Administrative United Kingdom
THE KING v BUCKINGHAMSHIRE COUNTY COUNCIL
Neutral Citation Number: [2026] EWHC 2792 (Admin)
Case No: AC-2025-LON-004661
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
KING'S BENCH DIVISION
ADMINISTRATIVE COURT
Royal Courts of Justice
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL
Date: 27/10/2026
Before:
JOHN HALFORD
sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge
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Between:
| THE KING (on the application of Jessica Martin) |
Claimant | |
| – and – | ||
| BUCKINGHAMSHIRE COUNTY COUNCIL | Defendant |
– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –
Ms Jessica Martin,the Claimant, in person
Iram Qureshi,Buckinghamshire Council Legal Services for the Defendant
Hearing date: 1 October 2026
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Approved Judgment
This judgment was handed down remotely at 10.30am on 27 October 2026 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives.
………………………..
Deputy High Court Judge John Halford:
Introduction
1. Should Ms Martin, who is the Claimant in this judicial review, have permission to proceed with her challenge to the 23 September 2025 decision of Buckinghamshire County Council (‘the Council’), to withdraw the temporary accommodation if offered her at 9 Smewincourt, Kitchener Road, High Wycombe? Relatedly, should this be decided now on the basis of the written submissions the parties made before and following the renewed permission hearing which took place on 1 October 2026 or should Ms Martin be given more time to develop her legal arguments, possibly through legal representatives that she has yet to instruct?
2. Ms Martin says that she has an arguable case that the Council’s withdrawal of the 9 Smewincourt offer was unlawful and that the court should make an order “quashing the withdrawal of temporary accommodation” and directing that an alternative offer be made fulfils certain conditions, feeling that it is downstairs within a certain distance of Aylesbury. The gist of the grounds of her claim is that the Council ought to have waited for the outcome of the section 202 Housing Act 2006 (‘2006 Act’) statutory review she had sought of the suitability of 9 Smewincourt accommodation before deciding to do anything about its offer, failed to take into account a number of relevant matters ranging from risk to her health and safety, her disability related needs and issues with the property, her neighbours and landlord, and that there were breaches of sections 19 and 20 of the Equality Act 2010 (‘the 2010 Act’) along with Articles 3, 6 and 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights which are made enforceable by section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998 (‘the 1998 Act’). She also says the decision was irrational, disproportionate and seriously prejudicial to her as a vulnerable person. However, although this judicial review claim was issued more than a year ago, Ms Martin says she needs more time to fully develop these arguments.
3. The Council’s response is that none of this matters now. It says it was legally entitled to withdraw the offer and that its decision-making at the time, even if it was wrong which it does not accept, has been overtaken by events specifically the series of further offers of accommodation which for various reasons Ms Martin considers unsatisfactory, but are not challenged in this claim. To the extent those offers is challenged by Ms Martin, her concerns must be taken from forward through the section 202 process (which in fact has happened in relation to one such offer). The outcome can, if unsatisfactory to her, be the subject of an appeal to the County Court under section 204 of the 1996 Act. In short, as the Council, the dispute with which this claim was once concerned is now ‘academic’ in the legal sense, that is to say, whatever the court would ultimately decide if permission for judicial review were granted would be of no practical relevance to Ms Martin or the Council. On timing, the Council is adamant that the renewed application for permission should be determined now.
4. Below in this short judgment I will deal first with Ms Martin’s request for more time to make submissions. That request that needs to be understood in the context of the procedural history of the claim (paragraphs 7 to 10). I will then say a little more about the factual background (paragraphs 14 to 29), then outline the legal framework (paragraphs 30 to 42), before turning to the parties’ submissions (paragraphs 43 to 51), and my own analysis and conclusions (paragraphs 52 to 70).
5. However, it is right for me to say at the outset that this is a judicial review that should proceed no further. The Council was entitled to withdraw its accommodation offer as an outcome of the section 202 review – which is what happened – and there is no arguable illegality. Events have also moved on significantly and the claim is now academic. The renewed application for permission will therefore be refused. Having considered it carefully, I have concluded that the claim is hopeless, bound to fail and so Totally Without Merit and will certify it as such in my order.
6. This decision will come as a bitter disappointment to Ms Martin. It is clear from the material she has filed with the court that she feels aggrieved at the Council’s offer withdrawal decision and wants it to be examined and identified as legally flawed. She also believes that this decision is at least in some ways the root cause of her ongoing dispute with the Council about how it should discharge the duties it owes her, given her homelessness. However, these are not good reasons for her judicial review of the 23 September 2025 decision to proceed, as I shall explain.
