Miscellaneous Etats-Unis
Kyle Robertson v. Cerebral Inc.
IN THE COURT OF CHANCERY OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
KYLE ROBERTSON, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. )
) C.A. No. 2026-0429-DH
CEREBRAL, INC., a Delaware )
Corporation, )
)
Defendant. )
)
)
)
)
REPORT
Report: October 29, 2026
Date Submitted: September 24, 2026
Andrew H. Sauder, Daniel S. Atlas, Matthew R. Conrad, DAILEY LLP; Attorneys
for Plaintiff.
Jason C. Jowers, Stephen B. Brauerman, Sarah T. Andrade, Abraham C. Schneider,
BAYARD, P.A.; Attorneys for Defendant.
HUME, IV, M.
The United States Department of Justice sued a company’s former CEO for
misconduct during his tenure and at new corporate ventures that followed. The
former CEO sought advancement from the company to pay for his entire defense.
The company paid initially. As the United States amended its complaints and
narrowed its focus to conduct at other entities, the company objected to footing the
whole bill. This litigation ensued. For the reasons below, I find the former CEO’s
conduct to be roughly apportionable across the entities and grant only a portion of
the advancement requested.
I. BACKGROUND1
A. The Parties
Plaintiff Kyle Robertson was one of Defendant Cerebral, Inc.’s co-founders
and served as its CEO.2 Cerebral is a Delaware corporation that provides a range of
telehealth services but focuses primarily on mental health treatment and medication.3
1
I draw the following facts from the pleadings and other documents of record. Unless
otherwise noted, pleadings and their associated declarations and exhibits are cited by
reference to items docketed in C.A. No. 2026-0429-DH. Citations are to: Plaintiff’s
Verified Complaint for Advancement (“Compl.”), Docket Item (“D.I.”) 1; Jointly
Submitted Stipulation and Pretrial Order (“PTO”), D.I. 51; Plaintiff’s Pretrial Opening
Brief (“POB”), D.I. 54; Defendant’s Pretrial Opening Brief (“DOB”), D.I. 55; Plaintiff’s
Pretrial Answering Brief (“PAB”), D.I. 59; Trial Transcript (“Trial Tr.”), D.I. 71; and
Joint Trial Exhibits (“JX”).
2
D.I. 1 ¶¶ 1, 20; PTO ¶ 7.
3
D.I. 1 ¶ 7.
1
As CEO of Cerebral, Robertson reviewed and approved privacy and data-security
policies, supervised marketing, and participated in data-breach responses.4
B. The Indemnity Agreement and Bylaws.
A February 2019 indemnity agreement (the “Indemnity Agreement”) and
Cerebral’s February 2022 Amended and Restated Bylaws (the “Bylaws”) govern
Robertson’s indemnification and advancement rights.5
1. The Indemnity Agreement.
The Indemnity Agreement defines “proceedings” as:
[a]ny threatened, pending, or completed action, suit, arbitration,
alternate dispute resolution mechanism, investigation, inquiry, administrative
hearing or any other actual, threatened or completed proceeding, whether
brought in the right of the Company or otherwise and whether of a civil,
criminal, administrative or investigative nature, and whether formal or
informal in any case, in which Indemnitee was, is or will be involved as a
party or otherwise by reason of: (i) the fact that Indemnitee is or was a director
or officer of the Company; (ii) the fact that any action taken by Indemnitee or
of any action on Indemnitee’s part while acting as director, officer, employee
or agent of the Company; or (iii) the fact that Indemnitee is or was serving at
the request of the Company as a director, officer, employee or agent of another
corporation, partnership, joint venture, trust, employee benefit plan or other
enterprise, and in any such case described above, whether or not serving in
any such capacity at the time any liability or expense is incurred for which
indemnification, reimbursement, or advancement of expenses may be
provided under this Agreement.6
Section 6 of the Indemnity Agreement provides:
4
JX 15 ¶¶ 6–7.
5
D.I. 1 ¶ 8; JX 1, 2.
6
JX 1 § 2(c).
2
6. ADVANCEMENT OF EXPENSES. To the extent not
prohibited by law, the Company shall advance the expenses incurred
by Indemnitee in connection with any proceeding, and such
advancement shall be made within twenty (20) days after the receipt by
the Company of a statement or statements requesting such advances
(which shall include invoices received by Indemnitee in connection
with such expenses but, in the case of invoices in connection with legal
services, any references to legal work performed or to expenditures
made that would cause Indemnitee to waive any privilege accorded by
applicable law shall not be included with the invoice) and upon request
of the Company, an undertaking to repay the advancement of expenses
if and to the extent that it is ultimately determined by a court of
competent jurisdiction in a final judgment, not subject to appeal, that
Indemnitee is not entitled to be indemnified by the Company.
Advances shall be unsecured, interest free and without regard to
Indemnitee’s ability to repay the expenses. Advances shall include any
and all expenses actually and reasonably incurred by Indemnitee
pursuing an action to enforce Indemnitee’s right to indemnification
under this Agreement, or otherwise, and this right of advancement,
including expenses incurred preparing and forwarding statements to the
Company to support the advances claimed. Indemnitee acknowledges
that the execution and delivery of this Agreement shall constitute an
undertaking providing that Indemnitee shall, to the fullest extent
required by law, repay the advance if and to the extent that it is
ultimately determined by a court of competent jurisdiction in a final
judgment, not subject to appeal, that Indemnitee is not entitled to be
indemnified by the Company. The right to advances under this Section
shall continue until final disposition of any proceeding, including any
appeal therein. This Section 6 shall not apply to any claim made by
Indemnitee for which indemnity is excluded pursuant to Section 10(b).7
Section 8 of the Indemnity Agreement addresses Cerebral’s assumption of
Robertson’s defense:
8. ASSUMPTION OF DEFENSE. In the event the Company shall be
requested by Indemnitee to pay the expenses of any proceeding, the
7
Id. § 8.
