Miscellaneous Etats-Unis

Kyle Robertson v. Cerebral Inc.

Official source
   IN THE COURT OF CHANCERY OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

KYLE ROBERTSON,                           )
                                          )
           Plaintiff,                     )
                                          )
     v.                                   )
                                          ) C.A. No. 2026-0429-DH
CEREBRAL, INC., a Delaware                )
Corporation,                              )
                                          )
           Defendant.                     )
                                          )
                                          )
                                          )
                                          )

                                    REPORT

                             Report: October 29, 2026
                        Date Submitted: September 24, 2026


Andrew H. Sauder, Daniel S. Atlas, Matthew R. Conrad, DAILEY LLP; Attorneys
for Plaintiff.

Jason C. Jowers, Stephen B. Brauerman, Sarah T. Andrade, Abraham C. Schneider,
BAYARD, P.A.; Attorneys for Defendant.




HUME, IV, M.
          The United States Department of Justice sued a company’s former CEO for

misconduct during his tenure and at new corporate ventures that followed. The

former CEO sought advancement from the company to pay for his entire defense.

The company paid initially. As the United States amended its complaints and

narrowed its focus to conduct at other entities, the company objected to footing the

whole bill. This litigation ensued. For the reasons below, I find the former CEO’s

conduct to be roughly apportionable across the entities and grant only a portion of

the advancement requested.

I.        BACKGROUND1

             A. The Parties

          Plaintiff Kyle Robertson was one of Defendant Cerebral, Inc.’s co-founders

and served as its CEO.2 Cerebral is a Delaware corporation that provides a range of

telehealth services but focuses primarily on mental health treatment and medication.3




1
  I draw the following facts from the pleadings and other documents of record. Unless
otherwise noted, pleadings and their associated declarations and exhibits are cited by
reference to items docketed in C.A. No. 2026-0429-DH. Citations are to: Plaintiff’s
Verified Complaint for Advancement (“Compl.”), Docket Item (“D.I.”) 1; Jointly
Submitted Stipulation and Pretrial Order (“PTO”), D.I. 51; Plaintiff’s Pretrial Opening
Brief (“POB”), D.I. 54; Defendant’s Pretrial Opening Brief (“DOB”), D.I. 55; Plaintiff’s
Pretrial Answering Brief (“PAB”), D.I. 59; Trial Transcript (“Trial Tr.”), D.I. 71; and
Joint Trial Exhibits (“JX”).
2
    D.I. 1 ¶¶ 1, 20; PTO ¶ 7.
3
    D.I. 1 ¶ 7.


                                           1
As CEO of Cerebral, Robertson reviewed and approved privacy and data-security

policies, supervised marketing, and participated in data-breach responses.4

             B. The Indemnity Agreement and Bylaws.
         A February 2019 indemnity agreement (the “Indemnity Agreement”) and

Cerebral’s February 2022 Amended and Restated Bylaws (the “Bylaws”) govern

Robertson’s indemnification and advancement rights.5

                   1.      The Indemnity Agreement.
         The Indemnity Agreement defines “proceedings” as:

       [a]ny threatened, pending, or completed action, suit, arbitration,
alternate dispute resolution mechanism, investigation, inquiry, administrative
hearing or any other actual, threatened or completed proceeding, whether
brought in the right of the Company or otherwise and whether of a civil,
criminal, administrative or investigative nature, and whether formal or
informal in any case, in which Indemnitee was, is or will be involved as a
party or otherwise by reason of: (i) the fact that Indemnitee is or was a director
or officer of the Company; (ii) the fact that any action taken by Indemnitee or
of any action on Indemnitee’s part while acting as director, officer, employee
or agent of the Company; or (iii) the fact that Indemnitee is or was serving at
the request of the Company as a director, officer, employee or agent of another
corporation, partnership, joint venture, trust, employee benefit plan or other
enterprise, and in any such case described above, whether or not serving in
any such capacity at the time any liability or expense is incurred for which
indemnification, reimbursement, or advancement of expenses may be
provided under this Agreement.6

Section 6 of the Indemnity Agreement provides:



4
    JX 15 ¶¶ 6–7.
5
    D.I. 1 ¶ 8; JX 1, 2.
6
    JX 1 § 2(c).


                                             2
                 6. ADVANCEMENT OF EXPENSES. To the extent not
          prohibited by law, the Company shall advance the expenses incurred
          by Indemnitee in connection with any proceeding, and such
          advancement shall be made within twenty (20) days after the receipt by
          the Company of a statement or statements requesting such advances
          (which shall include invoices received by Indemnitee in connection
          with such expenses but, in the case of invoices in connection with legal
          services, any references to legal work performed or to expenditures
          made that would cause Indemnitee to waive any privilege accorded by
          applicable law shall not be included with the invoice) and upon request
          of the Company, an undertaking to repay the advancement of expenses
          if and to the extent that it is ultimately determined by a court of
          competent jurisdiction in a final judgment, not subject to appeal, that
          Indemnitee is not entitled to be indemnified by the Company.
          Advances shall be unsecured, interest free and without regard to
          Indemnitee’s ability to repay the expenses. Advances shall include any
          and all expenses actually and reasonably incurred by Indemnitee
          pursuing an action to enforce Indemnitee’s right to indemnification
          under this Agreement, or otherwise, and this right of advancement,
          including expenses incurred preparing and forwarding statements to the
          Company to support the advances claimed. Indemnitee acknowledges
          that the execution and delivery of this Agreement shall constitute an
          undertaking providing that Indemnitee shall, to the fullest extent
          required by law, repay the advance if and to the extent that it is
          ultimately determined by a court of competent jurisdiction in a final
          judgment, not subject to appeal, that Indemnitee is not entitled to be
          indemnified by the Company. The right to advances under this Section
          shall continue until final disposition of any proceeding, including any
          appeal therein. This Section 6 shall not apply to any claim made by
          Indemnitee for which indemnity is excluded pursuant to Section 10(b).7

Section 8 of the Indemnity Agreement addresses Cerebral’s assumption of

Robertson’s defense:

          8. ASSUMPTION OF DEFENSE. In the event the Company shall be
          requested by Indemnitee to pay the expenses of any proceeding, the


