Miscellaneous Etats-Unis

Jesse Guardado v. State of Florida

Official source
          Supreme Court of Florida
                             ____________

                          No. SC2026-1605
                            ____________

                        JESSE GUARDADO,
                            Appellant,

                                  vs.

                        STATE OF FLORIDA,
                             Appellee.

                          October 29, 2026

PER CURIAM.

     Jesse Guardado was sentenced to death twenty years ago for

brutally murdering seventy-five-year-old Jackie Malone. The

Governor has signed a warrant for Guardado’s execution, currently

set for November 5, 2026. Guardado appeals the denial of his

successive motion for postconviction relief. He also seeks a stay of

his execution. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla.

Const.; see also State v. Fourth Dist. Ct. of Appeal, 

697 So. 2d 70, 71


(Fla. 1997) (holding “that in addition to our appellate jurisdiction

over sentences of death, we have exclusive jurisdiction to review all
types of collateral proceedings in death penalty cases”). For the

reasons that follow, we affirm the denial of postconviction relief. We

also deny his request for a stay of execution.

                                  I

     In 2004, Guardado wanted to rob a local grocery store to pay

for his crack cocaine habit and for repairs to his truck. 1 Guardado

v. State (Guardado I), 

965 So. 2d 108, 110

 (Fla. 2007). His attempt

failed after an employee intervened. Still desperate for money,

Guardado decided to rob Malone because she lived in a secluded

area and he shared a close relationship with her. Guardado had

rented from Malone, stayed as a guest in her home, and received

her assistance on multiple occasions.

     Guardado armed himself with a metal “breaker bar” and a

kitchen knife before driving to Malone’s residence. After arriving, he




      1. At the time of these crimes, Guardado had served
concurrent prison sentences—twenty years out of Orange County
for robbery with a deadly weapon and fifteen to twenty years out of
Seminole County for robbery and robbery with a weapon.
Guardado v. State (Guardado I), 

965 So. 2d 108, 110

 (Fla. 2007).
Guardado was conditionally released on January 1, 2003, with
supervision set to expire on February 6, 2014. Malone was
murdered on September 13, 2004.


                                 -2-
knocked repeatedly on the front door until Malone awoke. When

she came to the door, Guardado identified himself. Malone greeted

him, and he told her he needed to use the telephone. Malone let

him inside. When she turned her back, Guardado pulled out the

breaker bar he had concealed in his pants and repeatedly struck

her in the head. Malone raised her hands to defend herself before

falling to the living room floor. Believing she was still alive,

Guardado then stabbed her several times—including in the heart—

and slashed her throat. After the brutal attack, Guardado went to

Malone’s bedroom and stole her jewelry box, briefcase, purse, and

cell phone.

     Guardado waived counsel and pleaded guilty to first-degree

murder. 2 

Id. at 113

. Court-appointed counsel represented

Guardado for the penalty phase, and a jury unanimously

recommended that he be sentenced to death for Malone’s murder.

Id. at 111

. At sentencing, the trial court found five aggravating




     2. Guardado also pleaded guilty to robbery with a weapon.
Guardado I, 

965 So. 2d at 112

. For this count, the trial court
sentenced him to thirty years in prison, set to run consecutively to
the murder count. 

Id.



                                  -3-
factors: (1) the capital felony having been committed by a person on

conditional release supervision; (2) the defendant having been

previously convicted of a felony involving the use or threat of

violence to the person; (3) the capital felony having been committed

while the defendant was engaged in the commission of a robbery

with a weapon; (4) the capital felony being especially heinous,

atrocious, or cruel (HAC); and (5) the crime having been committed

in a cold, calculated and premeditated manner (CCP). 

Id. at 112

.

Guardado asked the trial court not to consider any statutory

mitigating factors, but the court still found nineteen nonstatutory

mitigating factors. 

Id.

 Ultimately, the trial court sentenced

Guardado to death. 

Id. at 111-13

.