3
Company, if appropriate, shall be entitled to assume the defense of such
proceeding, or to participate to the extent permissible in such
proceeding, with counsel reasonably acceptable to Indemnitee. Upon
assumption of the defense by the Company and the retention of such
counsel by the Company, the Company shall not be liable to Indemnitee
under this Agreement for any fees of counsel subsequently incurred by
Indemnitee with respect to the same proceeding, provided that
Indemnitee shall have the right to employ separate counsel in such
proceeding at Indemnitee's sole cost and expense. Notwithstanding the
foregoing, if Indemnitee's counsel delivers a written notice to the
Company stating that such counsel has reasonably concluded that there
may be a conflict of interest between the Company and Indemnitee in
the conduct of any such defense or the Company shall not, in fact, have
employed counsel or otherwise actively pursued the defense of such
proceeding within a reasonable time, then in any such event the fees
and expenses of Indemnitee's counsel to defend such proceeding shall
be subject to the indemnification and advancement of expenses
provisions of this Agreement.8
2. The Bylaws.
Article XI of the Bylaws governs indemnification and advancement. Section
1(a) provides:
(a) Indemnification of Directors, Executive Officers, Employees
and Other Directors and Executive Officers. The corporation shall
indemnify its directors and executive officers (for the purposes of this
Article, “executive officers” shall have the meaning defined in Rule 3b-
7 promulgated under the 1934 Act) to the fullest extent not prohibited
by the DGCL or any other applicable law; provided, however, that the
corporation may modify the extent of such indemnification by
individual contracts with its directors and executive officers; and,
provided, further, that the corporation shall not be required to
indemnify any director or executive officer in connection with any
proceeding (or part thereof) initiated by such person unless (i) such
indemnification is expressly required to be made by law, (ii) the
8
Id. § 7.
4
proceeding was authorized by the Board of Directors of the corporation,
(iii) such indemnification is provided by the corporation, in its sole
discretion, pursuant to the powers vested in the corporation under the
DGCL or any other applicable law or (iv) such indemnification is
required to be made under paragraph (d) of this Section.9
Section 1(c) addresses advancement:
The corporation shall advance to any person who was or is a party or is
threatened to be made a party to any threatened, pending or completed
action, suit or proceeding, whether civil, criminal, administrative or
investigative, by reason of the fact that such person is or was a director
or executive officer of the corporation, or is or was serving at the
request of the corporation as a director or executive officer of another
corporation, partnership, joint venture, trust or other enterprise, prior to
the final disposition of the proceeding, promptly following request
therefor, all expenses incurred by any director or executive officer in
connection with such proceeding; provided, however, that, if the DGCL
requires, an advancement of expenses incurred by a director or officer
in his or her capacity as a director or officer (and not in any other
capacity in which service was or is rendered by such indemnitee,
including, without limitation, service to an employee benefit plan) shall
be made only upon delivery to the corporation of an undertaking, by or
on behalf of such indemnitee, to repay all amounts so advanced if it
shall ultimately be determined by final judicial decision from which
there is no further right to appeal that such indemnitee is not entitled to
be indemnified for such expenses under this Section or otherwise.10
C. Robertson’s Departure and the Formation of Zealthy.
9
JX 2 Art. XI § 1(a).
10
Id. at pp. 20–21.
5
In spring 2022, the United States Department of Justice (the “DOJ”) began
investigating Robertson.11 Cerebral terminated Robertson in May 2022.12 Several
months later, Robertson formed Zealthy, a new telehealth company offering online
subscriptions, and incorporated it in Delaware on December 15, 2022. 13 Robertson
served as Zealthy’s CEO, and German Echeverry served as Zealthy’s Senior Medical
Director.14 Both also held positions at Bruno Health, a Zealthy affiliate that provided
telehealth services to Zealthy subscribers.15 Robertson was its CFO, and Echeverry
was its President.16
D. The Florida Action and Amendments to the Complaint.
The spring 2022 investigation prompted the DOJ to file suit against Cerebral
and Robertson in April 2024.17 This suit is still pending in the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Florida under Case No. 24-cv-21376-RAR (the
11
PTO ¶ 11.
12
PTO ¶ 6.
13
Id.; JX 15 ¶ 41.
14
D.I. 14 pp. 9–10.
15
JX 15 ¶¶ 205–06.
16
JX 15 ¶¶ 204–05
17
PTO ¶ 14.
6
“Florida Action”). Within days of the filing of the original Complaint, Cerebral filed
a notice of settlement.18 The DOJ subsequently amended its Complaint three times.19
1. The Original and First Amended Complaints.
The original Complaint asserted six counts against Cerebral and Robertson.20
Counts I through IV alleged violations of Section 5 of the FTC Act (“Section 5”)
arising from deceptive privacy practices, deceptive data security practices, unfair
privacy and data security practices, and deceptive cancellation practices.21 Count V
alleged violations of the Opioid Act, and Count VI alleged violations of the Restore
Online Shoppers’ Confidence Act (“ROSCA”).22
The DOJ filed the First Amended Complaint the following month. 23 It
retained all six claims and added three more.24 Counts I through IV continued to
assert the same Section 5 claims against Cerebral and Robertson.25 A new Count V
asserted a Section 5 claim against Robertson and Alex Martelli, Cerebral’s Director
of Product and Group Product Manager, for unfair and deceptive marketing and
18
D.I. 14 p. 8.
19
See JX 4, 15, 53.
20
JX 3 ¶¶ 159–85.
21
Id. ¶¶ 159–77.
22
Id. ¶¶ 178–85.
23
PTO ¶ 17.
24
JX 3 ¶¶ 159–85; JX 4 ¶¶ 256–99.
25
JX 3 ¶¶ 159–77; JX 4 ¶¶ 256–99.
7
consumer review practices.26 The original Opioid Act and ROSCA claims became
Counts VI and VII, respectively, with Martelli added as a defendant to the Opioid
Act claim.27 The DOJ also added two claims against Robertson, Echeverry, Zealthy,
and Bruno Health: Count VIII alleged unfair and deceptive practices under Section
5, and Count IX alleged violations of ROSCA.28
2. The Second Amended Complaint and Motion to Dismiss.
In May 2025, the DOJ filed the Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”), which
asserted no counts against Cerebral and omitted the Opioid Act claim. 29 Counts I
through IV retained the original privacy, data security, and cancellation claims, but
asserted them against Robertson alone.30 Count V retained the marketing and
consumer review claim against Robertson and Martelli, while Count VI retained the
original ROSCA claim against Robertson alone.31 The claims previously asserted
as Counts VIII and IX became Counts VII and X, respectively, and continued to
name Robertson, Echeverry, Zealthy, and Bruno Health.32 The DOJ also added two
26
JX 4 ¶¶ 274–79.
