Administrative United Kingdom
YB v The Secretary of State for the Home Department
First-tier Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber)
Appeal Number: PA/61565/2025
THE IMMIGRATION ACTS
Heard at Newport
On 23 October 2026
Before
FIRST-TIER TRIBUNAL JUDGE L Salkeld
Between
YB
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent
Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Joseph, Counsel
For the Respondent: Ms Duffy, Home Office Presenting Officer
DECISION AND REASONS
1. This is the decision of the Tribunal in the appeal of the Appellant against the decision of the Respondent made on 7 March 2025.
Anonymity
2. In making this decision I have considered that justice being administered openly and in public is a fundamental tenet of the justice system but it may be qualified by the interests of the parties and family members. I have decided to make an anonymity direction because the importance of facilitating the discharge of the obligations of the United Kingdom under the Refugee Convention in the circumstances of the case outweighs the principle of open justice.
Background
3. The background to the appeal is contained in the documentation in MyHMCTS.
4. The Appellant asserts that he would be at real risk on return to Turkey because of his actual and imputed political opinion. He relies upon his Kurdish ethnicity, his involvement with the HDP and the political profile of his father and wider family. He claims that he was detained and mistreated in 2018 and 2022, accused of association with the PKK and, during his second detention, pressured to act as an informant. He says that he did not provide the information sought and consequently remains of adverse interest to the Turkish authorities.
The Hearing
5. The hearing took place face to face. It was recorded using the Cloud Video Platform. That recording is the record of proceedings and should be consulted in the event of any dispute about what was said at the hearing.
Agreed and Disputed Issues
6. The Respondent accepts the Appellant’s identity, Turkish nationality, Kurdish ethnicity and membership of the HDP.
7. The Respondent accepts that the harm feared, namely arrest and serious ill-treatment because of the Appellant’s political opinion, would amount to persecution.
8. The issues in dispute are:
(a) whether the Appellant’s account of his political activities, detentions, mistreatment and pressure to act as an informant is credible;
(b) whether he remains of adverse interest to the Turkish authorities; and
(c) whether the Appellant would face a real risk of persecution or treatment contrary to Articles 2 or 3 ECHR on return to Turkey.
9. The Respondent accepts that, if the key material facts are established and the Appellant is at risk from the state, sufficient protection would not be available and internal relocation would not be a viable alternative.
10. Mr Joseph confirmed that the human rights claim stands or falls with the protection claim. No separate case under Article 8 ECHR was advanced.
Evidence
11. The Appellant adopted his witness statement and gave evidence with the assistance of a Turkish interpreter. No issues with interpretation were identified. He was cross-examined by Ms Duffy. I heard submissions from Ms Duffy and Mr Joseph, following which I reserved my decision.
Legal Framework
12. To succeed in an appeal on asylum grounds, the Appellant must show a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason (race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, political opinion). The burden of proof rests on the Appellant. As the asylum claim was made on or after 28 June 2022, section 32 of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 applies. Following the guidance in DS (NABA s.32(2)(a); JCK amended) Afghanistan [2026] UKUT 413 (IAC), I must first determine, on the balance of probabilities:
(a) whether the Appellant has a characteristic which could cause him to fear persecution for a Convention reason (or such a characteristic is attributed to him by an actor of persecution); and
(b) whether the Appellant does in fact fear such persecution.
13. If those questions are answered in the affirmative, I must then determine whether there is a reasonable likelihood that:
(a) the Appellant would be persecuted for that Convention reason;
(b) he would not receive sufficient protection; and
(c) he could not reasonably relocate internally.
14. When answering each of those questions, the evidence must be considered in the round. Section 32 does not require the Tribunal to determine whether each alleged material fact is established on the balance of probabilities.
15. To succeed in an appeal on humanitarian protection grounds the Appellant must not be a refugee; they must show substantial grounds for believing that they would face a real risk of suffering serious harm in their country of origin. The burden of proof rests on the Appellant.
16. My approach to assessing credibility comes from KB & AH (credibility-structured approach) Pakistan [2017] UKUT 491 (IAC) where the Upper Tribunal commended consideration of sufficiency of detail, internal consistency, external consistency and plausibility. I consider any documents along with all the evidence in the round. I am also conscious that just because a person has lied about one thing does not mean he has lied about another.
17. Section 8 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants etc) Act 2004 means that behaviour designed or likely to conceal information, mislead, obstruct or delay consideration of a claim, and claims made after a negative decision has been made or after there was an opportunity to make a claim in a safe country are damaging to credibility.
