Civil United Kingdom
MARK JOHN MAYO v ELIZABETH ANNE STANBROOK EVANS
Neutral Citation Number [2026] EWHC 2797 (KB)
| Case No: L00BNP152 |
IN THE ROYAL COURTS OF JUSTICE
KING’S BENCH DIVISION
Royal Courts of Justice
Strand
London
WC2A 2LL
BEFORE:
MASTER DAGNALL
BETWEEN:
| MARK JOHN MAYO | CLAIMANT | |
| – and – | ||
| ELIZABETH ANNE STANBROOK EVANS JUSTIN WILLS |
DEFENDANTS |
Legal Representation
Mr Mark John Mayo (Claimant), Litigant in Person
Ms Elizabeth Anne Stanbrook Evans (Defendant), Litigant in Person
Mr Justin Wills (Defendant), Litigant in Person
Other Parties Present and their status
None known
Approved Judgment
Judgment date:10 March 2026
(start and end times cannot be noted due to audio format)
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| Number of folios in transcript | 62 |
| Number of words in transcript | 4,424 |
Master Dagnall:
1. What I am going to do is to give a short judgment in relation to this matter, which is a situation where I am dealing with an application notice of 26 February 2026 of the First Defendant relating to a writ of control issued out of the Central Office. That application is effectively for the writ to be either set aside or stayed. The situation is that there is litigation between the Claimant and both Defendants in the County Court, commenced in the County Court sitting at Barnstaple, although it appears to have been heard by the County Court sitting in other places, including in Plymouth and in Exeter.
2. The underlying litigation appears to be of a property nature but is of no concern to me for the purposes of this judgment. It has, however, resulted in three costs orders, one from HHJ Mitchell, on 21 March 2025, where the First Defendant was ordered to pay £1,750 in relation to costs by 9 April 2025, in which the First Defendant did not do. The second, following some hearings earlier in October, was on 29 October 2025, made on paper by HHJ Mitchell, requiring the First Defendant to pay £2,112 by 19 November 2025. The third was also by HHJ Mitchell, again made on paper, required the First Defendant to pay £1,636.80 by 14 January 2026. Those costs orders together total £5,498.80.
3. The First Defendant has sought to appeal earlier orders of Judge Mitchell’s made in October 2025 and to seek a stay of the Costs Order of 29 October 2025. In order to be able to bring such an appeal, the First Defendant required both permission to appeal and permission to file an appeal notice out of time. Those matters came before HHJ Blohm KC, sitting as a Deputy Judge of the High Court in a Bristol District Registry, on 27 January 2025. He granted the extension of time to file an appeal notice, and he referred the question of permission to appeal off to another occasion. However, he refused to stay the Costs Order, on the basis of the usual approach that an appeal does not of itself operate as a stay of a Costs Order or other order made below, and that there has to be a reason as to why such a stay should be granted, usually based on questions of affordability but the First Defendant had not provided sufficient evidence to say that she was unable to pay the amount of the costs judgment of 29 October 2025.
4. The First Defendant says that Judge Blohm had misunderstood her basis for applying for the stay. That might or might not be correct, and I am in no way deciding as to whether or not, on some other basis other than affordability, it would be appropriate to grant a stay in support of an appeal. However, I do point out very much to the First Defendant that the usual rule is that a stay is not granted on the basis that, if someone is able to pay the money they can do so, and if they succeed on the appeal, they potentially will get an order for the money to be repaid (although the demonstration of the existence of a real risk as to whether such a repayment would actually be made may be a possible reason for granting a stay).
5. However, that is only a general approach and is subject very much to a consideration by the appeal judge as to how they should exercise their discretion in light of the factual and evidential material before them. I note also that it is unclear to me whether there is an appeal against Judge Mitchell’s Costs Order of 29 October 2025, or an appeal against the third costs order, even if they are indirectly being attacked by the main appeal itself, a matter which the First Defendant may wish to clarify with the appeal court.
