Family Etats-Unis

In the Matter of the Marriage of: Mark Jay Wondrack & Francisca Maria Wondrack

Official source
                                                               FILED
                                                           OCTOBER 29, 2026
                                                       In the Office of the Clerk of Court
                                                      WA State Court of Appeals, Division III




         IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
                            DIVISION THREE

 In the Matter of the Marriage of              )         No. 40513-3-III
                                               )
 MARK JAY WONDRACK,                            )
                                               )
                      Respondent,              )
                                               )         PUBLISHED OPINION
               and                             )
                                               )
 FRANCISCA MARIA WONDRACK,                     )
                                               )
                      Appellant.               )

       LAWRENCE-BERREY, J. — RCW 26.09.140 authorizes trial courts to award a

financially disadvantaged spouse reasonable attorney fees and costs from time to time.

In In re Marriage of Burke, 

96 Wn. App. 474, 480

, 

980 P.2d 265

 (1999), we held that a

clause in a prenuptial agreement that would prohibit an award of attorney fees and costs

incurred in parenting plan litigation is unenforceable because it violates public policy.

       On discretionary review, we are asked whether Burke authorizes a trial court to

award attorney fees and costs incurred for work other than parenting plan issues when a

parenting plan is being litigated. We construe Burke as authorizing this broader recovery

and remand.
No. 40513-3-III
In re Marr. of Wondrack


                                          FACTS

       In 2018, Mark Wondrack and Francisca Wondrack signed an antenuptial

agreement. Mark’s1 net worth exceeded $15 million while Francisca’s was

approximately $175,000. The agreement required each party to bear their own attorney

fees and costs in any dissolution or maintenance action. Mark and Francisca married in

July 2019, and they had one child.

       During the marriage, Francisca was primarily a stay-at-home mother. Although

Francisca did not regularly generate income, she paid one-half of the family’s monthly

expenses, including her hospital childbirth bill and a new family car. As a result, her

savings were depleted. While married, Mark bought a 2018 Porsche 911 Cabriolet and

claimed on social media that it was a present for Francisca.

       In July 2022, Francisca left Mark and filed for a domestic violence protection

order (DVPO). Soon after, Mark petitioned for legal separation. Francisca sought

counsel and signed a fee agreement for counsel to represent her in the DVPO and the

dissolution matters. In early 2023, Mark filed this dissolution action.




       1
        As typical in dissolution appeals, we refer to the parties by their first names to
avoid repeatedly using “Mr.” and “Ms.” We intend no disrespect.

                                              2
No. 40513-3-III
In re Marr. of Wondrack


       First RCW 26.09.140 attorney fee award

       In April 2023, Francisca moved for an award of attorney fees and costs under

RCW 26.09.140 and also because of Mark’s intransigence. By then, Francisca had

incurred $131,229.05 in attorney fees and costs.

       The court ordered Mark to pay Francisca $35,000 in attorney fees. The court also

ordered Mark to pay the costs of both parties’ psychological and parenting evaluations,

subject to reallocation at trial. The court further ordered Mark to immediately return

Francisca’s personal items that she claimed he still possessed and to provide her

possession of the 2018 Porsche 911 Cabriolet within 30 days.

       Mark did not return the items or provide the vehicle within 30 days and claimed

the Porsche was being serviced at a Porsche dealership. The court found Mark in

contempt for failing to return the Porsche to Francisca and reserved ruling on contempt

regarding Francisca’s personal items, pending his compliance. Mark nonetheless

continued to disregard the court’s order. Francisca then filed another contempt motion

based on Mark’s continued failure to return the Porsche. She asserted that Mark had

misrepresented that the Porsche was at a dealership and requested attorney fees. The

Porsche was actually with an exotic car consignment dealer and had been there for six

months before the court’s order.


