Tax United Kingdom

Frasers Group Financial Services Limited v The Commissioners for HMRC

Official source

Neutral Citation: [2026] UKFTT 01496 (TC)

Case Number: TC 10078

FIRST-TIER TRIBUNAL

TAX CHAMBER

Taylor House, London

Appeal references: TC/2022/11334

TC/2023/09234

TC/2023/09403

TC/2023/09838

TC/2023/09854

VALUE ADDED TAX – attribution of input tax – whether photography and modelling costs had a direct and immediate link with exempt supplies of credit as well as taxable supplies of goods – apportionment of residual marketing costs between taxable and exempt supplies – whether standard turnover method gave rise to distortions – whether alternative methods guaranteed a more precise apportionment –Article 1, Article 168, Article 173 and Article 174 of the Principal VAT Directive 2006/112/EC – Ss24-26 Value Added Tax Act 1994 – Regulations 101-102B Value Added Tax Regulations 1995 – powers of the Tribunal in relation to an appeal against HMRC's refusal to accept a proposed partial exemption special method – powers of the Tribunal in relation to an appeal against assessments following the issue by HMRC of a standard method override notice – whether assessments made out of time –– s73(6) Value Added Tax Act 1994

Heard on: 22-25 September 2026

Judgment date: 28 October 2026

Before

TRIBUNAL JUDGE ROBIN VOS

MR MOHAMMED FAROOQ

Between

FRASERS GROUP FINANCIAL SERVICES LIMITED

Appellant

and

THE COMMISSIONERS FOR HIS MAJESTY’S REVENUE AND CUSTOMS

Respondents

Representation:

For the Appellant: VALENTINA SLOANE KC of counsel, instructed by Eversheds Sutherland (International) LLP

For the Respondents: HOWARD WATKINSON of counsel, instructed by the General Counsel and Solicitor to HM Revenue and Customs

DECISION

Introduction

1. These appeals concern the extent to which, for VAT purposes, marketing costs incurred by the appellant related to taxable supplies made by it rather than supplies which were exempt from VAT. This in turn determines the amount of VAT incurred in relation to those costs which can be claimed as a credit against the VAT charged on the taxable supplies.

2. The appellant is currently known as Frasers Group Financial Services Limited. However, during the period relevant to these appeals (July 2018 to March 2022), it was known as Studio Retail Limited. The parties therefore refer to the appellant as “Studio” and we will do the same.

3. During the relevant period, Studio sold a wide range of goods (including for example clothes, gifts, toys and homeware) through catalogues and online. Most customers paid for the goods on credit and the majority of customers incurred interest.

4. The supplies of the goods themselves are within the scope of VAT whereas the supplies of credit, represented by the interest charged, are exempt from VAT. This is why it is necessary to examine whether certain costs incurred by Studio related both to the taxable supplies of goods and the exempt supplies of credit and, if so, how the costs should be apportioned between those supplies.

5. Studio has appealed against a number of assessments made by HMRC who have taken the view that the costs should be apportioned by reference to the proportion of the total income of Studio generated by taxable supplies compared to the proportion of that income which relates to exempt supplies (often referred to as the standard turnover method). This results in approximately £2.7m of VAT each year being irrecoverable.

6. Studio has put forward two main arguments in support of its appeal against the assessments. The first is that, what it refers to as photography and modelling costs (i.e. the cost of producing the photographs of the goods which appear in the catalogues and online) relate only to the supply of goods and not to the supplies of credit so that the VAT incurred in respect of those costs should be recoverable in full. This would result in approximately £60,000 a year of additional input VAT being allowed as a credit.

7. Studio's second point is that the standard turnover method produces distortions in relation to the apportionment of marketing (but not other) costs between taxable and exempt supplies. It originally put forward five alternative methods of apportioning such costs. However, by the end of the hearing, Studio only pursued two of these alternative methods, one of them subject to modification compared to the proposal put forward prior to the hearing. If either of these proposed alternatives were accepted by the Tribunal, the irrecoverable VAT would be reduced to around £2.3m-£2.5m a year.

8. There is a further appeal against a decision by HMRC to reject a partial exemption special method (“PESM”) proposed by Studio in 2023 (the “2023 PESM”). This is one of the proposed methods of apportioning the input costs put forward by Studio in its appeal against the various assessments and is the method which Studio seeks to amend.

9. It does not appear that the appeal against the refusal of the 2023 PESM will have any financial impact separate from the appeals against the assessments themselves although we must of course determine the appeal against the refusal of the 2023 PESM as a separate matter.

10. In relation to two specific assessments (for the 09/19 and 03/20 VAT periods), Studio argues that the assessments were made outside the statutory time limit and are therefore not valid.

Procedural matters

11. We should mention that, as well as abandoning its reliance on some of the alternative methods of apportioning costs between taxable and exempt supplies, Studio also indicated prior to the hearing that it would not pursue two other aspects of its appeals.

12. The first relates to the allocation of costs relating to a call centre in the Philippines between taxable and exempt supplies (appeal number TC/2023/09403). Studio now accepts that these costs should be allocated using the standard turnover method adopted by HMRC when making the assessments.

13. The second point which Studio no longer pursues is an appeal which had been made against HMRC's refusal of a proposed partial exemption special method put forward in 2022 (appeal number TC/2023/09854).

14. It follows that these two appeals are dismissed.

15. In its grounds of appeal, Studio had also argued that in making the assessments HMRC had not applied “best judgment”. Ms Sloane however clarified at the hearing that this is not relied on as a separate ground of appeal but is simply a reflection of Studio’s challenge to HMRC’s refusal to countenance any basis of apportionment between taxable and exempt supplies other than the standard turnover method. We do not therefore deal with this as a separate issue.

16. At the end of June 2026, HMRC applied for a stay of these appeals pending the final resolution of any appeals relating to the decision of the First-tier Tribunal in Littlewoods Limited v HMRC [2025] UKFTT 01602 (TC). That case dealt with the attribution of photography and modelling costs in similar circumstances to this case.

17. The stay application was however refused on the basis that these appeals deal not only with the attribution of photography and modelling costs but also the wider apportionment of costs between taxable and exempt supplies. It was in any event noted that questions of attribution are highly fact specific and the outcome of one case will not necessarily determine the outcome of another.

18. There was some suggestion in the papers provided to the Tribunal that the appeals against some of the assessments might have been made outside the statutory thirty day time limit. To the extent that there are any late appeals, HMRC do not object to them. In any event it seems that the late appeals relate to the appeal against the call centre assessment and the refusal of the 2022 PESM which are not pursued.

19. If any other appeals are out of time we give permission for the appeals to be notified to the Tribunal outside the statutory time limit as, having considered all the circumstances, it would not in our view be consistent with the overriding objective of dealing with cases fairly and justly to refuse permission some three years after the appeals have been notified to the Tribunal, at the start of the substantive hearing of the appeals and in circumstances where HMRC do not object.

20. We should record that we raised with Mr Watkinson, appearing for HMRC, the length of his skeleton argument which ran to 88 pages (compared to 42 pages for Ms Sloane, representing Studio), noting the comment of the Tribunal in Hackett v HMRC [2024] UKFTT 00749 (TC) at [19] that there was "nothing skeletal” about a 58 page skeleton argument.

21. We appreciate that such a document (which, in reality, contains detailed submissions rather than an outline of the points to be made and the authorities relied on) may be helpful to the Tribunal and may reduce the need for lengthy oral submissions. However, we do not think it appropriate for a party to provide the Tribunal with a document which clearly is not a skeleton argument without first explaining to the Tribunal why such a document is felt to be appropriate and seeking permission to do so.

22. We have been informed that HMRC has made further assessments for the VAT periods 06/22-04/23 and that Studio has notified appeals against these assessments to the Tribunal. Those appeals have however been stayed pending the outcome of these appeals as the issues are materially identical. We do not therefore address those appeals although we appreciate that the outcome of Studio’s appeals against those assessments is likely to be informed by our decision.

THE EVIDENCE

23. We were provided with a number of bundles of documents and correspondence amounting in total to approximately 5,000 pages as well as various spreadsheets in electronic format. We were also given links to some YouTube videos which gave examples of Studio's television advertising.

24. The documents included witness statements from three individuals, all of whom gave oral evidence and were cross-examined at the hearing.

25. We have no doubt that all three witnesses were honest in the evidence they gave and were doing their best to assist the Tribunal. There are however a few points we should mention in relation to their evidence.

26. Evidence on behalf of HMRC was given by Mr Robin Williamson. This evidence related to the suggestion that some of the assessments had been made out of time which, as we shall see, depends on the opinion of the assessing officer. Although Mr Williamson was an important part of the team dealing with HMRC's inquiries, he was not the assessing officer in relation to any of the assessments in question. We have therefore needed to consider whether we can make inferences based on his evidence and the other evidence before us.

27. Mr Paul Kendrick (the Managing Director/CEO of Studio at the relevant time) gave evidence on behalf of Studio. There were a number of areas where the evidence given in his witness statement was shown to be incorrect or incomplete. He dealt with two of these points prior to cross-examination. There were however other points which only came to light during cross-examination.

28. The position in relation to Mr Sam Jones (Director of Finance at Studio during the relevant period), is similar. Some errors in his witness statement were corrected before cross-examination but others were revealed during the course of cross-examination.

29. These inconsistencies did not in our view affect the credibility of either Mr Kendrick or Mr Jones as witnesses. As we have said, we are entirely satisfied that they were being truthful. Instead, we attribute the inaccuracies in some cases to lapses of memory and in other cases to the fact that Mr Kendrick and, particularly, Mr Jones did not have detailed involvement in some of the marketing activities in question. It does however mean that, where relevant, we have placed more reliance on the documentary evidence.

BACKGROUND FACTS

30. There is no real dispute between the parties in relation to the underlying facts which are relevant to these appeals. The question is rather how the relevant legal principles relating to the attribution and apportionment of costs for VAT purposes should be applied in the light of those facts.

31. The factual background is particularly important. As has been noted in many of the cases to which we were referred, small factual differences can lead to different outcomes (see, for example, David Richards LJ in Royal Opera House Covent Garden Foundation v HMRC [2021] EWCA Civ 910 at [3]).

Background to the business

32. As we have previously explained, Studio's business involved selling a wide range of goods both through catalogues and online. It had no physical shops.

33. Studio offered its customers a credit account known as Studio Pay and was regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority in respect of this part of its business. Studio Pay operated a little like a credit card in that customers had to make a minimum payment each month (the higher of £10 and 6% of the outstanding balance) and interest was incurred if the full balance was not paid off by a set date. If a customer failed to make the minimum payment, they ceased to receive any marketing materials and would not be permitted to order any further goods.

34. The rates of interest charged on the credit account were high, although depended on the individual customer. The typical APR was 49.9% (subsequently reduced to 39.9%). The actual APR charged to individual customers varied between 24.9% and 64.9%.

35. Due to the regulatory environment, Studio had to be careful in marketing Studio Pay. It could not, for example, encourage customers to incur interest or to go into default.

36. Studio nonetheless encouraged customers to open a credit account. This was not just because a credit account was likely to generate interest income but also because customers with a credit account placed more orders and spent more money whether or not they in fact paid any interest.

37. The business was significant. It had around two million customers and total revenues which varied between around £390m-£580m during the period in question. Approximately 90% of all purchases were made on credit account. Only about 15% of customers paid off their balances in full each month and so 85% of credit account customers incurred interest. On average, customers with a credit account paid off about 12% of their balance each month.

38. Both parts of the business were important, with credit interest during the relevant period consistently amounting to approximately 20%-24% of total revenues.

39. Although Studio has various performance metrics relating to interest income, it is not able to track the precise amount of interest generated by a particular purchase given that the balance of a customer’s credit account fluctuates all the time due to repayments and new orders.

40. Studio freely acknowledges that its business model was to provide integrated supplies of goods and credit. There was a symbiotic relationship between the two. As Mr Kendrick explained, Studio's ideal customer was one who made regular orders, made use of the credit account and paid interest. The purchase of goods on credit led to predictable and significant interest income whilst customers who had a credit account purchased more goods than other customers. Studio's figures show that credit account customers made three to four purchases a year, that the average order was £75 and that the average annual spend by customers with a credit account was £250.

