Miscellaneous Etats-Unis

RJ’s International Trading, LLC v. Crown Castle South, LLC

Official source
          Supreme Court of Florida
                             ____________

                          No. SC2024-0547
                            ____________

              RJ’S INTERNATIONAL TRADING, LLC,
                          Appellant,

                                  vs.

               CROWN CASTLE SOUTH, LLC, et al.,
                         Appellee.

                          October 29, 2026

GROSSHANS, J.

     Individuals can transfer land or establish legal interests in it

by executing deeds, contracts, and other documents. Often, such

instruments also impose continuing obligations. Not surprisingly,

these obligations are generally enforceable by and against the

original parties as a matter of contract law. But are those same

contractual obligations binding upon subsequent parties who

acquire an interest in the relevant land? The answer depends, in

part, on how closely the obligation is connected to the land itself.

Where a sufficient connection exists and other requirements are
satisfied, the obligation binds successors by operation of law and is

said to “run with the land”—an ancient term of art.

     In this case, the parties request that we answer a certified

question from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit,

which asks whether a prevailing-party attorney’s fee provision in an

easement agreement runs with the land as a matter of Florida law.

RJ’s Int’l Trading, LLC v. Crown Castle S., LLC, 

98 F.4th 1330, 1343


(11th Cir. 2024). 1 Framed differently, is a promise to pay attorney’s

fees an obligation that binds successors to the land? We conclude

that it is not. In so holding, we decline to extend the reasoning of

our recent decision in Hayslip v. U.S. Home Corp., 

336 So. 3d 207


(Fla. 2022), which addressed a materially different obligation.

                                   I

     More than three decades ago, Hidden Valley Corporation

bought two neighboring properties in Miami. Hidden Valley leased

one of them to BellSouth Mobility, later giving BellSouth (and its

successors) permission to use for telecommunication purposes a

portion of the adjacent property (which Hidden Valley retained). In



     1. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(6), Fla. Const.


                                 -2-
the easement agreement creating this nonpossessory interest, there

is a section entitled “Remedies for Breach,” which includes an

attorney’s fee provision. It states:

     In the event that it is necessary for either party hereto to
     file suit in order to enforce the terms hereof, then the
     prevailing party in such suit shall be entitled to receive
     reasonable attorney’s fees and court costs in addition to
     any other award that the court might make, from the
     non-prevailing party.

     Following creation of the easement, multiple transfers of both

properties occurred. At the time of the lawsuit in this case, RJ’s

International Trading, LLC (RJI) owned one of the properties subject

to the easement. Crown Castle South, LLC subleased the

neighboring property from BellSouth and had the right to use a

portion of RJI’s property by virtue of the easement.

     Conflict arose in 2020 when Crown Castle excavated portions

of RJI’s land beyond the easement and installed fiber optic cables

underground. Based on the unauthorized excavation and

installation, RJI sued Crown Castle in federal court. RJI asserted

five claims, alleging trespass and breach of the easement agreement

as two of the theories of liability.




                                   -3-
     The district court granted partial summary judgment for RJI,

finding Crown Castle liable on the trespass and breach-of-easement

claims. In doing so, the court ruled that a valid and enforceable

easement existed. It further ruled that Crown Castle’s excavation

and installation activities exceeded the easement’s boundaries and

constituted a trespass. The court made no determination as to

damages.

     Ultimately, following a six-day trial, the jury awarded RJI $1

for Crown Castle’s breach of the easement agreement and $40,000

for its trespass. 2 The district court entered a final judgment (later

amended), which reflected the jury’s assigned damages for the

breach-of-easement and trespass claims. 3 Crown Castle did not

seek appellate review.

     After entry of the updated judgment, RJI asked the district

court for an award of attorney’s fees based on the prevailing-party

provision in the easement agreement. Relying on property-law




     2. The jury declined to award any punitive damages.

      3. The jury awarded RJI a small amount of damages for its
last remaining claim, but RJI dismissed that claim prior to entry of
the final judgment.

                                 -4-
principles, RJI reasoned that the fee provision was a “real covenant”

that bound not only the original contracting parties (Hidden Valley

and BellSouth) but also those who succeeded them in interest

(including RJI and Crown Castle). Recognizing what Florida law

requires in this regard, RJI contended that the provision ran with

the land.