7
    Id. § 8.


                                             3
          Company, if appropriate, shall be entitled to assume the defense of such
          proceeding, or to participate to the extent permissible in such
          proceeding, with counsel reasonably acceptable to Indemnitee. Upon
          assumption of the defense by the Company and the retention of such
          counsel by the Company, the Company shall not be liable to Indemnitee
          under this Agreement for any fees of counsel subsequently incurred by
          Indemnitee with respect to the same proceeding, provided that
          Indemnitee shall have the right to employ separate counsel in such
          proceeding at Indemnitee's sole cost and expense. Notwithstanding the
          foregoing, if Indemnitee's counsel delivers a written notice to the
          Company stating that such counsel has reasonably concluded that there
          may be a conflict of interest between the Company and Indemnitee in
          the conduct of any such defense or the Company shall not, in fact, have
          employed counsel or otherwise actively pursued the defense of such
          proceeding within a reasonable time, then in any such event the fees
          and expenses of Indemnitee's counsel to defend such proceeding shall
          be subject to the indemnification and advancement of expenses
          provisions of this Agreement.8

                2.     The Bylaws.
          Article XI of the Bylaws governs indemnification and advancement. Section

1(a) provides:

          (a) Indemnification of Directors, Executive Officers, Employees
          and Other Directors and Executive Officers. The corporation shall
          indemnify its directors and executive officers (for the purposes of this
          Article, “executive officers” shall have the meaning defined in Rule 3b-
          7 promulgated under the 1934 Act) to the fullest extent not prohibited
          by the DGCL or any other applicable law; provided, however, that the
          corporation may modify the extent of such indemnification by
          individual contracts with its directors and executive officers; and,
          provided, further, that the corporation shall not be required to
          indemnify any director or executive officer in connection with any
          proceeding (or part thereof) initiated by such person unless (i) such
          indemnification is expressly required to be made by law, (ii) the


8
    Id. § 7.


                                             4
         proceeding was authorized by the Board of Directors of the corporation,
         (iii) such indemnification is provided by the corporation, in its sole
         discretion, pursuant to the powers vested in the corporation under the
         DGCL or any other applicable law or (iv) such indemnification is
         required to be made under paragraph (d) of this Section.9
Section 1(c) addresses advancement:

         The corporation shall advance to any person who was or is a party or is
         threatened to be made a party to any threatened, pending or completed
         action, suit or proceeding, whether civil, criminal, administrative or
         investigative, by reason of the fact that such person is or was a director
         or executive officer of the corporation, or is or was serving at the
         request of the corporation as a director or executive officer of another
         corporation, partnership, joint venture, trust or other enterprise, prior to
         the final disposition of the proceeding, promptly following request
         therefor, all expenses incurred by any director or executive officer in
         connection with such proceeding; provided, however, that, if the DGCL
         requires, an advancement of expenses incurred by a director or officer
         in his or her capacity as a director or officer (and not in any other
         capacity in which service was or is rendered by such indemnitee,
         including, without limitation, service to an employee benefit plan) shall
         be made only upon delivery to the corporation of an undertaking, by or
         on behalf of such indemnitee, to repay all amounts so advanced if it
         shall ultimately be determined by final judicial decision from which
         there is no further right to appeal that such indemnitee is not entitled to
         be indemnified for such expenses under this Section or otherwise.10

             C. Robertson’s Departure and the Formation of Zealthy.




9
    JX 2 Art. XI § 1(a).
10
     Id. at pp. 20–21.


                                              5
         In spring 2022, the United States Department of Justice (the “DOJ”) began

investigating Robertson.11 Cerebral terminated Robertson in May 2022.12 Several

months later, Robertson formed Zealthy, a new telehealth company offering online

subscriptions, and incorporated it in Delaware on December 15, 2022. 13 Robertson

served as Zealthy’s CEO, and German Echeverry served as Zealthy’s Senior Medical

Director.14 Both also held positions at Bruno Health, a Zealthy affiliate that provided

telehealth services to Zealthy subscribers.15 Robertson was its CFO, and Echeverry

was its President.16

             D. The Florida Action and Amendments to the Complaint.

         The spring 2022 investigation prompted the DOJ to file suit against Cerebral

and Robertson in April 2024.17 This suit is still pending in the United States District

Court for the Southern District of Florida under Case No. 24-cv-21376-RAR (the




11
     PTO ¶ 11.
12
     PTO ¶ 6.
13
     Id.; JX 15 ¶ 41.
14
     D.I. 14 pp. 9–10.
15
     JX 15 ¶¶ 205–06.
16
     JX 15 ¶¶ 204–05
17
     PTO ¶ 14.


                                           6
“Florida Action”). Within days of the filing of the original Complaint, Cerebral filed

a notice of settlement.18 The DOJ subsequently amended its Complaint three times.19

                 1. The Original and First Amended Complaints.
          The original Complaint asserted six counts against Cerebral and Robertson.20

Counts I through IV alleged violations of Section 5 of the FTC Act (“Section 5”)

arising from deceptive privacy practices, deceptive data security practices, unfair

privacy and data security practices, and deceptive cancellation practices.21 Count V

alleged violations of the Opioid Act, and Count VI alleged violations of the Restore

Online Shoppers’ Confidence Act (“ROSCA”).22

          The DOJ filed the First Amended Complaint the following month. 23 It

retained all six claims and added three more.24 Counts I through IV continued to

assert the same Section 5 claims against Cerebral and Robertson.25 A new Count V

asserted a Section 5 claim against Robertson and Alex Martelli, Cerebral’s Director

of Product and Group Product Manager, for unfair and deceptive marketing and



18
     D.I. 14 p. 8.
19
     See JX 4, 15, 53.
20
     JX 3 ¶¶ 159–85.
21
     Id. ¶¶ 159–77.
22
     Id. ¶¶ 178–85.
23
     PTO ¶ 17.
24
     JX 3 ¶¶ 159–85; JX 4 ¶¶ 256–99.
25
     JX 3 ¶¶ 159–77; JX 4 ¶¶ 256–99.


                                            7
consumer review practices.26 The original Opioid Act and ROSCA claims became

Counts VI and VII, respectively, with Martelli added as a defendant to the Opioid

Act claim.27 The DOJ also added two claims against Robertson, Echeverry, Zealthy,

and Bruno Health: Count VIII alleged unfair and deceptive practices under Section

5, and Count IX alleged violations of ROSCA.28

               2.      The Second Amended Complaint and Motion to Dismiss.

         In May 2025, the DOJ filed the Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”), which

asserted no counts against Cerebral and omitted the Opioid Act claim. 29 Counts I

through IV retained the original privacy, data security, and cancellation claims, but

asserted them against Robertson alone.30 Count V retained the marketing and

consumer review claim against Robertson and Martelli, while Count VI retained the

original ROSCA claim against Robertson alone.31 The claims previously asserted

as Counts VIII and IX became Counts VII and X, respectively, and continued to

name Robertson, Echeverry, Zealthy, and Bruno Health.32 The DOJ also added two




26
     JX 4 ¶¶ 274–79.
27
     JX 3 ¶¶ 178–85; JX 4 ¶¶ 280–87.
28
     JX 4 ¶¶ 288–99.
29
     JX 15 ¶¶ 318–70; JX 4 ¶¶ 280–82.
30
     JX 3 ¶¶ 159–77; JX 15 ¶¶ 318–35.
31
     JX 4 ¶¶ 274–79, 283–87; JX 15 ¶¶ 336–46.
32
     JX 4 ¶¶ 288–89; JX 15 ¶¶ 347–54, 366–70.