     In 2005, Guardado directly appealed, raising four issues.3 

Id.

at 113-18

. This Court affirmed Guardado’s judgment and sentence




      3. Guardado raised the following issues: (1) whether the trial
court erred by failing to conduct an adequate inquiry under Nelson
v. State, 

274 So. 2d 256

 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973), after Guardado
expressly asked the court to remove his court-appointed counsel;
(2) whether the trial court erred by instructing the jury it could
consider the HAC aggravator; (3) whether the trial court erred by
instructing the jury that it could consider the CCP aggravator; and
(4) whether the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss
on the ground that Florida’s death penalty was unconstitutional

                                 -4-
of death. Id. at 120. The United States Supreme Court denied

Guardado’s petition for certiorari. Guardado v. Florida, 

552 U.S.

1197

 (2008).

     Guardado next sought postconviction relief under Florida Rule

of Criminal Procedure 3.851. Guardado v. State (Guardado II), 

176

So. 3d 886, 889

 (Fla. 2015). He filed his initial postconviction

motion in October 2008 and an amended motion in June 2010. 

Id.

at 892

. Following an evidentiary hearing, the circuit court denied

relief, and we affirmed. 4 

Id. at 899

.

     In 2017, Guardado filed a successive postconviction motion

arguing that he was entitled to relief under Hurst v. Florida, 577




under Ring v. Arizona, 

536 U.S. 584

 (2002). Guardado I, 

965 So. 2d
at 113-18

.

      4. Guardado raised the following ineffective assistance of
counsel claims on appeal: (1) counsel failed to conduct a reasonable
mitigation investigation by not contacting ten potentially mitigating
witnesses; (2) counsel failed to expand the mitigation investigation
when it became apparent that further investigation was necessary;
(3) counsel failed to object when two prospective jurors were struck
for cause; and (4) counsel failed to strike three allegedly biased
jurors who ultimately served on the jury. Guardado II, 

176 So. 3d
at 893-99

.


                                  -5-
U.S. 92 (2016). 5 Guardado v. State (Guardado V), 

238 So. 3d 162,

162-63

 (Fla. 2018). The circuit court continued the postconviction

proceedings to allow Guardado’s filing a habeas petition with this

Court. Id.; Guardado v. Jones (Guardado III), 

226 So. 3d 213, 214


(Fla. 2017). This Court denied that petition. Guardado III, 

226 So.

3d at 215

. Guardado then filed a motion for rehearing, which this

Court also denied. Guardado v. Jones (Guardado IV), No. SC17-

389, 

2017 WL 4150352

 (Fla. Sep. 19, 2017). The United States

Supreme Court denied Guardado’s certiorari petition that followed.

Guardado v. Jones, 

584 U.S. 922

 (2018).

     After this Court denied habeas relief, the circuit court

summarily denied Guardado’s successive rule 3.851 motion.

Guardado V, 

238 So. 3d at 163

. This Court affirmed, holding that

Guardado’s claims had already been rejected in the habeas




     5. A few years prior to the filing of Guardado’s successive
motion for postconviction relief, he joined as a party to a petition
seeking to invoke this Court’s all writs jurisdiction. This Court
transferred the petition to the Eighth Judicial Circuit Court, where
it was ultimately dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Morrison v.
Bondi, No. SC15-1481 (Fla. Oct. 8, 2015); Morrison v. Bondi, No. 63-
2015-CA-00099 (Fla. 8th Cir. Ct. Mar. 4, 2016).


                                -6-
proceeding. 

Id. at 164

. The United States Supreme Court again

denied certiorari relief. Guardado v. Florida, 

586 U.S. 1004

 (2018).

     Guardado then sought federal habeas relief, asserting five

claims. Guardado v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., No. 4:15cv256-RH,

2022 WL 22863709

, at *2 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 19, 2022). The district

court denied the petition and denied a certificate of appealability.

Id. at *21. Guardado moved to amend or alter the judgment or to

reconsider the denial of the certificate of appealability, but the

district court denied the motion. Guardado v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of

Corr., No. 4:15cv256-RH, 

2022 WL 22863708

, at *1 (N.D. Fla. Feb.

22, 2022). The denial of Guardado’s petition was affirmed on

appeal. Guardado v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 

112 F.4th 958, 995


(11th Cir. 2024). The United States Supreme Court once again

denied Guardado’s petition for certiorari relief. Guardado v. Dixon,

145 S. Ct. 2822

 (2025).

     On October 5, 2026, Governor DeSantis signed a death

warrant for Guardado’s execution.