Studio’s marketing materials

41. Studio marketed its supplies of goods and of credit in a number of ways. The primary marketing was through the regular catalogues which were sent to existing or prospective customers and through its website.

42. In addition, Studio also distributed promotional leaflets (which might, for example, be sent to customers with their monthly credit account statement) and emails. Some of these separate marketing materials focused more on the credit side of the business.

43. Studio also offered promotional deals for Studio Pay, such as an "interest saver" promotion, which allowed a customer a grace period of, say, three months before having to pay any interest. These promotional offers were referenced in all of the types of marketing we have mentioned.

44. All of these marketing channels used the photographs of the goods to which the photography and modelling costs relate.

45. As well as these marketing materials, Studio produced television advertisements. Contrary to their witness statements, both Mr Kendrick and Mr Jones confirmed in their oral evidence that the photography and modelling costs used to create photographs of products for the catalogue, leaflets and website were not used in relation to the television advertisements, which were produced entirely separately. We accept this evidence. These advertisements are not therefore relevant when considering whether the photography and modelling costs were used in relation to the supplies of credit.

46. Studio accepts that all of its marketing materials promote both the supply of goods and the supply of credit and that, with the exception of the photography and modelling costs, all of those costs therefore need to be apportioned between taxable and exempt supplies. We do not therefore need to deal individually with each category of marketing cost other than the photography and modelling costs, which Studio maintains were used only in relation to its supplies of goods and not credit.

47. In order to determine these appeals, we need to look in a bit more detail at the nature of the various marketing materials. We start with the catalogues which each ran to several hundred pages and were produced three or four times a year.

48. The majority of the pages of the catalogues contain photographs of the products which are for sale, a description of the product and the price of the product as well as the website address and a telephone number through which orders could be placed. Most of the pages do not refer to purchasing on credit or to Studio Pay.

49. There are however a limited number of pages where the words “flexible payments” and “Studio Pay” (contained in a box with a consistent design) are superimposed onto the photograph of a particular product. As noted by Mr Watkinson, these messages tend to appear on the photographs of higher value items, although by no means all of the higher value items include such wording.

50. This is consistent with Studio's strategy, apparent from its board papers, of using credit to encourage customers to purchase higher priced goods which they would not otherwise be able to afford. Mr Kendrick confirmed in his evidence that some guidance was given to those individuals responsible for designing catalogues and web pages as to where to put the messages promoting credit. Mr Jones also acknowledged that references to Studio Pay in the catalogue are deliberately weighted towards higher value products.

51. In addition to the references to Studio Pay which appear on the photos of some of the products as described above, the catalogue also contains some separate pages describing Studio Pay in more detail or promoting an “interest saver” offer. These pages do not generally contain any photographs but simply explain how the credit account and/or interest saver promotion works.

52. Mr Kendrick's unchallenged evidence, which (having reviewed the sample catalogues) we accept, was that only approximately 5% of the pages of the paper catalogues contained both photographs of products and references to credit.

53. Turning to the website, we did not have a live version of the website which was in use at the relevant time, but had screenshots of numerous pages produced from an archive.

54. What is presumably a landing page when a customer first enters the website allows a customer to click on a particular category of products, such as “Womens”, “Toys” or “Gifts”. This page contains some photos of a product in the particular category but does not mention credit.

55. However, the landing page for a particular category such as the “Womens” section has a banner with the words “spread the cost” and offering free delivery and a 20% discount for customers who open a credit account as well as containing options to click on photos which lead to various subcategories (such as “Footwear”, or “Top Brands”). If a customer clicks on the banner, more details of the credit account or the promotion are given.

56. When a customer clicks on a specific product, they are taken to a page which relates only to that product. The page contains photos of the product, a description of the product and the price. It also has a banner at the top making some reference to Studio Pay and/or credit.

57. A significant number (well over half) of the individual product pages we were supplied with also contained a box directly underneath the price referring to Studio Pay and with an arrow pointing at the price. A typical example reads “Pay no interest for three months on all orders £50 or more. Representative 39.9% APR variable”. This is accompanied by the Studio Pay logo. The customer is able to click on a link to “learn more” which brings up a box giving more details about how Studio Pay and the interest saver option works.

58. In addition, underneath the link to add the item to the customer's bag there is a further box relating to delivery, Studio's returns policy and the Studio Pay credit account. The wording for Studio Pay reads “Shop now pay later with a Studio Pay credit account”.

59. As with the catalogues, the website also contained separate pages explaining the Studio Pay credit account in more detail. Most of these pages do not contain photographs. Based on Mr Kendrick's evidence and the photographs themselves, we accept that, where such pages did include photographs, they were stock photographs and are not photographs of specific products offered by Studio.

60. We had examples of a number of marketing leaflets. These would typically show photographs of a limited number of products with a brief description and the price of the product together with prominent messages about “spreading the cost”, “Studio Pay”, “flexible payments” and/or interest saver options. Mr Kendrick’s evidence (which we accept as it was not challenged) was that, out of a library of several hundred thousand photographs of Studio’s products, no more than a few hundred would have been used for the purposes of such leaflets.

Background to the assessments and decisions being appealed

61. For many years, Studio had been using a PESM approved by HMRC in 2005 to determine how much of the VAT paid in respect of its costs which were not attributable exclusively to taxable supplies or to exempt supplies should be recoverable.

62. On 25 June 2018, HMRC issued a partial exemption special method override notice (“SMON”) under regulation 102A Value Added Tax Regulations 1995 (“VATR”). In accordance with s 102B VATR, this required Studio to determine the amount of recoverable input tax in accordance with the use, or intended use, of goods and services in making taxable supplies.

63. Towards the end of 2019, HMRC started to investigate the way in which Studio had apportioned its costs between taxable and exempt supplies since the SMON had been issued.

64. During the course of the investigation, it emerged that in apportioning costs, Studio had only taken into account exempt income in the form of credit interest which, based on various assumptions, was calculated as having been received within 12 months of the sale of the goods giving rise to the payments of interest. In addition, photography and modelling costs had been treated as attributable solely to taxable supplies and so had not been apportioned between taxable and exempt supplies.

65. Ultimately, HMRC did not accept that the method used by Studio resulted in a fair and reasonable apportionment of its costs between taxable and exempt supplies. As a result, HMRC issued a number of VAT assessments under s 73 Value Added Tax Act 1994 (“VATA”).

66. The calculations used by HMRC for these assessments took the position that the photography and modelling costs were attributable both to the taxable supplies of goods and the exempt supplies of credit and therefore formed part of the residual costs which had to be apportioned between such taxable and exempt supplies. All of the residual costs were then apportioned based on the standard turnover method using the full amount of income actually received by Studio from taxable supplies and exempt supplies.

67. The assessments were issued at various times between October 2021 and June 2023 and, together, related to all VAT periods from the 09/18 VAT period to the 03/22 VAT period. Some of the assessments were subsequently reduced. In aggregate, the assessments (as reduced) come to a total of a little over £5.6m. These assessments also included some adjustments in relation to the apportionment of the costs of the call centre in the Philippines. As we have mentioned, Studio does not pursue its appeal in respect of the apportionment of these costs.

68. As part of its discussions with HMRC, Studio put forward an alternative PESM in 2022 which was rejected by HMRC in August 2022. Although Studio has appealed against HMRC's decision to reject the 2022 PESM, as we have already mentioned, it does not now pursue that appeal.

69. Studio also proposed a further alternative PESM in 2023 which, in apportioning costs, only took account of interest expected (based on various assumptions) to be generated from sales taking place within the relevant period rather than the actual amounts of exempt interest received in that period. This was also rejected by HMRC in July 2023. Studio has appealed against that decision although, as we shall see, it accepts that the proposal contains an error and invites the Tribunal to uphold the 2023 PESM with some variations.

Issues for the Tribunal

70. There are a number of issues which we must address. The first is whether the photography and modelling costs are attributable solely to the taxable supplies of goods or whether they are also attributable to the exempt supplies of credit.

71. The second issue relates to the methodology for the apportionment of residual marketing costs (i.e. those costs accepted as being attributable both to taxable and exempt supplies) between the taxable and exempt supplies. Studio must show that the standard turnover method used by HMRC gives rise to distortions and that one of the methods it proposes more accurately reflects the use made of those costs.

72. During the course of these proceedings, Studio has put forward three alternative methods of apportioning residual costs between taxable and exempt supplies. It is important to note that these three methods have not been formally proposed to HMRC as partial exemption special methods and, although HMRC has rejected them, there is no decision in respect of these alternative methods against which Studio appeals.

73. Both parties agree however that these alternative methods are relevant in determining the appeals against the assessments. As we shall see, Studio in fact does not rely in full on any of these three alternative methods but relies on one element which is common to two of the alternatives. This excludes interest paid by customers who are in default as a result of having failed to make the minimum monthly payment in respect of their credit account (referred to by the parties as being in a “non-trading position” as such customers are not permitted to place further orders).

74. Closely linked to the second issue is the appeal against the 2023 PESM. Studio will need to show that the 2023 PESM guarantees a more precise apportionment of costs between taxable and exempt supplies than the standard turnover method used by HMRC. However, they face an additional hurdle which is whether the Tribunal in any event is able to allow Studio's appeal against HMRC's refusal to accept the 2023 PESM given that Studio seeks to uphold it subject to certain amendments.

75. The final issue is whether the VAT assessments relating to the 09/19 and 03/20 VAT periods were made within the statutory time limit in section 73 VATA.

76. Studio bears the burden of proof in respect of all of these issues.

Attribution and Apportionment – Legal Principles

77. As with the basic facts, the parties are largely agreed as to the legal principles which should be applied by the Tribunal. We shall therefore try to set them out relatively succinctly.

78. We agree with the parties that EU law remains relevant to the interpretation of VAT legislation despite Brexit (ss 2 and 6 European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 – note that the EU Law (Revocation and Reform) Act 2023 was not in force at the time relevant to these appeals).

EU legislation

79. Article 1 of the Principal VAT Directive 2006/112/EC (“PVD”) gives businesses the right to deduct “VAT borne directly by the various cost components” of taxable supplies. This is supplemented by Article 168 PVD which only permits a deduction for VAT paid by a business if the goods or services to which the input VAT relates are “used for the purposes” of taxable output transactions.

80. Where costs relate both to taxable supplies and exempt supplies, Article 173(1) PVD confirms that it is only the proportion which is attributable to taxable supplies which can be deducted.

81. The apportionment of costs using the standard turnover method is provided for in Article 174(1) PVD. Article 175 PVD permits the standard turnover method to be applied based on the previous year's transactions but subject to adjustment once the current year transactions are known.

82. There is however provision for apportionment of costs between taxable supplies and exempt supplies to be based on the use made of the goods and services to which the costs relate (Article 173(2)(c) PVD).

Domestic legislation

83. The provisions of the PVD are reflected in domestic legislation. Sections 24-26 VATA give an entitlement to credit for input tax used in a person's business to the extent that it is attributable to taxable supplies.

84. Regulation 101 VATR contains a two stage process for determining whether input tax relates to taxable supplies. The first step is to identify input tax on goods or services which are used exclusively in making either taxable supplies or exempt supplies. Where the goods or services to which the input tax relates are not used exclusively in making either taxable supplies or exempt supplies (including, for example, where the goods or services are used to make both taxable and exempt supplies), the amount of input tax attributable to taxable supplies is to be calculated using the standard turnover method.

85. HMRC may however approve or direct the use of some other method of apportionment between taxable supplies and exempt supplies (i.e. a PESM – Regulation 102(1) VATR). The taxable person must confirm that the PESM “fairly and reasonably represents the extent to which goods or services are used by or are to be used by him in making taxable supplies” (Regulation 102(9) VATR).

86. As we have seen, Regulation 102A VATR permits HMRC to serve a notice on a taxpayer if they believe that a PESM does not “fairly and reasonably represent the extent to which goods or services are used by him or are to be used by him in making taxable supplies”. If so, the taxpayer must attribute input VAT to taxable and exempt supplies in a way which reflects such use.

87. In applying these legislative provisions to the present appeals, the first step is therefore to determine whether the photography and modelling costs are used exclusively in making the taxable supplies of goods or whether they are also used for making exempt supplies of credit (in which case they would form part of the residual costs).