     Crown Castle opposed RJI’s motion for fees, arguing that the

fee provision was too attenuated from the land to “touch and

concern” it—one of the requirements for a provision to run with the

land. Instead, according to Crown Castle, the fee provision was

merely a personal covenant that bound only the original parties to

the easement agreement: Hidden Valley and BellSouth.

     Siding with Crown Castle, the court denied RJI’s motion for

attorney’s fees. It ruled that the promise to pay attorney’s fees did

not touch and concern land and, thus, did not run with the land.

In reaching this conclusion, the court noted out-of-state cases,

found support in Caulk v. Orange County, 

661 So. 2d 932

 (Fla. 5th

DCA 1995), and distinguished our decision in Hayslip.

     RJI appealed. The Eleventh Circuit first considered and

rejected RJI’s argument that it was a “part[y] hereto” as that term is


                                 -5-
used in the easement agreement. RJ’s Int’l Trading, 

98 F.4th at

1339

. That interpretive issue is not before us.

     Having resolved this issue against RJI, the court next assessed

whether the prevailing-party fee provision could be enforced as a

covenant running with the land. 

Id. at 1339-43

. It discussed

Florida law on this topic, including Caulk and Hayslip. In Caulk,

the Fifth District Court of Appeal held that the reservation of

eminent-domain proceeds did not run with the land. 

661 So. 2d at

934

. Hayslip, on the other hand, involved an arbitration provision,

which we found to touch and concern the land. 336 So. 3d at 210.

In the Eleventh Circuit’s view, Hayslip appeared to come closer to

answering the question in this case. RJ’s Int’l Trading, 

98 F.4th at

1342

. Yet, due to factual distinctions, the court was reluctant to

treat Hayslip as controlling. 

Id. at 1341-42

.

     Based on this uncertainty and other considerations, the

Eleventh Circuit certified the following question to us: “Under

Florida law, when an easement agreement contains a prevailing-

party attorney’s fee provision, is the fee provision a real covenant

such that it runs with the land?” 

Id. at 1343

. We accepted review.




                                 -6-
                                  II

     A covenant or obligation that “runs with the land” binds

successors who “become liable as promisors upon the promise

made by their predecessor” by virtue of their acquiring an interest

in the land. Restatement (First) of Prop. § 530 cmt. a (A.L.I. 1944).

Note that this liability is not based on any promise or covenant that

the successor to the land personally made. Id.; see also Huck v.

Kenmare Commons Homes Ass’n, 

382 So. 3d 759

, 766 (Fla. 1st DCA

2023). Invoking this doctrine, RJI maintains that the attorney’s fee

provision here runs with the land and is binding on Crown Castle

as a matter of Florida law, even though Crown Castle did not

personally promise to pay RJI’s attorney’s fees. Based on our

assessment of the law, we disagree.

     For a covenant to run with the land, three requirements must

be satisfied. First, the original contracting parties must intend for

successors in interest to be bound by the covenant. Hayslip, 336

So. 3d at 209. Second, successors in interest must have notice of

the covenant. Id. And third, the covenant must touch and concern

the land. Id. Our focus is on the final requirement, which is

dispositive in answering the certified question.


                                 -7-
                                   A

     Many jurists trace the touch and concern requirement back to

a 1583 English decision, known as Spencer’s Case, 5 Co. Rep. 16a,

77 Eng. Rep. 72 (Q.B. 1583). 4 In that decision, which arose in the

landlord-tenant context, an English court distinguished between

covenants that touched and concerned the land and those that were

merely collateral to it. Spencer’s Case, 5 Co. Rep. at 16b, 77 Eng.

Rep. at 74. The former could be enforceable against an assignee;

the latter could not. To illustrate the distinction, the court

identified several collateral covenants that would not bind an

assignee including: (1) a lessee’s promise to build a house for the

lessor on land that was not the subject of the lease and (2) a

lessee’s promise to pay “any collateral sum” to the lessor. Id.

