Miscellaneous United Kingdom
High Court (Business List), 30 October 2026, n° [2026] EWHC 2781 (BP)
Neutral Citation Number: [2026] EWHC 2781 (BP)
Case No: BL-2023-000606
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
BUSINESS AND PROPERTY DIVISION
BUSINESS LIST
Royal Courts of Justice, Rolls Building
Fetter Lane, London, EC4A 1NL
Date: 30/10/2026
Before :
MASTER KAYE SITTING AS A DEPUTY HIGH COURT JUDGE
– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –
Between :
| CLEVELAND POTASH LIMITED | Applicant | |
| – AND – | ||
| SECRETARY OF STATE FOR BUSINESS, ENERGY AND INDUSTRIAL STRATEGY -AND- (1) THE HONOURABLE MRS FERELITH DRUMMOND (2) CLASSIC LODGES LIMITED (3) MRS JEAN MORALEE |
Referee Respondents |
– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –
– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –
Emyr Jones (instructed by Herbert Smith Freehills Kramer LLP) for the Applicant
Ciaran Keller KC and Gretta Schumacher (instructed by Knights plc) for the First Respondent
Paul Tucker KC and John Hunter (instructed by Excello Law) for the Second Respondent
No representation or submissions by the Third Respondent
Written Submissions:
30 June 2026, 10 July 2026, 13 July 2026, 1 October 2026 and 5 October 2026
– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –
Approved Judgment
This judgment was handed down remotely at 10.30am on 30 October 2026 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives.
………………………..
MASTER KAYE SITTING AS A DEPUTY HIGH COURT JUDGE
Master Kaye sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge :
1. This is my determination of matters consequential upon my judgment handed down on 22 May 2026 ([2026] EWHC 1182 (Ch) (“the Judgment”)). I will use the definitions in the Judgment where appropriate.
2. Following Judgment, the parties sought to reach agreement on all outstanding issues including consequential matters. They were unable to do so. Whilst CPL considered a consequentials hearing would be necessary, the parties were unable to provide dates that would enable such a hearing to be listed in any reasonable time period. I agreed that I would determine the consequential matters on paper so far as possible.
3. I received written submissions from Mr Jones (and Herbert Smith Freehills Kramer LLP) on behalf of CPL. Whilst Rs were jointly represented by Mr Kimblin KC at trial, each of R1 and R2 have now instructed separate counsel teams for consequential matters. Mr Keller KC and Ms Schumacher (and Knights plc) provided written submissions on behalf of R1 whilst Mr Tucker KC and Mr Hunter (and Excello Law) adopted R1’s submissions and supplemented them with their own written submissions on behalf of R2. R3 has not participated. I have read those submissions with care and have taken them and the authorities they refer to into account when determining the consequential matters even if I do not set them out in detail. I have also been referred to supplemental documents relevant to the various costs issues to be determined including offers and Part 36 offers which I have also taken into account. I raised a question with the parties in correspondence and have taken into account the responses.
The Issues to be determined:
4. The consequential matters can be summarised as:
i) Costs: including (a) the incidence of costs; (b) whether to make a percentage or issues based costs order; (c) when any costs order should run from or to; (d) conduct issues including the effect and consequences of any offers or Part 36 offers; (e) the amount of any interim payment on account; and (f) interest on costs;
ii) Miscellaneous/The Form of Order; and
iii) Permission to Appeal
Conclusions:
5. For the reasons set out in this judgment I have determined that:
i) CPL are entitled to an order that the Rs pay their costs of the proceedings on the standard basis, subject to detailed assessment if not agreed. This includes the costs reserved by the order dated 20 June 2023 but excludes any costs which are already the subject of another specific order for costs within the proceedings.
ii) CPL’s costs order should not be limited or extended by reference to a particular time period, nor should an issues or percentage-based costs order be made.
iii) CPL are not entitled to the enhanced benefits of Part 36 in respect of the Part 36 Offer dated 28 March 2024.
iv) If I am wrong about that then the enhanced interest rate should be 4% above base rate.
v) Interest runs on the costs to which CPL are entitled on the usual basis and is not to be deferred.
vi) CPL are entitled to an interim payment on account in the sum of £550,000.
vii) I have not determined the extraction royalty for salt and potash. I do not consider that it is consistent with the overriding objective or good case management to convene a further hearing to determine that narrow issue alone.
viii) Permission to Appeal is refused.
ix) The parties should finalise the terms of the order based on the terms of this judgment. The order should include a provision for the parties to apply for further directions in respect of the determination of the outstanding lease terms.
Costs:
Some general principles:
6. The court has a very broad discretion in relation to costs issues which includes whether to exercise its discretion to make an order for costs at all. If it decides to make a costs order at all it needs to determine who it considers is the successful or more successful party. CPR 44.2(2)(a) provides as a general rule that the unsuccessful party will be ordered to pay the successful party’s costs. However, the court may make a different order. When considering if there is any reason to disapply the general rule and make a different order the court considers all the circumstances (CPR 44.2 (1), (2) and (4)). Once the court has determined (or the parties have agreed) who is the successful or more successful party proper weight has to be attached to that determination and the general rule when considering whether to make a different order.
7. When considering whether to make a different order the court exercises its discretion consistent with the overriding objective including what it considers to be the overall justice of the case and good case management having regard to all the circumstances. The court’s approach is to stand back and take a common sense, broad-brush and pragmatic approach and determine where the overall balance lies as between the parties. The court looks at the substance and reality of who is overall the successful party and whether the circumstances relied on by the unsuccessful party affect the balance between the parties such that a different order should be made.
8. The factors which the court considers include consideration of the parties’ conduct which can include pre-action conduct, offers made by any party, and the reasonableness of a party pursuing a particular allegation or issue (CPR 44.2(4) and (5)).
9. Although the court may take into account the extent of a particular party’s success (or lack of success) on a specific or discrete issue or claim when determining the appropriate costs order and consider an issue or percentage-based costs order or a temporally limited order (CPR 44.2 (6) and CPR 44.2 (7)) it will be cautious of such an approach save in the clearest case given the often-overlapping nature of claims/issues. It will always have in mind that the approach is a pragmatic and common sense one and the need to give appropriate weight to the determination of who is the more successful party.
10. There are numerous authorities which consider how the court should approach the issue of who is the successful party and whether and how to determine if it is appropriate to depart from the general rule. The parties referred me to the White Book commentary at 44.2.6 to 44.2.10 (which itself refers to a number of well-known authorities) and more specifically to authorities including Budgen v Andrew Gardner Partnership [2002] EWCA Civ 1125 at [35], and Fox v Foundation Piling Limited [2011] EWCA Civ 790 Jackson LJ at [62].
11. The number of authorities and the fact sensitive nature of costs decisions about who is the successful party and/or whether a different order should be made only emphasises why the court, in exercising its broad discretion, considers the circumstances relevant to the particular claim to determine the outcome it considers most consistent with that broad discretion and most consistent with the overriding objective, justice and fairness.
12. It is not the role of the judge to analyse at a granular level every issue or argument that was pursued and determine who is successful on each. It is not a points-based system.The cases in which one party will have been wholly successful on every argument or issue are vanishingly small. As the authorities emphasise there is no single automatic “right” answer and the court should exercise a degree of caution where it is departing from the usual rule or seeking to separate out particular issues for different treatment.
13. Further, it is generally a matter for a costs judge on detailed assessment to determine the precise line between recoverable costs and irrecoverable costs inter partes. That is particularly so when considering the extent to which costs claimed as pre-action costs are recoverable. A costs judge armed with a detailed bill of costs and the underlying documents can, if necessary, make a granular assessment on an item-by-item basis to determine what costs are recoverable inter partes – though even on a detailed assessment that level of granularity is rarely appropriate. It is, however, entirely conventional as a matter of general principle for pre-action costs to be recoverable on a detailed assessment (see for example Re Gibson’s Settlement [1981] Ch 179 and the White Book commentary). There is no need for any special wording in a costs order to provide for that. There is a separate question of whether the court should in particular circumstances limit or circumscribe the period during which costs are recoverable. CPR 44 provides the court with the power to do so both for periods before and after a claim has commenced.
14. This claim was commenced by way of a referral from the Secretary of State. However, even if some costs during that period were arguably non-contentious when originally incurred, once the claim was issued they are then treated as contentious in so far as they related to the claim as issued. That emphasises that the approach to determining when and if pre-action costs including pre-action negotiations are recoverable costs is a granular exercise to be conducted by the costs judge. The judge determining the consequentials issues after a trial should be slow to interfere with that process save in a clear case.
15. Whilst therefore cost orders can include temporal limits such as fixed start and end dates, a general costs order does not need to include a temporal limit for a party to be entitled to recover pre-action costs. But that does not detract from the more general principles to be applied by a costs judge when undertaking a detailed assessment. The precise nature of a costs item and whether it is recoverable inter partes is primarily an exercise for a costs judge.
Some dates relevant to the Costs submissions:
16. The dates and events set out below are key dates relevant to the core costs submissions:
• 6 March 2020: CPL offer to R1 dated 28 February 2020, rejected on 6 March 2020 (“the 2020 Offer”)
• 22 December 2020: First Referral to the Secretary of State
• 24 May 2021: First Referral rejected by the Secretary of State
• 7 June 2022: Second Referral to the Secretary of State
• 8 February 2023: Referral to court by Secretary of State
• 21 April 2023: Claim Form Issued
• 20 June 2023: Order Master Brightwell: First Directions hearing. The Applicant identifies the likely Preliminary Issue. Master Brightwell gives directions that Rs (and others) be given notice and an opportunity to participate in the claim – costs reserved (“the Directions Order”)
• 17 October 2023: Order Master Brightwell: Ordered a Preliminary issue in relation to the Reservation and directed that the costs be in the Preliminary Issue (“Order for a Preliminary Issue”)
• 28 March 2024: CPL issue a Part 36 Offer to Rs on which they rely for costs purposes (“the Part 36 Offer”)
• 18 April 2024: Last date for acceptance of the Part 36 Offer
• 28 May 2024: Preliminary Issue Judgment ([2024] EWHC 1292 (ChD))
• 2 July 2024 (sealed 4 July 2024): Preliminary Issue Order which provided that:
(1) [CPL] shall pay [Rs’] costs of the preliminary issue, namely [Rs’] costs incurred between 17th October 2023 and 2nd July 2024, such costs to be subject to detailed assessment if not agreed.
(2) [Rs] shall pay [CPL’s] costs of [Rs’] application dated 15 March 2024 including those of the hearing of 15th April 2024, such costs to be subject to detailed assessment if not agreed. (“the Relief from Sanctions application”)
The parties overall positions on costs:
17. CPL seek a costs order in their favour to take effect from 6 March 2020 on the basis that they say that if the Rs had accepted the 2020 Offer the proceedings would not have been necessary. Further they submit that the Part 36 Offer was effective and that they have achieved a more advantageous outcome and are entitled to the benefits of Part 36 from 19 April 2024 including indemnity costs, the maximum additional sum together with interest at the maximum permitted rate of 10% over base.
18. Rs accept that CPL have been the more successful party. However, they argue that CPL should not be entitled to the usual costs order. Rs rely on what they say is the cumulative effect of the issues/circumstances they identify to justify a percentage based/partial costs order with temporal limits.