                                           8
claims against Robertson, Zealthy, and Bruno Health; Count VIII alleged unfair and

deceptive marketing and consumer review practices under Section 5, and Count IX

alleged violations of the FTC’s Rule on the Use of Consumer Reviews and

Testimonials.33 Each count incorporates the preceding allegations.34

         Counts I through VI address alleged practices at Cerebral, including privacy

representations and disclosures, data-security representations and safeguards,

cancellation obstacles, fabricated or compensated reviews, and subscription

disclosures, consent, and cancellation mechanisms.35 Counts VII through X address

alleged practices at Zealthy and Bruno Health.36          These allegations include

misleading subscription and service representations, unauthorized charges,

cancellation obstacles, privacy and security practices, improper telemedicine

practices, fabricated and manipulated reviews, and ROSCA violations.37

         Beginning at Section VII, paragraph 201, the SAC shifts from Robertson’s

conduct at Cerebral to his subsequent activities at Zealthy. 38 In describing those

activities, the DOJ compares Zealthy’s unusually high chargeback rate with



33
     JX 15 ¶¶ 355–65.
34
     See, e.g., JX 15 ¶¶ 318, 347, 366.
35
     Id. ¶¶ 319–46.
36
     Id. ¶¶ 348–70.
37
     Id. ¶¶ 348–52, 356–65, 367–70.
38
     Id. ¶¶ 200–05.


                                           9
Cerebral’s rate while Robertson served as CEO.39 It also compares Robertson’s

alleged direction of fabricated reviews and suppression of authentic negative reviews

at Zealthy and Bruno Health with his alleged conduct at Cerebral.40 The DOJ further

relies on Robertson’s experience and the legal guidance he received at Cerebral to

allege his knowledge of ROSCA’s requirements.41 As to the Cerebral review

practices, the DOJ alleges that a December 2023 announcement of a settlement with

Cerebral and the filing of the First Amended Complaint put Robertson on Notice

that the challenged practices were unlawful.42

         Robertson moved to dismiss Counts I through V of the SAC on the ground

that the DOJ had failed to allege ongoing or impending violations warranting

prospective injunctive relief because the challenged Cerebral conduct had occurred

more than three years earlier.43        The DOJ opposed dismissal, arguing that

Robertson’s ongoing Zealthy conduct supported injunctive relief based on his




39
     Id. ¶ 266.
40
     Id. ¶¶ 279, 298.
41
     Id. ¶¶ 248–52.
42
     Id. ¶¶ 295, 297.
43
     Trial Tr. 28:4–29:7, 29:11–30:6.


                                          10
Cerebral conduct.44 Its opposition included a chart comparing practices at the two

companies.45

         According to Michael Pineiro, Robertson’s current counsel in the Florida

Action, the DOJ’s position required him to defend the Zealthy allegations to defend

the Cerebral-related counts.46 He testified that he would have needed to perform this

work even without Counts VII through X of the SAC.47 In the same testimony,

Pineiro expressly described Counts VII through X as pertaining only to Zealthy.48

                3.      The Third Amended Complaint.

         On April 10, 2026, the DOJ filed the Third Amended Complaint (“TAC”),

narrowing the action to three counts against Robertson and Zealthy.49 Count I

alleged violations of ROSCA; Count II alleged unfair and deceptive practices under

Section 5; and Count III alleged violations of the FTC’s Rule on the Use of

Consumer Reviews and Testimonials.50 It omitted separate counts for the original

privacy, data security, and cancellation claims and for the marketing and consumer




44
     Id. 31:3–20.
45
     Id. 31:21–32:6.
46
     Id. 8:13–24, 34:8–35:14.
47
     Id. 36:10–24.
48
     Id. 36:14–24 (“If you excise Counts VII to X, which only pertain to Zealthy . . . .”).
49
     PTO ¶ 27; JX 53.
50
     JX 53 ¶¶ 283–99.


                                               11
review claim against Robertson and Martelli.51 It also removed Martelli, Echeverry,

and Bruno Health as defendants.52 The TAC relies on Robertson’s Cerebral-era

regulatory involvement and the New York Attorney General investigation to allege

knowledge of the applicable legal requirements.53

         Count I of the TAC expressly addresses conduct at both Cerebral and

Zealthy.54 It alleges Cerebral-related failures to disclose health-data practices,

Zealthy-related failures to disclose subscription terms, and cancellation and

unauthorized charging practices at both companies.55 Count II’s specific allegations

concern only Zealthy’s practices, including cancellation representations,

undisclosed charges, medication costs, and allegedly illegitimate telemedicine

services.56 Count III alleges violations of the FTC’s Rule on the Use of Consumer

Reviews and Testimonials against Robertson and Zealthy.57 The TAC nevertheless




51
     JX 15 ¶¶ 318–41; JX 53 ¶¶ 283–99.
52
     JX 15 ¶¶ 336–41, 347–70; JX 53 ¶¶ 12–15, 283–99.
53
     JX 53 ¶¶ 258–64.
54
     Id. ¶¶ 285–88.
55
     Id. ¶¶ 285–88.
56
     Id. ¶¶ 292–95.
57
     Id. ¶¶ 296–99.


                                           12
retains substantial background allegations concerning Cerebral, although it names

only Robertson and Zealthy as defendants.58

             E. Robertson’s Representation and the Advancement Dispute.
                 1. Counsel Changes and Initial Advancement Discussions.