88. Once it is determined whether or not the photography and modelling costs form part of the residual costs, a determination must be made as to the extent to which those residual costs are used in making taxable supplies.

89. As can be seen, the focus is very much on identifying how the goods or services to which the input tax relates are used. Guidance on how this should be determined is provided in both EU and domestic case law.

Case law – attribution

90. In BLP Group PLC v Customs and Excise Commissioners (Case C-4/94) [1995] STC 424, the CJEU explained at [19] that, in order for there to be a right to deduct input VAT “the goods or services in question must have a direct and immediate link with the taxable transactions, and that the ultimate aim pursued by the taxable person is irrelevant in this respect”.

91. In determining whether there is a direct and immediate link between the input transaction and an output transaction, it is necessary for the Court or Tribunal to consider “the facts of each case before them and to take account of all the circumstances surrounding the transactions at issue” – Midland Bank PLC v Customs and Excise Commissioners (Case C-98/98) [2000] STC 501 at [25].

92. The goods or services to which input VAT relates may have a direct and immediate link with more than one supply. In Dial-a-Phone Limited v Commissioners of Customs and Excise [2004] EWCA Civ 603, Dial-a-Phone made taxable supplies relating to airtime contracts for mobile phones but also made exempt supplies connected to insurance for mobile phones. Parker LJ noted at [30] that:

“…the fact (if it be the fact) that in the instant case the link between the marketing and advertising costs and DaP’s taxable supplies may be more direct and immediate than the link between those costs and DaP’s exempt supplies does not serve to exclude the possibility that there may nevertheless be a sufficiently direct and immediate link between those costs and the exempt supplies.”

93. As Articles 168 and 173 PVD make clear, the concept of use is important. However, the authorities also refer to a direct and immediate link between input costs and output transactions (BLP) as well as whether the input costs form a “cost component” of the output transactions (reflecting the words of Article 1 PVD).

94. In principle, the question as to whether goods or services are used for the purposes of a taxable supply, whether there is a direct and immediate link between the goods or services and the taxable supply or whether the goods or services form a cost component of the taxable supply are all different ways of asking the same question (see the explanation of the Court of Appeal in Royal Opera House at [17] and [18] and Dial-A-Phone at [28]).

95. In particular, in looking at whether an input transaction is a cost component of an output transaction, it is not necessary “to identify the cost of the input in the calculation of the price for the output” (HMRC v Hotel La Tour Limited [2025] UKSC 46 at [14]).

96. As noted by the Court of Appeal in Royal Opera House at [17], when determining whether goods or services are used for the purposes of taxable supplies “the taxable person’s purpose is to be objectively ascertained from the facts and circumstances of the transactions, not by investigating the subjective intentions of the taxable person”.

97. There was some suggestion from Mr Watkinson that a broader approach is now required in considering the purposes for which goods and services are used. In support of this, he refers to the observation of the Supreme Court in Hotel La Tour at [15] that:

“…the CJEU has more recently developed the case law to look more broadly at the use made of a particular input and to link it with the taxable overall business of the trader even though the input seems to be consumed by a specific non-taxable transaction”.

98. However, that is not the situation here. The question is not whether the photography and modelling costs had a link with Studio’s overall business. The question is whether those costs have a sufficiently direct and immediate link with the supplies of credit as well as the supplies of goods (a distinction drawn by the Supreme Court in Hotel La Tour at [15]).

99. We note that one of the two cases mentioned in Hotel La Tour in support of the proposition (‘Sveda’ UAB v Valstybinė mokesčių inspekcija prie Lietuvos Respublikos finansų ministerijos (Case C-126/14) [2016] STC 447) was also considered by the Court of Appeal in Royal Opera House. The Court of Appeal agreed at [83], that Sveda was dealing with a different issue and did “not herald a new and broader test for determining the existence of a direct and immediate link” with a specific output transaction.

100. In reaching this conclusion, the Court of Appeal in Royal Opera House also considered the previous decision of the Court of Appeal in HMRC v Associated Newspapers Limited [2017] EWCA Civ 54. Associated Newspapers incurred the cost of purchasing vouchers for retail goods which were distributed free of charge to certain purchasers of newspapers.

101. Although the supply of the vouchers themselves was outside the scope of VAT, it was accepted that the cost of purchasing the vouchers had a direct and immediate link with the sale of the newspapers (and also the sale of advertising space within the newspapers) so that the input VAT on the purchase of the vouchers was recoverable. Like Sveda, this was treated by the Court of Appeal in Royal Opera House as an example of inputs being used for a taxpayer’s general economic activity rather than for specific transactions.

102. It therefore remains the case that, in determining whether a particular input transaction has a direct and immediate link with an output transaction, it is the objective use of the input which must be ascertained and not the subjective purpose of the business.

103. Some guidance has been given as to what constitutes (or what does not constitute) a direct and immediate link between an input transaction and an output transaction.

104. In Commissioners for Customs and Excise v Southern Primary Housing Limited [2003] EWCA Civ1662, the Court of Appeal made it clear at [32] that, just because an output transaction could not have taken place “but for” a particular input transaction, that did not, on its own, give rise to a sufficiently direct and immediate link and that a commercial link between an input transaction and an output transaction would also not necessarily constitute a direct and immediate link.

105. The Court of Appeal confirmed in Royal Opera House at [86]-[87] that the test is not one of commercial necessity.

106. In order for there to be a direct and immediate link between an input transaction and an output transaction, it is not necessary for the link “to be “immediate” in the sense of being close in time to the making of the output supply” (Hotel La Tour at [13]).

107. When considering whether there is a direct and immediate link between input transactions and output transactions, the Court of Appeal in Southern Primary emphasized at [37] that it is necessary “to look at transactions individually, component transaction by component transaction”.

Case law – apportionment

108. The principles set out below are applicable both to the appeals against the various assessments and the appeal against the rejection by HMRC of the 2023 PESM.

109. As the CJEU explained in Volkswagen Financial Services (UK) Limited v HMRC (Case C-153/17) [2019] 4 WLR 32 at [52], the objective of the apportionment exercise is “to ascertain with the greatest possible precision, the portion of VAT relating to transactions in respect of which VAT is deductible”.

110. If a method other than the standard turnover based method is used, it is necessary to show that “the method used guarantees as a more precise determination of the deductible proportion of the input VAT” (Volkswagen at [51]).

111. Having said that, this does not “mean that the method chosen must necessarily be the most precise possible” (Wolfgang und Dr Wilfried Rey Grundstücksgemeinschaft v Finanzamt Krefeld (Case C-332/14) [2017] STC 1668 at [33]).

112. It is fundamental that the method for apportioning input tax between taxable and exempt supplies reflects “the economic reality, assessed objectively, of the use of the relevant inputs” Hippodrome Casino Limited v HMRC [2025] EWCA Civ 1259 at [14].

113. When looking at the economic reality, it is legitimate to take into account “the observable terms and features of the taxpayer’s business” (HMRC v Hippodrome Casino Limited [2024] UKUT 27 (TCC) at [89] referring to the comments of Etherton LJ in HMRC v London Clubs Management [2012] STC 388 at [34]).

114. In Hippodrome, the Court of Appeal also observed at [64] that:

“… the standard method, established by the principal VAT directive and enshrined in domestic law, can be relied on as giving a result which is fair and reasonable (even if a bit rough and ready). It will only be displaced if the alternative proposed is more precise in its outcome.”

115. Ms Sloane argues that, in the case of these appeals, the standard turnover method is not the default method given that Studio had already been using a PESM since 2005 and that the requirement under regulation 102B VATR is to apportion the input tax in a way which represents the extent to which the goods or services are used in making taxable supplies.

116. However, given that the assessments against which Studio is appealing have been made on the basis of the standard turnover method, it is in our view right that this is, in effect, the default and that it is for Studio to show that one of its proposed alternatives gives a more accurate result.

Powers of the Tribunal – appeals against assessments/PESM

117. Following questions from the Tribunal, there was some discussion as to the powers of the Tribunal in relation to the appeals against the assessments on the one hand and the appeals against HMRC’s decision not to approve the 2023 PESM.

118. Having considered the position, the parties were agreed as to the approach which the Tribunal should follow.

119. As far as an appeal against HMRC's refusal to approve a PESM is concerned, the principles were set out by the Court of Session in DCM (Optical Holdings) Limited v Revenue and Customs Commissioners [2007] CSIH 58 at [16]. The key points are as follows:

(1) The Tribunal cannot propose its own special method (St Helen’s School Northwood Limited v The Revenue and Customs Commissioners [2007] STC 633 at [27]);

(2) A tribunal might, however, accept a proposed PESM subject to factual changes as long as this does not depart from the proposed methodology.

120. Where the Tribunal is invited to depart from a PESM as originally proposed, the question is therefore whether the departure changes the underlying methodology or whether it is the application of the same methodology to the correct facts as found by the Tribunal (St John’s College, Oxford v HMRC [2010] UKFTT 133 (TC) at [81] and [82]).

121. As confirmed by Etherton J in Banbury Visionplus Limited v HMRC [2006] STC 1568 at [44], the Tribunal has full appellate jurisdiction in respect of an appeal under s 83(e) VATA (which covers refusal to approve a PESM). This means that the Tribunal can reach its own decision as to whether the proposed PESM is more accurate than the standard turnover method. It is not confined to considering whether HMRC’s decision to reject the PESM was reasonable.

122. Turning to appeals against assessments, the Tribunal again has full appellate jurisdiction (the appeals being either under s 83(1)(e) VATA or s 83(1)(p) VATA). However, in this case, the objective of the Tribunal is to determine the correct amount of tax (see HMRC v General Motors (UK) Limited [2015] UKUT 605 (TCC) at [69]).

123. This means that, as long as it is done in a way which is procedurally fair, the Tribunal may base its decision on any method proposed by either of the parties or, indeed, on a method which is proposed by the Tribunal itself (see NHS Lothian Health Board v HMRC [2022] UKSC 28 at [76]).

124. The Tribunal does not, in this case, suggest that the appeals against the assessment should be determined on a basis which has not been proposed by either of the parties. The principles set out above however do make it clear that, as long as procedural fairness is observed, it is open to Studio to propose alternative methods for apportioning input tax on the residual costs between taxable and exempt supplies.

125. In this case, Studio proposes only two alternative methods. One is based on the 2023 PESM, subject to a proposed modification as to the assumed purchases by an average customer in a year. The Tribunal directed Studio to provide calculations showing the impact of the proposed modifications and gave HMRC the opportunity to make submissions in respect of those calculations. HMRC have provided such submissions. Although not given permission to do so, Studio subsequently provided some observations on the points made by HMRC to clarify certain aspects of the calculations. We have taken all of these points into account.

126. The second alternative is, as we have explained, a part of two of the three alternative methods which had previously been proposed by Studio and which HMRC had the opportunity to consider prior to the hearing.

127. We are therefore satisfied that both of these alternatives could provide the basis for a determination by the Tribunal in relation to the assessments should we find that they provide a more accurate apportionment of the input VAT than the standard turnover method.

Attribution of the photography and modelling costs

Analogous cases

128. Before summarising the parties’ submissions, it is convenient to mention a number of case law authorities referred to by the parties. We have not yet referred to most of these authorities as, for the most part, they provide examples of the applications of the principles we have referred to in paragraphs [90]-[107] above and do not establish any new principles.

129. As we have already explained, these authorities must be approached with some caution given the consistent message from the Courts that matters of attribution and apportionment of costs which give rise to input VAT between taxable and exempt supplies are acutely fact sensitive.

130. In Royal Agricultural College v Commissioners of Customs and Excise [2002] VAT Decision 17508 (a decision of the VAT and Duties Tribunal – case reference number: (LON/00/1017)), the College argued that certain advertising costs had a direct and immediate link not only with exempt supplies of education but also taxable supplies such as those made by the College’s shops and bars. The advertisements did not refer specifically to the shops and bars.

131. The Tribunal concluded at [40]-[43] that the objective purpose of the advertising was to attract students so as to provide them with (exempt) education. Any link between the advertising costs and the supplies made by the College bar or shop was indirect and was not immediate in the sense that it involved a subsequent step after a student had been recruited.