19. R1 submits that there should be no order for costs up to 18 April 2024 and thereafter CPL should only be entitled to 80% of their costs to reflect their lack of success on the Bocardo issue. In the event that I am against them on no order for costs then any costs order should be temporally limited so that the starting point for costs should be the Second Referral.
20. R2 agrees with R1 on the substance of the orders she seeks but argues that there should be no order for costs up to 3 July 2024 further, that thereafter, in addition to an 80% order, R2 should be entitled to recover 20% of their costs for that same period.
21. Rs do not accept that the Part 36 Offer was effective and/or that CPL should have the benefit of it. If it is effective R1 seeks to limit the interest to 2% over base.
22. There was no obvious logic to the choice of either 18 April 2024 or 3 July 2024 for the period up to which there should be no order for costs. That tends to undermine the submissions made. 18 April 2024 is the final date for acceptance of the Part 36 Offer whilst 3 July 2024 is the day after the Preliminary Issue Order was made. Neither date had any connection with the issues or circumstances advanced to justify no order for costs and that was particularly acute in relation to 3 July 2024 since the Preliminary Issue Order made provision for the costs of the Preliminary Issue.
23. The separation by Rs into two periods that did not quite overlap and had no obvious logic was unhelpful. That was then further emphasised by the reliance by Rs on the Bocardo issue and the Preliminary Issue/Reservation issue which not only overlapped with each other but were relevant in both periods particularly on R1’s date range.
24. The parties’ submissions provided a good example of why the court’s approach to costs is to stand back and take a common sense and pragmatic approach when determining who is the more successful party and whether to depart from the usual order and if so whether to go as far as making an issues, temporal or percentage-based order. The parties submissions only emphasised the entanglement of the issues and timelines across an extended period which militated against the orders sought by Rs.
General:
25. The key issues/circumstances relied on by Rs in support of a departure from the usual order can be broken down into broad themes: (i) the Preliminary Issue and/or the Reservation; (ii) general conduct issues including offers/negotiations and the start date; and (iii) the Bocardo issue.
26. It appeared to me that Rs’ submissions had taken a misstep particularly in respect of the period up to April 2024/July 2024. There was a conflation between the entitlement to a costs order and what costs might be included in a bill of costs and/or recovered inter partes as a consequence of such a costs order which would for the most part be a matter for detailed assessment.
27. Rs also appeared to seek to reverse the starting point particularly in relation to the first period to April/July 2024. The overall submissions were that although CPL were the more successful party, the issues were too complicated and entangled for the court to tease out the costs that might in principle be recoverable from those that they say are not recoverable. No attempt had been made to allocate any percentages to any of the issues relied on or to identify with any clarity how those issues could be disentangled from the claim as a whole. It was an all or nothing submission that the cumulative effect of all the issues, factors, circumstances that Rs identified justified a departure from the usual order to deprive CPL of its costs entirely up to April/July 2024. This might be said to be both the beginning and the end of the argument. The way in which it was advanced failed to give any weight at all to the fact that CPL were overall the more successful party (which Rs accepted) and/or give any weight to the issues on which even on Rs’ case, given the terms of the Judgment, they had to accept that CPL had been successful. The onus is on Rs to identify with clarity the issues which supported the different order they sought and how they could be separated out from the other issues. Further, the approach is not, as I have said, a points-based system; the submissions needed to identify something beyond simply being unsuccessful on a particular issue, such as the Bocardo issue. There must be something more.
28. Whilst Rs’ submissions are that in relation to the period to April/July 2024 it is impossible to disentangle which costs might be recoverable, and hence there should be no order for costs, their approach to the later period is at odds with that. In the later period they do not consider there is any difficulty in disentangling the issues such that a percentage-based order focussed on the lack of success on the Bocardo issue is appropriate even though many of the entanglement issues remain.
Preliminary Issue:
29. Rs rely on the Preliminary issue to support their submission that there should be no order for costs up to April/July 2024. For costs purposes the Preliminary Issue covers two periods pivoting around 17 October 2023 when the Order for a Preliminary Issue was made.
30. CPL were ordered to pay Rs’ costs of the Preliminary Issue between 17 October 2023, and 2 July 2024 save for the Relief from Sanctions application which was specifically carved out in the Preliminary Issue Order.
31. The claim as issued included a claim for a declaration that R1 did not own the rights she claimed by the Reservation. On 17 October 2023, the Reservation issue was carved out of the claim and became the Preliminary Issue. CPL were unsuccessful on the Preliminary Issue resulting in a costs order in favour of R1.
32. R1 submits that the costs relating to the Reservation issue should not be recoverable by CPL whether related specifically to the Preliminary Issue or related to/attributable to the Reservation issue prior to 17 October 2023.
33. Relatedly R1 argues that the costs reserved by the Directions Order should not be recoverable by CPL either because CPL were unsuccessful on the Preliminary Issue.
34. The Preliminary Issue Order did not address the costs of the Referral or the proceedings more generally. It was quite properly limited to the costs of the Preliminary Issue using a specified start date, or temporal limit, being the date on which the Order for a Preliminary Issue was made on 17 October 2023.
35. The Preliminary Issue Order precludes CPL from seeking to recover any costs it has incurred in relation to the Preliminary Issue during the period specified by the Preliminary Issue Order. It is an order which has both temporal limits and issues-based effect. It does not preclude CPL from seeking to recover its costs relating to the proceedings generally during that same period. The liability for those costs falls to be determined as part of this determination.
36. Whether there are any costs referable to the claim, whether generically or specifically, rather than the Preliminary Issue is not a matter to be determined when determining the principle or incidence of costs. If I make a costs order in favour of CPL which also covers that period, it will be open to the Rs to challenge the recovery of those costs on detailed assessment if they consider they are properly attributable to the Preliminary Issue rather than the claim.
37. The fact of the Preliminary Issue and the Preliminary Issue Order does not have any bearing on the appropriate costs order in the proceedings for the period 17 October 2023 to 2 July 2024 but only the amount that might be recoverable inter partes. It therefore provides no support for Rs proposed no order for costs.
38. Costs that might be said to be referable to the Reservation issue prior to 17 October 2023 seem to me to fall to be treated as costs of the claim generically for the following interrelated reasons.
39. Rs argued that as a consequence of CPL’s lack of success on the Preliminary Issue any costs incurred in relation to the Reservation issue prior to 17 October 2023 should be taken into account as a conduct issue/circumstances justifying or supporting no order for costs.
40. The Reservation issue and whether Rs would allow CPL to acquire their rights were inextricably linked to the overall negotiations about the terms on which CPL would acquire those disputed rights (freehold or leasehold) and/or the terms on which Rs would sell any freehold or grant any lease in respect of their rights more generally which in turn raised the proprietary and valuation issues determined by the Judgment. Until 17 October 2023 the Reservation issue simply formed one of the many issues in dispute between the parties. The Reservation and the approach to the Reservation prior to the Preliminary Issue was simply part of the overall factual matrix, negotiations and dispute between the parties.
41. The negotiations including those relating to the Reservation form the background to the 2020 Offer, the Part 36 Offer, and the other offers and negotiations relied on by the parties in relation to costs, as well as the First and Second Referral, and the claim.
42. I am not persuaded that the costs referable to the Reservation prior to 17 October 2023 can or should somehow be excluded from the costs of the proceedings in principle, they formed part of the whole until 17 October 2023. I agree with Rs that it would in any event be impossible to disentangle them from the costs generally. Any attempt to do so would be entirely arbitrary.
43. The significance of the Reservation issue in relation to costs may have had more force if the Reservation was the issue and immediately following the determination of the Preliminary Issue the parties were able to finalise their agreement on all other issues. But it was simply one of many issues all of which had to be or will have to be determined. Rs’ approach – simply advancing a cumulative nil for the entire period up to April/July 2024 did not give any weight at all to CPL’s overall success.
44. But perhaps more simply the Preliminary Issue Order did not award the costs of the Preliminary Issue to Rs on an open-ended basis but deliberately bookended the costs order as covering a specified period. Until 17 October 2023 there was no Preliminary Issue. Prior to that date the Reservation issue had existed since at least the late 1960s and had never been determined. It was only from 17 October 2023 that the costs relating to what had then become the Preliminary Issue ceased to be part of the generic issues to be determined by the proceedings and the generic costs of the issues in dispute.
45. There was obvious sense therefore in the Preliminary Issue Order limiting the costs of the Preliminary Issue to those from the date of the Order for the Preliminary Issue, when the Reservation issue was carved out of the proceedings as a Preliminary Issue, until its determination.
46. Mr Jones had properly raised the possibility of a preliminary issue at the first directions hearing on 20 June 2023. This did not immediately result in an Order for a Preliminary Issue; rather, Master Brightwell made the Directions Order to enable him to consider whether to order a preliminary issue on notice to Rs.
47. It is not for me to vary the Preliminary Issue Order. Absent some broader order it seems to me that the costs referable to the Reservation issue prior to 17 October 2023 were simply part of the costs of the proceedings. It was not until 17 October 2023 that the nascent or inchoate Preliminary Issue came into being. Whilst there may be a grey area around the 17 October 2023 itself, when the Preliminary Issue was formulated that appears to me to be resolved at least in part by the Order for the Preliminary Issue which reserved the costs relating to that order.
48. If Rs had wanted to argue that any costs relating to the Reservation issue should be incorporated into the costs of the Preliminary Issue and/or that CPL were to be precluded from recovering any costs relating to the Reservation issue prior to 17 October 2023 it appears to me that that was a costs issue for the Preliminary Issue and should have been raised with the learned judge before the Preliminary Issue Order was made. However, that would only have raised the difficulty Rs themselves rely on now, of the impossibility of untangling the issues prior to the Order for the Preliminary Issue.
49. It seems to me therefore that the Preliminary Issue itself is of no assistance at all in supporting no order for costs in the period 17 October 2023 to April/July 2024 as it has its own separate costs order. So far as the period prior to 17 October 2023 is concerned, in the way the parties advanced their positions, the Reservation was inextricably linked with all the other issues that were in dispute. It does not support no order for costs but rather emphasises the caution with which the court should approach a submission that there should be a percentage or issues-based order save in the clearest case.
The Directions Order:
50. The costs reserved by the Directions Order should be treated as costs in the case. The Directions Order gave directions intended to bring the parties before Master Brightwell to enable him to determine if there should be a Preliminary Issue. It was a first directions hearing and a quintessential case management decision. Given the nature of the proceedings, it would always have been necessary. In those circumstances the usual order would have been costs in the case and I see no reason to depart from it in this case despite the costs having been reserved. If the Master had not directed a preliminary issue on 17 October 2023, he would then have given directions for a trial of all the issues. The Directions Order is to be distinguished from the Order for a Preliminary Issue which reserved costs to the Preliminary Issue. That makes costs sense since that order directed a Preliminary Issue. The Directions Order is an unexceptional case management order and the costs related to it do not provide any support for the costs order Rs seek.
Costs prior to issue of the Claim:
51. Many of the submissions made by Rs overlap. The Reservation/Preliminary Issue did a lot of the heavy lifting and those submissions which I have addressed come back into account in this more general category.