          In connection with the DOJ investigation, Robertson engaged Quinn Emanuel

Urquhart & Sullivan LLP to represent him.59 Cerebral began advancing Robertson’s

expenses as early as August 2022.60        Quinn Emanuel continued to represent

Robertson until February 2025, when Paul Hastings LLP replaced it as counsel. 61

Shortly after the DOJ filed the SAC in May 2025, Marcus, Rashbaum, Pineiro and

Meyers LLC (“MRPM”) replaced Paul Hastings.62

          Following MRPM’s substitution, Pineiro and Thomas A. Bednar, outside

counsel for Cerebral, discussed Cerebral’s advancement obligations concerning

Robertson’s representation.63 During this discussion, Bednar requested a budget.64

Pineiro gave a rough estimate of approximately $100,000 per month, but cautioned




58
     JX 53 ¶¶ 12–15, 32–98.
59
     PTO ¶ 12.
60
     Id. ¶ 13.
61
     Id. ¶¶ 18–19.
62
     Id. ¶ 21.
63
     Id. ¶ 22.
64
     Trial Tr. 13:21–14:15.


                                          13
that extensive discovery could increase the expense.65 Pineiro assured Bednar that

MRPM’s billing would be transparent and reasonable compared to previous

counsel’s billing.66

         Pineiro testified at trial that he understood Bednar and Cerebral to be

concerned that MRPM would bill Cerebral for Zealthy’s defense.67 He reassured

Bednar that Zealthy had separate counsel and that MRPM represented only

Robertson.68 Pineiro denied agreeing to bill Cerebral-related and Zealthy-related

work separately.69 He also testified that he and Bednar did not discuss Zealthy-

related work necessary to defend the Cerebral claims.70            Cerebral, however,

maintained that Bednar and Pineiro agreed that MRPM would not bill Cerebral for

Zealthy-related work.71

                2.     Discovery Expenses and Unpaid Invoices.




65
     Id. 14:6–11.
66
     Id. 14:12–15.
67
     Id. 14:17–15:5, 15:22–16:4.
68
     Id. 15:1–5, 15:22–16:4.
69
     Id. 15:17–23.
70
     Id. 15:6–16.
71
   Id. 227:9–228:12. Cerebral relied on Bednar’s deposition testimony, affidavit, and
contemporaneous email to support its understanding. Id. 228:2–12. Because I find the
Cerebral-related and Zealthy-related work roughly apportionable independently of any
alleged billing agreement, I need not resolve whether Bednar and Pinerio reached such an
agreement.


                                          14
         Cerebral paid MRPM’s first five invoices in full without requesting separate

invoices for Cerebral-related and Zealthy-related work, requesting more detailed

entries, or otherwise raising billing issues before payment.72 On November 10,

2025, MRPM submitted separate invoices for its October legal work and third-party

discovery services.73 These were the first invoices Cerebral failed to pay.74 Pineiro

repeatedly followed up with Cerebral concerning payment.75 On January 13, 2026,

he emailed Bednar, explaining that the outstanding balance of $263,326.50 was

unsustainable for a boutique firm and could impede MRPM’s ability to defend the

case.76

         On January 22, Pineiro spoke with Peter Healy of McDermott Will & Emery

LLP, who also served as Cerebral’s outside counsel.77 According to Pineiro, Healy

said Cerebral needed to raise more capital.78 Pineiro also recalled Healy stating that




72
     JX 69; Trial Tr. 46:14–22.
73
     JX 30.
74
     Trial Tr. 49:8–9, 55:7–10; JX 69.
75
     JX 34, 36, 38, 39, 43.
76
     JX 39.
77
     PTO ¶ 26; Trial Tr. 55:14–20, 69:6–18.
78
     Trial Tr. 69:15–24.


                                              15
he was unaware of a dispute over the invoices, although Pineiro was uncertain

whether that statement occurred during the January 22 call or an earlier call.79

                   3.   The Advancement Demand and Cerebral’s Response.
         According to Pineiro, Cerebral had not raised objections concerning invoice

form, segregation, or Zealthy-related fees when Robertson made an advancement

demand on February 19.80 Cerebral’s response requested separate invoices for

Robertson’s Cerebral-era actions and his subsequent actions.81 Pineiro testified that

this was the first such request.82 Cerebral also sought separate invoices for vendor

costs and legal fees and the exclusion of “ramp-up” time.83 It indicated that it might

raise additional questions or audit the invoices.84

                F. Procedural Posture.
         Robertson filed this advancement action in March 2026, seeking payment of

more than $800,000 in outstanding fees.85 On April 29, Robertson moved for

summary judgment.86 I denied Robertson’s motion, finding that expenses associated



79
     Id. 70:1–9.
80
     Id. 74:9–21; JX 45.
81
     Trial Tr. 75:6–13; JX 48.
82
     Trial Tr. 75:10–13.
83
     Id. 76:20–24, 77:12–21; JX 48.
84
     Trial Tr. 77:22–78:4.
85
     PTO ¶¶ 1, 24.
86
     D.I. 11.


                                          16
with Cerebral and Zealthy were roughly apportionable.87 Robertson then moved for

reargument, which I denied on June 18.88

         On July 27, Cerebral invoked its contractual assumption-of-defense right and

proposed Jason Hernandez of Stearns Weaver to represent Robertson concerning

claims asserted against him in his capacity as Cerebral’s former CEO.89 Robertson’s

counsel objected by letter dated July 29.90

         Robertson moved for a protective order barring Cerebral from deposing him.91

After hearing oral argument on the motion in September, I issued a bench ruling

granting the motion.92 I held trial on September 24, after which I took the matter

under advisement.93

         The parties agree that the Florida Action falls within the definition of a

“proceeding” in the Indemnity Agreement94 and that Robertson is entitled to

advancement for Counts I through VI of the SAC.95 The remaining dispute concerns



87
     D.I. 20.
88
     D.I. 23; D.I. 26.
89
     Trial Tr. 88:9–22; JX 60.
90
     Trial Tr. 89:7–17; JX 61.
91
     D.I. 40.
92
     D.I. 58.
93
     D.I. 67.
94
     PTO ¶ 15.
95
     JX 62 pp. 7–8.


                                          17
advancement for Counts VII through X of the SAC and Counts I through II of the

TAC.

II.      ANALYSIS
                A. Robertson is Entitled to Advancement for Counts I through VI of
                   the SAC; He is Not Entitled to Advancement for SAC Counts VII
                   Through X.

                  1. Work between Cerebral and Zealthy is Roughly Apportionable.

         When bylaws and contracts provide for mandatory advancement, “the

company carries the ultimate burden of proving that advancement is not required.”

Krauss v. 180 Life Scis. Corp., 

2022 WL 665323

, at *4 (Del. Ch. Mar. 7, 2022). I

denied Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, finding that expenses incurred

between Cerebral and Zealthy were likely to be roughly apportionable.96 During

trial, I again considered whether expenses were apportionable.         The Court’s

apportionment test is well-settled: “Would the disputed expenses have been incurred

in defense of the covered proceeding even if there was no non-covered proceeding?