     Two centuries later, that same English court explained that to

touch and concern 5 the land, the covenant must “directly affect[]

the nature, quality, or value of the thing demised, [or] the mode of



     4. E.g., A. Dan Tarlock, Touch and Concern Is Dead, Long Live
the Doctrine, 

77 Neb. L. Rev. 804

, 814 (1998); Gallagher v. Bell, 

516
A.2d 1028, 1032

 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1986).

     5. Since its earliest references, courts have used “touch or
concern” and “touch and concern” interchangeably.

                                 -8-
occupying it.” Mayor of Congleton v. Pattison, 10 East, 130, 136,

103 Eng. Rep. 725, 727 (K.B. 1808).

     In America, states accepted this common law concept as a

limitation on the enforceability of covenants by or against

successors. See Regency Homes Ass’n v. Egermayer, 

498 N.W.2d

783, 789-91

 (Neb. 1993) (canvassing cases on this concept from a

multitude of jurisdictions); Flying Diamond Oil Corp. v. Newton

Sheep Co., 

776 P.2d 618, 623

 (Utah 1989) (noting effect of the touch

and concern requirement). As for Florida, the first reported

decision applying this requirement appears to be Dunn v. Barton, 

16

Fla. 765

 (1878). There, while not using the specific phrase “touch

and concern,” we found that a restrictive covenant ran with the

land because it affected “the mode of enjoyment of the premises.”

Id. at 771

.

     Since then, Florida courts have considered whether certain

covenants or obligations meet the touch and concern requirement.

Caulk, 

661 So. 2d at 933

 (reservation of right to proceeds from an

eminent-domain proceeding); Maule Indus., Inc. v. Sheffield Steel

Prods., Inc., 

105 So. 2d 798, 799

 (Fla. 3d DCA 1958) (covenant

requiring maintenance of railroad facilities); Hagan v. Sabal Palms,


                                -9-
Inc., 

186 So. 2d 302, 304

 (Fla. 2d DCA 1966) (covenant restricting

what buildings could be constructed); Huck, 382 So. 3d at 766

(prohibition on street parking); Keyes Co. v. Frazier, 

213 So. 2d 276,

277

 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968) (promise to pay real estate commission);

Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Dolgencorp, Inc., 

964 So. 2d 261, 262

 (Fla.

4th DCA 2007) (restricting commercial use of certain property).

     In some cases, courts spoke in terms of the obligation

enhancing the value of the land. E.g., Maule Indus., 

105 So. 2d at

801

. But in those same cases and others, courts focused on

whether the covenant affected the use, occupation, or enjoyment of

the land. Dunn, 

16 Fla. at 771

; Maule Indus., 

105 So. 2d at 801

;

Winn-Dixie Stores, 

964 So. 2d at 265

; Huck, 382 So. 3d at 765. We

think that this latter formulation is doctrinally sound and

consistent with the concept’s history. Accordingly, when deciding if

the touch and concern requirement is met, courts should consider

whether the obligation is sufficiently connected to how the land is

used, occupied, or enjoyed.

                                  B

     Florida courts have not previously considered the particular

obligation at issue here. That being said, we believe that Caulk—a


                                - 10 -
case we cited with approval in Hayslip—provides helpful insight.

The covenant at issue in Caulk reserved to the original grantor

proceeds from any eminent-domain proceeding involving the land

conveyed. 

661 So. 2d at 933

. The Fifth District held that this

covenant did not run with the land, stressing that “[a]lthough the

covenant ‘concern[ed]’ the land” in some sense, it did so “only

tangentially.” 

Id. at 934

. That is, the covenant did not directly

impact the property. 

Id.


     Like the covenant in Caulk, the fee provision in question is

simply too attenuated from the use, enjoyment, or occupation of the

land to touch and concern it. The obligation does not restrict or

proscribe how the land RJI owns can be used. Nor does it govern

who can enjoy or make use of it. Put simply, the fee provision itself

does not meaningfully bear on the use of the land or otherwise

enhance the day-to-day enjoyment of it or impact its mode of

occupation. Although the fee provision may provide a financial

benefit to the prevailing party in a dispute, it does not alter the

parties’ rights or remedies with respect to the property itself. And,

it only becomes relevant after the parties have exhausted all legal

and equitable remedies in court.