27
JX 3 ¶¶ 178–85; JX 4 ¶¶ 280–87.
28
JX 4 ¶¶ 288–99.
29
JX 15 ¶¶ 318–70; JX 4 ¶¶ 280–82.
30
JX 3 ¶¶ 159–77; JX 15 ¶¶ 318–35.
31
JX 4 ¶¶ 274–79, 283–87; JX 15 ¶¶ 336–46.
32
JX 4 ¶¶ 288–89; JX 15 ¶¶ 347–54, 366–70.
8
claims against Robertson, Zealthy, and Bruno Health; Count VIII alleged unfair and
deceptive marketing and consumer review practices under Section 5, and Count IX
alleged violations of the FTC’s Rule on the Use of Consumer Reviews and
Testimonials.33 Each count incorporates the preceding allegations.34
Counts I through VI address alleged practices at Cerebral, including privacy
representations and disclosures, data-security representations and safeguards,
cancellation obstacles, fabricated or compensated reviews, and subscription
disclosures, consent, and cancellation mechanisms.35 Counts VII through X address
alleged practices at Zealthy and Bruno Health.36 These allegations include
misleading subscription and service representations, unauthorized charges,
cancellation obstacles, privacy and security practices, improper telemedicine
practices, fabricated and manipulated reviews, and ROSCA violations.37
Beginning at Section VII, paragraph 201, the SAC shifts from Robertson’s
conduct at Cerebral to his subsequent activities at Zealthy. 38 In describing those
activities, the DOJ compares Zealthy’s unusually high chargeback rate with
33
JX 15 ¶¶ 355–65.
34
See, e.g., JX 15 ¶¶ 318, 347, 366.
35
Id. ¶¶ 319–46.
36
Id. ¶¶ 348–70.
37
Id. ¶¶ 348–52, 356–65, 367–70.
38
Id. ¶¶ 200–05.
9
Cerebral’s rate while Robertson served as CEO.39 It also compares Robertson’s
alleged direction of fabricated reviews and suppression of authentic negative reviews
at Zealthy and Bruno Health with his alleged conduct at Cerebral.40 The DOJ further
relies on Robertson’s experience and the legal guidance he received at Cerebral to
allege his knowledge of ROSCA’s requirements.41 As to the Cerebral review
practices, the DOJ alleges that a December 2023 announcement of a settlement with
Cerebral and the filing of the First Amended Complaint put Robertson on Notice
that the challenged practices were unlawful.42
Robertson moved to dismiss Counts I through V of the SAC on the ground
that the DOJ had failed to allege ongoing or impending violations warranting
prospective injunctive relief because the challenged Cerebral conduct had occurred
more than three years earlier.43 The DOJ opposed dismissal, arguing that
Robertson’s ongoing Zealthy conduct supported injunctive relief based on his
39
Id. ¶ 266.
40
Id. ¶¶ 279, 298.
41
Id. ¶¶ 248–52.
42
Id. ¶¶ 295, 297.
43
Trial Tr. 28:4–29:7, 29:11–30:6.
10
Cerebral conduct.44 Its opposition included a chart comparing practices at the two
companies.45
According to Michael Pineiro, Robertson’s current counsel in the Florida
Action, the DOJ’s position required him to defend the Zealthy allegations to defend
the Cerebral-related counts.46 He testified that he would have needed to perform this
work even without Counts VII through X of the SAC.47 In the same testimony,
Pineiro expressly described Counts VII through X as pertaining only to Zealthy.48
3. The Third Amended Complaint.
On April 10, 2026, the DOJ filed the Third Amended Complaint (“TAC”),
narrowing the action to three counts against Robertson and Zealthy.49 Count I
alleged violations of ROSCA; Count II alleged unfair and deceptive practices under
Section 5; and Count III alleged violations of the FTC’s Rule on the Use of
Consumer Reviews and Testimonials.50 It omitted separate counts for the original
privacy, data security, and cancellation claims and for the marketing and consumer
44
Id. 31:3–20.
45
Id. 31:21–32:6.
46
Id. 8:13–24, 34:8–35:14.
47
Id. 36:10–24.
48
Id. 36:14–24 (“If you excise Counts VII to X, which only pertain to Zealthy . . . .”).
49
PTO ¶ 27; JX 53.
50
JX 53 ¶¶ 283–99.
11
review claim against Robertson and Martelli.51 It also removed Martelli, Echeverry,
and Bruno Health as defendants.52 The TAC relies on Robertson’s Cerebral-era
regulatory involvement and the New York Attorney General investigation to allege
knowledge of the applicable legal requirements.53
Count I of the TAC expressly addresses conduct at both Cerebral and
Zealthy.54 It alleges Cerebral-related failures to disclose health-data practices,
Zealthy-related failures to disclose subscription terms, and cancellation and
unauthorized charging practices at both companies.55 Count II’s specific allegations
concern only Zealthy’s practices, including cancellation representations,
undisclosed charges, medication costs, and allegedly illegitimate telemedicine
services.56 Count III alleges violations of the FTC’s Rule on the Use of Consumer
Reviews and Testimonials against Robertson and Zealthy.57 The TAC nevertheless
51
JX 15 ¶¶ 318–41; JX 53 ¶¶ 283–99.
52
JX 15 ¶¶ 336–41, 347–70; JX 53 ¶¶ 12–15, 283–99.
53
JX 53 ¶¶ 258–64.
54
Id. ¶¶ 285–88.
55
Id. ¶¶ 285–88.
56
Id. ¶¶ 292–95.
57
Id. ¶¶ 296–99.
12
retains substantial background allegations concerning Cerebral, although it names
only Robertson and Zealthy as defendants.58
E. Robertson’s Representation and the Advancement Dispute.
1. Counsel Changes and Initial Advancement Discussions.
In connection with the DOJ investigation, Robertson engaged Quinn Emanuel
Urquhart & Sullivan LLP to represent him.59 Cerebral began advancing Robertson’s
expenses as early as August 2022.60 Quinn Emanuel continued to represent
Robertson until February 2025, when Paul Hastings LLP replaced it as counsel. 61
Shortly after the DOJ filed the SAC in May 2025, Marcus, Rashbaum, Pineiro and
Meyers LLC (“MRPM”) replaced Paul Hastings.62
Following MRPM’s substitution, Pineiro and Thomas A. Bednar, outside
counsel for Cerebral, discussed Cerebral’s advancement obligations concerning
Robertson’s representation.63 During this discussion, Bednar requested a budget.64
Pineiro gave a rough estimate of approximately $100,000 per month, but cautioned
58
JX 53 ¶¶ 12–15, 32–98.
