Civil United Kingdom
Corporation Leasing & Finance Limited v Irwin Mitchell LLP
Neutral Citation Number: [2026] EWHC 2785 (KB)
Case No: KB-2024-000735
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
KING’S BENCH DIVISION
Royal Courts of Justice
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL
Date: 30th October 2026
Before :
MR JUSTICE MANSFIELD
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Between :
| Corporation Leasing & Finance Limited | Claimant | |
| – and – | ||
| Irwin Mitchell LLP | Defendant |
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James Pickering KC (instructed by Colman Coyle LLP) for the Claimant
Francis Bacon (instructed by Kennedys LLP) for the Defendant
Hearing dates: 22, 23, 24, 27, 28 and 30 July 2026
Draft Circulated: 26 October 2026
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Approved Judgment
This judgment was handed down remotely at 10.30am on 30th October 2026 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives.
………………………..
THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE MANSFIELD
Mr Justice Mansfield:
Introduction
1. The Claimant (“CLF”) brings a claim for professional negligence against its former solicitors (“IM”).
2. CLF instructed IM in September 2016. At that time, CLF had a pending claim in the Central London County Court, referred to as “the Order for Sale Claim”. The Order for Sale Claim was brought against a Mr Raby and a Ms McCann. In that claim, CLF sought to enforce a charge entered into by those individuals in favour of CLF in 2012 over a property they jointly owned in Esher, Surrey. CLF had been represented by another firm of solicitors (“RPL”) both in relation to the taking of the charge and in the Order for Sale Claim. However, in April 2016, shortly before trial, RPL withdrew, citing a conflict of interest. CLF obtained an adjournment of the trial and instructed IM. IM acted for CLF from September 2016 until May 2019. During that period:
i) The Order for Sale Claim was compromised: in principle shortly before an adjourned trial listed for November 2016; and formally by a settlement agreement signed on 19 May 2017.
ii) RPL pursued a claim against CLF for its unpaid fees.
iii) A claim for professional negligence was issued by CLF against RPL (“the Professional Negligence Claim”).
iv) The Professional Negligence Claim and RPL’s fees claim were compromised by a settlement agreement dated 22 May 2019.
3. CLF now claims that IM was negligent in respect of the settlement of the Order for Sale Claim and the Professional Negligence Claim.
i) The allegation in respect of the Order for Sale Claim now relates to one narrow point about the omission of a clause for interest to be payable on the settlement sum.
ii) As to the Professional Negligence Claim, it is alleged that IM was negligent in the pleading of the claim and negligent in its advice as to settlement. It is alleged that the settlement was at a substantial undervalue and CLF claims loss of a chance to have achieved a higher settlement, or to have succeeded at trial.
4. IM denies negligence and argues that in any event CLF has been caused no loss.
The background to the disputes
The Parties
5. CLF describes itself as a company which carries on the business of providing invoice discounting credit facility services.
6. Stephen David Thornton is a director of CLF. In a witness statement dated 16 March 2016, Mr Thornton said that he was a director of CLF during two periods. First, 16 September 1998-1 April 1999. Second, from 1 July 2011 to 8 August 2013 “in a caretaker role”. He described his relationship with CLF as “occasional and to represent those charged with monitoring the affairs of [CLF] on behalf of its investor group”. Mr Thornton was reappointed a director on 20 April 2016, shortly before the trial of the Order for Sale Claim listed on 25 April 2016. He remains a director of CLF at the time of the trial before me. The nature of CLF’s business and its corporate relationships is an important feature of the dispute, and I will address it in more detail below.
7. IM is a firm of solicitors. Jonathan Sachs was the partner at IM with conduct of CLF’s matters. Mr Sachs qualified as a solicitor in 1990 and had over 30 years’ experience as a professional negligence lawyer. Mr Sachs was assisted by Dominique Dolman, an experienced solicitor in his team. She, sadly, died after the events giving rise to the claim, but before the claim was intimated.
8. Mr Sachs instructed senior junior counsel at two phases of the retainer.
i) Faisal Sadiq was instructed in September 2016; his last involvement was in March 2019. Mr Sadiq was called in 2000 and is a specialist practitioner in property litigation and associated professional negligence claims.
ii) Hugh Jackson was instructed in April and May 2019. Mr Jackson was called in 1981 and is a specialist practitioner in professional negligence.
9. Neither Mr Sadiq nor Mr Jackson are defendants to the claim; there is no Part 20 claim against either of them by IM.
The Agreements between CLF, Avanex, Mr Raby and Ms McCann
10. The Order for Sale Claim arose out of dealings between CLF and an executive search business operated by Stephen Raby under the brand “Stephen Raby Associates” or “SRA”. Mr Raby ran an executive search agency through various companies from time to time.
i) First, through a company called Stephen Raby Associates Ltd, which later changed its name to Venartrix Ltd (“Venartrix”).
ii) Later, through a company called Avanex Systems Ltd (“Avanex”). It is not clear how the business transferred from Venartrix to Avanex, but that is not material.
iii) Avanex ceased trading in 2012 and was wound up. Mr Raby was declared bankrupt on 29 October 2012.
11. Mr Raby was in a personal relationship with Jane McCann from 1994 until 2013, when Ms McCann ended it. They were the joint owners of two properties:
i) Lammas Lodge – a property in Esher (“Lammas Lodge”).
ii) A property in Antalya, Turkey (“the Turkish Property”).
12. Mr Thornton told me that he and Mr Raby had worked together when they were trainee accountants, starting in 1977. They met again in 1994. Mr Thornton described himself as “an occasional business associate and acquaintance” of Mr Raby, prior to any invoice discounting facility being agreed.
13. According to a witness statement of Ms McCann (made in March 2016 and untested in this trial), she and Mr Raby were friends of Mr Thornton and his wife; she understood that Mr Raby confided in Mr Thornton full details of his business dealings; Mr Thornton was a trusted business adviser.
14. CLF’s case is that it provided an invoice discounting facility to Mr Raby’s business from 2003 until 2012, when the business collapsed.
15. On 13 March 2007 Mr Raby and Ms McCann entered into a deed of guarantee and legal charge in favour of CLF (“the 2007 Deed”). The 2007 Deed records that at that time Avanex was indebted to CLF by virtue of a revolving credit facility under which the amount outstanding was £169,456 or thereabouts. By the 2007 Deed:
i) Mr Raby gave a personal guarantee of Avanex’s indebtedness.
ii) Mr Raby and Ms McCann gave CLF a charge over Lammas Lodge, subject to a first mortgage in favour of Halifax plc.
16. On 2 February 2012, CLF, Avanex and Mr Raby entered into a new Confidential Invoice Discounting and Loan Facility Agreement (“the 2012 Facility Agreement”). According to that agreement, CLF agreed to extend its loan facility to Avanex, to a new maximum of £700,000, on condition that Mr Raby and Ms McCann provided further security.
17. According to the recitals to the 2012 Facility Agreement:
i) Under the existing arrangements between the parties Avanex had ceded the rights to invoice the customers of Avanex to a sales invoicing company (“SIC”) “which is under common control with [CLF]”. The name of the SIC was not stated. The arrangement was described as follows:
Avanex issues invoices to SIC, which then issues invoices of its own to customers of [Avanex] for the same sums as were invoiced to SIC by Avanex. By agreement with Avanex, on receipt of funds from the customer SIC pays the same to CLF in reduction of the amount outstanding under the Facility.
ii) The facility was said to have been originally limited to £200,000 but in 2007 CLF was “exceptionally” prepared to extend it to a maximum of £500,000 on condition that Mr Raby gave a personal guarantee secured by a second legal charge created by Mr Raby and Ms McCann over Lammas Lodge.
18. On the same date – 2 February 2012 – Mr Raby and Ms McCann entered into a deed of guarantee and legal charge in favour of CLF (“the 2012 Guarantee and Charge”). Mr Raby gave a personal guarantee of Avanex’s debt. As security for the obligations of Mr Raby, Mr Raby and Ms McCann gave CLF a legal charge over Lammas Lodge.
19. Clause 10.19 of the 2012 Facility Agreement records that Mr Raby and Ms McCann had agreed to create further security in favour of the lender over the Turkish Property. Recital 2.3 of the 2012 Guarantee and Charge refers to Mr Raby and Ms McCann agreeing to give such security. I understand that such security was given over the Turkish Property, though I was not shown any documents in relation to it.
20. Clause 13 of the 2012 Guarantee and Charge provided as follows (“the Certification Clause”):
A certificate by an official of [CLF] as to the money, liabilities, interest and other sums for the time being due, owing or incurred to [CLF] from or by [Mr Raby] or by [Mr Raby and Ms McCann] or by the Debtor Companies shall in any legal proceedings be binding and conclusive on [Mr Raby] and/or [Mr Raby and Ms McCann] as the case may be.
21. “Debtor Companies” was defined to mean Venartrix, Avanex or Perrycourt Ltd. (“Perrycourt”).
22. Perrycourt was described at 1.1 as a company under the control of Mr Raby. Recital 2.1 said:
The Business is presently carried on by Avanex a company of which [Mr Raby] is the principal shareholder and before that for a time by Venartrix. Avanex has engaged Perrycourt to discharge the expenses of the business on behalf of Avanex (for which purpose Avanex makes arrangements from time to time to place Perrycourt in funds that may have been advanced under the Facility and has empowered Perrycourt to act as its agent in drawing funds from the Lender).
23. Clause 11 of the 2007 Deed was in identical terms, save that instead of “Debtor Companies” the clause referred simply to Avanex. The 2012 Facility Agreement contained a certification clause as follows:
If the lender issues any certificate, determination or notification of a rate or amount payable under this agreement, it shall be (in the absence of manifest error or otherwise until any necessary revision by the Lender for errors or omissions) conclusive evidence of the matter to which it relates and shall contain reasonable details of the basis of determination.
24. In 2012 (but not, it would appear, in 2007) CLF was represented by Peter Phillips of RPL. At that time the solicitors’ practice was carried out through Rubinstein Phillips Lewis LLP. Both of those entities were in due course made defendants in the Professional Negligence Claim. Nothing turns on the distinction between the two entities, and in this judgment I will refer to them collectively as “RPL”.
The dispute leading to the Order for Sale Claim
25. When the 2012 Guarantee and Charge was taken Mr Raby and Ms McCann were represented by Banks Kelly solicitors, apparently by separate partners. In due course, Ms McCann alleged that (a) she was subject to undue influence by Mr Raby, and CLF was on constructive notice of that; (b) she was induced to enter the deed by misrepresentation on the part of Mr Raby, and/or misrepresentations to which CLF was privy, or of which it had constructive notice.
26. There are long established processes in place to protect a lender from being fixed with constructive notice of an undue influence claim by a mortgagor. They derive from Royal Bank of Scotland v Etridge [2002] AC 773 and are commonly referred to as the Etridge guidelines. It was later alleged that Mr Phillips failed to take steps to comply with the Etridge guidelines, exposing CLF to the risk that its security over Lammas Lodge was void against Ms McCann and, potentially, against Mr Raby. That issue was central to Ms McCann’s defence to the Order for Sale Claim, and to the allegations of negligence against RPL in the Professional Negligence Claim.
27. Within months of the 2012 suite of documents being signed Avanex’s business collapsed. It ceased trading in the middle of 2012 and was in due course wound up. Mr Raby was declared bankrupt in October 2012.
28. In October 2012, CLF sent written demands for payment to Avanex (under the terms of the 2012 Facility Agreement) and to Mr Raby (as guarantor) in the sum of £881,261.38. The demands are dated 30 October 2012 and are unsigned. The demand to Avanex, I was told, had attached to it two “Combined Running Account Ledgers”: one for the period 4 October 2010 to 26 September 2011 and one for the period 3 October 2011 to 30 September 2012. These contain only columns of debit and credit figures, with no narrative as to what any of the debits or credits represent. I will need to deal with these documents in more detail below.
29. I note at this point that although the limit under the 2012 Facility Agreement was said to be extended to £700,000, the balance at the time that agreement and the 2012 Guarantee and Charge were entered into was in excess of that. It had been in excess of £700,000 between 22 December 2011 and 30 January 2012 when it dipped to £698,677; on 3 February 2012 it was at £749,349. Thereafter, apart from a few days in March 2012, the balance remained above £700,000 and by 30 September showed the claimed figure of £881,261.38.
30. No sum was paid, and in August 2014, CLF commenced the Order for Sale Claim against Mr Raby and Ms McCann under the 2012 Guarantee and Charge, seeking an order for sale of Lammas Lodge. RPL acted for CLF – the relevant partners were Martin Lewis and Jacques Smith.
31. Mr Raby, who was by that time a bankrupt, did not file a defence and neither he nor his trustee in bankruptcy appear to have played a part in the Order for Sale Claim. Ms McCann was represented by SMB, by Mr Gould in particular. Ms McCann defended the claim on grounds of undue influence and misrepresentation. She also put CLF to proof of its debt, though I will need to address in more detail below her position in relation to the debt.
32. Trial of the Order for Sale Claim was listed for 25 April 2016. In circumstances I will address in more detail below, RPL came off the record shortly before the trial. Mr Thornton obtained an adjournment until November 2016. He instructed IM in September 2016. A settlement in principle of the Order for Sale Claim was reached shortly before trial, and a settlement agreement was signed in May 2017.
The Professional Negligence Claim
33. In the meantime, CLF sought advice from IM and Mr Sadiq in relation to a claim for professional negligence against RPL. The claim (i.e. the Professional Negligence Claim) was issued in January 2018. Mr Pickering characterised two key elements of the Professional Negligence Claim as follows:
i) Mr Phillips of RPL was negligent in failing to ensure compliance with the Etridge guidelines at the time the 2012 Guarantee and Charge was entered into (“the Original Etridge Breach Claim”); that left CLF’s security vulnerable to being set aside.
ii) Mr Lewis and Mr Smith were negligent in failing to advise CLF that RPL had failed to ensure compliance with the Etridge guidelines and failing to advise as to the weakness of the Order for Sale Claim. Had CLF been advised of the Etridge problem at the appropriate time, it would not have refused offers made by Ms McCann in early 2016 (“the Early 2016 Offers”). This was described as “the Subsequent Etridge Breach Claim”.
34. During the course of the Professional Negligence Claim, Mr Thornton raised a point that he had instructed Mr Phillips, back in 2012, to ensure that the 2012 Guarantee and Charge included a provision to protect CLF in the event that Ms McCann delayed or obstructed enforcement of the charge. In that event, she was not to be limited to the value of the security she charged but was to be personally liable for any shortfall between the sums owed and the security. The provision has been described in a variety of ways in CLF’s pleadings and evidence, but the Amended Particulars of Claim in this claim put the instruction as follows at paragraph 10(4):
(4) given that Ms McCann (unlike Mr Raby) was not providing a personal guarantee for the business debts, a feature of the security package would be that she would nonetheless become personally liable for any losses caused or shortfall in the value of the security suffered in the event that she obstructed or delayed the timely realisation of any such security following any default; accordingly in the event that Ms McCann delayed or obstructed the realisation of security rendering it insufficient to deal with the amount demanded plus interest, she would become personally liable for that shortfall including any costs (as opposed to just limiting her exposure to her interest in the security) – something which (so the Claimant believes) Ms McCann would have been willing to do.
35. The 2012 Guarantee and Charge did not contain such a provision (“the Additional Liability Provision”). CLF says that was as a result of Mr Phillips’ negligence, because Mr Thornton had instructed Mr Phillips to include such a provision (“the Additional Liability Claim”). The Professional Negligence Claim did not plead the Additional Liability Claim. In the weeks running up to trial there was consideration of an amendment to include it, but the firm advice of IM, Mr Sadiq and Mr Jackson was that the amendment application would fail. So, it was not pursued.
36. RPL defended the claim and was represented by Womble Bond Dickinson (“WBD”). WBD instructed specialist counsel, Clare Dixon. The Professional Negligence Claim was listed for trial in June 2019. It was settled by an agreement dated 22 May 2019. IM’s advice at the time of the settlement was that it was likely that CLF would lose the claim. I will need to return to the circumstances of the settlement in more detail below.
Issues
37. Although a wider set of allegations of negligence was pleaded, by the end of the trial, CLF pursued four allegations. Three related to the Professional Negligence Claim (Amended Particulars of Claim paragraphs 38(2), 38(3) and 38(6)), and one to the settlement of the Order for Sale Claim (Amended Particulars of Claim paragraph 37(2)).
The Professional Negligence Claim
38. Was it negligent of IM to fail to plead reliance on the Certification Clause, or to plead reliance on the ledger extracts provided by CLF for vouching which had been accepted by Ms McCann?
39. Was IM negligent in its advice on settlement, in that it took the view that there was a high risk that CLF would fail to prove the underlying debt and that the claim would fail? CLF argues:
i) IM had failed to take account of the Certification Clause which would have been conclusive as to the existence and amount of the debt. IM was negligent in failing to advise that the Certification Clause could be relied on and that there was no risk of a plea or finding of fraud.
ii) IM failed properly to evaluate the available evidence of the debt and failed to appreciate that Ms McCann had not claimed that no monies were advanced, nor that there was fraud on the part of CLF.
iii) IM failed to appreciate that the Subsequent Etridge Breach Claim did not depend upon proof of the underlying debt and was therefore negligent in advising as to the merits of that claim.
40. CLF further alleges that IM was negligent in failing to plead the Additional Liability Claim in the Professional Negligence Claim.
i) Was IM initially instructed to include the Additional Liability Claim?
ii) When, in 2019, the issue as to the omission of the Additional Liability Claim arose, was IM negligent in advising that there was no merit in the claim and in advising that an application to amend would fail?
41. If IM were negligent in relation to the pleading and settlement of the Professional Negligence Claim, what, if any, loss was caused to CLF by that negligence?
The Order for Sale Claim – The Interest Claim
42. The allegation in relation to the settlement of the Order for Sale Claim is not as to the value of the settlement per se. The allegation is that IM failed properly to advise as to the inclusion of a provision for interest on the settlement sum in the settlement, to protect CLF in the event of a delay in payment of the settlement sum (“the Interest Claim”).
43. Was it IM’s duty to advise CLF that an interest clause should be included in the settlement? Was it negligent in failing to raise the point?
44. What, if any, loss was caused to CLF by IM’s failure to raise the interest clause point?
Legal Principles
45. A solicitor owes a general duty to their client, in contract and tort, to exercise reasonable skill and care.
46. The standard of care is to be judged against that of a reasonably competent solicitor. That duty will be breached when the solicitor makes an error no reasonably competent and well-informed member of the profession could have made. Whether a solicitor has fallen below the requisite standard is a matter of assessment for the court.
47. In Langsam v Beachcrofts LLP [2012] EWCA Civ 1230, Arden LJ addressed the standard of care to be expected of a solicitor in advice on settlement (paragraph 84):
i) Advice on settlement often involves weighing up many different matters some of which will be difficult to predict precisely and are matters on which opinions will differ.
ii) Lawyers giving advice on settlement are not to be judged with the wisdom of hindsight.
iii) Arden LJ cited with approval the following passage from Karpenko v Paroian, Courey & Houston (1980) 117 DLR (3rd) 383, 397-8, per Anderson J in the Ontario High Court:
What is relevant and material to the public interest is that an industrious and competent practitioner should not be unduly inhibited in making a decision to settle a case by the apprehension that some judge, viewing the matter subsequently, with all the acuity of vision given by hindsight, and from the calm security of the Bench, may tell him that he should have done otherwise. To the decision to settle a lawyer brings all his talents and experience both recollected and existing somewhere below the level of the conscious mind, all his knowledge of the law and its processes. Not least he brings to it his hard-earned knowledge that the trial of a lawsuit is costly, time-consuming and taxing for everyone involved and attended by a host of contingencies, foreseen and unforeseen. Upon all of this he must decide whether he should take what is available by way of settlement, or press on. I can think of few areas where the difficult question of what constitutes negligence, which gives rise to liability, and what at worst constitutes an error of judgment, which does not, is harder to answer. In my view it would be only in the case of some egregious error that negligence would be found.