Procedural history and the latest request for more time
7. The procedural history is not straightforward.
8. The claim was issued on 23 December 2025, so on the very last day of the three months element of the “promptly and within three months” time limit for a judicial review claim. There was no warning given to the Council it was about to face a judicial review, nor any Judicial Review Pre Action Protocol-compliant letter saying so. The claim was accompanied by an application for interim relief which was refused on the papers six days later by Mr Justice Jay. Service was acknowledged on 9 January 2026, and a short Reply was served three days later. Permission was then refused by Debbie High Court Judge Simon Tinkler on 20 January 2026. A permission application renewal notice was filed on 27 January 2026. On 8 April 2026, Ms Martin filed an interim injunction application seeking an order preventing the Council from requiring her to occupy one of the other properties offered to her. That application was refused by Mrs Justice Farbey on 9 April 2026, though when that happened the Judge had not been told about the renewed application for permission so mistakenly assumed a judicial review was over. The renewal hearing was first listed for 7 July 2026 but adjourned by Tim Smith sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge at Ms Martin’s request because her health had deteriorated. A further hearing was listed for 18 August 2026. That too was adjourned by David Elvin KC sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge, Gaynor Ms Martin’s request for similar reasons. He expressed concerns about adjourning and directed that specific evidence from a medical practitioner of any inability to participate in future hearings should be filed in support of any further adjournment applications.
9. When the case came before me, there had been yet another adjournment application by Ms Martin, supported by some medical evidence of ongoing difficulties, though not of the kind the Deputy High Court Judge had thought necessary. Nonetheless, it was clear that Ms Martin could not properly participate in the hearing for reasons of disability and vulnerability. She and the Council pragmatically agreed with a suggestion I made, which was to determine the renewed permission application on the papers either under CPR 54.18 or, if permission were granted, by treating it as a CPR 3.1(7) application to set aside or vary the earlier refusal on the papers. Deadlines were set in directions for final, post-hearing submissions by Ms Martin, the Council and then for her to reply. I should mention that, by the time of the hearing, Ms Martin had made a third application for interim relief, but I indicated that I was unwilling to consider it until permission had been granted because it appeared to be substantially similar to the two that had already been considered and dismissed by Mr Justice Jay and Mrs Justice Farbey, but that if permission were granted, that might make a difference to the appropriateness of such relief.
10. The final written submissions deadlines were all met, though Ms Martin then wrote indicating she wanted more time to instruct lawyers and so her submissions were provision. I extended time to allow this to happen by an order sealed on 14 October 2026, but no-one had been instructed by the extended date so there were no more submissions. Then, in an email of 15 October 2026, Ms Martin wrote seeking further time, specifically that the court should “grant a fresh, workable deadline, and to take account of… disability, current illness, communication difficulties and the fact that the extension order was received only after the extended deadline had expired.” This request was not made in a formal application notice, however. Ms Martin’s email says in her email that she is too unwell to complete one.
11. I am willing to treat Ms Martin’s 15 October 2026 email as an application to extend time but refuse it for these reasons.
12. First, at the hearing a timetable was set for further, final written submissions. These were filed, supplementing what the court had when the application for permission was renewed, the skeleton argument for the renewed application hearing and material originally filed in support of the claim. Secondly, Ms Martin’s first, post-hearing extension request, which I grated, was not primarily to enable her to make further submissions, but to facilitate the instruction of lawyers. Unfortunately, she has not found anyone with capacity who is willing to represent her. The latest request is effectively for an open-ended extension because if Ms Martin was going to be able to instruct lawyers, it is likely that would already have happened by now. Thirdly, she has not identified anything further she wishes to say herself in writing to supplement the submissions she has already made. Fourthly, there is no medical evidence that shows what she submitted in response to my directions or final submissions was muted by her current health difficulties. The evidence indicates that Ms Martin’s difficulties are primarily to do with all communication, not setting out her position in writing and she has done so at length. Last, weighing heavily against the request for further time is the importance of the prompt determination disputes: CPR 1.1(2)(d). That is especially important in judicial review.
13. Ms Martin has done her best as a vulnerable litigant in person, despite the challenges her circumstances present, to explain how her case is arguable. There are detailed submissions from her in writing, as I said. There are no further CPR PD 1A directions that can realistically be made that will enable her to go to play a part in these proceedings in a better way, within a reasonable time. A decision now needs to be made in the material the has submitted and the Council’s response.
Background to the claim and events since issue
14. Ms Martin’s difficulties in finding accommodation that is satisfactory for her have been ongoing for some years. She approached the Council for help, providing evidence of threats from her landlord, disrepair in the property where she was then living, neighbour issues and impact on her health which was already poor due to a number of pre-existing conditions.