59
PTO ¶ 12.
60
Id. ¶ 13.
61
Id. ¶¶ 18–19.
62
Id. ¶ 21.
63
Id. ¶ 22.
64
Trial Tr. 13:21–14:15.
13
that extensive discovery could increase the expense.65 Pineiro assured Bednar that
MRPM’s billing would be transparent and reasonable compared to previous
counsel’s billing.66
Pineiro testified at trial that he understood Bednar and Cerebral to be
concerned that MRPM would bill Cerebral for Zealthy’s defense.67 He reassured
Bednar that Zealthy had separate counsel and that MRPM represented only
Robertson.68 Pineiro denied agreeing to bill Cerebral-related and Zealthy-related
work separately.69 He also testified that he and Bednar did not discuss Zealthy-
related work necessary to defend the Cerebral claims.70 Cerebral, however,
maintained that Bednar and Pineiro agreed that MRPM would not bill Cerebral for
Zealthy-related work.71
2. Discovery Expenses and Unpaid Invoices.
65
Id. 14:6–11.
66
Id. 14:12–15.
67
Id. 14:17–15:5, 15:22–16:4.
68
Id. 15:1–5, 15:22–16:4.
69
Id. 15:17–23.
70
Id. 15:6–16.
71
Id. 227:9–228:12. Cerebral relied on Bednar’s deposition testimony, affidavit, and
contemporaneous email to support its understanding. Id. 228:2–12. Because I find the
Cerebral-related and Zealthy-related work roughly apportionable independently of any
alleged billing agreement, I need not resolve whether Bednar and Pinerio reached such an
agreement.
14
Cerebral paid MRPM’s first five invoices in full without requesting separate
invoices for Cerebral-related and Zealthy-related work, requesting more detailed
entries, or otherwise raising billing issues before payment.72 On November 10,
2025, MRPM submitted separate invoices for its October legal work and third-party
discovery services.73 These were the first invoices Cerebral failed to pay.74 Pineiro
repeatedly followed up with Cerebral concerning payment.75 On January 13, 2026,
he emailed Bednar, explaining that the outstanding balance of $263,326.50 was
unsustainable for a boutique firm and could impede MRPM’s ability to defend the
case.76
On January 22, Pineiro spoke with Peter Healy of McDermott Will & Emery
LLP, who also served as Cerebral’s outside counsel.77 According to Pineiro, Healy
said Cerebral needed to raise more capital.78 Pineiro also recalled Healy stating that
72
JX 69; Trial Tr. 46:14–22.
73
JX 30.
74
Trial Tr. 49:8–9, 55:7–10; JX 69.
75
JX 34, 36, 38, 39, 43.
76
JX 39.
77
PTO ¶ 26; Trial Tr. 55:14–20, 69:6–18.
78
Trial Tr. 69:15–24.
15
he was unaware of a dispute over the invoices, although Pineiro was uncertain
whether that statement occurred during the January 22 call or an earlier call.79
3. The Advancement Demand and Cerebral’s Response.
According to Pineiro, Cerebral had not raised objections concerning invoice
form, segregation, or Zealthy-related fees when Robertson made an advancement
demand on February 19.80 Cerebral’s response requested separate invoices for
Robertson’s Cerebral-era actions and his subsequent actions.81 Pineiro testified that
this was the first such request.82 Cerebral also sought separate invoices for vendor
costs and legal fees and the exclusion of “ramp-up” time.83 It indicated that it might
raise additional questions or audit the invoices.84
F. Procedural Posture.
Robertson filed this advancement action in March 2026, seeking payment of
more than $800,000 in outstanding fees.85 On April 29, Robertson moved for
summary judgment.86 I denied Robertson’s motion, finding that expenses associated
79
Id. 70:1–9.
80
Id. 74:9–21; JX 45.
81
Trial Tr. 75:6–13; JX 48.
82
Trial Tr. 75:10–13.
83
Id. 76:20–24, 77:12–21; JX 48.
84
Trial Tr. 77:22–78:4.
85
PTO ¶¶ 1, 24.
86
D.I. 11.
16
with Cerebral and Zealthy were roughly apportionable.87 Robertson then moved for
reargument, which I denied on June 18.88
On July 27, Cerebral invoked its contractual assumption-of-defense right and
proposed Jason Hernandez of Stearns Weaver to represent Robertson concerning
claims asserted against him in his capacity as Cerebral’s former CEO.89 Robertson’s
counsel objected by letter dated July 29.90
Robertson moved for a protective order barring Cerebral from deposing him.91
After hearing oral argument on the motion in September, I issued a bench ruling
granting the motion.92 I held trial on September 24, after which I took the matter
under advisement.93
The parties agree that the Florida Action falls within the definition of a
“proceeding” in the Indemnity Agreement94 and that Robertson is entitled to
advancement for Counts I through VI of the SAC.95 The remaining dispute concerns
87
D.I. 20.
88
D.I. 23; D.I. 26.
89
Trial Tr. 88:9–22; JX 60.
90
Trial Tr. 89:7–17; JX 61.
91
D.I. 40.
92
D.I. 58.
93
D.I. 67.
94
PTO ¶ 15.
95
JX 62 pp. 7–8.
17
advancement for Counts VII through X of the SAC and Counts I through II of the
TAC.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Robertson is Entitled to Advancement for Counts I through VI of
the SAC; He is Not Entitled to Advancement for SAC Counts VII
Through X.
1. Work between Cerebral and Zealthy is Roughly Apportionable.
When bylaws and contracts provide for mandatory advancement, “the
company carries the ultimate burden of proving that advancement is not required.”
Krauss v. 180 Life Scis. Corp.,
2022 WL 665323
, at *4 (Del. Ch. Mar. 7, 2022). I denied Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, finding that expenses incurred between Cerebral and Zealthy were likely to be roughly apportionable.96 During trial, I again considered whether expenses were apportionable. The Court’s apportionment test is well-settled: “Would the disputed expenses have been incurred in defense of the covered proceeding even if there was no non-covered proceeding? If the answer is yes, then the disputed expenses are advanceable.” White v. Curo,
2017 WL 1369332
, at *10 (Del. Ch. Feb. 21, 2017) (citation modified).