48. In the same case, Longmore LJ cited with approval the following dicta of Simon Brown LJ in Ogilvy & Mather Ltd. v Rubinstein Callingham Polden & Gale (unreported 20 July 1999) (paragraph 160):
It can often be said that a party’s settlement prospects could and should have been improved and/or accelerated by their solicitor taking some step or another in the proceedings. The reasons why parties settle are many and various. It will seldom be possible to demonstrate any certainties in the matter. The scope for argument will be well-nigh limitless. If satellite litigation is to be kept in check claims like this should be treated with some circumspection.
49. In Griffin v Kingsmill [2001] EWCA Civ 934 (cited in Fassone v Hugh James [2026] EWHC 364 per Foster J at paragraph 107, upon which Mr Bacon relied), Stuart-Smith LJ said the following at paragraph 63:
The circumstances in which barristers and solicitors have to exercise their judgment vary enormously. …. in a very complex case it may be that in advising settlement too much weight is given to some factors and not enough to others. Here again a difficult judgment has to be made; and unless the advice was blatantly wrong, i.e. such as no competent and experienced practitioner would give it, it cannot be impugned and the prospects of successfully doing so would seem very slight.
50. In this case, IM relies on the fact that it sought advice from counsel and acted in accordance with that advice. In Langsam, Arden LJ set out the following propositions (see paragraphs 85, 88 and 139):
i) A solicitor does not abdicate his responsibility when he instructs counsel.
ii) In general, a solicitor is entitled to rely upon the advice of counsel properly instructed.
iii) For a solicitor without specialist experience in a particular field to rely on counsel’s advice is to make normal and proper use of the Bar.
iv) However, he must not do so blindly but must exercise his own independent judgment. If he reasonably thinks counsel’s advice is obviously or glaringly wrong, it is his duty to reject it.
v) Where a solicitor does have specialist experience, the solicitor’s judgment as to whether the advice given by counsel is obviously or glaringly wrong is informed by the solicitor’s specialist expertise.
51. If a claimant has been advised negligently, the question arises as to whether that negligence has caused any loss. That involves consideration of the outcome in the hypothetical scenario that non-negligent advice was given. The principles are well established and set out in Perry v Raleys [2019] 2 WLR 636 per Lord Briggs. At paragraph 20 he said:
To the extent (if at all) that the question whether the client would have been better off depends upon what the client would have done upon receipt of competent advice, this must be proved by the claimant upon the balance of probabilities. To the extent that the supposed beneficial outcome depends upon what others would have done, this depends upon a loss of chance evaluation.
52. In Perry, the claim concerned the loss of an opportunity to institute a claim. Lord Briggs said (paragraph 22) that there was no difference in principle from a claim, such as Allied Maples v Simmons & Simmons [1995] 1 WLR 1602, of the loss of an opportunity to achieve a more favourable outcome in a negotiated settlement. In both cases, the taking of some positive step by the client, once in receipt of competent advice, was an essential (although not necessarily sufficient) element in a chain of causation. Whether the client would have taken a particular step falls to be decided on the balance of probabilities.
53. At paragraphs 25-26 Lord Briggs said that the client had to prove that, competently advised he would have made a claim, and that the claim would have been an honest claim. He reasoned as follows (paragraph 26):
In Kitchen v Royal Air Force Association [1958] 1 WLR 563 the plaintiff’s husband, a member of the RAF, was electrocuted and killed in the kitchen of his house. His widow lost the opportunity to bring a claim under the Fatal Accidents Act in time due to the negligence of the defendant solicitors. In a leading judgment on the evaluation of the loss of a chance, Lord Evershed MR said this, at p 575:
“I would add, as was conceded by Mr Neil Lawson, that in such a case it is not enough for the plaintiff to say: ‘Though I had no claim in law, still, I had a nuisance value which I could have so utilised as to extract something from the other side and they would have had to pay something to me in order to persuade me to go away.’”
If nuisance value claims fall outside the category of lost claims for which damages may be claimed in negligence against professional advisors, then so, a fortiori, must dishonest claims.
The Witnesses
54. Before turning to the facts in detail, I will record some observations about the witnesses.
55. CLF’s sole witness was Mr Thornton. He was a very unimpressive witness. I have no doubt that he is an experienced businessman and an intelligent man. He gave his answers courteously and, superficially at least, helpfully. However, his evidence was characterised by vagueness, opacity and omission.
i) There were a number of instances where he failed to answer the question asked or gave an answer I struggled to understand.
ii) He gave evidence about events between 2012 and 2019. I would not expect him to have a perfect, or even clear, recollection of all of the events of such a long time ago. However, on the one hand he had a poor recollection of whether he had seen particular documents, and a poor recollection of the circumstances described in those documents. On the other hand, he appeared to have a surprisingly clear recollection of oral instructions and conversations which were not recorded in the documents. That suggested to me that when he gave evidence of undocumented conversations he was giving evidence that suited his case rather than an accurate recollection of what occurred.
iii) A number of matters covered in his witness statement did not survive first contact with the contemporaneous documents: his account was at odds with what the documents show.
iv) Some of the interpretations he placed on the documents, in order to remain consistent with his own version of events, were wholly unrealistic. He showed a clear tendency to pick out only those details that suited what he wanted to hear, ignoring other matters less helpful to his version of events.
v) A small, but typical, example was that he denied that he had been sent notes of conferences with counsel and said that he did not have a chance to comment on the notes. In fact, the documents show that he was sent such notes. I give further specific examples in my findings below.
56. Mr Thornton explained that, due to an earlier episode of blackmail, he has deployed complex structures in his affairs and is hesitant to give a full explanation of himself. I do not know whether that is the true reason, but he was certainly unable to give a clear explanation of matters that ought to be capable of clear explanation.
57. I have not found Mr Thornton to be a reliable witness. Where his evidence is not backed up by contemporaneous documentary evidence, I have treated it with considerable caution.
58. On behalf of IM, I heard evidence from Mr Sachs, Mr Sadiq and Mr Jackson.
59. In closing Mr Pickering did not challenge that Mr Sachs was a generally competent solicitor. However, he criticised him as being “full of bluster” in his evidence. He was criticised for being concerned with the big picture, rather than the detail of the documents. It was said that he failed to understand the nature of the case in significant ways. I will address further below whether or not Mr Sachs misunderstood the issues in the case. I reject the suggestion that he was “full of bluster”. I found him to be a truthful witness and one whose evidence was consistent with the contemporaneous documents. I also reject the contention that he was concerned only with the big picture. IM’s file shows many instances of him communicating with CLF on detailed points in the case. It is true that Ms Dolman had day-to-day conduct of the case and was no doubt closer to the detail of the documents: that is as one would expect in any firm.
60. Mr Pickering described both Mr Jackson and Mr Sadiq as honest witnesses. He was plainly right to do so. Both witnesses were honest and tried to assist the court with their recollection of a matter they had been involved with seven years or more ago. It was clear that neither had a perfect recollection of events. It was fortunate that the advice of each of them was well documented in correspondence and conference notes. Where, on occasion, their evidence was not in line with the detail of the documents, they were quick to accept correction and confirm the accuracy of the contemporaneous documents. In Mr Sadiq’s case he told me that his witness statement had been drafted without sight of the documents and he readily accepted errors when pointed out to him in the file. The answers of both counsel in cross-examination were thoughtful and considered.
61. There is little by way of factual dispute between Mr Thornton and either counsel. There are some points as to whether certain things were said. Where there is such a disagreement, I accept the evidence of Mr Jackson and Mr Sadiq, in the light of the remarks I have made above as to the credibility of all the witnesses, and the consistency of the evidence of counsel with the documentary record.
62. There was no challenge to the expertise and experience of either counsel. It was not put to either of them in terms that their advice had been negligent. Various matters were put to them that they had overlooked or failed properly to understand. I have taken those matters to be, by implication, allegations that their advice was, in those respects, negligent. I will address my evaluation of the quality of their advice below.
63. IM also relied on a witness statement from Mr Gould. Mr Pickering did not wish to cross-examine him, and I did not hear oral evidence from him.
The Order for Sale Claim
64. The Order for Sale Claim relied on the 2012 Facility Agreement and the 2012 Guarantee and Charge. CLF sought an order for sale of Lammas Lodge. There was no claim for a money judgment; that is not surprising given that Mr Raby was bankrupt and Ms McCann’s only liability was as a mortgagor under the charge.
65. The Particulars of Claim did not plead the Certification Clause and did not plead that a certificate had been issued.
66. Ms McCann’s Defence and Counterclaim, drafted by counsel, was originally dated 7 July 2015; it was subsequently amended in March 2016 and Re-Amended on 3 May 2016. Ms McCann pleaded:
i) Prior to 1 February 2012, CLF had advanced credit to Avanex beyond the total value of Relevant Invoices (as defined).
ii) CLF and Mr Raby breached their obligation under the 2012 Guarantee and Charge to provide discounting reports and monthly statements.
iii) The £700,000 credit limit under the 2012 Facility Agreement had already been exceeded, or was about to be exceeded, at the time of the 2012 Guarantee and Charge.
iv) Mr Raby and RPL (on behalf of CLF) made a series of false representations about the state of the Avanex business and the purpose of the lending; the amount of the lending; and the nature of the charge in order to induce Ms McCann to enter into the 2012 Guarantee and Charge. CLF was in part privy to those misrepresentations and in any event had constructive notice of them.
v) Ms McCann alleged that the effect of the 2012 Guarantee and Charge was to provide CLF with increased security in respect of credit already advanced in return for no entitlement or obligation to advance additional credit, in circumstances where there was no reasonable chance of saving the Avanex business.
vi) Ms McCann’s consent was procured by undue influence exercised by Mr Raby, and CLF was on constructive notice of that. Ms McCann pleaded that CLF had failed to take reasonable steps to satisfy itself that Ms McCann had understood and entered freely into the transaction.
vii) Ms McCann therefore sought for the 2012 Guarantee and Charge to be set aside.
viii) In the alternative, she put CLF to proof that the sum of £881,261.38 was owing and purported to reserve the right to plead further when particulars were provided.
67. I note the following about the pleaded position:
i) Ms McCann ran a “conventional” Etridge defence that CLF failed to take reasonable steps to satisfy itself that Ms McCann understood the transaction and entered into it freely; as a result of that failure it was fixed with constructive knowledge of Mr Raby’s undue influence.
ii) However, there was an additional plank to her defence – that in the unusual circumstances of the lending and the relationship between Mr Raby and CLF, CLF had itself made false representations to Ms McCann to induce her to agree the charge and had constructive notice of false representations by Mr Raby.
iii) Ms McCann put CLF to proof of the debt. That is not surprising, given that she herself was not involved in the Avanex business and was not the borrower. However, she pleaded a number of allegations to the effect that lending exceeded relevant limits. That, by implication, accepted that money had been loaned, though she did not accept the figures relied on by CLF.
68. On 2 June 2015, RPL obtained written advice from Daniel Bromilow of counsel as to the merits of the Order for Sale Claim. That advice was passed on to CLF.
i) Mr Bromilow said that he did not know and was unable to establish from the documents contained in his instructions, how the sum of £881,261.38 was calculated and he was therefore unable to verify that it was correct. He assumed, for the purposes of his advice, that if required to prove the sum due CLF would be able to do so.
ii) Mr Bromilow said that it was possible that Ms McCann had an Etridge defence, depending on a number of factual questions.
69. It is clear from RPL’s file that as early as June 2015 SMB queried the amount of the debt, and RPL advised CLF that it would need to prove the debt. For example, in an email to CLF on 17 June 2015, Mr Lewis said the following:
If this is the case and the amount claimed cannot be tested or fails testing, then the claim will simply be dismissed with costs.
If it is the case that the calculation of the debt is no longer correct or to be relied on, then it must be and can be corrected and the stage for doing this is now. The risk in not doing so is that the defendant shows that it is unjustified and should never have been pleaded and having done so is therefore to be regarded as an abuse of process, with the consequences that follow from that. It appears that there is some issue with the calculation and we need to know now what the problem is, so that we have the best opportunity to deal with any problem.
70. CLF’s response, on the same day, suggested that documents could be found: “we can certainly look at what we have in terms of document requests, reliable archive indexes and box labelling permitting”.
71. On 16 July 2015, in preparation for the Reply and Defence to Counterclaim, Mr Smith asked CLF for a full account in accordance with the agreement showing the calculation of £881,261.38. However, when the Reply and Defence to Counterclaim was filed, and when it was later amended, the figure is not explained. In each version, paragraph 24 reads “An account of how the sum of £881,261.38 was calculated will be provided in due course.” It is clear from RPL’s file that this was a matter of discussion between RPL, counsel and CLF. The wording in paragraph 24 appears to have resulted from an email dated 12 August 2015, when Mr Bromilow sent Mr Smith a revised draft Reply and Defence to Counterclaim. He explained a number of points in the drafting. One of his points was as follows:
I note that a full account of how the indebtedness arose will be provided, but I have not seen an account to date. The appropriate deletion should be made from paragraph 24 of the draft Reply depending on whether an account is ready or whether it will be produced in due course. It would be better, of course, if it was served with the Reply.
72. The Reply and Defence to Counterclaim (in any of its versions) made no reference to the Certification Clause. I was not shown anything to suggest that RPL advised at this time that the Certification Clause would be sufficient to prove the debt, nor that there was any discussion about pleading it.
73. On 16 October 2015, Mr Smith wrote to Jason at CLF concerning orders which SMB intended to seek at the forthcoming CMC. It appears that Jason had queried SMB’s request for an explanation as to how the sum claimed was calculated. Mr Smith said:
I do not agree that the request for the calculation is curious. If we were acting for the opponents we would have insisted on this many months ago. The fact that they have requested a direction on the point is entirely understandable given that it is the genesis of the claim and given also that we have stated in the Reply that it will be supplied.
Anticipating your request that the pressure for production of the statement be relieved I have suggested to Daniel that we argue that this should be provided as part of the (later) disclosure process. Daniel is very doubtful that he will be able to convince the court that this is the appropriate way forward. Further, and as you recognise, by making a request of that nature it would be very difficult not to give the impression that your company is in difficulty in producing the calculation. The reality is that the court will almost certainly make a direction that your company produces the statement at this stage. I expect that the court will take the view that if your company was able to specify the amount of the debt in the demand and the claim form it should be able to show how that figure was calculated. If having made such a direction the statement is not produced, the opponents will apply for an order striking out the case if the statement is not produced by further stated deadline. Accordingly it is essential that the statement is now provided without further delay.
74. The CMC took place on 23 October 2015. DJ Lightman made an order that, by 30 October 2015, CLF should file and serve an account of how the sum of £881,261.38 was calculated. He also made standard directions to prepare the case for trial. Standard disclosure was to be by 20 November 2015. Witness statements were to be exchanged on 19 January 2016. Trial was listed for 21 March 2016-27 March 2016. The parties agreed an extension to the date for disclosure and witness statements. The trial date was subsequently put back to 25 April 2016.
75. At around this time, Mr Thornton asked Mr Phillips whether there were any problems with the claim that he was not aware of, specifically in relation to the Etridge issue. Mr Phillips emailed Mr Smith and Mr Lewis to relay this concern on 20 October 2015.
76. Following the CMC and Mr Phillips’ email, Mr Smith emailed Mr Thornton on 23 October. He did not identify any issue in relation to RPL’s handling of the Etridge guidelines. As to the debt, he said:
The pivotal matter at present is as you know the production of the calculation of the debt. It is very unfortunate for your company that this has not been produced. Its absence has had the effect of encouraging McCann to believe that she has a viable defence to the claim and it will have sustained her belief that Mr Raby and the company have in some way acted in concert to her disadvantage.
……
At the risk of repeating a point made previously, the further danger to your company is that unless the calculation is produced very rapidly, the Court will strike out the case and order the company to pay McCann's costs as well as its own.
77. He went on to say that RPL had not advised on the merits recently. However, he described the response to Ms McCann’s pleaded case about Etridge as “cogent and credible”.
78. Mr Thornton wrote a long email to Mr Smith on 28 October 2015, in which he:
i) Queried how there could be an Etridge issue, given that Mr Phillips of RPL had handled the Etridge requirements at the time of the 2012 Guarantee and Charge;
ii) Expressed concern as to the proof of the debt, which he regarded as a secondary issue.
79. Also on 28 October, Jason emailed Mr Smith: “Please find enclosed ledger sheet which corresponds to the amount claimed”. He attached a PDF headed “Stephen Raby Associates Avanex – Invoice Discounting and Loan Arrangements – Combined Running Account Ledger (UK£)”. For dates between October 2011 and 30 September 2012, it showed a series of debits and credits and a balance. The total, as at 30 September 2012, was £881,261.38. This appears to be the same ledger, or at least part of the same ledger, that was attached to the 30 October 2012 demand.
80. RPL filed that document with the Court on 30 October 2015, in purported compliance with DJ Lightman’s 23 October 2015 order. SMB responded by asking for copies of the invoices relating to the credit items appearing in the statement of account and the discounting reports for November 2011, December 2011 and January 2012. Mr Smith advised CLF to provide these documents, as they would fall within the ambit of documents CLF would be required to disclose.
81. On 18 November 2015, Jason sent a further lengthy email to Mr Smith. On the topic of witnesses, it appeared that CLF could offer nobody to speak to the detail of the account. The email said:
The bookkeeping of the account which would encompass the running and on-going mundane calculation to which you refer would have been carried out on outsourced basis and the support relationship involved would have ceased some years ago. In truth we probably have nobody with live knowledge of matters mundane of now some years ago available. What might you want them to cover by way of detailed example so we can scratch some heads.
82. As to documents, the email said that “We think pretty much anything that we had was provided to your Firm at or around the commencement of the instruction”. It went on to say that the invoices for credit items in the statement of account were generated by the borrower, as were discounting reports.
83. Mr Gould of SMB and Mr Smith had a without prejudice conversation on 27 November 2015. According to Mr Smith’s written account to Jason on the same date, Mr Gould raised a number of points challenging the underlying debt.
i) He queried the SIC used and suggested that CLF and/or the SIC had not accounted properly for receipts and payments. He suggested that payments to Mr Raby may have been diverted via the SIC and that the statement of account was inaccurate and misleading. Mr Smith characterised this (both to Mr Gould and in his report to Jason) as effectively an allegation of fraud on the part of CLF which had not been pleaded.
ii) Mr Gould further alleged that the financial arrangements in the case were not truly at arm’s length and in accordance with the documents but were operated in accordance with private understandings between Mr Thornton and Mr Raby.
iii) He alleged that Ms McCann had been misled into entering into the 2012 Guarantee and Charge. He alleged that the account had been deliberately manipulated by CLF to give a false impression immediately prior to execution.
iv) Mr Gould however acknowledged that Lammas Lodge would need to be sold. Ms McCann was prepared to settle on the basis that she received a certain sum from the net proceeds and CLF would receive the remainder.
84. Mr Smith suggested that RPL make an assessment of the merits of the offer by comparison to the likely outcome at trial before responding to the offer. In an email dated 2 December 2015, Jason said that CLF did not wish RPL to make any assessment of the offer at this stage.
85. RPL made a counter offer to settle in a letter dated 13 January 2016. The letter first pushed back on Mr Gould’s allegations which were said to amount to fraud.
