Civil United Kingdom

Court of Appeal (Civil Division), 30 October 2026, n° [2026] EWCA Civ 1390

Official source
Judgment Approved by the court for handing down. Servis-Terminal v Drelle

Neutral Citation Number: [2026] EWCA Civ 1390

Case No: CA-2026-002001

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)

ON APPEAL FROM THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE

BUSINESS AND PROPERTY COURTS OF ENGLAND AND WALES

INSOLVENCY AND COMPANIES LIST (ChD)

Mr Justice Richards

[2024] EWHC 521 (Ch)

Royal Courts of Justice

Strand, London, WC2A 2LL

Date: 30/10/2026

Before :

LORD JUSTICE NEWEY

LADY JUSTICE FALK
and

LORD JUSTICE MILES

– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –

Between :

SERVIS-TERMINAL LLC Petitioner/
Respondent to appeal
– and –
VALERIY ERNESTOVICH DRELLE Respondent to petition/
Appellant

– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –

– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –

Charles Samek KC and Bláthnaid Breslin (instructed by Sterling Law) for the Appellant

Mark Phillips KC and Clara Johnson (instructed by Madison Legal) for the Respondent

Hearing date : 14 October 2026

– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –

Approved Judgment

This judgment was handed down remotely at 10.30am on 30 October 2026 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives.

………………………..

Lord Justice Miles :

Introduction

1. This is the second time this appeal has reached this court. It is from a decision of Richards J (“the Judge”) by which he dismissed an appeal from ICC Judge Burton (“the ICCJ”). The ICCJ dismissed an application by Mr Drelle, the appellant, to set aside a statutory demand issued by the respondent, Servis-Terminal LLC (“ST”) and made a bankruptcy order against Mr Drelle. Permission to appeal to this court from the decision of the Judge was given on several grounds. When the appeal first came before this court, Mr Drelle succeeded on the first ground, which was a point of law, and the remaining points were not addressed. The Supreme Court allowed an appeal from this court’s decision on the first ground and remitted the rest to this court. This judgment addresses the remaining grounds of appeal.

The facts

2. ST is a Russian company in bankruptcy. It acts by its trustee-in-bankruptcy, Mr Sergey Lisin. Mr Drelle is the former Director General of ST. He was also a shareholder.

3. The largest creditor of ST is Gazprom Neft (“GPN”). GPN is a subsidiary of PJSC Gazprom (“Gazprom”), a publicly listed company engaged in energy production, majority owned (directly or indirectly) by the Russian State.

4. In December 2011 ST advanced a loan of RUB 2 billion (“the Loan”) to Fort-Steiton LLC (“FS”), a Russian company, with the benefit of a personal guarantee from FS’s owner, Anatoly Motylev, the chairman and majority shareholder of the Russian Credit Bank (“RCB”).

5. In or around July 2015 RCB collapsed. As a result, ST lost around RUB 7.9 billion held in its accounts with RCB. The majority of these funds came from GPN. Shortly after RCB’s collapse Mr Motylev left Russia. The Loan was never repaid. Mr Motylev was declared bankrupt in Russia in February 2018, and in England in November 2020.

6. Mr Drelle left Russia and settled in London.

7. In April 2017 the Arbitrazh Court of Yaroslavl Region (“the Arbitrazh Court”) declared ST bankrupt and appointed Mr Lisin as its trustee-in-bankruptcy.

8. In March 2018 ST issued proceedings against Mr Drelle in the Arbitrazh Court. The basis of the claim was that, by causing ST to advance the Loan, Mr Drelle had acted unreasonably and in bad faith, and had caused loss to ST.

9. Mr Drelle defended the claim on a number of grounds, including that the Loan had been entered into in order to generate a profit, that there were no grounds to doubt FS’s solvency, that he had acted in accordance with established business practice in obtaining a guarantee from Mr Motylev and had no grounds to doubt Mr Motylev's creditworthiness since he was the owner of a banking group, that ST had issued several other loans to FS which had all been repaid with interest, and that ST’s shareholders had approved the granting of the Loan.

10. The proceedings in the Arbitrazh Court were conducted over a 14-month period and involved hearings as well as written submissions. In a judgment dated 24 May 2019 (“the Russian Judgment”) the judge held that Mr Drelle had breached his duties to ST and he was ordered to pay RUB 2 billion to ST.

11. Mr Drelle appealed to the Second Arbitrazh Appeal Court. Following a hearing on 31 July 2019, in a judgment dated 6 August 2019, that court dismissed the appeal.

12. Mr Drelle appealed to the Cassation Instance Arbitrazh Court (Arbitrazh Court of Volgo-Vyatsky District) (“the Arbitrazh Court of Appeal”). In a judgment dated 6 November 2019 the appeal was dismissed.

13. Mr Drelle appealed to the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation. His application was considered by a single judge who held that there were no grounds for the appeal. By a ruling dated 17 February 2020, the appeal was dismissed.

14. The Russian Judgment and the three appellate judgments have together been referred to by the parties and courts below as “the Russian Judgments” and I shall adopt that term.

15. On 9 October 2020 ST served a statutory demand under section 268(1)(a) of the Insolvency 1986 Act (“the Statutory Demand”) on Mr Drelle based on the Russian Judgment. On 13 October 2020 ST presented a bankruptcy petition (“the Petition”) on an expedited basis under section 270 of the 1986 Act.

16. On 27 October 2020 Mr Drelle issued an application to set aside the Statutory Demand. The grounds (which were the same grounds as those for opposing the making of a bankruptcy order) were that the debt was disputed on genuine and substantial grounds because the Russian Judgments were improperly obtained, biased and/or contrary to natural justice and English public policy, and further or alternatively that they were obtained by fraud and/or collusion.

17. Mr Drelle adduced witness evidence from Ms Alyona Zheglova, formerly ST's finance officer, in support of his contention that the outcome of the Russian proceedings was predetermined against him, and expert evidence on Russian law from Mr Maxim Kulkov, and state interference in Russian legal proceedings from Mr John Lough. ST also adduced expert evidence in those fields from Professor Andrei Egorov and Professor Paul Stephan.

18. The trial of the Petition took place on 28, 29 and 30 June 2022 before the ICCJ. In her judgment, which was handed down on 9 March 2023, she found that the Russian Judgment debt was not disputed on genuine and substantial grounds: [2023] EWHC 506 (Ch), [2024] BPIR 285. On 31 March 2023 a bankruptcy order was made on the Petition.

19. Mr Drelle obtained permission to appeal to the High Court against the bankruptcy order on the basis that the ICCJ's conclusion that the Russian Judgment debt was not disputed on genuine and substantial grounds was wrong. He also raised for the first time the contention that the Russian Judgment did not constitute a petition debt since it had not been the subject of recognition proceedings in the English courts.

20. The appeal was heard by the Judge on 15 and 16 January 2024. By his judgment, which was handed down on 11 March 2024, the Judge dismissed the appeal: [2024] EWHC 521 (Ch), [2024] BPIR 496.

21. Mr Drelle obtained permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal on 19 April 2024 on the ground that the Judge had erred in holding that an unrecognised foreign judgment is a debt within the meaning of section 267(2)(b) of the 1986 Act (Ground 1), and also on the grounds that he had applied the wrong standard of appellate review to the decision of the ICCJ and that the ICCJ’s conclusion that the Russian Judgment debt was not disputed on genuine and substantial grounds was wrong (Grounds 2 to 4).

22. The first hearing of the appeal took place on 11 and 12 December 2024 before Newey, Popplewell, and Snowden LJJ. They handed down judgment on 31 January 2025: [2025] EWCA Civ 62, [2026] Ch 1, [2025] BPIR 564. The appeal was allowed on Ground 1. Because the Court of Appeal did not want to say anything which might prejudice any future recognition proceedings which ST might bring, the court did not address Grounds 2 to 4.

23. On 22 April 2025 ST issued a claim form under Part 7 of the CPR for recognition of the Russian Judgment. The parties have agreed a stay of that claim pending the determination of these proceedings.