132. We have already mentioned the decision of the Court of Appeal in Dial-a-Phone which related to supplies of both exempt insurance services and taxable airtime services for mobile phones. Again, the issue was whether advertising costs had a direct and immediate link to both supplies. The advertisements in question referred both to the airtime contract and the insurance. It was decided at [72]-[73] that the objective purpose of the advertising was to promote both supplies. The advertising costs therefore had a direct and immediate link with both taxable and exempt supplies.

133. One point worth noting at this stage is that both Royal Agricultural College and Dial-a-Phone concern the attribution of advertising costs as a whole rather than one specific element of those advertising costs (in this case the photography and modelling costs). This is another reason for exercising caution in seeking assistance from these cases.

134. The Court of Appeal had to consider the attribution of input tax again in Mayflower Theatre Trust Ltd v HMRC [2006] EWCA Civ 116. The question was whether the costs of staging productions had a direct and immediate link not only with the exempt supply of tickets but also (as contended by the theatre) with taxable (or zero rated) supplies such as programmes, food and drink, sponsorship rights, corporate entertaining and advertising.

135. The Court of Appeal concluded at [43] that there was a direct and immediate link between the production costs and the sale of programmes because the production provided the content of the programmes. As far as food and drink was concerned, the theatre did not in fact pursue this before the Court of Appeal, although it was noted at [40] that any link between the production costs and such supplies would be indirect and not immediate (on the authority of Royal Agricultural College). Other taxable supplies including production linked merchandise and sponsorship arrangements were also found at [49] and [52] not to have a direct and immediate link with the production costs as they did not relate to a specific production.

136. Skipton Building Society v HMRC [2009] UKFTT 191 (TC) was a decision of this Tribunal. The issue related to input VAT on the cost of advertisements relating to properties for sale placed in local newspapers by Skipton’s estate agency business.

137. It was held that the costs of the advertisements which mentioned that Skipton also offered mortgage services had a direct and immediate link not only with the taxable supplies relating to the sale of the houses but also the exempt supplies connected with the mortgage services. The Tribunal Judge observed at [26] that “though ultimate aim is not the test, it seems to me that in the case of advertising what the advertiser intends to promote is likely to be the best available guide to what he is in fact promoting.”

138. However, relying on the decision in Royal Agricultural College, the Tribunal concluded at [27] that there was no direct and immediate link with the mortgage services if an advertisement did not “overtly mention mortgage services”.

139. Again, we note that the issue in Skipton related to the overall cost of advertising and not, for example, the cost of photographing the relevant properties as a separate input cost.

140. This Tribunal looked again at the attribution of input VAT in The Roald Dahl Museum and Story Centre v HMRC [2014] UKFTT 308 (TC). The museum incurred expenditure refurbishing and maintaining museum exhibits. It argued that this expenditure had a direct and immediate link not only with the exempt supply of tickets to the museum but also taxable supplies made by the museum shop.

141. The Tribunal concluded at [83]-[85] that there was no direct and immediate link between the exhibit costs and the supplies made by the shop, finding that almost all of the items in question could be (and many were) sold in any shop. An analogy was drawn with Royal Agricultural College and Mayflower. It was accepted at [90] that there was a commercial link between the exhibit costs and the supplies made by the shop (the profits from the shop subsidising the museum) but that was not sufficient.

142. In addition, photographs of the museum exhibits did not have a direct and immediate link with the exhibit costs, as “costs incurred in making one supply are not cost components of a second supply, merely because the practical effect of making the first supply is that it becomes feasible, or even easier, to make the second supply” (at [185]).

143. The only item sold in the shop which was held at [112] to have a direct and immediate link with the exhibition costs was a book which interpreted the objects in the museum and was produced in conjunction with the refurbishment of the museum. In a sense, this was similar to the decision in Mayflower where the production cost provided the content for the programmes relating to that production.

144. Both parties referred in some detail to the decision of this Tribunal in N Brown Group PLC v HMRC [2019] UKFTT 172 (TC). On the face of it, that appeal has some similarities with the current appeal. N Brown was a fashion retailer. Like Studio, it primarily sold goods online and by mail order, although it also had some physical shops. Customers were able to pay in cash or purchase on credit and so the business made both taxable and exempt supplies. The Tribunal had to consider both the attribution of input VAT incurred on marketing costs (including photography and modelling costs) and the apportionment of input VAT related to both taxable and exempt supplies.

145. The Tribunal found that N Brown had the same sort of integrated business strategy as Studio accepts exists in its case. The supply of goods supported the supply of credit and the supply of credit (through the use of a “personal account” – similar to a Studio Pay account) generated further sales.

146. One difference to our findings in this case is that, in the case of N Brown, it was found at [111] that, in most of the marketing materials, any references to credit were “at most tangential”. The Tribunal in N Brown accepted at [179] that input costs relating to the preparation of marketing material that contained a reference to credit had a direct and immediate link both to the taxable supplies of goods and the exempt supplies of credit.

147. The result of this is that the focus of the Tribunal in N Brown was on whether the costs of marketing materials which did not refer to credit nonetheless had a sufficiently direct and immediate link with the supplies of credit.

148. Whilst accepting at [179] that there were “strong arguments that could be made to the effect that such marketing material was not “used for” the purpose of making exempt supplies of finance”, the Tribunal nonetheless concluded at [180]-[191] that, given the integrated (two way) relationship between sales of goods and sales of credit, there was a sufficiently direct and immediate link between the marketing costs and the supplies of credit, even where the marketing materials did not refer to credit.

149. The Tribunal rejected the suggestion that its conclusion meant that any input cost relating to the sale of goods inevitably had a direct and immediate link to the supply of credit as well. It concluded at [193] that, although the focus is on use of the goods or services to which the input cost relates, marketing costs were used in a different way to, for example, the cost of purchasing the item for onward sale.

150. We should note that it is apparent from the very brief discussion of photography costs at [218] that the appellant in N Brown did not seek to distinguish between photography costs and other marketing costs in the same way as Studio does in these appeals.

151. As we shall see, Ms Sloane suggests that, in the light of the decision of the Court of Appeal in Royal Opera House (see further below), the Tribunal in N Brown applied the wrong test in that the integrated nature of a business cannot, of itself, give rise to a sufficiently direct and immediate link between input costs and supplies which would otherwise only have an indirect or commercial link with such supplies.

152. We have already referred to the decision of the Court of Appeal in Royal Opera House. The question was whether there was a direct and immediate link between the production costs of a particular production and taxable supplies of food and drink (as well as with the exempt supply of tickets). The Court drew a distinction at [46] between production costs and the costs of advertising the catering services.

153. The Court of Appeal concluded at [87]-[88] that, although there might be a link of commercial necessity (there would be no supplies of food or drink without the production), this was no more than a “but for” link and was not sufficient to provide a direct and immediate link between the production costs and the catering supplies.

154. This was despite the fact that the unchallenged evidence at [7] was that a visit to the Royal Opera House was “a fully integrated visitor experience” and at [9] that there was “a virtuous circle, whereby the high quality of the artistic output drove demand for the catering offered by the ROH, which in turn increased the income available for spending on the artistic output”.

155. The First-tier Tribunal returned to the question of attribution after the decision of the Court of Appeal in Royal Opera House in Sofology Limited v HMRC [2022] UKFTT 00153 (TC). The costs in question in that case were the costs of Google advertising in circumstances where Sofology supplied sofas and also services relating to insurance for the sofas. Supplies were made online, by telephone and in store.

156. The Tribunal at [172] rejected HMRC’s argument that the Google advertising costs had a direct and immediate link with the exempt supply of insurance services as well as the supplies of sofas despite the fact that the supplies of insurance services were found at [190] to be an important part of Sofology’s business and at [191] that there was a close economic link between the adverts and the supplies of insurance services.

157. In reaching this conclusion, the Tribunal placed importance at [194(1)] that the search terms for which Sofology paid did not include any reference to insurance and neither did the landing pages when a customer clicked on the relevant link. The importance the Tribunal placed in its conclusions about the content of the relevant adverts and the landing pages to which a customer was taken when clicking on the results produced by the Google advertising can be seen from the Tribunal’s comments at [196(3)-(5)].

158. It was also said at [194(2)] to be relevant that “insurance could be purchased only in conjunction with the purchase of a sofa, and consequent upon the user’s decision to purchase the sofa” and to be irrelevant that Sofology could predict the likely amount of income from insurance services based on the income from the sales of sofas – i.e. the relationship between the two remained relatively constant.

159. In addition, the Tribunal noted at [194(4)] that Sofology promoted its insurance services by other means, such as sales staff in the shops and specific marketing aimed at insurance, most of which took place after a customer had decided to purchase a sofa.

160. The final case we need to refer to is the decision of this Tribunal in Littlewoods which we have already mentioned. This is perhaps the most relevant to the attribution issue as it relates to photography and modelling costs in very similar circumstances to these appeals. We understand that permission has been granted for an appeal by HMRC to the Upper Tribunal which will be heard in early December.

161. Like Studio, Littlewoods sold a wide range of goods through catalogues and through its website. A significant proportion of purchases were made on credit. The question for the Tribunal was whether the costs of producing photographs of the products being sold had a direct and immediate link only with the taxable supply of those products or whether (as contended by HMRC) they also had a direct and immediate link with the exempt supplies of credit.

162. Both the catalogues and website pages contained references to flexible payment options. As in this case, there was a “symbiosis” between the sale of goods and the granting of credit, with the purchase of goods generating credit income and the availability of credit increasing sales.

163. The Tribunal concluded at [135] and [146] that there was no direct and immediate link between the costs of the photographs and the exempt supply of credit. It distinguished at [129] the decision in N Brown on the basis that, unlike in that case, a majority of Littlewood’s customers did not in fact incur any interest.

164. In any event, it did not consider at [134] that the decision in N Brown, being based on the interdependency of the supplies of goods on the one hand and the supplies of credit on the other, could stand in the light of the subsequent decision of the Court of Appeal in Royal Opera House. The fact that the sale of goods gave rise to a predictable supply of credit did not provide a direct and immediate link between the supply of credit and the photographs used to promote the goods in the same way that the production costs incurred by the Royal Opera House did not have a direct and immediate link with the supply of food and drink, even though customers who bought tickets for the production would predictably purchase and consume food and drink.

165. As to the objective use of the photographs, the Tribunal in Littlewoods took the view at [142] that, although messages relating to credit or flexible payment options appeared alongside the photographs, the photographs were used only to display the product. The supplies of credit were promoted by the text itself and not the photographs.

The parties’ submissions

166. Studio accepts that its website, catalogues, and other marketing materials promote both the sale of goods and the supply of credit. It therefore accepts that costs such as printing the catalogues and designing the website are residual costs (in the sense of having a direct and immediate link with both taxable and exempt supplies), which need to be apportioned between the taxable and exempt supplies.

167. However, Ms Sloane submits that it does not follow that all of the costs incurred in the creation and content of such materials are used to promote both supplies. It is necessary, she says, to look at each component transaction individually (Southern Primary at [37]).

168. Looking at the photography and modelling costs, Ms Sloane submits that the only objective use of the photographs which derive from those costs is to display the products. In effect, the photographs are, she says, the equivalent of a rail of dresses in a bricks-and-mortar shop. They allow the customer to inspect the goods.

169. As far as the supplies of credit are concerned, Ms Sloane argues that the only part of the relevant materials which promote the credit is the text itself which mentions Studio Pay, flexible payment options or makes other references to credit, and not the photographs, even though the text referring to credit may appear on the same page as the photographs or even on top of or next to the photographs.

170. Ms Sloane again draws an analogy with a bricks-and-mortar shop. The shop may advertise credit with signage or leaflets, but that does not, in her submission, mean that the costs of displaying the products in the shop have a direct and immediate link with the supply of credit. It is only the costs of the signage and the leaflets which have such a link.

171. In effect, these were the arguments which were accepted by this Tribunal in Littlewoods at [142–146].

172. Ms Sloane accepts that a small number of photographs (a few hundred out of a library of several hundred thousand) were, in Mr Kendrick’s words, “repurposed” by being used on leaflets primarily promoting credit but also displaying selected products. However, she says these are no different to the catalogues and the website in that the photographs only promote the products and the credit is promoted by the text.