6. Further, there is no appeal against the Costs Order of 21 March 2025. The First Defendant says that that is because she has not been provided with an underlying costs schedule N260 relating to the March 2025 costs order, a matter which is heavily in dispute between the parties. She says that she cannot bring an appeal without having the N260. In any event, the First Defendant contends that that order and all the other orders are unjust or, she would say, fraudulent, on the basis that relevant costs had not been paid by Mr Mayo, the Claimant, to his solicitors, and that there are obvious mathematical discrepancies in the costs schedules and other material produced by those solicitors.
7. It seems to me at first sight, although I have no need to, and do not finally, decide this, that the First Defendant is possibly operating under a number of misconceptions as to the law. The first point is that an order made by the court is binding unless or until set aside, either by the court that made it or on appeal. That general rule has been recently reiterated by the Supreme Court in the decision of R (on the application of Majera) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2021] UKSC 46 at paragraphs [43] and [44] onwards, where it is made clear, for example:
“It is a well established principle of our constitutional law that a court order must be obeyed unless or until it has been set aside or varied by the court (or, conceivably, overruled by legislation).”
8. Secondly, that, although the rules provide for an N260 to be provided within certain periods of time, the Court can always waive that requirement under its general discretionary power under Civil Procedure Rule 3.10 and proceed as it considers to be just, in accordance with the Civil Procedure Rules overriding objective, CPR 1.1.
9. Thirdly, that an appeal can be brought under Civil Procedure Rules 52.21(3) effectively on two main bases, (a) that the decision below was “wrong”, although there is a limited meaning given to the word “wrong” as used in that rule, or (b) because it was:
“Unjust because of a serious procedural or other irregularity in the proceedings in the lower court.”
10. If a person says that there was something improper in the hearing, such as they had not received a relevant document, or that they had not been heard, or even that there was actual or apparent bias on the part of the judge, such as to make the outcome unjust, then that is a potential basis of appeal. Whether or not the appeal court would consider that there had been a sufficient irregularity, or that it was such as to make the outcome unjust, would be a matter for the appeal court.
11. Fourthly, if a person wishes to say they cannot tell whether they have a ground for appeal because they have not received a particular document or have lost it, they have the usual abilities to seek to obtain documents from court files. Otherwise, the ordinary situation is that they should decide whether or not to take their own chance by putting in an appeal notice, and saying to the court that there should be, or making an application to the court for, disclosure of relevant material. All of those matters, again, are for the appeal court.
12. However, for the reasons which I have given, it seems to me that it would be quite wrong for me to proceed on the basis I should decide that in some way or other the County Court’s costs orders are a nullity and are simply to be treated as altogether invalid. I am not the appeal court. The appeal court is the Bristol District Registry, and appeals are dealt with by High Court Judges, or Circuit Judges or Recorders or others sitting as Deputy High Court Judges, and not by Masters.
13. I return, though, to what has happened in this case. The Claimant instructed the High Court Enforcement Officer, Ms Sandbrook, to apply for a relevant enforcement of the costs orders. My understanding is that Ms Sandbrook’s operational body employs at least one lawyer within it. In any event, it, on the Claimant’s behalf, presented a form N293A to the County Court. That is a procedure which exists under the Civil Procedure Rules, Rule 40.14A, which in sub rule (1) provides that a:
“Person who wishes to have a certificate of any judgment or order given or made in the claim in the County Court may make a request in writing to the court.”
14. Sub rule 40.14A(4) provides that:
“Where the certificate is required for the purpose of enforcing the judgment or order in the High Court, the applicant must also either –
(a) state that –
(i) it is intended to enforce the judgment or order by execution against goods…”
That being the particular scenario here.
15. Sub rule 40.14A(6) provides that where the Applicant, who here is technically the Claimant, is making the request:
“A certificate under this rule may be signed by a court officer.”
Civil Procedure Rule 83.19 provides in CPR83.19(4) that, where the certificate is granted under those provisions, the grant of the certificate takes effect as if an order had been made to transfer the proceedings, here the proceedings being the cost orders, to the High Court for the purposes of enforcement.
16. The certificate was filled out with just simply the total sum of £5,498.80 and was signed and dated by the County Court’s court officer, one M Kelly.
17. The First Defendant says that this was a matter which needed to be dealt with by the judge, and not a court officer, particularly as the First Defendant was complaining that the costs orders had been made as a result of various misrepresentations made to the judge.