                                             3
No. 40513-3-III
In re Marr. of Wondrack


       The court found Mark in contempt a second time for not returning the Porsche and

for lying to the court. The court found Mark’s actions constituted intransigence, imposed

$5,000.00 in sanctions, and granted $8,962.50 in attorney fees to Francisca. The court

subsequently appointed a guardian ad litem (GAL) to represent their child and ordered

Mark to pay all of the GAL’s fees, subject to reallocation at trial.

       Over the course of litigation, the court found Mark in contempt four times for

refusing to obey court orders. The court also found Mark intransigent three times. Mark

contacted Francisca’s sister and stated that he and his mother would completely deplete

their assets on the litigation.

       Second RCW 26.09.140 attorney fee award

       In January 2024, Francisca moved for a second award of reasonable attorney fees

and costs under RCW 26.09.140. In her motion, she requested $189,253.24 in attorney

fees, after crediting Mark for the attorney fees he had paid. She did not include the

$5,000.00 sanction award in this credit. Her request encompassed all fees and costs

incurred in the legal separation, dissolution, and DVPO matters. In response, Mark

argued their antenuptial agreement prevented an award of attorney fees. The court

ordered Mark to pay $40,000.00 in attorney fees for litigating child-related issues, subject

to reallocation at trial.


                                              4
No. 40513-3-III
In re Marr. of Wondrack


       First reconsideration

       Francisca moved for reconsideration. She argued the trial court erred in

concluding that Burke did not permit an award of attorney fees beyond those incurred on

child-related issues. She further claimed that nearly all of her fees and costs were directly

related to those issues. She claimed the court’s order placed her counsel in an ethical

dilemma because he was required to provide competent representation but could not rely

on RCW 26.09.140.

       The court denied Francisca’s motion for reconsideration. However, it said it

would consider awarding additional attorney fees and costs if Francisca’s counsel

provided a budget for trial, including estimated fees and costs for depositions and future

motions.

       When the court entered the judgment and order denying reconsideration, it

included an express statement that there was “no just reason for dela[ying]” entry of

the judgment because the order precluded Francisca’s counsel from representing her.




                                             5
No. 40513-3-III
In re Marr. of Wondrack


Clerk’s Papers at 2527. Francisca appealed the judgment and order. 2

       Second reconsideration 3

       While this appeal was pending, the litigation between the parties continued. Five

months after her appeal, Francisca’s counsel filed a supplemental declaration stating that

Francisca owed $277,710.29 in attorney fees, which he asserted placed him in an

untenable financial and ethical position. Counsel stated that his firm had to borrow

substantial sums to cover the shortfall. He attached monthly billing statements. The

billing statements reflected work on the dissolution and DVPO matters, as well as

appellate work. Francisca asked the court to order the title to the Porsche and the other

family car she and Mark bought to be transferred to her so she could sell them, purchase a

less expensive vehicle, and apply the remaining proceeds to attorney fees.




       2
         We doubt this matter is properly before us. Neither party sought discretionary
review under RAP 2.3 but instead treated this appeal as one permitted as of right under
RAP 2.2(a). The judgment appealed from is not a final judgment for purposes of
RAP 2.2(a)(1). Nor is it a decision determining the action that prevents entry of a final
judgment under RAP 2.2(a)(3). Nor is it a “final judgment” under RAP 2.2(d) that
involves “multiple parties” and “multiple claims.”
       Rather than dismiss the appeal at this late stage, we exercise our discretion and
address the purely legal issue driving this appeal—how broadly to construe Burke.
       3
         We address this order, related to the order on appeal, primarily because the trial
court directed that it be sent to us to supplement the record on appeal.

                                             6
No. 40513-3-III
In re Marr. of Wondrack


       On reconsideration of the earlier order awarding fees and costs, the court granted

Francisca’s motion in part. It found that Mark’s net monthly income was $72,055.09 and

Francisca’s was $6,080.74. The court determined that Mark had the ability to pay

Francisca’s attorney fees. However, the court awarded Francisca $188,911.49 in attorney

fees, rather than the $277,710.29 she had requested. The court stated that the reduction

was appropriate for several reasons.