86. On 29 January 2016, Mr Smith wrote to Jason. He reported on a further without prejudice meeting with SMB.
i) First, he summarised some merits points made by SMB. SMB raised questions about use of the SIC in the 2012 agreement.
They questioned how the account operated in practice in particular how invoicing was dealt with on behalf of SRA. SMB point to the apparent joint ownership of the SIC (as mentioned in the 2012 Guarantee and Charge) as indicating that CLF was able to and did exercise control over invoicing and this was not, as we argue, a conventional arm’s length arrangement, but one where CLF was more intimately involved in the SRA business.
ii) SMB also argued that if Ms McCann was successful in having the 2012 Guarantee and Charge rescinded, this would rescind the charge in toto – against Ms McCann and Mr Raby. CLF would be left with an equitable charge in respect of Mr Raby’s interest, but that would be unsecured for the purposes of Mr Raby’s bankruptcy.
iii) SMB said that the 13 January offer was not acceptable.
iv) Ms McCann had made a further offer, somewhat more advantageous to CLF than the November offer. Mr Smith indicated the figure was acceptable. SMB also suggested an alternative structure for a settlement.
v) Mr Smith said:
It is axiomatic that any settlement involves concessions being made by both sides. In my view it would be far better to agree appropriate settlement terms rather than to take the inevitable litigation risk of pursuing this case to trial. At present our approach has not recognised that there is any risk for CLF, since we have not indicated that any concession will be made in our settlement discussions. Whilst that approach is tenable in terms of the position we take in discussions with the opponents, CLF ought in my view factor in the possibility that this claim will fail at trial and the substantial adverse financial consequences of such a result.
….
I also suggest that CLF reconsiders its instructions to us not to review the merits/prospects of success. I believe it is necessary at this stage to consider in particular the likely overall effect on recoveries if Ms McCann were to establish that the 2012 Guarantee and Charge should be rescinded.
87. It is this offer, together with the offer discussed in the November 2015 without prejudice email, which are referred to by CLF in this claim as “the Early 2016 Offers”.
88. Jason sent a lengthy response on 2 February 2016. It appears that the writer was still convinced that Ms McCann’s position was wrong and disingenuous. He gave an explanation of the way in which the SIC and Avanex operated. He said that although the 2012 Facility Agreement contemplated that the SIC would be under common control that is not what in fact happened. The SIC was independent.
89. During the course of preparation for disclosure, Sarah of CLF wrote to Mr Smith on 3 February 2016:
It occurs to us that as CLF operates as a quasi-bank it does not have bank statements as such and its relationship with the borrower is recorded on the ledger sheets the extract of which we have already provided as a statement of account or analysis of the balance demanded.
We could indicate that these ledger sheets are available for previous years.
Nothing on the limited bank statements of CLF would relate to the borrower and relate to other confidential parties.
90. It is far from clear what was meant by the expression “quasi-bank”. Nor is it clear why CLF “does not have bank statements as such”, nor how that fits with the later reference to “the limited bank statements of CLF”, nor why none of CLF’s bank statements would contain anything relating to Avanex (the borrower).
91. Jason asked RPL to write to SMB dealing with the issues raised about the SIC. Accordingly, RPL wrote to SMB on 5 February 2016:
It may therefore assist your client if we confirm our instructions in relation to the operation of the SIC. In this respect the original intention, as is set out in Recital C, was that there was an SIC under common control, the purpose of which was to raise invoices to clients of the SRA business in respect of fees due from those clients to the SRA business. The purpose of this arrangement was to segregate the stewardship and ring fence of the trading receipts of the SRA business.
In fact the SIC arrangement that was put in place was not subject to any control by our client. Instead the SIC was utilised by the borrower and operated by it under the style known as "SR Associates Europe" and was wholly independent of our client. The Borrower used the livery and GB VAT number of the SIC to raise invoices to the SRA clients. Receipts from those clients were received by a deposit taker retained by the SIC.
As such, the SIC handled invoicing as agent for the SRA business. These arrangements were administered by the borrower and not our client. Accordingly these arrangements did not vary or affect the security held by our client and operated satisfactorily and as contemplated; they were simply part of the administrative arrangements dealing with the invoicing and collection of the fees of the SRA business.
There is nothing ominous about these simple and expedient arrangements that were put in place by the borrower and the related invoicing and receipts were reviewed by our client and both defendants on an on-going basis. Our client is aware of no query over these arrangements being raised by your client either on inception or throughout subsequent operation.
92. On 3 February 2016, CLF provided its Disclosure List. It included only seven items. There were no further documents concerning the debt beyond the ledgers and discounting reports that had already been provided.
93. Trial witness statements were exchanged in mid-March 2016.
i) Mr Michael Fitzgerald provided a statement for CLF, dated 16 March 2016. He described himself as a Corporate Affairs Administrator for CLF. He explained the way in which the lending operated. He exhibited the same ledgers as had already been provided. Mr Fitzgerald said that invoices for Avanex were raised through a separate company, Gresham Corporate Holdings Ltd (“Gresham”), which was the SIC. The purpose of this was said to be to ring-fence the value and security of the customer debts from the business itself. CLF had no control over the invoicing and no control over the sales ledger. However, he also said that CLF administered the loan by monitoring amounts lent and receipts. It reviewed the sales ledger at least monthly as part of assisting the borrower with its monthly reporting.
ii) Mr Thornton also made statements dated 16 March 2016 and 16 April 2016. His statements did not address the detail of how CLF’s business worked, nor the detail of the debt. What he did say was in very general terms.
94. Mr Fitzgerald’s statement appears to be the first time Gresham was named as the SIC. In due course it was said by Mr Thornton that Mr Fitzgerald would not be able to attend trial due to his health.
95. On 30 March 2016, SMB wrote to RPL. Their letter followed a meeting with Mr Raby.
i) SMB repeated its request for disclosure of bank statements relating to CLF’s receipt of payments from Avanex customers and advances to Avanex.
ii) SMB raised a number of queries about the “Combined Running Account Ledger” in the light of information received from Mr Raby, suggesting first that Avanex issued invoices for hundreds of thousands of pounds for which CLF must have received payment but had not accounted; and second that Mr Raby said no payments were made by CLF to Avanex following its closure in late May, but the ledger showed payments after that date. SMB indicated that absent documentary evidence it would invite the Court to find that CLF had not made out its case as to the debt.
96. Mr Smith’s email to Jason on the same day said that he had discussed SMB’s requests with counsel (Daniel Bromilow) and that bank statements were disclosable and various other queries would need to be addressed.
97. On 4 April 2016, Mr Smith wrote to Sarah:
Given that CLF will be providing no further disclosure, we will have to be prepared to explain in detail why (for example) CLF cannot now show that advances and receipts were made/received. This is not in my view the same as a standard bank account since it is a loan account under which CLF has received payments from debtors of SRA and it has remitted or caused the remittance of CLF funds to the SRA business/its agents. One would therefore expect CLF to be able to produce its bank statements or some other material that evidences payments and receipts that appear in the ledger. I appreciate that CLF gave an explanation of such matters in its list of documents, but we can anticipate a robust interrogation from the opponents on this.
98. Sarah replied on 4 April 2016:
Following the amended defence and counterclaim this of itself did not cause us to identify any further disclosure. It is conceivable that some may come to our attention but then we have been watchful for this since disclosure became in prospect. Unfortunately we did not believe that we had to go behind our Ledger sheets or that it was reasonable or proportionate for us to do so. We also thought there was some provision in the paperwork that prevented any form of shakedown on this and especially long after the event.
99. I take the last sentence to be an oblique reference to the Certification Clause. I was not shown anything in RPL’s file to suggest that this had been discussed at an earlier time than this.
100. On 7 April 2016 RPL responded in relation to the calculation of the debt, explaining the limits on the available documentation and relying on the Certification Clause. This would appear to be the first reference to the Certification Clause in inter partes correspondence.
101. SMB wrote to RPL on 8 April 2016. They picked up on a point from CLF’s trial witness statements (in particular that of Mr Fitzgerald) that the SIC was identified as Gresham. RPL had also recently confirmed that Gresham operated the account “SR Associates Europe” to which SRA clients were directed to pay their invoices. A company search showed Gresham to be an Isle of Man company owned by Mr Thornton. SMB said it ought therefore to be possible for CLF to provide Gresham’s bank statements so that SMB could get to the bottom of what had happened to Avanex funds that were currently unaccounted for, which it estimated to be £677,367. SMB also asked for CLF’s bank statements showing its receipt of funds from Gresham.
102. In the meantime, Mr Thornton was becoming increasingly concerned that there were problems with the case, caused by RPL, which RPL were not being open about. He wrote to Mr Phillips on 9 April and 10 April. On 11 or 12 April Mr Thornton made a complaint about RPL’s deficiency in handling the Etridge process in 2012, and their failure to reveal the problem during the handling of the Order for Sale Claim. He asked for an explanation of whether Etridge was a problem or not.
103. On 13 April 2016, John Rubinstein of RPL wrote to Mr Thornton saying the practice saw no alternative but to cease to act; it proposed to make an application to come off the record. The reasons stated were said to be:
i) A breakdown of trust, based on instructions provided having been untrue on two occasions. Those occasions were:
a) CLF had instructed RPL to write to SMB, in its 19 February 2016 letter, saying that the SIC arrangement was wholly independent of CLF, but SMB had provided documents (on 8 April 2016) which showed that the SIC was owned by Mr Thornton.
b) SMB had produced an email exchange (with their letter of 30 March 2016) which showed that Mr Thornton agreed with the borrower on 31 January 2012 that the loan facility would be limited to £700,000 and what RPL had been told about that was not true.
ii) Fees: CLF owed RPL £98,940 in fees. RPL had not been put in funds for counsel fees for the forthcoming trial.
iii) Conflict of interest: Mr Thornton’s letter of 11 April 2016 articulated a complaint arising from Mr Phillips’ services relating to the creation of the security. Mr Phillips’ evidence may conflict with the contention on which CLF’s complaint is based. RPL denied that there was a failure of service but could not continue to act in the light of the conflict of interest.
104. On 13 April 2016, Sarah sent Mr Smith an email attaching two PDFs. She said:
We have now received some redacted copy statements from the service provider for the period you thought necessary i.e. the year to 30.09.12. This comprises a GBP and CHF statement run. A listing that should cover the analysed position requested from June 2012 is expected later today.
105. The two attachments are what have been referred to in these proceedings as bank statements, running in total to 11 pages. I will return to what these show in due course.
106. On 15 April 2016, Ms McCann made an application for specific disclosure.
107. On 19 April 2016, SMB wrote to RPL without prejudice, having received a file from Mr Raby’s trustee in bankruptcy. SMB described Mr Raby as “shockingly untruthful” in his dealings with the Inland Revenue. SMB said:
I enclose a copy of a diagram of how Mr Raby and Mr Thornton set up the Avanex/Gresham/CLF/Perrycourt business. My client’s case at trial will be that this structure enabled them to siphon off Avanex’s income thereby enabling the debt secured on 32 Lammas Lodge and the Kalkan property to balloon thereby sucking up Mr Raby’s equity in each. The debt was therefore an illusion manufactured to defeat the claims of Mr Raby’s unsecured creditors. The implication is that there are large sums unaccounted for retained offshore under Mr Thornton or Mr Raby’s control.
As such, my client is "collateral damage” arising from these arrangements and the contrived nature of CLF’s debt.
108. SMB proposed a without prejudice discussion. It appears that did not take place. A draft response to the letter on behalf of CLF refuted the allegations. CLF wrote to SMB on 21 April 2016 with draft letters which were prepared by RPL but not sent out as they came off the record. It is not entirely clear from the file what the attached letters were.
109. On 21 April 2016 CLF applied to adjourn the trial.
110. On 22 April SMB wrote to CLF, noting that RPL had applied to come off the record.
i) SMB noted RPL’s argument that Ms McCann was prohibited from challenging the certificate of debt raised on 2nd and 30th October 2012 because the certificate was final. SMB said:
Putting to one side arguments about construction of the terms of the facility agreement and mortgage deed, the nature of the relationship which these created between the parties, and the legal effect this may have (all of which may become issues at trial) there is a strong prima facie case that the certificate of debt issued by you is fraudulent. As such it is void or voidable.
ii) Under the headings “The fraudulent certification of the debt” and “The fraudulent scheme devised by Mr Raby and Mr Thornton”, SMB alleged, on the basis of a meeting with Mr Raby, that Mr Raby had conspired with Mr Thornton in a scheme to defraud HMRC. Income arising from Avanex’s trading was paid to Gresham, an Isle of Man company controlled by Mr Raby and Mr Thornton. Avanex’s expenses were channelled through Perrycourt. Payments to Perrycourt were channelled through CLF, and to the extent that they exceeded the funds received from Gresham they were shown as “loans”.
iii) Under the heading “the manipulation of the Avanex debt”, SMB repeated the allegation that there were large sums unaccounted for and alleged that sums had been diverted for which CLF must account. It was also alleged that Mr Raby and Mr Thornton intended to defeat Mr Raby’s unsecured creditors by increasing the size of Mr Raby’s secured debt, which would then take up the equity in Lammas Lodge.
111. Also on 22 April 2016, RPL wrote to CLF seeking payment of its outstanding fees.
112. Ms McCann’s counsel’s Skeleton Argument for trial set out in some detail allegations which were said to arise from recent disclosure from CLF and from Mr Raby’s trustee in bankruptcy file. It was alleged that Mr Raby intended to close down Avanex and set up a new business in Switzerland; that Mr Raby was being chased for a very large unpaid income tax bill, and HMRC had issued a statutory demand in January 2012, prior to the 2012 Guarantee and Charge; sums on CLF’s ledger from 1 June 2012 to 30 September 2012 were paid to Mr Raby personally, not to Avanex, for the purpose of his new business in Switzerland; invoices totalling £462,770 were unaccounted for.
113. On 25 April 2016, Mr Eaton-Turner ordered CLF by 26 April 2016 to provide specific disclosure of classes of documents in Schedule 1 to the order, together with an affidavit setting out the searches carried out, and explaining, if disclosure could not be given, why not. CLF was also ordered to provide unredacted copies of documents already disclosed. The documents to be disclosed included (among other things):
i) Bank statements for the period 1 February 2012 to 31 August 2014 relating to the operation of a loan account with Avanex or Mr Raby;
ii) Invoices sent to Avanex or Mr Raby’s customers by Gresham from 31 October 2011 until 30 September 2012.
iii) Financial statements of Gresham for the period 1 August 2011 to 31 August 2014.
iv) Communications between CLF and Avanex relating to the operation of a loan account or facility between 1 November 2011 and 30 September 2012 relating to the amounts of invoices, and certain other topics.
114. CLF was also ordered to file and serve an affidavit giving details of its disclosure searches to date.
115. Mr Thornton swore an affidavit on 26 April 2016. Much of the affidavit is a complaint about the order for disclosure made, and the arguments advanced in support of it. What was said about the available documents was opaque. He said:
i) Documents were under the control of third parties. Mr Thornton had no control over Gresham. Gresham’s operations did not require it to maintain the information sought. It was not obvious that there was a need to obtain or keep safe any such material.
ii) As to redactions on documents already provided to SMB, it was said that such residual information that the third party service providers were eventually able to locate was redacted by them to impose the confidentiality they in their discretion considered necessary.
iii) No bank accounts in respect of the facility were maintained or operated by CLF; all was dealt with by “third party outsourcing”. It was said that the third party’s reported numbers were integrated into the running account ledger maintained by CLF on an ongoing basis “and once completed and reconciled discarded”. The disclosure searches comprised making requests through Gresham of the “paying agent Fleming Services”, though those relationships had closed in September 2012. Nothing was found, but “around mid-April certain copies were unexpectedly located by and redacted at the discretion of the service provider.” CLF had provided everything that it was possible for third parties to provide to it.
iv) CLF never had invoices – invoices were prepared by Avanex “exhibiting Gresham’s livery”. Gresham did not require those invoices.
116. In this affidavit, the explanation of CLF’s business arrangements and the reasons given as to why documents were not available is hard to follow and unconvincing. I will return to this in my discussion below. This affidavit appears to be the first mention of Fleming Services.
117. Accordingly, no documents were disclosed in response to the Recorder’s order, beyond those which had already been disclosed.
118. There was a further hearing before the Recorder on 27 April 2016. The Recorder’s order included the following:
i) CLF was ordered to file an affidavit confirming that Mr Thornton was a duly authorised officer of CLF at the time of his affidavit dated 26 April 2016, or, if he was not, complying with the Recorder’s 25 April order.
ii) CLF was ordered to provide specific disclosure of:
a) Unredacted versions of those documents already disclosed;
b) Unredacted copies of bank statements from 1/2/12 to 31/8/14 relating to the operation of a loan account with Avanex or Mr Raby;
c) Copies of Gresham’s financial statements from 1/8/11 to 31/8/14;
d) Copies of documents relating to Banks Kelly’s request for information dated 31/1/12.
iii) Ms McCann was given permission to reamend her Defence and Counterclaim.
iv) Directions were given in relation to Ms McCann’s security for costs application.
v) The trial was adjourned to the first open date after 1 July 2016 and CLF was ordered to pay the costs thrown away.
119. On 3 May 2016, the same date as the Re-Amended Defence and Counterclaim, Mr Gould of SMB served his fourth witness statement in support of Ms McCann’s application for security for costs, as provided for in the Recorder’s directions of 27th April. That statement made similar allegations to those made in counsel’s Skeleton Argument for trial. It alleged that Mr Raby and Mr Thornton had put the 2012 Guarantee and Charge in place as part of a scheme to secure Mr Raby and CLF’s position at the expense of HMRC and Mr Raby’s other unsecured creditors. It also raised the issue of the £466,770 invoices which were unaccounted for. Mr Gould exhibited an organisation chart he had produced showing the companies said to be involved in the matter and highlighting that a number of them were “dead-end” companies – that is it was not possible to tell who owned them.
120. Mr Thornton swore an affidavit on 11th May stating that he was a duly appointed officer of CLF and repeating his position that no further documents could be disclosed (including unredacted copies of documents which had already been disclosed).
Factual findings arising from the Order for Sale Claim
121. Before summarising the position as it stood at the beginning of IM’s instruction, I will deal with some factual issues that arise from the conduct of the Order for Sale Claim up to September 2016.
Reliance on the Certification Clause and the need to prove the debt
122. As I will set out below, in September 2016 Mr Sadiq advised that it would not be sufficient to rely on the Certification Clause. Mr Thornton made repeated references in his witness statement for this trial to RPL having advised him that a certificate would suffice to prove the debt. At paragraph 23 he said Mr Smith was unequivocal about this. At paragraph 32 he said in a meeting with Mr Smith and Mr Lewis (for which he gave no date) Mr Smith confirmed without hesitation that proof of the debt would be by certification. At paragraph 64 he said:
I had always understood from RPL that it was common for certificates of this nature to be used in these sorts of situations and RPL had never suggested to me, either at the time of drafting the security, nor during the litigation, that the Court would want to look behind the certificate except as Mr Smith was running out the door and would not explain his U-Turn on this.
123. Mr Thornton’s evidence on this is demonstrably wrong.
124. RPL’s file shows repeated references to the need to prove the debt by evidence – as I have set out above. There is scant, if any, reference to the Certification Clause. There appears from the RPL file to have been no mention of the Certification Clause until April 2016 in the run up to trial. The Certification Clause was not pleaded, and there appears to have been no discussion of pleading it.
125. At paragraph 38 of his witness statement, Mr Thornton dealt with SMB’s request for bank statements, which he says was made at a late stage before the April 2016 trial. He said:
To my surprise, Mr Smith suggested that it was essential that these should be provided which did not make any sense to me given his early and long standing position on certification.