15. Notwithstanding all of this, the Council initially decided that it owed Ms Martin no duties. It then changed its position, indicating in a letter of 6 May 2025 that it owed her the section 189B(2) 1996 Act ‘relief duty’ and then confirming in a further letter of 5 August 2025 it now accepted Ms Martin was homeless, eligible for its assistance and in priority need and so that it owed her the ‘full’ section 193(2) duty to “secure that accommodation [was] available for occupation” by her.
16. By the time the offer withdrawal decision was made on 23 September 2025, the Council had twice offered her 9 Smewincourt to her. It did so first on 17 July 2025 on the basis of its relief duty whilst it completed enquiries and assessed the information it had, in other words, but was offered pending final decision, and that was offered again on 5 August 2025, this time in an effort to discharge the section 193(2) duty.
17. Ms Martin was then represented by specialist solicitors, Gillian Radford and Co. On 12 August 2025, they emailed the Council to advise that the second 9 Smewincourt offer was being accepted but “under protest” as it was manifestly not suitable. A formal request for an internal review of 9 Smewincourt’s suitability was made under section 202 was made on 20 August 2025. Further evidence going to the suitability issue was submitted on 9 September 2025. Ms Martin’s concerns included that 9 Smewincourt was unsuitable due to her medical needs, diagnosed claustrophobia, limited access to essential caregivers, and inability to attend vital aqua-physiotherapy sessions, all of which would negatively affect her health, wellbeing, and recovery.
18. Amongst the material filed support her claim by Ms Martin was an email exchange between “Richard”, someone who purported to be speaking for Ms Martin and Gillian Radford and Co, starting with an email on 8 September 2025 instructing them to “Demand Immediate Withdrawal of the Offer” of 9 Smewincourt as “[t]he council is acting in breach of its statutory duties. The council must be forced to acknowledge the illegality of their position and withdraw the offer formally.”
19. Days later, the Council did second of these things in the 23 September 2026 decision. The reasons have not been explained. In the letter of that date, the Council simply says:
“I write further to your request for a review of the suitability of the temporary accommodation offered to you at Flat 9, Smewincourt, Kitchener Road, High Wycombe, HP11 2TA, under Section 193(2) of the Housing Act 1996.
What decision has the Council made
The Council has decided to withdraw the offer of temporary accommodation. This decision is made without prejudice and does not constitute a determination of unsuitability under Section 206 of the Housing Act 1996. The withdrawal was not prompted by any concerns regarding the accommodation’s suitability in relation to your needs.”
20. The Council’s Summary Grounds for Contesting the Claim shed further no light on this save to say at paragraph 2 “the offer was withdrawn at the Claimant’s request” and then at paragraph 30:
“On 8 September 2025, an email was sent from the Claimant’s email account demanding the immediate withdrawal of the offer of 9 Smewincourt. The email was signed “Richard” and is at JM27 in the Claimant’s bundle.”
21. Gillian Radford and Co then ceased representing Ms Martin, advising her that the section 202 review process had ended and so there was no legal matter ongoing.
22. The Council appears not to have made an alternative section 193(2) alternative offer until 26 March 2026, however when it did, Ms Martin had concerns about its suitability too. This offer was of a ground floor flat at 28-32, Victoria House, Desborough Street, High Wycombe, Buckinghamshire HP11 2NF. Ms Martin did not initially take it up and on 10 April 2026 asked for a further section 202 review. However, in a letter of 10 June 2026, the Council says that she has collected the keys signed a licence agreement that that it has evidence that she is not using that property as her principal home, and that she advised Council two days earlier that she was temporarily staying with friends because the features of the flat which made it unsuitable were having an adverse impact on her health. The letter goes on to say that, but part, the Council believes the flat is suitable and is minded to conclude that it has been rejected by Ms Martin within the timeframe given for acceptance and so Council is entitled to treat its section 193(5) duty is discharged, but that anything else she has to say about this would be considered before a final decision was made.
23. I have already summarised the procedural history of this claim at paragraph 8 above, including that permission was refused by Deputy High Court Judge Simon Tinkler. His reasons were:
“(5) The claim refers to a decision of 23 September 2025 as being the decision under challenge. That was a decision to withdraw one offer of accommodation. The withdrawal followed an email being sent from the claimant’s email address to the defendant asking for the accommodation offer to be withdrawn. The defendant offered, on 7 October 2025, to meet the claimant to establish her housing needs. The claimant has not done so. The defendant says that as soon as the claimant discusses her needs with them then it will offer suitable accommodation.
(6) In my judgment there is no realistic prospect of the claimant successfully arguing that the 23 September decision should be quashed. The offer was withdrawn because the claimant asked it to be. The remaining elements of the claim are academic – the defendant accepts the duties which the claimant say it owes her. It is not appropriate to bring a claim for judicial review, which is a remedy of last resort, when the defendant is already
offering the remedy which is sought.”