     Guardado timely filed the successive motion for postconviction

relief at issue here, raising three claims: (1) that Florida’s clemency

process is unconstitutional because it denies death-sentenced


                                  -7-
individuals the minimal due process required; (2) that Guardado’s

death sentence is unreliable under the Sixth, Eighth, and

Fourteenth Amendments due to counsel’s representation at trial

and in initial postconviction proceedings; and (3) that Florida’s

warrant process is unconstitutional because that process deprives

Guardado of a full and fair postconviction proceeding, in violation of

his due process rights, and fails to satisfy the heightened reliability

required in capital cases.

     On October 14, 2026, the circuit court held a Huff6 hearing

and found that Guardado was not entitled to an evidentiary

hearing. On October 19, 2026, the circuit court entered its order

summarily denying Guardado’s successive motion for

postconviction relief. Guardado now timely appeals that order and

asks that we stay his execution.

                                   II

     Summary denial of a successive postconviction motion is

appropriate “[i]f the motion, files, and records in the case

conclusively show that the movant is entitled to no relief.” Fla. R.



     6. Huff v. State, 

622 So. 2d 982

 (Fla. 1993).


                                   -8-
Crim. P. 3.851(f)(5)(B). In reviewing a circuit court’s summary

denial, we accept as true the defendant’s allegations to the extent

that they are not conclusively refuted by the record. Cole v. State,

392 So. 3d 1054

, 1061 (Fla. 2024). A circuit court’s decision

whether to grant an evidentiary hearing on a rule 3.851 motion “is

tantamount to a pure question of law, subject to de novo review.”

Marek v. State, 

14 So. 3d 985, 1000

 (Fla. 2009) (citing State v.

Coney, 

845 So. 2d 120, 137

 (Fla. 2003)).

                                  A

     In his first argument on appeal, Guardado challenges the

circuit court’s denial of his clemency process claim, arguing

Florida’s clemency process violates the Due Process Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment. Guardado argues that clemency in Florida

is a nullity because it has not been granted to a death-sentenced

defendant since 1983 and because the current Governor has

expressly stated that he will not grant clemency to murderers or

felony sex offenders. In support, Guardado relies on Justice

O’Connor’s concurrence in Ohio Adult Parole Authority v. Woodard

for the proposition that clemency proceedings require “some

minimal procedural safeguards.” 

523 U.S. 272, 289

 (1998)


                                 -9-
(O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)

(emphasis omitted).

     Although we have acknowledged Justice O’Connor’s

concurrence, we have never adopted a requirement of specific

procedural safeguards applicable to the clemency process. See

Marek, 

14 So. 3d at 998

 (noting that “none of the opinions in

[Woodard] required any specific procedures or criteria to guide the

executive’s signing of warrants for death-sentenced inmates”).

Instead, we have repeatedly emphasized that Florida’s clemency

process rests in the unfettered discretion of the Governor. Art. IV,

§ 8(a), Fla. Const.; Fla. R. Exec. Clem. 4 (“The Governor has the

unfettered discretion to deny clemency at any time, for any

reason.”); see Johnston v. State, 

27 So. 3d 11, 25

 (Fla. 2010) (“no

specific procedures are mandated”); Zakrzewski v. State, 

415 So. 3d

203

, 211 (Fla.), cert. denied, 

146 S. Ct. 57

 (2025); Chavez v. State,

132 So. 3d 826, 831-32

 (Fla. 2014); Carroll v. State, 

114 So. 3d 883,

887-89

 (Fla. 2013).




                                - 10 -
     Here, Guardado received clemency review. 7 Indeed,

Guardado’s death warrant states that clemency “was considered

pursuant to the Rules of Executive Clemency, and it has been

determined that executive clemency is not appropriate.” So even

taking as true his allegations about the Governor’s blanket policy,

Guardado points to no authority prohibiting the executive branch

from considering the offense of the conviction when “determining

whether to exercise the ‘grace’ of clemency.” See Bryan v. DeSantis,

343 So. 3d 127

, 129 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022) (holding Governor’s denial

of inmate’s clemency application for commutation of sentence for

sexual battery by adult on victim less than twelve years of age did

not violate inmate’s right to due process, even though Governor

denied clemency applications of all individuals convicted of murder

or felony sex offenses). As in Bryan, Guardado has not been denied

all access to the statutorily established clemency process, identified

any procedures the Governor violated, or demonstrated that the

Governor failed to consider any required criteria. “[I]t is not our



      7. In March 2026, Guardado received notice that his clemency
interview was scheduled for July 2026. He alleges he only learned
that the clemency process had concluded when his death warrant
was signed on October 5, 2026.