                                 - 11 -
     In light of this, we find that the fee provision is, at best, only

tangentially related to the land. See id.; Huck, 382 So. 3d at 765-

66. Thus, the attenuated connection between the fee provision and

the land renders the provision incapable of running with the land

so as to bind successors to the property, such as Crown Castle.

     We note that our holding aligns with the majority of courts

outside of Florida that have addressed the precise issue of whether

a fee provision touches and concerns the land. See Est. of Ogumoro

v. Han Yoon Ko, No. CV-06-0015-GA, 

2011 WL 5223117

, at *14 (N.

Mar. I. Oct. 20, 2011) (fee provision does not run); Fusco v.

Matsumoto, No. 2009-SCC-0030-CIV, 

2011 WL 12673474

, at *14

(N. Mar. I. Dec. 30, 2011) (same); Keogh v. Peck, 

259 Ill. App. 503,

518

 (1931) (same); Paloma Inv. Ltd. P’ship v. Jenkins, 

978 P.2d 110,

116

 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1998) (same); Lundeberg v. Dastrup, 

497 P.2d

648, 650

 (Utah 1972) (same). To our knowledge, only two courts

have reached the opposite conclusion. Jack Mathis Gen.

Contractors, Inc. v. Murphy, 

472 P.2d 820, 823

 (Or. 1970) (fee

provision runs); Solky v. Smith, 

129 Nev. 1152

 n.4 (2013)

(unpublished) (same).




                                 - 12 -
                                  C

     This brings us to RJI’s most forceful argument. RJI contends

that our recent decision in Hayslip compels us to hold that the fee

provision here touches and concerns the land. We see things

differently.

     In Hayslip, we held that an arbitration provision in a deed ran

with the land. 336 So. 3d at 209-10. We reasoned that the

challenged provision touched and concerned the land as it

established the means for resolving defects to the home and that

the outcome of any arbitration proceeding necessarily affected both

the home and homeowner. Id.

     The fee provision here is different. It is, as the Eleventh

Circuit noted, further removed from the land than the arbitration

provision in Hayslip. Specifically, the Eleventh Circuit said:

     In Hayslip, arbitration was the means of resolving alleged
     defects in the property. Hayslip had to arbitrate with the
     developer to force the developer to fix defective stucco—
     part of the property. The arbitration was thus one step
     removed from the property itself.
          By contrast, the fee provision here is two steps
     removed. The parties have already litigated their dispute
     over Crown Castle’s trespass and breach of the easement.
     And through that litigation, RJI has already been
     awarded both equitable and legal remedies.



                                - 13 -
RJ’s Int’l Trading, 

98 F.4th at 1342

.

     We underscore the nature of the obligation in Hayslip. The

defects subject to arbitration were construction-related, meaning

that they were physical, built into the house, and in a real sense

tied to the land. See Hayslip, 336 So. 3d at 210 (characterizing the

defects as being “in the home”). And as alluded to above, we also

stressed that the outcome of the arbitration proceeding impacted

the property, because it was the means by which the homeowners

could seek recourse from the builder for improvements or repairs to

the property. Id.

     By contrast, a prevailing-party fee provision does not govern

the resolution of property-related disputes. It comes into play only

after the dispute has been finally resolved on the merits and serves

solely to allocate litigation costs between the parties. It is wholly

unconnected to the use, enjoyment, or occupation of the property

itself or any interest therein. Accordingly, we find that Hayslip is

distinguishable and does not have controlling significance.

     We add one other point. It is undisputed that the touch and

concern requirement has not remained static since the late 1500s.

Decisions have, over time, relaxed the rule to some extent and


                                 - 14 -
found covenants enforceable that would not have run with the land

under the traditional common law. See e.g., Neponsit Prop. Owners’

Ass’n v. Emigrant Indus. Sav. Bank, 

15 N.E.2d 793, 796-97

 (N.Y.

1938) (promise to pay annual assessments to homeowners

association enforceable); Egermayer, 

498 N.W.2d at 793

 (similar).

Various reasons have been offered for this shift, including freedom

of contract and the availability of recorded deeds that did not exist

at common law. See Richard A. Epstein, Notice and Freedom of

Contract in the Law of Servitudes, 

55 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1353

, 1358

(1982). Hayslip, though not expressly relying on either rationale, is

arguably consistent with that trend. 6 However, RJI has not

convinced us to extend Hayslip’s reach under the facts presented

here.