The Court should undertake apportionment review only when it can do so
“realistically without significant burden to the Court.” Holley v. Nipro Diagnostics,
96
D.I. 22.
18
Inc.,
2015 WL 4880418
, at *1 (Del. Ch. Aug. 14, 2015). The fact that a portion of the case is subject to advancement does not mean that all expenses in the case must be advanced. Fasciana v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp.,
(Del. Ch. 2003)
(“[Roven], which involved complex facts, does not hold that a plaintiff seeking
advancement is entitled to have all of his expenses advanced if he merely proves
that some portion of the case against him is subject to a contractual right of
advancement.”).
Advancement is subject to a reasonableness requirement. Underbrink v.
Warrior Energy Servs. Corp.,
2008 WL 2262316
, at *16 (Del. Ch. May 30, 2008). A claim is advanceable only if it arises “by reason of the fact that he was a director or officer of Cerebral.” Robertson is entitled to advancement where the DOJ “pursued” him by reason of the fact that he was Cerebral’s director or officer. See Marino v. Patriot Rail Co.,
(Del. Ch. 2016) (“The scope of an individual’s advancement rights normally turns on the pleadings in the underlying litigation that trigger the advancement right.”). Under the circumstances and the DOJ’s charges, he is not entitled to advancement for his conduct after he resigned.
Pineiro acknowledged that Counts VII through X concerned only Robertson’s
conduct at Zealthy, but maintained that defending Counts I through VI required
19
addressing the Zealthy conduct even without Counts VII through X.97 The counts
are temporally distinct, and each grouping relates only to Robertson’s acts at that
respective company. As analyzed below, I find the advancement roughly
apportionable between Cerebral and Zealthy conduct.
2. The DOJ’s Complaint Does Not Transform Zealthy Conduct
Into Cerebral-based Conduct.
The Indemnity Agreement and Cerebral’s Bylaws provide Robertson with
indemnification and advancement rights in proceedings arising “by reason of the
fact” that he was a director or officer of Cerebral.98 The parties do not dispute that
the Florida Action is a “proceeding.”99 Cerebral agrees that Robertson is entitled to
advancement for Counts I through VI of the SAC, but contends that Counts VII
through X are non-advanceable because they concern his conduct at Zealthy and
elsewhere.100
97
Trial Tr. 36:14–18 (“If you excise Counts VII to X, which only pertain to Zealthy, based
on the background allegations which are incorporated by reference and used to support all
of the other claims, I would have had to [do work relating to Robertson’s time as
Zealthy].”); Pl.’s Notice of Lodging of Dep. Tr., Ex. 3 at 42:10–15, D.I. 64 (“Separate from
that, counts seven to 12 also were also brought against Mr. Robertson and Zealthy. And
those were different causes of action that pertained solely to things that have occurred at
Zealthy. But you can see the claims are sort of intertwined based on the way the
government pled it.”).
98
JX 1 §§ 1(c), 6; JX 2 Art. XI § 1(a), 1(c).
99
PTO ¶ 15.
100
DOB at p. 32.
20
The Court reviews requests for indemnification and advancement on a claim-
by-claim basis. Paolino v. Mace Sec. Int’l, Inc.,
(Del. Ch. 2009). “[I]f there is a nexus or causal connection between any of the underlying proceedings . . . and one's official capacity, those proceedings are ‘by reason of the fact’ that one was a corporate officer, without regard to one's motivation for engaging in that conduct.” Homestore v. Taffeen,
888 A.2d 205
, 214 (Del. 2005). A nexus or causal connection “is established if the corporate powers were used or necessary for the commission of the alleged misconduct.” Bernstein v. TractManager, Inc.,
1003, 1011
(Del. Ch. 2007). That said, “the conduct complained of must occur at a time when one is a corporate officer or director.”
To put it succinctly, claims for advancement “can be parsed ‘where a bright-line, temporal standard’ can be applied to demarcate advanceable claims from non-advanceable claims.” Ahmed v. JPMorgan Chase & Co.,
2026 WL 251542
, at *9 (Del. Ch. Jan. 21, 2026) (quoting Mooney v. Echo Therapeutics,
2015 WL 3413272
, at *7 (Del. Ch. May 28, 2015)).
A bright-line, temporal standard exists here. When the DOJ filed the SAC,
both Cerebral and Robertson were parties.101 The Complaint began with
Robertson’s Cerebral conduct and pivoted to his post-Cerebral activity beginning at
101
JX 15.
21
Section VII and paragraph 201.102 The Counts reflect a similar shift. Counts I
through IV are against Robertson individually and relate to his conduct at
Cerebral.103 Count V involves Robertson’s conduct, along with another co-
defendant, Martelli, while at Cerebral.104 Count VI involves only Robertson during
his time at Cerebral.105 Again, to the extent that Counts I through VI are by reason
of the fact of Robertson’s role as an officer or director at Cerebral, the parties are
aligned that Robertson is entitled to advancement.
The remaining counts involve Robertson’s conduct after he left Cerebral.
Count VII is against Robertson and co-defendants Echeverry, Zealthy, and Bruno
Health.106 Count VII does not mention Cerebral.107 Count VIII is against Robertson,
Zealthy, and Bruno Health.108 Again, there is no mention of Cerebral in Count
VIII’s language.109 Count IX is against Robertson, Zealthy, and Bruno Health.110
102
See JX 15 ¶ 201.
103
Id.
¶¶ 318–35.
104
Id.
¶¶ 336–41.
105
Id.
¶¶ 342–46.
106
JX 15 ¶¶ 347–54.
107
See
Id.
108
Id.
¶¶ 355–62.
109
See
Id.
110
Id.
¶¶ 363–65.