If the answer is yes, then the disputed expenses are advanceable.” White v. Curo,

2017 WL 1369332

, at *10 (Del. Ch. Feb. 21, 2017) (citation modified).

         The Court should undertake apportionment review only when it can do so

“realistically without significant burden to the Court.” Holley v. Nipro Diagnostics,




96
     D.I. 22.


                                           18
Inc., 

2015 WL 4880418

, at *1 (Del. Ch. Aug. 14, 2015). The fact that a portion of

the case is subject to advancement does not mean that all expenses in the case must

be advanced. Fasciana v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 

829 A.2d 160, 175

 (Del. Ch. 2003)

(“[Roven], which involved complex facts, does not hold that a plaintiff seeking

advancement is entitled to have all of his expenses advanced if he merely proves

that some portion of the case against him is subject to a contractual right of

advancement.”).

      Advancement is subject to a reasonableness requirement. Underbrink v.

Warrior Energy Servs. Corp., 

2008 WL 2262316

, at *16 (Del. Ch. May 30, 2008).

A claim is advanceable only if it arises “by reason of the fact that he was a director

or officer of Cerebral.” Robertson is entitled to advancement where the DOJ

“pursued” him by reason of the fact that he was Cerebral’s director or officer. See

Marino v. Patriot Rail Co., 

131 A.3d 325, 346

 (Del. Ch. 2016) (“The scope of an

individual’s advancement rights normally turns on the pleadings in the underlying

litigation that trigger the advancement right.”). Under the circumstances and the

DOJ’s charges, he is not entitled to advancement for his conduct after he resigned.

Id.


      Pineiro acknowledged that Counts VII through X concerned only Robertson’s

conduct at Zealthy, but maintained that defending Counts I through VI required




                                         19
addressing the Zealthy conduct even without Counts VII through X.97 The counts

are temporally distinct, and each grouping relates only to Robertson’s acts at that

respective company.           As analyzed below, I find the advancement roughly

apportionable between Cerebral and Zealthy conduct.

                 2.     The DOJ’s Complaint Does Not Transform Zealthy Conduct
                        Into Cerebral-based Conduct.

         The Indemnity Agreement and Cerebral’s Bylaws provide Robertson with

indemnification and advancement rights in proceedings arising “by reason of the

fact” that he was a director or officer of Cerebral.98 The parties do not dispute that

the Florida Action is a “proceeding.”99 Cerebral agrees that Robertson is entitled to

advancement for Counts I through VI of the SAC, but contends that Counts VII

through X are non-advanceable because they concern his conduct at Zealthy and

elsewhere.100




97
  Trial Tr. 36:14–18 (“If you excise Counts VII to X, which only pertain to Zealthy, based
on the background allegations which are incorporated by reference and used to support all
of the other claims, I would have had to [do work relating to Robertson’s time as
Zealthy].”); Pl.’s Notice of Lodging of Dep. Tr., Ex. 3 at 42:10–15, D.I. 64 (“Separate from
that, counts seven to 12 also were also brought against Mr. Robertson and Zealthy. And
those were different causes of action that pertained solely to things that have occurred at
Zealthy. But you can see the claims are sort of intertwined based on the way the
government pled it.”).
98
     JX 1 §§ 1(c), 6; JX 2 Art. XI § 1(a), 1(c).
99
     PTO ¶ 15.
100
      DOB at p. 32.


                                                   20
         The Court reviews requests for indemnification and advancement on a claim-

by-claim basis. Paolino v. Mace Sec. Int’l, Inc., 

985 A.2d 392, 400

 (Del. Ch. 2009).

“[I]f there is a nexus or causal connection between any of the underlying proceedings

. . . and one's official capacity, those proceedings are ‘by reason of the fact’ that one

was a corporate officer, without regard to one's motivation for engaging in that

conduct.” Homestore v. Taffeen, 

888 A.2d 205

, 214 (Del. 2005). A nexus or causal

connection “is established if the corporate powers were used or necessary for the

commission of the alleged misconduct.” Bernstein v. TractManager, Inc., 

953 A.2d

1003, 1011

 (Del. Ch. 2007). That said, “the conduct complained of must occur at a

time when one is a corporate officer or director.” 

Id.

 To put it succinctly, claims for

advancement “can be parsed ‘where a bright-line, temporal standard’ can be applied

to demarcate advanceable claims from non-advanceable claims.”                 Ahmed v.

JPMorgan Chase & Co., 

2026 WL 251542

, at *9 (Del. Ch. Jan. 21, 2026) (quoting

Mooney v. Echo Therapeutics, 

2015 WL 3413272

, at *7 (Del. Ch. May 28, 2015)).

         A bright-line, temporal standard exists here. When the DOJ filed the SAC,

both Cerebral and Robertson were parties.101             The Complaint began with

Robertson’s Cerebral conduct and pivoted to his post-Cerebral activity beginning at




101
      JX 15.


                                           21
Section VII and paragraph 201.102 The Counts reflect a similar shift. Counts I

through IV are against Robertson individually and relate to his conduct at

Cerebral.103      Count V involves Robertson’s conduct, along with another co-

defendant, Martelli, while at Cerebral.104 Count VI involves only Robertson during

his time at Cerebral.105 Again, to the extent that Counts I through VI are by reason

of the fact of Robertson’s role as an officer or director at Cerebral, the parties are

aligned that Robertson is entitled to advancement.

         The remaining counts involve Robertson’s conduct after he left Cerebral.

Count VII is against Robertson and co-defendants Echeverry, Zealthy, and Bruno

Health.106 Count VII does not mention Cerebral.107 Count VIII is against Robertson,

Zealthy, and Bruno Health.108     Again, there is no mention of Cerebral in Count

VIII’s language.109 Count IX is against Robertson, Zealthy, and Bruno Health.110




102
      See JX 15 ¶ 201.
103
      

Id.

 ¶¶ 318–35.
104
      

Id.

 ¶¶ 336–41.
105
      

Id.

 ¶¶ 342–46.
106
      JX 15 ¶¶ 347–54.
107
      See 

Id.

108
      

Id.

 ¶¶ 355–62.
109
      See 

Id.

110
      

Id.

 ¶¶ 363–65.


