Administrative United Kingdom
Rayaan Abdil, R (on the application of) v London Borough of Tower Hamlets
Neutral Citation Number: [2026] EWHC 2738 (Admin)
Case No: AC-2026-LON-004088
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
KING'S BENCH DIVISION
ADMINISTRATIVE COURT
SITTING IN LONDON
Thursday, 29th October 2026
Before:
FORDHAM J
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Between:
| THE KING (on the application of RAYAAN ABDUL (a minor, by his litigation friend Mabel Abdul) |
Claimant | |
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| LONDON BOROUGH OF TOWER HAMLETS | Defendant |
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Mabel Abdul in person for the Claimant
Wayne Beglan (instructed by Legal Services Tower Hamlets) for the Defendant
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Hearing date: 20.10.26
Draft judgment: 23.10.26
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Approved Judgment
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FORDHAM J
Note: This judgment was handed down on 29.10.26 by circulation to the parties and release to the National Archives.
FORDHAM J:
Introduction
1. This is a permission-stage judicial review case where the Court refused to allow a defendant to rely on late documents and decided to disallow any costs of their preparation. This Judgment explains the context and circumstances, and why the Court took that course. The subject-matter of this Judgment matters for three reasons.
i) First, because procedural rigour applies in judicial review, including to a defendant public authority, and including as to: (a) the need to comply with deadlines set by Court direction; and (b) the need to apply for any extension of time properly, in good time, and for good reason. See the Administrative Court Judicial Review Guide 2026 at §§2.1, 13.8 and Annex 5A §2.
ii) Second, because the Court has – and must be prepared to use – a range of sanctions at its disposal to respond to defaults, including by: (a) declining to accept documents which are filed late; and (b) imposing adverse costs orders including disallowing any recovery of the costs of preparing the document. See the JR Guide at §§2.2 and 20.4.6.
iii) Third, because it is important, having regard to the overriding objective and the public interest, for the Court to be clear and transparent in the message it gives.
Permission for judicial review
2. The judicial review claim concerns a four year old child with disabilities, and adaptations made to the family’s home, rented from a housing association. At the heart of the case are questions about the Defendant local authority’s statutory duties, the way in which it approached the Claimant’s needs, and the role played in the decision-making by resources and perceived resource limitations. The case came before me at an oral hearing at 10:30 on 20 October 2026. At the hearing, Mr Beglan for the Defendant told me that – in the circumstances – the Defendant did not resist the grant of permission for judicial review. It is proper for a defendant to concede that permission for judicial review should be granted: see eg. R (K (A Child)) v SSHD [2018] EWHC 1834 (Admin) at §105. I am sure the Defendant was right to take that course in this case. The claim documents filed by the Claimant cross the threshold of arguability with a realistic prospect of success. No permission-stage knock-out blow had been identified by the Defendant, still less one which was identified from or in any response filed and served fairly. As to the legal merits, all I have decided is that the claim is arguable. I drew the parties’ attention – on the question whether this claim will prove to have been an impermissible “rolling judicial review” – to R (Raja) v Redbridge LBC [2020] EWHC 1456 (Admin) [2020] PTSR 2129.
The 17 September 2026 Order of the Court
3. This Court (DHCJ Guy Vassall-Adams KC) made an Order on 17 September 2026. This was an important Order, in the first place because it explained to the parties that the Claimant’s application for urgent interim mandatory relief had been refused. The Claimant had filed a claim (N461) and application for urgent consideration (N463) on 3 September 2026. An Order (Tipples J) on 4 September 2026 gave directions for a response from the Defendant by 5m on 9 September 2026. The Defendant had responded on 8 September 2026, and the Claimant had replied that same day. The Order of 17 September 2026 (§1) refused the application for interim relief and gave reasons.
4. In the second place, the Order of 17 September 2026 was important because it made these directions (§§2-6):
2. This claim shall be expedited. The case should be listed before a single Judge for a permission decision as soon as the following directions have been complied with.
3. The Claimant must amend his Claim Form properly to identify the Defendant’s decision, action or failure said to amount to a public law wrong.
4. The Claimant must file a chronology with the amended Claim Form, setting out each of the decisions made in respect of the Claimant’s needs and the housing adaptations concerning those needs, cross-referenced to the relevant correspondence and other documents.
5. Steps 3 and 4 must be complied with within 14 days.
6. The Defendant shall, within 14 days of service by the Claimant of the amended Claim Form, chronology and supporting documents, file and serve (a) Detailed Grounds for contesting the claim, and (b) any written evidence that is to be relied on. The Defendant must ensure that any relevant documents not already provided by the Claimant are provided as part of its evidence. The Defendant must also identify any material omissions or inaccuracies in the Claimant’s chronology and if there are significant omissions, the Defendant must provide its own chronology.
