duties in rendering or causing such invoices to be rendered to the Claimant without any reasonable justification. I find that it was dishonest on both Mr and Mrs Srivastava’s parts to do so.
195. I also find that Mrs Srivastava’s state of knowledge at the relevant time was greater than she stated in evidence and sufficient that I find that she did know and understand what was happening and that it was unlawful. Her role was not nominal per Plus Group Ltd v Pyke [2002] 2 BCLC 201 (Sedley LJ). I would be prepared to accept that there were features of the fraud which Mr Srivastava kept to himself. Mrs Srivastava may not have had full knowledge of all the facts and circumstances. But Mrs Srivastava was a director or person in significant control of companies to which payments were made either directly or indirectly by UEL: Skyhigh, Seasons, AAMC. For each of those corporate entities, Mrs Srivastava had to undertake the tasks which are common to any director in respect of establishing the company, filing its returns and operating a bank account. However much she relied on the assistance of others such as her accountant, she was and should be taken to be involved as would any director of a small company.
196. The amounts of the payments to Mrs Srivastava’s companies are notably large. Even if her involvement in her companies was limited and she was deferential to the work of her accountant and the input of her husband, she would see accounts and banking records which show sums of money which far exceed her husband’s remuneration from his employment and which far exceed any other income which is referred to in reference to these companies. Those notably large payments were received over an extended period, not a fleeting or one-off transaction which she might have missed. Mrs Srivastava failed to engage with this part of the case and there was never any answer to it.
197. The Claimant submits that the transfer of ownership of the family home on 12th June 2023 to her sole name was demonstrative of her knowledge of the fraud and actions to put assets out of reach of the Claimant. I do not accept that submission. Even if the submission is correct as to motivation, that is not probative of knowledge of the fraud at a time that it was active.
198. My conclusion in respect of Mrs Srivastava is that she conspired by unlawful means with Mr Srivastava and with Mr Sachdeva to defraud the Claimant, save that I am not persuaded that Mrs Srivastava knew or had the means to know of the over-payments which Mr Srivastava made to himself, in excess of his salary and other agreed remuneration. That is a category within the fraud in which there is no sufficient evidence of implicate Mrs Srivastava, nor indeed the Sachdeva defendants.
199. There is also a claim for unjust enrichment. Given my conclusions to this point in the judgment, it is unnecessary for me to address this legal basis for the claim, but if I had needed to do so, on the facts which I have found, I would have found against Mrs Srivastava.
Mrs Sachdeva (D11);
200. I do not accept Mrs Sachdeva’s defence as to the payments received from Mr Noble. I accept Mr Noble’s evidence in this regard. It is clear, makes sense and directly rebuts Mrs Sachdeva’s account in her defence. Mr Noble is likely to know whether he went to Goa or not. Mrs Sachdeva is mistaken in this regard and generally. The payments received were not received as payment for Mr Noble to attend her son’s wedding. £20k is an improbable sum for such a visit.
201. Further, Mrs Sachdeva has not participated in these proceedings save for her defence. She did not seek to put in issue the clear evidence in Mr Noble’s witness statement. I have been given no reason to reject Mr Noble’s evidence.
202. Was she a conspirator with her husband and the other actors who I have already found to be part of the conspiracy? I find that she was.
203. Mrs Sachdeva signed the agreement between SVS and SSE dated 1st October 2020 (addressed at paragraph 108 above). She can therefore be taken to know of the arrangement of substantial monthly payments to her family’s HUF.
204. I have rejected Mrs Sachdeva’s explanation for the payments to her former trading entity. She was therefore receiving unexplained sums of some tens of thousands of pounds and she was signing contractual documents which were clearly designed to cause still more thousands of pounds to be paid to her family.
205. Mrs Sachdeva had the opportunity to rebut the case against her with evidence and to challenge the evidence which was against her. She did not take that opportunity. That deprives the Claimant of the opportunity to put its case to her. That is an important element of the trial process. It is the time at which the answers to the other side’s case can be given and the case can be shown to be wrong. Mrs Sachdeva, like Mr Sachdeva, has remained silent and that is a matter which tends to support a conclusion that Mrs Sachdeva was indeed part of a conspiracy to defraud the Claimant.