173. In relation to this, Ms Sloane also notes that HMRC’s guidance in PE78200 suggests that there is only a direct and immediate link to supplies where there is a firm intention to make such supplies. On this basis, she submits that where photographs were not originally intended to be used on leaflets primarily promoting credit but were subsequently “repurposed”, there would be no direct and immediate link between the cost of producing the photographs and the exempt supplies of credit.

174. Ms Sloane further submits that, even if the photographs appearing on these leaflets were promoting credit, any use of the photography and modelling costs for such purposes is de minimis and should not result in any restriction on the amount of input VAT which can be recovered. She notes that, in HMRC’s guidance at PE41500, it is suggested that, where high value supplies are generated using negligible resources, the value of those supplies should be excluded from any apportionment calculation.

175. We pause to note that, as Mr Watkinson observed (and as is clear from the HMRC guidance Ms Sloane refers to), strictly, this is an issue which should be addressed at the apportionment stage and not the attribution stage, given that Regulation 101(2)(b) VATR refers to goods or services being used “exclusively” in making taxable supplies. There is no de minimis exception.

176. Assuming there is no direct and immediate link between the photography and modelling costs and the supply of credit based on the way in which the photographs are actually used, Ms Sloane submits that no such link can be established simply on the basis that Studio operates an integrated business of supplying goods on credit or that there is a symbiotic relationship between the supply of goods and the supply of credit.

177. Whilst there is a commercial and economic link, and whilst the supplies of credit could not take place “but for” the supplies of goods, Ms Sloane notes that it is clear from the authorities (see, for example, Royal Opera House and Sofology) that this is not sufficient.

178. In this context, Ms Sloane submits that the Tribunal in N Brown came to the wrong conclusion in deciding that marketing costs relating to adverts which made no reference to credit nonetheless had a direct and immediate link to supplies of credit, given the integrated, two way relationship between the supplies of goods and the supplies of credit, arguing that the decision cannot be right in the light of the decision of the Court of Appeal in Royal Opera House.

179. In particular, Ms Sloane argues that the fact that one of the ultimate purposes of the business is to promote credit (or catering in the case of Royal Opera House), and that this will generate a predictable income stream, does not provide a sufficiently direct and immediate link between the photography and modelling costs and the supplies of credit.

180. Ms Sloane suggests that, if, as a result of the integrated nature of the business, there were a sufficiently direct and immediate link between the photography and modelling costs and the supplies of credit, there is no reason why there should not also be a sufficiently direct and immediate link between other costs relating to the sale of products (such as purchase, manufacturing, storage, and distribution costs) and the supplies of credit. However, she observes that HMRC do not suggest that there is any such link.

181. HMRC’s position is that the objective use of the photographs is to promote credit as well as the supplies of goods, so that there is a direct and immediate link between the photography and modelling costs used to produce the photographs and the exempt supplies of credit.

182. Mr Watkinson submits that, once it is accepted that the marketing materials which use the photographs, including the catalogues and the website, promote both the goods and the credit, the costs of creating those materials (including the photography and modelling costs) inevitably have a direct and immediate link to both outputs (as was the case in Skipton and Dial-a-Phone).

183. Mr Watkinson makes the point that the photographs which result from the photography and modelling costs do not themselves advertise anything until they are put in some sort of context by being included in the marketing materials, such as the catalogues or the website. He submits that treating a component cost of those materials (in this case, photography and modelling) as separate from the marketing in which it was in fact used ignores the exempt use of the cost.

184. In any event, as far as the website is concerned, Mr Watkinson notes that the wording relating to credit appears in close proximity to the photographs and on this basis submits that the photographs are being used in relation to the supplies of credit as well as the supplies of the goods themselves.

185. Even if this were not the case, Mr Watkinson argues that the integrated nature of Studio’s business model leads inevitably to the conclusion that there is a sufficiently direct and immediate link between the photography and modelling costs and the exempt supplies of credit on the basis that the objective purpose of Studio's marketing was to increase the number of customers purchasing goods through a credit account, which would, in turn, further increase sales.

186. Mr Watkinson submits that this goes well beyond a commercial/economic or “but for” link, and that it is legitimate to consider the objective purpose of the marketing without this falling foul of the requirement not to take into account the ultimate aim of the taxpayer. It was in this context that Mr Watkinson deployed his argument that the courts now take a broader view of the use made of a particular input which, for the reasons explained at paragraphs [97]-[102] above, we have rejected.

187. Based on the decision of the Court of Appeal in Dial-a-Phone, Mr Watkinson however submits that, in the case of marketing costs, when determining the objective use to which costs are put, it is necessary to consider what supplies the marketing was intended to attract customers to. In Dial-a-Phone itself, it was held that the marketing was intended to attract customers both to sign up to an airtime contract and also to take out insurance. In the same way, Mr Watkinson suggests that, in the present case, the purpose of the marketing was to encourage customers to buy products and to take out credit.

188. In relation to this, Mr Watkinson submits that, as recognised by the Court of Appeal in Royal Opera House at [46], there is a difference between marketing costs and other costs. Marketing costs will have a direct and immediate link with the supplies which they are being used to promote. Whereas other costs (such as the production costs in Royal Opera House) may not have such a link even if the subjective intention of the business is to promote such supplies.

189. As noted in Sofology at [185], Mr Watkinson argues that it is permissible to take into account a business’ marketing strategy as part of the objective evidence, even though subjective purposes cannot be taken into account.

190. On this basis, Mr Watkinson does not accept that the decision in N Brown was wrong. If, based on the nature and strategy of the business, marketing costs are objectively used to promote two different supplies, they will have a direct and immediate link with both supplies.

191. Mr Watkinson argues that there is, in any event, difference between this case and N Brown. He says that, given the strategy of the business, the marketing costs in effect represent an upfront investment in acquiring customers, the result of which is to generate both supplies of goods and supplies of credit.

Discussion of attribution of photography and modelling costs

192. As is clear from the principles we have set out above (paragraphs [90]-[107]), we must look at all of the circumstances of the transactions, but should not take into account Studio's subjective aims. There may be a sufficiently direct and immediate link with the supplies of credit even though there is a more direct and immediate link with the supplies of goods. A commercial or economic link is not, of itself, sufficient. Nor is it enough that the supplies of credit could not take place, but for the supply of the goods.

193. We bear in mind that the question we have to determine is not whether marketing costs generally have a direct and immediate link with the supply of credit, but whether the photography and modelling costs specifically have a direct and immediate link with the supply of credit.

194. This is an important distinction and one which distinguishes this case from some of the others we have looked at such as Skipton, Dial-a-Phone and Sofology. In our view, it also distinguishes this case from N Brown as, although the Tribunal in that case looked at a long list of marketing expenses, including photography expenses, no distinction was made in the decision between the different types of expense. There is no evidence that any special case was made in relation to the photography expenses compared to any of the other expenses.

195. As we have noted, it is accepted by Studio that the catalogues, website and other marketing materials which use the photographs promote both the supply of goods and the supply of credit and that, in general, costs incurred in producing these materials are objectively used for the purposes of both supplies. This is entirely consistent with authorities such as Royal Agricultural College, Dial-a-Phone, Skipton and Sofology given the references to the availability of credit contained in those materials.

196. We do, however, accept that each component transaction must be considered separately (Southern Primary at [37]) and that it is therefore necessary to consider the objective use to which the photographs contained in those materials are put. It does not automatically follow that just because the photography and modelling costs are a cost component of the marketing materials, the photographs which result from those costs are being used for the purposes of the supply of credit.

197. Having said that, taking into account all the facts and circumstances relating to the transactions, we have reached the conclusion that there is a sufficiently direct and immediate link between the photography and modelling costs and the exempt supplies of credit based on the way in which the photographs are used in the marketing materials.

198. We agree that the primary function of the photographs in the catalogues and on the website is to help describe the products to potential customers. However, we accept Mr Watkinson's submission that, in order to have any meaning, the photographs must be placed into some sort of context. A catalogue or website which contained the pictures but nothing else would be unlikely to achieve any sales.

199. In this case, the context includes the other information and content contained in the catalogues, website and other marketing materials. This includes, for example, a written description of the products, the price and, in some cases, the availability of credit.

200. As we have seen, although some of the messages relating to credit are generic, for example, the banners that appear at the top of every webpage, there are other messages which are specific to particular products.

201. In the catalogues, these include the branded “Studio Pay” wording, which is superimposed on the photographs of certain products, particularly (and deliberately) higher value items. As far as the website is concerned, we were provided with a number of examples of web pages relating to specific products with prominent wording relating to the availability of credit alongside the photograph where the price of the product is shown. The wording relating to credit is significantly more prominent than the actual description of the product, as well as being closer to the photograph of the product.

202. In the light of this, it is in our view artificial to suggest that the only part of the catalogues and the website which promote credit is the text which refers to the credit and not the photographs as well.

203. We accept that it is possible to have marketing materials which promote two separate supplies and for photographs included in those marketing materials to have a direct and immediate link with one supply but not the other.

204. Ms Sloane gave as an example of this, an M&S brochure marketing both its food products and its clothing products. Photographs of the food would not have a direct and immediate link with the supply of clothes and vice versa.

205. However, that is very different to the present situation where the catalogues and the website have a photograph of a specific product with prominent wording encouraging a customer to purchase that specific product on credit. Objectively, the photograph is, in our view, being used in relation to the supply of credit as well as the supply of the product itself. This is because the wording relating to credit which is aimed at the specific product can only properly be understood and assessed when taken together with the other details of the product, including its description (of which the photographs form part) and the price.

206. We can see some force in Ms Sloane's analogy with a bricks-and-mortar shop. The photographs in the catalogues and website could be seen as the equivalent of the physical display of the goods in the shop and the messages relating to credit could be seen as the equivalent of separate signage or leaflets dotted around the shop. In such circumstances, it is unlikely that the cost of displaying the products in the shop would have a direct and immediate link to the supply of credit.

207. We are not, however, convinced that it is possible to draw a direct analogy between the sale of goods by mail order or online on the one hand and the sale of goods in a physical shop on the other. It is a completely different business model, no doubt with different drivers as to the way in which the products are marketed to potential customers.

208. One difference, for example, is that, on the website, messages relating to credit and flexible payment appear on every product page. Whilst it might in theory be possible for a physical shop to place messages referring to credit next to every product it sells, we suspect that this would be unusual. As submitted by Mr Watkinson, if this were to happen, it might well be the case that the costs of displaying the goods might have a direct and immediate link to supplies of credit.

209. We appreciate that our conclusion on this issue is different to the conclusion reached by the Tribunal in Littlewoods. It may be that this can be explained by differences in the facts. For example, in Littlewoods it is said at [142] that the information about credit was “provided discreetly alongside the photographs”, whereas, in the case of Studio there was nothing discreet about the messages relating to credit and some of them were superimposed on the photographs themselves. As the Tribunal itself noted in Littlewoods at [129], even small factual differences can change the result.

210. We are also of the view that the photographs of products contained in the leaflets which are primarily designed to market credit have a direct and immediate link with the supplies of credit. It is hard to see how a different conclusion could be reached. Alongside the photographs is the name of the product and the price, but there is no separate description of the product as would be found in the catalogues or the website. The main focus of the leaflets is various messages about credit. There can be no doubt that the photographs are being used for the purposes of supplies of credit.

211. It is no doubt for this reason that Ms Sloane picked up on Mr Kendrick's suggestion in his evidence that when used in the context of these leaflets, the photographs were being “repurposed”.

212. However, we do not accept this description. It is clear from the evidence that the leaflets primarily aimed at promoting credit were a regular feature of Studio's marketing. It is also clear from the evidence that the leaflets typically contain photographs of products alongside the name and the price of the product.

213. We infer from this that the business always knew and intended that some of the photographs would be used in this way. Even when used as part of a leaflet primarily promoting credit, the photographs are also being used to encourage customers to purchase the products themselves as well as to pay on credit.

214. Whilst it may be the case that a decision as to which photographs would appear in the credit leaflets was only taken sometime subsequently, we do not consider that this means that it can be said that the photography and modelling costs were not intended to be used for the purposes of the exempt supplies of credit at the time they were incurred.