5. The reasons within the Order included this:
This is a very sad and difficult case that needs to be expedited. The best I can do at present is to make a series of directions the purpose of which is to provide the Judge who is tasked with making the decision on permission with the information necessary for that purpose. There will be an abridged timetable because of the Claimant’s high degree of vulnerability.
Timing of a skeleton argument
6. There is general guidance in the JR Guide, that any skeleton argument should be served “at least two working days before” a listed hearing (§20.4.3) and that, if filed late, the Court may refuse to permit reliance on it and may disallow costs (§20.4.5). The Order of 17 September 2026 did not make provision for the Defendant to file any skeleton argument. It is not difficult to see why. The Order did make provision for “Detailed Grounds for contesting the claim” (§6(a)). The next Judge would not need a skeleton argument, because she or he would have these Detailed Grounds. In this case, the Defendant was not entitled to default on the provision of Detailed Grounds, and instead provide a later skeleton argument. There was no need to do both. But if the Defendant did want to do both, two clear working days were needed for the skeleton argument.
Timing of an authorities bundle
7. There is general guidance in the JR Guide, that any authorities bundle should be served “in good time” and “at least 3 clear days before the hearing” unless “the urgency of the application makes this impossible” (§§22.3.2 and 22.3.3). The Order of 17 September 2026 did not make provision for the Defendant to file any authorities bundle. Relevant authorities should have been identified in the Detailed Grounds. There should then have been a clear communication of when a bundle would be provided. The minimum was 3 clear days before the hearing. It could well have been unreasonable to refuse to provide them earlier than that, especially if requested following receipt of the Grounds and communication.
No response
8. The Claimant’s documents were filed and served, pursuant to §§3-4 of the Order, well within the prescribed 14 days (§5). In fact, that was done on 18 September 2026. It followed that the Defendant’s deadline (§6) was within 14 days of 18 September 2026, namely by 2 October 2026. The hearing was fixed for Tuesday 20 October 2026, the Court staff sensibly adopted the position that it should be fixed to allow the prescribed time for the Defendant to have “complied with” the deadline (cf. §2). The papers were allocated to me, for the hearing and for pre-reading. There was no response from the Defendant. I asked the Court staff to check the Court’s email in-boxes. That search elicited nothing.
Reaction and explanation
9. I asked the Court staff to contact the Defendant about the absence of a response. On Wednesday 14 October 2026 at 13:18 a member of the Court staff sent an email to the Defendant’s solicitor Mr Onuba. It was headed: “please action as per Judge instruction”. It said: “The court kindly asks for a response as soon as possible. Please see paragraph 6 of the attached order for reference”. The Order of 17 September 2026 was attached. Twenty-four hours later, at 13:27 on Thursday 15 October 2026, an email from Mr Onuba to the Court gave his reaction. It read as follows:
Please can you let me know what I am supposed to do as I only received this order yesterday and there is no way that I can apply with this order and also seek the relevant instructions from the client department to comply with this order dated 17 September 2026.
10. I am not going to make any further observations about that reaction email in this Judgment. That is because I have made a direction requiring Mr Onuba to file and serve a witness statement “explaining how he came to communicate to the Court on 15.10.26 at 13:27 an unawareness of the court order of 17.9.26”.
11. On Monday 19 October 2026, I consulted the CE File and found an email dated 17 September 2026 at 16:10 from the Court addressed to the Claimant’s mother and litigation friend (Mrs Abdul) and to Mr Onuba, attaching the Order of 17 September 2026. I also found a letter dated 25 September 2026, originally fixing the oral permission hearing for 25 September 2026. At my instruction, the staff emailed both parties at 10:19 on 19 October 2026, pasting Mr Onuba’s reaction email, and stating: “the Judge wants a full explanation from [the] Defendant as to what communications it received”. The email sending the Order and the listing letter were attached. At 11:58 on 19 October 2026, an email from Mr Onuba to the Court gave his explanation. It read as follows:
In light of the email and upon reviewing my inbox, I can confirm that I did receive the email from the court dated the 17 September 2026. Admittedly due to some administrative oversight or error in the matter, I mistakenly did not and was unable to respond or comply with the directions as per the Order … I apologise to the court for this error and oversight and I can confirm that I did receive the Claimant’s Amended Grounds but did not respond as I had not actually noticed or reviewed the Order dated 17 September 2026 where the [Defendant] at paragraph 6 was ordered to … [the text of para 6 was then set out]. The Defendant sincerely apologises for this administrative oversight and any inconvenience this may have cause[d] or will cause in the proceedings …
12. I am not going to make any further observations about that explanation email in this Judgment. That is because I have directed that the required witness statement from Mr Onuba must be one “giving ‘the full explanation as to what communications the Defendant received’ described in the Court’s email of 19.10.26 at 10:19”.
