Miscellaneous Etats-Unis

Uber Technologies, Inc. v. City of Seattle

Official source
                FOR PUBLICATION

  UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
       FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC.;             No. 25-228
PORTIER, LLC,
                                       D.C. No.
                                    2:24-cv-02103-
         Plaintiffs - Appellants,
                                         MJP
and
                                    ORDER AND
MAPLEBEAR INC., doing business       OPINION
as Instacart,

         Intervenor-Plaintiff,

 v.

CITY OF SEATTLE,

         Defendant - Appellee.


UBER TECHNOLOGIES,                   No. 25-231
INC., PORTIER, LLC,
                                       D.C. No.
                                    2:24-cv-02103-
         Plaintiffs,
                                         MJP
and

MAPLEBEAR INC., doing business
2           UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC. V. CITY OF SEATTLE


as Instacart,

             Intervenor-Plaintiff -
             Appellant,

    v.

CITY OF SEATTLE,

             Defendant - Appellee.

         Appeals from the United States District Court
           for the Western District of Washington
         Marsha J. Pechman, District Judge, Presiding

             Argued and Submitted July 10, 2025
                    Seattle, Washington

                    Filed October 29, 2026

    Before: Susan P. Graber, Richard R. Clifton, and Mark J.
                    Bennett, Circuit Judges.

                             Order;
                   Opinion by Judge Clifton;
                Partial Dissent by Judge Bennett
           UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC. V. CITY OF SEATTLE              3


                          SUMMARY *


        First Amendment / Preliminary Injunction

    The panel filed (1) an order withdrawing its opinion and
dissent filed on March 4, 2026, and denying as moot a
petition for rehearing en banc; and (2) a superseding
amended opinion and dissent, affirming the district court’s
denial of a motion by Uber Technologies, Inc. and
Maplebear Inc. for a preliminary injunction to enjoin the
City of Seattle from enforcing Seattle’s App-Based Worker
Deactivation Rights Ordinance (the “Ordinance”), which
applies to network companies that provide a platform for
customers to hire temporary workers and prohibits
unwarranted deactivations of these app-based workers’
accounts.
    Section 8.40.050.A of the Ordinance requires (1) that a
network company “inform” any app-based worker “in
writing” of the company’s deactivation policy and (2) that
the deactivation policy be “reasonably related” to the
company’s “safe and efficient operations.” Plaintiffs, two
network companies that rely on app-based workers for their
businesses, alleged that the Ordinance compels speech in
violation of the First Amendment, and that it is
unconstitutionally vague.
   Assuming, without deciding, that the Ordinance
regulates speech, the panel concluded that speech is
commercial speech, and the Ordinance’s regulation of it
overcomes the applicable lower level of First Amendment

*
 This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
4         UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC. V. CITY OF SEATTLE


scrutiny. Because the Ordinance regulates deactivation
standards and requires companies to communicate those
standards to their workers, the panel applied the test
articulated in Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of
the Supreme Court of Ohio, 

471 U.S. 626, 651

 (1985).
    As to the Ordinance’s first requirement that network
companies inform app-based workers of their deactivation
policies, the panel held that it meets the test drawn from
Zauderer, because the provision is reasonably related to
Seattle’s goal to keep app-based workers informed and
employed while keeping the public safe, does not purport to
compel speech on controversial issues, and is not unduly
burdensome.
    Concerning the Ordinance’s second requirement that the
deactivation policies be “reasonably related” to the
companies’ “safe and efficient operations”, the panel
concluded that provision is not an impermissible regulation
of speech because it regulates speech related to what Seattle
has designated as unlawful activity: the unwarranted
deactivations of worker accounts.
    The panel further held that the Ordinance is not
unconstitutionally vague because it provides fair notice to a
person of ordinary intelligence as to what grounds for
deactivation are reasonably related to safety and efficiency.
    Accordingly, the panel held that because Plaintiffs are
unlikely to succeed on the merits of their claim, the district
court did not abuse its discretion when it denied the
preliminary injunction.
   Dissenting in part, Judge Bennett agreed with the
majority that the Ordinance is not unconstitutionally
vague. However, he disagreed with the majority’s decision
          UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC. V. CITY OF SEATTLE        5