52. Other overlapping issues focussed on the period prior to the issue of the claim and including the First and Second Referral were said to provide further support for no order for costs up to April/July 2024.
The First Referral and the Second Referral:
53. CPL’s First Referral dated 22 December 2020 was rejected by the Secretary of State on 24 May 2021. Rs submit that the rejection of the First Referral is significant in costs terms and supportive of the order they seek.
54. Whilst the Secretary of State was satisfied that a prima facie case had been made out under s.3 (1) of the 1966 Act – that the rights sought were expedient in the national interest – he was not satisfied that CPL had made out a prima facie case that it would not be reasonably practicable to obtain the rights they sought in relation to Rs’ interests by private arrangement pursuant to s.3 (2) 1966 Act. The Secretary of State noted what he considered to be a lack of evidence to support some of the matters relied on by CPL. CPL advanced the First Referral on the basis they would ideally like to be granted a freehold rather than a leasehold albeit acknowledging that they were unlikely to secure that under the 1966 Act.
55. Rs advised the Secretary of State that there were ongoing negotiations. CPL were not given an opportunity to respond. The First Referral was rejected in part on the basis that the negotiations were not yet at an end. There is a dispute between the parties about the rejection of the First Referral. CPL needed to be able to demonstrate to the Secretary of State that it had sought to negotiate the terms it was actually seeking in its referral. Rs seek to characterise the subsequent Second Referral as CPL abandoning its claims to a freehold interest.
56. However, the issues raised by the First Referral were substantially the same as those raised in the Second Referral; the more nuanced position about the freehold does not change the real substance of the disputes between the parties. The real difference for the Second Referral was that CPL were better able to evidence that the negotiations had run their course and the parties had reached an impasse.
57. The First Referral like the Second Referral and the claim when issued raised overlapping issues including the Reservation issue, CPL’s desire to acquire the freehold if possible, failing which a lease, the proprietorship and valuation issues, the Bocardo issue/key value issues and the other lease terms.
58. Rs argue that on any basis CPL should not be entitled to recover its costs of the rejected First Referral and that this supports their overall submission that there should be no order for costs prior to April/July 2024.
59. The position in relation to the costs of the First Referral is more nuanced when looked at in costs terms. The First Referral is not the basis for the claim so to that extent there is something in the point raised by Rs. However, the work undertaken to advance the First Referral was not for the most part wasted or thrown away by any party. The basis of the rejection was primarily that the parties had not yet exhausted their opportunities to reach a negotiated solution. When they were then unable to do so the Second Referral utilised and updated the evidence relied on in relation to the First Referral.
60. The Second Referral was made on 7 June 2022 and was accepted by the Secretary of State who referred the matter to the court. It therefore forms the basis for the claim.
61. Whilst Rs resist any costs order at all up to April/July 2024, they do not do so on the basis that the costs of the Second Referral would not fall within the costs of the proceedings. Instead, Rs submit that if CPL are entitled to any costs in the period up to April/July 2024, the date of the Second Referral is the correct starting point. This reversed the costs position and highlighted the problem with Rs approach. If CPL are, in principle, entitled to recover the costs of the Second Referral why should there be no order for costs prior to April/July 2024?
62. If CPL are entitled to a costs order, then Rs should have to pay once for the work undertaken and properly recoverable. If the court were to fix a date such as the date of the Second Referral as the start date for costs that would not capture or reflect the costs that may have been properly incurred and be recoverable by CPL in relation to the Second Referral.
63. I do not consider that in costs terms there is likely to be a clear bright line which demarcates the work which related to the First Referral from the work which related to the Second Referral. In so far as there are discrete costs referrable only to the First Referral then it seems to me that there may be a credible argument on a costs assessment for arguing that they are not costs of the Second Referral or the claim. However, in so far as the evidence filed in support of the First Referral was repurposed and used in the Second Referral, it became part of the Second Referral. The line/demarcation in relation to pre-action costs is at best grey and here, even more indistinct because of the double referral. Whether an item of costs is recoverable is for determination by a costs judge with the benefit of the detailed bill of costs and the documents. This does not support no order for costs for the period prior to the First Referral. It is a question for the costs assessment in due course.
Conduct:
64. The parties rely on conduct to support the orders they were seeking. Those conduct issues again overlapped with the Preliminary Issue, the Reservation issue, and the Bocardo issue and encompass both the offers made, the responses to the offers and the proprietary issues. I was not persuaded that the conduct issues supported no order for costs prior to April/July 2024 but nor was I persuaded that they supported CPL’s submissions that there should be an earlier fixed start date for the recovery of costs in March 2020.
Offers:
65. CPL relies on its offers to Rs between 2020 to 2025. These offers set out the terms on which CPL asked Rs to grant leases to enable CPL to continue to work the Polyhalite. Tied up in those offers and negotiations was the ongoing issue as to the nature of those rights (the Reservation issue and the proprietary issues) and the related disagreements about the valuation issues (the Bocardo issue, key value and valuation methodology). CPL provided a schedule setting out five of its offers including the Part 36 Offer. The 2020 Offer pre-dates the First Referral by about 10 months.
66. Mr Jones submits that the 2020 Offer provided for an award with the same financial consequences as the Judgment. He therefore submits that CPL should be entitled to its costs from 6 March 2020 because had Rs accepted the 2020 offer the Referrals and this claim would not have been necessary.
67. The 2020 Offer made by Mrs Iwanicki was said to be a final offer and if not accepted CPL would make a referral under the 1966 Act in relation to the valuation issues and the proprietary interests. Mr Troman’s rejection of the 2020 Offer included proposals for mediation and/or expert determination.
68. Rs say that the 2020 offer cannot be relied on for costs purposes and cannot be mapped against the eventual outcome because (i) it is made on a different basis to the basis on which the claim was advanced, (at that stage CPL were still hoping to acquire a freehold interest); (ii) CPL continued to engage in negotiations long after the 2020 Offer including making offers of wayleaves; and (iii) that the engagement was a two-way process. Rs continued to engage constructively including proposing both mediation and/or expert determination.
69. CPL argues that the offers are still admissible offers even if they seek a freehold interest because they were all predicated on the basis that Rs would be compensated in relation to all their rights. CPL argues that the financial consequences of the 2020 Offer and all the offers relied on were matched or beaten by the outcome achieved following the Judgment.
70. Although the parties engaged in discussions and negotiations over an extended period of time, they had diametrically opposed views on key issues including the valuation methodology. The offers have to be viewed as a whole. Cherry picking a particular term or provision in an offer on which a party has been more successful does not of itself provide a basis for a different costs order. The offers have to be considered in the round with the court taking a broad brush and common-sense approach. Each of the offers relied on in this case was multi-faceted. CPL made a variety of offers some of which included offers of Certain Rent which were in excess of the figure determined by the Judgment but to the extent that CPL relied on the offers to support a costs order in their favour it went no further than evidence that the parties had actively engaged in extended pre-action negotiations in attempts to resolve the dispute before the costs of the First Referral, Second Referral and the claim. Rs accepted that CPL was the more successful party; the question was whether any offers made by CPL could justify pushing back the date from which they could recover their costs to the 2020 Offer.
71. Here the issues between the parties were more fundamental than just the financial consequences of the proposed Certain Rent.
72. The evidence demonstrates that the parties’ negotiations ranged across a number of different potential solutions. The financial elements of those proposals were just a part of those negotiations and offers. The parties have still not yet reached agreement on all the lease terms.
73. The court should be encouraging parties to engage in attempts to resolve the dispute at an early stage and not penalising them. Both CPL and Rs consider that the other was being unreasonable on the issues of the Reservation and valuation. Both CPL and Rs had options if they considered the negotiations had reached an impasse. I do not consider that the 2020 Offer and the fact that it was not accepted justifies an order for costs in favour of CPL from March 2020. I do not consider that in light of the issues between the parties that it was unreasonable of Rs not to accept the offer made when at that stage the Reservation issues remained at large and there were ongoing discussions about the acquisition of the freehold. But equally I do not consider that those ongoing discussions support the contention that CPL’s conduct in seeking to reach a negotiated settlement supports no order for costs up to April/July 2024.
74. Instead, it demonstrates active, albeit unsuccessful engagement by both parties in attempts to reach resolutions but where fundamental points of difference made it difficult. It is costs neutral.
Negotiations:
75. The parties have been in negotiations over an extended period of time. Even the Judgment is not the end. The parties have not yet agreed all the terms of the lease to be granted to CPL. The Amended Details of Claim include at [13] and in [4] of the Prayer that CPL sought a lease for a period of 50 years on the terms set out at [144] of Mr Barrett’s First witness statement dated 22 December 2020 (“Barrett 1”) or on such terms and conditions as the court deemed fit. Barrett 1 provides:
144.
(1) A term of 50 years
(2) Break clauses operable by the Applicant only at every fifth anniversary on 12 months prior notice, or at any time without prior notice in the event of the closure of the Boulby Mine, the exhaustion of minerals, their abstraction ceasing to be economically or commercially viable, or if prevented by some other cause outside of the control of the Company from mining
(3) Areas of leases to be as shown in Exhibits "GNB 7" and also if Mrs Drummond's claim under the imperfect reservation succeeds the areas B, C, Q and V as shown on Exhibit "GNB 2"
(4) Certain Rental £29.20 per acre per annum or to be assessed by the Court
(5) Certain Rent reviews to be every three years in accordance with RPI
(6) Demise
a) Areas A, 0, 5 and 67 – all existing tunnels voids and shafts within the lease areas or corridors as shown on Exhibit GNB 7 and coloured light green -155.34 acres (Area A) brown 106.59 acres ( Area O), light blue 216.06 acres (Area 5) and dark blue 21.11 acres (Area 67)
b) Leases 0, 5 and 67 only – all strata seams and beds of sodium salts the "Demised Minerals") within the Property in the corridor shown coloured brown as shown on Exhibit "GNB 7" extending to approximately 106.59 acres (Area 0) shown coloured light blue extending to approximately 216.06 acres (Area 5) – and shown coloured dark blue (Area 67) extending to approximately 21.11 acres (required in order to dig a new salt tunnel as shown on Exhibit "GNB 7")
c) (if Mrs Drummond’s claim under the imperfect reservation succeeds) – all existing tunnels voids and shafts within the lease areas A,B,C,O, Q and V shown on Exhibit "GNB 2"
(7) Royalty – payable only where Royalties exceed Certain Rents -Demised Minerals – 2% of "Net Mine Realisation" as apportioned for the area of the Demised Minerals being mined.
…
8) Rights
Areas 0, 5 and 67 only
(a) full right and power for the Buyer to win work and carry away the Demised Minerals by underground operations only –
(b) full right and power to carry out by underground operations only anything reasonably necessary or convenient for the full exploitation of the Demised Minerals
All Areas
(c) full right and power to use the tunnels voids and shafts already created or to be created within the Property including but without limitation the right to access and export any Foreign Minerals which the Applicant has the right to extract and including and not limited to the rights to use all tunnels voids and shafts dug through these areas for ancillary rights – vis ingress and egress of men, mining equipment and mining materials, control of flooding and circulation of air, installation of all necessary electrical and communications equipment, pipes, wires, cables and conveyors
(d) full rights to use the tunnels voids and shafts voids within the Property whether existing or created in the future for infilling backfilling structural support, storage or disposal or such other purposes as the Applicant shall reasonably require
9) Restrictions
(a) …
10) Alienation – not to sublet or part with possession etc – standard assignment terms re Group Company otherwise only with written consent of Landlord not to be unreasonably refused coupled with AGA covenant
76. On 1 October 2024 Rs pleaded in response:
21. The Applicant seeks leases for a period of 50 years on the terms set out at paragraph 144 of [Barrett 1]. The Respondents and each of them are content to grant such leases but on reasonable terms and for a period of 26 years, which is the duration of the current planning permission.