     6. Neither party has argued that Hayslip is clearly erroneous
or asked us to revisit that decision in any respect. Moreover,
whether Hayslip was correctly decided and how these principles
might apply beyond the circumstances presented here are beyond
the scope of the question certified to us by the Eleventh Circuit.
See art. V, § 3(b)(6), Fla. Const. (providing that we “[m]ay review a
question of law certified by the Supreme Court of the United States
or a United States Court of Appeals which is determinative of the
cause and for which there is no controlling precedent of the
supreme court of Florida”).


                                - 15 -
                                  III

     Based on the analysis above, we answer the Eleventh Circuit’s

certified question in the negative and return this case to it for

further proceedings.

     It is so ordered.

COURIEL, C.J., and LABARGA, MUÑIZ, and FRANCIS, JJ., concur.
BARRIOS, J., concurs in result only with an opinion, in which
TANENBAUM, J., concurs.
TANENBAUM, J., concurs in result only with an opinion, in which
BARRIOS, J., concurs.

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION
AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED.

BARRIOS, J., concurring in result only.

     In response to the certified question, the majority articulates

the test for whether a covenant touches and concerns the land in

this way: “whether the obligation is sufficiently connected to how

the land is used, occupied, or enjoyed.” Applying this rule, the

majority concludes that the attorney fee provision here does not

touch and concern the land and consequently does not run with the

land. While I agree with the result reached, I do so for a different

reason. In my view, a covenant must be evaluated using a complete

understanding of the “used, occupied, or enjoyed” rule, which



                                 - 16 -
carries with it a requirement that the subject matter of the covenant

have a direct effect on the physical use of the property. I cannot

square my understanding of the complete common-law rule with

Hayslip v. U.S. Home Corp., 

336 So. 3d 207

 (Fla. 2022). For those

reasons, I concur in result only.

     The touch and concern test articulated by the majority has its

roots in Dunn v. Barton, 

16 Fla. 765, 772

 (1878), where we said a

covenant runs with the land when “it affects the mode of enjoyment

of the premises.” We applied that rule and concluded that an

agreement limiting leased premises to be used in a way that would

compete with an adjacent bar-room business was a covenant

running with the land. Following Dunn, we continued to apply that

rule, limiting the touch and concern test to covenants that directly

impacted the physical use of the land. See, e.g., Armstrong v.

Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co., 

95 So. 506, 510

 (Fla. 1922) (covenant to

maintain freight schedule and depot name did not touch and

concern the land because it did not relate to a thing physically

connected to or annexed to the property); Osius v. Barton, 

147 So.

862, 867-68

 (Fla. 1933) (covenant prohibiting commercial uses

within a subdivision was one running with the land); Frumkes v.


                                - 17 -
Boyer, 

101 So. 2d 387, 389-90

 (Fla. 1958) (provision of deed

dedicating portion of land for use as public road was a covenant

running with the land).

     Both the rule and application deployed in Dunn were

consistent with an understanding of the touch and concern

requirement as an inquiry into the relationship between the

covenant’s subject matter and the physical land itself. This

understanding was synthesized in the First Restatement of

Property. Restatement (First) of Prop. § 537 cmt.f (A.L.I. 1944) (“It

must in some way make the use or enjoyment more satisfactory to

his physical senses.”). The restatement explains that “it is not

enough that the performance of the promise operates to benefit

either the promisor or the beneficiary of the promise in the use of

his land but it must operate to benefit him in the physical use of his

land.” Id. In other words, a promise cannot run with the land

unless it relates to “the way in which [their] land [] is used.” Huck v.

Kenmare Commons Homes Ass’n, 

382 So. 3d 759

, 765 (Fla. 1st DCA

2023) (alterations in original) (“For the burden of a promise to run

the promise must be one respecting the use of the land of the

promisor.” (citing Restatement (First) of Prop. § 537 cmt. b)). That


                                 - 18 -
qualifier—that the enjoyment or use be related to the physical use

of the land—is critical for any coherent and principled application of

the rule.