24. ST successfully appealed to the Supreme Court, which decided ([2026] UKSC 29, [2026] 3 WLR 357) that an obligation to pay a sum of money under an unrecognised Russian Judgment is a debt within the meaning of section 267 of the Insolvency Act 1986. It remitted the other grounds to this court. This has been the appeal of the remitted Grounds 2 to 4.

The ICCJ’s decision

25. The ICCJ’s judgment is careful and detailed. It is only necessary to summarise the key points for the purposes of the challenges made on this appeal.

26. The ICCJ recorded that the central question was whether the Petition was disputed on genuine and substantial grounds and that the trial of a petition does not generally require cross-examination of witnesses.

27. The ICCJ explained that Mr Drelle relied on flaws in the Russian Judgments, as highlighted by his experts, as evidence that should lead the court to conclude that they were obtained as a result of a miscarriage of justice. GPN, as ST’s primary creditor, had taken an active role in the Russian proceedings, funding them and giving evidence against Mr Drelle. Mr Drelle relied on a letter from Mr Dyukov, GPN’s CEO, to the head of the Russian criminal prosecution authorities urging them to prosecute him. Mr Drelle also referred to the evidence of Ms Zheglova stating that she was informed by a well-placed third party that the Chairman of the Arbitrazh Court had informed the third party that the case against Mr Drelle was predetermined. This was supported by Mr Lough’s expert report, which stated that “with GPN driving the case, Mr Drelle stood no chance of winning in court” (see paragraph 21 of the judgment).

28. The ICCJ concluded at paragraph 29 that the bankruptcy court may look behind a foreign judgment debt where it appeared that (a) there was no true underlying debt or (b) where the judgment debt was obtained as a result of fraud, collusion or pursuant to a miscarriage of justice. At paragraph 30 she referred to Rule 48 of Dicey Morris and Collins on the Conflict of Laws (16th ed.) (“Dicey”) which states that a foreign judgment will be treated as unimpeachable unless it can be impeached under Rules 50 to 52 on grounds of fraud, as contrary to public policy, or as opposed to natural justice. She said in paragraph 31 that the question for her was not whether the Russian Judgments should be impeached but whether there was a bona fide and substantial dispute that the Russian Judgments may be impeached.

29. At paragraph 33ff, the ICCJ referred to a number of authorities concerned with challenges to foreign judgments on the grounds of fraud, public policy and natural justice. The ICCJ then summarised Mr Drelle’s criticisms of the Russian Judgments. On Mr Drelle’s case, there were alleged procedural and substantive irregularities which indicated that there had been an unfair trial and breaches of natural justice in the Russian proceedings.

30. The ICCJ referred in paragraph 60 to Long v Farrer & Co [2004] BPIR 1218 (“Long”) where Rimer J noted that, subject to limited exceptions, the court cannot and should not disbelieve the evidence of a witness given on paper in the absence of cross-examination of that witness.

31. In paragraph 61, the ICCJ said this:

“However, the Court must first determine the relevance of the areas of disagreement highlighted in the experts’ reports. Following [Maximov v. Open Joint Stock Company Novolipetsky Metallurgichesky Kombinat [2017] EWHC 1911 (Comm), [2017] 2 C.L.C. 121 (“Maximov”)] it is not enough to find that there is a genuine triable issue that the Russian court(s) appear to have erred and/or that a properly constituted tribunal would not have found Mr Drelle to be liable. Evidence to the standard of a genuine triable issue of incompetence, if I were to find it, is not enough. I must find that there is before me, a substantial dispute as to whether the Russian Judgments are deliberately wrong or that the decision is so wrong as to be evidence of bias or to be such that no court acting in good faith could have arrived at it, and/or there must be a substantial dispute that the judgment is impeachable by fraud or that the proceedings were opposed to natural justice (the “Threshold Test”).”

32. At paragraph 63ff, the ICCJ addressed several alleged substantive errors of law in the Russian Judgments. These were set out in Mr Kulkov’s expert evidence. The ICCJ concluded that the Arbitrazh’s Court’s reasoning either did not contain the suggested errors or that any error that was made was not so striking as to suggest that there was a genuine and substantial dispute that the court’s approach or conclusion was deliberately wrong and not merely incompetent so as to meet the Threshold Test.

33. At paragraph 100ff, the ICCJ addressed several alleged procedural irregularities. She directed herself that, as set out in Dicey [14-163], issues concerning the regularity of proceedings go primarily (but not exclusively) to whether there has been a breach of natural justice and that where a procedural complaint has been raised and rejected by a foreign court, it is less likely that an English court will entertain arguments that the defect(s) give rise to a breach of natural justice.

34. The ICCJ then addressed the alleged procedural irregularities in the Russian proceedings at paragraphs 103ff. These were (a) an alleged failure to give reasons, (b) an alleged failure to give reasons for rejecting Mr Drelle’s arguments on causation, (c) the dismissal of ST’s claims against Mr Drelle’s co-defendants, and (d) Ms Zheglova’s evidence.

35. The ICCJ’s treatment of Ms Zheglova’s evidence is central to this appeal. At paragraph 115 she summarised the evidence. At paragraph 117 the ICCJ said this:

“This Court must consider Ms Zheglova’s witness statement in the context of the test that I have held this Court must apply. Her statement comprises evidence of the fact that her conversation with Ms Lobanova took place. It is not evidence of the truth of what Ms Lobanova is reported to have said and it is not evidence of the accuracy or truth of what Ms Lobanova is said to have learned from her conversation with Mr Guschev. It is “double hearsay” evidence. As such, it is not cogent evidence that there is a good arguable case that there has been a breach of natural justice. Moreover it only refers to the Arbitrazh Judgment. The case was re-examined in the Court of Appeal where Mr Guschev’s alleged advance disclosure of the result has no bearing.”

36. The ICCJ considered the alleged procedural irregularities cumulatively in paragraph 118. She concluded that neither separately nor cumulatively did they meet the Threshold Test.

37. At paragraph 119ff, the ICCJ addressed Mr Drelle’s case that there had been state influence and/or that the Russian proceedings were partial (in the sense of being not impartial). She recorded that GPN was 95.68% owned by Gazprom, which is 50.23% state owned. She referred to the evidence of Mr Lough that GPN would have been understood by the Russian trial judge as representing the interests of the Russian state and that a striking number of GPN’s board members were from within “Putin’s network”. Mr Lough said that given GPN’s status as a subsidiary of Gazprom no judge could ignore its position as a company controlled by “trusted individuals” who form part of the ruling group and that this gave GPN enormous power in Russia. He contrasted the treatment of Mr Drelle in the proceedings with that of Mr Motylev. He said that a Russian judge would take a great personal risk by ruling against GPN or any other major state company so intimately connected with the Kremlin. He also referred to the letter from Mr Dyukov to the Head of the Main Directorate for Economic Security and Anti-Corruption in the Ministry of Internal Affairs, sent in 2016, “strongly urging” him to investigate Mr Drelle’s alleged criminal behaviour relating to the loss of funds deposited with RCB. Mr Lough said that the recipient of the letter and the investigators will have been in no doubt about the importance of the case for GPN and the need to demonstrate a satisfactory result.

38. In paragraph 122 the ICCJ referred to Mr Lough’s evidence that there had been a purge of older judges at district level in 2001 leading to an influx of new judges loyal to the Presidential administration. The ICCJ quoted a passage from a 2010 report by the International Commission of Jurists, entitled “The state of the judiciary in Russia,” which stated that:

“Threats to judicial independence are reported to be particularly acute in cases where powerful political or economic actors have an interest in an outcome of a case, but pressure on judges permeates the judicial system as a whole. Such pressures can – although they by no means always do – affect a court’s ability to deliver justice in a wide range of cases. The way the judiciary operates puts pressure on judges through a complex system which is not always apparent or visible. The problem is not one of external pressure only, but to a great extent has to do with internal mechanisms and bureaucracy. These internal mechanisms have become more significant as a result of the government’s drive to strengthen the powers of the executive, known in Russia as “strengthening the vertical of power”. Methods of inappropriate influence on judges are multifarious and range from manipulation of promotions or benefits to applying direct pressure on a judge regarding a concrete case and the chilling effect on judges of dismissing colleagues perceived to be too independent or outspoken.”