77. It appears therefore that despite the submissions made by Rs about the negotiations and their significance for costs purposes that as at 1 October 2024 the terms of the leases to be granted were far from agreed.
78. The heads of terms set out at [144] of Barrett 1 were the terms advanced by CPL both in the Referrals, the claim and in the Part 36 Offer. Mr Barrett’s supplemental witness statement of 7 June 2022 (“Barrett 2”) confirms that following further negotiations between the parties from July 2021 various terms of the leases had been largely agreed. Rs agree that by June/July 2022 there were revised heads of terms which were broadly agreed save for the financial aspects but say that the terms agreed differed from those set out in [144] of Barrett 1.
79. At the trial, the parties sought a determination of only certain valuation and proprietary issues. Subject to that the parties intended to continue their negotiations to seek to agree the balance of any lease terms. As is clear from the terms of the draft order the parties have not yet agreed the outstanding lease terms.
80. R1 argues that a factor to be taken into account is that the negotiations about the prospective lease terms were to some extent successful. That would/should have narrowed the issues between the parties, but it does not assist in determining the appropriate costs order.
81. Insofar as some of the terms were agreed, the parties will then not have had to incur further costs in asking the court to determine those terms and the costs benefit of negotiating those terms is achieved by that means. But the terms of the draft order make it clear that no complete final binding terms have yet been agreed.
82. The fact that the parties had engaged constructively in seeking to negotiate the terms of the leases and agreed some terms and not others but did not reach a final resolution and did not agree the key terms on which they required a judicial determination does not militate in favour of no order for costs. It goes no further than the general submissions about the offers and how the court should take them into account.
83. R1 does not identify the extent to which she says terms were agreed nor when, nor is there any explanation about how one could separate out the negotiations (and associated costs) relating to a particular term of the lease that was agreed over the course of 2020 to 2025 from the broader negotiations about the lease terms, the freehold, the Reservation/Preliminary Issue, the proprietary issues, the valuation issues, the Bocardo issue/key value issue and the issues which remain outstanding. Nor has she explained how in the absence of final binding terms this would assist in any event. A term (provisionally) agreed on some basis between 2020 and 2024 may not reflect the terms of the final leases in due course. R1 has not explained what she says was negotiated and agreed prior to 2022 or prior to April 2024 but equally neither has CPL.
84. All the court can do is determine the dispute before it. In this case the Judgment only deals with the proprietary and valuation issues. This makes the submissions about the importance of the multifaceted offers and whether either party has been more successful or some benefit should attach to the offers they have made more difficult to assess. The Judgment addresses important valuation and proprietorship issues but that is all.
85. From a pragmatic and common-sense perspective on the basis of the evidence available and submissions made about how the offers and negotiations should be assessed those offers and negotiations are costs neutral. They do not justify depriving CPL of a costs order. There will be an entirely separate costs issue that will arise in the future if the parties need to seek further judicial intervention in relation to the terms on which the leases should be granted.
Bocardo:
86. Whilst Rs relied on the Bocardo issue as a further factor in support of no order for costs prior to April/July 2024 the focus of their submissions was on the impact they say it had on the trial and trial preparation. Rs submit that the Bocardo issue in the later period including the trial and trial preparation supports a percentage-based costs order. Whilst CPL were successful Rs submit that the court should only award CPL 80% of their costs after April/July 2024 to reflect the lack of success on the Bocardo issue. R2 argue that in addition, the lack of success on the Bocardo issue supports an order that CPL pay 20% of R2’s costs from 3 July 2024.
87. This again highlighted the lack of logic to Rs’ pivot dates for the costs orders. The expiry of the Part 36 Offer did not appear to me to have any logical connection with the costs associated with the Bocardo issue. Arguably July 2024 is no better since the Bocardo issue had always been part of the claim.
88. The Bocardo issue was not carved out for separate determination as another preliminary issue, but this is not surprising since the issue and the submissions made in relation to it substantially overlapped with and were interrelated to the key value/Pointe Gourde issue, and the arguments about the parties’ rights over the tunnels and the shafts. It was just one of the valuation issues to be determined. CPL were successful on all the other valuation issues and all of the proprietary issues. And that is really the answer to the Bocardo issue.
89. The Bocardo issue was a legal issue which turned on an analysis of Bocardo itself, the 1966 Act and the 1934 Act. It had no impact on the expert evidence. None of the documents, evidence or valuation issues were therefore affected by it. Although it was addressed at length in Barrett 1 in support of the Referrals none of the documents prepared for the claim other than the statements of case and counsels’ written submissions engaged with it.
90. However, whilst on one view it was a discrete narrow legal question, it was not, in fact, a specific and discrete issue at all. Both Ms Ellis and Mr Kimblin advanced legal submissions about the Bocardo issue in opening and closing. Their submissions, both written and oral, overlapped with and were integrated with their submissions on key value/Pointe Gourde, the tunnels and the shafts. This entanglement or intertwining of issues militates against any attempt to separate out the Bocardo issue for separate treatment in relation to the period from April/July 2024 and explains why it does not support no order for costs prior to April/July 2024.
91. Rs submit that (i) CPL pleaded the issue and were unsuccessful; (ii) it took up a substantial part of CPL’s oral and written submissions; (iii) Mr Barrett had described it as the real dispute and it was also described as a fundamental disagreement; (iv) CPL lost on the issue; (v) the fact that it did not affect the outcome supports Rs submission that there should be some reduction in the costs. R2 argues that if I had come to a different decision about the Pointe Gourde principle that it would have made a difference. But the submissions advanced by the parties on the Bocardo and Pointe Gourde issues coupled with the issues around the tunnels and the shafts were quite obviously interconnected.
92. Rs’ submissions that there was some clear rational basis on which I could separate out the costs of the Bocardo issue into a percentage-based costs order did not appear to me to accord with the reality. Even with the benefit of a transcript, it is not at all obvious how one would even begin to try to separate the submissions or to make an assessment of what proportion of the time was taken up by the Bocardo issue alone so as to be able to assess or determine whether it was reasonable, fair, appropriate to carve it out on a percentage basis.
93. Mr Kimblin addressed the Bocardo issue and the key value/Pointe Gourde issues together in 5 paragraphs in his skeleton. It took up more of CPL’s written submissions which Rs had to consider but Mr Kimblin’s reply submissions devoted 6 pages to the Bocardo issue and the related issues of key value/Pointe Gourde together. Mr Kimblin’s written submissions on Bocardo were succinct and his oral submissions admirably concise and focussed. Ms Ellis spent more time on it in her skeleton and submissions. Their submissions intertwined the Bocardo, Pointe Gourde and key value, shaft and tunnel submissions. This is not to detract from those submissions but helps to put into context the interconnected nature of the issues.
94. Overall, however, Bocardo took up a modest part of the trial with the focus being on the expert valuation evidence. To put this in context the Bocardo issue takes up only 22 paragraphs of the Judgment which runs to 376 paragraphs. The vast majority of the judgment is taken up dealing with the valuation issues arising from the expert evidence which were not affected by this issue at all.
95. Mr Kimblin explained in his skeleton that Rs had decided not to deploy any resources on the proprietary issues so it is hardly surprising that Rs may feel that they have proportionately expended more resources on the Bocardo issue. However, for CPL the proprietary issues were significant. They were entitled to expend time and resource on those issues which were not conceded until closing. That has to be taken into account when looking at where the balance lies in relation to the costs.
96. Rs’ reliance on Mr Barrett’s “evidence” for the Referrals which described the Bocardo issue as “the real dispute” does not advance Rs’ position. I have to stand back and consider whether the Bocardo issue justifies making a different order in relation to costs from either April or July 2024.
97. In the end Rs’ submissions demonstrated that different parties apply different weight or importance to different issues legal or factual when they are preparing a claim or defence. There is no one way to prepare the issues in dispute for a trial.
98. For the period prior to the issue of the claim the Bocardo issue was one of a multitude of issues which the parties were seeking to resolve which formed part of the whole. When the claim was issued it was one of the issues on which CPL specifically sought a determination. The arbitrary proposed reduction of 20% appears to bear little relationship to the overall scale of the issues to be determined and the relative weight of each issue in terms of time and cost nor the overlapping nature of the submissions. R2’s additional submission that not only should CPL be deprived of 20% of its costs but that R2 should recover 20% of its costs seemed to me to part company with reality.
Conclusion on costs:
99. I have considered the submissions with care and reflected on the relative merits of the parties’ positions. I accept that this dispute has been long, drawn out, and by reason of the procedural mechanism under the 1966 Act slightly unusual. The parties’ positions have developed over time and many of the issues are overlapping.
100. But none of that detracts from the need for me take a common sense and pragmatic approach to the exercise of my broad discretion as to costs. I am satisfied that CPL are overall the more successful party, as Rs accept. CPL are in principle entitled to an order that Rs pay their costs on the standard basis. Considerable weight attaches to that determination when looking at whether there are factors that justify departing from the usual order.
101. I am not persuaded that individually or cumulatively the issues raised by Rs are sufficient to displace the usual order whether before or after April/July 2024 and are insufficient to tip the balance in their favour.
102. For the reasons set out above it would be practically impossible to disentangle the issues for the period prior to April/July 2024. Rs rely on the entanglement or overlapping nature of the issues prior to April/July 2024 to seek to justify no order for costs. That is the wrong way round and is instead a powerful factor to support not departing from the usual order rather than making no order for costs. Many of the issues they rely on do not in fact support no order for costs in any event for the reasons set out above.
103. CPL succeeded at trial on all the issues to be determined other than the Bocardo issue. The Preliminary Issue on which CPL were unsuccessful has its own costs order. I am not persuaded that there should be an issues or percentage-based order from either April or July 2024 related to the Bocardo issue. There is nothing in Rs’ submissions that persuades me that the lack of success on the Bocardo issue is sufficient to change the balance between the parties or displace the starting point.
104. I do not consider that limiting the costs order on an issues, percentage or time basis meets the fair balance between the parties or reflects CPL’s overall success. As I have already noted in a complex multiple issue case the successful party will rarely have been successful on every issue but that does not mean that as a matter of course the court should be undertaking a granular analysis of each issue. The broad brush, common sense and pragmatic approach in this case is that CPL were plainly and clearly overall the more successful party and the complex intertwined nature of the issues over an extended period of time supports a costs order in their favour including after April/July 2024 rather than no order for costs or an issues or percentage-based order.
105. It follows that R2 is not entitled to a costs order of 20% in its favour for the period after July 2024.
106. That of course does not mean that all of the costs that CPL are claiming will fall within the scope of what is recoverable. I have identified in this judgment that there may well be pre-issue costs including in particular pre-Second Referral costs that do not form part of the recoverable costs. That does not provide any basis for a different costs order but is a matter for detailed assessment. It may affect the quantum of the interim payment but not the appropriate order for costs.