22
As with the others, Count IX does not reference Cerebral.111 Finally, Count X is
against Robertson, Echeverry, Zealthy, and Bruno Health, likewise making no
reference to Cerebral.112
But the analysis does not turn solely on whether Counts VII through X
mention Cerebral. The DOJ’s narrative complaint references Robertson’s conduct
at Cerebral at various points in DOJ’s discussion of his post-Cerebral conduct. For
instance, the DOJ recites:
Just as Cerebral’s chargeback rate was often high while Robertson was
its CEO, Zealthy’s chargeback rate has been unusually high. Its rate has
been so high that at least one payment processor threatened to stop
allowing its members to use its payment cards to pay Zealthy’s
charges.113
In alleging that Robertson, Zealthy, and Bruno Health violated the FTC’s Rule on
the Use of Consumer Reviews and Testimonials, the DOJ stated:
Just as he did at Cerebral, where he informed his employees that he was
‘fine with fake ones [reviews],’ Robertson has led a practice of
impersonating Zealthy subscribers and Bruno Health patients by
fabricating online reviews purportedly written by them—but in fact
written by Zealthy’s own employees and Robertson himself.114
111
See
Id.
112
Id.
¶¶ 366–70.
113
Id. ¶ 266.
114
Id. ¶ 279.
23
Within this area, the DOJ also noted a settlement with Cerebral based on Robertson’s
conduct while there:
Robertson knew that posting fake reviews, suppressing authentic
reviews, upvoting positive reviews, and downvoting negative reviews
was illegal no later than December 28, 2023, when the New York
Attorney General announced a settlement with Cerebral relating to,
among other misconduct, fake reviews that Robertson directed while its
CEO (as alleged above).115
The Complaint also references Robertson’s and Cerebral’s charged conduct
from the DOJ’s First Amended Complaint: “Robertson has also been on notice since
May 31, 2024 that these unlawful and unethical practices have been at issue in this
action, because the First Amended Complaint directly implicates analogous
practices directed by Robertson when he was CEO of Cerebral.”116 Robertson
argues that references like these were sufficient to meet the advancement provisions
of the Bylaws and Indemnity Agreement because they relate to his conduct at
Cerebral, even for the conduct relating solely to his position at Zealthy.
Robertson’s corporate powers at Cerebral “were [not] used or necessary for
the commission of the alleged misconduct” at Zealthy. Bernstein,
.
Nor were his corporate powers at Zealthy used or necessary to commit the misdeeds
at Cerebral. Robertson’s roles at Cerebral and at Zealthy were temporally distinct.
115
Id. ¶ 295.
116
Id. ¶ 297.
24
Pineiro admitted that Counts VII through X pertain solely to Zealthy.117 There was
no overlap between the positions. Robertson suggests that the “DOJ’s arguments in
the Florida Action . . . broadly tied together Cerebral and Zealthy related conduct.”118
In support, he cites this Court’s holding that a nexus or causal connection “can
include post-separation conduct if it is rooted in pre-separation responsibilities.”
Barr v. Genesis CMG Hldgs., LLC,
2025 WL 3720720
, at *5 (Del. Ch. Dec. 23,
2025).
The mention of Cerebral as background is insufficient to justify advancement
when the groups of charges each relate to Robertson’s conduct by reason of the fact
that he was a director or officer at Cerebral and Zealthy, respectively. Our Courts
look to the pleadings in the underlying litigation to determine whether a causal
connection exists. Charney v. Am. Apparel, Inc.,
2015 WL 5313769
, at *16 (Del. Ch. Sept. 11, 2015). “Nexus is established if the corporate powers were used or necessary for the commission of the alleged misconduct.” Rose v. Berkeley Compute, Inc.,
2026 WL 700385
, at *5 (Del. Ch. Mar. 5, 2026) (citation modified).
I must determine whether there is a nexus or causal connection between the DOJ’s
charges against Robertson in Counts VII through X and his corporate capacity at
117
Trial Tr. 36:14–18.
118
POB at p 29.
25
Cerebral. See Brown v. LiveOps, Inc.,
(Del. Ch. 2006). “The Court must look to the substance of the claim, as opposed to the words a plaintiff has chosen to use in the pleading.” Rose,
2026 WL 700385
, at *5.
The corporate powers used in Counts VII through X took place in Robertson’s
post-Cerebral role. They relate to his time and conduct at Zealthy. The DOJ’s SAC
mentions Cerebral conduct in the context of Zealthy conduct but Counts VII through
X solely concerned Robertson’s post-Cerebral activity and arose by reason of his
role at Zealthy. Robertson did not use or need his Cerebral powers to commit the
alleged misconduct in these latter counts. The DOJ’s background references do not
transform Counts VII through X into Cerebral-related claims. Under these relatively
unique circumstances, it would be inequitable to require Cerebral to provide
advancement both for Counts I through VI, which concern Robertson’s conduct as
Cerebral’s CEO, and for Counts VII through X, which concern only his subsequent
Zealthy conduct.
3. The SAC Claims Are Not Inextricably Intertwined.
Robertson argues that he is entitled to advancement for Counts VII through X
because the defense of those claims is inextricably intertwined with the defense of
Counts I through VI. In support, he directs the Court to the decisions in Hyatt v. Al
Jazeera Am. Hldgs. II, LLC,
2016 WL 1301743
(Del. Ch. Mar. 31, 2016) and Rizk
v. TractManager, Inc., C.A. No. 9073-ML (Del. Ch. May 30, 2014).
26
Those cases are inapplicable because they do not involve the temporally
distinct circumstances present here. In Hyatt, following a merger, the defendant
served five “claim certificates” for indemnification for damages stemming from
action by the acquired company, including violation of the merger agreement. Hyatt,
2016 WL 1301743
, at *2. Plaintiff, a former director of the acquired company whom the merger agreement appointed as Members’ Representative, received the claim certificates in that capacity.
Id.
Plaintiff filed suit against defendant alleging that
the claim certificates were invalid and breached the merger agreement. Id. at *3.
Defendant asserted counterclaims alleging that plaintiff breached the merger
agreement by failing to accept the claim certificates, and plaintiff sought
advancement for the expenses incurred in defending those counterclaims. Id.
Defendant argued against advancement, contending that plaintiff rejected the claim
certificates in his role as Members’ Representative and not as a former officer or
director. Id. at *6. This Court held as follows:
Although the Counterclaims appear on their face to merely implicate
[plaintiffs’] role as Members’ Representative, the resolution of the
validity of the Claim Certificates in the Underlying Action, in part,
necessarily requires [plaintiffs] to defend their actions as former
officers and directors, for which they are contractually entitled to
advancement. Without such a (successful) defense, the rights of
[plaintiffs] (and the other former members of [the acquired company])
in the Escrow Fund will be forfeit.