39. In paragraph 123 the ICCJ listed a number of examples which Mr Lough had described as “the most salient cases” of manipulation of the judicial or legal process since 2000 for political and other purposes. In paragraph 124 she referred to Professor Stephan’s evidence to the effect that the Russian state reserves its powers as a controlling shareholder to implement national policy, not to settle insignificant commercial disputes where only money, and not firm viability or capacity, is at stake. He did not regard the claim in ST’s bankruptcy proceedings as one where the state would have any reason to interfere. The amounts were relatively small, and there was a lack of political ramifications.

40. In paragraph 125 the ICCJ said that Mr Lough’s report made for uncomfortable reading. She nonetheless concluded that the cases Mr Lough had listed as examples concerned critics of the state, state interference in the nationalisation of energy resources, and criminal proceedings. She concluded that there was no evidence that Mr Drelle was a critic of President Putin and the proceedings against him did not carry the level of state financial or political interest that was in play in the examples given by Mr Lough. She addressed the allegedly differential treatment of Mr Motylev in the proceedings and the letter from Mr Dyukov to the criminal prosecutors.

41. She said in paragraph 129 that the question was whether there was cogent evidence to support a finding that there is a genuine triable issue that all four of the Russian Courts were deliberately wrong. In paragraph 130 she said that it was not enough to be satisfied that Russia frequently encounters problems of judicial corruption and political interference.

42. In paragraph 131 the ICCJ said:

“The most that I have seen is a keen interest by GPN’s CEO to pursue Mr Drelle via criminal proceedings, anecdotal evidence that the Russian courts would be reluctant and/or highly unlikely to rule against GPN and hearsay evidence that the Arbitrazh Proceedings were pre-determined. Mr Drelle’s expert’s criticisms do not extend beyond the Arbitrazh Judgment and Court of Appeal Judgment. There have been four, fully reasoned judgments. Those judgments, like any, are not immune from criticism. But I have seen no cogent evidence that points to the existence of any potential interference with the judges in all four courts. A relatively small number of potential procedural breaches, a potentially harsh application, with the benefit of hindsight of the law surrounding a director’s duties, hearsay, anecdotal evidence and a general recognition that some cases in Russia are infected by bias are insufficient to lead me to conclude that there is a substantial dispute that the proceedings giving rise to the Debt in this case, were tainted by political interference and/or bias.”

43. At paragraph 132ff, the ICCJ returned to the test for finding that there was a genuine and substantial case that the Russian Judgments were the result of fraud, collusion or a miscarriage of justice. She said in paragraph 135 that the letter from GPN’s CEO demonstrated an interest at the highest level of the organisation. She noted that there were cases in Russia of political interference in judicial decisions. In paragraph 138 she again referred to the evidence of Ms Zheglova as “hearsay”. She described the evidence about GPN’s interest in the case and the state’s interest in GPN that would lead judges to know that life could become difficult for them if they ruled against GPN as “very serious but nevertheless anecdotal”. She concluded that there was no genuinely arguable case that the threshold for impugning the Russian judgments was met.

The Judge’s decision

44. The appeal to the Judge involved two principal issues. The first was whether the Petition could be brought on the basis of a foreign judgment which had been neither registered nor recognised by an English court.

45. The second was whether the ICCJ had erred in concluding that the debt was not subject to a genuine and substantial dispute when Mr Drelle’s case was that it was at the very least not fanciful to suppose that such judgment was impeachable for fraud.

46. In paragraph 18 the Judge recorded that both Mr Drelle and ST accepted that the ICCJ’s formulation of the Threshold Test in paragraph 61 of her judgment was correct.

47. The Judge referred to the well-known statement in Allied Fort Insurance Services Ltd v Creation Consumer Finance Limited [2015] EWCA Civ 841 at paragraph 80 (“Allied Fort”) that it is not appropriate for a judge hearing a summary judgment application to conduct a mini-trial in order to resolve conflicts of evidence. The Judge also referred to Rimer J’s comments in Long to the effect that the court cannot and should not disbelieve the evidence of a witness given in a statement in the absence of cross-examination. The Judge noted that Rimer LJ applied the same principle in Coyne v DRC Distribution Ltd [2008] EWCA Civ 488.

48. At paragraph 71ff, the Judge referred to the degree of deference to be given by an appellate court to the first-instance evaluative decision that there was no genuine and substantial dispute. He referred to Malik v Henley Homes plc [2023] EWCA Civ 726 (“Malik”), where Nugee LJ said at paragraph 79 that “[t]he decision of a judge, at any rate in a case like this, that a defendant has no real prospect of successfully defending a claim is an evaluative decision on the facts. It is not a pure point of law. In those circumstances I think we should only disturb his conclusion if it was one that we are satisfied was not open to him”.

49. In paragraph 77 the Judge noted that part of Mr Drelle’s complaint was that the ICCJ had conducted a mini-trial and had wrongly disbelieved the evidence of Ms Zheglova. In paragraph 78 the Judge said that Allied Fort shows that the degree of deference to be given to a first-instance decision depends on the reasons for the challenge. Where the challenge is to an evaluative decision, the approach in Malik will apply. Where it is that the first-instance judge followed the wrong approach, that is likely to amount to an error of law and an evaluative decision outside the reasonable range because it was reached following a flawed approach.

50. In paragraph 81 the Judge turned to Ms Zheglova’s evidence. He set out a number of passages from her witness statement and then referred to the ICCJ’s conclusions in paragraph 117 of her judgment. The Judge addressed her comment that the evidence was hearsay. He recorded counsel for ST’s acceptance that a submission he had made to the ICCJ about the evidence being inadmissible was wrong, since section 1 of the Civil Evidence Act 1995 provides that in civil proceedings evidence is not to be excluded on the grounds that it is hearsay, of whatever degree.

51. The Judge rejected Mr Drelle’s submission that the ICCJ had disbelieved Ms Zheglova’s evidence. Rather, he held that the ICCJ’s conclusion was that, even if what Ms Lobanova had said was completely accurate, it was not sufficiently cogent to establish a good arguable case of a breach of natural justice. He accepted that the ICCJ had said, after noting that the evidence was double hearsay, that it was “as such” not cogent. He decided, however, that she had not disregarded it but had evaluated its contents and the weight to be given to it.

52. In paragraph 87 the Judge went on to say that there were gaps in the evidence of Ms Zheglova which flowed from the fact that she reported on a conversation that Ms Lobanova had had with Mr Guschev, and that the ICCJ had not been obliged to fill those gaps in a manner favourable to Mr Drelle. In paragraph 88 he set out the gaps. I shall quote his judgment as ST relied on this passage and said that the Judge was right:

“i) There is no attempt to report either what Ms Lobanova actually said to Ms Zheglova, or what Mr Guschev actually said to Ms Lobanova. What is relayed is simply the gist of both conversations.

ii) It is not clear whether the statement that “we cannot win this case” is something that Mr Guschev said, or whether it was simply Ms Lobanova’s opinion on the matter.

iii) Mr Drelle argues that it is obvious that the view that Mr Drelle could not win was that of Mr Guschev not least since paragraph [85] of Ms Zheglova’s [statement] refers to the “negative outcome, which Mr Guschev had described to Ms Lobanova”. I do not agree. Ms Lobanova’s brief as described in paragraph [81] was to find out “who is really behind this claim”. It is quite possible to read Ms Zheglova’s witness statement as meaning that the “negative outcome” was that GPN, who Mr Drelle had previously been assuming was focusing on tracking down assets owned by Mr Motylev, was in fact focusing on securing a contribution from Mr Drelle to ST’s bankruptcy. If Mr Guschev was simply confirming that GPN was behind the claim against Mr Drelle, it is quite possible that the view that Mr Drelle “cannot win” represented the opinion of Ms Zheglova and/or Ms Lobanova rather than a statement of Mr Guschev.

iv) Moreover, the wording in paragraph [83] of Ms Zheglova’s witness statement reads most naturally as an expression of Ms Lobanova’s opinion. The words “she said” appear at the beginning of the second sentence and of the fourth sentence. Therefore, the conclusion that there would be “judgment against Mr Drelle for RUB 2 billion” is expressly said to be a statement made by Ms Lobanova rather than by Mr Guschev. One might expect that if Ms Zheglova was intending to make the eye-catching assertion that the Chairman of the Court had told Ms Lobanova that Mr Drelle “cannot win”, that would have been said expressly. Mr Lough, at [70] of his expert report, appears to have read her witness statement in this way referring to “the conclusion allegedly drawn by Ms Lobanova after her telephone enquiries [with Mr Guschev]”.”