       First, the court noted that Mark had incurred significant expert witness and GAL

fees and concluded that those amounts should offset Francisca’s attorney fee award. The

court also ruled that the sanctions Mark paid should be applied toward Francisca’s

attorney fees.

       The court also found that Francisca’s request included wasteful, duplicative, and

unreasonable charges, including: (1) appellate fees and costs before the Court of Appeals

adjudicated the matter, (2) fees for defending a Washington State Bar Association

complaint Mark filed against counsel, which the court noted may have been covered by

liability insurance, (3) billing administrative and paralegal work at $425 per hour,

(4) duplicative administrative work (e.g., communications with the court, excessive file

review, and excessive research), and (5) duplicative calls, e-mails, and e-mail review

between Francisca and her attorney.


                                             7
No. 40513-3-III
In re Marr. of Wondrack


       To assist paying Francisca’s future attorney fees, the court ordered the Porsche in

her possession to be sold and the proceeds placed in a trust. The court directed that a

portion of the proceeds be paid to Mark for GAL fees, with the remainder reserved for

Francisca’s future attorney fees. The court noted that any additional fees and costs would

be addressed at trial.

                                         ANALYSIS

       Francisca argues that the trial court erred when it awarded her substantially less

than the fees and costs she requested and that Burke places a duty on trial courts to

prevent a financially disadvantaged spouse from being deprived of their day in court in

matters affecting the welfare of their children. Mark responds that Burke does not

authorize the trial court to award attorney fees and costs beyond parenting plan litigation.

       We disagree with Mark. For the reasons explained below, we conclude that the

trial court has discretion under RCW 26.09.140 to award reasonable attorney fees and

costs to a financially disadvantaged spouse when parties are litigating parenting plan

issues and that such an award is not limited to fees and costs incurred litigating parenting

plan issues. This broad construction of Burke is necessary so that trial courts can protect

the best interests of children as long as parenting plan issues are being litigated.




                                              8
No. 40513-3-III
In re Marr. of Wondrack


       Relevant framework

       RCW 26.09.140 grants trial courts discretion to award reasonable attorney fees

and costs “‘from time to time’” in a dissolution proceeding by balancing the requesting

spouse’s needs with the other spouse’s ability to pay. In re Marriage of Moody, 

137

Wn.2d 979, 993-94

, 

976 P.2d 1240

 (1999) (quoting RCW 26.09.140).

       Reviewing an attorney fee award involves mixed questions of law and fact. Legal

issues, such as how to construe decisional authority, are reviewed de novo. Zink v. City

of Mesa, 

17 Wn. App. 2d 701, 713

, 

487 P.3d 902

 (2021). But factual issues, such as the

reasonableness of an attorney fee and cost award, are reviewed for an abuse of discretion.

Allard v. First Interstate Bank of Wash., N.A., 

112 Wn.2d 145, 148

, 

768 P.2d 998

 (1989).

       Marriage of Burke

       In Burke, we addressed the tension between RCW 26.09.140, the policy of

enforcing contracts freely made, and the policy “prohibiting marital agreements that

divest . . . court[s] of [their] authority and discretion over issues affecting the rights and

welfare of . . . children.” 

96 Wn. App. at 479

. In addressing this tension, we

acknowledged that RCW 26.09.140 is intended to ensure that no person is denied access

to the courts because of financial disadvantage. 

Id.

 (quoting 20 KENNETH W. WEBER,




                                               9
No. 40513-3-III
In re Marr. of Wondrack


WASHINGTON PRACTICE: FAMILY AND COMMUNITY PROPERTY LAW § 40.2, at 510

(1997)). We resolved the tension by concluding:

       In fair and fairly made marital agreements, parties may waive rights
       affecting themselves and their property. But the waiver of rights under
       RCW 26.09.140, as it applies to parenting plan issues, is not binding upon
       the court because such waivers violate public policy. The state’s interest in
       the welfare of children requires that the court have the discretion to make
       an award of attorney fees and costs so that a parent is not deprived of his
       or her day in court by reason of financial disadvantage.