     More modern applications of the rule began uncoupling the

use and enjoyment aspect of the rule from the physical use of the

land. For example, in Palm Beach County v. Cove Club Investors,

Ltd., 

734 So. 2d 379

 (Fla. 1999), this Court considered whether a

covenant requiring individual lot owners in a mobile home

community to pay monthly recreation fees to an adjoining country

club constituted a compensable property right when the

government condemned one of the lots. Over dissent, a majority of

this Court held that the covenant was a covenant running with the

land and that the country club’s right to receive the monthly fees

was a compensable property interest upon condemnation. 

Id. at

390

. Then in Hayslip, a builder’s warranty deed contained a

provision requiring that any dispute arising from a construction

defect be resolved through binding arbitration. We reasoned that

the arbitration covenant touched and concerned the property itself

because it affected the mode of enjoyment of the premises—

referencing Dunn—and that the thing required to be done (arbitrate


                                - 19 -
the dispute) touched the enjoyment of the land because the

homeowners benefit from the defective stucco being resolved.

Hayslip, 336 So. 3d at 210.

      My best reading of both Hayslip and Cove Club is that the

results of those cases are based on a misapplication of the touch

and concern test rather than an effort to move away from the

established common-law rule. My conclusion in this regard is

supported by both the majority’s reliance on and the Hayslip

Court’s “favorable citation” to Caulk v. Orange County, 

661 So. 2d

932

 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995). There, the Fifth District held that a

covenant did not run with the land, stressing that “[a]lthough the

covenant ‘concern[ed]’ the land” in some sense, it did so “only

tangentially.” 

Id. at 934

. In describing what it meant by

“tangentially,” the Fifth District explained that

      [u]nlike covenants respecting mineral rights and crops,
      for example, which directly impact the use of the land,
      the covenant . . . [had] no effect whatever on the land.
      The only thing the covenant in the instant case really
      “touches” and “concerns” is the intangible personal
      property, namely cash, that may be paid by a
      condemnor.

Id.





                                 - 20 -
     Viewed through this lens, I agree that, as the majority says,

“[l]ike the covenant in Caulk, the fee provision in question is simply

too attenuated from the use, enjoyment, or occupation of the land

to touch and concern it.” It is important to explain why though,

and in my view, the attorney fee provision is too attenuated because

it does not relate to the physical use of the land. I agree with the

majority that Hayslip is distinguishable and does not have

controlling significance. But it is difficult to discern the logical

difference between an arbitration provision and a prevailing party

attorney fee provision applicable to litigation over an easement. So,

I’d call Hayslip what it is—an outlier. This distinction is worth

articulating now, so when the next issue arises, whether it is a jury

trial waiver or something else, parties are not left to guess how

“tangential” the issue is and instead can order their affairs around a

clear statement of the applicable common-law rule.

TANENBAUM, J., concurs.

TANENBAUM, J., concurring in result only.

     At the outset, I join Justice Barrios’s concurrence in full. I

still want separately to expand on why a prevailing party attorney

fee provision cannot ever be a real covenant.


                                  - 21 -
     The Eleventh Circuit asks us whether a prevailing party fee

provision in a contract granting an easement constitutes a covenant

running with the land. Both an easement and real covenant

address restrictions and duties pertaining to the use of land but in

a non-mutual way, as I will briefly explain. By their very nature,

then, neither of these could include within their definition a

bilateral contract imposing mutuality of obligation. In turn, a

prevailing party attorney fee provision, including the one the

Eleventh Circuit asks us about here, could not—as a matter of

law—run with the land.

     First consider an easement. When an easement is created, “it

modifies what would otherwise be the normal right of [a] possessor”

of land. 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY: A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF

PROPERTY IN THE UNITED STATES § 8.4 at 231 (A. James Casner ed.,

1952). A possessor “subject to the burden of the easement” has

fewer possessory rights “as against the owner of the easement than

they otherwise would be.” Id.; see also id. § 8.5 at 232 (“An

easement consists in a privilege on the part of the person entitled to

it to make some use of land subject to it.”).




                                 - 22 -
     The grant of an easement is asymmetric; there is no mutuality

of obligation in an easement. Rather, an easement can entitle its

owner to “positive action within or upon the land subject to it” or “to

compel the owner of the land subject to [the easement] to refrain

from action he could take were his land free from the easement.”