107. CPL are entitled to an order that Rs pay CPLs costs on a standard basis subject to detailed assessment if not agreed and this includes the Directions Order costs.
Part 36 Offer:
108. Part 36 is a self-contained prescriptive code which applies where an offer is made in the correct form. If a claimant makes an effective Part 36 offer and at trial achieves an outcome that is at least as advantageous as its Part 36 offer then it is usually entitled to receive the benefits set out in Part 36 which include an entitlement to indemnity costs from the expiry of the Part 36 offer, additional interest on those costs and an additional sum unless the court considers it would be unjust to do so. In considering whether it is unjust to do so the court takes into account the factors set out in CPR 36.17 (5).
109. On 28 March 2024 CPL made the Part 36 Offer. They submit that it was an effective Part 36 offer and that they have achieved an outcome that is at least as advantageous as that offer and so are entitled to the additional benefits under CPR 36.17. Rs argue it was not an effective Part 36 offer. R2 submits that even if it were that it would be unjust for CPL to have the benefit of it.
110. The Part 36 Offer was made in advance of the Preliminary Issue being determined. CPL intended that it should be effective irrespective of the outcome of the Preliminary Issue. The Part 36 Offer sets out the terms on which CPL were prepared to enter into the lease by reference to [144] of Barrett 1. CPL explain that those terms were intended to apply to such rights as Rs had or might be found to have after determination of the Preliminary Issue. This was entirely consistent with the way in which the parties had approached their negotiations and would have been easily understood by Rs. The Part 36 Offer records that the lease areas to be granted by Rs would be those shown in Exhibit GNB 7 (Annex 4 to the Judgment) but that if R1 were successful it would include areas B,C,Q and V as shown in Exhibit GNB2 (Annex 1 to the Judgment). The Part 36 Offer was intended to apply to not just the proportion of GNB 7 over which CPL wanted to acquire rights but also those parts of GNB 2 over which CPL would require rights if R1 were successful on the Preliminary Issue. I do not therefore accept R2’s submission that the Part 36 Offer applies to a smaller area because it refers to 499.1 acres of GNB 7.
111. R2 further argued that because the Part 36 Offer sought a lease on terms it was not effective because the court would grant rights not a lease. Whilst Part 36 is a prescriptive code this did appear to me to be a bad point. Rs had confirmed in their amended defence dated 1 October 2024 that they were prepared to grant a lease on terms. Indeed, at [2] the Rs pleaded “the only issue between the parties is the fair and reasonable royalty and rent for the grant of the necessary rights to win and work polyhalite offshore”. Although that does not appear to be an accurate reflection of the parties’ positions on the lease terms. What the Part 36 Offer sought to do was to set out the terms CPL was prepared to offer for the grant of those rights which would be recorded in the form of a lease as agreed between the parties. I do not therefore consider that the phraseology in terms of a lease was sufficient to make it ineffective when considered in its proper context.
112. Rs’ construction of the terms of the Part 36 Offer was to the effect that in reality it was no offer at all and consequently not effective. It is well established that a Part 36 Offer has to involve a measure of “give and take”, but an offer does not have to be particularly generous to be a commercial offer of settlement providing a measure of certainty (see for example Jockey Club Racecourse Ltd v Willmott Dixon Construction Ltd [2016] EWHC 167 (TCC)). Rs understood the Part 36 Offer to simply be reflecting the effect of RPI increases on an assumption of 3-yearly rent reviews from 1 July 2020 so recording the Certain Rent as it would be at the time of the Part 36 Offer and not backdating the increase to 1 July 2020 and so no offer at all.
113. The Part 36 Offer records that:
“Our client is willing to offer a certain rent per acre basis of payment, the heads of terms for which were set out in [144 Barrett 1] and revised on 20 December 2020…”
114. The Part 36 Offer continues: “For convenience the relevant paragraph is repeated below … and form part of this Part 36 Offer.” The Part 36 Offer was therefore not just an offer in respect of the certain rent per acre but for a package of terms including those set out in [144] of Barrett 1 (as set out above).
115. Sub-clause 4 of the heads of terms provided for a Certain Rent of “£29.20 per acre per annum or as assessed by the court”. The Part 36 Offer continued:
“There is one amendment to sub-clause 4 of the above heads of terms from those originally proposed, which is that our client is prepared, given the period which has elapsed since December 2020, to increase its certain rent payment offer, in line with its three yearly historical retail prices index review, within its other leases. This results in the figure of £29.20 per acre per annum, as set out above, being increased to £37.61 per acre per annum.”
116. This wording provides for one amendment to the heads of terms. Although the wording of the paragraph could have been clearer the combination of the opening phrase and the final sentence make it clear that the change is to replace £29.20 with the £37.61 in sub-clause 4. The explanation for the recalculation “which….within its other leases” does not add anything to the proposed change/amendment to the heads of terms and is just descriptive. The operative parts of the paragraph therefore explain that the Certain Rent in sub-clause 4 is to be uplifted to £37.61.
117. The Part 36 Offer does not change the agreed proposed start date of the lease – 1 July 2020 – nor any of the other heads of terms. The only construction of the Part 36 Offer on a careful reading of the relevant paragraphs is that it was intended to increase the Certain Rent figure in sub-clause 4 of the heads of terms to £37.61 with effect from the start of the lease on 1 July 2020 but otherwise maintain the offer/terms set out in [144] Barrett 1. If the heads of terms for the new lease were amended so that sub-clause 4 provided for a rent of £37.61, I am satisfied that it could only be construed as increasing the rent to that starting figure from the inception of the new lease when granted.
118. By the Judgment, the rental mechanism in the leases will be a Certain Rent at the figure of £29.38 subject to uplifts for RPI. The Part 36 Offer which offered to replace or uplift the Certain Rent figure in the heads of terms to £37.61 from 1 July 2020 was therefore more advantageous than the eventual award in terms of the Certain Rent which is why CPL rely on it. I am satisfied that this represented a genuine offer of improved terms in relation to the Certain Rent sufficient to meet the requirements of Part 36. That is not, however, the only term of the Part 36 Offer which was an offer of terms including an uplifted Certain Rent.
119. In a complex case involving well represented parties it would be an odd Part 36 Offer that made no offer at all. CPR 36 has its own mechanism for seeking clarification of any offer given the potential consequences. If Rs did not understand the Part 36 Offer they should have sought clarification. They did not.
120. Rs did not respond to the Part 36 Offer but rather made counter offers and Part 36 offers on different bases consistent with their desire to have a wayleave rather than a Certain Rent. On 12 April 2024 R1 offered to convey such rights as she might have other than in relation to iron and ironstone (i.e. the rights subsequently determined in her favour on the Preliminary Issue) if CPL agreed to her proposed valuation methodology (not a Certain Rent). This makes it tolerably clear that (i) the terms of the Part 36 Offer were not agreed and that the difference between the parties was more fundamental than whether the Certain Rent had been increased; but (ii) both parties were using Part 36 offers which were predicated on/subject to the outcome of the Preliminary Issue.
121. Rs argue that the Part 36 Offer could not be effective because it was made on the assumption that the Preliminary Issue would continue. Whilst in the context of the dispute between the parties the intention and intended scope of the Part 36 Offer as an offer would have been easily understood by Rs that is a different question to whether it was an effective Part 36 Offer and should have the consequences set out in Part 36.
122. CPL intended the Part 36 Offer to settle the claim which was why it took into account the possibility of a change in the areas to which the proposed lease terms would apply. Rs argue that to be effective it should have specified that it was only settling part of the claim. However, that is not what CPL intended – they intended it to settle all of the claim subject only to a determination of the Preliminary Issue. The consequences are that the Part 36 Offer is in one sense conditional since the full effect of it could not be known until the Preliminary Issue was resolved. However, conversely, there was no need for the Preliminary Issue to be determined before the parties could agree the terms of the lease including the Certain Rent. They had been negotiating on that basis for years.
123. Rs explain that the costs of the Preliminary Issue had not been carved out of the Part 36 Offer as drafted so that if it had been accepted it would have required Rs to meet CPL’s costs of the Preliminary Issue up to the date of acceptance irrespective of the outcome of the Preliminary Issue. Whilst it is generally the case that Part 36 Offers are more safely drafted without reference to costs here there is an issue as to whether because the Preliminary Issue had been carved out, the costs of the claim would include or exclude the Preliminary Issue costs if the claim were settled before the Preliminary Issue had been determined.
124. Again, it presents an obvious need for clarification either from CPL when drafting it or by Rs seeking clarification within 7 days. Of course, that assumed that the party in receipt of the Part 36 Offer considers that it needs clarification. The notes in the White Book at 36.8.1 explain that seeking clarification may be particularly important where the offer is not purely in monetary terms and there is scope for argument.
125. There may be good reasons why CPL did not wait until after the Preliminary Issue to make the Part 36 Offer when there would have been more clarity, but I agree with Rs that as drafted the Part 36 Offer appears to present some difficulties including its apparent conditionality and the potential costs issues.
126. It seems to me that there are some real difficulties with how the Part 36 Offer was framed to work in conjunction with the Preliminary Issue which do not appear had been thought through. Those issues do present CPL with difficulties in persuading me that their Part 36 Offer would have been effective. It is not about whether the Part 36 Offer settles all or part of the claim but that there appear to be structural issues with the way in which it was drafted which did not make it capable of acceptance. This is either fatal to the Part 36 Offer or a significant factor in considering whether it would be unjust to allow CPL to take the benefit of it.
127. However, there is a more fundamental issue which is the scope of the offer. In order to assess whether the position that CPL find themselves in is more advantageous than that set out in the Part 36 Offer, it has to be read as a whole. The Part 36 Offer sets out the heads of terms on which it is proposing to enter into a lease with Rs based on all 10 clauses set out at [144] of Barrett 1 but with the Certain Rent uplifted. It is a multifaceted offer.
128. Barrett 2 confirms that there were further extensive negotiations between CPL and Rs and their respective valuers after Barrett 1. He explains that various heads of terms had been agreed but that the mechanism for calculating compensation had not. In order to assess whether CPL have obtained an outcome more advantageous than the terms set out in the Part 36 Offer I need to understand what the current position is as against all of the terms of the Part 36 Offer.
129. From the evidence available, I note that CPL sought a lease term of 50 years. Rs immediately prior to trial offered only a 25-year lease from 1 July 2022. Mr Kimblin in his submissions indicated that if CPL wanted a 50-year lease with a break clause the Rs would grant it and that they did not know if CPL now objected to any of the terms of the draft lease they were prepared to grant other than in relation to the rent and royalty. I do not know what those draft terms are or how closely they align with [144] Barrett 1 and/or if they are more advantageous to CPL.
130. On the evidence available it appears that at least some of the lease terms offered in [144] of Barrett 1 have been superseded or remain unagreed. For example [144], advanced lease terms including rent reviews every 3 years. In 2024 Rs proposed annual reviews. The draft order following the Judgment includes unagreed wording about how the parties are to agree the frequency of those reviews including by determination by the court. That term at least has not been agreed as proposed in the Part 36 Offer or at all.