to “[a]ssum[e] without deciding[] that the Ordinance
regulates speech,” because the Ordinance does compel
speech and is thus subject to the First Amendment. As for
the majority’s alternative reasoning that the speech at issue
is commercial speech and “overcomes the appropriate level
of scrutiny,” Judge Bennett is unpersuaded and believe
Plaintiffs have at least raised serious questions going to the
merits. He would therefore vacate and remand to have the
district court redo its analysis on the merits and reexamine
the Winter preliminary injunction factors in light of a
determination that the Ordinance is subject to intermediate
scrutiny, and in light of the current facts.



                        COUNSEL

David M. Zionts (argued), Alexander J. Cave, Neha
Jaganathan, and Stacey K. Grigsby, Covington & Burling
LLP, Washington, D.C.; Neema Sahni, Covington &
Burling LLP, Los Angeles, California; Robert J. Maguire
and Theo A. Lesczynski, Davis Wright Tremaine LLP,
Seattle, Washington; for Plaintiffs-Appellants.
Alexander T. MacDonald (argued), Littler Mendelson PC,
Washington, D.C.; Douglas E. Smith, Littler Mendelson PC,
Seattle, Washington; for Intervenor-Plaintiff-Appellant.
Jessica L. Goldman (argued), Lawrence C. Locker, Eva S.
Oliver, Molly J. Gibbons, and Jesse L. Taylor, Summit Law
Group PLLC, Seattle, Washington; Ghazal Sharifi, Assistant
City Attorney; Ann Davison and Erika J. Evans, City
Attorneys; Seattle City Attorney's Office, Seattle,
Washington; for Defendant-Appellee.
6         UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC. V. CITY OF SEATTLE


Jason W. Anderson, Mark C. Lamb, and Nicholas A.
Carlson, Carney Badley Spellman PS, Seattle, Washington,
for Amicus Curiae Washington Food Industry Association.
Adam G. Unikowsky and Jonathan J. Marshall, Jenner &
Block LLP, Washington, D.C.; Jonathan D. Urick and
Audrey Beck, United States Chamber Litigation Center,
Washington, D.C.; for Amicus Curiae The Chamber of
Commerce of the United States.
Naomi Tsu, Sophie House, Elaine Poon, and Jonathan B.
Miller, Public Rights Project, Oakland, California; Robert
Taylor, City Attorney, Office of the Portland City Attorney,
Portland, Oregon; Heather Ferbert, San Diego City
Attorney, Office of the San Diego City Attorney, San Diego,
California; for Amici Curiae Local Governments.
Jessica A. Skelton and W. Scott Ferron, Pacifica Law Group
LLP, Seattle, Washington, for Amicus Curiae International
Municipal Lawyers Association.



                          ORDER

    Pursuant to General Order 5.3(c)(1), the panel withdraws
the opinion and dissent filed on March 4, 2026, and
concurrently files a superseding amended opinion and
dissent. Appellant’s petition for rehearing en banc (Docket
Entry No. 51) is denied as moot. G.O. 5.3(c)(1). Further
petitions for panel rehearing and rehearing en banc may be
filed from the superseding amended opinion. See 

id.

            UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC. V. CITY OF SEATTLE               7


                            OPINION

CLIFTON, Circuit Judge:

    The City of Seattle enacted Ordinance 126878 (the
“Ordinance”) in 2023. 1 It added a new chapter 8.40 to the
Seattle Municipal Code, titled the “App-Based Worker
Deactivation Rights Ordinance.” Applying to “network
companies” that provide a platform for customers to hire
temporary workers, like delivery drivers, the Ordinance
prohibits “unwarranted deactivations” of these app-based
workers’ accounts. Seattle, Wash., Ordinance 126878,
§ 8.40 (Aug. 14, 2023). The law is Seattle’s attempt to
address what it perceives to be the instability of the gig
economy and the consequent vulnerability of delivery
workers.
    Uber Technologies, Inc., including its wholly owned
subsidiary Portier, LLC (“Uber”), and Maplebear Inc.
(“Instacart”) (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) are two network
companies that rely on app-based workers for their
businesses. They claim that the Ordinance violates their
constitutional rights in two ways: it impermissibly infringes
on their protected speech, and it is void for vagueness. They
appeal the district court’s denial of their motion for a
preliminary injunction to enjoin enforcement of the
Ordinance against them.
    Assuming, without deciding, that the Ordinance
regulates speech, that speech is commercial speech, and the
Ordinance’s regulation of it overcomes the applicable lower
level of First Amendment scrutiny. As for the vagueness

1
 Relevant portions of the Ordinance are attached as an appendix to this
opinion.
8         UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC. V. CITY OF SEATTLE


challenge, we conclude that the Ordinance is not
unconstitutionally vague, because a person of ordinary
intelligence would understand its meaning. Accordingly, the
district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied
Plaintiffs’ request for a preliminary injunction, and we
affirm.
I. Background
    Uber and Instacart are large companies in the growing
gig economy. Plaintiffs and other companies like them
connect workers with customers, then take a cut of payments
made by the customers. Relevant to the Ordinance, Uber and
Instacart act largely as delivery services. (The Ordinance
does not apply to certain categories of app-based workers,
like rideshare drivers, which is what many people may
immediately think of as “Uber.” Ordinance § 8.40.020.)
Their workers pick up orders from restaurants, or retailers,
or even other customers on the app. The workers also can
operate as personal shoppers by going to businesses like
grocery stores, browsing for items, and delivering those
items to customers.
    Both workers and customers access those services
through accounts on apps built by the network companies.
While Uber and Instacart are the parties to bring
this challenge, any app-based worker regulation
affects more than just the users of those two platforms. As of
2021, sixteen percent of adults in the United
States have earned money via an online gig
platform. Monica Anderson et al., The State of Gig Work in
2021,      PEW     RSCH.      CTR.      (Dec.     8,   2021),
https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2021/12/08/the-state-
of-gig-work-in-2021/ (last visited Oct. 29, 2025)
[https://perma.cc/JH6W-VSDM].
              UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC. V. CITY OF SEATTLE                     9


    Seattle’s Ordinance prohibits deactivations of app-based
workers for reasons that its drafters deemed unwarranted.
Ordinance § 8.40.060.A. Plaintiffs do not challenge that
prohibition but instead challenge the constitutionality of
certain provisions of the Ordinance, in particular section
8.40.050, titled “Deactivation requirements.” That section
requires (1) that a network company “inform” any app-based
worker “in writing” of the company’s deactivation policy
and (2) that the deactivation policy be “reasonably related”
to the company’s “safe and efficient operations.” Id.
§ 8.40.050.A.1–2.
    The Ordinance includes a list of eight example policies
that are not reasonably related to safety and efficiency. Id.
§ 8.40.050.A.2.a–h. The list includes policies that would
result in a deactivation “based solely on a quantitative metric
derived from aggregate customer ratings” or “based on the
results of a background check, consumer report, driver
record, or record of traffic infractions, except in cases of
egregious misconduct or where required by other applicable
law.” Id. § 8.40.050.A.2.e, h. 2


2
    “Egregious misconduct” is defined as:
           [A]n action or behavior by an individual app-based
           worker that: (1) endangers the physical safety of the
           customer, or a third person, the network company, or
           an animal; or (2) intentionally causes economic harm
           to the customer, a third person, or the network
           company; or (3) is threatening, harassing, or abusive
           to the customer, a third party, or the network company.
                . . . [It] includes but is not limited to . . . failing to
           maintain a valid state driver’s license . . . .
                . . . [It] shall not include conduct related to non-
           criminal moving violations . . . or traffic collisions
           unless the app-based worker has accumulated more
10            UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC. V. CITY OF SEATTLE