Greenedge (D14)
206. The application to add D14 which I heard at the pre-trial review, and which I allowed, was supported by this explanation:
1. This application was initially made to join Green Edge Packaging Private Limited as a Defendant, however the Claimant now amends the application to join a different entity, Greenedge Eco Solutions Private Limited (“Green Edge”) instead.
2. Green Edge is a company incorporated in India with Company Identification Number U51909HR2021PTC098150, whose registered office is located at Unit 1002, 10th Floor, Emaar Capital Tower 1, Sikanderpur, DLF QE, Gurgaon, Dlf Qe, Haryana, India, 122002. Green Edge was formerly known as Greenedge Packaging Solutions Private Limited. Its directors include the First Defendant, Mr Sachdeva, and various members of his family.
3. As set out in the attached witness statement and draft Re-Amended Particulars of Claim, the allegations against Green Edge are that it was the recipient of bribes/secret commissions for the benefit of Mr Sachdeva. The circumstances in which the Claimant seeks to join Green Edge instead of Green Edge Packaging Private Limited are that Green Edge Packaging Private Limited, which the Claimant previously believed to be the recipient, has written to the Claimant to state that it was not incorporated at the time of those payments. On further investigation, the Claimant accepts that that is at least partially true, and therefore that it cannot have been the recipient.
4. The Claimant now infers that Green Edge was the recipient, and Green Edge is similarly connected to Mr Sachdeva, since Mr Sachdeva is a director of both Green Edge and Green Edge Packaging Private Limited. The substance of the application therefore remains unchanged, save for the identity of the proposed Defendant.
207. The most persuasive feature of the case against Greenedge is fact of the payments made. The total of those payments is £202,500, comprising 14 payments between 1st March 2022 and 29th March 2023 all of which are for ‘round’ sums in the bracket £12k to £17k, each supported by a bank statement and all but for two supported by an invoice for “Commission and other service”. Those payments were made by NES to Mr Sachdeva.
208. I have already found that payments to NES were caused to be made by Mr Sachdeva and fraudulently so. Greenedge received from NES and is a company of which Mr Sachdeva is a director.
209. The amendment was late and Greenedge’s defence understandably takes that point and objected that it had an inadequate opportunity to respond and prepare. However, I have to assess that objection in the context of what the Sachdeva defendants have contributed to the proceedings and the trial which I have already addressed and on which basis I have drawn an adverse inference. I am not able to give any significant weight to the objection because the Sachdeva defendants have failed to engage beyond bare denials.
210. Greenedge may or may not have an independent and lawful operation in some way which is entirely separate from UEL. I do not have to make any finding in that regard. I do however find that Mr Sachdeva caused the payments as alleged to be made by NES to Greenedge and should therefore account to UEL for those monies, as claimed, and I exercise my discretion to order an account. I will do likewise in respect of Mr Srivastava.
211. There is less evidence in the witness statements and the documents to support the inclusion of Greenedge in the conspiracy than I have found with the other entities in the case. Greenedge was not a prominent feature of the Claimant’s skeleton argument nor its closing submissions, though I expressly asked for submissions in that regard. I find that the Greenedge payments do not form a part of the conspiracy. Mr Sachdeva, as a fiduciary, is however obliged to account for those payments, as are he and Mr Srivastava also obliged to account for the payments in many other respects, and I now turn to those payments in more detail.
Other Claims
Unauthorised payments – Mr Srivastava
212. The Claimant claims the sums set out at paragraph 141 as amounts which were drawn down by Mr Srivastava but to which he was not entitled.
213. I find that the Claimant has made out this case on the written evidence of its witnesses which has not been challenged. I accept Mr Chatteraj’s evidence as I summarise at paragraphs 62 to 63 above. I further find that Mr Srivastava’s remuneration was clear from his agreement with his employer and that the payments in excess of this are substantial and obviously not in accordance with any authorisation.
Latest & AAMC
214. The interactions with Latest (accountancy) and AAMC occur in the context of Mrs Srivastava’s case which I have already addressed. I make separate mention of them because they are treated distinctly within the Claimant’s closing submissions. There is a further interaction in respect of payments made to Latest and to AAMC for services which were never carried out.