131. I asked the parties whether the terms set out in [144] had been agreed in that form. Rs say that they were not. They say the lease terms were subject to further discussion, and negotiation as a result of which by June/July 2022 revised heads of terms were broadly agreed save for the financial matters.
132. The Judgment only determined the valuation and proprietorship issues and did not deal with the lease terms more broadly and it is clear from the draft order that at least some of those remain outstanding.
133. When considering the entirety of the Part 36 Offer whilst CPL have achieved a more advantageous outcome on the Certain Rent issue, it is not possible to say that CPL have achieved a more advantageous outcome overall. They have negotiated lease terms which appear to differ from those set out in [144] and it appears others are yet to be agreed.
134. It seems to me therefore that reliance on the Part 36 Offer is either premature since not all the relevant lease terms in [144] of Barrett 1 have been agreed and/or if Rs are right then the terms negotiated since the Part 36 Offer was made other than the Certain Rent are not overall as advantageous as the Part 36 Offer. This identifies the risks of seeking to rely on a Part 36 Offer which is drawn more broadly than the issues which the Judgment addressed.
135. Whilst therefore I am satisfied that the Part 36 Offer included an offer to pay a Certain Rent that exceeded the sum which I have determined by the Judgment it does not seem to me that one can pick and choose which elements of a Part 36 Offer one can rely on. One has to consider the Part 36 Offer as a whole. There are not yet any final binding lease terms even in respect of the 10 terms included in the Part 36 Offer against which the Part 36 Offer could be measured to enable an assessment to be made as to whether the outcome achieved by CPL was more advantageous than the Part 36 Offer. There is certainly no evidence about that and such evidence as there is points to there not being a final position.
136. It was incumbent on CPL to satisfy me that the outcome they have achieved was more advantageous overall than the Part 36 Offer they sought to rely on when seeking to obtain the advantages set out in CPR 36.
137. I am not satisfied that CPL have been able to satisfy me that they have achieved an outcome that is more advantageous than the Part 36 Offer and they are not entitled to the benefits of Part 36.
138. For completeness, the Part 36 Offer was certainly an offer that should be taken into account when considering costs, but I do not consider it goes any further.
Part 36 Unjustness:
139. R2 does not accept that if the Part 36 Offer was effective that CPL should be entitled to the benefits of CPR 36. R2 submits that it would still be unjust to allow CPL to obtain the benefit of its Part 36 Offer.
140. When considering whether it would be unjust to make an order providing CPL with the benefits of its Part 36 Offer, the court must take into account all the circumstances including the five matters identified in CPR 36.17 (5) (a) to (e). All of Rs arguments about the limitations of the Part 36 Offer come back into account and each of the CPR 36.17 (5) factors have been considered above.
141. It seems to me that if the CPR 36 Offer were effective on the basis of the improved offer on the single term of the lease – the Certain Rent and that it had been capable of acceptance in advance of the determination of the Preliminary Issue that it would nonetheless be unjust for CPL to have the benefit of CPR 36 for the same reasons. I do not consider that it would meet the balance between the parties, for CPL to obtain the benefit of CPR 36 in relation to only a single term of the lease given the scope of the issues determined by the Judgment and the fact that the lease terms are not yet agreed. It would be unjust to treat the Part 36 Offer as having any greater status than any of the other offers which the parties exchanged so far as it relates to costs.
Part 36 Interest:
142. R1 accepts that if the Part 36 Offer is effective that the consequences that follow are that CPL would be entitled to indemnity costs and the maximum additional payment. The issue between them is the rate of interest. CPL seeks 10% over base being the maximum interest rate permitted under CPR 36. Whilst these parties have been involved in a heavily contested dispute over an extended period of time, I do not consider that the conduct of the parties justifies an interest rate at 10% above base. This is not a claim that involves allegations of fraud or dishonesty. Further this dispute covers a period when interest rates were historically low although more recently, they have increased.
143. R1 submits that interest should be limited to 2% over base. This would reflect a usual commercial rate of interest but does not provide any additional benefit or compensatory element to reflect CPL’s success and Rs failure to accept the Part 36 Offer. This is ultimately a substantial commercial dispute. The interest rate should reflect the nature of the dispute and all the circumstances.
144. I am satisfied that having regard to the nature of the dispute and the issues involved that an appropriate rate of interest in the event that the Part 36 Offer is effective is 4% over base. That will provide CPL with interest at a rate higher than the judgment rate for the later part of the period, but I am satisfied that it provides a fair balance between the parties.
The quantum of any interim payment:
145. Having determined that CPL are entitled to a costs order in their favour for the entire period but that the Part 36 Offer was not effective their costs will be subject to detailed assessment on the standard basis.
146. In those circumstances CPR 44.2(8) provides that where there was an adverse costs order that could not immediately be quantified whether after an application or at the end of a claim, the court would order payment of a reasonable sum by way of interim payment pending detailed assessment unless there was a good reason not to do so. The effect of CPR 44.2(8) is that the burden is on the paying party to persuade the court that there is a good reason not to do so.
147. The objective of the rule is to enable a receiving party to recover part of their expenditure on costs before the protracted process of a detailed assessment.
148. R1 accepts that CPL is entitled to an interim payment on account but raises issues about quantum and timing. R2 adopts R1’s submissions on this issue.
149. In Excalibur Ventures LLC v Texas Keystone Inc [2015] EWHC 566 (Comm) (“Excalibur”) Christopher Clarke LJ explained that a reasonable sum on account will be an estimate of the likely level of recovery dependent on the circumstances and involves an element of uncertainty. He identified some factors that might be relevant to that consideration and made it clear that the assessment was not based on an irreducible minimum.
150. The very process of determining a reasonable sum can take into account the risk of the sum being sought by the receiving party being too high and/or the risk of a paying party having difficulties in recovering any sum overpaid. Again, this process can be seen clearly in a number of the authorities including Excalibur at [24].
151. The amount sought, the quality of the information provided, and all the circumstances will determine whether and in what amount the court will order an interim payment on account.
152. It is for the receiving party to provide sufficient information to enable the court to be satisfied that it can safely make an order for an interim payment of a specific amount. It is for the paying party to identify any factors it considers relevant to that consideration at the time at which the order is made.
153. CPL say that their costs up to the date of their submissions but excluding the costs relating to the Preliminary Issue Order amount to £1,204,160.86. They seek an interim payment of £700,000, approximately 60% (in fact around 58%) if they were not successful on the Part 36 Offer. R1 proposes an interim payment on account based on 30%. The figure offered was in fact £207,000 based on 30% of 80% from 19 April 2024. Given my findings if one applies 30% to the total amount of costs the figure (rounded) would be £361,250.
154. The Judgment and this judgment set out some of the history of this dispute and the conduct issues the parties rely on in relation to the claim. I take those into account when considering the quantum of the interim payment.
Quantum of the Interim Payment:
155. CPL provided a schedule broken down into 11 phases covering the period from 6 March 2020 to 29 June 2026. Each of those phases provided details of the disbursement costs for that period broken down between counsel, expert and other disbursements and solicitors’ costs broken down by fee earner and hours.
156. The schedule was not a detailed bill of costs of the type that will be required on detailed assessment, nor was it as detailed as a costs budget. But this is not a detailed assessment nor a costs budgeting exercise. Whilst the schedule did not provide any detail about the work undertaken in each period, I was satisfied that the schedule provided sufficient information and was more than adequate to enable me to assess a reasonable sum for an interim payment, taking an appropriately cautious approach where I considered it necessary, to ensure that in the exercise of my broad discretion, I was satisfied that the sum awarded was a reasonable sum. I had had the benefit of the parties’ submissions on costs more generally and their specific submissions on quantum. I had already had the benefit of the trial and submissions resulting in the Judgment and this judgment. Rs were well able to critique the costs sought based on the schedule and did so.
157. This was a complex and heavily contested claim in an area of the law where there was little prior authority on the particular issues raised. It appears to be the first fully contested determination under the 1966 Act. Rs’ assessment of the value of their rights by reference to NMR was significant. But even on CPL’s figures this was not an insubstantial claim. The difference of approach provided a significant divergence of views on the approach to valuation which meant that the claim was both high value and significant to all parties. The issues to be determined were numerous and more numerous than they should have been because of the Rs’ approach to the proprietorship issues even after the Preliminary Issue. This was a claim that fully justified being considered to be high value complex litigation suitable for the Business and Property Division and not only to be considered suitable for London 1 rate but that it may well justify a rate in excess of London 1. It was in my view of sufficient complexity that even if it were not the case that the Guideline Hourly Rates were ultimately just guidelines, particularly at this stage in the process, that it was a case that could have justified a departure from those rates.
158. I did not find Rs’ submissions that the hourly rates should be recalculated on National 2 because Boulby was in a National 2 area to be helpful or realistic not least because neither R1 nor R2 had instructed a local solicitor in Boulby themselves but had instead instructed solicitors practices with specialist teams working in the area of mines and minerals. To find legal teams with that expertise R2 was instructing a national firm through its London office and R1 was instructing a national firm through its Newcastle-under-Lyme office. Rs’ alternative submission that if not National 2 then London 2 was the appropriate rate again was of limited assistance. I have already determined that this was a complex matter that justified London 1 rates and the use by all parties of highly specialist solicitors and counsel (and experts) wherever they were based reinforces that view.
159. Rs’ recalculation of the costs figures claimed by CPL on that granular basis of course produces a lower figure but does not assist me in determining what is a reasonable sum for an interim payment. That is just a matter of arithmetic and tells me nothing about the nature of the work and what might be reasonable to undertake that work.
160. In determining a reasonable sum I do not set rates but determine a reasonable sum for an interim payment based on all the circumstances. Consequently, I do not need to go further and fix any particular hourly rate. The question of the actual rates to be applied and the granular arguments about the costs will be for a costs judge in due course. That is not to abdicate responsibility but to acknowledge the limited exercise I am undertaking in determining a reasonable sum.
161. The detailed assessment in due course will be undertaken on a standard basis such that CPL will be entitled to recover their reasonable and proportionate costs but with the element of doubt weighing against them. This informs the exercise of determining a reasonable sum which needs to find a balance that reflects a reasonable sum on account of that future standard basis assessment. There will be further arguments on detailed assessment including (i) whether the work undertaken by each fee earner is recoverable inter partes; (ii) whether a particular item of work was recoverable at all; (iii) whether the cost was reasonable and proportionate in amount; (iv) whether there has been appropriate delegation; and (v) whether there is duplication, insufficient or inappropriate delegation and/or over reliance on counsel and so on.
Fee earners:
162. The CPL team consists of a Partner, two senior associates, an associate and a trainee and in addition for some time periods a paralegal and a court clerk. Rs’ complaints about the number of fee earners are generic and do not focus in on which fee earners are undertaking the work. Whilst there are a number of fee earners with varying hourly rates the main fee earner in each phase undertaking the vast majority of the work is Graeme Robertson. Mr Robertson’s hourly rate of £550 should be considered against the GHR for a Grade A fee earner in London 1 which ranged from £546 in 2024 to £579 in 2026. The rates issue does not therefore appear to be a significant proportionality issue at this stage. There will be broader questions about how CPL have resourced the claim (see above). I keep in mind that CPL were dealing with more than one Respondent and that R1 and R2 had separate solicitors throughout and separate experts for much of the period although they used a single counsel for trial and by then relied on a single expert. This has an impact on costs and one I have to take into account.