Id. at 480 (emphasis added). Had the Burke court ended its discussion of this issue after

the second sentence, the holding would have required courts to limit fee and cost awards

to parenting plan issues.4 But the Burke court saw fit to provide financially

disadvantaged spouses greater protection. The court added the third sentence to ensure

that the financially disadvantaged spouse “is not deprived of [their] day in court” so that

the rights and welfare of children can be best protected. Therefore, we construe Burke as

holding: When litigation involves parenting plan and child support issues, a trial court has

discretion under RCW 26.09.140 to award reasonable attorney fees and costs to a

financially disadvantaged spouse, despite a freely made contract to the contrary, and such

an award is not limited to those fees and costs incurred litigating parenting plan issues.


       4
         Parenting plan issues include child support. Otherwise, the public policy
granting courts “authority and discretion over issues affecting the rights and welfare of
their children” would only partly be achieved. Burke, 

96 Wn. App. at 479

.

                                             10
No. 40513-3-III
In re Marr. of Wondrack


       Our concurring colleague asserts that we read the third sentence as holding that

“any financially disadvantaged spouse should not be deprived of their day in court.”

Concurrence at 3. We disagree. Rather, we read the sentence as saying exactly what it

says. Burke’s holding, as well as our clarification, is limited to parents litigating

parenting issues. Our holding simply clarifies that fees and costs awarded in that context

are not limited to those issues.

       Were we, instead, to limit fee and cost awards to parenting issues, the financially

advantaged parent could excessively litigate nonparenting issues and cause the other

parent’s attorney to withdraw for nonpayment before trial. Courts would be less able to

protect the welfare of children if the financially disadvantaged parent was unrepresented

at trial. Burke, as seen in the third sentence of the above-indented quote, contemplates

trial courts having authority to remedy this concern.

       We decline to affirm or reverse the trial court’s first or second interlocutory

attorney fee and cost awards. Rather, we limit this opinion to a discussion of the relevant

framework and our clarification of Burke.

       Attorney fees and costs on appeal

       Citing RCW 26.09.140, Francisca requests an award of attorney fees on appeal.

We grant the trial court discretion to award Francisca her reasonable attorney fees and


                                              11
No. 40513-3-III
In re Marr. of Wondrack


costs on appeal. In exercising its discretion, it may consider relevant factors including

the extent Francisca prevailed on appeal and the extent she eventually prevails on the

other interlocutory issues she raised and replied to in this appeal.

       However, simply because Francisca might not prevail on an issue should not limit

her recovery of reasonable attorney fees and costs. As noted previously, the touchstone

for awarding fees and costs under RCW 26.09.140 is balancing the requesting spouse’s

needs with the other spouse’s ability to pay. Moody, 

137 Wn.2d at 993-94

. And the

touchstone for the amount of the award is the reasonableness of the fees and costs

incurred. Reasonable litigation can encompass making sound arguments that ultimately

are rejected, either legally or factually. What type of arguments are “reasonable” is

inherently a factual determination and is subject to the wide discretion of trial courts.

       We remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.