215. There is no evidence that any services were carried out for UEL by these entities and I find accordingly for the reasons which are explained in detail above in respect of Mrs Srivastava’s case.
AMOUNT
216. I now address:
a. Ascertaining the Claimant’s case on the amount of the claims, at the end of the trial;
b. The extent to which the amounts which the Claimant claims are proven by the evidence which has been filed at court and served on the parties;
c. The relationship between the causes of action which have been shown against the defendants, and each of them. In other words, who is liable for what?;
d. The effect of the settlements with those who were formerly defendants;
e. Whether there is a limitation on the time period over which the Claimant can recover.
217. As I have observed, the processes of preparing for trial and the trial itself are incomplete (paragraphs 52 to 55 above). There are important gaps in disclosure and the evidence which all defendants have filed and served. However, each of the defendants has served a defence. None of them disputes the amounts of the claims. That is a matter which I must take into account, but it does not alleviate the Claimant’s burden of proving the amount of its claim.
218. As to [d] above and the effect of the Linc defendants’ Tomlin Order, that has its own effect because the settlement is confidential, whereas this judgment is public. If I am to respect the confidentiality of the settlement agreement, then the detail of the reasons for my conclusions on the amount should not disclose either expressly or by inference what the terms of that settlement were. That is what I have sought to do.
[a] The detail of the Claimant’s claim
219. Mr Solomon indicated that he wished to revise the schedule to the particulars of claim, as amended. I directed that any such proposed amendment must be the subject of an application which I would determine if it became necessary to do so after drafting the judgment on liability. I now do so.
220. The changes proposed go in both directions. The Claimant no longer pursues 25 of the payments by reason of duplication or the effect of disclosure of bank statements. There are a further six amendments of the amount of a payment. On the other hand, there are 30 proposed additional payments which are part of the revised schedule.
221. The net effect of the proposed changes is that the claim in respect of the Srivastava Secret Commissions increases from £4,812,295.33 to £4,907,345.41and in respect of the Sachdeva Secret Commissions from £806,850 to £974,490, and thus the total from £5,619,145.33 to £5,881,835.41.
222. No party objected to the amendment, either by the end of the trial or since.
223. I have concluded that there is no prejudice to any defendant. The overarching case remains the same. The changes to the schedule have been evidenced by bank statements. There would be an increase in liability for the Srivastava and Sachdeva defendants, but the changes are modest in relative terms. If the defendants had complied more comprehensively with their disclosure obligations then the need for amendment would have been lesser and they would be in a better position to resist amendment, but in any event, they have not sought to do so. For these reasons I have allowed the amendments.
224. The payments made to:
a. Mr Noble amount to £713,982.61 as set out in his spreadsheet, the accuracy of which I have accepted (paragraph 68);
b. AAMC were £371,569.92;
c. Latest were £40,200;
d. Mr Srivastava which were unauthorised were £600,889.66.
225. These amounts are unchanged by the amendment to the schedule of the particulars of claim, as amended.
226. There are alternative ways in which the payments may be categorised, such as by splitting out the payments which were made to the Linc defendants between those payments made to SVS and those to NES. The Claimant has made an estimate in support of its case on overcharging for warehouse services.
[b] Proof of losses
227. I have found that the Srivastava and Sachdeva defendants were paid secret commissions which amounted to bribes. This has the consequence that the Claimant has a claim in damages in those amounts against all the co-conspirators to the bribe. As a result, subject to proof of the payments, discussed below, the Sachdeva defendants and Mrs Srivastava are all prima facie liable for the full amount alleged of £5,619,145.33, while Ds 6 and 13 are liable for £4,812,295.33.
228. There are two routes to proving the payments which go to make up those alleged losses. The first is to look at the bank statements of the companies which were used as the vehicles to move money from the Claimant to the Sachdeva and Srivastava defendants. The second approach is to look at the payments made to SVS and NES for services which were neither necessary nor provided.