24. I will return to Ms Martin’s criticisms of this below.
25. Bringing the factual position up to date from her perspective, in the material provided in support of her renewed application for permission for judicial review, Ms Martin says that the instruction given to Gillian Radford and Co about pressing Council to withdraw the 9 Smewincourt offer were not authorised, and in any event, never acted on them so the 8 September 2025 email was irrelevant to the 23 September 2025 decision. The wording of that decision means that the dispute over 9 Smewincourt’s suitability was never resolved and the evidence Gillian Radford and Co had submitted about that was never properly considered. Stepping back from these details, the section 202 review was never completed, she says.
26. Ms Martin adds that her health has deteriorated that this should be taken into account by the court in deciding whether interim relief should be granted in relation to the most recent accommodation offer. There had also been some equivocation by the Council about what it considered to be suitable accommodation, but the available evidence on that issue was still not being properly grappled with. She highlights material showing her current unsatisfactory living conditions including what she characterises as disrepair and medical evidence about the importance of her having no neighbours above or below her which she says demonstrates a need for accommodation in a separate house or bungalow.
27. Ms Martin insists that that she is not asking the court to step into the shoes of the Council or the County Court to consider the suitability of what has been offered since the withdrawal of the 9 Smewincourt offer and acknowledges that was a more recent review decision on 14 August 2026 which Ms Martin she relies on. It was favourable, she says (it endorses the need for a house or bungalow, for example) and there has since been yet another accommodation offer, this time of Flat 78, Griffin Place dated 18 September 2026.
28. Ms Martin stresses nonetheless that the court can and should take ‘protective’ steps by granting interim relief in the present claim because she had effectively been given an ultimatum to accept Flat 78, Griffin Place which was not kind of accommodation acknowledged the Council as being necessary in the 14 August 2026 review decision.
29. If the court considered that this or any other issue required amendment of the claim, as Martin added, it should give directions to that effect. Last, she stressed:
“[t]he central unresolved issue concerning 9 Smewincourt remains the lawfulness of the Defendant's withdrawal of the accommodation offer on 23 September 2025 while the section 202 suitability review remained ongoing.”
Legal framework
Offers of temporary accommodation to homeless persons to whom a duty is owed
30. As noted above, once a local authority is satisfied of a homeless person’s eligibility for assistance and that they are in priority need and not homeless intentionally, section 189B(2) of the 1986 Act imposes an immediate relief duty to identify and provide what will generally be temporary accommodation. That duty and come to an end in a number of different ways including passage of time: once 56 days from acceptance of the relief duty has passed, the full housing duty is triggered: sections 189B(7)(b) and 193(1) and (2). What is offered once either duty is triggered must be ‘suitable’ thanks to section 206(1), though the nature of ‘suitability’ will vary on the circumstances, including how long the person is likely to need the accommodation. Accommodation might be suitable in the short term the meat an immediate need, but not in the medium or long-term: Ali v Birmingham CC [2009] UKHL 36.
Internal reviews and appeals to the County Court
31. The right to seek an internal review of a decision on suitability is set out in section 202 the 1986 Act, as I have already mentioned.
32. Section 203 obliges local authorities to notify those who have sought a review of their decisions in writing once the review is completed. Section 203(4) provides that the reasons must be given if the decision is to confirm the original decision in any material respect.
33. The Secretary of State has issued detailed guidance on how the legislation is intended to operate, ‘Homelessness code of guidance for local authorities’ (‘the Code’), which was last updated on 15 October 2026 but is materially unchanged from that enforced when the 26 September 25 decision was made. Paragraph 19.34 of the Code states that, in circumstances where the review outcome is favourable to the applicant, reviewing officers are recommended to:
“use their discretion to assess the impact of the failure across the whole period of the relevant duty and make recommendations which seek to remedy this:
(a) the decision on reasonable steps in the personalised housing plan; or
(b) the decision to issue a notice bringing the prevention or relief duties to an end.”
34. However, this is not a mandatory step, and it did not happen in Ms Martin’s case. Nothing more is said about the circumstances in which a past offer can be withdrawn as a result of a review.
35. Section 204 contains an appeal right against the review decision to the County Court on a point of law. It provides:
“(1) If an applicant who has requested a review under section 202—
(a) is dissatisfied with the decision on the review, or
(b) is not notified of the decision on the review within the time prescribed under section 203,
he may appeal to the county court on any point of law arising from the decision or, as the case may be, the original decision.
(2) An appeal must be brought within 21 days of his being notified of the decision or, as the case may be, of the date on which he should have been notified of a decision on review.”