53. In paragraph 90 the Judge accepted that the ICCJ had not spelt out each of these concerns but he concluded that they were consistent with her overall view that Ms Zheglova’s evidence was insufficiently cogent to establish a genuine and substantial dispute.

54. In paragraph 91 the Judge added that even if Mr Guschev had been the source of the “cannot win” statement, that would not inexorably lead to the conclusion that the case had been predetermined against Mr Drelle. He noted that by the time of the Lobanova/Guschev conversation the case had been proceeding for some time. The ICCJ was entitled to conclude that even if Mr Guschev was indiscreetly and inappropriately commenting on the outcome in advance, that was not on its own evidence of predetermination.

55. In paragraph 92 the Judge noted the submission that Mr Lough’s evidence was consistent with Mr Drelle’s case on predetermination. He concluded that consistency with other evidence was not enough. The Judge concluded in paragraph 93 that, “[o]verall, the evidence of Ms Zheglova was light indeed on detail as to why the conversations reported raised a clear and cogent case to the effect that the Arbitrazh Court had made up its mind in advance”.

56. At paragraph 94ff the Judge addressed Mr Drelle’s contention that the ICCJ had taken the wrong approach to the expert evidence. The Judge noted at paragraph 95 that the experts had been broadly agreed on the applicable principles of Russian law and procedure. He found that their disagreements involved the application of those principles to the facts of the case.

57. At paragraph 97ff he addressed the contention that the ICCJ had undertaken a mini-trial and had decided issues of Russian law without the benefit of cross-examination of the experts. He rejected this submission. He noted that the ICCJ had properly directed herself about the task she was to undertake. She had not decided between the experts on the differences of Russian law. Instead she had asked whether, taking account of their evidence, the case met her Threshold Test.

58. At paragraph 102ff the Judge addressed Mr Drelle’s argument that the Russian Judgment contained a swathe of major errors and that this led to the inference that it was impeachable for fraud. The Judge rejected this argument. In paragraph 103 he said (based on the line of cases including Maximov) that in order to establish fraud it was not enough to show that the judgment was wrong; it had to be shown that it was deliberately wrong. In paragraph 104 he found that the ICCJ had properly asked whether the alleged errors gave rise to an arguable case that the Arbitrazh judge had deliberately reached an erroneous decision against Mr Drelle and that, applying that test, there was no sufficiently cogent case. There was as he said no extra ingredient beyond a list of alleged errors.

59. At paragraph 108ff the Judge addressed the criticisms of the ICCJ’s treatment of Mr Lough’s evidence. At paragraph 112 the Judge rejected the argument that the ICCJ had undertaken a mini-trial and/or disbelieved the evidence of Mr Lough which has not been tested in cross-examination. He concluded that the ICCJ did not reject or disbelieve the evidence. Rather she was pointing out that the examples Mr Lough had given did not throw much helpful light on Mr Drelle’s case.

60. In paragraph 114 the Judge rejected the argument that Mr Lough’s evidence was sufficiently cogent to establish at least a triable issue that the Russian Judgment could be impeached. The Judge treated this as a challenge to the ICCJ’s evaluative assessment, to which he was required to pay due appellate deference. The Judge concluded in paragraph 115 that the ICCJ had been entitled to regard the evidence as being insufficient on its own to establish a triable issue since it was generalised and said nothing about the particular proceedings.

61. In paragraph 118 the Judge rejected an argument based on the Dyukov letter to the criminal prosecuting authorities. It was for the ICCJ to assess the significance of the letter. Her conclusion at paragraph 135 that the letter was not cogent evidence of the Judgment being impeachable for fraud was open to her.

62. At paragraph 119ff the Judge addressed an argument that the ICCJ had failed to consider the various strands of evidence in the round. In paragraphs 120 and 121 the Judge concluded that even considering the various arguments in the round, the grounds of appeal failed. The evaluative decision of the ICCJ was available to her, applying the approach in Malik.

63. At paragraph 123ff the Judge addressed and rejected an argument that the ICCJ had improperly relied on the unsuccessful appeals to the superior courts in Russia as pointing against a conclusion that there was a triable issue that the Judgment of the Arbitrazh Court was impeachable for fraud.

64. The Judge’s overall conclusion (in paragraph 131) was that the appeal should be dismissed.

The appeal

The grounds of appeal and the respondent’s notice

65. Grounds (2) to (4) may be summarised as follows: (2) the Judge applied the wrong standard of review to the ICCJ’s judgment; (3) the Judge took the wrong approach to the ICCJ’s treatment of Ms Zheglova’s evidence: the ICCJ had wrongly rejected that evidence; it was irrelevant that Ms Zheglova’s evidence related only to the Arbitrazh proceedings; the Judge was wrong to have identified material gaps in that evidence; and was wrong not to have resolved any doubts in favour of Mr Drelle; (4) the Judge erred regarding the expert evidence, specifically by supposing that Mr Drelle was seeking to argue that the expert evidence of itself disclosed a serious issue that the Russian Judgment could be impugned for fraud; rather it was to be considered together with the evidence of Ms Zheglova, which the expert evidence supported; and both of the judges below erred in drawing erroneous conclusions from the expert evidence.

66. ST has served a respondent’s notice, of which only ground (3) remains relevant. ST contends that (a) Mr Drelle’s case before the ICCJ was that she had to decide whether there was a substantial dispute that all of the Russian Judgments were impeachable and not just the Russian Judgment; and (b) even if the ICCJ was not permitted to take into account the fact that the Russian Judgment had been upheld by three courts, she had nonetheless not been satisfied that there was a genuinely triable issue that the Russian Judgment on its own was impeachable.

Grounds (3) and (4)

67. It is convenient to start with grounds (3) and (4).

Ms Zheglova’s witness statement

68. Ms Zheglova explains that her witness statement was prepared with the assistance of an interpreter as her native language is Russian and that if she gave oral evidence at a hearing she would require the assistance of an interpreter.

69. Ms Zheglova was the Finance Director of ST between 2002 and 2016. She is a qualified accountant and auditor. She has been a member of the Russian Association of Auditors since 1998.

70. Her account of the January 2019 events was as follows. When ST brought the Russian claim, she and Mr Drelle were surprised as the only possible driving force was GPN and they had thought that they had good relations with GPN. She therefore thought about possible contacts who might be able to provide information regarding the claim (paragraphs 70-71).

71. Mr Guschev was appointed as the new Chairman of the Commercial Court [i.e. the Arbitrazh Court] of the Yaroslavl Region in July 2015 and he had spent his career in Nizhny Novgorod (paragraph 72).

72. Her “personal view”, based on her professional experience, was that the Chairman of a regional court has a decisive role in deciding major cases in Russia. The judges allocated to cases involving large companies, particularly state-owned companies (such as GPN), discuss with the Chairman of the Court such cases and decisions are taken in consultation with the Court (paragraph 73).

73. GPN is one of the largest Russian companies, with a global presence. She said “[t]herefore, any case involving GPN would have a major political importance and would be considered by the Chairman of the Yaroslavl Commercial Court” (paragraph 74).