Late documents
13. As to the documents filed and served ahead of the oral permission hearing on Tuesday 20 October 2026, the position was as follows. I read the documents “de bene esse”, in order the better to see and decide whether I should permit reliance on them.
i) No Detailed Grounds of resistance were ever filed.
ii) No document was ever filed which served to “identify any material omissions or inaccuracies in the Claimant’s chronology”, nor did the Defendant “provide its own chronology”.
iii) At 16:40 on Friday 16 October 2026, Mr Onuba emailed the Court referring to the hearing on 20 October 2026 and saying “please see attached witness statement and attached exhibits on behalf of the Home Improvement Agency Manager”, continuing “I will file and serve another witness statement shortly”, and finally “the claimant is also copied in”. The attachments were an 8-page witness statement and 131 pages of exhibits.
iv) At 11:38 on Monday 19 October 2026, Mr Onuba emailed the Court referring to the hearing “tomorrow” and saying “please see attached signed witness statement and attached exhibits on behalf of the NHS Occupational Therapist”, adding “the claimant is also copied in”. The attachments were a further 8-page witness statement and 185 pages of exhibits.
v) No application (Form N244) was filed, at any time, for an extension of time. No reference was made, in any communication I have seen, to needing an extension of time or seeking one; nor to any reason why the Court should grant one.
vi) At 15:41 on 19 October 2026, Counsel (Mr Beglan) sent a 15-page skeleton argument direct to my clerk. It was filed and served immediately thereafter. Counsel’s email acknowledged that “the Defendant has been late with various documents including the attached skeleton argument” and offered “my apologies”.
vii) At the hearing on 20 October 2026 at 10:30, Mrs Abdul told me she had received a 418-page hearing bundle at 7pm the previous evening, a 272-page bundle of authorities at 08:11 that morning, and yet further documents at about 9am.
14. I had no hesitation in declining to allow the Defendant to rely on any of these documents and disallowing the Defendant from recovering any costs of their preparation, and any costs of the permission hearing, whoever wins or loses this case at the end of the day. In the event, Mr Beglan did not resist permission for judicial review. He also fairly acknowledged that it was appropriate for the Court to mark its disapproval, and that one course open to the Court was a disallowance of costs. This was a very clear set of breaches of an Order of the Court, as well as contraventions of the guidance in the JR Guide. The skeleton argument, itself unfairly late, could not through the back door properly or fairly provide the substance which should have been within Detailed Grounds as directed by the Court. There was a wholesale failure to acknowledge the defaults. There was no attempt or even reference to applying for extensions of time. It was all as if compliance was optional, a belated industry with a brief apology would do the trick, and the Court’s wish to make an informed decision in the public interest would leave it with no option but to excuse the default. There is no place for such an attitude: see FRY v SSD [2026] EWHC 2571 (Admin) at §34. Nobody suggested an adjournment. This hearing had been fixed, pursuant to an Order designed to achieve expedition. If this had been an urgent substantive hearing, there could have been a rule of law dilemma for the Court to consider, involving the interests of justice and the public interest in ensuring a properly informed substantive resolution of the issues in this case. I say nothing about how that would be approached and resolved. At this expedited permission stage, I found no similar dilemma.
15. A number of features of the case served to aggravate the Defendant’s defaults, and served as reinforcement for the decisions which I made.
i) First, Mrs Adbul acts in person. She is balancing looking after the Claimant and fighting his claim as his advocate. On the face of it, she has herself conducted these proceedings with full and prompt compliance with all rules, practice requirements and directions. I am not convinced that any litigant should be placed in the position of receiving materials in the way that she did. But receipt of those materials, as a mother in a case of such importance for her young child, at a hearing which could have terminated the proceedings in the High Court, and lacking the experience to know how the Court would react, was an intolerable position to be placed in. The Defendant should have apologised properly. It should have promptly conceded permission, ahead of the hearing, not half way through it. Mr Beglan rightly recognised that the defaults were serious; that the documents were much too late; that this was inexcusable; and that it was especially unacceptable where Mrs Abdul was acting in person, and given her circumstances and the ramifications of the case.