36. Notably, the nature of the ‘dissatisfaction’ with the “decision on the review” is not limited although the challenge to it must be on a point of law. The jurisdiction is equivalent to that of the High Court when dealing with the judicial review. The right of appeal must be explained in any section 203 decision.
Pleading grounds of the judicial review claim
37. Under the heading “Contents of the Claim Form” paragraph 4.2 of CPR PD 54 explains that the form must include or be accompanied by:
“(b) a clear and concise statement of the grounds for bringing the claim – “the Statement of Grounds”. The Statement of Grounds should: identify in separate, numbered paragraphs each ground of challenge; identify the relevant provision or principle of law said to have been breached; and provide sufficient detail of the alleged breach to enable the parties and the court to identify the essential issues alleged to arise…”
Academic judicial review claims
38. Judicial review is intended to be a practical, and so relatively speedy, means of determining whether decisions, actions or failures that affect the rights and interests of claimants and other similarly-placed persons are unlawful and ought to be decisively remedied by the court. To ensure the process functions in that way, the Administrative Court has developed mechanisms to control its caseload, including that permission to proceed to a full hearing may be withheld if a judicial review claim is ‘academic’ or has become so in the course of proceedings, even if the claim is arguable.
39. ‘Academic’ is not an especially helpful term as it means different things depending on the context. In judicial review it means the claim that no longer has practical relevance for the parties, even if it once did. The concept is explained in cases like R v Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte Wynne [1993] 1 WLR 115 where Lord Goff at 120A-B referred to the reluctance of the courts to determine “hypothetical” questions. In R v Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte Salem [1999] 1 AC 450 (“Salem”), Lord Slynn of Hadley used the term to refer to a question, “the answer to which cannot affect the respondent in any way”. Similarly, in R (Hidenda Tax Ltd) v HMRC [2025] EWHC 551 (Admin), Sheldon J held at paragraph18 that “a claim is academic if ‘there is no longer a lis to be decided which will directly affect the rights and obligations of the parties’”.Here ‘lis’ means a live legal dispute requiring the court's determination, not simply ongoing litigation.
40. There are exceptions to the general rule that a claim that has become academic or ought to be refused permission or be struck out post-permission. The most well-known is where the rights or interests of others besides the claimant will be affected by the decision the court is being asked to take: e.g. Salem at pages 456H–457A and R (Zoolife International Limited) v Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs [2007] EWHC 2995 (Admin) at paragraph 35. Yet another narrow exception is where a judgment will have some important vindicatory effect: e.g. R (Gardner) v Secretary of State for Health and Social Care [2022] EWHC 967 (Admin) at paragraph 139 (“Gardner”) and R (Smith) v Chief Constable of Northumbria [2025] EWHC 1805 (Admin) at paragraphc85 (“Smith”).
Totally without merit judicial review claims
41. CPR Rule 23.12 states:
“If the court dismisses an application (including an application for permission to appeal or for permission to apply for judicial review) and it considers that the application is totally without merit-
(a) the court's order must record that fact; and
(b) the court must at the same time consider whether it is appropriate to make a civil restraint order.”
42. In Wasif v The Secretary of State for the Home Department [2016] EWCA Civ 82 at paragraph 15, the Court of Appeal held that the rule was intended to identify cases which were not merely unarguable, but rather those:
“in which the judge considering an application for permission to apply for judicial review can see no rational basis on which the claim could succeed: these are in our view the cases referred to in [R (Grace) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2014] EWCA Civ 1091] as "bound to fail" (or "hopeless").”
The positions taken by Ms Martin and the Council
43. Ms Martin’s grounds of claim have never been amended. They contain much detail about the history of her difficulties and differences with the Council, but very little about why the 26 September 2026 decision is actually unlawful. For instance, the statement of facts and grounds which is reproduced at page 37 of the bundle for the permission application renewal hearing simply states:
“Unlawfulness: Housing Act 1996 ss.188 & 189(1) – withdrawn without assessing risks
Procedural Impropriety: Ignored safety risks, solicitor failures, LAA misdirection, neighbour break-in
Irrationality / Wednesbury Unreasonableness: Withdrawal despite imminent risk
Human Rights: Articles 3, 6, 8 ECHR
Equality Act 2010: Disability discrimination, failure to provide reasonable adjustments
Causal link: LAA misdirection delayed legal challenge → Council withdrew accommodation based on incomplete evidence.”
44. Little more is said about these grounds in the various iterations of Ms Martin’s skeleton argument, nor in her final written submissions. However, Ms Martin make four points about Deputy High Court Judge Tinkler’s refusal of permission which are a little clearer.