126. This, again, is simply wrong. The documents show that RPL had been raising the need for documents to prove the debt for months prior to trial and had not advised that CLF could simply rely on the Certification Clause.
The “Vouching” Exercise
127. One of the things relied on by CLF as proving the debt is a “vouching” or “sampling” exercise said to have been undertaken by SMB to test the reliability of CLF’s ledger.
128. Mr Thornton’s witness statement dealt with this exercise at paragraph 36. He said that RPL and SMB agreed the testing would take the form of vouching on a sample basis the entries in CLF’s customer account ledger for Avanex. It was carried out “over and around” two meetings between RPL and SMB and “produced no exceptions”. He also said at paragraph 69 that the vouching exercise revealed no disagreement over figures.
129. Mr Thornton elaborated on this in cross-examination. When asked about the columns in the various versions of the ledger he said that when they did the vouching exercise with Mr Gould certain additional details were added, at his request or at Mr Smith’s suggestion. He complained that the advice he was given by IM ignored the work done between Mr Smith and Mr Gould to test the ledger.
130. I find that no such exercise took place:
i) Mr Gould filed a witness statement in these proceedings stating that he had no recollection of taking part in such an exercise. Mr Pickering chose not to cross-examine Mr Gould. I have no reason to doubt Mr Gould’s evidence.
ii) I have seen nothing on RPL’s file to indicate such an exercise was discussed or arranged between RPL and SMB. There is nothing to support Mr Thornton’s account that during the vouching a version of the ledger was produced with details added.
iii) Given the very limited disclosure provided by CLF, during RPL’s time handling the case, amounting to no more than the Ledger until the “bank statements” were disclosed on 13 April 2016, it is difficult to see what sampling or vouching exercise could have been conducted.
iv) It is clear that the figures were not agreed. In April and May 2016 SMB’s correspondence, counsel’s Skeleton Argument for trial and Mr Gould’s fourth witness statement all make points that Ms McCann’s team had compared the ledger to limited discounting reports in their possession and that led them to raise a number of detailed challenges to the reliability of the Ledger; to claim that there were monies unaccounted for; and to claim that there had been fraud on the part of Mr Raby and Mr Thornton.
The Additional Liability Claim
131. In support of the Additional Liability Claim, Mr Thornton says that during the Order for Sale Claim he was told by Mr Smith that such a provision was in place.
132. Mr Thornton gave no specifics as to when this was raised. I have not found, nor was I taken to, any reference on RPL’s file to:
i) Mr Thornton raising the Additional Liability Provision: either to suggest relying on the provision or complaining that there had been a failure to include the provision in the 2012 Guarantee.
ii) Mr Smith, or anyone else at RPL giving reassurance that there was such protection.
133. There are a number of instances where CLF queries whether it is possible to recover more than Ms McCann’s exposure under the charge, but that is not the same thing. The Additional Liability Provision would have been a route to such recovery, but there does not appear to be any discussion in which Mr Thornton raised the point that he had instructed Mr Phillips to include the Additional Liability Provision.
134. Accordingly, I find that Mr Thornton is wrong in saying that this was raised during the Order for Sale Claim and that he was reassured about it.
Summary of the position in September 2016 when IM was instructed
135. In September 2016, at the time of IM’s instruction:
i) The trial of the Order for Sale Claim had been adjourned and listed for November 2016.
ii) There was an outstanding issue relating to specific disclosure: the Recorder had made orders, but CLF had disclosed no further documents.
iii) Ms McCann had an outstanding application for security for costs against RPL, which was listed for 7 October 2016.
iv) RPL had an outstanding claim for its fees against CLF.
v) No allegation of fraud had been pleaded in the Re-Amended Defence and Counterclaim. Allegations were made that more money had been advanced than the limit on the facility. Ultimately, CLF was put to proof of its debt.
vi) However, it is clear from Ms McCann’s Skeleton Argument for trial and security for costs application that her legal team intended to pursue (a) allegations of impropriety on the part of Mr Raby and Mr Thornton in setting up and operating the arrangement between Avanex/CLF/Gresham/Perrycourt; (b) a challenge to the accuracy of the ledger provided, alleging that sums paid out had been diverted, and that invoices issued by Avanex were unaccounted for.
vii) In correspondence in April 2016 SMB had gone further still, expressly alleging fraud on the part of Mr Raby and Mr Thornton.
viii) The disclosed documentation relating to the sums claimed by CLF in the Order for Sale Claim was very limited.
ix) There had been no vouching or sampling exercise, and SMB had not indicated that Ms McCann accepted the accuracy of the ledger. On the contrary, they had challenged it.
x) RPL had not advised CLF that it would be sufficient to rely on the Certification Clause. RPL’s advice was that CLF should disclose documents to prove the debt.
xi) The Certification Clause was not pleaded; nor was any specific certificate. The Certification Clause does not appear to have been raised in inter partes correspondence until April 2016. When it was raised, SMB immediately countered with a letter alleging fraud.
xii) During the course of the Order for Sale Claim, there had been no discussion between CLF and RPL of the Additional Liability Provision.
IM’s Instruction
136. It was against the background summarised above that CLF instructed Mr Sachs of IM. IM was instructed in relation to the Order for Sale Claim, RPL’s claim for fees, and a professional negligence claim against RPL.
137. By 22 September 2016 Mr Sachs had received files from RPL and had provided a core bundle to Mr Sadiq. Although he had not yet reviewed the files in detail, Mr Sachs was immediately alive to the issue relating to proof of debt. He wrote:
I am concerned that from the disclosure that has been made to date by CLS [sic], it would appear that CLS has not clearly proved that the debt of £881k is due. This view may change once I have considered the papers in more detail but from my initial review it appears that CLS is not in a position to provide bank statements that clearly show monies being provided to the second defendant. If such monies were provided by a third party then we will need to reconsider the position of CLS further but at the moment, I have not seen any evidence that either CLS or a third party have made loans of £881k.
138. There was a conference on 27 September 2016, attended by Mr Thornton, Mr Sadiq, Mr Sachs, Ms Dolman and a junior from IM, Ms McKenzie as a notetaker. I was shown an attendance note of the conference, and Mr Sadiq gave evidence about the conference.
139. Mr Thornton said, in his witness statement, that he was not sent a copy of that note nor any conference notes. He was wrong about that. A letter dated 30 September 2016 from Mr Sachs to Mr Thornton refers to the conference note as attached. Mr Bacon told me, and Mr Pickering accepted, that there was an email showing the note was sent with the letter. Mr Thornton ultimately accepted that in cross-examination. I find that the note is an accurate summary of the advice given and that Mr Thornton received it soon after the conference. A similar issue arose in relation to other conference notes. I can see no basis for Mr Thornton to have claimed that he was not sent any notes of conferences, when plainly he was.
140. It is clear from the attendance note that Mr Sadiq started from the premise that it ought to be straightforward for a lender to demonstrate that it had lent money. That is not a surprising position for him to have taken. He advised that the court would want to see the underlying documents, and CLF must prove the debt.
141. As to the Certification Clause, Mr Sadiq’s advice was that if Ms McCann was alleging fraud, which was the underlying inference, then the certificate would not be sufficient. The court would want to see the paper trail if there may be fraud. He gave clear advice that if CLF could not show a viable paper trail of documents showing the money, it would lose. He also thought it likely that the imminent security for costs claim would be lost.
142. Mr Sachs’ 30 September 2016 letter summarised the advice both as to the security for costs application and as to the strength of the main action. He said that IM and Mr Sadiq’s advice was that CLF was very likely to lose the Order for Sale Claim for three main reasons:
i) CLF had been unable to show that it could prove the debt; though Mr Sachs acknowledged that Mr Thornton believed he may perhaps be able to obtain further documents from Fleming.
ii) CLF, through the fault of RPL, failed to comply with the Etridge guidelines and was on constructive notice of a claim of undue influence by Ms McCann.
iii) It was likely that Ms McCann would be able to establish undue influence. Mr Raby’s witness evidence was likely to be poor, and he was likely to be called as a hostile witness by Ms McCann.
143. The letter went on to make the following points:
i) There was a chance that if CLF could not prove the debt it may not be able to obtain judgment against Mr Raby and the charge against his 50% interest might also be set aside.
ii) If CLF could establish that the reason the claim against Ms McCann would fail was because of failure to follow the Etridge guidelines, there was potentially a strong claim for negligence against RPL. However, if CLF could not prove the debt, RPL may have a defence to the claim.
iii) RPL may have conducted the Order for Sale Claim negligently. However, CLF would have to show loss, which Mr Sachs identified as the wasted fees. If CLF could not prove the debt, this may have a damaging effect on any claim for negligence.
144. On 4 October 2016 Mr Sachs wrote a further letter setting out preliminary advice on the Professional Negligence Claim.
i) The summary of the basis of complaint referred to the failure to comply with the Etridge guidelines, the failure to advise as to the consequences of that failure, and the failure to advise as to the need to prove the debt.
ii) There was no mention of the alleged failure to include the Additional Liability Provision.
iii) Mr Sachs considered there was good evidence to suggest that RPL were negligent in relation to compliance with the Etridge guidelines in 2012, and negligent in the Order for Sale Claim by failing to advise CLF that the Etridge guidelines had not been followed.
iv) As to proof of debt, Mr Sachs said this:
As we also advised Mr Thornton in conference, in order to succeed with this claim, it is fundamental for CLF to prove and substantiate with documentary evidence the debt due to CLF, in the sum of £881k. CLF will, as a bare minimum, be required to provide bank statements, essentially showing a paper trail of the transfer of monies, to demonstrate the debt claimed. Whilst it is apparent from a review of the files that this was raised with CLF by RPLS and Counsel, only a very limited amount of supporting accounting information has been disclosed to date by CLF. It was only when further demands were made by SMB for invoices and bank statements to be produced that RPLS appear to appreciate the relevance of why these demands were being made by SMB and the difficulties that CLF might face, if they could not be produced. We addressed this point at length in conference and we refer to the comments made by Counsel, in the attendance note. It is our firm view, which is shared by Counsel, that unless CLF are able to prove the debt, by way of further supporting documentation, then it is highly likely CLF’s claim will not succeed….
v) Further, under the heading of causation he said:
However, even if CLF can demonstrate that RPLS and/or RPL have been negligent, as summarised above, any claim will fail because at the moment, in our view, the claim being pursued by CLF is more than likely to fail in any event, unless CLF can prove the debt and provide supporting financial information to support its claim. This would be raised in defence of any claim brought against RPLS / RPL so potentially, there is a real risk that any claim in negligence would fail, on causation. Every effort should therefore be made by CLF to locate such supporting information not only for the underlying claim but for any associated negligence claim against RPLS and/or RPL.
145. Mr Sachs then went on to set out the history of offers to settle in the period November 2015 to April 2016. He said:
Whilst this is only a preliminary view, we consider that RPLS had many months to consider the correct approach, to provide CLF with appropriate advice and adopt a sensible commercial position to ensure the best outcome for CLF. The offers that were made by JM in November 2015 and January 2016 were offers, that in our opinion, should have been seriously considered by CLF and clear advice should have been provided to CLF, to that effect. It does not appear that any such advice was provided because RPLS appear to have failed to appreciate the serious weaknesses surrounding CLF's claim. Whilst there are a few references to the “risks of litigation” there is no detailed analysis of CLF’s position and likely prospects of success. It also does not appear that any advice from Counsel was sought in relation to the offers that had been made.
In particular, there appears to have been a clear opportunity for CLF to have reached a settlement with JM either in November 2015 or shortly thereafter. JM appears keen to reach a quick settlement. Had either of these offers been accepted by CLF, in our view, it is likely that such terms of settlement would have resulted in a far better outcome than the position that CLF now finds itself in. This is particularly the case, if CLF is not able to provide us with any supporting documents in respect of the debt. However, even if such evidence is produced, for the reasons that we discussed with Mr Thornton during the conference with Counsel, we still consider there are a number of hurdles for CLF to overcome.
We raise two further points. To succeed with a claim against RPLS, it would be necessary to demonstrate that had CLF received the correct and proper advice in respect of its claim, then CLF would probably have agreed to the terms being offered by JM, by way of settlement. We assume this would not be an issue but we would need to explore this further. A further issue that RPLS will no doubt raise is that they will say that CLF failed to provide them with full and frank instructions as to the background to this matter. They may claim that it was only late in the proceedings, when SMB re-amended their claim and provided further disclosure surrounding the background to the underlying claim and operation of CLF's accounts, that the full picture began to emerge. We fully appreciate that CLF disputes much of the claims that have been made by JM but nevertheless, we assume RPLS will say that they could only advise on the facts that were presented to them and upon the instructions that they were provided by CLF. They are likely to claim that it was only around April 2016, that it became apparent that there were a number of difficulties to CLF's claim. Again, we will need more time to consider this further but on the face of it, in our view, RPLS's failure to comply with the Etridge principles and the need for CLF to prove the debt, were apparent from the initial stages of the proceedings and these two issues alone cause us some real concerns. As such, it seems reasonable to assume that the opportunity to settle the claim in January 2016 (or indeed earlier), should have been actively encouraged by RPLS.
If CLF does decide to pursue a professional negligence claim, then the Court would have to evaluate what the chances might have been of CLF obtaining a more favourable court order or a better settlement had the appropriate advice been given to CLF and that of course will depend upon how the underlying claim against JM and SR proceeds, in the next few weeks.
146. IM sent a preliminary notice of claim to RPL on or around 7 October 2016. Mr Thornton saw drafts of the letter and commented in detail.
i) At that time, one of the allegations of negligence was that RPL had failed to give proper advice as to the need to prove the debt – which need it described as “paramount”. It referred to a certificate but said that would not alone be satisfactory evidence and would face severe scrutiny at trial. This allegation was in due course abandoned, once the full file had been reviewed and it became clear that RPL had repeatedly advised as to the need to prove the debt.
ii) The letter contained the allegations that RPL failed to comply with the Etridge guidelines and failed to advise on this failure when there was an opportunity to settle the case in late 2015 and early 2016.
iii) There was no mention of the Additional Liability Claim.
Settlement of the Order for Sale Claim
147. Following IM and Mr Sadiq’s advice:
i) The security for costs application was compromised on 4 October 2016, with security agreed at £60,000, plus costs (with an interim payment of £10,000). At the time SMB’s costs were said to be £16,000 odd.
ii) Steps were taken to negotiate a settlement of the Order for Sale Claim in October 2016.
148. Terms for settlement were reached on 21 October 2016, shortly ahead of the listed pre-trial review. The headline deal was that:
i) CLF’s interest over Lammas Lodge and the Turkish Property would be discharged.
ii) CLF would receive £270,000 and the costs order in Ms McCann’s favour arising from the security for costs application would be set aside. The security for costs would no longer need to be given.
149. The Order for Sale Claim was brought against Ms McCann and Mr Raby. The settlement included both of them. Although the Order for Sale Claim was brought only in respect of Lammas Lodge, the settlement also included the Turkish Property.
150. The Amended Particulars of Claim plead that IM’s advice as to settlement failed to take into account the value of the equity in the Turkish Property and the value of Mr Raby’s interest in Lammas Lodge. In cross-examination Mr Thornton described the settlement as “obscenely insufficient”. However, those allegations were expressly abandoned in closing submissions at the end of trial. There is no live allegation that it was negligent to include Mr Raby’s liability or the Turkish Property in the settlement, nor that the settlement was undervalued, save in respect of interest post-settlement.
151. The settlement agreement in respect of the Order for Sale Claim was not in fact signed until 19 May 2017; it was approved by the court on 8 June 2017. Under the terms of the settlement:
i) The Order for Sale Claim was compromised, each party released all others from all claims and liabilities.
ii) Upon the Court approving the settlement, the parties would “initiate and execute as soon as reasonably practicable” a set of transactional steps set out in a schedule, the effect of which was to transfer to Ms McCann CLF and Mr Raby’s interests in Lammas Lodge and the Turkish Property.
iii) Ms McCann would pay CLF £270,000.
iv) The costs order against CLF arising from the security for costs application was set aside. SMB’s bill was for around £16,000, subject to detailed assessment and the Recorder had ordered an interim payment of £16,000.
Factual finding as to interest in the settlement of the Order for Sale Claim
152. It is clear from IM’s file that IM was in contact with Mr Thornton in relation to the negotiation of the settlement agreement. Mr Thornton gave detailed comments on the draft agreement on 10 March 2017. There is no evidence to suggest he raised the question of post-settlement interest during the negotiation of the settlement. Indeed, it is not pleaded that Mr Thornton gave instructions as to the interest provision which IM failed to follow. It is pleaded that IM failed to identify the issue.
153. In cross-examination, Mr Thornton, after maintaining the (now abandoned) position that the settlement was undervalued, said that another problem was that there was no longstop completion date and no interest provision. He did not say that he gave an instruction that these matters should be included but said that he would expect a competent solicitor to have built in those protections.
154. In support of that, he said that the settlement was marketed to him (by IM) as a “cash on the nail, cash now” deal by which he meant “cash on the nail of doing the deal, not on the nail of subsequent events”.
155. The suggestion that the settlement did, or should have, provided for an immediate payment of the £270,000, rather than that sum being payable after completion of the property transfer is not CLF’s pleaded case. I was shown no evidence in the documents to indicate that immediate payment was discussed between IM and CLF, or between the parties. If Mr Thornton has believed that the £270,000 was payable at the date the agreement was completed, I would have expected evidence of him vigorously chasing payment; there is none. I reject Mr Thornton’s evidence that he was told that the settlement was on a “cash now” basis.
The Professional Negligence Claim
156. Instructions were sent to Mr Sadiq in January 2017 to advise on the merits of the Professional Negligence Claim and to draft Particulars of Claim. The instructions pointed out that RPL had issued proceedings against CLF for its unpaid invoices in the sum of £131,313. If there was to be a claim for professional negligence, it would need to be issued before a hearing before a Costs Judge listed for 22 March 2017. Mr Thornton saw the draft instructions and commented on them in detail. The instructions did not refer to the Additional Liability Claim.
157. On 18 January 2017, Mr Sachs wrote to Mr Thornton saying that although he had not been asked to advise on the merits of the claim, he did not want Mr Thornton to be under any illusion “as to the difficulties that make me consider this is not a 65% to 70% claim”. He considered the difficulties to be:
i) The claims for failure to advise on Etridge in 2012 or later in the litigation are strongly arguable as not being causative of loss, as CLF has been unable to prove its debt.
ii) RPL did advise that the case had real difficulties if the debt could not be proved.
iii) CLF instructed RPL that it did not want advice on the proposed settlement terms.
iv) Some of the correspondence regarding settlement and advice came from Jason, whom Mr Sachs had not met.
158. IM sent RPL Mr Sadiq’s draft Particulars of Claim attached to a letter before claim on 17 March 2017. It is clear from IM’s file that Mr Thornton had extensive input into the drafting of the Particulars of Claim up to and including a conference with counsel on 16 March 2017. He commented in detail on various drafts of the Particulars of Claim.
159. The Particulars of Claim do not include the Additional Liability Claim. However, the loss claimed included (paragraph 42(a)) a sum of “no less than” £1,239,168. This was said to be:
The difference between the sums owed by Mr Raby under the personal guarantee and secured by the [2012 Guarantee and Charge] had the same been properly and validly executed and enforceable and the sums obtained by the Claimant as part of the settlement of the Claim.
160. It appears from emails from Ms Dolman in mid-March 2017 that this was a figure she and Mr Thornton had reached. In an email to Mr Sachs on 15 March 2017 she said, in relation to this paragraph of the draft Particulars of Claim that “DT’s latest lost figure is £1,509,168.09 less £270,000 received under the settlement – £1,239,168.”