215. We have considered the other cases which the parties have referred to and which we have briefly summarised but have not found these particularly helpful by way of analogy given that, with the exception of Littlewoods, the factual background is very different.

216. We accept Mr Kendrick's evidence that only around five per cent of the pages of the catalogue referred to credit in the way that we have described. We also acknowledge that we have no direct evidence as to the number of individual product pages on the website which contain the prominent messages relating to credit in relation to that specific product.

217. We were however provided with a number of examples of individual product pages, more of which contained such wording than did not. We infer from this that it was certainly not unusual for references to credit in relation to a particular product to appear alongside that product on the website.

218. Based on the evidence we have available, we do not consider that the use of the photography and modelling costs for the purposes of the supplies of credit can be said to be de minimis (even if that were relevant at the attribution stage) given that it includes the costs relating to all of the photographs in the catalogues on which the Studio Pay wording is superimposed, all of the photographs on the individual product pages of the website which contain prominent messages relating to credit alongside the price of that particular product, as well as the photographs used in the leaflets primarily promoting credit.

219. In making this finding, we are conscious that, at the attribution stage, the question is, in any event, whether the costs are attributable exclusively to taxable supplies. Indeed, in her opening submissions, Ms Sloane accepted that, if only one photograph was used for the purposes of the supplies of credit, the entirety of the photography and modelling costs would be “residual costs”, which would need to be dealt with at the apportionment stage (a similar result to that in the Roald Dahl Museum case, where use of the exhibition costs in respect of a taxable supply of a single product in the shop meant that the entirety of the exhibition costs could then be apportioned between exempt and taxable supplies).

220. Given our conclusion that, based on the context in which the photographs are placed in the catalogues, the website and the credit leaflets, the photography and modelling costs are, objectively, used for the purposes of Studio's supplies of credit (as well as the supply of goods), we do not strictly need to deal with HMRC's separate argument that, if this were found not to be the case, the photography and modelling costs are, in any event, used for the purposes of the exempt supplies of credit as a result of the integrated and symbiotic nature of Studio's business. However, as this was fully argued, we will address the point briefly.

221. Mr Watkinson's key submission is that, when considering whether marketing costs have a direct and immediate link to a particular supply, it is necessary to ask what, objectively, the marketing materials in question aim to promote. As mentioned above, in support of this, he refers to the decision of the Court of Appeal in Dial-a-Phone.

222. Whilst it is true that the Court of Appeal accepted the finding of the First-tier Tribunal that the adverts in question were intended to attract customers both to sign up to an airtime contract and to take out mobile phone insurance, the reason for this was that the adverts referred specifically to insurance and was not based on any integrated or symbiotic business strategy.

223. Mr Watkinson seeks to extend this principle so that marketing costs will have a direct and immediate link to a particular supply even where the marketing materials do not make any reference to that supply if there is a sufficiently integrated business model from which it can be concluded that the purpose of the marketing material was to promote such supplies. This was the approach taken by the Tribunal in N Brown.

224. Mr Watkinson accepts that the Court of Appeal in Royal Opera House concluded that, in the case of production costs an integrated business strategy was insufficient to give rise to a direct and immediate link between those production costs and supplies of catering services. However, he submits that, as recognised by the Court of Appeal at [46], the position is different in relation to marketing costs.

225. We do not accept this. What the Court of Appeal referred to in that paragraph was the contrast between the production costs on the one hand and, by way of example, costs incurred in advertising the catering services. Clearly, costs of specific adverts for the catering services would have a direct and immediate link with the supplies of catering.

226. What the Court of Appeal did not say is that the cost of advertising a particular production would have a direct and immediate link with the catering supplies as a result of the integrated nature of the Royal Opera House's business model even if the advert did not mention catering services.

227. There is therefore no reason to suppose that the Court of Appeal in Royal Opera House would have come to any different conclusion had the costs in question been marketing costs relating to a particular production (which did not mention the catering services) as opposed to production costs. Indeed, there is every reason to think that the Court of Appeal would have come to the same conclusion.

228. Mr Watkinson relied heavily on the decision of the Court of Appeal in Associated Newspapers in suggesting that a broader analysis of the use of particular costs should be undertaken when considering how those costs had been used by the business. However, as we have explained, the Court of Appeal in Royal Opera House rejected at [83] a similar submission, as did the Supreme Court in Hotel La Tour at [95]–[96] (although the discussion there focussed on a very different set of circumstances).

229. Based on what was said in those cases, we agree that there is no broader test for establishing a direct and immediate link between input costs and specific supplies (as opposed to establishing a link with the taxpayer’s business as a whole in circumstances where the transaction with which the inputs have the closest link is outside the scope of VAT).

230. Like the Tribunal in Littlewoods, we think it unlikely that the Tribunal in N Brown would have reached the same conclusion had the decision of the Court of Appeal in Royal Opera House been available to it.

231. The decision in N Brown was predicated on the two-way (or symbiotic) relationship between sales of goods and supplies of credit. However, the fact that the strategy of the business in N Brown was to encourage customers to take credit and that the sale of goods would lead to a predictable supply of credit is, in our view, no more than a “but for”, commercial or economic link between the two supplies. It focuses (impermissibly) on the ultimate aim of the taxpayer and not the objective use to which the marketing costs are put.

232. In reaching this conclusion, we recognise that the strategy of the business may be an objective feature of a business which it is relevant to take into account (Sofology at [185] and London Clubs Management at [34]). However, in our view, this is not sufficient to elevate a “but for” or commercial link to a direct and immediate link. Any such conclusion would, as we have said, be placing too much weight on the ultimate aim of the taxpayer, in circumstances where the marketing materials in question make no mention of the exempt supplies of credit.

233. The conclusion that the integrated or symbiotic nature of the supplies made by a business cannot, of itself, determine whether (objectively) there is a direct and immediate link between marketing costs and supplies that are not mentioned in the marketing materials is consistent with previous authorities including, for example, Royal Agricultural College, Skipton, Dial-a-Phone, and Sofology. It is also consistent with previous cases dealing with other categories of costs such as Mayflower and Roald Dahl Museum. More importantly, it is consistent with the reasoning of the Court of Appeal in Royal Opera House.

234. Had the photographs not in fact been used for the purposes of the supplies of credit in the relevant marketing materials, we would therefore have concluded that there was no direct and immediate link between the photography and modelling costs and the supplies of credit simply as a result of the (admitted) integrated and symbiotic nature of Studio's business.

235. We cannot see that any different conclusion would be reached if the point is put on the basis that the marketing costs represent an upfront investment in acquiring a customer. This is simply another way of saying that the ultimate aim of the business is for customers both to purchase goods and to incur credit interest. For the reasons we have already explained, it does not lead to the conclusion that the photography and modelling costs have a direct and immediate link with the supply of credit as well as the supply of goods.

236. Having decided that the photography and modelling costs form part of the residual marketing costs, we turn now to consider the apportionment of those costs between taxable and exempt supplies.

Apportionment

The parties' submissions

237. We deal here with the appeals against the various assessments made by HMRC to the extent that those assessments relate to the apportionment of residual costs (i.e. those costs which do not relate exclusively to taxable supplies or to exempt supplies) between exempt and taxable supplies. As we have already mentioned, those assessments were made on the basis that the residual costs should be apportioned using the standard turnover method.

238. Studio now only takes issue with this in relation to marketing costs. It is accepted that all other residual costs should be apportioned using the standard turnover method. As a result of our conclusion in relation to the attribution issue, the marketing costs include the photography and modelling costs.

239. We should note that Studio has not made any separate proposals to adjust the apportionment of photography and modelling costs. Those costs therefore fall to be apportioned in the same way as all other marketing costs.

240. As we have already explained at paragraphs [108]-[116], the search is for a method which objectively reflects the use of the costs and it is for Studio to show that one or other of their alternatives guarantees is a more precise determination of the deductible proportion of the input VAT than the standard turnover method, in each case, taking into account the economic reality of the use of the relevant inputs. In assessing economic reality, account should be taken of the “observable terms and features of the taxpayer’s business” (London Clubs Management at [34]).

241. Studio says that using the standard turnover method in relation to marketing costs produces distortions and that, as a result, their proposed alternative methods produce a result which is more precise and which is fairer and more reasonable.

242. Whilst Studio accepts that the marketing costs have a direct and immediate link with supplies of credit as well as supplies of goods (and therefore need to be apportioned as residual costs), it does not accept that marketing costs incurred in year one continue to have a direct and immediate link with all payments of interest (including those received in future years) which relate to products purchased in year one.

243. It is important to note in this context that it is common ground that the effect of regulation 90(1)(a) VATR is that each payment of interest represents a separate supply of credit and so it is necessary to consider what costs incurred by Studio are used for the purposes of each of those subsequent supplies of credit.

244. In essence, Studio’s submission is based on the underlying proposition that any link between the marketing materials which induce a customer to purchase goods and, as a result, to incur credit interest, decays over time and that there comes a point when it cannot be said that the costs of those marketing materials are in any sense used for the purposes of the later supplies of credit represented by those payments of interest. This follows the reasoning of the Tribunal in N Brown at [196] and [234]–[237].

245. In N Brown, the parties were given an opportunity to consider these observations of the Tribunal. It is understood that a settlement was reached and that there was no need for the parties to return to the Tribunal for a determination of the correct method of apportionment.

246. It is this perceived distortion which Studio took into account when making the adjustments required in response to the special method override notice issued by HMRC in 2018. It did this by excluding an estimated amount of interest said to represent interest received more than 12 months after a particular sale.

247. However, following the evidence at the Tribunal hearing, Studio now accepts that it has no reliable way of tracking interest paid back to a particular sale. As a result, it has abandoned any alternative methods based on excluding from the apportionment calculation all or part of the amount of interest received more than a specified period after a sale has taken place as it is impossible for it to calculate the amount of such interest.

248. In order to address what it considers to be the distortions created by the standard turnover method, Studio now proposes two alternatives:

(1) The first is based on the 2023 PESM proposal which was rejected by HMRC. This seeks to calculate (based on a number of assumptions) the total amount of interest expected to be generated at any time in the future from purchases made by an average credit account customer in the year in which the apportionment calculation is taking place and to include only such interest in the apportionment calculation rather than the actual interest received in the relevant period.

In his oral evidence, Mr Jones identified an error in the calculations contained in the 2023 PESM. The model had assumed a single purchase of £75 by a customer during the year. This is the average amount of an order placed by a customer purchasing on credit. However, Studio’s analysis shows that a credit customer will place between three and four orders each year and that the total spend during a year for a customer purchasing on credit is £250.

Studio has therefore put forward two updated models for the 2023 PESM. One is based on a single purchase at the start of the year of £250. The other assumes three purchases of £75 each in months one, five, and nine of the financial year. This would represent purchases in April, August and December as, during the period in question, Studio generally made its accounts up to a date in the last week of March each year.

The first version of this proposal, involving a single purchase of £250, results in irrecoverable VAT of approximately £2.4 million for the 2021 financial year (compared to £2.7 million based on HMRC’s standard turnover method). The second version (three purchases of £75 each) results in irrecoverable VAT of approximately £2.3 million for the 2021 year.

(2) The second proposal put forward by Studio is to exclude from the apportionment calculation any interest paid during the period for which the apportionment is being made by a customer who, at the time the interest is paid, is in a “non-trading position”.

As previously explained, this is a customer who has failed to make the minimum monthly payment and, as a result, no longer receives any marketing materials and is unable to place any further orders until the default has been remedied.

This method would result in irrecoverable VAT in the 2021 financial year of approximately £2.5 million.

249. Underlying both these proposals is a submission that marketing materials are, objectively, only being used by the business to generate the interest income which Studio anticipated would be received from an average customer at the time a purchase was made. The first proposal reflects this by only including interest which would be paid by an average customer making average monthly repayments. The second proposal excludes interest which would not be expected due to a customer being in default.

250. Ms Sloane argues that the marketing materials cannot be said to be used in any meaningful way to generate interest above and beyond this. Instead, she suggests that such interest (or the decision to continue to incur interest) is likely to be the product of external events such as (by way of example) COVID or changes to the customer’s employment status.