ii) Second, the background sequence of communications. The documents which I have seen clearly reinforce the inexcusability of the defaults, and the weakness of the Defendant’s suggestion that there was a Court Order which was “overlooked”. The evidenced picture is as follows. (1) The Order was received by the Defendant (17.9.26 at 16:20). Its contents must have mattered, not least because they told the Defendant whether it was or was not under an Order of mandatory interim relief. Its terms were clear. (2) The Claimant’s documents pursuant to §§3-4 of the Order were received by the Defendant (18.9.26 at 04:19), and Mr Onuba acknowledged them and said “I will ensure that these are passed on to the relevant departments for further instructions” (18.9.26 at 11:24). (3) The Court’s email notification of oral hearing (then fixed for 13.10.26) was received by the Defendant (25.9.26 at 15:53). (4) The Court’s email follow up (29.9.26 at 11:45) referred to the Defendant’s deadline for filing documents as 11.10.26, 14 days after the Claimants’ were due on 27.9.26. The listing letter (29.9.26) fixed the hearing for 20.10.26. (5) The Claimant wrote a clear email to the Court and the Defendant (29.9.26 at 11:54) pointing to the terms of the Order of 17.9.26, and correctly explaining that the Defendant’s deadline was 14 days from 18.9.26, namely 2.10.26. (6) The Claimant wrote another clear email to the Court and the Defendant (12.10.26 at 10:01) attaching her own skeleton argument, in accordance with the JR Guide, and a supplementary bundle. She referred to the upcoming hearing on 20.20.26. Mr Onuba acknowledged these documents (12.10.26 at 10:42).
iii) Third, the manner and tone of the communications. None of the communications from the Defendant to the Court, into which Mrs Abdul was copied, contains any apology to her. There is no recognition of her circumstances. There is no hint of empathy or appreciation. There is no contrition; no acknowledgement that the Defendant will need an extension of time; no recognition that it might not obtain an extension of time. They are ‘front foot’ litigation communications, suggestive of entitlement. They simply provide the very late documents ahead of the hearing, as though the Defendant was simply entitled to provide them so late. There is no hint that the Defendant might choose not to, or find itself unable to, resist permission being granted. Mr Beglan rightly accepted that it is appropriate for the Court to seek to put itself in the shoes of Mrs Abdul, and consider what her human experience must have been in receiving these materials in this way. She was able to write in response, indicating the outrage which she justifiably felt, at the way she was treated by the Defendant. In her oral submissions, she invited me to exclude the materials from the case going forward to the substantive hearing and bar the Defendant from filing anything else. But she also told me that she did not wish to hide anything from the Court and would not object to the use of the materials at the substantive hearing, if the Court considered it appropriate. That was a measured response to what has been a disturbing and disarming sequence of events and communications. I was satisfied that it was just and appropriate to allow the evidence to be relied on by the Defendant, going forward, and to allow a short further window of time (3.11.26) for the Detailed Grounds and any further Defendant’s evidence, with 7 days (10.11.26) for the Claimant to reply, with directions to an expedited substantive hearing (1.12.26).
Candour
16. I am conscious that there can be questions relating to candour. A public authority defendant owes a duty of candour, including at the permission stage. Circumstances could arise in which a defendant may wish to disclose documents, even if they are late, for a permission hearing, so as to make sure that the Court has materials which can assist the claim or undermine the defence. The Claimant and the permission Judge are entitled to know from the defendant whether it says it has discharged its duty of candour or not. The answer, where discharge of the duty of candour comes very late, may well be to grant permission for judicial review. In the present case, if the Defendant wanted to provide documents which assisted the Claimant, this could have been done with a clear communication saying what that material was and why it was relevant in that way. That is not what happened. None of this can excuse what happened. Here, the late documents were being marshalled to support resistance to permission for judicial review. The appropriate course was that they were excluded, for the purposes of the permission hearing, with the Court granting permission for judicial review.
Order
17. The relevant terms of my Order were as follows. (1) The Defendant is prevented from relying at this permission hearing on: (i) the witness statement evidence filed on 16 October 2026 and 19 October 2026 with exhibits; (ii) the witness statement evidence filed on 19 October 2026 with exhibits; and (iii) a skeleton argument filed on 19 October 2026. (2) The Defendant shall not, in any circumstances hereafter, recover its costs of: (i) the preparation of any of the materials referred to in paragraph (1) above; or (ii) this hearing.
Postscript
18. It is appropriate that I record that, after I had circulated this judgment in draft, Mr Onuba duly filed a witness statement and exhibits, in compliance with the direction I had made (see §§10 and 12 above). It is sufficient for present purposes to record the following. (1) Mr Onuba has accepted that inaccurate statements were made to the Court, for which he has taken responsibility and apologised to the Court, recognising that he “should have checked the position carefully before informing … the Court that the Order had only been received recently”. (2) Mr Onuba has explained and evidenced that he did send an email chronology of communications. This was sent to the Court and Mr Beglan at 22:33 on 19 October 2026. I was not aware of this at the hearing. I note that the email does not appear to have been copied to Mrs Abdul, notwithstanding that the Court’s email requesting the explanation had said clearly: “All communications should be cc’d to the Claimant, who may wish to comment”. (3) The substantive hearing is scheduled to take place before me on 1 December 2026 and I will, in any event, be able to consider any further submissions from either party arising out of the witness statement. This Judgment stands as the reasoned explanation for the decisions which I made at the permission stage.
Official sources: view the source page
Open Justice Licence (The National Archives).