74. She contacted Tatyana Lobanova, whom she had known for more than ten years. Ms Lobanova is general director of one of the 100 largest audit and consulting firms in Russia. Hers is the only such firm in Nizhny Novgorod. Ms Lobanova had spent most of her working life in the Nizhny Novgorod region. Ms Zheglova spoke to Ms Lobanova in January 2019 and agreed to meet in a café in Nizhny Novgorod on 26 January (paragraphs 75-80).

75. Ms Zheglova explained the situation to Ms Lobanova. Mr Drelle had received the claim from ST’s receiver (who was really representing GPN). Ms Zheglova asked Ms Lobanova if she could contact Mr Guschev and find out who was really behind the claim as they thought that they were working with GPN to seek recoveries from Mr Motylev. Ms Lobanova said she would make some calls (paragraphs 81-82).

76. In paragraph 83 Ms Zheglova states:

“She returned after approximately one hour. I understand that she spoke with Mr Gushchev. Ms Lobanova said that things do not look well for Mr Drelle. She said that GPN is pushing this claim forward. Given that GPN was behind the claim (which is understood to mean, a very influential and powerful company working closely with the highest levels of the Russian state), we cannot win this case. She said that the decision would be judgment against Mr Drelle for RUB 2 billion.”

77. In paragraph 84 Ms Zheglova states that she reported the conversation to Mr Drelle, and in paragraph 85 states that, “[w]e decided that in spite of the negative outcome, which Mr Guschev had described to Ms Lobanova that we would still argue this case”.

The expert evidence

78. This is sufficiently summarised for present purposes in the earlier section recording the contents of the ICCJ’s decision.

The parties’ submissions in outline

79. In broad summary, Mr Samek KC contended that Ms Zheglova’s statement constituted credible evidence that by January 2019 the outcome of the case was predetermined against Mr Drelle. He noted that the evidence in the Arbitrazh proceedings was not complete at that time, and it was not the case that all that remained was for judgment to be given.

80. He submitted that the ICCJ had wrongly dismissed Ms Zheglova’s evidence on the basis that it was hearsay. This error had led the ICCJ to conclude that the evidence did not form a sufficient basis for seeking to impeach the Russian Judgment.

81. Mr Samek submitted that, in turn, the Judge was wrong to conclude that the ICCJ had not based her decision on the hearsay nature of the evidence. He contended that, since the ICCJ had gone wrong in principle, the Judge had erred in giving appellate deference to the ICCJ’s evaluation.

82. He also argued that the Judge’s own approach to Ms Zheglova’s evidence was flawed. The passage in which the Judge had identified gaps in the evidence went beyond his proper appellate function but, in any case, the supposed gaps were based on an incomplete reading of the witness statement. They were essentially cross-examination points. What was required at this stage was a proper evidential basis for an arguable case, in the sense of a case that was more than remote, and not a watertight one.

83. Mr Samek also submitted that the ICCJ and the Judge had failed properly to understand and apply the supporting expert evidence of Mr Lough to the effect that where large state-owned companies, such as GPN, are parties to Russian litigation judges are under a variety of professional and personal pressures to ensure that the outcome favours the state. Mr Samek also referred to the various substantive and procedural problems identified by Mr Kulkov and submitted that his evidence supported Mr Drelle’s allegation of judicial predetermination.

84. Again in broad summary, Mr Phillips KC submitted that the ICCJ had undertaken an evaluative exercise, after reviewing all of the evidence, and had reached a decision that was reasonably open to her. The Judge had properly upheld the ICCJ on this basis. There was therefore no proper basis for this court to intervene. But in any case the conclusions drawn by the courts below about Ms Zheglova’s witness statement were clearly correct. That evidence had the gaps identified by the Judge and did not establish a cogent evidential basis for saying that the Russian Judgment was impeachable for fraud. Mr Lough’s evidence was generalised and unspecific and, as the ICCJ had observed, the examples he gave of state interference were far removed from the present dispute. Mr Kulkov’s criticisms were the kinds of points that might be taken on appeal in the Russian proceedings and did not amount to evidence of judicial predetermination. The ICCJ had reached an evaluative conclusion that was open to her that the factual and expert evidence did not cross the arguability threshold and the Judge had been right not to upset her decision.

85. Moreover the conclusions of the ICCJ were powerfully supported by the decisions of the Russian courts. Each of the Russian Judgments was convincing in its own terms. A fair reader of those judgments would not conclude that there had been partiality or predetermination in the Russian courts. It was particularly telling that Mr Drelle had not raised any argument about judicial predetermination in the Russian appeals. Mr Drelle only raised the alleged conversation of January 2019 in the current bankruptcy proceedings.

86. I shall refer in more detail to the parties’ submissions in the discussion that follows.

The test for disputing the bankruptcy proceedings

87. It is well-established that a bankruptcy petition (or a winding up petition) will not be allowed to proceed where the debt is disputed on genuine and substantial grounds.

88. The insolvency court is generally not the proper place for the determination of genuine and substantial disputes. There are generally no pleadings, no discovery and no oral evidence (though these could exceptionally be ordered). Bankruptcy proceedings also place greater pressure to pay the claimed sum than ordinary proceedings place on respondents to pay.

89. The mere assertion by a debtor that there is a dispute does not of course mean that there actually is one. That is why the court requires the dispute to be substantially grounded. The test of substantial and genuine dispute is for practical purposes the same as whether the dispute is real, as opposed to frivolous or remote: see Bryce Ashworth v Newnote Limited [2007] EWCA 793 at paragraph 32. As in the case of summary judgment applications under the Civil Procedure Rules, it is open to the insolvency court to reject evidence because of its inherent implausibility or because it is contradicted by, or not supported by, the documents (ibid at paragraph 33).

90. As already noted, the ICCJ directed herself that a party seeking to set aside a judgment for fraud or breach of natural justice must adduce “cogent” evidence. Mr Phillips supported this proposition and relied on a number of cases.

91. The first was Altimo Holdings v Kyrgyz Mobil Tel Ltd [2011] UKPC 7, [2012] 1 WLR (“Altimo”), a decision of the Privy Council. The claimant sought to enforce a Kyrgyz judgment in the Isle of Man. The defendants counterclaimed, contending that the judgment had been obtained by fraud, and obtained permission to serve the counterclaim out of the jurisdiction on various Kyrgyz entities in respect of events in Kyrgyzstan. The judge set aside the permission as against six of those entities. The Manx court of appeal (the Staff of Government Division) allowed an appeal and reinstated the original permission to serve out. The Privy Council upheld that decision. One of the issues was whether the courts of the Isle of Man or the courts of Kyrgyzstan were the appropriate forum for the trial of the proceedings. In that context the defendants contended that there was a real risk that they would not be able to obtain justice in the Kyrgyz courts. The Privy Council decided that there was sufficient evidence to establish such a risk and that if there was to be no trial in the Isle of Man there would be no trial anywhere.

92. At paragraph 101 Lord Collins, giving the opinion of the Board, said:

“The true position is that there is no rule that the English court (or Manx court) will not examine the question whether the foreign court or the foreign court system is corrupt or lacking in independence. The rule is that considerations of international comity will militate against any such finding in the absence of cogent evidence. That, and not the act of state doctrine or the principle of judicial restraint in Buttes Gas & Oil Co v Hammer, is the basis of Lord Diplock’s dictum in The Abidin Daver and the decisions which follow it. Otherwise the paradoxical result would follow that, the worse the system of justice in the foreign country, the less it would be permissible to make adverse findings on it.”

93. In paragraph 102 he said that evidence of corruption in the foreign court system is admissible, but it must go beyond generalised, anecdotal material.

94. In Yukos Capital Sarl v OJSC Rosneft Oil Co (No 2) [2012] EWCA Civ 855, [2014] QB 458 (“Yukos”), this court considered the approach to the public policy ground for seeking to oppose the recognition of a foreign judgment. At paragraph 152 Rix LJ referred to paragraphs 101 and 102 of Altimo and said at paragraph 153 that it was clear that “cogent evidence is required before it is possible to call a foreign court decision partial and dependent”.