                                           _________________________________
                                           Lawrence-Berrey, J.

I CONCUR:



______________________________
Hill, J.


                                             12
                                      No. 40513-3-III

       STAAB, C.J. (concurring) — Attorney Fees Under RCW 26.09.140

       I concur that RCW 26.09.140 confers discretionary authority on trial courts to

award attorney fees and costs and does not create an entitlement to all fees. I respectfully

disagree, however, with the majority’s broad construction that effectively permits

RCW 26.09.140 to categorically supersede a valid antenuptial fee-waiver clause and

award fees for disputes beyond parenting issues. While In re Marriage of Burke, 

96 Wn.

App. 474

, 

980 P.2d 265

 (1999), properly limits fee waivers in parenting and child-related

litigation, the freedom to contract, together with Washington’s policy favoring

enforcement of valid antenuptial agreements, supports honoring a fee-waiver for property

and maintenance issues once the agreement’s validity is established. Nevertheless, I

would hold that where enforceability is contested, a fee-waiver clause should not bar

interim fee relief until the trial court makes a determination of validity and enforceability.

                                        ANALYSIS

       Preliminarily, I agree with the majority that when applicable, RCW 26.09.140

provides a trial court with discretion to award attorney fees but does not create a

mandatory duty as Francisca Wondrack contends. This conclusion is supported by the

plain language of the statute. RCW 26.09.140 provides that after considering the

financial resources of both parties, a court “may” award fees. This provision is

discretionary and “neither spouse is entitled to attorney fees as a matter of right.” In re
No. 40513-3-III
In re Marriage of Wondrack—concurrence


Marriage of Leslie, 

90 Wn. App. 796, 805

, 

954 P.2d 330

 (1998). When exercising

discretion under RCW 26.09.140, the court should balance the requesting party’s need

against the other party’s ability to pay. 

Id.

 Courts may also consider the extent to which

one spouse’s intransigence caused the other to incur additional legal fees. In re Marriage

of Williams, 

84 Wn. App. 263, 272

, 

927 P.2d 679

 (1996).

          I respectfully disagree, however, with the majority’s conclusion that Burke

surreptitiously upset decades of precedent and held that RCW 26.09.140 grants a trial

court discretion to ignore fee-waiver provisions in valid property agreements. Majority at

10. Washington has a long history of recognizing the rights of people to negotiate and

enter into contracts regarding their property interests, viewing such agreements as

conducive to marital tranquility and the avoidance of future disputes.

In re Marriage of Matson, 

107 Wn.2d 479, 481-82

, 

730 P.2d 668

 (1986). Critically,

however, such agreements cannot affect the rights of parties with respect to their children.

Courts are not bound by agreement terms that purport to divest them of authority over

parenting plan issues including collateral issues such as the award of attorney fees under

RCW 26.09.140 incurred by one parent to resolve parenting issues. Burke, 

96 Wn. App.

at 479

.

          In Burke, the court recognized the general rule that the majority ignores: that “[i]n

fair and fairly made marital agreements, parties may waive rights affecting themselves


                                                2
No. 40513-3-III
In re Marriage of Wondrack—concurrence


and their property.” 

Id. at 480

. From this general rule, the court carved out a narrow

exception and held that such agreements cannot preclude an award of attorney fees under

RCW 26.09.140 for fees related to parenting issues. 

Id.


       Here, the majority concludes that the exception carved out in Burke was not

limited to parenting issues. Instead, the majority holds that Burke provides “greater

protection” in the form of discretionary attorney fees beyond parenting issues to a

financially disadvantaged spouse regardless of a valid antenuptial agreement. Majority at

10. I disagree for several reasons.

       Contrary to the majority’s conclusion, the exception created in Burke was limited

to parenting issues. The language relied on by the majority does not support its own

reasoning. The majority points to a sentence in Burke that reads: “‘The state’s interest in

the welfare of children requires that the court have the discretion to make an award of

attorney fees and costs so that a parent is not deprived of his or her day in court by reason

of financial disadvantage.’” Majority at 10 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Burke, 

96 Wn.

App. at 480

). The majority reads this sentence as holding that any financially

disadvantaged spouse should not be deprived of their day in court. Majority at 10. That

is not what the sentence says. In line with its limited holding, the sentence provides an

exception for financially disadvantaged “parents.” Burke, 

96 Wn. App. at 480

.