45. First, she says that he was mistaken about the significance of the 8 September 2025 email, which was sent to her solicitors, not the Council and never acted on. The desire for the 9 Smewincourt offer be withdrawn was not something the Council had taken into account. The Council could not rely on it ex post facto in the judicial review because it had not featured in its contemporaneous reasons. For the reasons discussed below, I consider that Ms Martin is right about the irrelevance of that email.
46. Secondly, she says withdrawal of an offer could not happen during a live section 202 review. Council had acted ultra vires. Below I explain why this misunderstands the 26 September 2025 decision.
47. Thirdly, Ms Martin said, Deputy High Court judge Tinkler heard not engaged with the arguments about which of the 2010 Act, procedural fairness or irrationality. Strictly speaking, that is right but there was no need for him to do so having identify the claim as academic. For completeness, I have examined them, however.
48. Last, so far as events since the 6 September 2025 decision were relevant at all, such as subsequent offers, they illustrated the Council’s failure to properly assess her needs, or at least the to meet those identified on assessment, and offer accommodation that was suitable for her in the light of them. As Ms Martin puts this point:
“[t]he subsequent accommodation developments demonstrate that the underlying accommodation problem has continued. They also demonstrate a repeated pattern in which accommodation has been offered despite known medical and accommodation requirements not being fully met, followed by continuing harm and further attempts to identify more suitable accommodation.”
49. The adverse impact on her is ongoing, Ms Martin says. What happened on 26 September 2025 “remains an unresolved public-law decision” with ongoing relevance, not a historical matter without continuing consequences. I will return to this point below.
50. The Council’s primary argument was that the withdrawal of the 9 Smewincourt offer had come about as a direct result of Ms Martin’s request and was essentially what she was seeking through the section 202 1986 Act internal review. Ms Martin was clearly dissatisfied with the subsequent decisions, but exercised her right to seek a section 202 review in relation to at least one of them. The judicial review was concerned with the decision was now irrelevant the discharge of the Council’s duties towards her Matters had therefore moved on in the claim was academic. Permission should be refused.
51. Neither Ms Martin nor the Council have said anything about whether the 26 September 2025 decision could have been the subject of a section 204 appeal.
Analysis and conclusions
52. As indicated at the outset, I consider that this claim could not have permission. I say this for two main sets of reasons: it has no merit and is academic.
53. Before I explain why, I need to current a fundamental misunderstanding of the 26 September 2025 decision. To recap, this was set out in a letter from a Council reviewing officer who expressly states that she is writing on Council’s behalf in response to the request for a section 202 review. It follows that Ms Martin is wrong to say that this decision was wrongly made whilst the section 202 process was ongoing. On the contrary, the review came to an end with this decision. In fact, Ms Martin was told this by Gillian Radford and Co solicitors at the time.
54. Ms Martin rightly points out that the reviewing officer gave no reasons for her decision and expressly disavowed it had anything to do with the suitability of 9 Smewincourt. For its part, in these proceedings, the Council has suggested that the reason was that she had asked for the 26 September 2025 be withdrawn. In one sense, this is right. The 26 September 2025 decision would not have been made there been no request for a review challenging it. However, that decision cannot be consequence of the 8 September 2025 email to Gillian Radford and Co because there is no evidence to suggest that was ever communicated to the Council, as Ms Martin says.
55. What then is the explanation for the 26 September 2025 decision given it says that the Council does not accept 9 Smewincourt was unsuitable for Ms Martin? There are two possible answers.
56. One is that the Council accepted that 9 Smewincourt was unsuitable but was unwilling to say so and concede it had been wrong to make the offer in the first place. It did not need to make such a concession because had significantly more evidence about Ms Martin’s needs than when the offer was made, thanks to Gillian Radford and Co’s efforts. However, it might have wanted to avoid giving any positive indications about what would be suitable as far as future offers were concerned. This would explain why no recommendations were made of the kind of in the Code at paragraph 19.34.
57. There is an alternative explanation. The Council may have still thought that that 9 Smewincourt was suitable in the legal sense but decided it would be better to withdraw the offer as an outcome to the review to avoid conflict about that and very real possibility of a section 204 appeal to the County Court for the delay that would entail in a case that had an ill, disabled and vulnerable person at its heart.
58. It would have been far better if the Council had been forthcoming about its reasons in the 26 September 2025 letter even though reasons are not required where a review does not confirm an earlier decision. Certainly, when the Council acknowledged service in these proceedings would have been helpful to the court to have that clarity and quite possibly to Ms Martin too. However, I need not resolve the factual issue of why the Council decided to withdraw the 9 Smewincourt offer as a result of the review. For the purposes of this judicial review claim, it only matters that it did.