229. I have considered both sets of evidence because the exercise is one of understanding the flow of the funds from one entity to the next. The starting point is a good set of data in the form of the Claimant’s payment records. That is a good set of data because it is complete whereas the banking records of the defendant’s companies are incomplete.
230. The Claimant’s ledger is complete and detailed. I have not checked the many hundreds of lines of entries. I have no reason to doubt the maths, nor has any submission been made to the effect that the Claimant’s analysis is wrong in any respect. I have been shown a sufficient sample of the entries which contribute to the total to be quite sure that the payments were made.
231. The exercise is however useful in other respects. It puts more colour on the nature of the payments which the Claimant was routinely making. For example, the Christmas and New Year period of 2018/19 discloses that Mr Sachdeva drew cheques of £315 and £1499 for “Gift to customer”. The next entry is for £2630 for ‘Gift for Customer – Selfridges’, followed by £4785 “Gift for customer – Selfridges”. This later payment was linked on the ledger to Philip Noble. In February of 2019, there are entries for “Diaries for Tilda” in sums of £942 and £322.
232. There are long lists of credit card payments which disclose substantial payments, in the aggregate, to Apple, Mont Blanc and Amazon (not more particularly described) and, for example, gym memberships as guest entertainment. I will return to those observations below.
233. The ledger also records the payments made to SVS and NES. The regular monthly payments as envisaged by the contracts with SVS and NES are shown to have been paid. I find the payments to SVS and NES to be as claimed.
234. The evidence available in respect of the secret commissions cannot be proved from the Claimant’s ledger for the obvious reason that the payments were largely between the defendants. It is equally obvious that the simple means available to a defendant to defeat the Claimant’s claim is to produce bank statements and demonstrate that the payments as alleged were not made, or were justified. In circumstances where a defendant has not disclosed essential financial records and a prima facie case needs an answer, the court is entitled to take account of failure to disclose those documents. That is what has happened in this case.
235. The Sachdeva defendants, AARB, AAMC, Kaliste, Networker and Eljay have not provided any disclosure. Seasons and Skyhigh have provided some bank statements. The Claimant’s ability to prove the totality of the payments made to and from these companies is accordingly limited by those disclosure failings. I summarise the detailed payments and such evidence to supplement bank statements as the Claimant relies on, starting with the Srivastava defendants:
Payments made by Linc-
a. In respect of AARB, the total of the payments is £1,217,579.72comprising 81 payments between 1st May 2019 and 28th January 2023. The sources of evidence in support largely comprise invoices, nominal activity reports and VAT reports;
b. In respect of AAMC, the total of the payments is £64,100 comprising 10 payments between 15th August 2017 and 1st May 2018. The source of the evidence is solely the nominal activity report;
c. In respect of Kaliste, the total of the payments is £324,584 comprising 36 payments between 1st September 2015 and 2nd October 2019. The source of the evidence is almost exclusively the nominal activity report, with four payments of £6500 evidenced by emails from Latest to Mr Goodman in 2015 and 2016. These are the emails which I discuss at paragraph 127 above;
d. In respect of Networker, there is a single payment of £15,600 during 2018. The evidence in support is a payment receipt from HSBC bank;
e. In respect of Seasons, the total of the payments is £216,650.40 comprising 7 payments between July 2021 and April 2023. One payment of the seven is not supported by a bank statement but is supported by an invoice;
f. In respect of Skyhigh, the total of the payments is £504,912.76 comprising 40 payments between 1st March 2019 and 14th September 2022. Most payments are supported by statements and further supported by nominal activity reports;
Payments made by NES:
g. In respect of AARB, the total of the payments is £264,000 comprising 16 payments, between 4th May 2021 and 1st November 2022, three of which are not supported by bank statements but which are supported by invoices;
h. In respect of AAMC, the total of the payments is £271,349.25 comprising 35 payments between 28th January 2013 and 31st August 2016 which are supported by email correspondence and invoices, but no bank statements;
i. In respect of Kaliste, there is a single payment of £18,000 on 11th April 2023 which appears on a bank statement;