18. It does not seem to me that there has been any apparent non-compliance with the rules here. The certificate was applied for on behalf of the Claimant, and the certificate was signed by the court officer. That is what the rules provide and the certificate operates as a transfer of the relevant judgments to the High Court for the purposes of enforcement.
19. I point out that under section 42(6) of the County Courts Act 1984, and notwithstanding that the above had happened, the County Court retains the power to set aside, correct, vary, or quash the judgment, and the other enactments relating to appeals from a judgment or order continue to apply. So, appeals from the costs judgments made by the Circuit Judge are still to a High Court Judge.
20. It seems to me that the court officer has the power under the rules to sign the certificate, whether or not some query is being made with regards to the mathematics.
21. Technically, under the rules – see CPR83.19(4), the situation would be different if an application had actually been issued to the County Court to set aside or vary its orders, but nobody has suggested that that is the situation or that there is any subsisting application to the County Court. All that has been said is that documents had been sent in complaining that the costs orders had been made. But an application requires an application notice under Civil Procedure Rule Part 23 (unless that requirement had been waived by the court, and which had not occurred – see CPR23.3), and nobody has suggested in their evidence that such an application notice exists.
22. The N293A Certificate goes on in its part 3 to contain the usual wording directing that a writ should be issued.
23. Often, the County Court does not complete that wording in any way; part 3 is effectively left blank, and with the consequence in the writ of control procedure that it is simply up to the Claimant and their High Court Enforcement Officer as to which part of the High Court to go to ask for the writ to be issued, whatever the potential convenience or inconvenience of the venue which is chosen [the position is different with regard to writs of possession where the writ generally has to be issued out of the District Registry in whose county court district the relevant land is located, see CPR30.4(3)].
24. However, in this case, the part 3 has been completed with both the date of 9 February 2026 and also a High Court seal, or what at least purports to be a High Court seal, and there is nothing to suggest that it is not, which seal has the following contents:
The words "His Majesty's High Court of Justice”, a picture of a Crown, the date of “9 Feb 2026”, and the further words “District registry”.
25. At first sight, it seems to me, therefore, that a district registry and someone operating within it has decided to carry the part 3 into effect. I am somewhat confused about this because the seal does not identify which district registry it is. That seems to me to be highly unfortunate and undesirable. While there is now a single County Court which sits in a number of different locations (see section A1 of the County Courts Act 1984 introduced by section 17 of the Crime and Courts Act 2013), the High Court is divided up into London locations (being the Central Office of the King’s Bench Division in the Royal Courts of Justice and other parts located in the Rolls Building) and a number of distinct District Registries which have their own individual existences (see section 99 of the Senior Courts Act 1981 and the Civil Courts Order 2014).
26. I also have a slight query about the form of the crown which exists within this particular seal, which is not the form of crown which is used in the Central Office or in the County Court. I am making enquiries with regards to those matters.
27. However, it seems to me to be unlikely that this seal is not a genuine seal. The date stamp and date are all 9 February 2026, which seems to be the dating of this Certificate which was being given to it by the County Court.
28. I think that the natural conclusion to which I should come is that what has occurred here is that the staff at Barnstaple, being of both the County Court sitting at Barnstaple and the Barnstaple District Registry, have used a district registry seal which has not identified the district registry as such.
29. It seems to me, though, that in those circumstances, the Barnstaple District Registry has become involved and that the matter is for the purposes of the Civil Procedure Rules “Proceeding within the District Registry”. That is something which Ms Sandbrook, as the High Court Enforcement Officer, has accepted before me, although Mr Mayo, the Claimant who has appeared before me representing himself, has really been in a position where he has been unable to say much about it.
30. In those circumstances, it seems to me that I need to have regard to Civil Procedure Rule 23.2(6), which provides:
“If an application is made after proceedings to enforce judgment have begun, it must be made to the court or County Court hearing centre which is dealing with the enforcement of the judgment unless any enactment rule or practice direction states otherwise.”
31. Here, the situation seems to me to be that the Barnstaple District Registry has become involved in and regards itself as dealing with the enforcement of the judgment and that the certificate provides that that is the case and so that the certificate operates as a transfer to the Barnstaple District Registry; and all so that it is Barnstaple District Registry which then became the “court… which is dealing with the enforcement of the judgment”. If I am wrong about the relevant district registry being the Barnstaple District Registry, then it would be some other specific district registry to which the certificate had effected the transfer and which would be the “court… which is dealing with the enforcement of the judgment”.