   The Ordinance applies only to internal communications
with app-based workers. It does not require that the
companies communicate any deactivation policies to the
general public. Nor does it require that the companies
communicate their agreement with such policies. The
companies may describe the policies as being required by the
Ordinance.
    Seattle’s stated purpose for enacting the Ordinance is to
“protect[] and promote[] public health, safety, and welfare.”
Id. § 1.C. Minimum labor standards are recognized as
helping both employers, by improving worker performance
and quality, and workers, by increasing job stability. Id.
§ 1.E, W. But network companies’ growing reliance on
algorithms leads, Seattle says, to “arbitrary evaluations and
unwarranted deactivations.” Id. § 1.H. Establishing “clear
performance expectations,” limitations on deactivations
predicated on quantitative metrics and possibly inaccurate
background checks, and a legal right to challenge
unwarranted deactivations are all attempts to regulate
reliance on automatic, algorithmic determinations of
worker-eligibility. See id. § 1.I–L, P, U.
    Uber filed this action seeking a temporary restraining
order and preliminary injunction against the Ordinance
shortly before it was set to take effect. It alleged three claims,
two of which are pursued in this appeal: that the Ordinance
compels speech in violation of the First Amendment, and
that it is unconstitutionally vague. 3 Instacart moved to


           than three non-criminal moving violations or at-fault
           collisions in the previous three years.
Id. § 8.40.020.
3
    The third claim cited in the complaint, that the Ordinance restricts
          UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC. V. CITY OF SEATTLE         11


intervene and, in doing so, agreed to forego independent
briefing on the temporary restraining order before the district
court.
    The district court held that the Ordinance regulates the
deactivation of worker accounts, with any effects on speech
or expression being “incidental to its worker-related conduct
goals.” The court concluded that the Ordinance was not void
because the term “reasonable” was not vague, and any
discrepancies in interpretation were rooted in a
“fundamental disagreement” between Uber and Seattle over
what policies are reasonably related to safe and efficient
operations. After determining that Uber did not show a
likelihood of establishing any constitutional violation, the
district court found neither irreparable harm nor a balance of
equities or public interest tipping in Uber’s favor. It denied
the motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary
injunction.
    Uber and Instacart appealed. A stay pending final
resolution of the appeals, entered by the district court based
on a stipulation of the parties, is currently in place.
    We have jurisdiction under 

28 U.S.C. § 1292

(a)(1). A
district court’s denial of a preliminary injunction is reviewed
for abuse of discretion, a “limited and deferential” standard.
Harris v. Bd. of Supervisors, 

366 F.3d 754

, 766 (9th Cir.
2004); see also X Corp. v. Bonta, 

116 F.4th 888, 897

 (9th
Cir. 2024). The underlying issues of law that led to that
decision, such as whether the Ordinance compels speech or
merely regulates conduct, are reviewed de novo. See Harris,
366 F.3d at 760.


Uber’s expressive associational rights in violation of the First
Amendment, has not been argued in this appeal.
12        UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC. V. CITY OF SEATTLE


II. First Amendment claims
    Uber and Instacart argue that Seattle’s Ordinance
compels pure, content-based speech in violation of the First
Amendment in two ways. First, the notice requirement
compels speech by forcing the companies to communicate
their deactivation policies and decisions in writing and make
them accessible to workers. Second, the deactivation
standards regulate that speech’s content by requiring that the
companies’ policies be, in the words of the Ordinance,
“reasonably related” to “safe and efficient operations.”
Seattle argues that the Ordinance is not a regulation of
speech and that the First Amendment does not apply. In the
alternative, Seattle argues that, if the Ordinance regulates
speech, then it is commercial speech subject to lower
scrutiny under the First Amendment. Plaintiffs insist that the
regulated speech is pure speech about controversial issues
and not commercial speech.
    We agree with Seattle. Assuming, without deciding, that
the Ordinance regulates speech, it is speech that “simply
propose[s] a commercial transaction.” Va. State Bd. of
Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 

425 U.S.
748, 760

 (1976) (quoting Bigelow v. Virginia, 

421 U.S. 809,
822

 (1975)). We have already held that speech related to
hiring people who “perform temporary work” is commercial
speech. Valle Del Sol Inc. v. Whiting, 