Findings and Reasons
18. I have considered all the evidence in the round. I refer only to those matters necessary to explain my findings.
Political and Family Profile
19. The Respondent accepts that the Appellant is of Kurdish ethnicity and a member of the HDP. His membership document records that his application for membership was approved on 9 October 2022.
20. The Appellant said that he attended HDP meetings, rallies and demonstrations, participated in election campaigns, distributed leaflets and encouraged other young people to become involved.
21. The Appellant also relied upon the political activities of his father and members of his wider family. He said that his father had held a position within the HDP and had previously been detained and prosecuted because of his political activities. He produced documents which he said related to criminal proceedings involving his father. Some of those documents have not been translated, and I place no reliance upon their contents. The translated judgment identifies the Appellant’s father as a defendant in criminal proceedings arising from a political demonstration. It records that he was detained during the investigation and convicted of offences connected with the demonstration. Although terms of imprisonment were imposed, they were converted into judicial fines. The Appellant did not explain how the judgment was obtained, and there is limited evidence concerning its provenance. Nevertheless, it is a detailed court document containing information specific to his father and the proceedings. Applying the approach in Tanveer Ahmed [2002] UKIAT 00439 and considering the document with the evidence as a whole, I attach weight to it. I find that it supports the Appellant’s evidence that his father was detained, prosecuted and convicted in connection with political protest.
22. The Appellant said that two cousins had been imprisoned because of their political activities and that other members of his extended family were involved with the HDP party. His mother’s and sister’s letters are consistent with that account. I recognise that those letters were written by close family members and their evidence was not tested in cross-examination. The translations also contain apparent errors, for example references to the Appellant’s mother’s wife. Nevertheless, I attach some weight to them because they contain specific details and are broadly consistent with the Appellant’s evidence and the documented political history of his father. I accept that members of the Appellant’s wider family have been involved in Kurdish political activity.
23. The Appellant also gave oral evidence that the family name was well known in his home area because of the family’s association with the HDP. There is no independent evidence to establish the extent to which the name is recognised or the significance attributed to it by the authorities. I nevertheless accept that it may identify the Appellant locally as a member of a politically active family. I do not find that the name alone would place him at risk but I take it into account as one aspect of his overall profile.
The Appellant’s Account of Detention
24. The Appellant said that he was first detained on 16 April 2018, when he was 13 years old. He had attended a political event with his father. He said that the police handcuffed him and that two people associated with the HDP attempted unsuccessfully to prevent the police from taking him away. He was taken to the security headquarters, questioned about his father and his political activities, accused of supporting the PKK, physically mistreated and released the following day.
25. The Appellant said that he was detained for a second time on 22 November 2022. Four plain-clothes officers approached him near his sister’s place of work, handcuffed him and took him to the security headquarters. He was detained for two days, questioned about his father and the HDP, accused of supporting the PKK and subjected to physical and verbal mistreatment.
26. The Appellant said that the officers sought information about future HDP meetings and demonstrations, those involved in its youth activities and his father’s intentions. They required him to act as an informant. He agreed because of the treatment he had received and was released through a rear entrance on the understanding that he would retain the same address and telephone number and provide information about the HDP and his father. Instead, he left his home area and went to Istanbul.
27. The Appellant gave detailed evidence about both detentions at his substantive asylum interview. The central features of that evidence were repeated in his witness statement and oral evidence.
The Respondent’s Credibility Concerns
28. The Respondent did not accept the Appellant’s account. Reliance was placed upon differences between the screening interview and his subsequent evidence, the absence of documentary evidence of either detention, his release without charge and his ability to remain in Istanbul for several months without being found. I address each of those matters below.
The Screening Interview
29. In YL (Rely on SEF) China [2004] UKIAT 00145, the Tribunal confirmed that the purpose of a screening interview is to establish the general nature of an appellant’s case and that answers given at screening may fairly be compared with answers given later. However, a screening interview is not intended to establish in detail the reasons relied upon in support of a protection claim. The Tribunal also recognised that the record may contain an inaccurate summary and that the interview may be conducted when an appellant is tired after a long journey. Those matters must be considered when evaluating any differences between the screening interview and the later evidence.
30. The screening interview was conducted by telephone two days after the Appellant’s arrival in the United Kingdom following a journey which concluded with a small boat crossing. Kurdish is his first language and Turkish is his second, although he described himself as fluent in Turkish. The interpreter changed during the interview without any recorded explanation. The Appellant confirmed at its conclusion that he had understood the questions and did not identify any corrections. However, there is no indication that the answers were read back to him. At the beginning of his substantive interview, he said that neither he nor his representative had received a copy and that he was therefore unable to confirm its accuracy.