Id. at *9. To defend the claim certificates’ rejection, including breach of the merger
agreement, plaintiffs were required to “defend their actions as officers and
27
directors.” Id. at *10. Thus, the plaintiffs’ actions in the underlying action were
directly connected to the counterclaims.
Our situation is starkly different. Counts VII through X relate only to
Robertson’s conduct at Zealthy. Robertson admits as much.119 Although the DOJ
mentions Robertson’s Cerebral conduct as background, he is not charged in any of
the relevant counts with conduct that occurred at Cerebral by reason of the fact of
his role there. Each Zealthy count relates solely to Robertson’s conduct at that
company. Although Robertson may have repeated misconduct from his time at
Cerebral, that does not intertwine the acts.
The same is true in Rizk. Thomas Rizk was the founder, former CEO, and
director of defendant TractManager, Inc. (“TMI”). Rizk, C.A. No. 9073-ML, at 2.
Rizk was involved in the merger of TMI with another entity. Id. at 3. After the
merger, Rizk remained on TMI’s board as the minority stockholders’ board designee
and continued serving as CEO. Id. Under new management, TMI found
improprieties and terminated Rizk. Id. at 4. Rizk filed suit against TMI but
ultimately found himself embroiled in counterclaims and related lawsuits concerning
his conduct as an officer or director. Id. at 5–9. He sought advancement of the
expenses incurred in defending those claims. Id.
119
Trial Tr. 36:14–18.
28
In particular, Rizk sought advancement for what the Court termed the “New
York Action.” Id. at 20. TMI argued that Rizk was not due advancement because
the plaintiff in the New York Action sued him in his capacity as a seller in the
merger. Id. at 21. As the Court ruled, advancement was required here because the
merger and his conduct at TMI were inextricably intertwined. Id. As the Court
noted, “the complaint in the New York Action alleges that Rizk incurred, and
permitted [others] to incur, inappropriate expenses that were charged to TMI, and
that Rizk improperly directed TMI resources and personnel to the Joint Venture, at
the expense of TMI’s domestic business.” Id. at 21–22. The Court granted
advancement in the New York Action, finding that the allegations were that Rizk
diverted TMI resources and personnel for his benefit. Id. at 22. “Although Rizk
was sued for representations he made as a seller, these allegations regarding Rizk’s
conduct as CEO create the necessary causal connection between the New York
Action and Rizk’s official capacity.” Id.
Rizk’s acts as CEO were part of the underlying complaint in the New York
Action. Not so here. Counts VII through X address only Robertson’s acts during
his tenure at Zealthy. While they may mirror the similar acts he took at Cerebral,
they are by reason of the fact of his role at Zealthy, not Cerebral. The roles are
temporally attenuated both in reality and in the DOJ’s SAC. Compared to the
Court’s finding in Rizk, the mentions of Cerebral conduct are truly the “background
29
facts” that the Rizk Court considered. Id. The Cerebral and Zealthy conduct are not
inextricably intertwined.
This Court’s decision in Barr v. Genesis CMG Hldgs., LLC also merits
mention. Barr,
2025 WL 3720720
. There, Theodore Barr co-founded a company
that was ultimately sold to the defendant. Id. at *1. Barr remained with the company
but resigned less than two years after the sale and started another company. Id. at
*2. The defendant sued Barr in a separate suit, alleging that plaintiff breached a
portion of the sale agreement by competing with the defendant and soliciting its
clients. Id. Despite an amended complaint that was “alleging no pre-separation
misconduct,” the Court held that Barr’s solicitation of his prior employees and
clients indicated that Barr did “learn of, form relationships with, or otherwise gain
knowledge of these parties through his official capacity with the Defendant.” Id. at
*6.
No such connective tissue exists here. Robertson is alleged to have committed
certain acts at Cerebral. He is alleged to have committed similar acts at Zealthy.
But there was no occasion when his roles crossed over. Nor is it alleged, as it was
with Barr, that Robertson used his former position at Cerebral to commit misconduct
at Zealthy.
B. Robertson is Not Entitled to Advancement for Count II of the Third
Amended Complaint.
30
The parties agree that Robertson is not entitled to advancement for Count III
of the TAC and is entitled to advancement for Count I to the extent his conduct was
“by reason of the fact that such person is or was a director or executive officer of”
Cerebral. That leaves Count II for me to assess.
First, it is important to note the change in posture in the TAC. When the DOJ
filed its Third Amended Complaint, Cerebral was no longer a party to the action.120
In the TAC, Robertson focuses on the section entitled “Unlawful Business Activities
at Cerebral” with a subheading of “Robertson’s Direction of Unlawful Cancellation
Practices at Cerebral.”121 This section discusses Robertson’s conduct at Cerebral
from 2019 to 2022, when he directed the implementation of subscription cancellation
procedures designed to frustrate subscribers’ attempts to cancel.122 Cerebral homes
in on the charge itself. Count II is entitled “FTC Act Section 5—Unfair and
Deceptive Practices.”123 As Cerebral notes, there is no mention of Cerebral in the
charge.124 The count’s language addresses only Robertson’s conduct at Zealthy and
the impact on Zealthy customers. This lacks the required causal nexus. Robertson
120
JX 53.
121
POB at p. 33; JX 53 ¶¶ 32–53.
122
JX 53 ¶¶ 32–53.
123
Id. p. 58.
124
DOB at p. 29; JX 53 ¶¶ 291–95.
31
is not charged by reason of the fact of his position at Cerebral. Although the count
incorporates by reference the entirety of the TAC, the conduct relates only to
Zealthy. Coupled with the DOJ’s clear intent that the TAC narrow the focus of the
case to Robertson’s conduct at Zealthy, there is no causal nexus between the Zealthy
activity and Robertson’s role at Cerebral.
Robertson argues that the DOJ’s incorporation of the Cerebral background
means that “Count II incorporates and relies upon alleged conduct by Robertson
while he was at Cerebral.”125 But this Court rejected this exact kind of argument in
Charney v. Am. Apparel, Inc.,
2015 WL 5313769
, at *17. There, Charney argued that his former, covered role was inextricably intertwined with his current role because “relationships he built as CEO and the knowledge he gained as a director and officer of the Company enabled him to take the actions alleged in the Standstill Proceeding.”
Id.