163. CPL instructed two counsel, Ms Ellis and Mr Jones. Rs instructed Mr Kimblin. Rs say that two counsel are not justified when Rs managed with only one. That submission rings rather hollow in the face of Rs submissions on these consequential matters from two teams of two counsel and two firms of solicitors. This was a claim which justified two counsel. That does not mean that their fees are automatically reasonable or proportionate and/or that the instruction of two counsel coupled with a team of solicitors and Mr Barrett does not require me to consider carefully what might happen on assessment when setting a reasonable sum. However, I do not consider that two counsel of itself was unreasonable or disproportionate for this claim.
Mr Barrett:
164. Mr Barrett explains his role as a part time “in house” solicitor for CPL. His costs are treated as a disbursement. Rs rightly raise a question about the extent to which those “consultant fees” would be recoverable inter partes. The position in relation to the recoverability of Mr Barrett’s fees may differ at different stages of the dispute. The current solicitors were not immediately instructed in 2020. In phases during which CPL did not have solicitors Mr Barrett’s fees may be treated differently to the later stages where they did. However, there will need to be an assessment about the work he undertook, how his consultant fee was calculated (and its constituent parts) and whether it was recoverable at all in any particular phase and if so at what rate or amount. On the basis of the information available I cannot assess how his consultant fees have been calculated and how his “in house” role should impact on the recoverability of his costs inter partes if at all. I take this issue into account when determining a reasonable sum.
Mrs Iwanicki:
165. CPL seek to recover costs relating to work undertaken by Mrs Iwanicki in each of the phases. Her position is different to that of Mr Barrett but may raise similar issues about recoverability in some phases. The court gave permission for expert evidence at the trial on the valuation issues when making the Preliminary Issue Order in July 2024. Prior to that (and excluding any expert evidence advanced in relation to the Preliminary Issue) Mrs Iwanicki provided evidence in support of the First and Second Referral and was central to the direct negotiations between CPL and Rs and more generally between the rights owners and CPL. It is not possible for me to determine the extent to which her costs are recoverable inter partes on the basis of the information available. Whether and the extent to which work undertaken by Mrs Iwanicki prior to the issue of the claim and/or permission to advance expert valuation evidence and/or including costs relating to negotiations and/or the mediation that are properly recoverable inter partes as part of the costs of the claim are matters to be considered at a granular level on detailed assessment. For present purposes when considering what might be a reasonable sum on account, I need to treat the claim for those costs with some caution in light of the circumstances in which the claim came to be made.
Disbursements:
166. There are a couple of oddities in the disbursement sections which do not obviously appear to relate to CPL’s solicitors costs. These are travel costs and postage costs generally rather than specifically identified costs of travelling to the client. If these are disbursements relating to Mr Barrett, they fall to be considered more generally with his costs. It is difficult to see why CPL’s solicitors would be charging occasional postage when that would usually be an overhead cost built into the hourly rates. The sums are comparatively small, but I take them into account.
167. All of these general issues together with questions about overlap, duplication, over reliance on counsel and/or the role that Mr Barrett has played are all matters to take into account when setting a reasonable sum, but I do not need to and should not finally determine them. They are part of the granular exercise on detailed assessment.
168. With these general points in mind, I turn to the phases.
Phase 1 and Phase 2:
169. The First Referral was made in December 2020 six years ago. For the reasons set out above I have not been persuaded that it is appropriate to fix the start date for costs. It appears to me that at least some of the costs incurred in relation to the First Referral may be recoverable.
170. Phase 1 covers the period 6 March 2020 to 22 December 2020 and amounts to £46,457.06 made up of disbursements. That period represents the period up to the First Referral. Phase 2 covers the period from 23 December 2020 to 7 June 2022 which covers the period in which the First Referral was rejected and up to the making of the Second Referral in the sum of £28,543.46.
171. A considerable amount of work was undertaken preparing the First Referral including the preparation of evidence that was subsequently used and supplemented for the Second Referral. The split in costs between phases 1 and 2 demonstrates that clearly.
172. For the reasons set out above I do not consider Phase 1 and Phase 2 should be discounted entirely in determining the costs that would be properly recoverable as costs of the claim inter partes or the reasonable amount for an interim payment. However, the costs in these phases are primarily those of Mr Barrett and Mrs Iwanicki which raises the issues identified above. To reflect my caution in relation to Phase 1 and Phase 2 I take a particularly cautious approach to these phases when determining a reasonable sum pending detailed assessment.
Phase 3:
173. Phase 3 covers the period 8 June 2022 to 21 April 2023, when the claim was issued and amounts to £93,129.56. CPL instructed solicitors to assist with the claim and £56,405.40 of this is solicitors’ time divided between 6 fee earners. The bulk of the work was undertaken by Mr Robertson. The disbursements include two counsel, Mrs Iwanicki, Mr Barrett and a court fee. The work covered in this period is the entirety of the Second Referral and the issue of the claim and appears in principle to be recoverable. I take into account the issues raised above when setting a reasonable sum.
Phase 4:
174. Phase 4 covers the period 22 April 2023 to 16 October 2023 and is said to cover Interim hearings/responses and Notification under the 1966 Act and amounts to £49,199.15. This is the period between issue of the claim and the hearing at which the Order for the Preliminary Issue was made. It is in principle recoverable. This phase includes the Directions Order which for the reasons set out above those should be included as costs of the claim. The majority of this phase is work undertaken by Mr Robertson with some modest counsel fees which will of course include the hearing in June 2023.
175. For completeness in so far as there are any costs of the claim between 17 October 2023 and 2 July 2024 these will be recoverable on a standard basis in due course. They do not appear to be specifically identified in the schedule.
Phase 5:
176. Phase 5 in the sum of approximately £49K represents the sums claimed in relation to the Relief from Sanctions application. This was dealt with in the Preliminary Issue Order. The costs are recoverable by CPL. They will need to be assessed as part of the work on the Preliminary Issue costs. No doubt the parties will agree that they should be set off (or will seek an order if not agreed) against CPL’s costs liability to R1 in relation to the Preliminary Issue. I do not understand why they are included as a phase in relation to the costs of the claim for the purposes of this interim payment. I consider they should be excluded when determining a reasonable sum.
Phase 6:
177. Phase 6 covers the period 3 July 2024 to 23 September 2024 and is said to relate to Trial directions, preparation of further details of claim and Rs’ responses. Essentially this phase relates to compliance with the directions for the trial to which the Judgment relates as set out in the first part of the Preliminary Issue Order. It amounts to £48,388.10. The bulk of the work was undertaken by Mr Robertson and Mr Jones. This phase is in principle recoverable, but I take into account the issues I have identified for the purposes of determining a reasonable sum.
Phase 7:
178. Phase 7 covers the period 24 September 2024 to 30 November 2024 and is said to relate to expert evidence. Again, this phase is in principle recoverable. It amounts to £75,984.85. Of that only £20,137 relates to Mrs Iwanicki. Her deep involvement in the claim will have to be taken into account when considering the comparatively modest amount charged for her report as against the work she has undertaken and charged for in earlier phases and whether it is recoverable. Rs’ concern as to the level of the solicitors’ fees in this phase (£46,331) may have some force but has to be considered against the requirement to review and seek to understand Mr Troman’s report as well. I take this into account for the purposes of determining a reasonable sum.
Phase 8:
179. Phase 8 concerns the period from 1 December 2024 to 16 May 2025 described as settlement discussions, negotiation of lease terms and mediation. The total for this period is significant, £260,577.20, covering a period of about 6 months. Mr Robertson charged over 234 hours in this period and Mr Baily the partner who had not previously been heavily involved charged over 56 hours. Other partners and fee earners were involved. The disbursement costs also include a significant level of fees for two counsel and Mrs Iwanicki. I agree with Rs that at first sight and without further detail this seems on the high side and that should be reflected in the interim payment.
Phase 9:
180. Phase 9 covers Trial Preparation and is said to cover the period 17 May 2025 to 27 June 2025. This phase amounts to £250,712.45. I can understand that the four-to-six-week period prior to a trial of this importance to the parties, and generally, will generate a high level of work. However, there are reasons to be cautious about this phase when setting a reasonable sum for an interim payment.
181. The trial was listed for 3-days. Rs complain that counsels’ fees of £118,250 for the brief, refreshers and any other pre-trial work are too high. To put the sum into some perspective counsels’ hourly rates were £600 and £300. It seems to me that on the basis of the information available that the brief and refreshers appear to be on the high side given counsels’ heavy involvement in the prior phases. I should treat the figures with caution when setting a reasonable sum. Although not raised by Rs I also note that there are five eDiscovery fee earners undertaking work in this phase and it was not clear what work they had undertaken for over 50 hours.
Phase 10:
182. Phase 10 covers the week in which the trial took place and the first few days of the following week. The total for this phase was £97,274.71 of which £10,584 were Mrs Iwanicki’s fees. Rs say that the solicitors costs are too high and that having a partner and Mr Robertson at the trial was not justified. The only witnesses in this case were the experts and although this was an important case for CPL it may well be said that the presence of two solicitors at the trial was a solicitor own client cost. Again, therefore I need to reflect that in any interim payment.
Phase 11:
183. Phase 11 covers the post judgment period. There will obviously be costs of considering the Judgment and making and considering the various submissions in relation to the consequential matters. I am also aware that the parties sought to negotiate further after the Judgment was handed and prior to this decision and the final order which will follow. However, the total costs sought in this phase up to 29 June 2026 are £204,760.15. On the basis of the information available I simply do not know what work is covered by this phase and what justifies such a significant sum and whether it includes any element of solicitor own client time.
Reasonable Sum?
184. I take into account the general issues and the phase specific issues, Rs’ submissions and CPL’s submissions and the basis of assessment when setting a reasonable sum.
185. It seems to me that on the basis of the information available the costs sought are on the high side as is the interim payment and that the phases appear to include irrecoverable costs. However, even having identified a number of areas where the court should approach the costs with caution the 30% interim payment proposed by R1 still appears to me to be on the low side. Considerable costs have been incurred that will be recoverable on any basis. The purpose of an interim payment is to provide a reasonable sum on account pending the determination of that final amount for the reasons set out above.
186. Doing the best I can, and in the exercise of my broad discretion as to costs and seeking to find a balance between the parties that reflects CPL’s entitlement to payment of its costs and a reasonable sum on account against the shortcomings in the information available and the reasons to be cautious it seems to me that an interim payment of £550,000 is a fair balance and a reasonable sum.
187. £550,000 provides CPL with a substantial payment on account but leaves substantial headroom to reflect the concerns I have identified about the recoverability of some of the costs and the concerns that the Rs have raised about quantum. I am satisfied that at that level that Rs are sufficiently protected from the concerns that they have raised about quantum, but that CPL will receive a reasonable sum on account in the meantime recognising that they were the more successful party with the benefit of a costs order.