161. £1,509,168 appears to be what Mr Thornton was saying was the total amount of the moneys owed as at March 2017, though I have seen no breakdown of that sum and no evidence to support it. It is CLF’s case that the sum of £1,239,168 was only viable on the basis of the Additional Liability Claim, as otherwise the value of the claim was limited to the “lost” security. It is argued therefore that Mr Thornton must have instructed IM as to the Additional Liability Claim, in order for this figure to have been pleaded.
162. The Bundle contains correspondence from IM’s file, but I was not shown any of the mark-ups of the draft Particulars of Claim to which the correspondence refers. The correspondence does not indicate that Mr Thornton gave instructions that he had instructed RPL to include the Additional Liability Claim. Nor does there appear to have been any detailed discussion of the basis for the figure claimed at paragraph 42(a).
i) On 13 March 2017, Ms Dolman wrote to Mr Sadiq:
We have received Mr Thornton’s comments to the POC (V2). Whilst some of the comments are stylistic points, Mr Thornton does raise one key issue about the fact that Ms McCann did not provide a personal guarantee in relation to the invoice discounting facility (this was only provided by Mr Raby) – McCann only allowed a charge to be placed over the property. From my review of the POC in the original action, this seems to be correct.
ii) On 16 March 2017 Mr Thornton wrote:
There is also a fairly fundamental matter to consider, which should not be difficult to do at this stage given we are sending a draft, at 43(a) where I think we can make strides to stake a claim to some recovery of amounts in excess of the secured equity in the properties. There is also the matter of the costs thrown away at the aborted hearing which we have suggested some wording for.
iii) However, the basis for these remarks is not explained. There is no clear reference to instructions to Mr Phillips to include the Additional Liability Provision.
iv) Mr Thornton did not give specific evidence as to what he said about the Additional Liability Claim during his review of the various drafts of the Particulars of Claim in March 2017. No specifics of any instructions were put to either Mr Sachs or Mr Sadiq, and they were not taken to these documents. Mr Pickering’s case was put on the basis that it is to be inferred from the pleading of paragraph 42(a) that the Additional Liability Claim was raised.
163. I find that Mr Thornton wanted to claim for the whole figure of the debt plus interest (minus sums recovered). He said that CLF should be entitled to recover that. Little consideration was given to the basis for that sum. No instructions were given by Mr Thornton (or by anyone else at CLF) at this time to the effect that RPL had failed, in 2012, to act on his instructions to include the Additional Liability Provision.
164. On 24 March 2017 Mr Sadiq set out his advice on the merits of the Professional Negligence Claim in an email to Ms Dolman.
i) Under the heading “Merits of the Proposed Claim” he said:
(a) CFL [sic] has good prospects of success (60%) of succeeding in a claim for negligence both as respects the failure to properly advise on Etridge when the legal charge was created in 2012 and as respects the failure to properly advise on the merits of the possession claim.
(b) CFL has good prospects of success (60%) of recovering the monies wasted by it in pursuing the possession claim.
(c) CFL currently has poor prospects of success (less than 50%) of recovering the shortfall on the monies and interest lent to Avanex but not recovered from Messrs. Raby and McCann. Advancing this claim runs the risks of an adverse costs order (potentially on an indemnity basis). To succeed in recovering this head of loss, CLF needs to be able to prove that it lent Avanex the monies claimed.
ii) After setting out his views on RPL’s negligence he said (my emphasis added):
22. In light of the foregoing I am confident that CFL has good prospects of success in establishing negligence against both RPL and RPLS and will recover its costs of and associated with the possession claim.
23. It is trite law that a party to a claim must (unless it is admitted by the other side) prove every element of its alleged loss at the trial of its claim. In the context of this claim, this will require CFL to be able to demonstrate that the sums it lent to Avanex were in fact lent – i.e. by producing proof of payments made to Avanex either by CFL or to CFL's order.
24. From the papers before me it is clear that CFL were being asked to provide such proof by RPLS by, at the latest, the Autumn of 2015. There are repeated requests for this proof but despite numerous promises to produce these documents they never materialised. This was in a context where Ms. McCann's legal team begun to heavily hint that no such monies were ever actually lent and that the further facility was a sham designed to put Mr. Raby's assets beyond the reach of his creditors / Ms. McCann.
25. At a conference with IS in the Autumn of 2016, I also raised the need for CFL to produce this evidence. To date it has not materialised.
26. RPL and RPLS are clearly aware of this difficulty. I would fully expect them to, in effect, adopt this aspect of Ms. McCann's defence. They would be fully entitled to do so. In the absence of the documentary evidence materialising it is likely that the court will conclude that CFL did not advance the sums claimed under the further charge to Avanex and it would probably conclude that this aspect of the claim was fraudulent or dishonestly brought. Even if CFL succeeded in recovering its wasted costs if (as I currently think likely) the court concluded that the further facility was a sham, CFL would be likely to be ordered to pay RPL and RPLS's costs and probably ordered to do so on an indemnity basis too.
iii) He then considered the question of whether RPL had failed to advise CLF of the need to prove the debt. This had been raised in his instructions (and in the notification of claim) as an allegation of negligence. In the light of his fuller consideration of the documents he did not think the allegation could succeed. He said:
27. As you will see from the draft Particulars, I do not think so and have not advanced this.
28. CFL is a commercial money lender. In my view, the courts are highly unlikely to find that CFL was owed a duty to be told that which ought to have been obvious to a commercial lender – namely that it had to prove that it lent Avanex the monies claimed. I think it would stretch the credulity of the court to argue otherwise and would almost certainly damage our credibility with the court.
29. Further, as explained above, once the issue became germane in the Autumn of 2015, RPLS did in fact raise this as an issue with CFL.
165. On 6 April 2017 Mr Sadiq further advised in an email to Mr Sachs:
i) He did not advise adding a further head of loss to paragraph 42(a) – that RPL were negligent in failing to advise CLF to accept Ms McCann’s offers. From late 2015, RPL had been encouraging CLF to consider offers. Mr Thornton had remained bullish.
ii) Mr Sadiq thought CLF would struggle on causation (my emphasis added):
When Dominique and I spoke to David a few weeks ago I was under the impression that we would shortly receive evidence to support CFL’s contention that monies were paid to Avanex under the further facility. The evidence would not necessarily have been robust enough to support the recovery of the full amounts advanced under the facility but would have been sufficient to knock out any suggestion that the facility itself was a sham and so vulnerable on the basis of ex turpi causa. I had expected that we would have received this evidence by now. I would struggle to advise that any aspect of the claim has 60% prospects of success in the absence of some evidence that monies were advanced to Avanex under the further facility. This is because without such evidence the courts would be likely to conclude that the further facility was a sham ab initio and would prevent recovery from RPLS for wasted costs, etc, too.
In my view, it would be unsafe for CFL to issue proceedings until we are satisfied that it can prove that monies were advanced under the further facility. Nor should ATE insurance be advanced until we are satisfied on this point.
166. Mr Sachs sent Mr Thornton the advice of Mr Sadiq and IM on 12 April 2017. The letter repeated the main points of the advice given by Mr Sadiq. In a section headed “The Way Forward” Mr Sachs advised that if the proceedings were issued “the larger claim” might well be at risk of summary judgment. He advised that if no further documentation could be obtained, it may be sensible not to issue the claim at all.
167. Therefore, at the time of the letter before claim and draft Particulars of Claim, the clear advice to CLF, based on counsel’s advice, was that:
i) The Certification Clause would not suffice to establish the debt;
ii) The debt would need to be proved;
iii) On the evidence available, CLF would be unlikely to be able to prove the debt. The court would be likely to conclude that the further facility (i.e. the 2012 extension of the facility) was a sham.
iv) The claim would therefore be likely to fail, absent further evidence.
168. WBD, for RPL, responded to the letter before claim on 2 August 2017.
i) WBD denied that RPL had been negligent in relation to the Etridge procedure in 2012. It was also denied that any loss was caused, as properly advised Ms McCann would not have entered into the 2012 Guarantee and Charge. Alternatively, Ms McCann would not have been able to establish undue influence.
ii) WBD then said:
It is also clear that compliance with the Etridge procedure was far from the only issue that CLF faced in the Possession Claim. Correspondence between our client and Ms McCann's solicitors
(SMB) in the first half of April 2016 revealed significant further information, of which our client was previously unaware, regarding the true structure of the financial transactions between Avanex, CLF and Mr Raby. In particular, the fact that CLF (and in particular Mr Thornton) was well aware of Mr Raby's pending bankruptcy in early 2012, and that it expedited the finalisation of the loan documentation in order to gain priority over his unsecured creditors is noteworthy. Doubtless the evidence of both Mr Thornton and Mr Raby would have come under considerable scrutiny by both the Court in the Possession Claim and in any subsequent proceedings brought by Mr Raby's Trustee in Bankruptcy, and that CLF would have been anxious to avoid such a situation.
3.9 Finally, even if CLF is able to show that: (i) differently advised Ms McCann would still have executed the 2012 Charge; (ii) the Etridge procedure was actually relevant to that transaction; and (iii) it would actually have pursued the claim to trial in those circumstances given the issues around its conduct raised by SMB, we still do not consider that the claim would have succeeded at trial, for reasons quite unconnected with the allegations that CLF now seeks to make against our client.
…
As will no doubt have been apparent to you, CLF was asked on a number of occasions to produce evidence of that debt, and consistently failed to either do so or to provide a credible explanation as to why that was not possible. Our client's consistent advice throughout the retainer was that the failure to provide that evidence would seriously jeopardise CLF's prospects of success in the Possession Claim. However, in spite of this no such evidence was forthcoming.
3.11 We also note that the only witness evidence put forward in respect of the debt was that of Mr Fitzgerald, but that extremely late in the day CLF indicated that it was unwilling to call him as a witness due to health issues. We note however that this was not raised with our client at any stage during the preparation of Mr Fitzgerald's statement, and indeed was discussed for the first time only when it became apparent that he would be called to give evidence. We also note that no medical evidence was provided by CLF in order to substantiate the given reasons for his ability to attend trial. Absent documentary or witness evidence of that debt, it seems unlikely that CLF would have succeeded at trial as it well knew from the advice provided by our client.
169. Following this, IM continued to advise Mr Thornton that proof of the loan/debt was essential, and that without such proof a court was more likely than not to conclude that the loan was a sham. Ms Dolman addressed this in an email dated 22 August 2017. Indeed, in September 2017 Mr Sachs advised that absent better evidence he could not even make a request to an ATE insurer.
170. On 5 December 2017 Mr Sachs emailed Mr Sadiq to say that the matter had come back to life as RPL had not agreed to an offer of mediation and Mr Thornton had given instructions to issue the claim to avoid any limitation issues and to support CLF’s position in the costs claim. The Particulars of Claim required revision to reflect the fact that the Order for Sale Claim had settled, and a further file from RPL showed that Mr Phillips had advised CLF about Etridge on a number of occasions. That led to a refinement of the Particulars of Claim, to allege not that Mr Phillips did not advise, but that (i) he failed to take the steps he was required to implement the Etridge procedure; and (ii) then failed to advise CLF that he had failed to do so. The claim was issued on 10 January 2018.
171. WBD served a Defence on behalf of RPL on 12 March 2018.
i) RPL denied that there had been negligence in the execution of the 2012 Guarantee and Charge and denied that any negligence had caused loss. If further steps had been taken to comply with the Etridge guidance then there was no real prospect that Ms McCann would have executed the 2012 Guarantee and Charge.
ii) RPL denied that there had been negligence in the conduct of the Order for Sale Claim. It pleaded that it had given proper advice as to the Etridge arguments raised by Ms McCann, and as to the offers of settlement. It made no admission as to what CLF would have done if advised differently, nor as to whether there was a real chance of achieving a better outcome than that which was in fact achieved by the settlement of the Order for Sale Claim.
iii) The Defence referred to the fact that Ms McCann had defended the Order for Sale Claim on the basis that there had been excess credit advanced beyond the 2007 Deed and that Ms McCann put CLF to proof of the sums claimed. It further pleaded (at paragraph 73) that SMB had raised deficiencies in CLF’s disclosure. It referred to SMB’s position (as set out in its 30 March 2016 letter) that absent disclosure it would invite the Court to find that CLF had not made out its case that the alleged or any sum was owed under the Facility.
172. At the same time as the Defence, WBD served an RFI asking for the names, job titles and places of work of Nigel, Jason, James, Rodney and Sarah. It asked specifically if those names were aliases. In due course IM advised that it was likely that CLF would be ordered to answer that request.
173. In a letter dated 7 June 2018, WBD referred to the sums claimed in the Particulars of Claim (i.e. the sum of £1,239,168) as being “quite obviously unsustainable” on the basis that recovery would have been limited to the available equity in the UK property, less credit for sums received. Mr Sachs agreed with that in advice he gave to Mr Thornton on 21 June 2018.
174. IM and Mr Sadiq continued to advise that without further evidence of the loans and that money had actually been advanced, CLF was more likely to lose the case than win it (for instance, in Mr Sachs’ letter to Mr Thornton dated 11 June 2018).
175. On 18 June 2018 Mr Thornton wrote to IM saying, in his summary section:
The debt was proven in accordance with the agreement and in fact further in several stages albeit on a without prejudice basis. It was proven in accordance with advice of RPL and then RPLS.
176. This assertion by Mr Thornton was plainly wrong:
i) The phrase “in accordance with the agreement” referred to the Certification Clause. However, he knew that Mr Sadiq had already advised that certification would not be sufficient.
ii) The second point he made was a reference to an earlier passage where he had said “the voluntary testing of the cumulative balance due conducted between Jacques Smith and SMAB when they tried to make it an issue was conducted satisfactorily.” I have already found that no such testing had taken place and that SMB had not accepted the figures. Mr Thornton must have known, from SMB’s position at the adjourned trial in April 2016, that SMB disputed the evidence of the figures.
iii) RPL had advised Mr Thornton that proof of the debt was necessary. They had not advised that the debt was proven.
177. WBD’s challenge to the loss figures claimed in the Particulars of Claim prompted an email discussion between IM and Mr Thornton on 21 June 2018.
i) During the course of that, Mr Thornton said “The defective drawing of the facility letter or security by RPL may help, defective if they did not allow enough scope for recovery from a truculent joint owner of the security relied upon”.
ii) In an email on 21 June 2018 Mr Sachs told Mr Thornton that the claimed sum of £1,239,168 was unrealistic “because even if [RPL] had been negligent for not creating such a personal liability for Ms McCann, whose liability was restricted to what she had charged, on a causation basis she would not have signed such a charge or guarantee.”
iii) This suggests that some form of additional liability claim was discussed at this time. However, Mr Thornton’s allegation was a vague one. There is nothing in the file to indicate that he gave IM specific instructions that he had instructed Mr Phillips to include the Additional Liability Provision.
178. On 26 September 2018, after disclosure in the Professional Negligence Claim, Mr Sachs reiterated IM’s view that CLF was more likely to lose the Professional Negligence Claim than win. CLF would be required to prove the debt and the evidence was insufficient. Mr Sachs said he had anticipated that more information would be provided, but that had not occurred. He anticipated an application for specific disclosure regarding bank statements and communications with Jason. In reply, on 28 September 2018, Mr Thornton maintained his position that Mr Smith of RPL had thought there was no problem with proof of debt and that, essentially, there was adequate proof.
179. Over the course of the autumn of 2018, Mr Sachs pressed for further documents, but Mr Thornton’s position was that there were none. On 19 December 2018, Mr Sachs wrote to WBD stating that CLF had disclosed all relevant documents in its possession or power relating to the proceedings.
180. In cross-examination, Mr Bacon took Mr Thornton to several instances of Mr Sachs advising him that CLF needed to produce better evidence to prove its debt, and without such evidence, the claim would likely be lost. That included the claim as to failure to advise as to settlement, given the risk of success of an illegality defence, as had been advised at an early stage by Mr Sadiq. Mr Thornton’s response was that it was “mentioned from time to time”, but that he always countered it by relying on the auditing, the ledger and the certification. In other words Mr Thornton continued to rely on material that IM had already advised would be insufficient. He also said that he was given insufficient guidance as to what was needed. I have formed the distinct impression that Mr Thornton simply did not listen to advice that he did not want to hear.
181. The parties agreed to mediate, and the mediation took place on 28 February 2019. Mr Sachs gave some advice in writing to Mr Thornton ahead of that on 22 December 2018. Mr Sachs said his firm advice was that in view of the poverty of documents relating to the proof of debt CLF was likely to lose at trial. He advised that any offers at the mediation should be seriously considered. He said that some parts of the claim were more seriously damaged by the failure to obtain evidence than others. He said the strongest part of the claim may be RPL’s failure to advise CLF to accept settlement offers from Ms McCann. Repeatedly ahead of the mediation, Mr Sachs advised that the maximum recovery was the value of the equity in the two properties, which he thought to be around £700,000. He raised a query as to whether there needed to be a discount for Mr Raby’s 50%. He gave some advice as to the level of offers, and as to the level of starting offer. In the event, CLF’s opening offer was in excess of that advised by Mr Sachs. The mediation was unsuccessful. The parties continued to negotiate, but, having reviewed the offers, it is plain that they were some considerable distance apart.
182. Mr Thornton queried the advice that the recovery was limited by the amount of the equity in the two properties. He still wanted to argue that the loss was the whole value of the loan plus interest, regardless of the value of the equity. That loss depended not on any failure by RPL to take an effective charge, but on its failure to ensure protection above the equity value of the charged properties: i.e. the Additional Liability Claim. That was not in the Particulars of Claim. An amendment to introduce the claim was considered. Mr Sachs advised, on 12 March 2019, that the proposed amendment application had no merit and he was not prepared to make it. He noted that the mediator had expressed the same view about its merit.
183. There was a conference with Mr Sadiq, attended by Mr Sachs, Ms Dolman, Mr Thornton and a notetaker on 14 March 2019.
184. The Additional Liability Claim was addressed.
i) Mr Thornton did say that Mr Phillips had “left the back door open” by failing to ensure that Ms McCann was not liable for the value of equity in the property alone. He said that the documents should have given protection in the event that delay meant that the amount due grew past the value of the security.
ii) Mr Sadiq advised – quite properly – that an agreement which sought to prevent or penalise Ms McCann for raising a valid legal challenge (such as the Etridge challenge) would be unenforceable. Mr Thornton appears from the note to have accepted that. In any event, the advice was plainly right.
iii) What Mr Thornton said in that conference fell well short of an explanation that he had expressly instructed Mr Phillips to include the Additional Liability Provision (which is now his case). At page 2 he referred to this being “his reasonable commercial expectation re outcome”. At page 5 he said that if Ms McCann were to challenge the claim unsuccessfully RPL “should have made her pay under the document”. Mr Sachs said “but you didn’t ask them to”. Mr Thornton replied “I know, but I would expect that to be part of giving me properly [sic] security”. The discussion then proceeded on the basis that there was no express instruction to include such a clause, and Mr Sadiq and Mr Sachs doubted that there could be an implied obligation on RPL to include it in the documents. This is significant for two reasons. First, it is totally at odds with Mr Thornton’s case as to his instructions to Mr Phillips. Second, it is telling that Mr Thornton completely glosses over this evidential difficulty in his witness statement.
185. On the proof of debt issue:
i) Mr Thornton said that SMB had been satisfied with the documents provided on debt, and the issue was only re-ventilated close to trial. He maintained that there were documents missing from the RPL file. It is clear that Mr Sadiq and IM were dubious about this. They were right to be. Mr Thornton’s explanation did not reflect the clear document trail in the RPL file, which showed repeated reference to the need to prove the debt.
ii) Mr Sadiq advised that it beggared belief that there was no paper trail of money lent. Money laundering requirements would require that. Mr Sadiq described himself as “bemused” that he had raised the need for documents in his first conference yet now, (more than two years later) there were still no further documents. He said that if the court formed the view that CLF should be able to prove the debt the inference would be that Mr Thornton was being dishonest. He said a finding of dishonesty would affect everything, and that if documents could not be produced at trial they would be on a “hiding to nothing”.