                                         22
As with the others, Count IX does not reference Cerebral.111 Finally, Count X is

against Robertson, Echeverry, Zealthy, and Bruno Health, likewise making no

reference to Cerebral.112

          But the analysis does not turn solely on whether Counts VII through X

mention Cerebral. The DOJ’s narrative complaint references Robertson’s conduct

at Cerebral at various points in DOJ’s discussion of his post-Cerebral conduct. For

instance, the DOJ recites:

          Just as Cerebral’s chargeback rate was often high while Robertson was
          its CEO, Zealthy’s chargeback rate has been unusually high. Its rate has
          been so high that at least one payment processor threatened to stop
          allowing its members to use its payment cards to pay Zealthy’s
          charges.113

In alleging that Robertson, Zealthy, and Bruno Health violated the FTC’s Rule on

the Use of Consumer Reviews and Testimonials, the DOJ stated:

          Just as he did at Cerebral, where he informed his employees that he was
          ‘fine with fake ones [reviews],’ Robertson has led a practice of
          impersonating Zealthy subscribers and Bruno Health patients by
          fabricating online reviews purportedly written by them—but in fact
          written by Zealthy’s own employees and Robertson himself.114




111
      See 

Id.

112
      

Id.

 ¶¶ 366–70.
113
      Id. ¶ 266.
114
      Id. ¶ 279.


                                            23
Within this area, the DOJ also noted a settlement with Cerebral based on Robertson’s

conduct while there:

          Robertson knew that posting fake reviews, suppressing authentic
          reviews, upvoting positive reviews, and downvoting negative reviews
          was illegal no later than December 28, 2023, when the New York
          Attorney General announced a settlement with Cerebral relating to,
          among other misconduct, fake reviews that Robertson directed while its
          CEO (as alleged above).115

          The Complaint also references Robertson’s and Cerebral’s charged conduct

from the DOJ’s First Amended Complaint: “Robertson has also been on notice since

May 31, 2024 that these unlawful and unethical practices have been at issue in this

action, because the First Amended Complaint directly implicates analogous

practices directed by Robertson when he was CEO of Cerebral.”116 Robertson

argues that references like these were sufficient to meet the advancement provisions

of the Bylaws and Indemnity Agreement because they relate to his conduct at

Cerebral, even for the conduct relating solely to his position at Zealthy.

          Robertson’s corporate powers at Cerebral “were [not] used or necessary for

the commission of the alleged misconduct” at Zealthy. Bernstein, 

953 A.2d at 1011

.

Nor were his corporate powers at Zealthy used or necessary to commit the misdeeds

at Cerebral. Robertson’s roles at Cerebral and at Zealthy were temporally distinct.




115
      Id. ¶ 295.
116
      Id. ¶ 297.


                                           24
Pineiro admitted that Counts VII through X pertain solely to Zealthy.117 There was

no overlap between the positions. Robertson suggests that the “DOJ’s arguments in

the Florida Action . . . broadly tied together Cerebral and Zealthy related conduct.”118

In support, he cites this Court’s holding that a nexus or causal connection “can

include post-separation conduct if it is rooted in pre-separation responsibilities.”

Barr v. Genesis CMG Hldgs., LLC, 

2025 WL 3720720

, at *5 (Del. Ch. Dec. 23,

2025).

         The mention of Cerebral as background is insufficient to justify advancement

when the groups of charges each relate to Robertson’s conduct by reason of the fact

that he was a director or officer at Cerebral and Zealthy, respectively.    Our Courts

look to the pleadings in the underlying litigation to determine whether a causal

connection exists. Charney v. Am. Apparel, Inc., 

2015 WL 5313769

, at *16 (Del.

Ch. Sept. 11, 2015). “Nexus is established if the corporate powers were used or

necessary for the commission of the alleged misconduct.”             Rose v. Berkeley

Compute, Inc., 

2026 WL 700385

, at *5 (Del. Ch. Mar. 5, 2026) (citation modified).

I must determine whether there is a nexus or causal connection between the DOJ’s

charges against Robertson in Counts VII through X and his corporate capacity at




117
      Trial Tr. 36:14–18.
118
      POB at p 29.


                                          25
Cerebral. See Brown v. LiveOps, Inc., 

903 A.2d 324, 328

 (Del. Ch. 2006). “The

Court must look to the substance of the claim, as opposed to the words a plaintiff

has chosen to use in the pleading.” Rose, 

2026 WL 700385

, at *5.

      The corporate powers used in Counts VII through X took place in Robertson’s

post-Cerebral role. They relate to his time and conduct at Zealthy. The DOJ’s SAC

mentions Cerebral conduct in the context of Zealthy conduct but Counts VII through

X solely concerned Robertson’s post-Cerebral activity and arose by reason of his

role at Zealthy. Robertson did not use or need his Cerebral powers to commit the

alleged misconduct in these latter counts. The DOJ’s background references do not

transform Counts VII through X into Cerebral-related claims. Under these relatively

unique circumstances, it would be inequitable to require Cerebral to provide

advancement both for Counts I through VI, which concern Robertson’s conduct as

Cerebral’s CEO, and for Counts VII through X, which concern only his subsequent

Zealthy conduct.

             3.    The SAC Claims Are Not Inextricably Intertwined.

      Robertson argues that he is entitled to advancement for Counts VII through X

because the defense of those claims is inextricably intertwined with the defense of

Counts I through VI. In support, he directs the Court to the decisions in Hyatt v. Al

Jazeera Am. Hldgs. II, LLC, 

2016 WL 1301743

 (Del. Ch. Mar. 31, 2016) and Rizk

v. TractManager, Inc., C.A. No. 9073-ML (Del. Ch. May 30, 2014).



                                         26
      Those cases are inapplicable because they do not involve the temporally

distinct circumstances present here. In Hyatt, following a merger, the defendant

served five “claim certificates” for indemnification for damages stemming from

action by the acquired company, including violation of the merger agreement. Hyatt,

2016 WL 1301743

, at *2. Plaintiff, a former director of the acquired company whom

the merger agreement appointed as Members’ Representative, received the claim

certificates in that capacity. 

Id.

 Plaintiff filed suit against defendant alleging that

the claim certificates were invalid and breached the merger agreement. Id. at *3.

Defendant asserted counterclaims alleging that plaintiff breached the merger

agreement by failing to accept the claim certificates, and plaintiff sought

advancement for the expenses incurred in defending those counterclaims. Id.

Defendant argued against advancement, contending that plaintiff rejected the claim

certificates in his role as Members’ Representative and not as a former officer or

director. Id. at *6. This Court held as follows:

      Although the Counterclaims appear on their face to merely implicate
      [plaintiffs’] role as Members’ Representative, the resolution of the
      validity of the Claim Certificates in the Underlying Action, in part,
      necessarily requires [plaintiffs] to defend their actions as former
      officers and directors, for which they are contractually entitled to
      advancement. Without such a (successful) defense, the rights of
      [plaintiffs] (and the other former members of [the acquired company])
      in the Escrow Fund will be forfeit.