188. It may be that once the detailed bill has been drawn up, CPL will be able to justify and maintain a figure closer to the total sum claimed and/or a sum in excess of the interim payment they sought. Nothing in this determination of the level of the interim payment on account prevents the parties from arguing about any of the issues raised in support of or opposition to the interim payment so far as those issues are relevant on a detailed assessment.
Should the date from which interest accrues on the costs be postponed?
189. Rs seek an order that the date on which interest accrues on any costs order should be deferred or postponed until after they have received more detail about the costs either three months from the order or a month after the detailed bill of costs for detailed assessment has been served.
190. The entitlement to interest on a costs order is derived from section 17 and section 18 of the Judgments Act 1838, CPR 40.8 and CPR 44.2 (6)(g). For these purposes the receiving party is treated as the judgment creditor and the paying party the judgment debtor.
191. The entitlement to interest on costs runs from the date on which the order for costs is made and not from the date on which the quantum of the costs is determined unless the court makes a different order (the incipitur rule). The logic for this is that the costs order is a judgment debt and interest would accrue from the date of the judgment in the usual course. If the court had the time and resources to determine the quantum of the costs and/or carry out the detailed assessment at the time at which the order was made it would.
192. However, interest will only ever accrue on the sum that is eventually found due not the sum sought. Consequently, the absence of clarity on the precise figure claimed at the time the costs order is made or an interim payment on account is ordered is nothing to the point in the majority of cases.
193. Pursuant to CPR 40.8(2) and CPR 44.2(6)(g) the court may order that interest on costs starts to run from a date earlier than the date of any costs order or may defer the date on which the liability for interest starts to accrue.
194. Particularly where, as here, the interim payment has been carefully calibrated to ensure that it is a reasonable sum taking into account the risks identified by the paying party and balancing that against the interest of the receiving party there will rarely be a good reason to postpone or defer the accrual of interest from the date of the order.
195. CPL is a substantial entity and none of the submissions were concerned with its ability to repay any overpayment which would include interest. It was and remains unclear why in those circumstances in this case any deferral was sought or needed.
196. Rs rely on Involnert Management Inc v Aprilgrange Limited & Ors [2015] EWHC 2834 (Comm), in which Leggatt LJ explained at [27]: “I do not think it just in these circumstances that interest on whatever further sums the claimant is ultimately found liable to pay to the defendants and OAMPS should begin to run at the rate applicable to judgment debts before the claimant has been provided with a detailed statement of the costs claimed so that it can take an informed view of the amount its liability.”
197. Rs submit that the same applies in this case where CPL have not provided an adequate breakdown of the work to enable them to take an informed view of the amount of their liability. That seemed at odds with the submissions they were able to make in relation to the interim payment which I have summarised above.
198. Whether to postpone or defer an award of interest is an exercise of the court’s broad discretion consistent with the overriding objective of dealing with cases justly and fairly as between the parties having regard to the particular circumstances of the case and being satisfied that there was a good reason for doing so. None of the points raised by Rs seemed to me to tip the balance in favour of deferring or postponing the date on which interest accrues on the judgment debt.
199. Rs will only ever pay interest on the sums eventually found due. They maintain the costs are excessive. If they are right that the costs will be substantially reduced on assessment and even below the interim payment on account, that will affect any interest they may have to pay in due course. The interim payment, if paid, will reduce their risk in relation to ongoing interest on either basis.
200. If Rs consider that they need more clarity, they will be in a position to accelerate the costs assessment process and force CPL to produce a bill of costs and commence a detailed assessment pursuant to CPR 47.8 in due course should they wish to do so.
201. I do not consider that in the exercise of my broad discretion there is any proper basis to adjust the position in relation to post judgment interest and defer or postpone it. I do not consider that it is unjust that interest should run at 8% in the usual way from the date of the costs order on the sums eventually found due to CPL.
Miscellaneous/Terms of the Order:
202. The parties should now be able to finalise the majority of the terms of the order. The unagreed parts of the order which relate to terms of the lease which have not yet been agreed and have not yet been determined should be simplified to reflect only those matters actually agreed and those matters actually determined. The use of a composite order to seek a determination on those issues is inappropriate. As I recorded in the Judgment, the parties’ position had been that I was to determine only certain issues and that if they were unable to agree the balance of the lease terms those might have to be determined at a later date.
203. This also applies to the issue that has arisen between the parties as to whether Mrs Iwanicki’s proposed £/t for the extraction royalty should be adopted or whether that issue still needs to be determined.
204. Unlike many of the other disputed lease terms, both experts were instructed to consider the issue of the extraction royalty for the purposes of their expert evidence. It was essentially a valuation issue. Mrs Iwanicki’s report addresses the level of the the extraction royalty concluding at 4.1.9 that although it seemed unlikely that there would be any potash to be extracted in order to future proof the new leases an extraction royalty for both potash and salt should be included. She concluded that in line with the other new Onshore leases the extraction royalty rents should be £1.69 per tonne for potash and £0.37 per tonne for salt. This is recorded in the Judgment. Mr Troman did not express any view in his report despite his instructions. This was in part because of his overarching position that the method of assessing any royalties was to rely on % NMR and a wayleave, a position that I rejected.
205. The parties did however discuss the extraction royalty in their joint meeting, and their joint statement records the rival contentions. These were consistent with the differences between them on the overall approach to valuation. Mrs Iwanicki argued for onshore royalties on a £/t basis following historic practice and provided her figures for that extraction royalty. Mr Troman consistent with Rs’ alternative approach advanced 2 or 2.5% NMR.
206. I recorded Mrs Iwanicki’s position in the Judgment at [21] and at [64] recorded that I considered that Mrs Iwanicki’s “Certain Rent with free passage and an extraction royalty would be fair and reasonable…”
207. The dispute arises because on the wording of [64] I did not make a specific finding that Mrs Iwanicki’s £/t was to be adopted although I did determine that there should be an extraction royalty. It seemed to me that having determined that the approach should be a Certain Rent, it followed that there should also be an extraction royalty consistent with the previous approach in the leases.
208. The issue of the appropriate extraction royalty was not on the list of issues on which the parties sought a specific finding. Neither party made specific submissions on this issue in the sense of what should be allowed for the extraction in financial terms. It formed part of the submissions and cross examination only in respect of the relative merits of a Certain Rent where the potash and salt had already been worked as against a % NMR but went no further. Neither of the experts was cross examined on it which given it was not an issue to be determined was not entirely surprising.
209. If it was an issue on which the parties considered that I needed to make a specific finding they should have asked me to do so in advance of me finalising the Judgment. I could then have considered whether based on the evidence available I was in a position to do so or whether some other approach was necessary.
210. CPL would like me to determine the issue; they rely on my findings overall including in relation to Mr Troman. They submit that I should simply confirm that Mrs Iwanicki’s figures should be adopted. Rs resist any finding on this issue. Mr Troman’s approach is inextricably linked to his valuation methodology which I have rejected.
211. Notwithstanding that, I do not consider that it would be fair or just to determine the point without providing an opportunity for the parties to make submissions and for the experts to be cross examined on the issue. Consequently, I do not consider that I can or should determine it now. But nor do I consider that it would be reasonable or proportionate to convene a hearing on this single short point at this stage.
212. It is a short point on which the parties should have an opportunity to cross examine the experts and make submissions, but it is not one on which either party should be given an opportunity to file further evidence – they have both done so.
213. Given the continuing differences between the parties, it seems likely that there will need to be directions for a determination of those other outstanding issues. If that occurs and this issue is not agreed then it can be added to the list of issues. If all the other outstanding issues relating to the lease terms are agreed I would hope that the parties can reach agreement on this outstanding issue.
Permission to Appeal:
214. R1 and R2 both seek permission to appeal. R2 substantially supports R1 and the grounds of appeal overlap.
215. As recorded in the Judgment [51] in closing it was conceded that R2 had no proprietary interest and that the Collaboration Agreement was not relevant to the award. R2 do not seek to appeal either of those determinations.
216. Instead R2 maintains that it has standing to seek permission to appeal the substantive determination despite the fact that it has no proprietary interest because the Collaboration Agreement gives it “a real, direct and practical interest in the proposed appeal.” The Collaboration Agreement is a private contractual agreement between the Rs regulating their respective interests. To that extent R2 has an interest in R1 succeeding on appeal but it has no direct proprietary interest in the award.
217. R2 submits that it has standing because CPL had not sought to have it removed as a party after the Preliminary Issue. This did not appear to me to take matters any further. Until closing it was maintained by Rs that each of R1 to R3 continued to have a proprietary interest.
218. It seems to me in light of the position in the Judgment and given that the grounds of appeal R2 seeks to advance relate to the issues affecting R1 as a party, that R2’s role is now akin to a non-party or an intervenor. Whilst R2 falls within the definition of an appellant their status would be an additional factor when considering whether to grant them permission to appeal as opposed to R1.
219. R1 and R2 advance broadly similar grounds for seeking permission to appeal though R1 breaks them down into five grounds whilst R2 divides them into three.
220. Both R1 and R2 submit that their respective grounds of appeal raise important points of principle which merit consideration by the Court of Appeal and in any event that they have a real prospect of success and/or there is some other compelling reason for granting permission to appeal for the purposes of CPR 52.6(1).
221. Without intending to detract from the detail of the eight grounds advanced, they can in fact be reduced to three headline grounds:
i) The approach to section 8 of the 1966 Act
ii) The approach to key value
iii) Whether a wayleave was unreasonable
222. Rs contend that my approach to section 8 of the 1966 Act was contrary to principle and inconsistent with authority. However, the detail of the grounds shows that they are an attempt to challenge decisions based on facts. These involved an evaluation of the expert evidence including in relation to Mr Troman’s credibility and findings of fact. For example, it was open to me to find on the evidence that a Certain Rent was the appropriate mechanism and my acceptance of Mrs Iwanicki’s evidence on quantum was also a conclusion on the evidence. Likewise, I rejected Rs’ arguments on key value in the context of the section 8 grounds again by reference to findings of fact. This does not raise any point of principle.
223. The issue of key value is central to the second group of the grounds of appeal. In this context Rs argue that I failed to sufficiently take into account R1’s key value. However, this is clearly an attempt to re-argue the valuation dispute on which I heard submissions and cross-examination and made findings. This would be an appeal on the facts. I do not consider that a challenge to those findings of fact and that evaluation meets the real prospect of success test.
224. The third group of grounds relates to whether it was unreasonable to demand a wayleave. Although advanced as an issue of principle as to whether a wayleave royalty would be unreasonable, the Judgment determined that a wayleave royalty was unreasonable on the facts having considered the evidence advanced by the parties and made findings in relation to those facts. This would also be an appeal on findings of fact. I do not consider that a challenge to those findings of fact and my evaluation of the valuation evidence meets the real prospect of success test.
225. The grounds on which permission to appeal is sought seek to reargue the valuation issues which were considered at a 3-day trial involving cross examination of experts and on which I have made findings of fact. I preferred Mrs Iwanicki’s evidence to that of Mr Troman on all key issues for the reasons I gave. That I did so does not identify an error of law. A wish to have another go is not a permissible ground of appeal.
226. I do not consider that R1 and R2 have a real prospect of success on appeal and I do not consider that there is any other compelling reason to give permission to appeal. Permission to appeal is therefore refused.
Official sources: view the source page
Open Justice Licence (The National Archives).