186. Mr Sadiq’s advice was stark. The note of the conference records the following:
If can’t prove the debt at trial we lose. Secondly if we can’t prove it, the concern I have is that this trial is in QBD. It’s likely although not necessarily the case, to have a proper High Court Judge. If have proper HC Judge, required to sit in criminal court. They will have in mind issues like fraud, perjury, and failure to do what ought to have done, contempt of court etc.
You do not want to go to trial if can’t prove debt. You will go down in a ball of flames and high risk that the court will want to refer underlying proceedings elsewhere. Typically, refer them to DPP. I’m not saying that this would be probable or likely, but saying a real risk you need to be aware of.
187. Following this conference, CLF disinstructed Mr Sadiq, but not IM. Mr Jackson was instructed as alternative counsel.
188. Mr Sachs, in emails on 2 April and 8 April 2019, remained negative about the Additional Liability Claim: as to the fact of instruction, causation (whether Ms McCann would have agreed) and quantum (whether Ms McCann had assets beyond the equity in the properties). He said there was no evidence to prove that Mr Phillips was instructed to draft anything other than a classic third party charge.
189. WBD made a Part 36 Offer on behalf of RPL on 11 April 2019. It involved payment of a sum of money and (in the normal way) payment of CLF’s costs. The offer was open for acceptance until 2 May 2019. The offer related to the Professional Negligence Claim and did not entail compromise of RPL’s outstanding claim for fees.
190. In due course Mr Jackson advised in conference on 17 April 2019. The main issue addressed was the proposed Additional Liability Claim amendment.
i) It was put to Mr Thornton in cross-examination that Mr Jackson advised that the amendment would not succeed on its merits. Mr Thornton’s answer was that the key point of Mr Jackson’s advice was that the amendment application was out of time.
ii) I found that answer telling. It is true that Mr Jackson advised against the application to amend. His grounds included that the amendment was late and the amended claim would be out of time. But he also addressed the merits at some length. He had reviewed the documents from 2011/2012 and there was no documentary evidence of the instruction being given to Mr Phillips. Nor was there any reference to the issue. He said:
HJ saying that he had reviewed the initial instructions and part of the early email correspondence from the solicitors file and referred by way of example to an email from PP dated 22 December 2011. In this email there is specific reference to him drafting a personal guarantee for Raby and asking further questions in relation to this. HJ advising DT that there is no evidence of DT/CLF going back to him in response to this email asking for a personal guarantee from JM as well? This was the evidence that would be put to him and which would need to be overcome. In HJ’s view it would be a massive hurdle. In essence HJ said that was just one example that he had seen but he was just trying to demonstrate how the documents were not consistent with DT’s recollection of events.
iii) Mr Jackson said that the proposed amendment was “not a runner.”
iv) Mr Thornton, however, fastened only on the limitation issue. This is one of a number of examples of Mr Thornton focussing only on what he wants to hear and ignoring negative advice that he was given.
191. Mr Sachs set out starkly negative advice in writing on 24 April 2019, and advised that a counter-offer should be made to the offer at that time on the table from WBD.
192. Some days later, on 29 April 2019, Mr Thornton had another conference with Mr Jackson. Ms Bleasdale attended as notetaker, but Mr Sachs and Ms Dolman did not attend.
i) Mr Thornton spoke at length about the failure of RPL properly to include what is now known as the Additional Liability Provision, and IM’s failure to plead the Additional Liability Claim. Mr Jackson said that there was no evidence of the instruction to Mr Phillips for the Additional Liability Provision, and that such a clause would have been unusual. He reiterated his advice that it would be a waste of money to try to amend the claim.
ii) Mr Jackson then turned to the question of proof of debt. He advised that, in a professional negligence claim by a lender where the lender does not recover its capital, the loss is the cost of funding that capital. He advised Mr Thornton that he would need to address where the capital came from. He would have to say why it was his capital. He advised that neither the ledgers nor the vouching exercise would be sufficient. Mr Jackson then asked a series of questions about how CLF raised funding. Mr Thornton said there was a facility agreement with First Securities Group, which provided money to a paying agent in British Columbia. He said that documents could not be obtained in the Order for Sale Claim because the relationship had ended. Mr Jackson asked him the simple question whether CLF kept books. Mr Thornton said, “various service companies deal with over the years”. Mr Jackson asked a series of questions about CLF’s relationship with First Securities and CLF’s internal ledger, and made suggestions as to documents Mr Thornton should try to obtain.
193. Mr Jackson prepared an Excel spreadsheet setting out his “claim computation”. His difficulty was that he had no figures for capital advanced to Avanex or interest paid or due on such capital. He focused, therefore, on the wasted costs of the litigation. Taking those figures into account and applying a 50% merits assessment, he came to a figure of £113,185. His evidence was that it reflected his view at the time that the claim had limited value and RPL’s offer was well pitched.
194. A further conference took place on 30 April 2019 (though the note is misdated 2 May 2019).
i) It is clear from the note that Mr Jackson struggled to understand the structure of the corporations involved in CLF’s business. He thought it odd that the claim for the debt had arisen in 2012, and years later Mr Thornton still had not obtained the key documents to prove the claim. He said that from what he had seen at that time CLF was clearly going to lose at trial. There was a good offer on the table which could be withdrawn in a day or two. He also identified a risk that Mr Thornton may be personally liable for costs. He said:
The key point being that at the moment CLF were unable to prove that they had suffered any loss whatsoever. There was no ledger; no accounts; no bank statements, absolutely nothing in fact to show that any money was in fact borrowed or given to Stephen Raby Associates. As such, Counsel saying that his claim to quantify was extremely easy. The value of his claim was nil. “You have lost nothing”.
ii) Mr Sachs and Mr Jackson advised Mr Thornton firmly to accept the offer on the table, or to make a sensible counter-offer. Mr Thornton was reluctant to do so, but ultimately indicated he would accept WBD’s offer if a counter-offer was not accepted. Mr Sachs put a counter-offer to WBD on 1 May 2019. He reported back to Mr Thornton that WBD’s position was that CLF’s case was weak on proof of debt. Mr Sachs had said that if it was so weak, offers from SMB should have been accepted. That indicates that he had firmly in mind the Subsequent Etridge Breach Claim as being the stronger part of the case. WBD said that if CLF could not prove that the money was lent the claim would be a fraud. He remained of the view that WBD’s Part 36 offer should be accepted by its deadline the following day.
iii) Mr Thornton’s evidence is that Mr Jackson was of the opinion that the failure to plead the point about the drafting of the security (i.e. the Additional Liability Claim) was negligent on the part of IM. Mr Jackson denied that he said that in cross-examination. Mr Pickering moderated the proposition he put to Mr Jackson – that he may have given the impression to Mr Thornton that he thought it had been negligent. Mr Jackson also rejected that: his opinion was that Mr Sadiq had done a good job in the pleading. I reject any suggestion that Mr Jackson either said or gave the impression that there had been a negligent failure to plead the Additional Liability Claim. There is nothing in the conference minutes to indicate that he said that or gave that impression. On the contrary, it is clear that Mr Jackson thought that claim would fail on its merits. I accept Mr Jackson’s evidence on this.
195. Ms Dolman continued to press Mr Thornton for documents to prove the lending. On 2 May 2019 Mr Thornton emailed Ms Dolman attaching a pdf “CLF Invoice Discounting Ledger to Close 300912 – SRA-CLF S0068.pdf”. Mr Thornton said “Please find enclosed the ledger for the facility.” No explanation was given for the provenance of this ledger, nor as to how it came to be produced now, when CLF had long been saying that there were no further documents. A yet further ledger, running from October 2010 to 30 September 2012, was sent on 8 May 2019, again, without explanation.
196. On 9 May 2019, Mr Jackson prepared paginated versions of the four versions of the ledger that had been received, for discussion with Mr Thornton. The four versions included the two ledgers provided in May 2019, the ledger exhibited to Mr Fitzgerald’s witness statement in the Order for Sale Claim, and another one page version said to be derived from RPL’s file.
197. A further conference with Mr Jackson, Ms Dolman and Mr Thornton took place on 13 May 2019. The conference lasted nearly 2.5 hours. Mr Sachs attended for the first 30-40 minutes.
198. Mr Jackson asked a series of granular questions about the operation of CLF’s business and the documents that had been disclosed in relation to the lending. It is clear from the note of the conference that there were questions Mr Thornton did not know the answer to, and many of the answers he gave were vague and unpersuasive.
199. Mr Jackson was clearly not satisfied with the answers. He pulled no punches in his advice at the end of the conference. The note records:
From the discussion this morning it appeared to Hugh that DT was just being utterly evasive in relation to some of the questions that had been put to him. It was quite clear that he was not going to be able to provide any proper answers on cross examination. Furthermore he appeared to be unable to support what was being said by any of the documents. Put quite simply Hugh advising DT that his evidence would not be accepted. Hugh repeated again that CLF was going to lose the case. Further than that there was a very real risk that he would be held personally liable for the costs. Hugh repeated again that it looked very very “iffy” from Hugh’s point of view. His very firm and clear recommendation was that he should now accept the offer on the table.
200. Mr Jackson’s evidence was that he became increasingly concerned at the adequacy and truth of the instructions he received, particularly as to the whereabouts of documentation, the corporate makeup of CLF’s operation and the personnel involved on CLF’s side. He said those were unusual concerns to have about a lender client, which he would assume would keep scrupulous records of its funding and its lending. He doubted that the case was credible and doubted Mr Thornton’s likely performance in the witness box.
201. CLF did not accept WBD’s Part 36 offer, but a settlement was reached on 22 May 2019. The Professional Negligence Claim was dismissed on terms that:
i) RPL would pay CLF’s costs to be assessed if not agreed. Subsequently CLF accepted £90,000 in settlement of its claim for costs.
ii) RPL’s costs claim would be dismissed on terms that each side would bear its own costs. RPL would forgo their claim to recover their outstanding fees (which were said to be £151,909.30 as at 11 April 2019) and would pay back CLF the £9,000 held on account.
Discussion: the Alleged Negligence in relation to the Professional Negligence Claim
202. CLF alleges that as a result of the way in which the claim was pleaded and the advice given, it settled the claim at an undervalue. Had IM not been negligent, either the claim would have settled for a higher amount, or CLF would have succeeded at trial. In essence, IM’s advice was that although there were good grounds to say that RPL had been negligent in failing to comply with the Etridge guidelines in 2012, and in failing to advise of that in early 2016, the claim against it was likely to fail due to serious problems in proving CLF’s underlying debt. The arrangement was opaque, the documentary evidence poor, and Mr Thornton would be a poor witness. Therefore IM advised that the case should be settled for, essentially, whatever CLF could get. That was Mr Sachs’ view, informed by advice from Mr Sadiq and Mr Jackson.
203. Was Mr Sachs’ advice negligent? Was the advice of counsel glaringly wrong so that he could not rely on it? The allegations are essentially:
i) Mr Sachs and counsel misunderstood the nature of Ms McCann’s case. There was no pleaded case of fraud or illegality. There had been “hints” of such allegations, but they were not pursued. In any event, the fraud made no sense.
ii) IM should therefore have advised that the Certification Clause could and should be relied on as conclusive proof of the debt.
iii) Even without the Certification Clause, there was sufficient evidence of the debt that CLF had a better prospect of succeeding at trial.
iv) The Subsequent Etridge Breach Claim (i.e. failure to advise acceptance of the Early 2016 Offers) was a good claim, as it did not depend on the proof of the underlying debt.
v) The failure to rely on the Additional Liability Claim meant that CLF was unable to recover its full loss and therefore limited in the settlement it could achieve.
The Opacity of CLF’s business and structure
204. Before looking at the questions concerning the Certification Clause and the documents said to prove the debt, it is useful to consider the broader context of CLF’s business arrangements, as explained to IM. I note that the way in which they were explained at trial was essentially to the same effect. That context is relevant to the concerns that IM and counsel had as to the credibility of the claim.
205. CLF is said to be a lender specialising in the provision of bespoke commercial finance facilities, including invoice discounting credit facility services. As Mr Pickering put it, it operates on a “turnkey” basis with its administration largely carried out through “service and outsource companies.” While there was no evidence as to CLF’s other business activities, this case concerned CLF’s invoice discounting facility said to have been provided to Mr Raby’s business since 2003. Mr Pickering explained at some length in opening the nature of an invoice discounting business.
206. CLF’s business was inexplicably complex. IM, Mr Sadiq and Mr Jackson found the position unclear. It is no clearer now.
207. For at least part of the period when it claims to have been lending to Mr Raby’s business, CLF filed dormant company accounts.
208. Mr Thornton was a director of the company at some times and not at others. From the commencement of the Order for Sale Claim until a few days before trial he was not a director, though he was clearly giving instructions on behalf of the company.
209. Mr Thornton referred in his evidence to acting on behalf of unidentified investors. It was wholly unclear where CLF’s funding to run its business derived from, and there is no documentation to show this.
210. It is wholly unclear by whom CLF was staffed and managed. Both in correspondence with IM and in his evidence in this trial, Mr Thornton would frequently use the term “we”. It was unclear who “we” included, other than himself. He eventually accepted a suggestion from me that he used “the royal we”, meaning himself acting on behalf of the company and those who invested in it.
211. One particularly bizarre issue is as to the identity of staff within CLF. During RPL’s retainer, the documents show that much of the correspondence with RPL was sent, on CLF’s part, by “Jason”, “Sarah” and various other individuals who only used their first names. The emails were sent from an email address “[email protected]”. Jason and Sarah in particular wrote long emails to RPL and were the substantial points of contact with RPL during the Order for Sale Claim.
212. The identity of these individuals became an issue during the course of the Professional Negligence Claim. First, WBD, for RPL, served a request for further information as to who those individuals were. Second, IM advised that the names would need to be disclosed, and asked for the information. Those individuals were relevant to important issues in the case, for example proof of the lending, and causation questions as to what CLF would have done had RPL not given negligent advice. One particular issue was that Jason had told RPL, in two emails (one in late 2015 and one in early 2016) that CLF did not want RPL’s merits assessment.
213. The identity of Jason, Sarah and the others was never revealed. Neither IM nor WBD were given an explanation by Mr Thornton. It was suggested that the named individuals were just aliases of Mr Thornton.
214. In cross-examination, Mr Thornton gave no clear explanation. He said that Jason, Sarah and others were staff of the third-party service company which CLF used. I understood him to mean Fleming, the name of the service provider in Canada, about whom he gave an explanation during supplementary questions in chief. However, eventually, in the course of cross-examination, a picture emerged that the emails were in fact written by Mr Thornton for administrative staff to send out. Although Mr Thornton was unclear in his evidence as to his input as against the input of others, it became clear that he was not suggesting that any other person was more than administrative support. Mr Thornton did not know their full names or their roles. There has not been disclosure of a single communication passing between Mr Thornton and “Jason”, “Sarah” or for that matter anybody else at CLF or providing services to CLF. It was clear to me that the emails were Mr Thornton’s, not anybody else’s.
215. I do not need to decide whether Jason, Sarah and others were aliases of Mr Thornton, or purely administrative staff. The key point is that Mr Thornton did not explain this to IM, even under questioning as to who Jason and Sarah were. It would have been easy for him to do so. There was an obvious need to do so. For example, IM raised a question as to if and why Jason instructed RPL not to advise on the merits in early 2016. Mr Thornton neither provided access to Jason, nor explained that emails from Jason were written by him. This led to an understandable question mark over Mr Thornton’s credibility in the mind of Mr Sachs and counsel. It is difficult to see, even now, why Mr Thornton chose to operate in this way.
216. The operation of the invoice discounting business with Avanex has, throughout, been unclear. On any view, CLF did not simply advance money to Avanex and recoup its loan when Avanex’s customers paid their invoices.
217. An SIC – later said to be Gresham, an Isle of Man company – operated as a sales invoicing company to issue invoices to Avanex’s customers. That company was jointly owned and controlled by Mr Thornton, though he was at pains in the Order for Sale Claim to say, falsely, that Gresham was independent. There was no clear reason for doing this. In 2016 it was said to be to “ring-fence” the invoices from Avanex.
218. Given that, in theory, Gresham was sending out invoices on behalf of Avanex to Avanex’s customers, one would expect Gresham to be acting as Avanex’s agent. However, the invoice disclosed on the first day of trial described “Stephen Raby Associates Europe” as a division of Gresham. It is difficult to see what was meant by that. The Stephen Raby Associates business was carried on by Avanex, which was not a division of Gresham.
219. The loans to Avanex appear not to have been paid to Avanex, but to another company, Perrycourt, which defrayed expenses on Avanex’s behalf and was said to be a company associated with Avanex or Mr Raby.
220. It was said that payments and receipts were handled not by Gresham but by another company, Fleming, in Canada, which operated as a third party service provider. The relationship with Fleming is said to have ended in 2012. Fleming’s name appears to have come up for the first time in Mr Thornton’s 26 April 2016 affidavit as the third party service provider. Mr Pickering said in opening that Fleming was Gresham’s paying agent. That seems unlikely, given that Gresham was supposed to be Avanex’s agent for the purpose of invoicing. Indeed CLF’s case was put on the basis that Gresham was effectively controlled by Mr Raby and Avanex. It seems unlikely that a lender would outsource all services to the borrower’s agent.
221. During the course of the Professional Negligence Claim, WBD referred to an email from Mr Thornton to Mr Phillips on 2 April 2010 which showed a lack of clarity as to the arrangements between CLF, Avanex, Gresham and Perrycourt:
"[Avanex] is rather mothballed. The sharp end of the business (invoicing clients) is now carried on by one of my companies GCHL IOM (G) essentially as a caretaker. The back office functions of [Stephen Raby Associates] are now carried on by a successor to [Avanex] called Perrycourt Limited (PCL). CLF discounts invoices issued by G and advances the funds to PCL. We can leave the debt in [Avanex] but would prefer to shift it to PC as [Avanex] may not have long to live".
222. The effect of all of these arrangements, and the purpose of them, remained entirely unclear. Even at the trial of this claim, none of these arrangements were properly explained in witness statements, and there was not a single document setting out the relationship between CLF, Gresham and Fleming. IM and its counsel were entitled to take the view that CLF would have a significant credibility problem in trying to explain that these were genuine business arrangements.
Failure to rely on the Certification Clause
223. Mr Pickering put CLF’s case as follows:
i) As a matter of law, a certificate under the Certification Clause in the 2012 Guarantee and Charge is binding absent manifest error or fraud.
ii) There was no manifest error or fraud, nor was there a pleaded allegation to that effect. Therefore, the certificate should have been relied on and would have been sufficient to address the “proof of debt” point.
224. Early on in IM’s instruction Mr Sadiq advised that the Certification Clause would not be sufficient to prove the debt. Mr Sachs relied on that advice and agreed with it.
225. Mr Pickering put to Mr Sadiq and Mr Sachs that Ms McCann’s Defence and Counterclaim, in each of its iterations, did not allege fraud, and did not allege that no money had been advanced. It put CLF to proof of the sum advanced, but part of its complaint was that too much money had been advanced. It is true that neither SMB in the Order for Sale Claim, nor WBD in the Professional Negligence Claim pleaded fraud. Mr Pickering also made some fair submissions that it was not clear what the fraud was, how it worked or who was said to benefit.