95. Maximov concerned an application by the claimant to enforce an arbitration award. There had been proceedings to set aside the award in the Moscow Arbitrazh Courts on the basis that some of the members of the arbitral tribunal had failed to disclose links to the expert witnesses whose evidence the claimant relied on in the arbitration. The Arbitrazh Court upheld the non-disclosure challenge to the award and also went on to hold that the award was contrary to public policy on the grounds that the underlying dispute was not arbitrable and the arbitrators had misapplied the underlying contract. The decision of the Arbitrazh Court was upheld on appeal in the courts of Russia. The claimant contended that the Russian court’s decision was so extreme and incorrect as not to be open to a court acting in good faith, so that bias could be inferred. Sir Michael Burton (sitting as a High Court Judge) dismissed the claimant’s application. He held that although there were very serious flaws in the reasoning of the Arbitrazh Court and the Russian appeal courts, the decisions were not so perverse that they could not have been reached in good faith and could only be ascribed to bias against the claimant.

96. In paragraph 15 he said this:

“… there is no issue between the parties that:-

(1) The fact that a foreign court decision is manifestly wrong or is perverse is not sufficient (see for example Dicey, Morris and Collins, The Conflict of Laws 15th Ed at 14-163, OJSC Bank of Moscow v Chernyakov [2016] EWHC 2583 (Comm) and Erste Group Bank AG (London) v JSC (VMZ Red October) [2013] EWHC 2926 (Comm)). The decision must be so wrong as to be evidence of bias, or be such that no court acting in good faith could have arrived at it.

(2) The evidence or grounds must be “cogent”.

(3) The decision of the foreign court must be deliberately wrong, not simply wrong by incompetence.”

97. The passage at paragraph 15(1) (but not the remainder of the paragraph) was quoted by this court without criticism in Koza Ltd v Koza Altin Isletmeleri AS (No 2) [2022] EWCA Civ 1284, [2023] 1 BCLC 617 at paragraph 156.

98. Mr Phillips also relied on other first instance cases which relied on one or more of these authorities, but they did not add to the weight to be given to them. As with all judicial statements, the passages cited need to be read in context:

i) Altimo was concerned with the issue of the availability of justice in a foreign court in the context of forum non conveniens. In such cases the issue of jurisdiction falls to be determined once and for all. As Lord Collins explained in paragraph 95 the question was whether there was a real risk that justice will not be obtained in the foreign court by reason of incompetence or corruption. The exercise was therefore not the same as the one raised in the present case which is whether there is a genuine and substantial case that the foreign judgment was obtained by fraud or was contrary to natural justice. Moreover the exercise in forum disputes is largely a predictive one about the prospects of obtaining substantial justice from a foreign legal system. Here the question is whether an actual, past, judgment has been the result of judicial predisposition.

ii) In Yukos the court was not concerned with the application of the standard to be applied where a foreign judgment is sought to be impugned. The statement at [153] was part of a discussion about issue estoppel arising from a decision of the Dutch courts concerning alleged partiality in Russian proceedings. The approach to evidence in a case where a foreign judgment is sought to impugned, and, specifically, the standard of proof, was not in issue in that case and the reference to cogency was not part of the essential reasoning. I do not consider that it adds materially to the statement in Altimo.

iii) In Maximov the challenge to the judgment was based entirely on inference. The claimant’s contention was that the judgment was so flawed that the only realistic conclusion was that the court was biased. The case was not concerned with the court’s approach to independent or separate factual evidence of fraud or predisposition. Moreover, the legal propositions summarised in that case do not appear to have been the subject of any argument.

99. In my judgment the true principle is that there is a single standard of proof for the resolution of disputes at a trial where the issue falls to be resolved, namely, the balance of probabilities. This standard applies in cases where a party to a foreign judgment seeks to impugn it on grounds of fraud, breach of natural justice or otherwise. Such cases involve serious allegations, which must be properly identified and based in evidence. The court will naturally evaluate the evidence against the underlying degree of probability (or improbability) of corruption, bias or procedural impropriety in the process that has led to the foreign judgment. Generalised and anecdotal assertions are unlikely to suffice. In my view, there is, however, no principled basis for suggesting that there is a heightened standard that is required simply because there is an attempt to impugn a foreign judgment. This accords with the current approach to the unitary standard of proof: see, e.g., Bank of St Petersburg v Arkhangelsky [2020] EWCA Civ 408, [2020] 4 WLR 55. While some of the cases refer to the need for cogent evidence arising from international comity, Altimo also explains that there is no rule that the English court will not examine allegations that foreign legal systems are corrupt. Where a party seeks to impugn a foreign judgment on grounds of fraud or breach of natural justice, the English court will adjudicate on it according to its usual procedural rules, including by applying the civil standard of proof.

100. That is the standard of proof for the resolution of such issues at a trial. How then is the court to approach an allegation of fraud or breach of natural justice where the issue is whether there is a sufficiently disputed debt for the purposes of bankruptcy proceedings? The answer as I see it is that there is a single question: has the respondent raised a genuine dispute on substantial grounds. When assessing that issue, the court will doubtless take account of the underlying degree of probability or improbability of corruption, bias, or procedural impropriety and will ask whether, in that context, the evidence and allegations amount to a real dispute. But again there is no special heightened standard simply because a foreign judgment is being impugned.

101. It is also convenient to address a suggestion made by Mr Phillips that, in order to impugn the Russian Judgment, Mr Drelle was required to establish a case to the relevant standard that the Arbitrazh Court had deliberately reached the wrong decision. This suggestion was based on paragraph 15(3) of Maximov. I am unable to accept that suggestion. First, as already explained, Maximov was a case in which the only basis for alleging bias was that the foreign judgment was so wrong that it could only have been made by a biased tribunal. That is not this case. Secondly, the proposition does not appear to have been the subject of argument. Thirdly, the proposition as expressed cannot be correct. A putative judge who is actually biased may well seek to produce a judgment which is right, and would survive an appeal or other challenge. Indeed, a judge who is biased in favour of a party will want so far as possible to give a correct decision so as to serve the interests of the favoured party. At any rate, where the allegation is, as here, that there has been judicial predetermination, it is not necessary to establish that the judge in question deliberately reached a wrong decision.

The ICCJ’s approach to Ms Zheglova’s evidence

102. Mr Drelle’s principal challenge to the ICCJ’s judgment concerns the treatment of Ms Zheglova’s evidence in paragraph 117 of the judgment (see paragraph ‎35 above).

103. In my judgment the ICCJ erred in law in this passage. The evidence was admissible under the section 1 of the Civil Evidence Act 1995. The ICCJ did not say in terms that the evidence was inadmissible but in paragraph 117, having characterised Ms Zheglova’s evidence as double hearsay, she then said that, “as such”, it lacked cogency. The mistake is shown by her finding that Ms Zheglova’s statement is not evidence of the truth of what Ms Lobanova is reported to have said and it is not evidence of the accuracy or truth of what Ms Lobanova is said to have learned from her conversation with Mr Guschev. Those comments were wrong. Furthermore, nowhere in her judgment did she analyse the strengths or weaknesses of Ms Zheglova’s evidence or carry out any evaluation of it. The only reason she gave was that it was double hearsay. This is then echoed in paragraph 131 of the judgment where she twice referred to Ms Zheglova’s evidence as hearsay and paragraph 138 where she again referred to it as hearsay but did not go on to assess its strengths or weaknesses or the weight to be given to it at this stage in the proceedings.

104. The Judge concluded that the ICCJ had not simply disregarded Ms Zheglova’s evidence as hearsay. He said that the ICCJ had referred to its lack of cogency. He noted that she did not say that the evidence was inadmissible and relied on the fact that she had accurately summarised its contents. He concluded, on a fair reading of her judgment as a whole, that the ICCJ had decided that Ms Zheglova’s evidence was insufficiently cogent to satisfy her that there was a genuine and substantial dispute. The Judge said in paragraph 86 that the ICCJ was entitled to reach this conclusion on the evidence. The Judge also spelt out in paragraphs 87 and 90 further reasons why that view had been open to the ICCJ. He pointed to gaps in Ms Zheglova’s evidence and explained why it was consistent with the finding that Mr Guschev had indiscreetly and inappropriately commented on the outcome of the Russian proceedings. Mr Phillips argued that the Judge’s analysis of the ICCJ’s judgment was correct.