(citation modified). The Court rejected that argument, explaining, “Charney's former status may have made his violations of the Standstill Agreement more damaging, but that former status was not necessary for the violations themselves.”
Id.
While the Cerebral conduct may add some color and background to
Robertson’s acts at Zealthy, that conduct was not necessary for the Zealthy
125
POB at p. 33; PAB at p. 10.
32
violations that he is alleged to have committed. Robertson is not entitled to
advancement for Count II of the TAC.
C. Cerebral Failed to Assume Robertson’s Defense.
The Indemnity Agreement contains an Assumption of Defense provision.126
The relevant portion reads:
In the event the Company shall be requested by Indemnitee to pay the
expenses of any proceeding, the Company, if appropriate, shall be
entitled to assume the defense of such proceeding, or to participate to
the extent permissible in such proceeding, with counsel reasonably
acceptable to Indemnitee. Upon assumption of the defense by the
Company and the retention of such counsel by the Company, the
Company shall not be liable to Indemnitee under this Agreement for
any fees of counsel subsequently incurred by Indemnitee with respect
to the same proceeding, provided that Indemnitee shall have the right
to employ separate counsel in such proceeding at Indemnitee's sole cost
and expense. Notwithstanding the foregoing, if Indemnitee's counsel
delivers a written notice to the Company stating that such counsel has
reasonably concluded that there may be a conflict of interest between
the Company and Indemnitee in the conduct of any such defense or the
Company shall not, in fact, have employed counsel or otherwise
actively pursued the defense of such proceeding within a reasonable
time, then in any such event the fees and expenses of Indemnitee's
counsel to defend such proceeding shall be subject to the
indemnification and advancement of expenses provisions of this
Agreement.127
126
JX 1 § 8.
127
Id.
33
Cerebral argues that it assumed Robertson’s defense and ended advancement under
the Indemnity Agreement.128 Jacqueline Kniska, Cerebral’s representative at trial,
testified that “practically speaking,” Cerebral had not assumed Robertson’s
defense.129 Her qualifier of “practically speaking” was based on the absence of
billing from counsel that Cerebral sought to obtain for Robertson. 130 Kniska’s
perspective is informative but not determinative.
I turn to the Assumption of Defense provision. First, Cerebral must notify
Robertson that it intends to assume the defense.131 Second, the defense must be
assumed within a reasonable time.132 Third, if the Indemnitee’s counsel determines
that there may be a conflict of interest between the Company and the Indemnitee,
then indemnification and advancement are not suspended.133 On March 28, 2026,
Cerebral’s counsel sent a letter to Pineiro expressing concerns over advancement
requests.134 In that letter, Cerebral advised, “Cerebral has decided to identify counsel
128
Id.
129
Trial Tr. 172:1–4.
130
Id. 172:9–16.
131
JX 1 § 8.
132
Id.
133
Id.
134
JX 52.
34
to assume the defense pursuant to Section 8 of the Indemnity Agreement.”135 This
letter may have expressed Cerebral’s intent, but it was prospective. Cerebral had not
yet retained or identified replacement counsel. This is underscored by a July 27,
2026, letter from Cerebral’s counsel to Robertson’s counsel stating that “Cerebral
invokes its contractual right to assume Mr. Robertson’s defense.” 136 In that letter,
Cerebral also noted, “Cerebral identifies and retains Jason Hernandez of Stearns
Weaver Miller Weissler Alhadeff & Sitterson, P.A. as proposed counsel for Mr.
Robertson in the Florida Action.”
Cerebral’s assumption of defense could not have been perfected before July 27,
2026. Two days later, Robertson’s counsel wrote to Cerebral’s counsel and objected
to the assumption of defense on two bases.137 First, counsel argued that the
assumption of defense was untimely because the DOJ filed its initial complaint in
April 2024.138 Second, Pineiro advised Cerebral that he reasonably concluded that
there might be a conflict of interest between Robertson and Cerebral because
135
Id.
136
JX 60.
137
JX 61.
138
Id.
35
Cerebral appeared committed to only defending Robertson for a portion of the
proceeding.139
Addressing the conflict argument first, I find that Robertson’s counsel’s
reasonable determination that a conflict of interest existed blunted the assumption of
defense. The assumption of defense clause speaks to assuming the defense in a
“proceeding.” Circumstances like those presented here, with multiple amended
complaints and claims across different entities, were never considered by the
clause’s drafters. It is ill-fitting for these circumstances. It would be challenging,
although not impossible, for counsel to defend only portions of a case. In any case,
I find that Robertson’s counsel provided reasonable notice of a conflict of interest.
The untimeliness argument is even stronger for Robertson. Cerebral argues that
its assumption of defense was timely because it had no reason to assume the defense
until Robertson’s counsel failed to provide clarity in its billing.140 Robertson
disagrees because the DOJ initiated its Complaint in April 2024, more than two years
before Cerebral attempted to assume the defense.
I find that the timeliness prong of the Assumption of Defense relates to the
viability of the defense. The DOJ filed its initial Complaint in April 2024. Since
139
Id.
140
Trial Tr. 232:15–233:3.
36
then, there have been three amended complaints. The parties are scheduled to
complete discovery in December 2026.141 The court has scheduled trial to begin on
April 19, 2027.142 It is too late to reasonably assume the defense. Substituting
counsel now comes with great risk to Robertson’s defense. After all, this is an
indemnification agreement intended to provide a defense for corporate officers and
directors. It would be illogical, then, to suggest that it is timely to replace counsel
more than two years and four complaints into a three-year timeline. I find that
Cerebral failed to assume the defense.
D. Fees on fees
I find that Robertson is entitled to fees on fees. Here, that is for Counts I
through VI of the SAC.143 A prevailing plaintiff is entitled to fees on fees in the
indemnification and advancement context. Stifel Fin. Corp. v. Cochran,
555
, 560–61 (Del. 2002). Robertson “prevailed in his request for advancement, but not on all points.” Marino,
. Robertson is therefore entitled to fees on fees in proportion to his success in this matter.
III. CONCLUSION
141
PTO ¶ 28.
142
143
To the extent that any advancement was already provided for these Counts, that may
reduce the proportion.
37
For the reasons explained above, I find that Robertson is entitled to
advancement consistent with this Report. This is a Final Report pursuant to Court
of Chancery Rule 144.
38
For advice on a matter of this kind in France, contact our corporate lawyer in Paris.
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