32. This writ was, however, issued out of the Central Office. In these particular circumstances, it seems to me that that is an error of procedure, the writ should have have been issued out the (Barnstaple) District Registry in which the enforcement process was proceeding.
33. It is further an error of procedure which seems to me to be undesirable, because, as is the case even where (unlike here) a district registry or other part of the High Court is not dealing with enforcement within the meaning of CPR 23.2, it is potentially highly inconvenient and contrary to the overriding objective for the writ to be issued out of the Central Office if there is a lack of connection between the proceedings and/or their subject-matter with the Central Office and the London area.
34. The parties in this case live and are based in Devon, and the place where the writ is likely to be enforced is in Devon. The County Court which is dealing with the matter is located in Devon. Masters, and indeed High Court Judges in the Royal Courts of Justice, have no access to the County Court file. For applications to have to be made to London in those circumstances, even with the ability to conduct hearings remotely, which I am doing today in order to save time, costs, and expense, simply seems to me to be potentially inconsistent with dealing with the case justly and at proportionate cost, which is what is laid down by the overriding objective in Civil Procedure Rule 1.1.
35. It therefore seems to me that the error of procedure is all the more important here.
36. However, under Civil Procedure Rule 3.10, it is provided that:
“Where there has been an error of procedure such as a failure to comply with a rule or practice direction—
(a) the error does not invalidate any step taken in the proceedings unless the court so orders; and
(b) the court may make an order to remedy the error.”
Sometimes an error of procedure can invalidate the proceedings effectively, such as with regard to failure to serve claim forms in time, but that is because there is a specific regime set out in the rules which takes priority. That is not the situation here.
37. It seems to me that the appropriate thing to do here in all the circumstances is not to set aside the writ as such (which would result in a waste of time, cost and resource in a process of reissuing and a further stay application), but to make orders which provide for a fair and appropriate procedural result. What it seems to me is appropriate to do here is to transfer the writ to a proper place and to give the First Defendant time to seek some sort of stay or other remedy with regard to the County Court orders, which the First Defendant can then use to seek to justify a stay of execution of the writ.
38. The situation effectively, for the reasons which I have already given, seems to me to be one that the First Defendant's real only possible basis for challenging the writ being executed is that she is bringing an appropriate appeal and that the circumstances are such as to make it just for a stay to be granted.
39. Judge Blohm has already considered once that it is not appropriate for a stay to be granted, but the First Defendant, it seems to me, effectively wishes to renew that application, saying that Judge Blohm has misunderstood its basis. I am not at all sure that the First Defendant would be able to persuade a High Court Judge that it was appropriate to grant a stay, but I am not dealing with the appeal process. I am simply dealing with what is appropriate to happen with regards to the writ, where that is potentially parasitic upon any orders made in the appeal process.
40. In order to achieve an efficient solution and to have the matter dealt with properly, where at the moment it seems to me that there has been a failure of procedure with regards to the issuing and location of the writ, I consider that what I should do is to transfer the writ and the First Defendant's present application for a stay to the Bristol District Registry, and to direct that any further application in relation to the writ be made to the Bristol District Registry, and to direct that execution of the writ shall be stayed for 28 days, with permission to apply to the Bristol District Registry. I consider that all that will give the First Defendant a proper period of time to decide whether she is going to try and make some further appeals, but also to make some application for a stay of the writ to the Bristol District Registry. There the High Court level judge (who would always be able to sit simultaneously in the Barnstaple District Registry should that be technically necessary or desirable) will be able to consider the writ in the context of whatever appeals are made, or are sought to be made, and will be able to take a holistic approach to this.
41. The judge in the Bristol District Registry will also have the advantage that they should be able to see the County Court electronic file, and even possibly also the County Court hard copy file depending on what has happened with regards to the appeal, and deal with the matter on a proper informed basis.