                                              3
No. 40513-3-III
In re Marriage of Wondrack—concurrence


       Moreover, the exception created in Burke was grounded entirely on the state’s

interest in the welfare of children. In support of its position, the court looked to

RCW 26.09.002, RCW 26.09.140, and in In re Marriage of Thier, 

67 Wn. App. 940

, 

841

P.2d 794

 (1992). The Burke court noted that RCW 26.09.002 mandates that the best

interest of the child is the standard by which courts determine and allocate parental

responsibilities. Id. at 478. In Marriage of Thier, the court refused to enforce separation

and prenuptial agreement provisions that purported to bind courts on parenting plan

matters. 

67 Wn. App. at 944

. Finally, the Burke court noted that the purpose of

RCW 26.09.140 is “‘to make certain that a person is not deprived of his or her day in

court by reason of financial disadvantage.’” Burke, 

96 Wn. App. at 479

 (quoting 20

KENNETH W. WEBER, WASHINGTON PRACTICE: FAMILY AND COMMUNITY PROPERTY

LAW § 40.2, at 510 (1997)).

       Additionally, the holding in Burke makes it clear that the exception is limited to

parenting issues: “We reverse because the attorney fees clause, as applied to the litigation

of parenting plan issues, violates public policy.” Id. at 475 (emphasis added).

       Finally, with all due respect, the majority’s holding is patronizing. The majority

concludes that RCW 26.09.140 provides the court with discretion to award attorney fees

to a financially disadvantaged spouse “despite a freely made contract to the contrary.”

Majority at 10. Implicit in the majority’s holding is the premise that financially


                                              4
No. 40513-3-III
In re Marriage of Wondrack—concurrence


disadvantaged spouses do not have the capacity to enter into substantively

disadvantageous contracts and therefore need parens patriae protection from the courts.

However, any concern that one spouse will use an antenuptial agreement to take

advantage of the other spouse is addressed at the contract’s inception. Courts have long

recognized that so long as a spouse is provided with independent counsel and is informed

of the nature of the property and the rights being waived, that spouse has the autonomy to

enter into a substantively unfair agreement. In re Marriage of Bernard, 

165 Wn.2d 895,

902-03

, 

204 P.3d 907

 (2009). The majority’s holding disregards this precedent and the

spouses’ autonomy.

       While I disagree with the majority’s holding that courts can ignore a fee-waiver

provision in a valid property agreement, I agree that the court in this case had discretion

to award Francisca her pretrial attorney fees. I would hold that when there is a genuine

dispute as to the validity of a property agreement, a fee-waiver provision is not binding

on the trial court until the agreement is determined to be valid.

       An antenuptial agreement is valid if it is either substantively fair or procedurally

fair; it is void from inception when both prongs fail. Kellar v. Est. of Kellar, 

172 Wn.

App. 562, 585

, 

291 P.3d 906

 (2012). The validity of the antenuptial agreement is a

threshold issue. The burden of proving the validity of a prenuptial agreement rests with




                                              5
No. 40513-3-III
In re Marriage of Wondrack—concurrence


the party seeking its enforcement. RCW 26.16.210; Marriage of Bernard, 

165 Wn.2d at

902

.

       This allocation of the burden of proof is significant in the pretrial context. “If one

party disputes the validity of the agreement, the agreement will not be given effect on a

temporary basis until the validity of the prenuptial agreement is determined either by

interim order or by final decree.” 19 SCOTT J. HORENSTEIN, WASHINGTON PRACTICE:

FAMILY AND COMMUNITY PROPERTY LAW § 16:22, at 431 (2d ed. 2015). Applying the

fee-waiver before that determination would effectively presume the agreement’s validity

in favor of the party who bears the burden of proving it, inverting the proper allocation of

the burden of proof.