59. Ms Martin has not challenged the lack of reasons for the 26 September 2025 decision and, in my view, such a challenge would have been hopeless in circumstances where Parliament has expressly provided that reasons are not required. Nor has she challenged the lack of Code paragraph 19.34 recommendations. Even if she had, I consider that challenge would have had no real prospects of success either in circumstances where making such recommendations is discretionary, and suggested in the Code only as a possibility, rather than being required by statute. It is also important to note that Ms Martin has not challenged any failure of the Council in the immediate aftermath of the decision to make an alternative accommodation offer, or any decision to make one. It is the 26 September 2025 decision that remains squarely in the crosshairs of her challenge.
60. Further, dissatisfaction with any aspect of the “decision on the review”, including the withdrawal of the 9 Smewincourt offer, could be subject of a section 204 appeal were there some legal errors as discussed at paragraph 36 above. However, mentioned at paragraph 54, neither Ms Martin nor the Council raised this alternative remedy issue in their submissions and in the circumstances, it would be wrong to refuse permission on this basis. I do not do so.
61. The first set of reasons for refusing permission is that none of Ms Martin’s grounds have any legal merit. In my view, they do identify the relevant provision or principle of law said to have been breached and provide sufficient detail of the alleged breach to enable the parties and the court to identify the essential issues as required by paragraph 4.2 of CPR PD 54. I will however address each as best I can, given that lack of detail.
62. Ms Martin asserts there is unlawfulness because accommodation could under sections 188 and 189(1) had been “withdrawn without assessing risks”. This point is bad. The withdrawn 9 Smewincourt offer was of section 193 accommodation. If the Council withdrew the offer because it is accepted the force of at least some of Ms Martin’s criticisms of the assessment that the flat was suitable (i.e. first of my two hypotheses at paragraph 56 above), then it must have taken a view about risk because that had been put squarely in issue by the back in 202 review request. Alternatively, if it withdrew the offer because it wanted to avoid ongoing conflict and the effects on Ms Martin, any lack of thought to risk would again have made no real difference to the decision because the request for review was arguing that the offer never should have been made in the first place, including because characteristics of that property created risks for Ms Martin. In other words, the Council would have got to the right result even if it did not take into account all the factors it should have.
63. Ms Martin then says that there was procedural unfairness in withdrawing the 9 Smewincourt offer. Under this heading, she repeats her point about safety risk being ignored. She says there were “solicitor failures” and “LAA misdirection”. From what I can ascertain, these points are to do with the handling of her application for Legal Aid to pursue the impure to review, which post-dated the 26 September 2025 decision and involved the decision-making of a different body. She mentions a “neighbour break-in”. Presumably this happened where she was living prior to the offer and she is suggesting that this is something the Council took no account of. However, Council did consider the problems she was experiencing with her neighbours for accepted it owed her 1986 Act duties. They were amongst the factors that caused the Council to shift its position.
64. Ms Martin then says that the withdrawal of the 9 Smewincourt offer involved irrationality and Wednesbury unreasonableness, given the imminent risk to her. This appears to be a repetition of her first point, which I have addressed. In any event, it cannot be irrational for the Council to have withdrawn the offer in circumstances where was Martin was arguing through solicitors that erred in making that particular offer, given her needs.
65. Next Ms Martin the, but without giving details, that there were breaches of Articles 3, 6 and 8 ECHR.
66. Article 3 strictly prohibits a range of extreme forms of oppressive treatment, including that which is inhuman and degrading. A person can be unlawfully treated in that way if a public authority’s failure or decision, whether intentional or not, forces them into street homelessness or to live circumstances that are debasing and undignified, including because basic needs are not met, including any significant housing needs arising from disability: e.g. R (Limbuela) v SSHD [2005] UKHL 66 and R (TMX) v London Borough of Croydon [2024] EWHC 129 (Admin). Ms Martin has not explained how or produced any evidence showing that this kind of harm was the direct result of the withdrawal of the 9 Smewincourt offer, however, and so this part of her claim is not arguable. Article 8 protects against unnecessary, unlawful or disproportionate interferences with the right to respect for interests including ‘home’ and ‘private life’, a concept that includes physical and psychological integrity. Again, this right can be engaged in the housing context: e.g. R (Bernard) v London Borough of Enfield [2002] EWHC 2282 (Admin). Again though,Ms Martin has not produced evidence to show that withdrawing the 9 Smewincourt offer interfered with those interests in an unjustified way, nor is this cogently argued. Article 6 creates an entitlement to a fair hearing before an independent authority to determine civil rights and obligations. This can be engaged in relation to some housing decisions, but the courts have held that the section 202 review process taken together with the section 204 appeal provides the hearing that the right demands: Begum v London Borough of Tower Hamlets [2003] UKHL 5. Ms Martin has not explained why her case is an exception to this long-established principle.