                                - 11 -
prerogative to second-guess the application” of this exclusively

executive function. See Bundy v. State, 

497 So. 2d 1209, 1211

 (Fla.

1986). So Guardado cannot establish a due process violation.

     Because Guardado received a clemency proceeding, and he

challenges only its sufficiency, his claim was properly denied by the

circuit court. We affirm.

                                  B

     Next, Guardado argues that the circuit court erred in denying

his second claim, in which he contends that counsel’s performance

at trial and in the initial postconviction proceedings makes his

death sentence unreliable under the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth

Amendments.

     Guardado’s argument amounts to multiple ineffective

assistance of counsel claims. As to trial counsel, Guardado asserts

that counsel inadequately prepared for the penalty phase by failing

to both investigate mitigation leads and present additional

mitigating evidence, these failures allegedly preventing the jury from

hearing Guardado’s full background. 8 Guardado argues that, had



     8. Guardado identifies several categories of mitigation that he
contends could have been presented at trial, including his remorse;

                                - 12 -
the jury heard the additional mitigation evidence, it would not have

returned a unanimous recommendation of death. He also contends

that initial postconviction counsel likewise failed to discover or

develop this mitigation evidence.

     Guardado also alleges deficiencies in his initial postconviction

representation more broadly. He asserts that his first appointed

counsel had been barred from capital cases; that replacement

counsel did not investigate mitigation evidence and did not pursue

several claims; and that he went several years without

representation in state court. Guardado alleges that these failures

prevented the presentation of evidence that would have lessened his

culpability and that, as a result, his death sentence is

disproportionate and inconsistent with the individualized

sentencing required by the Eighth Amendment.

     Guardado’s claims are untimely. A defendant must file a

postconviction motion within one year after the judgment and



leads referenced in Dr. James Larson’s report (including childhood
sexual abuse and drug and alcohol abuse); his stay at the Dozier
School for Boys; additional sexual abuse and substance abuse as
an adult; and his lack of tools to succeed upon release from prison
and supervision.


                                 - 13 -
sentence become final, absent certain exceptions. See Fla. R. Crim.

P. 3.851(d)(1)-(2); Ferguson v. State, 

101 So. 3d 362, 366

 (Fla. 2012)

(“Claims raised pursuant to rule 3.851 must meet either the

timeliness requirements provided in section (d)(1) or the exceptions

provided in section (d)(2).”). The factual basis for these arguments

was available long before the death warrant was signed, and

Guardado does not allege or show that any exception under rule

3.851(d)(2) applies. See Cole, 392 So. 3d at 1061-62 (finding the

“harsh conditions at the Dozier School were exposed long ago” and

rejecting a claim based on that evidence as untimely); Bates v.

State, 

416 So. 3d 312

, 320 (Fla.) (holding as untimely claims about

mitigation omitted from a penalty phase that occurred decades ago),

cert. denied, 

146 S. Ct. 66

 (2025).

     The claims likewise could have been raised in prior

proceedings and are therefore procedurally barred. See Jennings v.

State, 

422 So. 3d 107

, 114 (Fla.), cert. denied, 

146 S. Ct. 402


(2025); Rogers v. State, 

409 So. 3d 1257

, 1263 (Fla.), cert. denied,

145 S. Ct. 2695

 (2025). Guardado’s allegations are not new, and

even if they were, they could have been raised in earlier

postconviction proceedings. Nearly two decades have passed since


                                - 14 -
Guardado’s penalty phase and initial postconviction proceedings;

accordingly, the claims are barred. See Atkins v. State, 

663 So. 2d

624, 626

 (Fla. 1995) (holding that a procedural bar applies to issues

which should have been raised in prior collateral proceedings);

Jones v. State, 

419 So. 3d 619

, 624 (Fla.), cert. denied, 

146 S. Ct.

79

 (2025); Bates, 416 So. 3d at 320; Gudinas v. State, 

412 So. 3d

701

, 712 (Fla.) (holding that a defendant’s claim is procedurally

barred because it could have been previously raised), cert. denied,

145 S. Ct. 2833

 (2025). Guardado’s invocation of the concept of

manifest injustice does not dissuade us from this conclusion. See

Reaves v. State, No. SC2026-1512, 

2026 WL 3071534

, at *4 (Fla.