j. In respect of Seasons and Skyhigh, the total of the payments is £589,500 in the amended schedule. It would have been preferable to split those payments out as between those companies, but only three of them relate to Seasons, from January 2023 and it is clear that all derive from bank statements;
Payments made by SVS:
k. In respect of AARB, the total of the payments is £598,160 comprising 34 payments supported by bank records and invoices;
l. In respect of Kaliste, the total of the payments is £187,800 comprising 13 payments supported by bank records, invoices and nominal activity reports;
m. In respect of Networker, there is a single payment of £21,600 on 13th June 2018 which appears on an HSCB bill payment record;
n. In respect of Seasons, the total of the payments is £120,000 comprising 4 payments of £30,000 which appear on bank statements during early 2023;
o. In respect of Skyhigh there were two payments of £24,000 in June and September 2022 which appear on bank statements;
p. In respect of Eljay, the total of the payments is £25,500 comprising 3 payments during 2018. The largest is for £15,300 which appears on an SVS nominal activity report at N/C 89. For the two payments of £5,100 one is shown on an HSBC priority payment report. The other is stated in the schedule to the amended particulars of claim to be evidences by an email to Paul Martin. The cross-reference on the schedule does not lead to an email and I have been unable to track this point;
q. Additional payments to Mr Srivastava amount to £405,559 (20 payments) as disclosed on bank statements for the period 26th March 2018 to 2nd March 2023, but most of which were in 2021;
Unauthorised payments
r. There is a series of unauthorised payments which were made to Mr Srivastava, relating to pension payments, insurance and various expenses (see earlier at paragraph 141 ). Each of those is proved from the Claimant company’s records; even the Netflix subscriptions.
236. I now repeat this exercise in respect of Mr Sachdeva:
Payments made by NES
a. In respect of SSE, the total of the payments is £322,500, comprising 26 payments between July 2021 and April 2023 which are largely supported by bank statements, or failing which, by invoices;
b. In respect of Greenedge, the total of the payments is £202,500, comprising 14 payments between 1st March 2022 and 29th March 2023 all of which are for ‘round’ sums in the bracket £12k to £17k, each supported by a bank statement and all but for two supported by an invoice for “Commission and other service”;
c. Additional payments to Mr Sachdeva amount to £207,640 (11 payments) as disclosed on bank statements for the period 5th November 2020 to 24th January 2023, but most of which were in 2021, just like the point at ‘q’ above in respect of Mr Srivastava.
Payments made by SVS:
d. In respect of SSE, the totality of the payments is £241,850 comprising 17 payments during 2020 and 2021. There are no bank statements. Invoices are relied upon along with some emails.
237. I conclude that the Claimant and its advisors have taken considerable care to audit the available material in a forensic and even-handed way. The work is comprehensive and clear. I am content to accept the level of documentary support which the Claimant relies upon as demonstrating that each of the payments was made because of the features of the evidence which I have assessed as an integrated whole. By that I mean that this exercise is not simply an exercise of considering the evidence in respect of each single payment. If this case were concerned with one, single, payment which was only evidenced by an invoice then I would not be able to find that the payment had been made. But where I find, as I do, that there are many hundreds of payments in which bank statements establish the payment with certainty and that there are further documents in evidence which tally with and relate to that payment, there is an established pattern and consistency of those documents which indicate that payments have been made actually resulting in payment. In other words, there is an evidential matrix which comprises:
a. Bank statements for the large majority of payments;
b. Bank receipts;
c. Invoices;
d. Company records, in particular nominal activity reports;
e. Correspondence.
238. I find that the available evidence supports the Claimant’s claim. I find that I am able to do so without reliance on any inference arising from disclosure failures. The documents prove the losses as alleged, without more.
239. I made the finding that Mr Noble’s spreadsheet fully made out the claim in respect of the amounts paid to Mr Srivastava (paragraph 68).
240. I have found against the Claimant on the overcharging aspect of the Lincs claims. That has no impact on the quantum of the claim because the quantum of the claims in respect of secret commissions exceeds the quantum of the overcharging claim, so I need say nothing further on that topic.