67. Ms Martin then says there was a breaches of the 2010 Act in the form of disability discrimination (which is prohibited by section 19), a failure to provide reasonable adjustments (which made unlawful by section 20, provided the conditions for the duty are satisfied and the adjustments are ‘reasonable’ in the legal sense) and possibly also a breach of section 149 which requires ‘due regard’ to be had to the need to avoid those other forms of unlawful discrimination, to advance equality of opportunity between groups with different protected characteristics and to foster good relations between them. Again, Ms Martin gives no details of these complaints in her grounds. There is also nothing to indicate that the Council acted unlawfully in these ways. As regards section 19, regardless of which possible explanation for the withdrawal decision is right, neither involved treating Ms Martin differently than a non-disabled person would have been to her detriment in circumstances where she was arguing that the 9 Smewincourt was a property that was unsuitable for her, given her disabilities. As regards section 20, she has not explained what provision, criterion or practice Council applied which put her at a substantial disadvantage in comparison to non-disabled persons, nor what adjustments ought to have been made to address that. Section 149 requires thought to be given to equality considerations by public authorities, not particular outcomes. A formal, documented assessment is not necessary, unless the authority has made a commitment to producing one, even though it may be helpful: R (Brown) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2008] EWHC 3158 (Admin). It is unlikely that the Council gave no thought to the matters made relevant by the duty here, particularly in circumstances where it had been presented with a large volume of evidence and detailed representations about Ms Martin’s needs as a disabled person and Ms Martin has not produced anything from the Council’s internal decision-making records, or pointed to anything in the 26 September 2025 letter that indicates these matters were ignored or not given the regard that was due.
68. Ms Martin’s last ground, “Causal link: LAA misdirection delayed legal challenge → Council withdrew accommodation based on incomplete evidence” that not make sense and appears unconnected with the 26 September 2025 decision which she is challenging.
69. Ms Martin also says that the withdrawal decision was disproportionate. The grounds to not explain why proportionality standard of justification applies to decisions of this kind (and it did not apply to every public authority decision, as explained in Keyu v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2015] UKSC 69), nor what a proportionate decision would have been in the circumstances. As far as this is a ground ball, it was not coherently argued and, besides, there is no obvious disproportionality in withdrawing a decision in circumstances where Ms Martin, its subject, says it was wrongly made in the first place.
70. Even if any of Ms Martin’s grounds had been arguable – and they are not – her claim is now academic in the Salem sense. There are two clear indications of that.
71. The first is that Ms Martin insists that the 26 September 2025 decision continues to infect the Council’s thinking on what her needs are and what kind of property will meet them, so has ongoing relevance and needs to be overturned. This is unsustainable. Whatever the Council’s thinking may have been when it withdrew the 9 Smewincourt offer, it is clear that its thinking has moved on, particularly given the favourable conclusion of the most recent section 202 review reflected in the 14 August 2026 decision. There is also no evidence whatsoever that the Council took an entrenched position that Ms Martin’s needs were being capable being met at a property with the characteristics of 9 Smewincourt despite the offer of that property being withdrawn.
72. Secondly, when it was first filed and served Ms Martin’s claim sought the remedy of quashing of the 26 September 2025 decision. That is still the principal form of relief sought. Supposing the court granted this, the effect would be to return the parties to the position that they were in on 25 September 2025 where the 9 Smewincourt offer was still a live one. This would make no sense because Ms Martin does not believe 9 Smewincourt meets her needs, or that the Council properly understood them at that time in the way that it now does as a result of the latest review, and in any event the property may not now be vacant. Granting the relief sought would serve no practical purpose whatsoever. This is the epitome of an academic claim. The fact Ms Martin seek interim relief in relation to her current accommodation situation does not change this. If the Council is failing in its duties now – a question which is not for me to determine – there needs to be challenged to that failure and interim relief sought in that context. Ms Martin cannot use challenge to a past, now irrelevant decision as a vehicle to secure interim relief to address any present-day difficulties.
73. Last, in the interests of completeness I should say that this is not a claim where judicial determination would assist with future decision-making on others’ rights and interests so the Salem pages 456H–457A exception does not apply. Nor, in my view, is it one where there is some compelling need to vindicate the claimant’s position in a judicial determination such that the Gardner/Smith exception applies. In any event, neither of these exceptions can arise in an unarguable claim, less still in one that is hopeless.
Conclusion
74. This claim is determined by agreement under CPR 54.18. Permission for judicial review is refused. The claim certified as Totally Without Merit.
75. On costs, the Council has not made a specific application far as I am aware. In any event, taking into account its “conduct” during the course of the litigation for CPR 44.2(4)(a) purposes, I have concerns about the appropriateness of any costs being be awarded in its favour in circumstances where it has not properly explained the reasons decision under challenge.
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