Id. at *9. To defend the claim certificates’ rejection, including breach of the merger

agreement, plaintiffs were required to “defend their actions as officers and


                                          27
directors.” Id. at *10. Thus, the plaintiffs’ actions in the underlying action were

directly connected to the counterclaims.

         Our situation is starkly different. Counts VII through X relate only to

Robertson’s conduct at Zealthy. Robertson admits as much.119 Although the DOJ

mentions Robertson’s Cerebral conduct as background, he is not charged in any of

the relevant counts with conduct that occurred at Cerebral by reason of the fact of

his role there. Each Zealthy count relates solely to Robertson’s conduct at that

company. Although Robertson may have repeated misconduct from his time at

Cerebral, that does not intertwine the acts.

         The same is true in Rizk. Thomas Rizk was the founder, former CEO, and

director of defendant TractManager, Inc. (“TMI”). Rizk, C.A. No. 9073-ML, at 2.

Rizk was involved in the merger of TMI with another entity. Id. at 3. After the

merger, Rizk remained on TMI’s board as the minority stockholders’ board designee

and continued serving as CEO.          Id.        Under new management, TMI found

improprieties and terminated Rizk. Id. at 4. Rizk filed suit against TMI but

ultimately found himself embroiled in counterclaims and related lawsuits concerning

his conduct as an officer or director. Id. at 5–9. He sought advancement of the

expenses incurred in defending those claims. Id.




119
      Trial Tr. 36:14–18.


                                             28
      In particular, Rizk sought advancement for what the Court termed the “New

York Action.” Id. at 20. TMI argued that Rizk was not due advancement because

the plaintiff in the New York Action sued him in his capacity as a seller in the

merger. Id. at 21. As the Court ruled, advancement was required here because the

merger and his conduct at TMI were inextricably intertwined. Id. As the Court

noted, “the complaint in the New York Action alleges that Rizk incurred, and

permitted [others] to incur, inappropriate expenses that were charged to TMI, and

that Rizk improperly directed TMI resources and personnel to the Joint Venture, at

the expense of TMI’s domestic business.”       Id. at 21–22. The Court granted

advancement in the New York Action, finding that the allegations were that Rizk

diverted TMI resources and personnel for his benefit. Id. at 22. “Although Rizk

was sued for representations he made as a seller, these allegations regarding Rizk’s

conduct as CEO create the necessary causal connection between the New York

Action and Rizk’s official capacity.” Id.

      Rizk’s acts as CEO were part of the underlying complaint in the New York

Action. Not so here. Counts VII through X address only Robertson’s acts during

his tenure at Zealthy. While they may mirror the similar acts he took at Cerebral,

they are by reason of the fact of his role at Zealthy, not Cerebral. The roles are

temporally attenuated both in reality and in the DOJ’s SAC. Compared to the

Court’s finding in Rizk, the mentions of Cerebral conduct are truly the “background


                                        29
facts” that the Rizk Court considered. Id. The Cerebral and Zealthy conduct are not

inextricably intertwined.

      This Court’s decision in Barr v. Genesis CMG Hldgs., LLC also merits

mention. Barr, 

2025 WL 3720720

. There, Theodore Barr co-founded a company

that was ultimately sold to the defendant. Id. at *1. Barr remained with the company

but resigned less than two years after the sale and started another company. Id. at

*2. The defendant sued Barr in a separate suit, alleging that plaintiff breached a

portion of the sale agreement by competing with the defendant and soliciting its

clients. Id.   Despite an amended complaint that was “alleging no pre-separation

misconduct,” the Court held that Barr’s solicitation of his prior employees and

clients indicated that Barr did “learn of, form relationships with, or otherwise gain

knowledge of these parties through his official capacity with the Defendant.” Id. at

*6.

      No such connective tissue exists here. Robertson is alleged to have committed

certain acts at Cerebral. He is alleged to have committed similar acts at Zealthy.

But there was no occasion when his roles crossed over. Nor is it alleged, as it was

with Barr, that Robertson used his former position at Cerebral to commit misconduct

at Zealthy.

          B. Robertson is Not Entitled to Advancement for Count II of the Third
             Amended Complaint.




                                         30
          The parties agree that Robertson is not entitled to advancement for Count III

of the TAC and is entitled to advancement for Count I to the extent his conduct was

“by reason of the fact that such person is or was a director or executive officer of”

Cerebral. That leaves Count II for me to assess.

          First, it is important to note the change in posture in the TAC. When the DOJ

filed its Third Amended Complaint, Cerebral was no longer a party to the action.120

In the TAC, Robertson focuses on the section entitled “Unlawful Business Activities

at Cerebral” with a subheading of “Robertson’s Direction of Unlawful Cancellation

Practices at Cerebral.”121 This section discusses Robertson’s conduct at Cerebral

from 2019 to 2022, when he directed the implementation of subscription cancellation

procedures designed to frustrate subscribers’ attempts to cancel.122 Cerebral homes

in on the charge itself. Count II is entitled “FTC Act Section 5—Unfair and

Deceptive Practices.”123 As Cerebral notes, there is no mention of Cerebral in the

charge.124 The count’s language addresses only Robertson’s conduct at Zealthy and

the impact on Zealthy customers. This lacks the required causal nexus. Robertson




120
      JX 53.
121
      POB at p. 33; JX 53 ¶¶ 32–53.
122
      JX 53 ¶¶ 32–53.
123
      Id. p. 58.
124
      DOB at p. 29; JX 53 ¶¶ 291–95.


                                            31
is not charged by reason of the fact of his position at Cerebral. Although the count

incorporates by reference the entirety of the TAC, the conduct relates only to

Zealthy. Coupled with the DOJ’s clear intent that the TAC narrow the focus of the

case to Robertson’s conduct at Zealthy, there is no causal nexus between the Zealthy

activity and Robertson’s role at Cerebral.

         Robertson argues that the DOJ’s incorporation of the Cerebral background

means that “Count II incorporates and relies upon alleged conduct by Robertson

while he was at Cerebral.”125 But this Court rejected this exact kind of argument in

Charney v. Am. Apparel, Inc., 

2015 WL 5313769

, at *17. There, Charney argued

that his former, covered role was inextricably intertwined with his current role

because “relationships he built as CEO and the knowledge he gained as a director

and officer of the Company enabled him to take the actions alleged in the Standstill

Proceeding.” 

Id.

 (citation modified). The Court rejected that argument, explaining,

“Charney's former status may have made his violations of the Standstill Agreement

more damaging, but that former status was not necessary for the violations

themselves.” 