251. In support of this, Ms Sloane makes the point that, under Financial Conduct Authority rules, Studio cannot use marketing materials to encourage customers to continue to pay interest, to go into default or to incur default interest. She notes that the evidence shows that Studio tightened up its acceptance criteria for credit accounts in order to minimise potential defaults. In addition, it set its minimum payments at a higher level than some of its competitors with the specific purpose of trying to ensure that balances were paid off quicker and that customers did not therefore fall into default.

252. Ms Sloane adds that it was clearly not in Studio’s interests for customers to go into default, given that such customers could not make further purchases.

253. As Ms Sloane observes, customers who do go into default end up paying significantly more interest as they have a larger unpaid balance and are paying interest on the unpaid interest which has been added to their accounts. All of this can add up to significant additional costs given the high rates of interest charged. Ms Sloane argues that it was no part of Studio’s purpose when incurring the marketing costs to generate such additional interest income.

254. Ms Sloane cautions that it is important to distinguish between use and causation. Although she accepts that it can in some sense be said that marketing costs are the original cause of interest income being received, it does not follow that the marketing costs continue to be used in relation to future supplies of credit represented by interest income.

255. Ms Sloane also raises an issue relating to the timing of costs being incurred and supplies being made. She points out that the turnover basis assumes that all inputs are being used on a rolling basis in relation to supplies of credit which are made in the same period. However, this is clearly not the case whilst a customer is in default as such customers receive no marketing materials whilst they are in default. The standard turnover basis cannot therefore, she submits, provide a fair and reasonable apportionment.

256. HMRC, on the other hand, do not accept that the standard turnover method produces any distortion. On the contrary, Mr Watkinson draws attention to the fact that the result of using a method based in some way on expected income results in around £20m-£30m of actual interest income received in the 2021 financial year being excluded from the apportionment calculations.

257. Mr Watkinson points out that there is no authority for the “erosion over time” argument relied on by Studio other than the decision of this Tribunal in N Brown and, as a result, does not accept that there is any such principle.

258. As far as the possibility of external events influencing the payment of credit interest is concerned, Mr Watkinson observes that the right to deduct is forward looking and must be assessed at the time the relevant costs are incurred.

259. In relation to this, he relies on the decision of the CJEU in Belgium v Ghent Coal Terminal NV (Case C-37/95) [1998] STC 394. The circumstances of that case were rather different in that the issue related to expenditure which was intended to be used for a taxable supply but where (as a result of the land in question being sold) the supply never took place. The CJEU explained at [19]–[20] that:

“The right to deduct, once it has arisen, remains acquired even if the planned economic activity has not given rise to taxable transactions.

Likewise, the right to deduct remains acquired where the taxable person has been unable to use the goods or services which have given rise to a deduction in the context of taxable transactions by reason of circumstances beyond his control.”

260. The principle which Mr Watkinson derives from this decision is that, once it is established that costs are (objectively) intended to be used for future supplies, the fact that there is some intervening event or that the supplies do not take place does not prevent the costs in question from having a direct and immediate link with the supplies in question.

261. In any event, Mr Watkinson argues that the subjective reason why a customer pays interest is irrelevant in the context of an objective analysis as to whether residual costs are used for the purposes of the exempt supplies of credit.

262. Looking at the economic reality, Mr Watkinson submits that, where a customer purchases goods on credit, all of the marketing costs up to that point are used for the purposes of the future supplies of credit which relate to the purchase in question so that it is right for the apportionment calculation to take into account all of the interest in fact received rather than some artificial estimate of the expected interest.

263. Mr Watkinson acknowledges that calculating an apportionment based on income from retail sales and interest income in the same accounting period creates a mismatch in the sense that some of the interest received is likely to relate to sales in a previous accounting period. However, he submits that this is simply a feature of the VAT system.

264. In particular, Mr Watkinson notes that it is clear that input tax is deductible when the costs are incurred, irrespective of when the future taxable supply will take place (Hotel La Tour at [13]). Similarly, income from subsequent taxable supplies is taken into account in the period in which it is received even though the inputs which are cost components of those supplies may have been accounted for in some prior VAT period.

265. HMRC in any event do not consider that either of the alternative apportionment proposals put forward by Studio provide a fair and reasonable or more precise result than the standard turnover method.

266. As far as the amended 2023 PESM is concerned, HMRC contend that there is no basis for using an artificial estimate of anticipated interest in calculating the apportionment rather than using the actual interest received as, in their view, using an estimated figure does not measure or reflect the actual use of the residual marketing costs.

267. With respect to the second alternative method, which excludes interest paid by non-trading customers, Mr Watkinson submits that there is no basis for excluding interest paid during this period if it is accepted that marketing costs continue to be used for the purposes of all future supplies of credit relating to a specific purchase.

268. In any event, as mentioned above, HMRC do not accept the “erosion over time” argument to the extent that this provides the underlying basis for this method of apportionment. Mr Watkinson argues that there is no justification for excluding interest just because a customer has gone into default.

Discussion – apportionment of residual costs

269. Having considered all the circumstances, our conclusion is that the standard turnover method, whilst not perfect, does not lead to any significant distortion and so produces a fair and reasonable result. We do not consider that either of the alternatives proposed by Studio gives rise to a more precise apportionment of the residual marketing costs between the taxable and exempt supplies.

270. A significant difficulty with the case put forward by Studio has resulted from its need to accept, following oral evidence, that it could no longer put forward any alternatives which depend on excluding from any apportionment calculation all or part of the interest resulting from a particular sale, based on the length of time after the sale the interest is paid, due to its inability to identify such income reliably.

271. The result of this is that even if it were right that there comes a point when marketing costs are no longer used for the purposes of future supplies of credit where interest is paid many months after the supply of the goods to which the interest relates, the solutions put forward by Studio do not address that problem.

272. This can be seen from the fact that the first alternative (based on expected interest) contains no temporal cut-off. It purports to take account of all interest generated by a particular sale but does so on the basis of estimates and assumptions rather than based on the actual interest received.

273. Similarly, the second proposal does not restrict the amount of exempt interest based on any particular timescale. A customer could go into default in the second month after the purchase or at any subsequent time. On the basis of the proposal put forward by Studio, once the customer ceases to be in default (by paying off any arrears), any interest subsequently paid would still be included in the apportionment calculation however long after the purchase the interest is paid.

274. It is therefore hard to see how the alternative proposals can guarantee a more precise result in circumstances where they do not address the primary reason put forward as to why the standard turnover basis is not fair and reasonable.

275. Leaving this on one side for a moment, it appears that the principle which underpins both alternative methods proposed by Studio is that it is only interest which the business expects or intends to generate which should be included in the apportionment calculation.

276. Although we accept that we should take into account the “observable terms and features of the taxpayer’s business” (see paragraph [240] above), in our view, the approach which is proposed by Studio strays into the impermissible territory of taking into account Studio’s subjective motives (or “ultimate aim” as it was put in BLP).

277. Ms Sloane placed great emphasis on the terms of the credit agreement between Studio and its customers. She notes that this contains minimum payment terms and warnings about incurring additional interest if there is a default. However, in our view, the only objectively observable feature of this is that Studio will be entitled to receive all of the interest which is due under the terms of the credit agreement, whether or not the customer is in default and however long it happens to take a particular customer to repay their debt.

278. We fully accept, based on the evidence, that Studio would prefer customers not to default and that it took steps such as imposing the minimum payment terms and tightening its credit acceptance criteria to try and ensure that this was the case. It also made commercial sense for Studio to try and prevent customers from being in default as they would not then be able to place further orders. However, this seems to us to be no more than the subjective intention of the business and does not determine how the marketing costs have (objectively) been used.

279. Importantly, we fail to see how this intention or aim of the business leads to the conclusion that marketing costs which are accepted as being used for the purposes of exempt supplies of credit both before and after any default takes place cease to be so used during the period of any default.

280. It is true that the cost of the materials which are not sent to customers in default are not being used for supplies of credit which take place during the period of default. However, that does not mean the marketing costs incurred before the period of default are not so used.

281. Similarly, the first alternative method which seeks only to take account of interest which is expected to be paid by an average customer in our view ignores the observable terms and features of the business as it substitutes an estimated figure based on averages and assumptions for the interest which is actually received and which reflects what is due under the credit agreement.

282. To the extent that either of the proposed alternatives is in fact intended to address the perceived distortion caused by an erosion of any link between marketing costs and the payment of interest based on the time which has elapsed between the date when the goods were purchased and the date when interest relating to those purchases is paid, we take a different view of this than the Tribunal in N Brown. In effect, we accept Mr Watkinson’s submissions.

283. Looking at the economic reality, if marketing costs which are accepted as having a direct and immediate link with both the supply of goods and the supply of credit result in a purchase, we cannot see why the last payment of interest in relation to that purchase does not (objectively) use those marketing costs in exactly the same way as the first payment of interest.

284. As noted by Mr Watkinson, the subjective motivation of a customer which may result in them going into default or taking longer to pay off the full balance than the average customer plays no part in an objective determination as to whether input costs are used for the purposes of a particular supply.

285. The fact that a customer may, for example, lose their job and be unable to continue to meet the minimum payments or be able only to make the minimum payment and not to pay off 12% of the balance on their account each month (which the evidence shows is the amount paid off each month by an average customer) is simply not relevant. Looked at objectively, the marketing costs leading to the sale are intended to be used in respect of all of the supplies of credit representing the interest paid in respect of that sale, irrespective of the subjective reason why the customer chooses to pay interest.

286. As submitted by Mr Watkinson, this is not a “but for” (or causation) analysis. We are not saying that the future payments of interest would not have been made but for the sale so that the marketing costs which are used for the purposes of the sale are also being used for the supplies of credit. What we are saying (in agreement with the submission made by Mr Watkinson) is that marketing costs which are objectively used both for the purposes of the sale and the initial supply of credit (as is accepted), continue to be used in the same way for all subsequent supplies of credit relating to that particular sale.

287. We accept that this gives rise to a timing mismatch as marketing costs incurred in year one will continue to be used in respect of supplies of credit which may be made in year two or year three (or subsequently). Similarly, supplies of credit in year two or year three may not use any of the marketing costs incurred in that year (for example, because a customer is in default and is not receiving any of those marketing materials).

288. However, as was noted by Mr Watkinson in his skeleton argument, the proportion of credit interest as a percentage of total revenues has stayed fairly constant during the period in question. In each of the five years from 2018 to 2022 it was either 23% or 24% of total revenues, with the exception of 2021, where it was 20%.

289. Based on this, we do not therefore consider that any mismatch between the time when marketing costs are incurred and the time when interest is received would, over the relevant period, result in a significant distortion as a result of using the standard turnover method. The actual interest received in the year serves as a reasonable proxy for the interest generated by the sales in the relevant year, even though some of that interest may be received in later years.

290. We acknowledge that a similar argument was rejected by the Tribunal in N Brown at [235]–[236]. However, that was on the basis that, in contrast to our conclusions in this case, the Tribunal considered that there comes a point when the marketing costs are no longer used for the purposes of the supplies of credit represented by interest paid some years after the purchase of the goods in question.

291. We note that, if Studio’s first proposal were accepted, the amount of “expected” interest which would be taken into account in 2021 would only be approximately 13%-14.6% of total revenues for that year, a figure which is clearly out of line with the figures mentioned in paragraph [288] above. In the light of this, we cannot accept that this method produces a fair and reasonable result.

292. Studio did not provide details of the amount of interest which would be excluded if its second proposed alternative (excluding interest paid by non-trading customers) were adopted.

293. As Ms Sloane pointed out, the search is not for perfection. However, we consider that the standard turnover method provides a more precise apportionment than the proposed alternatives which, in carrying out the apportionment calculations, seek to ignore a significant proportion of the interest actually received which, as we have found, continues to have a direct and immediate link with the residual marketing costs (albeit, in some cases, costs incurred in a prior period).

294. We therefore dismiss the appeal against the assessments to the extent that the appeals relate to the apportionment of input VAT in respect of residual costs between taxable and exempt supplies on the basis of the standard turnover method.

2023 PESM

295. Studio appeals against HMRC’s rejection of the 2023 PESM and asks the Tribunal to allow the appeal on the basis of an amended 2023 PESM as described at paragraph [248(1)] above.