105. The Judge said that the fact that the ICCJ had accurately summarised Ms Zheglova’s evidence showed that she had evaluated it. But that does not follow. She summarised the evidence as part of the narrative but did not go on to evaluate it. The Judge noted that the ICCJ had made an overall assessment in paragraph 131 of her judgment.

106. But, for the reasons already given, in reaching her conclusions in that paragraph she appears to have treated Ms Zheglova’s evidence as having no weight because of its character as hearsay, no less and no more.The Judge was in turn wrong to apply the appellate test for an evaluative decision. He should have concluded that there was an error of law and then decided whether to remit the decision or remake it.

107. The ICCJ took a second misstep in paragraph 117 when she said of Ms Zheglova’s evidence that “[a]s such, it is not cogent evidence that there is a good arguable case that there has been a breach of natural justice.” The ICCJ directed herself in the same terms in paragraph 129. She therefore asked herself whether there was cogent evidence of a good arguable case. That was an error. The right question was whether there was a genuine and substantial dispute, taking account of all of the evidence and the seriousness of the allegations.

108. Mr Samek submitted that the ICCJ’s error in paragraph 117 led to her approach the expert evidence of Mr Lough and Mr Kulkov through the wrong lens. He said that she had not properly asked whether the expert evidence, taken together with the evidence of Ms Zheglova, gave rise to a real and substantial dispute. She considered the expert evidence separately rather than considering it in the round.

109. Mr Phillips submitted that the ICCJ had carried out a careful and conscientious assessment of the evidence and had properly considered it in the round. This is seen clearly in paragraphs 131 and 138, where she brought the various strands of evidence together. He submitted that the ICCJ had undertaken a proper evaluative exercise and reached a conclusion that the appellant simply did not like.

110. I have concluded that Mr Samek’s submission on this point is correct. Having concluded that the evidence of Ms Zheglova, being double hearsay, was not cogent, the ICCJ went on to consider whether the expert evidence was sufficient alone to satisfy the threshold test she had set. She described the evidence of Mr Lough as making for uncomfortable reading, but she concluded that the cases of Russian judicial bias he had identified were far removed from the present case. She concluded that the expert evidence of Mr Lough and Mr Kulkov was not sufficient to raise a genuine triable issue that all four courts were deliberately wrong.

111. In my judgment, the ICCJ should have considered the weight properly to be given to Ms Zheglova’s evidence about judicial predetermination in the light of the expert evidence of Mr Lough, which explained that where a state-owned commercial entity was involved in proceedings in Russia, judges were under personal and professional pressures to find in favour of such entities. Mr Lough also noted that the Dyukov letter showed that the claims against Mr Drelle were being taken very seriously by GPN and that this bore on the probability that GPN would be seeking to obtain the result it sought in ST’s proceedings against Mr Drelle. I consider that the ICCJ failed properly to assess whether these various strands of evidence, taken together, gave rise to a genuine and substantial dispute.

112. I would therefore allow the appeal on grounds (3) and (4).

Remaking the decision

113. Mr Samek invited this court to remake the decision rather than remitting it, and Mr Phillips did not object. I consider that we should do so. All the evidence is written and we have heard detailed submissions about it.

114. It is therefore for this court to decide whether there is a genuine and substantial dispute, applying the approach set out above. I return to the evidence of Ms Zheglova. The general approach to written evidence is as summarised in Kireeva v Bedzhamov [2022] EWCA Civ 35, [2023] Ch 45 at paragraph 34, namely, that it is not to be rejected unless manifestly incredible. Mr Phillips did not suggest that the evidence should be disregarded on this basis. The discussion below proceeds on that accepted basis.

115. As to the contents of the evidence, I agree with Mr Samek that, taken in combination with the expert evidence, it raises an arguable case that that the Arbitrazh Court was predetermined. According to Ms Zheglova the source of Ms Lobanova’s information was Mr Gushchev. Ms Zheglova said at paragraph 73 that the Chairman of a regional Arbitrazh Court has a decisive role in deciding major cases in Russia and that the judges allocated to cases involving large companies, particularly state-owned companies (as GPN), discuss such cases with the Chairman of the Court, and that decisions are taken in consultation with the Court. If Mr Gushchev did make the statements attributed to him, it is also reasonably arguable that they reflected discussions he had had with the Arbitrazh judge rather than his own mere speculation.

116. It is also notable that as at the date of the conversation, 26 January 2019, there was still the possibility of further evidence being adduced concerning the underlying merits in the Arbitrazh proceedings. The Russian Judgment records that on 19 March 2019, nearly two months after the conversation, the court invited the respondents (including Mr Drelle) to provide evidence proving the existence or absence of information, including about Mr Motylev’s financial position at the time of the surety agreements. Mr Phillips countered this by saying that, in the event, no such evidence was provided, and that this confirms the safety of the judgment. But that is using hindsight. On the evidence before us, it is realistically arguable that, when the conversation took place, the court did not know whether such additional evidence would be provided.

117. A further feature of the conversation is that the actual outcome was judgment for RUB 2 billion, the amount Mr Guschev said would be awarded. While that was one of a number of possible outcomes (being the principal sums loaned by ST) it was not the only one. I agree with Mr Samek that this bolsters Mr Drelle’s case that the decision was predetermined by the date of the conversation.

118. Mr Phillips relied on the list of gaps given in paragraph 87 of the Judge’s judgment (see paragraph ‎52 above). In my judgment there are realistic counterpoints to each of the suggested gaps:

i) The fact that the evidence gives the gist of the conversation rather than the precise words is not remarkable given the passage of time.

ii) Reading her evidence as a whole it is realistically arguable that Ms Zheglova’s evidence was that Mr Guschev was indeed the source of the statement in paragraph 83 that “we cannot win this case”. In paragraph 85 she referred to the “negative outcome” which Mr Guschev had described to Ms Lobanova. She also said in paragraph 87 that judgment for RUB 2 billion was given in April 2019 “just as Mr Guschev had described to Ms Lobanova”.

iii) The Judge considered that even if Mr Guschev had described a negative outcome it was not obvious that “the negative outcome” meant that Mr Drelle could not win. In his view it was quite possible to understand “the negative outcome” as the discovery that GPN was behind the case. In my judgment Ms Zheglova’s evidence can be read reasonably as saying that “the negative outcome” was that Mr Drelle could not win and that judgment for RUB 2 billion would be awarded against him.

iv) The Judge considered that the wording of paragraph 83 reads most naturally as giving Ms Lobanova’s opinion that “we cannot win this case” and that judgment would be entered for RUB 2 billion. To my mind while that is possible, another reasonably available reading (particularly when read with paragraphs 85 and 87 of the statement) is that Ms Lobanova was reporting what Mr Guschev had told her. There is also the question as to how Ms Lobanova could have formed an opinion about any judgment that would be given against Mr Drelle unless it was based on what Mr Guschev told her. I note that the Judge did not refer to paragraph 87 in his judgment.

119. Mr Phillips also relied on the Judge’s conclusion in paragraph 90 that even if Mr Guschev was the source of the “cannot win” statement, that would not lead inexorably to the conclusion that the case had been predetermined; by the time of the conversation, the case against Mr Drelle had been proceeding for some time; and the ICCJ was entitled to conclude that, even if Mr Guschev was indiscreetly and inappropriately commenting on the outcome in advance, that was not on its own evidence of predetermination.

120. As to this, on the assumption that Mr Guschev (who was not the judge deciding the proceedings) did say that Mr Drelle could not win and that judgment would be entered for RUB 2 billion, in my view there is a reasonably arguable case of judicial predetermination. The question at this stage is not whether the conclusion is inexorable; it is whether it is realistically arguable. ST may be able to say in due course that whatever Mr Guschev may have said was an indiscreet and unwise comment. But Mr Drelle’s case is that the evidence goes further than an advance comment of that kind. It is that Mr Guschev said that Mr Drelle had no chance of winning the case and indeed that the judgment would be for a stated amount.