31. At screening, the Appellant said that he had been detained at a political meeting approximately four months earlier and handcuffed, but that others prevented the police from taking him to a police station. The timing does not correspond with either of the detentions later alleged, and his later evidence was that he was taken to the security headquarters. These are material differences. However, the intervention of others when he was handcuffed is a distinctive feature of his subsequent account of the April 2018 incident. I attach adverse weight to the differences, while recognising that the answer contains elements of the later account.
32. At screening, the Appellant denied having been involved with, or accused of involvement with, an armed organisation. He later said that the authorities accused him of supporting the PKK. He explained that he understood the question as asking whether he was in fact involved with the PKK, which he has consistently denied. As the question combined actual involvement with an accusation of involvement, I attach some, but limited, adverse weight to the difference.
33. The Appellant also said at screening that he left Turkey by lorry on 20 June 2023. His later evidence was that he flew to Serbia on 16 June 2023 and travelled onwards by lorry. His explanation that the different stages of the journey were confused does not fully account for the different date and method of departure. I attach adverse weight to this discrepancy, although it concerns his route rather than the events underlying the protection claim.
34. There was also a difference concerning the timing of the workplace accident in which the Appellant lost two toes. His evidence about the date was imprecise, but he has consistently attributed the injury to a workplace accident. As the matter is peripheral to his claim, I attach little adverse weight to it.
35. I do not assume that these differences resulted from interpreting errors or disregard them because they arose at screening. I nevertheless take account of the timing and remote nature of the interview, the unexplained change of interpreter and the absence of an opportunity to check the recorded answers against a copy.
36. The discrepancies damage the Appellant’s credibility to some extent. I have also taken account of his reference at the substantive asylum interview to 2 November rather than 22 November 2022. However, he otherwise consistently placed the second detention in November 2022, and identified the date as 22 November in his chronology, witness statement and oral evidence. I attach little adverse weight to that difference. No other material inconsistency was identified between his substantive asylum interview, witness statement and oral evidence concerning the two detentions, the questioning about his father and the HDP, the mistreatment alleged and the pressure placed upon him to act as an informant. Considering the evidence in the round, I do not find that the discrepancies, including those arising from the screening interview, are sufficient to justify rejecting the central account.
Absence of Documentary Evidence and Release Without Charge
37. The Respondent relied upon the absence of documentary evidence of either detention, particularly as the Appellant had produced documents concerning his father.
38. The Appellant said that the 2018 detention was not formal: he was a child, had committed no offence and was released without charge. He said that the November 2022 detention was also unofficial, that he signed no documents and that he was released through a rear entrance after agreeing to act as an informant. His evidence was that no official record was created.
39. Those explanations do not establish that the detentions occurred. However, they are consistent with the nature of the events described. There is no requirement for corroboration and I do not find that the absence of an arrest warrant, charge or detention record materially undermines his account.
40. The photographs said to show the Appellant’s injuries are undated and do not establish when or how the injuries were sustained. I attach limited weight to them.
41. The Respondent also questioned why the authorities would release the Appellant if they considered him to be associated with the PKK. His account is that they wanted information about his father and the HDP and released him after he agreed to provide it. That provides a coherent explanation for his release. His subsequent failure to cooperate provides a reason for continuing adverse interest.
42. It was further submitted that the imprisonment of the Appellant’s cousins for similar political activities was inconsistent with his release. The Appellant explained that he left his home area shortly afterwards and concealed himself in Istanbul, whereas his cousins were subsequently arrested. I take that explanation into account and do not find that the difference in outcome materially undermines his account.
43. The objective evidence provides support for the general plausibility of the Appellant’s account. The July 2025 CPIN records credible allegations of torture and ill-treatment in formal and informal places of detention. It also records many reports of persons being released after arrest or detention on condition that they act as informants for the police, with Kurdish university students and persons from politically involved families identified as particular targets. Conditions of release may include regular reporting and continued monitoring. That evidence does not establish that the events alleged by the Appellant occurred. It is, however, consistent with his account of being mistreated and released after agreeing to provide information about the HDP and his politically active father. [July 2025 Kurds CPIN, paragraphs 10.12.4 and 10.13.1.]