296. We accept that the Tribunal has jurisdiction to approve the 2023 PESM on the basis of such amendments. In our view, they do not change the methodology applied to the originally proposed 2023 PESM. They simply change the factual inputs to reflect the undisputed evidence as to the average purchases made by a customer with a credit account in any given year.

297. However, as will be apparent from what we have said about the appeals against the assessments, we do not accept that the 2023 PESM (as amended) guarantees a more precise apportionment of the input VAT between taxable and exempt supplies than the standard turnover method.

298. The appeal against the 2023 PESM is therefore dismissed.

Out of time assessments

299. The two assessments which are said to be out of time are an assessment which relates to the 09/19 VAT period which was issued on 1 October 2021 and an assessment which relates to the 03/20 VAT period which was made on 30 March 2022.

300. The assessments were made under s 73 VATA. In accordance with s 73(6) VATA the assessment cannot be made after the later of:

“(a) two years after the end of the prescribed accounting period; or

(b) one year after evidence of the facts, sufficient in the opinion of the Commissioners to justify the making of the assessment, comes to their knowledge.”

301. It is common ground that the assessments were not made within the two year time limit in s 73(6)(a). In the case of the assessment for the 03/20 VAT period that is because the VAT period ended on 27 March 2020 and not 31 March 2020. The focus is therefore on the alternative time limit in s 73(6)(b) VATA.

302. The Supreme Court in DCM (Optical Holdings) Limited v HMRC [2022] UKSC 26 confirmed the approach which should be taken by the Tribunal, approving at [18] the following statement of Dyson J in Pegasus Birds Limited v Customs and Excise Commissioners [1999] STC 95 (paragraph 4 on pages 101-102) that:

“The correct approach for a Tribunal to adopt is (i) to decide what were the facts which, in the opinion of the officer making the assessment on behalf of the Commissioners, justified the making of the assessment, and (ii) to determine when the last piece of evidence of these facts of sufficient weight to justify making the assessment was communicated to the Commissioners. The period of one year runs from the date in (ii).”

303. As noted by the Supreme Court in DCM at [20]:

(1) The focus is on “the assessment which HMRC has in fact made and not a hypothetical assessment which they might have made but did not”; and

(2) “The focus is also on the subjective opinion of the relevant HMRC official, which is a question of fact. Absent a perverse view, akin to Wednesbury unreasonableness, on the part of the official as to the adequacy of the evidence before him or her in relation to the assessment which is later made, it is HMRC's knowledge of the evidence relevant to the particular assessment which starts the clock running under s 73(6)(b).”

304. As to requests by HMRC for further information before making an assessment, the parties both accept the comment made by this Tribunal in Carbondesk Group Plc v HMRC [2015] UKFTT 367 (TC) at [21] that:

“…if the further investigations produce nothing of material significance the result must be that the last such piece of evidence was received before the officer asked for the further information.”

305. The question therefore is what evidence the HMRC officer who made the assessment in fact relied on as justifying the assessment and not when the last request for information was made (or response to such request was received) if this did not produce any further evidence which was relied on by the relevant HMRC officer.

306. In relation to the assessment for the 09/19 VAT period which was issued on 30 October 2021, Ms Sloane submits on behalf of Studio that HMRC had everything they needed when Studio provided the calculations for their apportionment calculations on 11 December 2019. She suggests that HMRC themselves acknowledge in their statement of case that the calculations needed were not complex given that they would just be applying the standard turnover method to the turnover figures shown in the 11 December 2019 calculations.

307. HMRC’s case however is that, whilst this made it clear that part of the exempt interest income had been excluded from the apportionment calculation, it did not explain the reason for this or how the amount which had been excluded had been calculated.

308. There is no dispute that the fact that Studio's calculations excluded any interest which it calculated had been received more than 12 months after the relevant purchase was only revealed in a letter to HMRC from Studio's accountants, PwC dated 2 November 2020. That letter did not however explain why interest charged more than 12 months after the original sale had been excluded. This was only explained by PwC in a further letter to HMRC dated 30 April 2021.

309. As noted by Ms Sloane, neither of the officers who made the assessments on 1 October 2021 and 30 March 2022 have given any evidence. As such, she submits that the Tribunal cannot be satisfied as to the evidence which the officers in question considered sufficient to justify the assessments.

310. Mr Watkinson on the other hand invites the Tribunal to infer what the subjective opinions of the assessing officers were based on the evidence provided by HMRC's witness, Mr Williamson.

311. In his evidence, Mr Williamson explained that the officers who made the assessments were part of HMRC's Large Business group. They were not specialists in VAT or partial exemption calculations. Mr Williamson on the other hand is a partial exemption specialist.

312. Mr Williamson joined the case team dealing with Studio in June 2020. At that time, he reviewed all of the information which had been provided to HMRC and drafted a letter for the Large Business Team to send to Studio asking for further information. This was sent on 17 September 2020 by the officer who issued the 1 October 2021 assessment (Paul Hughes). It is this letter which prompted PwC’s letter to HMRC dated 2 November 2020 which, for the first time, explained that interest income received more than 12 months after a purchase had been excluded for the purposes of the apportionment calculations.

313. Mr Williamson further explained that, when decisions relating to assessments concerning partial exemption were made, he was part of the decision making process. His evidence was that he was the person who “dictated how the case progressed” including determining whether HMRC had sufficient information (as demonstrated by the fact that he had drafted the letter dated 17 September 2020 requesting significant amounts of further information).

314. It is fair to note that Mr Williamson accepted on a number of occasions whilst giving evidence that he could not speak for the assessing officers as to what their opinion was at the time the assessments were issued. However, based on Mr Williamson’s evidence about his role in the decision making process, we consider that it is reasonable to infer that the assessing officers had the same opinion as Mr Williamson himself.

315. It is clear from Mr Williamson’s evidence that he was the person who decided what information was needed and whether an assessment was justified. As far as partial exemption was concerned, there can be little doubt that the assessing officers deferred to Mr Williamson.

316. Mr Williamson confirmed that he had regular discussions with the assessing officers and so they would have been up to speed with his views. As non-specialists, there is no reason to suppose that their opinions as to whether they had sufficient evidence of the facts to justify an assessment would have been any different from Mr Williamson's opinion.

317. Returning to the assessment issued on 1 October 2021, we accept that in December 2019, HMRC knew that some of the exempt interest income had been excluded from the partial exemption calculations. It was however, in our view, perfectly reasonable for HMRC to want to know how the amount which had been excluded had been calculated. It is clear that Mr Williamson did not consider that HMRC had sufficient information to justify an assessment without knowing what lay behind Studio's calculations. As we have said, we infer that the assessing officer, Mr Hughes, shared Mr Williamson's opinion.

318. As the assessment was made within 12 months of the information being provided on 2 November 2020, it was made within the time limit set out in s 73(6)(b) VATA.

319. We note that it is HMRC's case that the assessing officer also needed to understand the reasons for the 12 month cut off in relation to exempt interest income before making an assessment. Ms Sloane challenges this on the basis that, Mr Hughes, in a letter dated 11 March 2021 stated that HMRC “do not agree that any of the exempt income should be left out of the calculation”. However, at the end of that letter, he indicated that he would give Studio an opportunity to respond to HMRC’s concerns.

320. This resulted in PwC’s letter of 30 April 2021 which, amongst other things, explained the rationale for the 12 month restriction. Mr Williamson’s response to this in cross-examination was that, in order to form a view, HMRC needed to understand why the interest paid after 12 months had been excluded. We infer from this that the view expressed in the HMRC letter dated 11 March 2021 was a provisional view and that they were open to receiving additional information which might change that view.

321. Again, we think that this is perfectly reasonable (and indeed sensible). It is possible that the explanation might have persuaded HMRC that a restriction on the amount of interest income based on the time elapsed after the purchase of the goods in question was justified. This explanation was part of the evidence taken into account by HMRC in making the assessment. It is not a situation where further information was requested but nothing new was received.

322. Another piece of information referred to by Mr Williamson as forming part of the evidence for the making of the assessment was the actual turnover of the business for the relevant year which, he says, was taken from Studio's financial statements for the year ended 31 March 2020 which were filed with Companies House in January 2021.

323. Mr Williamson accepted that these figures were not needed before HMRC could make an assessment as the assessment could have been made on the basis of provisional figures (ie the turnover figures shown in the 19 December 2021 calculations).

324. However, as we have seen, that is not the test. The question is what facts were relied on by the relevant HMRC officer in making the assessment which was actually made and not a different assessment which could have been made but which was not.

325. It is clear that HMRC needed to have evidence of the actual turnover of the business in order to make the assessment which was in fact made on 1 October 2021 as it was based on those figures. The fact that HMRC could have made best judgment assessments based on the turnover figures used in the 19 December 2021 calculations is irrelevant.

326. We should mention that when HMRC's assessment decision was reviewed, the review officer mentioned in their conclusions that HMRC had relied on turnover figures purportedly appended to PwC’s letter of 30 April 2021 when making the original assessment. Mr Williamson’s evidence is that this is wrong and that the figures in fact came from the statutory accounts as mentioned above.

327. It is clear that Mr Williamson is correct that no reliance was placed on any turnover figures attached to the letter from PwC dated 30 April 2021 as there were no such figures contained in the appendix to that letter which, instead, simply set out the input tax incurred on the photography and modelling costs (and not the turnover of the business).

328. Whilst Ms Sloane is critical of HMRC for making this mistake in the review letter, in our view it has no bearing on the question we have to decide which is identifying the evidence which, in the opinion of the assessing officer, justified the assessment.

329. Based on what we have said above, we find that the final piece of the jigsaw was received by HMRC on 30 April 2021. At that point, Mr Williamson (and therefore Mr Hughes as the assessing officer) had all of the information which, in his opinion, justified the making of the assessment which was issued on 1 October 2021. This assessment was not therefore made out of time.

330. Turning to the assessment made on 30 March 2022 relating to the 03/20 VAT period Studio's position is that HMRC had enough information to make the assessment as soon as it had submitted its VAT return on 24 April 2020 given that by that time HMRC already knew from the information that had been provided in December 2019 that not all of the exempt interest had been included in the apportionment calculations.

331. For the reasons set out above, we do not accept this. One piece of information received by HMRC which justified the making of the assessment, being the reason for the 12 month restriction on interest, was only received on 30 April 2021. The assessment on 30 March 2022 was made less than a year after that information was received and was not therefore made out of time.

332. In any event, Mr Williamson’s evidence is that HMRC needed to see the calculations that lay behind the figures in the VAT return for the 03/20 VAT period before making any decision in relation to an assessment. That information was provided on 29 November 2021.

333. The need for this information was not challenged by Ms Sloane in cross-examination. Although Mr Williamson confirmed that he could not speak to the assessing officer’s own opinion in respect of this information, for the reasons we have already explained, we infer that the assessing officer shared Mr Williamson's views.

334. The result of that is that as far as the assessment dated 30 March 2022 in respect of the 03/20 VAT period is concerned, the last piece of evidence was in fact only obtained on 29 November 2021. As this was only four months before the assessment was made, it was within the time limit in s 73(6)(b) VATA.

Summary of conclusions

335. The photography and modelling costs have a direct and immediate link not only with the taxable supply of goods but also the exempt supply of credit. They are therefore residual costs which fall to be apportioned along with the other residual marketing costs.

336. Whilst not perfect, the standard turnover method is fair and reasonable and does not give rise to significant distortions. The alternatives put forward by Studio do not guarantee a more precise result.

337. The assessments for the VAT periods 09/19 and 03/20 were made within the relevant time limit.

338. Studio's appeals against the various assessments and against HMRC’s decisions are therefore dismissed in their entirety.

Right to apply for permission to appeal

339. This document contains full findings of fact and reasons for the decision. Any party dissatisfied with this decision has a right to apply for permission to appeal against it pursuant to Rule 39 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Tax Chamber) Rules 2009. The application must be received by this Tribunal not later than 56 days after this decision is sent to that party. The parties are referred to “Guidance to accompany a Decision from the First-tier Tribunal (Tax Chamber)” which accompanies and forms part of this decision notice.

Release date:

28 October 2026

If you are facing a similar issue in France, you may contact our tax lawyer.


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