226. However, that submission overlooks the serious allegations that had been made by SMB in correspondence in the Order for Sale Claim. Those were allegations which seemed unlikely to go away, given that, at the time of the adjourned trial, SMB had CLF’s inadequate disclosure firmly in their sights.
227. Mr Sadiq accepted that he was in error in his witness statement when he said that Ms McCann had pleaded that the relationship between Ms McCann, Mr Raby and CLF was tainted with fraud. However, Mr Sadiq’s assessment was based on a broader view than simply the pleaded case. He said that his recollection was that although the pleadings did not advance an allegation of fraud it seemed to him that was what was coming. Mr Gould had raised points and it was becoming clear that there was more than a hint of “jiggery-pokery” and it seemed to Mr Sadiq that it had “a very fraud-y flavour”. He was right about that. He had in mind Mr Gould’s witness statement for the security for costs application, which was around the same date as the Re-Amended Defence and Counterclaim. It is also fair to Mr Sadiq to note that although the pleading did not make an allegation of fraud, it made a series of allegations that Mr Raby and CLF (through RPL) had made a series of misrepresentations as to the state of Mr Raby’s business and the state of the lending.
228. Mr Sadiq said that he was concerned that, despite the pleading, the case was heading in the direction of an allegation of fraud. If that were to be alleged, it would get round the Certification Clause. He wanted to establish that the monies had been advanced. It is plain from his conference notes that was something he did not regard as difficult for a lender to do, and he was troubled by the absence of cogent evidence.
229. Mr Sadiq’s advice was sensible and reasonable. It was argued by Mr Pickering that Mr Sachs could not rely on Mr Sadiq’s advice because Mr Sadiq made a fundamental and obvious mistake, as Ms McCann had not pleaded that the facility was a fraud or sham. I reject that criticism of Mr Sadiq’s advice. It was neither itself negligent nor, from Mr Sachs’ point of view, glaringly wrong. I reject the argument that either Mr Sachs or Mr Sadiq misunderstood the nature of the case and therefore erred in not placing reliance on the Certification Clause.
230. Mr Sadiq was right to regard these issues as still live. It is true that Mr Gould’s more serious allegations had not been pleaded. But they were being raised in the live security for costs application, and at the time of the pleading, SMB’s specific disclosure application was live.
231. Mr Pickering suggested that Mr Sadiq was “going down a rabbit hole” or “on the wrong track” on a point about fraud that had never been pleaded. I reject that argument. Part of counsel’s task is to anticipate the way an argument may develop. Mr Sadiq’s assessment of the direction of travel was, to my mind, a realistic one. Mr Sadiq said that he did not plead the Certification Clause because it would prompt a plea of fraud by the other side. His assessment of that risk was a sensible and realistic one.
232. It would have been foolhardy to rely simply on the Certification Clause, rather than seeking to prove the debt (which ought to have been a simple exercise). Even if the Certification Clause had been relied on, once the picture emerged from disclosure that CLF could not evidence its debt, there was a real risk that fraud would be raised and would be considered by the Court.
233. If there was a trial, the court would have considered all the evidence in the case at the same time as any consideration of the Certification Clause.
i) First, because of the stage that the evidence had reached in the Order for Sale Claim. CLF had been asked in the first instance, and then ordered, to provide documents evidencing its debt. The documents it had produced had been unpersuasive. They had clearly raised further questions in the mind of SMB, who had begun to lay out some serious allegations in correspondence and in a witness statement.
ii) Second, because of the nature of the dispute in that claim. The Certification Clause was part of the deed that Ms McCann was seeking to set aside on grounds of undue influence and misrepresentation. That defence would inevitably involve a detailed consideration of the evidence.
234. It would be wholly unrealistic to suggest that the court would exclude any consideration of the evidence of the debt, or that it would compartmentalise the issues of undue influence/misrepresentation from the evidence of the debt. If the court formed the view, on the evidence, that the simple fact of the existence of the debt could not be proven its suspicions would be aroused. It would be unrealistic to suggest that the Court would regard itself as bound by the certificate in the face of the evidence. If the Court formed the view that the evidence underlying the certificate was defective and the debt could not be proved, it was unlikely to disregard those issues and simply rely on the certificate.
235. Mr Sadiq’s view was that, where a court was dealing with a woman who alleged that she had been subjected to undue influence and that misrepresentations had been made, and where the lender had failed to comply with a specific disclosure order and was struggling to prove the debt, the court would take a relatively benign view of claims of manifest error or fraud. That was a reasonable view.
236. A peculiar feature of the case is that it is far from clear that there was ever a certificate pursuant to the Certification Clause. None has been produced. None was pleaded in the Order for Sale Claim. None is pleaded in this claim.
237. Mr Pickering argued that the 30 October 2012 demand for payment amounted to a certificate. I doubt that. The document does not claim to be a certificate, and a demand for payment is a document that serves a different purpose. However, the absence of a certificate was not the basis of Mr Sadiq’s advice not to rely on the Certification Clause. I do not need to reach a concluded view on this. Mr Pickering also said that a certificate could be issued at any time. The notion that, at any time after the event, even now, CLF could simply produce a certificate which would be binding (absent manifest error or fraud) is highly unattractive. I doubt that it would have found favour with a judge trying the Order for Sale Claim, or the Professional Negligence Claim, had the judge asked, as I did, where the certificate was.
Proof of Debt/Loss
238. Mr Pickering argued that even without reliance on the Certification Clause, the evidence was such that a court would have accepted that CLF had advanced monies as pleaded. It was, he argues, negligent of IM not to have appreciated that.
239. The strands of this argument are that:
i) There was no pleading of fraud, or that no monies were advanced. Ms McCann in fact pleaded that money was advanced and settled the claim on the basis that money was due.
ii) There was evidence of the lending: the ledgers, the bank statements, the discounting reports, all of which tied up.
iii) The vouching or sampling exercise was carried out by RPL and SMB and identified no problems.
240. Regardless of the state of the pleading, RPL and WBD had raised serious allegations challenging the debt. The argument was not simply that no money had ever been advanced at all, but encompassed a number of strands: from the date of the 2012 Deed monies were not accounted for, and had been siphoned off; monies were advanced in support of a fraudulent tax evasion scheme; such monies as were lent could not be shown to have been lent by CLF, nor could CLF be shown to have suffered any loss. The absence of pleading of fraud does not by itself mean that CLF would not struggle to prove the debt.
The “Vouching” Exercise
241. I have already found that the vouching exercise did not take place. So the claim gains no support from it. During the course of the retainer, CLF gave IM no clear evidence that the exercise had happened, nor that it yielded results upon which IM could have relied as assisting in proving the debt.
The documentary evidence of debt
242. Mr Pickering alleges that the documents which CLF provided were sufficient to prove the debt. He relies on: the ledgers, the bank statements, and the discounting reports. I will address each of those classes of documents and then stand back and look at the overall documentary picture.
243. CLF relies on a document headed “SRA-CLF A/c S0068 UK£ – Rolling Forfaiting Transactions Ledger”. The file name is “CLF Invoice Discounting Ledger to Close 300912 – SRA – CLF S0068.pdf”. Mr Pickering described this as “the Master Ledger” and “the single most important ledger”. It is difficult to criticise IM for failing to attach weight to this document. It was first produced on 2 May 2019, in the run up to the Professional Negligence Claim trial, some seven years after the debt was originally claimed.
244. The Master Ledger has columns headed “Date”, “Payments”, “Receipts”, “Balance”, “Days” and “Interest”, and then three more unnamed columns. One repeats the figures in the “Balance” column, one is simply a column of zeros, and the last contains some text: some of the entries appear to be client names; some are currencies, e.g. “EUROS”; and some, particularly in 2012, appear to be expenses, e.g. “SUPPLIERS GENEVA”. The date column starts in 2003 and ends on 30 September 2012, with a balance owing of £881,261.38.
245. The other ledgers provided are the two Combined Running Account Ledgers provided during the Order for Sale Claim and, it would appear, attached to the 30 October 2012 demands. These ledgers are each three pages long and respectively cover the periods October 2010 to September 2011 and 3 October 2011 to 30 September 2012. The entries tally with those found in the Master Ledger.
246. However, I note the following differences from the Master Ledger. The column headings are different: “Date”, “Debit”, “Credit”, “Balance” and “Charge”. There are fewer columns: this document has no text-description column. The balance figures run to two decimal places, whereas the Master Ledger gives four decimal places for the same figures. All of this suggests that these documents may not simply be extracts from the same root source of data. Whatever the source, there is no way of telling from this ledger to whom or from whom any payment was made.
247. There is no evidence as to when these ledgers were produced or by whom. It remains unclear whether they are CLF’s internal documents or obtained from a third party service provider. There was no satisfactory explanation, either in the Order for Sale Claim or the Professional Negligence Claim, as to how they were compiled or maintained, or from what systems or databases they were derived.
248. Mr Bacon pointed out an oddity, which I accept, which is that there is more detail for each row in the Master Ledger provided in 2019 than there is in the earlier ledgers. No explanation was offered for the differences in fields of data in the various iterations.
249. CLF relied on the 11 pages of bank statements first produced in April 2016. Mr Pickering said, and it was not disputed, that the transactions shown match transactions in the Master Ledger.
250. Mr Pickering described these as “downloads” of statements and portrayed them as the sort of thing one would obtain if downloading a statement from an online bank account.
251. I disagree. There is something odd about them, and the oddities are unexplained. The documents do not identify the bank with which the account was held, the name of the account holder or the account number. Although some text has been redacted, the redactions are only within the line entries for transactions. It is therefore not the case that the bank and account details have been redacted; they are simply not there. The statements show debits and credits, but there is no balance column. Each page has a line for “brought forward”, but no sum is brought forward on any page. In any event, one would expect a balance to be brought forward, not a debit or credit.
252. There are redactions of some transactions said not to be relevant to the case. Mr Bacon was right in pointing out that there are two copies of these statements and the redactions are different. There was no satisfactory explanation of that – Mr Thornton suggested that the third party service provider must have provided the documents twice, doing fresh redactions each time. That seems unlikely, but as there is no evidence of any communication with the service provider to obtain these documents (once or twice) there is no way of knowing.
253. The provenance of the bank statements was inadequately explained.
i) “Sarah” when she provided them to RPL on 13 April 2016 simply said that CLF had received some copy statements from “the service provider” without any explanation. A few days later when Mr Thornton disclosed them to SMB he said that redacted copy bank statements had been obtained from the third party service provider/paying agent “after they discovered that some copies had by chance been retained.”
ii) That suggests that, as at 2016 the service provider was still in contact with CLF and willing to provide documents but that (a) it had no access to its own bank account for 2012 (otherwise fresh statements could have been obtained from the bank’s system); and (b) it had no systematic filing of statements from 2012 otherwise Mr Thornton would not have referred to them being retained “by chance”. The notion that a company operating payment services for a commercial lender would not retain either access to its own bank records or files of its work seems fanciful.
254. While it is impossible to tell exactly what was going on with these documents, any sensible lawyer would be highly suspicious of them, and fearful of how they might come across at trial.
255. CLF’s case is that the ledgers and the bank statements tie up with the monthly discounting reports. There are two flaws with that argument. First, the available reports only go up to late 2011, before the 2012 Guarantee and Charge. Second, according to SMB, a comparison between the documents showed an inexplicable increase in the debt and a large sum unaccounted for.
The evidence of proof of debt – conclusions
256. Looking at the overall picture, from the commencement of the Order for Sale Claim until the settlement of the Professional Negligence Claim, despite repeated requests and advice, the only additional documents CLF produced to evidence its debt were the Master Ledger and the bank statements. In this trial, no further documents have been produced, other than a single invoice which was disclosed on the first day of the trial.
257. What is striking is the absence of documents which one would expect to see in the normal course of business and the lack of satisfactory explanation of that absence.
i) Despite the fact that CLF is said to operate as a lender, and was described as a “mini-bank” or “quasi-bank”, there are no internal documents setting out a clear account of its operations. There was no clear explanation of its internal workings or book-keeping.
ii) As I have outlined above, Mr Thornton’s affidavits in 2016 suggested that documents were in the hands of third parties and that neither CLF nor the third parties had the need to maintain further records than had been produced. That is a wholly unrealistic position for any business to adopt, let alone one purporting to be in the business of commercial lending.
iii) Apart from one invoice produced on the first day of trial, there are no records of invoices, or of payments received, or of sums lent out.
iv) Although Mr Thornton appears to have told Mr Jackson that funds were borrowed to enable CLF to lend, there are no records of agreements with funders and no records of transactions with funders.
v) Mr Thornton says that the explanation is that operations were carried out by a third party service provider. That was only explained to be “Fleming” in Canada at the beginning of the trial. There is no credible explanation as to why Fleming could not provide documents. If it was acting as a service provider, it must have been obliged to maintain CLF’s records and to produce them on request. There is no service agreement between Fleming and CLF, no agreement between Gresham and CLF, nor with any other service provider.
vi) To the extent that documents were held within Gresham, those must have been available to Mr Thornton, as he was an owner of that company. Mr Thornton said that he had “deadlocked” the company so he was not in control. I found that explanation to be meaningless. A deadlock in a company usually refers to a situation where owners with equal shareholdings are in disagreement as to the management of the company. That was not the situation here. There was nothing to suggest that Mr Thornton no longer had control of Gresham.
vii) There is no evidence of any internal communications within CLF about any of these issues.
viii) There is no evidence of any communications between CLF and third parties – for instance Gresham, Fleming, or funders either (a) during the operation of the facility or (b) during the process of gathering evidence for the Order for Sale Claim or the Professional Negligence Claim.
258. The absence of documents, and the quality of such documents as exist, are made all the more striking by the circumstances in which the limited documents that have been produced were provided.
i) When documents were provided by CLF either to RPL or IM, they arrived simply as attachments to emails from CLF, in pdf form. There is nothing on the face of the documents themselves to explain who created them, or when. There are no documents provided showing the communications that led to them coming into CLF’s possession.
ii) Most of the documents were provided late in the day ahead of a significant moment in the litigation. The bank statements were provided less than 2 weeks before the 25 April Order for Sale Claim trial. The “Master Ledger” was provided a few weeks ahead of the Professional Negligence Claim trial, shortly ahead of a conference with Mr Jackson. The only sales invoice produced was disclosed on the first day of the trial before me. Mr Pickering told me (and I accept) that it had only just been provided to him and his solicitors by his client.
iii) Many of these documents were provided despite Mr Thornton having made earlier statements that no further documents were available. There was no satisfactory explanation as to how they were subsequently obtained.
iv) As to the sales invoice, Mr Thornton’s explanation in cross-examination was that he had been looking at some old computer files and had luckily found an invoice. That explanation was, I am afraid, absurd. SMB had started asking for invoices in the Order for Sale Claim by, at the latest, early 2016. In the knowledge that such documents were relevant, CLF has been required to carry out a disclosure exercise in the Order for Sale Claim, the Professional Negligence Claim, and this claim. None were produced. Mr Thornton swore affidavits in May 2016 explaining why CLF had no invoices. It beggars belief that he was able to put his hand to an invoice on the night before trial. No credible explanation was given as to how the document was found now and not earlier. I do not need to make a finding whether this turn of events is a result of a late fabrication, or an earlier wilful failure to disclose documents which were in his possession. What I do find is that the inexplicable nature of this disclosure is of a piece with the dubious nature of earlier disclosure. When IM and counsel formed the view that the evidence as to debt was unreliable, they were well justified in that view.
Conclusions on negligence in relation to the proof of debt
259. The question is whether it was negligent of IM, and its counsel, to regard the documentation as insufficient, and to form the view that CLF would lose at trial with a real risk of serious repercussions for Mr Thornton. I do not need to reach a conclusion on what the documents show, or whether there was a fraudulent scheme. I do not do so.
260. What I do find is that the documents shown to me at trial, and Mr Thornton’s evidence about them, were highly unpersuasive. I can well understand IM’s and counsel’s view that Mr Thornton would have been a poor witness at trial and that there was a very serious risk that CLF would fail to prove its debt, with serious repercussions. Neither IM’s assessment, nor that of Mr Sadiq or Mr Jackson, was negligent.
The Subsequent Etridge Breach Claim
261. CLF’s case (introduced by amendment in May 2026 at paragraph 38(6)(b)) is that in advising on settlement, IM failed to take into account RPL’s failure to accept the Early 2016 offers, a matter which was not reliant on CLF being able to prove its debt.
262. CLF’s argument is that had RPL advised CLF of the weakness of its case, it would have accepted the Early 2016 Offers. The claim is for loss of opportunity to accept an offer to settle the claim, which is wholly separate from the question of whether the claim would succeed.
263. Mr Pickering relies on Mr Jackson’s acceptance, in cross-examination, that this claim did not depend on proof of the underlying debt.
264. However, I do not accept Mr Jackson’s answer in evidence to be a full or accurate analysis of the position. It is not the case that the problems with the proof of debt were not relevant to this claim.
265. Mr Bacon argues, and I accept, that the burden was on CLF to show that its underlying claim in the Professional Negligence Claim was an honest claim, relying on Perry v Raleys (which I cite above). There was a real risk in the Professional Negligence Claim that CLF would fail to prove its debt, and that the court might find fraud or illegality. Were that to be the case, there was a real risk that the claim would be found not to be an honest one. That would affect all of the claim, including the Subsequent Etridge Breach Claim.
266. All of the issues in the Professional Negligence Claim would have been tried at the same time. It would be wholly unrealistic to think that CLF might fail to establish its claim was based on a genuine underlying debt but then recover for the loss of a chance to have settled an unmeritorious, even fraudulent, claim. Further, even if the Subsequent Etridge Breach Claim was viable on its own, any lawyer would be entitled to take the view that it was too dangerous to proceed to trial and risk adverse findings on the other parts of the claim.
267. I also reject the contention that IM failed to take this claim into account or failed to attach adequate weight to it. The claim was pleaded, and it was referred to in various advice letters from IM. It is clear that Mr Sachs regarded it as the stronger component of the claim. There is no basis to think that either IM or counsel lost sight of the point.
268. I did not understand it to be suggested that Mr Jackson was negligent in his assessment of the merits of the claim, the need to prove loss, or the state of the evidence.
269. Mr Pickering queried whether Mr Jackson had been properly instructed on the whole claim or had time to read the papers fully or understand the whole claim before advising. I reject that. Mr Jackson advised in four conferences over a period of almost four weeks. Trial was only weeks away. It was contemplated that he would be trial counsel and he had the trial pencilled in. It would have been apparent to him that he needed to understand the whole claim. He gave advice on the whole claim, and there is no basis to suggest he was not in a position to do so. He was an experienced barrister dealing with a claim in his specialist area. No challenge was made to Mr Jackson’s competence in general terms, nor to his diligence in preparation. There is no suggestion that he was not provided with the relevant papers – if he had not been he would no doubt have asked for them. It is suggested that he did not focus on the Subsequent Etridge Breach Claim, which did not depend upon proof of loss. There is no reason to think that he did not have that in mind in advising on settlement.
270. I accept concerns as to Mr Thornton’s credibility, and the credibility of the documentary evidence were genuinely and reasonably held by Mr Jackson based on his analysis of the evidence available to him, and his own experience of acting for lenders over many years.
271. Mr Jackson was not cross-examined on his assessment of the value of the claim. While Mr Jackson accepted that the Subsequent Etridge Breach Claim did not depend upon loss, it was not suggested to him that he failed to have regard to that claim in advising on the settlement.