Oct. 14), cert. denied, 

2026 WL 3132759

 (U.S. Oct. 20, 2026). The

circuit court therefore correctly denied this claim.

                                   C

      Finally, Guardado argues that the expedited warrant process

deprives him of due process, fundamental fairness, the right to

effective counsel, and access to counsel. The circuit court correctly

denied this claim because our precedent has repeatedly rejected

similar challenges.




                                - 15 -
     Guardado contends that he did not receive the same fair

notice as the attorney general, citing comments made by an

assistant attorney general at the scheduling hearing. The assistant

attorney general had remarked that a warrant could be issued at

any time during the past year given the pace at which the Governor

has been signing warrants. Guardado also asserts that, under

section 922.052, Florida Statutes, he was not eligible for a warrant

until the clemency process was concluded, and that he did not

learn that clemency had been denied until the warrant was signed.

But Guardado has long been on notice that a warrant could be

issued: his death sentence was imposed in 2005, and his sentence

became final in 2008.

     We have repeatedly held that expedited warrant proceedings

do not violate due process. See, e.g., Jennings, 422 So. 3d at

118-19; Jones, 419 So. 3d at 625. Due process in post-warrant

litigation requires only notice and an opportunity to be heard.

Bates, 416 So. 3d at 321; Tanzi v. State, 

407 So. 3d 385

, 390 (Fla.),

cert. denied, 

145 S. Ct. 1914

 (2025). So we have rejected similar

challenges to the length of the warrant period. See Barwick v.

State, 

361 So. 3d 785

, 789-90 (Fla. 2023); Hutchinson v. State, 416


                                - 16 -
So. 3d 273, 279-80 (Fla.), cert. denied, 

145 S. Ct. 1914

 (2025);

Zakrzewski, 415 So. 3d at 210-11; Bell v. State, 

415 So. 3d 85

, 106-

07 (Fla.), cert. denied, 

145 S. Ct. 2872

 (2025).

     Guardado cannot establish that the thirty-one-day warrant

period deprives him due process because he “has not identified any

matter on which he was denied notice and an opportunity to be

heard.” Jones, 419 So. 3d at 625. Guardado’s allegations of

gamesmanship and an unlevel playing field do not undermine the

application of our existing precedent here. The circuit court

properly denied relief.

                                  III

     We affirm the summary denial of Guardado’s successive

motion for postconviction relief. We also deny his request for a stay

of execution and request for oral argument. No motion for

rehearing will be considered by this Court. The mandate shall issue

immediately.

     It is so ordered.

COURIEL, C.J., and MUÑIZ, GROSSHANS, FRANCIS, and
BARRIOS, JJ., concur.
TANENBAUM, J., concurs with an opinion.
LABARGA, J., concurs in result.



                                 - 17 -
TANENBAUM, J., concurring.

        Capital collateral counsel should keep in mind that part IV of

chapter 27, Florida Statutes, and Florida Rule of Criminal

Procedure 3.851(h) do not give license to submit frivolous claims in

the post-conviction court or here, even if there is an active death

warrant. Rule 3.851(h), in particular, simply establishes a post-

warrant expedited process for the rare, last-minute, meritorious

claim for post-conviction relief. It should not be mistaken for an

invitation to submit just one more successive post-conviction

motion—any motion—for the mere sake of filing one, regardless of

whether it wholly lacks merit. More to the point, an active death

warrant does not exempt counsel from complying with Rule

Regulating the Florida Bar 4-3.1, which precludes a lawyer from

asserting an issue in a proceeding “unless there is a basis in law

and fact for doing so that is not frivolous, which includes a good

faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing

law.”

An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Walton County,
    J. Ryan Love, Judge
    Case No. 662004CF000903CFAXMX




                                  - 18 -
Dawn Macready, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Karin Moore,
Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Lisa M. Fusaro,
Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, and Merribeth
Bohanan, Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Northern
Region, Tallahassee, Florida,

     for Appellant

James Uthmeier, Attorney General, Jason W. Rodriguez, Special
Counsel and Assistant Attorney General, and Charmaine M.
Millsaps, Special Counsel and Assistant Attorney General,
Tallahassee, Florida,

     for Appellee




                             - 19 -

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