Residence in Istanbul and Continuing Interest
44. The Respondent relied upon the Appellant remaining in Turkey for approximately seven months after the November 2022 detention without being found or rearrested.
45. The Appellant said that he left his home area within one or two days, stayed with a relative in Istanbul and did not live openly. He said that he rarely left the house and did so only at night. His evidence was not that he was subject to continuous nationwide surveillance, but that the authorities continued to visit the family home and ask about him and his father.
46. As set out above, the letters from the Appellant’s mother and sister provide some support for his account that the authorities continued to make enquiries at the family home. I have already addressed the limitations of that evidence and the weight I attach to it.
47. The photographs showing police attending a house are undated and do not establish when, where or why the officers attended. I attach limited weight to them. They do not establish that the police were looking for the Appellant or his father.
48. I do not find it implausible that the Appellant could avoid the authorities temporarily by leaving his home area and concealing himself in Istanbul. His ability to do so for several months does not establish that any adverse interest had ceased or that he could live there openly and safely on a permanent basis.
Section 8
49. The Respondent relied upon the Appellant’s failure to claim asylum in France. At screening, the Appellant said that he had remained concealed in a lorry, did not know the countries through which he travelled and arrived in France on the same day that he crossed the Channel. He also said that he had always intended to come to the United Kingdom.
50. The Appellant’s preference for the United Kingdom does not provide a satisfactory explanation for failing to seek protection elsewhere. However, the evidence does not establish that he spent any appreciable time in France or had a practical opportunity to make a protection claim there. I therefore attach limited adverse weight to this matter and consider it as part of the evidence in the round.
Overall Credibility Assessment
51. I have considered the evidence in the round. The matters relied upon by the Respondent, including the discrepancies in the screening interview, the absence of records of the Appellant’s detentions, the period he remained in Istanbul and his failure to claim asylum in France, cause some damage to his credibility. I have weighed those matters against the explanations given, the consistency of his evidence since the substantive asylum interview and the supporting evidence considered above.
52. The Appellant has given a detailed and materially consistent account of the central events in his substantive asylum interview, witness statement and oral evidence. His account is not established by the documentary or country evidence, but that evidence provides some support for the surrounding circumstances of his account and general plausibility.
53. Considering the evidence as a whole and applying the relevant standard of proof, I accept that the Appellant’s political involvement went beyond passive membership of the HDP. I accept that he attended meetings, rallies and demonstrations, distributed leaflets and organised meetings and activities among university students. He also encouraged other students to support or join the party and acted as a reference for prospective members.
54. I accept that the Appellant was detained in April 2018 and again in November 2022. I accept that, during the second detention, he was questioned about his father and the HDP, accused of association with the PKK, seriously mistreated and required to provide information to the authorities.
55. I accept that the Appellant agreed to act as an informant because of the treatment he received but did not provide the information sought and instead left his home area. I also accept that the authorities subsequently made enquiries about him and his father at the family home.
56. I therefore find that the Appellant came to the adverse attention of the Turkish authorities because of his actual and imputed political opinion.
Determination of the Issues
Question 1: Does the Appellant have a characteristic which could cause him to fear persecution for a Convention reason, or is such a characteristic attributed to him by an actor of persecution?
57. The Appellant is of Kurdish ethnicity and is a member of the HDP. I have accepted that his political involvement went beyond passive membership and that the Turkish authorities accused him of association with the PKK.
58. I am satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that the Appellant has relevant characteristics arising from his Kurdish ethnicity and actual political opinion. I am also satisfied that the Turkish authorities attributed a political opinion to him because of his perceived association with the PKK. Those characteristics are capable of causing him to fear persecution for reasons of race and actual or imputed political opinion. Question 1 is answered affirmatively.
Question 2: Does the Appellant in fact fear persecution for that Convention reason?
59. The Appellant left his home area shortly after his release, concealed himself in Istanbul and subsequently left Turkey. In light of my findings that he was previously detained and mistreated because of his actual or imputed political opinion, considered in the context of his Kurdish ethnicity, I am satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that he genuinely fears persecution for those Convention reasons. Question 2 is answered affirmatively.
Question 3: Is there a reasonable likelihood that the Appellant would be persecuted for that Convention reason?
60. I have considered the risk factors identified in IA and others (Risk-Guidelines-Separatist) Turkey CG [2003] UKIAT 00034, as adopted in IK (Returnees, Records, IFA) Turkey CG [2004] UKIAT 00312. Those factors are not a checklist. The assessment must be made in the round, taking account of the Appellant’s individual profile and the current country evidence.