121. Moreover, the Judge appears to have thought that at the time of the conversation the only thing that remained in the proceedings was the delivery of judgment. It is arguable on the evidence before us that there was in fact still the prospect of further evidence.

122. Ms Zheglova has not been cross-examined on her statement. One function of cross-examination is to allow a witness to explain any alleged problem or contradiction in his or her evidence: Griffiths v TUI (UK Ltd) [2023] UKSC 48, [2025] AC 374 at paragraph 42.

123. As Mr Samek noted, in paragraph 39 of Kireeva Newey LJ said that the court would not be justified in rejecting Mr Bedzhamov’s written evidence without cross-examination, despite there being grounds for questioning the contents of that evidence. In my judgment, the same applies here. The points made by the Judge in paragraphs 87 to 90 may well be useful material for cross-examination. None of them amounts to a knock-out blow.

124. Mr Phillips also correctly said that the hearsay, indeed double hearsay, nature of Ms Zheglova’s evidence affects the weight to be given to it. As to this, Mr Guschev is most unlikely to give the evidence himself, and one can well see why Ms Lobanova might not wish to give the evidence directly. Giving due attention to its hearsay nature, in my view the evidence does have a significant weight in the exercise of deciding whether there is a genuine and substantial dispute.

125. Mr Samek submitted that Ms Zheglova’s evidence about judicial predetermination was supported by the evidence of Mr Lough. Ms Johnson, who made submissions on this part of the case, relying on passages in the judgment of the ICCJ, submitted that the various instances of state interference in judicial proceedings identified by Mr Lough were far removed from the present case. However, none of these points had such force as to cause me to disregard Mr Lough’s evidence and give it no or negligible weight. Part of Ms Zheglova’s evidence is that the Chairs of regional Arbitrazh Courts become involved in cases involving important state-owned entities and that they discuss the cases with the relevant judges. Mr Lough’s evidence is that GPN is such an entity. Mr Lough also explains the personal and professional pressures to which judges are subjected in such cases. He also observes that the Dyukov letter shows that those at the highest levels of GPN are interested in claims for recovery against Mr Drelle. In my judgment, Mr Lough’s evidence does add some weight to the case of judicial predetermination advanced in Ms Zheglova’s evidence.

126. In addressing the case of judicial predetermination, Mr Phillips relied heavily on the contents of each of the Russian Judgments. He contended that they made sense in their own terms and that there was nothing surprising or striking about them; and certainly nothing that could be called perverse.

127. Before addressing the substance of this argument, I need to consider a difference between the parties about the legal principles. Mr Samek appeared at one point to contend that the decisions of foreign courts are wholly irrelevant in cases, such as the present, where the first instance judgment is sought to be impugned for fraud and the challenge has not been ruled upon in the foreign appellate court. He also relied on the decision of this court in Adams v Cape Industries Plc [1990] 1 Ch. 433, 568-9 (“Adams”), for the proposition that a party seeking to impugn a foreign judgment for fraud is not required first to have used any remedy in the foreign court; and that the same rule may apply in at least some cases of breach of the rules of natural justice.

128. Mr Phillips contended that the decisions of the appellate courts were potentially relevant to any claim that the first instance judgment was predetermined. He also noted that the decision of the Arbitrazh Court of Appeal was by way of rehearing rather than review.He did not however seek to argue that the decision of the Arbitrazh Court of Appeal was conclusive or determinative of the challenge on the basis of fraud or bias. Rather he said that the English court could consider the quality of the reasoning of the foreign courts, including any appellate decisions, when assessing whether the judgment in question could be impugned. Mr Phillips also repeated his submission that it was necessary to show that the Russian Judgments at all levels were deliberately wrong.

129. My conclusions on this point are as follows. First, there may be a debate in any recognition proceedings about the proper characterisation of the grounds on which the judgment is sought to be impugned. Mr Samek characterised all cases of judicial predisposition as cases of fraud by the court; but it appears to me at least arguable that they may fall under the rubric of breach of natural justice. The proper characterisation of such a challenge is open to debate as a matter of law: see Altimo at paragraph 101 and Yukos at paragraph 90. It may also be sensitive to the full facts. We heard no material argument on these issues. I would prefer not to express a concluded view on it at this stage, on the limited evidence before the court. It is sufficient to say that in my judgment, at this stage, there is a sufficiently arguable case that the case of judicial predisposition falls under the fraud rubric.

130. Secondly, that being so, on the current state of the law, illustrated by Adams, Mr Drelle was not required to raise the complaints of judicial predisposition in the appellate courts in Russia.

131. Thirdly, on the other hand, it does not follow, as Mr Samek contended, that the contents of the Russian judgments (including the appellate ones) are wholly irrelevant when considering the allegations of judicial predisposition. The contents of the judgments, the reasoning, and the manner in which the parties’ positions were addressed in those judgments are potentially relevant factors when considering the allegation of predisposition.

132. Fourthly, for the reasons I have given I do not consider that Mr Drelle needs to establish that each of the Russian Judgments was deliberately wrong. Where the case is that the first instance judgment is tainted by fraud or breach of the rules of natural justice, there is no further hurdle that, as a matter of law, the first instance judgment and any appellate judgments must also be deliberately wrong. Indeed if fraud or breach of natural justice are made out the English court is not concerned with the rights or wrongs of the judgments at all.

133. Turning to the contents of the judgments, Mr Phillips pointed out that the Arbitrazh Court did not give judgment for the amount originally claimed by ST of RUB 4.41 billion odd, or even its reduced claim of RUB 2.78 billion odd. He also observed that the Arbitrazh Court had ruled in favour of Mr Drelle on a number of procedural motions and had dismissed claims against his co-defendants. He said that this all showed that there had been due and fair process.

134. These points carry some force. One can well see how the Russian courts could have reached the decisions they did without any predisposition or bias. However, the question is not whether the judgments can be justified in their terms; the complaint is that the result was preordained before the case was complete and that this arose from external pressures. Moreover, a biased judge may have a predetermined view about parts of a case against a party, without ruling completely against that party (or indeed other parties). I do not consider that the contents of the judgments read on their own are so powerful as to render the case of judicial predetermination fanciful or remote.

135. Moreover, the evidence of Mr Kulkov contains some evidential basis for contending that the judgments were flawed both substantively and procedurally. I agree with the ICCJ that the evidence of Mr Kulkov taken on its own would not have been sufficient to raise a triable issue that the judgments were the result of predetermination or bias. But the evidence is not advanced on its own. It properly falls to be tested and assessed as part of the broader evidence relied on by Mr Drelle.

136. Mr Phillips also submitted that even if, as a matter of law, Mr Drelle was not required to raise the point that the first instance judge had been wrongly predisposed against him, it is evidentially telling that he did not in fact raise it in the three rounds of Russian appeals. This point has some traction. However, I have concluded that this argument, which will be available to ST in cross-examination, is not sufficient wholly to undermine Ms Zheglova’s evidence.

137. On a global assessment, in my judgment Ms Zheglova’s evidence is sufficient to establish a genuine and substantial case that the Russian Judgment on which the Petition is based is impugnable for fraud or breach of natural justice or is contrary to the public policy of this court. In my judgment the proper procedural vehicle for determining the issues is the recognition proceedings, where the usual processes of disclosure and cross-examination of witnesses will be available.

138. For these reasons I would allow the appeal on grounds (3) and (4).

Ground (2) and the respondent’s notice

139. In the light of this decision, ground (2) (which concerns the standard of appellate review) does not arise. I would however state that in my judgment there is no inconsistency between the statement of the principles in Allied Fort at paragraph 103 and those in Malik at paragraph 79. The point taken in the respondent’s notice concerns the relevance of the Russian appellate judgments. I have addressed this above.

Disposition

140. I would allow the appeal and set aside the bankruptcy order.

Lady Justice Falk :

141. I agree.

Lord Justice Newey :

142. I also agree.

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