42. That, it seems to me, is the just way of dealing with this. It is permitted by CPR30.2(4) (transfer from the Royal Courts of Justice to a District Registry) and is supported fully by a consideration of the CPR30.3(2) factors (and in particular convenience in the circumstances and for the reasons which I have already given above). If the First Defendant says she requires more time, she can apply to the judge at the Bristol District Registry, although again that would have to have a proper basis for such an application.
43. I note also that the Second Defendant says that the First Defendant, who is the judgment debtor, has no assets against which enforcement can lawfully take place at the property which is named in the writ. That may be something which the parties should consider, but I have no application before me to set aside the writ on that particular basis, and it seems to me that if such an application is to be made, it has to be made formally by application notice supported by evidence, and again the appropriate judge to deal with such an application would be the judge in the Bristol District Registry.
44. A question has arisen with regards to whether the Claimant should send the First Defendant a further copy of a N460 schedule of costs relating to the March 2025 Costs Order. It seems to me that, where I am only dealing with the writ, it is not for me to make orders requiring such material to be provided. But it does seem to me that it would be a helpful thing to have done in order to try and reduce the amount of dispute which reasonably exists between the parties. I will therefore include a suggestion, but not an order, to that effect in the order which I am making.
45. The First Defendant, the judgment debtor, says that I should retain some regulatory oversight over these matters. It seems to me that I should not do so. Firstly, because I am merely a Master sitting in the Central Office of the High Court. It does not seem to me that I have any jurisdiction to carry out oversight over either the County Court or the District Registry, or High Court judges within the District Registry. Secondly, I am only dealing with the question with regards to the stay of the writ which is before me, and I am transferring the writ and matters relating to it to the Bristol District Registry for the reasons which I have already given. I am therefore not going to go down that route.
46. I do very much draw the First Defendant's attention to the fact that these costs orders, in court terms and in particular High Court terms, are relatively small. I do not know what is the underlying dispute, or what are the assets or other financial positions of the parties. However, I do suggest that spending a large amount of time, costs, and resource in relation to relatively low-level costs orders, at least in this court's experience, may well involve a situation generating much greater liabilities than those which are actually in dispute. I also again draw the parties' attention to the desirability for alternative dispute resolution, but also to the fact that the Supreme Court has said that court orders are there to be obeyed.
47. The fact that one may not like a court order and may feel that the judge got the matter wrong does not necessarily mean that it is a good idea to keep on trying to contest it. The system in this jurisdiction is that the courts are a way of resolving disputes. Judges seek to come to a proper decision, and the fact that a different judge might (or even would had it come before them) have decided the case, or a procedural application within a case, differently is often simply a feature of the system (especially where there is a discretion or an evaluation involved). It does not necessarily mean that the actual decision is so “wrong” that it should be set aside. It all depends on the circumstances. However, once a judge has come to a decision, any party should think carefully before deciding to spend more time, resource, and emotional energy in deciding to try and challenge it. They may well have a right to do so (and will generally have a right to, at least, seek to permission to appeal), and I am in no way saying that they should not consider exercising such a right or that they should not exercise it. But it can result in a much greater expense at the end of the day than if they had not treated the order as being final. I would, of course, suggest to the parties that obtaining legal advice is a sensible idea.
48. One other point which has been raised by the Defendant is that Mr Mayo, the Claimant, has not demonstrated that he has actually paid particular solicitors' costs. While the fact that certain asserted costs have not been paid may indicate that the costs were never actually due, it does not necessarily follow from their not having been paid that they have not been incurred. If they have been incurred by a successful party that may very well entitle them to an outcome that the losing other side should pay those costs, particularly since that then enables the successful party to pay their own solicitors. However, I only draw the First Defendant’s attention to that because it is a matter on which she might wish to obtain legal advice.
49. Nevertheless, my decision is simply as follows. I am transferring the writ to the Bristol District Registry, and providing that any further applications in relation to it must be made to the Bristol District Registry. I am staying the writ for 28 days with permission to apply for any further extension to the Bristol District Registry. I am going to include a suggestion that the March N260 be sent or resent by Mr Mayo to the First Defendant. My initial inclination is to reserve costs so far as there are any, because I do not know what the final outcome of this application is going to be, but I will consider other possible costs orders, bearing in mind that I have found that there has been a procedural error.
Approved30.10.2026
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