272. Further, IM and counsel had considerable ground to doubt that even if proper advice had been given, that would have resulted in a better settlement. That was a point Mr Sadiq had raised in his advice. Whilst it is true that CLF did eventually settle the claim, in early 2016 CLF were bullish about the case. From IM’s perspective they did not have the evidence of one of the main persons involved – Jason – as to what he would have done if differently advised. Mr Thornton was (as he still is) reluctant to hear and take on board negative advice. Further, it is far from clear that there was a realistic chance Ms McCann would have concluded a deal on the basis of the Early 2016 Offers. It would have taken some time to reach a signed agreement following the WP discussions of the possible deals. At around the same time, SMB was becoming increasingly alert to flaws in the case – as to the control of Gresham, and as to the genuineness of the debt for example. It is difficult to see a deal being concluded once SMB’s allegation of fraud had developed over the period that negotiations were taking place.
273. Neither counsel, nor IM, were negligent in failing to take into account the Subsequent Etridge Breach Claim. The opinion that failures in the evidence of debt would affect this claim was a reasonable one. The opinion that this claim would not lead to a better settlement or result at trial was a reasonable one. Further, IM was entitled to rely on counsel’s advice which was neither negligent nor glaringly wrong and not based on incomplete instructions.
The Additional Liability Claim
274. Did Mr Thornton instruct IM to advance this allegation of negligence? In my judgment he did not. I was taken to no documents setting out the instruction, nor to any document in which Mr Thornton complained that his instructions had not been followed, prior to early 2019. That is despite the fact that IM’s file shows that Mr Thornton gave detailed comments on the various drafts of the Particulars of Claim and responded in lengthy emails to correspondence. He also was shown drafts of instructions to counsel.
275. Mr Pickering put the argument on the basis that CLF must have raised it with IM because that is the only explanation for the £1.2 million figure pleaded in the Particulars of Claim. With respect to him, that is a slender foundation upon which to build the claim. As I have outlined above, the figure appears to have emerged from discussions between Ms Dolman and Mr Thornton. It does not appear to have been subject to detailed analysis.
276. The Additional Liability Provision was not pleaded because IM did not instruct Mr Sadiq as to the facts that would give rise to such a claim. IM did not do so because Mr Thornton did not give instructions to IM about this. Therefore, IM was not negligent in failing to bring a claim about which it was not instructed.
277. When the issue arose in 2019, IM advised, in reliance on the advice of both Mr Sadiq and Mr Jackson, that an application to amend would fail on grounds which included the fact that the claim had no merit. That was sensible and reasonable advice to give.
i) There was no evidence to show that Mr Thornton had instructed Mr Phillips to include the Additional Liability Provision. There was nothing in the 2012 documents to show the instruction.
ii) In the 14 March 2019 conference Mr Thornton accepted that he had not told Mr Phillips to include such a provision. He said he would have expected Mr Phillips to ensure there was proper protection. Mr Sadiq and Mr Sachs quite reasonably thought that it would not be an implied obligation on the part of RPL to suggest such a provision.
iii) The proposed clause was an unusual one (as Mr Jackson later said) and not one that appeared in the 2007 Deed.
278. I find that there is no factual basis for this claim in any event. I find that Mr Thornton did not give Mr Phillips the instruction to include the Additional Liability Provision.
i) Mr Thornton’s case that he did so depends entirely on his evidence of an alleged oral conversation in 2012. Given my reservations about the reliability of Mr Thornton’s evidence, I do not accept that the conversation took place without other evidence to support it. There is none.
ii) Mr Thornton would have been well able to spot that the clause he wanted was not in the draft documents before they were executed.
iii) The Additional Liability Claim was not raised with RPL during the Order for Sale Claim.
iv) It was not raised during the Professional Negligence Claim until 2019. When it was raised, Mr Thornton accepted that he had not given an express instruction, but that it was something he would have expected Mr Phillips to include.
v) For reasons I explain below the clause is an unusual one and even now, in the pleadings in this claim, it is put in inconsistent ways.
279. Even if Mr Phillips had been given the instruction, there is no realistic prospect that Ms McCann would have agreed to a term that made her personally liable for Avanex’s debts above the level of security she was giving.
280. I note further that the term as pleaded in this claim is both inconsistent and unusual. It is difficult to see how the term, even if pleaded, could have resulted in any loss to CLF.
i) Paragraph 10(4) of the Amended Particulars of Claim pleads that CLF was only willing to extend the facility if:
given that Ms McCann (unlike Mr Raby) was not providing a personal guarantee for the business debts, a feature of the security package would be that she would nonetheless become personally liable for any losses caused or shortfall in the value of the security suffered in the event that she obstructed or delayed the timely realisation of any such security following any default; accordingly in the event that Ms McCann delayed or obstructed the realisation of security rendering it insufficient to deal with the amount demanded plus interest, she would become personally liable for that shortfall including any costs (as opposed to just limiting her exposure to her interest in the security) – something which (so the Claimant believes) Ms McCann would have been willing to do.
ii) That is consistent with Mr Thornton’s witness statement, where he says that he instructed Mr Phillips that:
If Ms McCann impeded or delayed recovery or realising the security there would be provision for her to be personally liable for any additional interest or costs if the equity in the properties was thereby not sufficient.
iii) However, paragraphs 11(1) and 29(2) of the Amended Particulars of Claim both plead that Ms McCann would be liable in the event of either of them obstructing or delaying timely realisation of security.
iv) I see no realistic prospect that Ms McCann would have agreed to this provision in relation to her own delay, let alone that of Mr Raby, over whose actions she had no control.
v) If the clause were to provide effective protection for CLF, there would need to be circumstances in which Ms McCann (and/or Mr Raby) “delayed or obstructed” realisation of the security. As Mr Sadiq correctly advised in conference, such a clause could not prevent Ms McCann raising a valid objection to the enforceability of the security. If Ms McCann lawfully raised a challenge to the security (e.g. by way of her undue influence claim), then (i) given that the clause forms part of the challenged deed, it would be void and (ii) the clause would not be enforced if it sought to stop her from bringing such a challenge. If, on the other hand, Ms McCann did not have a lawful challenge to the security then there is no reason to think that she would have taken steps to delay enforcement of the security. There is no reason to believe she would have “obstructed or delayed” in the sense captured by this clause.
281. In any event, even if the Additional Liability Claim had been pleaded, it would have been only one of a number of elements in the mix when CLF and its legal advisers considered settlement of the Professional Negligence Claim. IM and both counsel thought the Additional Liability Claim was without merit. Given the difficulties that IM and counsel perceived with the credibility of Mr Thornton’s evidence, even if the claim had been pleaded, little, if any, value could have been attached to it in settlement discussions. Such a view was, and is, perfectly reasonable.
282. Further, such a claim was contingent on the other claims succeeding. If CLF’s claim against Ms McCann was a bad one because CLF could not prove its debt, then it was a bad claim in respect of both the secured sum and the additional liability.
Overall conclusion on the settlement of the Professional Negligence Claim
283. Taking all of these factors into account, Mr Sachs was not negligent either in the pleading of the Professional Negligence Claim, or in his advice as to the settlement of that claim. He was entitled to rely on counsel, who were properly instructed and gave advice that was not glaringly wrong. Far from it, both Mr Sadiq and Mr Jackson gave advice that was reasonable and sensible. I reject any suggestion that there was any negligence in their advice.
284. I also reject the argument that there was any realistic prospect of achieving a better settlement from RPL, or of achieving a better result at trial. CLF was caused no loss as a result of the advice it was given.
Settlement of the Order for Sale Claim
285. The sole allegation of negligence in relation to the settlement of the Order for Sale Claim is that IM failed to include a provision for interest on the settlement sum.
286. There was no such provision in the agreement. There is no indication that either CLF or IM suggested such a thing. I do not accept that IM was negligent in failing to propose such a term.
i) In hindsight, given the delay in completion of the terms of the agreement, such a term would have been a benefit to CLF.
ii) However, there was no reason to think that Ms McCann or Mr Raby would have agreed to such a term. There was no reason for IM to think that Ms McCann or Mr Raby would have agreed to it.
iii) A deal was struck for a sum to be paid; part of the deal involved transfer of properties. There is no reason to think that the parties did not each price in the risk of delay in completion of transfer and delay in payment of the settlement sum.
iv) IM was not in a position to drive a harder bargain: at the time the settlement terms were agreed, there was an imminent security for costs application, and trial was only a few weeks ahead. The view of counsel and IM (rightly) was that CLF was likely to lose both the application and the trial.
v) Mr Thornton was aware of the terms of the settlement, and had the opportunity to consider them. Indeed, the terms were agreed in principle in October but the settlement agreement was not signed until 19 May 2017. CLF had ample time to consider the settlement.
vi) A provision for interest would be part of the commercial terms of the deal. CLF and Mr Thornton were sophisticated commercial operators whose business was lending. CLF would not have been in need of legal advice to think of the protection of an interest provision. CLF was as able as IM, if not more able, to propose such a term. It did not.
287. The claim is, in any event, incoherent. Looking at the alleged term as pleaded (i.e. the term it is said IM should have included) there is no basis to say that if that had been included, Ms McCann or Mr Raby would have breached it, or any entitlement to interest would have been triggered.
i) Amended Particulars of Claim paragraph 27(3)(b) alleges that IM failed to ensure the inclusion of an interest provision in the event of Mr Raby or Ms McCann “not paying the above settlement sum in accordance with the settlement agreement”. Paragraph 41 pleads that if IM had not been negligent the settlement would have included such a term, using the same wording as I have just quoted from paragraph 27(3)(b). Paragraph 41 then pleads that Mr Raby and Ms McCann “did not pay the above settlement sum in accordance with the terms of the Raby/McCann settlement agreement”.
ii) It is clear from these three references that the alleged clause would have given rise to an entitlement to interest if Mr Raby and Ms McCann did not pay the settlement in accordance with the terms of the agreement. However, there is no basis to say that they failed to pay the settlement sums in accordance with the terms of the agreement. The agreement contains no payment date. The schedule to the agreement sets out a list of steps to be taken to transfer interests in Lammas Lodge and the Turkish Property. Those steps took some time, and then the settlement sum was paid. Time passed, but there is nothing to say that was as a result of a breach by Mr Raby or Ms McCann.
iii) I raised this point with Mr Pickering in closing. He did not suggest Mr Raby or Ms McCann were in breach of the settlement agreement. Instead, he argued that the pleading was meant to convey that interest was payable from the date the agreement was signed. He also said that the agreement should have had a payment date specified.
iv) These are different allegations. A clause which triggers interest from the date a party defaults is very different from a clause that triggers interest from the date an agreement is signed. A failure to include a specified payment date is not a pleaded allegation. Such a case would have been consistent with Mr Thornton’s evidence that the deal was “marketed” as a cash-on-the-nail deal. However:
a) That is not the pleaded case.
b) I have rejected Mr Thornton’s evidence that he was told that the deal was cash on the nail.
c) The settlement involved a series of steps to be taken for Ms McCann to have the interests in Lammas Lodge and the Turkish Property transferred to her. Those steps were largely out of her hands. There is no realistic prospect that she would have agreed either to pay the settlement sum up front before those steps were done, or that she would have agreed to pay interest from the date of the settlement agreement.
v) I was given no claimed sum for interest on behalf of CLF. Nor was I given any case as to the rate of interest that IM should have included in the alleged term. I asked Mr Pickering about this in closing. He said that a rate of 2-4% would be normal. There is no pleading as to the appropriate rate of interest, and simply no evidence to support the plea.
288. I find that IM was not negligent in failing to propose inclusion of an interest provision. Even if it had been, CLF suffered no loss. Given the circumstances of the settlement, there is no realistic chance that Ms McCann would have agreed to such a term, and CLF would have entered into the settlement anyway, even if Ms McCann had refused to agree the term. If CLF had refused to agree the settlement, it would have lost at trial, and its position would have been significantly worse than it was under the settlement.
LOSS
289. Although I have found that IM was not negligent, I will briefly address the losses claimed by CLF. The Amended Particulars of Claim, amended as recently as 14 May 2026, roughly two months before trial, claims losses under the following headings. For the reasons I set out below, the losses claimed are poorly thought through and, in large part, lacking in evidence.
The IM Professional Negligence Retainer
290. The losses advanced in the Amended Particulars of Claim are significantly higher than CLF could have recovered if the claim had succeeded.
291. Paragraph 42 of the Amended Particulars of Claim alleges that, if properly advised, CLF would have settled the Professional Negligence Claim for a substantially higher sum than the sum payable under the settlement or would have proceeded to trial to recover a substantially higher sum. It accepts that the claim is to be assessed on a loss-of-a-chance basis. It claims that the difference between the sum received under the settlement and the sum that would otherwise have been recovered is no less than £1,464,860.87. That is the base figure before a loss-of-a-chance discount. Mr Pickering argued that any loss-of-a-chance discount should be small.
292. There is no calculation for this figure in the pleading and no evidence was led to support it. The sum demanded in the Order for Sale Claim was a much lower figure of £881,261.38. It was said that interest and charges after 2012 made up the difference; but I was shown no document evidencing that. I was not shown a single document that either evidences or explains the figures claimed after 2012.
293. It would appear that the sum is the total amount of indebtedness that Avanex and Mr Raby are claimed to have owed. It is impossible to see how that sum could ever have been recovered.
i) Ms McCann never offered a personal guarantee of the whole debt – she only gave security over her interests in Lammas Lodge and the Turkish Property;
ii) Mr Raby gave a personal guarantee, but was made bankrupt, so there was no realistic prospect of recovering more than his interest in the charged properties.
iii) There is no live allegation that the settlement of the Order for Sale Claim (including Mr Raby’s personal liability) was at an undervalue.
iv) It may be said that the figure takes into account the sums which would have been recoverable had the Additional Liability Claim been included in the Professional Negligence Claim. I have found that it was not negligent to omit that claim and that there is no realistic prospect that Ms McCann would have agreed to such a clause. Even if the clause had been included in the 2012 Guarantee and Charge, it would not have made Ms McCann personally liable for the whole debt. She would only have been liable for any shortfall in recovery caused by her delay or obstruction. To recover losses for breach of that clause, CLF would need to prove Ms McCann’s relevant delay or obstruction, and the losses that flowed from that. The Amended Particulars of Claim include no pleading of that loss.
294. In his closing submissions, Mr Pickering acknowledged that (a) the agreed valuation of Lammas Lodge was £1,575,000 at the relevant time, and that the first charge on the property was £1 million, leaving £575,000 equity. Taking into account the Turkish Property, he put the base loss (before evaluation of loss of a chance) arising out of having ineffective security at £725,000. That is significantly less than the sum claimed in the Amended Particulars of Claim at paragraph 42. Even Mr Pickering’s figure takes no account of the sums recovered in the settlement of the Order for Sale Claim, nor the value of the settlement of the Professional Negligence Claim.
295. The alternative formulation of the claim is that, if properly advised, CLF would have accepted the Early 2016 Offers. The loss is pleaded on the basis of the difference between the sum actually received in settlement of the Order for Sale Claim and the value of those offers, which are claimed to have been worth in the region of £700,000 to £800,000.
296. Mr Pickering accepted in his closing submissions that, although at the time it was thought that the offers were worth that much, on the basis of the actual property valuations, the offers were worth “up to £575,000”. Instead, under the Order for Sale settlement CLF received only £250,000. He argued the base loss was therefore £325,000, before applying a loss of a chance discount. In fact, under the settlement of the Order for Sale Claim, the sum payable to CLF was £270,000, not £250,000. So, the base figure would be up to £305,000. So, the claim is based upon the loss of a chance, in the Order for Sale Claim to have accepted an offer which would have been worth £305,000 more than the actual settlement of that claim. CLF’s claim in these proceedings is for the loss of a chance to have used that loss of a chance claim to obtain either a better settlement of the Professional Negligence Claim or a better result at trial. So there is a double loss of a chance assessment.
297. In any event, I have found that it is doubtful that a better settlement could have been achieved in the Order for Sale Claim and that there is no realistic prospect that the claim would have settled for a higher amount or resulted in a better result at trial than the settlement that was achieved.
Loss of Use of Money
298. Paragraph 43 of the Amended Particulars of Claim pleads that, but for IM’s negligence, CLF would have had use of “that money” which it would have loaned out with an average rate of return of 12.68%. It went on to say “Further particulars of its loss will be provided in due course.” It is not entirely clear which sums are being referred to by “that money”. I assume it to be the sums that are claimed in the earlier sections. No particulars have been provided.
299. I was shown no evidence to demonstrate that CLF would have lent out money, nor the rate of return it would have earned on it. Mr Thornton’s witness statement dealt with this head of loss in the vaguest of terms at paragraphs 112-113. He says that if CLF had recovered the amounts owing it would have been able to lend them out “on its average margins”. There is no evidence as to what those margins are, and no evidence as to its lending history. Paragraph 113 refers to unspecified projects over an unspecified period of time introduced by a “Mr Gold” that CLF could not take on. There has been no disclosure of evidence in relation to this. I was given no reason why CLF could not provide such evidence. As Mr Bacon correctly submitted, CLF resisted giving disclosure of other loans it has made. There was no evidence that CLF lent out the money it recovered in the Order for Sale Claim. It is doubtful that CLF would have lent out any settlement sum it might have received from a better settlement of the Professional Negligence Claim, as Mr Thornton told Mr Recorder Eaton at the hearing on 26 April 2016 that he intended to wrap up the company after the claim was concluded.
300. The claim is without any evidential basis.
Other wasted expenditure
301. Paragraph 44 claims that CLF is entitled to the return of the fees paid to IM. The sum claimed is £240,759.
302. This would appear to be double recovery if CLF recovers losses on the basis that IM should have achieved a better settlement. Had it done so, it would have incurred fees and CLF would have had to pay them. On the other hand, if CLF suffered no loss, it is difficult to see why it should be entitled to recover its fees. IM did the work, and I was told that there was no in time challenge for its bills to be assessed on a solicitor/own client basis. IM achieved a settlement of the Order for Sale Claim, which is now alleged to have been negligent only in a minor respect. It is not claimed that if IM had given non-negligent advice the Professional Negligence Claim would never have been brought. It cannot be said that the fees were wasted.
303. Further, I accept Mr Bacon’s submission that this claim is inflated by failing to have regard to the fact that £90,000 of IM’s costs were paid by RPL, as part of the settlement of the Professional Negligence Claim. Mr Thornton accepted that credit would need to be given for that sum. I was given no explanation for why this obvious sum was not taken into account in the first place.
The Order for Sale Claim
304. The only live claim is for loss of interest on the settlement sum from the date of settlement. I have dismissed that claim on the grounds that there was no negligence. The loss under this head of negligence is pleaded at paragraph 41 of the Amended Particulars of Claim. Paragraph 41 does not set out a rate of interest, nor a period over which it would have been recovered. It concludes “Further particulars of such loss will be provided in due course.” No such particulars were provided. By the end of trial, I was given no figure claimed for this head of loss, nor was I shown any evidence to support a particular figure.
Conclusion
305. IM’s advice was not negligent. Both counsel were properly instructed and gave advice which was not negligent and not glaringly wrong. IM was entitled to rely on it.
306. IM and counsel formed realistic and non-negligent opinions that, given the serious evidential weaknesses, the Professional Negligence Claim was very likely to fail. The settlement of the Professional Negligence Claim was a reasonable one in all the circumstances. Had CLF rejected the advice on settlement (a) there is no realistic prospect that RPL would have agreed to a higher settlement; (b) even if CLF would have proceeded to trial, there is no realistic prospect of a better outcome being achieved. In all likelihood, the outcome would have been far worse for CLF.
307. The only remaining challenge to the settlement of the Order for Sale Claim (i.e. the omission of an interest clause) is without merit. IM was not negligent in failing to try to include such a clause, and there is no realistic prospect that Ms McCann or Mr Raby would have agreed to it.
308. The claim is dismissed.
Official sources: view the source page
Open Justice Licence (The National Archives).