[c] Liability of particular defendants
241. The principles to be applied are:
a. “A conspiracy to injure by unlawful means is actionable where the claimant proves that he has suffered loss or damage as a result of unlawful action taken pursuant to a combination or agreement between the defendant and another person or persons to injure him by unlawful means, whether or not it is the predominant purpose of the defendant to do so.”. Liability extends to acts falling within the scope of the common design but the need for proof is required to the relevant standard at every stage. Kuwait Oil Tanker Co SAK v Al-Bader (No. 3) [2000] 2 All E.R. (Comm) 271 at [108] and [133].
b. The agreement need not be contractual, formal or express; participation may be active or passive; direct evidence is not required; the precise formation of the conspiracy need not be identified; and an intention to injure is established where the conspirators’ gain is necessarily achieved at the victim’s expense: Lakatamia Shipping Co Limited v Su [2021] EWHC 1907 (Comm), [83–96].
c. Conspirators need not join simultaneously and need not share identical aims: Bird v O’Neal [1960] A.C. 907 [920–921]; The Dolphina [2011] SGHC 273; [2012] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 304 at [282].
d. Knowledge of the relevant facts is what is required, not knowledge of the unlawfulness, and a ‘blind eye’ suffices: The Racing Partnership Ltd v Sports Information Services Ltd [2020] EWCA Civ 1300, [2021] Ch. 233, [139 and 171], [159].
e. “The actions of any one of them (i.e. the conspirators) in furtherance of the objects of their conspiracy will be treated as the actions of all of them”: DC Thomson & Co Ltd v Deakin [1952] Ch. 646 at [674], per Evershed MR.
242. I have found that the Sachdeva defendants (D1, D2 and D11) are liable to the Claimants by reason of Mr Sachdeva’s fiduciary duties, the bribes which were made and the conspiracy to defraud the Claimant, as I have already explained. I have similarly found that Mrs Srivastava was a knowing participant in that conspiracy with her husband, with their sham companies forming a part of the scheme, under their direction (D6, D9, D13). They were all in it together. The ‘it’ was to extract money from the Claimant company month-in, month-out by invoicing and paying themselves dishonestly and on a large scale. The ‘together’ was each taking part by setting up, agreeing to, directing, instructing and receiving in different roles at different times but which complemented each other.
[d] Effect of Settlement Sums
243. It will be necessary to set-off those sums received or receivable pursuant to settlements which the Claimant and those who were previously defendants have made and recorded. That set off will be reflected in the order.
[e] Limitation
244. The defences of the Srivastava and Sachdeva defendants seek to rely on limitation defences in relation to the portions of the claims against them that occurred more than 6 years before the issue of proceedings (i.e. claims occurring before 8th April 2018).
245. I have not done the calculation, but it is clear that the large majority of the payments on which the Claimant relies occurred after 8th April 2018, both in number and in amount. However, there are parts of the claim which would fall away if the defendant’s limitation argument were to succeed and therefore the limitation point would have real effects on the claim. One example is the payments made by NES to AAMC, which are pleaded against Mr Srivastava in Schedule 1 to the amended particulars of claim. They commence on 28th January 2013 and conclude on 30th September 2016 and so are all well before the 8th April 2018.
246. However, I have not received any detailed argument on this aspect of the case from any defendant. The example which I give in respect of the NES/AAMC payments is an observation which I have made from review of the evidence. There may be better points, but if there are, they have not been presented to me, nor has the Claimant had an opportunity to respond. While this is another way in which the reality falls short of the model, the findings nevertheless yield a clear result.
247. The six-year limitation in the Limitation Act 1980 (‘the Limitation Act’) is pleaded by the defendants: ss. 2, 5 and 21(3). As to s. 21, the Limitation Act provides, so far as material:
“(1) No period of limitation prescribed by this Act shall apply to an action by a beneficiary under a trust, being an action—
(a) in respect of any fraud or fraudulent breach of trust to which the trustee was a party or privy; or
(b) to recover from the trustee trust property or the proceeds of trust property in the possession of the trustee, or previously received by the trustee and converted to his use.
…
(3) Subject to the preceding provisions of this section, an action by a beneficiary to recover trust property or in respect of any breach of trust, not being an action for which a period of limitation is prescribed by any other provision of this Act, shall not be brought after the expiration of six years from the date on which the right of action accrued. For the purposes of this subsection, the right of action shall not be treated as having accrued to any beneficiary entitled to a future interest in the trust property until the interest fell into possession.”