       There are compelling reasons to hold that a contested property agreement is not

operative until determined to be valid. Unlike the majority’s position, holding that a fee-

waiver is not operative until the property agreement is determined to be enforceable does

not eliminate the fee-waiver’s ultimate effect. Instead, it maintains the distinction

between parenting issues and property issues as recognized in Burke. If the trial court

determines the agreement is valid and enforceable, the fee-waiver will apply going

forward on property-related issues. Deferring its application until validity is established

is consistent with the void-from-inception doctrine and with the burden-of-proof

framework.


                                              6
No. 40513-3-III
In re Marriage of Wondrack—concurrence


         In this case, Francisca has challenged the validity of the antenuptial agreement,

and the trial court has determined that the issue will be decided at trial. Meanwhile, both

spouses accuse the other of using abusive litigation tactics. Francisca contends that Mark

is intentionally driving up attorney fees and relying on the fee-waiver provision in the

contract to prevent her from affording counsel during these proceedings. Mark, on the

other hand, contends that the court should presume the validity of the agreement and not

award Francisca any nonparenting fees. In the alternative, he argues that Francisca

should be required to repay any nonparenting fees once the agreement is determined to be

valid.

         Mark Wondrack’s position would create a perverse incentive structure. A party

who drafts an unfair property agreement could use the fee-waiver to financially exhaust

the challenging spouse before the agreement’s validity is ever adjudicated, effectively

insulating an invalid agreement from challenge. This outcome would be contrary to

Washington’s policy of zealous judicial scrutiny of prenuptial agreements that attempt to

eliminate community property rights. Marriage of Matson, 

107 Wn.2d at 486

. On the

other hand, holding that a fee-waiver is not operative until the agreement is validated

provides an incentive for the financially advantaged spouse to resolve the matter quickly,

either by summary judgment or trial.




                                               7
No. 40513-3-III
In re Marriage of Wondrack—concurrence


       While the majority and I share the same concern about litigation abuse, the

majority’s solution goes too far and is not supported by RCW 26.09.140 or public policy.

The majority holds that a trial court can ignore a fee-waiver provision in an otherwise

valid antenuptial agreement and award attorney fees to a financially disadvantaged

spouse even for nonparenting issues, so long as the spouse is also litigating parenting

issues. The majority’s holding does not provide the same exception to spouses who are

not litigating parenting issues. There is no basis for this distinction or the majority’s new

exception.

       The statute certainly does not provide such a distinction. RCW 26.09.140 merely

provides that a trial court has discretion to award attorney fees between spouses based on

their financial resources. But other than the exception created by Burke, the statute has

never been interpreted to override an otherwise valid antenuptial agreement. Burke

certainly does not support the majority’s interpretation. As set forth above, Burke’s

holding is limited to fees related to parenting issues.

       Nor does public policy support the majority’s position. The concern for the best

interest of children is already addressed by the exception carved out in Burke. As I

propose above, concerns about abusive litigation tactics can be addressed without

completely disregarding valid antenuptial agreements. Indeed, the majority’s distinction

creates a financial incentive for spouses subject to an antenuptial agreement who want to


                                              8
No. 40513-3-III
In re Marriage of Wondrack—concurrence


litigate property issues to also raise parenting issues. How is this in the best interest of

children?

       Here, Mark is seeking to enforce the antenuptial agreement and therefore bears the

burden of establishing the agreement’s validity. The trial court has determined that the

agreement’s validity will be decided at trial. I would hold that the trial court has

discretion to award Francisca attorney fees related to the parenting issues under Burke.

As for fees related to nonparenting issues, I would hold that the trial court need not treat

the fee-waiver provision as operative and that it has the discretion to award Francisca her

property-related attorney fees pursuant to RCW 26.09.140 until it has decided the validity

of the antenuptial agreement.



                                                   ________________________________
                                                   Staab, C.J.




                                               9

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Trois recherches par jour, sans compte. Votre question est enregistrée et relue par le cabinet pour améliorer l’outil : n’y mettez ni nom ni information sensible.