Id.


         While the Cerebral conduct may add some color and background to

Robertson’s acts at Zealthy, that conduct was not necessary for the Zealthy




125
      POB at p. 33; PAB at p. 10.


                                         32
violations that he is alleged to have committed. Robertson is not entitled to

advancement for Count II of the TAC.

               C. Cerebral Failed to Assume Robertson’s Defense.
            The Indemnity Agreement contains an Assumption of Defense provision.126

The relevant portion reads:

            In the event the Company shall be requested by Indemnitee to pay the
            expenses of any proceeding, the Company, if appropriate, shall be
            entitled to assume the defense of such proceeding, or to participate to
            the extent permissible in such proceeding, with counsel reasonably
            acceptable to Indemnitee. Upon assumption of the defense by the
            Company and the retention of such counsel by the Company, the
            Company shall not be liable to Indemnitee under this Agreement for
            any fees of counsel subsequently incurred by Indemnitee with respect
            to the same proceeding, provided that Indemnitee shall have the right
            to employ separate counsel in such proceeding at Indemnitee's sole cost
            and expense. Notwithstanding the foregoing, if Indemnitee's counsel
            delivers a written notice to the Company stating that such counsel has
            reasonably concluded that there may be a conflict of interest between
            the Company and Indemnitee in the conduct of any such defense or the
            Company shall not, in fact, have employed counsel or otherwise
            actively pursued the defense of such proceeding within a reasonable
            time, then in any such event the fees and expenses of Indemnitee's
            counsel to defend such proceeding shall be subject to the
            indemnification and advancement of expenses provisions of this
            Agreement.127




126
      JX 1 § 8.
127
      Id.


                                              33
Cerebral argues that it assumed Robertson’s defense and ended advancement under

the Indemnity Agreement.128 Jacqueline Kniska, Cerebral’s representative at trial,

testified that “practically speaking,” Cerebral had not assumed Robertson’s

defense.129 Her qualifier of “practically speaking” was based on the absence of

billing from counsel that Cerebral sought to obtain for Robertson. 130 Kniska’s

perspective is informative but not determinative.

      I turn to the Assumption of Defense provision. First, Cerebral must notify

Robertson that it intends to assume the defense.131      Second, the defense must be

assumed within a reasonable time.132 Third, if the Indemnitee’s counsel determines

that there may be a conflict of interest between the Company and the Indemnitee,

then indemnification and advancement are not suspended.133 On March 28, 2026,

Cerebral’s counsel sent a letter to Pineiro expressing concerns over advancement

requests.134 In that letter, Cerebral advised, “Cerebral has decided to identify counsel




128
      Id.
129
      Trial Tr. 172:1–4.
130
      Id. 172:9–16.
131
      JX 1 § 8.
132
      Id.
133
      Id.
134
      JX 52.


                                          34
to assume the defense pursuant to Section 8 of the Indemnity Agreement.”135 This

letter may have expressed Cerebral’s intent, but it was prospective. Cerebral had not

yet retained or identified replacement counsel. This is underscored by a July 27,

2026, letter from Cerebral’s counsel to Robertson’s counsel stating that “Cerebral

invokes its contractual right to assume Mr. Robertson’s defense.” 136 In that letter,

Cerebral also noted, “Cerebral identifies and retains Jason Hernandez of Stearns

Weaver Miller Weissler Alhadeff & Sitterson, P.A. as proposed counsel for Mr.

Robertson in the Florida Action.”

      Cerebral’s assumption of defense could not have been perfected before July 27,

2026. Two days later, Robertson’s counsel wrote to Cerebral’s counsel and objected

to the assumption of defense on two bases.137 First, counsel argued that the

assumption of defense was untimely because the DOJ filed its initial complaint in

April 2024.138 Second, Pineiro advised Cerebral that he reasonably concluded that

there might be a conflict of interest between Robertson and Cerebral because




135
      Id.
136
      JX 60.
137
      JX 61.
138
      Id.


                                          35
Cerebral appeared committed to only defending Robertson for a portion of the

proceeding.139

      Addressing the conflict argument first, I find that Robertson’s counsel’s

reasonable determination that a conflict of interest existed blunted the assumption of

defense. The assumption of defense clause speaks to assuming the defense in a

“proceeding.” Circumstances like those presented here, with multiple amended

complaints and claims across different entities, were never considered by the

clause’s drafters. It is ill-fitting for these circumstances. It would be challenging,

although not impossible, for counsel to defend only portions of a case. In any case,

I find that Robertson’s counsel provided reasonable notice of a conflict of interest.

      The untimeliness argument is even stronger for Robertson. Cerebral argues that

its assumption of defense was timely because it had no reason to assume the defense

until Robertson’s counsel failed to provide clarity in its billing.140 Robertson

disagrees because the DOJ initiated its Complaint in April 2024, more than two years

before Cerebral attempted to assume the defense.

      I find that the timeliness prong of the Assumption of Defense relates to the

viability of the defense. The DOJ filed its initial Complaint in April 2024. Since




139
      Id.
140
      Trial Tr. 232:15–233:3.


                                          36
then, there have been three amended complaints. The parties are scheduled to

complete discovery in December 2026.141 The court has scheduled trial to begin on

April 19, 2027.142 It is too late to reasonably assume the defense. Substituting

counsel now comes with great risk to Robertson’s defense. After all, this is an

indemnification agreement intended to provide a defense for corporate officers and

directors. It would be illogical, then, to suggest that it is timely to replace counsel

more than two years and four complaints into a three-year timeline. I find that

Cerebral failed to assume the defense.

               D. Fees on fees

            I find that Robertson is entitled to fees on fees. Here, that is for Counts I

through VI of the SAC.143 A prevailing plaintiff is entitled to fees on fees in the

indemnification and advancement context. Stifel Fin. Corp. v. Cochran, 

809 A.2d

555

, 560–61 (Del. 2002). Robertson “prevailed in his request for advancement, but

not on all points.” Marino, 

131 A.3d at 350

. Robertson is therefore entitled to fees

on fees in proportion to his success in this matter. 

Id.


III.        CONCLUSION




141
      PTO ¶ 28.
142
      

Id.

143
   To the extent that any advancement was already provided for these Counts, that may
reduce the proportion.


                                              37
      For the reasons explained above, I find that Robertson is entitled to

advancement consistent with this Report. This is a Final Report pursuant to Court

of Chancery Rule 144.




                                       38

For advice on a matter of this kind in France, contact our corporate lawyer in Paris.


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