61. The Appellant would not be at risk merely because he is Kurdish or a member of the HDP. However, his activities extended beyond passive membership. He attended political events, organised meetings and activities among university students, encouraged others to support or join the party and acted as a reference for prospective members. The authorities accused him of association with the PKK. I have accepted that this was an imputed association rather than any actual involvement with that organisation.
62. The Appellant was detained in 2018 and November 2022. The first detention occurred when he was a child and did not cause him to leave Turkey. The later detention was directly connected to his departure. During it, he was questioned about the HDP and his father, accused of association with the PKK and seriously mistreated. Those circumstances indicate that the authorities viewed him as having separatist sympathies.
63. The Appellant was not formally charged. However, he was released after agreeing to provide information about the HDP and his father. His photograph and fingerprints were taken, and he was told not to change his address or telephone number. He was expected to provide information to the authorities but did not do so. The absence of formal charges must be considered in the context of my finding that the detention and release were unofficial.
64. The Appellant’s father has a documented history of detention, prosecution and conviction in connection with political protest. Other members of the wider family have also been involved in Kurdish political activity. The family name does not itself establish risk, but may identify the Appellant locally as a member of a politically active family.
65. Approximately seven months elapsed between the second detention and the Appellant’s departure from Turkey. However, he left his home area within one or two days and spent the intervening period concealing himself in Istanbul rather than living openly. I have also accepted that the authorities continued to make enquiries at the family home. The period before his departure does not therefore indicate that their interest in him had ceased.
66. Of particular significance is that the Appellant was asked to become an informant but failed to provide the information sought. The July 2025 CPIN records that Kurdish university students and persons from politically involved families may be targeted for recruitment as informants. His failure to cooperate provides an additional reason for the authorities to remain interested in him.
67. I have considered the guidance in IK concerning the return process and the records available to the Turkish authorities. The evidence does not enable me to determine whether the Appellant would return on a current Turkish passport or an emergency travel document, and I do not assume that the unofficial detention in November 2022 generated an official record. I therefore do not find that he would necessarily be identified as a person of adverse interest at the airport. However, the relevant question is not confined to the point of arrival. Given his previous adverse attention, political and family profile, failure to provide the information sought and the subsequent enquiries at the family home, I am satisfied that there is a reasonable likelihood that he would come to the attention of the authorities on or after return.
68. Considering these matters cumulatively and taking account of the Appellant’s previous treatment as an indication of the risk he would face again, I am satisfied that there is a reasonable likelihood that he would be detained and subjected to treatment amounting to persecution on return because of his race and actual or imputed political opinion. Question 3 is answered affirmatively.
Question 4: Is there a reasonable likelihood that sufficient protection would not be available?
69. The Respondent accepts that, if the material account is established, sufficient protection would not be available because the feared actor is the state. In light of my findings, Question 4 is answered affirmatively.
Question 5: Is there a reasonable likelihood that the Appellant could not reasonably be expected to relocate within Turkey?
70. The Respondent accepts that, if the material account is established, internal relocation would not be available because the feared actor is the state. In light of my findings, Question 5 is answered affirmatively.
Conclusion
71. The Appellant has established a well-founded fear of persecution in Turkey for reasons of his actual or imputed political opinion, considered in the context of his Kurdish ethnicity. He cannot obtain sufficient protection or reasonably relocate within Turkey.
72. As the Appellant qualifies as a refugee, he does not qualify for humanitarian protection.
73. For the same reasons, I find that there are substantial grounds for believing that the Appellant would face a real risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 ECHR if returned to Turkey.
74. The evidence does not establish a distinct real risk of death requiring a separate finding under Article 2 ECHR. No separate case was advanced under Article 8 ECHR.
Notice of Decision
75. The appeal is allowed on asylum grounds.
76. The appeal is allowed on human rights grounds under Article 3 ECHR.
ANONYMITY ORDER
77. Unless and until the Tribunal, the Upper Tribunal, or, a court orders otherwise, pursuant to rule 13(1)(b) of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Rules 2014, the Appellant and any identified member of his family are granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal either directly or indirectly any information, including their names or their addresses, that is likely to lead members of the public to identify them. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.
To the Respondent – Fee Award
78. No fee is paid or payable and therefore there can be no fee award.
Signature
Signed Date 28 October 2026
L Salkeld
First-tier Tribunal Judge L Salkeld
Our immigration lawyer in Paris assists clients in matters of this kind.
Official sources: view the source page
Open Justice Licence (The National Archives).