Id. § 8.5 at 232. In this respect, under an easement, there is a

dominant estate (which owns the privilege to act or compel) and a

servient estate (which is subject to the easement’s restrictions or

requirements).

     A real covenant is similar, though it creates a contractual

obligation and does not necessarily vest the property interest that

an easement does. Still, for a covenant to bind the assignee of a

promisor or be enforceable by that of a promisee (absent an

assumption contract), the covenant must either diminish the

covenantor’s legal rights or increase the covenantee’s rights with

respect to some physical use or enjoyment of the land. See id. § 9.4

at 342–43. Putting it a different way, there are two sides to the

covenant, and the question about its running—whether it “touches

and concerns” land—must be separately considered for each side.

Id. § 9.13 at 374.


                                - 23 -
     On the one hand, “the covenant must always be capable of

running with the land of the” covenantee, “in order to be able to run

with the retained land of the” covenantor. Id. As to the benefit to

the covenantee, it must be as to the physical use of the land,

meaning that the benefit to the covenantee must at least be “by

reason of [the covenantee’s] ownership” and “physical use” of his or

her land. Id. at 379 & n.40; see Dunn v. Barton, 

16 Fla. 765, 771


(1878) (“Such a covenant as existed between Mrs. Barton and Dunn

would run with the land, affecting, as it does, the mode of

enjoyment of the premises.”).

     By contrast, the most that can be said about the prevailing

party fee provision at issue here is that it is a bilateral agreement

pertaining to litigation involving the easement contract. Cf. Levy v.

Levy, 

326 So. 3d 678

, 681 (Fla. 2021) (noting that a one-way

attorney-fee provision is “unilateral” and section 57.105(7), Florida

Statutes, transforms such a “one-sided provision into a reciprocal

provision”); D.L. Peoples Grp., Inc. v. Hawley, 

804 So. 2d 561, 563


(Fla. 1st DCA 2002) (defining “a bilateral contract” in terms of

“mutuality of obligation”). We cannot assess whether one party’s

burden or the other’s benefit runs with the land under the provision


                                 - 24 -
because it simply is not that kind of agreement. Rather, it is an

agreement with a mutuality of obligation that is, at best, merely

“collateral to the land” rather than “touch[ing] and concern[ing]” it.

AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, § 9.4 at 341. Simply put, a prevailing

party fee provision does not obligate one party to act or not act in a

way that benefits the other party’s land. Such a provision can have

no connection to the land “over and above the fact that [it has] been

placed in the” contract. Id.

     So it is regarding the fee provision in the easement agreement.

The prevailing party fee provision contained in the easement

agreement has nothing to do with the easement itself or the servient

property. The premise underlying the Eleventh Circuit’s question,

then, is flawed. In this respect, so is the premise underlying

Hayslip. Regardless of whether a fee provision appears in an

easement agreement or anywhere else, it is not the type of

contractual obligation that ever could run with the land. The

answer to the certified question is no.

BARRIOS, J., concurs.

Certified Question of Law from the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit – Case No. 22-11977



                                - 25 -
Dwayne A. Robinson and Abe Andrew Bailey of Kozyak Tropin &
Throckmorton LLP, Miami, Florida; and Faudlin Pierre of Pierre
Simon LLC, Fort Lauderdale, Florida,

     for Appellant

Eve A. Cann and Desislava K. Docheva of Baker, Donelson,
Bearman, Caldwell & Berkowitz, P.C., Fort Lauderdale, Florida, and
Joshua Tropper of Baker, Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell &
Berkowitz, P.C., Atlanta, Georgia; and David M. Gersten of Gordon
Rees Scully Mansukhani, Miami, Florida, and Jacob C. Cohn of
Gordon Rees Scully Mansukhani, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania,

     for Appellee

C. David Harper of Foley & Lardner LLP, Tampa, Florida,

     for Amicus Curiae U.S. Home Corporation and Lennar
     Homes, LLC

Manuel Farach of Mrachek Fitzgerald Rose Konopka Thomas &
Weiss, P.A., West Palm Beach, Florida,

     for Amicus Curiae Florida Land Title Association, Inc.




                               - 26 -

For advice on a matter of this kind in France, contact our real estate lawyer in Paris.


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