248. s.32 Limitation Act provides:
“(1) […] where in the case of any action for which a period of limitation is prescribed by this Act, either—
(a) the action is based upon the fraud of the defendant; or
(b) any fact relevant to the plaintiff's right of action has been deliberately concealed from him by the defendant; or
(c) the action is for relief from the consequences of a mistake;
the period of limitation shall not begin to run until the plaintiff has discovered the fraud, concealment or mistake (as the case may be) or could with reasonable diligence have discovered it. References in this subsection to the defendant include references to the defendant's agent and to any person through whom the defendant claims and his agent.
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1) above, deliberate commission of a breach of duty in circumstances in which it is unlikely to be discovered for some time amounts to deliberate concealment of the facts involved in that breach of duty.”
249. The issues which arise from these sections of the Limitation Act are whether fraud has been proven against a defendant such that there is dishonesty or lack of good faith (First Subsea Ltd (formerly BSW Ltd) v Balltec Ltd [2018] Ch 25) and if so, when the Claimant could have discovered such fraud if the Claimant used reasonable diligence?
250. I have found that that there was obvious dishonesty in this case: paragraph 164. That dishonesty permeates the conspiracy.
251. When should the Claimant have discovered the fraud? In respect of the example which I cite above in respect of NES/AAMC, the Claimant made this submission in closing:
“As for the Srivastava Secret Commissions, these occurred between January 2013 and April 2023. These were not discovered until the disclosure process in the present case, and they could not have been discovered with reasonable diligence prior to this point, since C had no knowledge of these payments nor ability to discover that they existed, given that D3 failed to disclose them. That is all the more so when it is recalled that C needs sufficient information to be able to plead a claim in this regard, which requires the ability to plead such a claim with precision (which was not possible until after disclosure).”
252. I am prepared to accept this submission because of: (1) the fact of concealment on the part of the Defendants; (2) reasonable expectation that senior employees will act with integrity and not dishonestly; (3) the further factor in respect of those employees that they were long-standing employees who had in some respects made the business bigger and been successful in that regard; (4) the period prior to April 2018 was not the most intense period of the fraud; as I have observed, the number and amounts of fraudulent payments was yet to increase, post April 2018. However, I do not accept the submission with any great enthusiasm because the Claimant was on notice about the financial performance of UEL and can be expected to make enquiries as to the purpose and benefit of the good or services which it apparently is purchasing by settling invoices. I come to that point further in respect of interest.
253. I have considered the issue as it relates to other categories of payment and have reached the same conclusion, namely that none of the claims are barred by reason of the Limitation Act because the payments were fraudulent and would not have been discovered with reasonable diligence prior to April 2018.
INTEREST
254. The Claimant claims interest for the claims which commence on 3rd October 2012 and conclude on4th May 2023. The Claimant submits that the midpoint between those dates is 17th January 2018, meaning that there will have been 3096 days between that midpoint and the end of trial on 11th July 2026. The Claimant seeks interest over that period, claimed at 8%, which would comfortably exceed £3M.
255. The Claimant is entitled to interest from the date of issue, namely 8th April 2024 to the date of the order.
256. I have found that the frauds were concealed prior to April 2018 and not discoverable with reasonable diligence. However, I do not regard that finding as a continuing one which does not require re-examination as time went on and circumstances changed.
257. In July 2021, Mr Chatteraj sent an email which arose out of UL’s concern about UEL’s finances and the payment of marketing and consultancy fees. Mr Bhushan was doing likewise. The result was a requirement for prior authorisation, from the Chairman, Mr Chaturvedi. In my judgment, this is a clear signal that the most senior management at UL were on notice and concerned.
258. Mr Rakesh Malhotra noticed that the expenses for Bilton Towers were worrying in December 2022. In that regard, UL was clearly on notice by that time that there was a problem with those expenses. In my judgment, that was clear from glancing at the company’s ledger of expenses which included large sums which went well beyond the management of a ‘guest house’. In my judgment, the overall picture is of notably loose financial oversight and an approach to expenditure which was consistent with the evidence which I heard. Both Mr Malhotra and Mr Chaturvedi explained that losses by UEL were not significant to UL which could well afford them, per Mr Malhotra during his cross-examination:
“we continue to suffer our losses because Uflex is a bigger group who has a bigger profitability and can sustain a million pounds of loss in a year. That is not an issue for an Uflex group as a whole. So this is a very small company in the part of that. 1 million is not a substantial amount for the Uflex as a group.”
259. The ability of a company to absorb very large losses is not a useful measure of what is reasonable diligence to monitor its financial transactions. Those who own shares in the company are plainly entitled to more and better vigilance. In my judgment it is neither just nor equitable to order the defendants to pay interest on those losses which had, or should have, become obvious sources of concern. I will therefore order the Claimant will be entitled to interest on the basis of: (1) such losses as were made during the period 3rd October 2012 and 1 July 2021, by taking the midpoint for that period and using the number of days to that midpoint to calculate interest in that regard, and; (2) interest on the judgment sum from 8th April 2024 to 28th October 2026.
260. I do not know whether that approach will yield a significantly different sum to that sought. However, it does accord with the view that I have taken of all of the facts and circumstances and so has the benefit of a foundation in principle. The amount can be calculated and included in the order.
CONCLUSION
261. The Claimant succeeds against the Sachdeva defendants and likewise against Mrs Srivastava and the companies which she and her husband owned and controlled. They, with others, conducted a long-term invoice-fraud, conspiring to siphon monies from UL to entities which they owned and controlled. To the same effect, both Mr Sachdeva and Mr Srivastava dishonestly took money from UEL to which they were not entitled. The Claimant is entitled to an order which gives effect to these findings.
262. The overall position can now be summarised as against the pleaded claims as follows:
a. The Sachdeva secret commissions are proved as against Mr Sachdeva as D1 and D2 as breaches of fiduciary duty and in bribery. Further he was unjustly enriched. Mr Sachdeva conspired with the other defendants by unlawful means;
b. Mr Sachdeva as D1 and D2 shall provide an account of those monies which arise from the secret commissions;
c. Mr Sachdeva is liable in damages and in restitution for the secret commissions in the sum of £974,490.00, subject to the account which he shall give in respect of Greenedge and deduction accordingly;
d. Mr Sachdeva shall also give an account in respect of Greenedge;
e. Mrs Sachdeva conspired with the First, Second and Ninth Defendants by unlawful means in respect of the Sachdeva secret commissions and is liable in damages accordingly;
f. Mrs Sachdeva and Mrs Srivastava are also liable in damages for the Sachdeva secret commissions in the sum of £974,490.00, subject to the account which Mr Sachdeva shall give in respect of Greenedge and deduction accordingly;
g. The Srivastava secret commissions are proved as against Mr and Mrs Srivastava who conspired with the other defendants (save for Greenedge) by unlawful means. I reach the same conclusion as to unjust enrichment as I make in respect Mr Sachdeva;
h. All the defendants (save for Greenedge) are liable in damages for the Srivastava secret commissions and in restitution for the secret commissions in the sum of £4,907,345.41;
i. Mr Srivastava caused payments to be made to Latest (£40,200) and AAMC (£371,569.92), and these payments were made pursuant to the unlawful means conspiracy to which the First, Second, Sixth, Ninth and Eleventh Defendants were party, accordingly each is liable in damages;
j. Mr Srivastava and Mr Sachdeva, and each of them, caused payments to be made to Mr Noble in the sum of £713,982.61 and these payments were made pursuant to the unlawful means conspiracy to which the First, Second, Sixth and Eleventh Defendants were party, accordingly each is liable in damages;
k. Mr Srivastava received payments from his employer in terms of pension, insurance and sundry expenses to which he was not entitled in the sum of £600,889.66 for which he is liable in damages and in restitution. These payments do not form a part of the conspiracy established and referred to in the sub-paragraphs above.
263. I am grateful to counsel for their assistance in writing and during the trial, and to their instructing solicitors for the orderly presentation of the trial materials.
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