709 F.3d 808

, 817–18
(9th Cir. 2013); see also Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh
Comm’n on Hum. Rels., 

413 U.S. 376

, 387–88 (1973)
(holding that employment advertisements are commercial
speech); Greater Phila. Chamber of Com. v. City of
Philadelphia, 

949 F.3d 116

, 137 (3d Cir. 2020) (holding that
speech involving a “proposal of possible employment” is
commercial speech).
          UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC. V. CITY OF SEATTLE      13


    Our precedents establishing that hiring communications
can be commercial speech cover the purported speech at
issue here. That speech is communication by Uber or
Instacart to temporary app-based workers about the
proposed terms of engagement, including the standards for
deactivation or termination of those workers’ accounts. The
Ordinance’s challenged provisions regulate how and when a
platform may prevent a worker from accessing its service to
seek employment. Whatever speech might be regulated by
the Ordinance is directly related to employment, however
temporary.
    Plaintiffs invoke two recent decisions by this court to
argue that the Ordinance should be subject to greater
scrutiny than that applied to commercial speech. See
NetChoice, LLC v. Bonta, 

113 F.4th 1101, 1111, 1121

 (9th
Cir. 2024); X Corp., 

116 F.4th at 894, 898

. Both cases
involved state laws that regulated the speech of social media
companies by requiring that they submit reports to the
government that identified harmful speech and described
what the companies were doing to address the problem. That
requirement distinguishes these cases from the one before
us. In both NetChoice and X Corp., we held that the reports
were not commercial speech subject to intermediate
scrutiny, but instead were compelled speech subject to strict
scrutiny, because they required businesses to provide their
own conclusions about “highly controversial issues of public
concern.” NetChoice, 

113 F.4th at 1120

; see X Corp., 116
F.4th at 901–03. We noted that these reports required
businesses to go beyond “opining about their products or
services,” NetChoice, 

113 F.4th at 1120

, and instead
communicate their “opinions about and reasons for those
policies,” X Corp., 

116 F.4th at 901

 (emphasis added).
14        UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC. V. CITY OF SEATTLE


    Here, the Ordinance regulates Plaintiffs’ deactivation
policies and requires communication of the policies to the
workers subject to them. Unlike the social media
companies—which were required to speak on topics
“disconnected from any economic transaction” like hate
speech, online harassment, and content harmful to children,
NetChoice, 113 F.4th at 1119—Plaintiffs are not subject to a
directive to produce a report. Instead, they must modify their
deactivation policies, if necessary to comply with the
Ordinance, and communicate those policies to their app-
based workers.
    The reporting requirement differs in another key area.
Under both laws at issue in NetChoice and X Corp, social
media companies were required to produce communications
for an outside party: the government. Here, the Ordinance
applies only to internal communications between a company
and its app-based workers. It is a modern version of
established workplace disclosure laws—it makes no
difference whether such a disclosure occurs on bulletin
boards, via distribution of employee handbooks, or in an
online portal that only app-based workers may access. See
CompassCare v. Hochul, 

125 F.4th 49, 65

 (2d Cir. 2025)
(“[S]uch notice requirements are part of ‘a longstanding
tradition in this country’ supported by a ‘historical
warrant.’” (quoting Brown v. Ent. Merchs. Ass’n, 

564 U.S.
786, 795, 792

 (2011))).
     Assuming the Ordinance does regulate commercial
speech, we conclude that the Ordinance satisfies the
appropriate, lower level of scrutiny. Commercial speech is
still subject to constitutional protections. We determine what
protection that speech receives depending on whether the
            UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC. V. CITY OF SEATTLE                 15


government is restricting or compelling speech. 4 Am.
Beverage Ass’n v. City & County of San Francisco, 

916 F.3d
749, 755

 (9th Cir. 2019) (en banc).
    Under our precedent, we apply one of two separate
Supreme Court tests to laws regulating commercial speech.
CTIA - The Wireless Ass’n v. City of Berkeley, 

928 F.3d 832,
842

 (9th Cir. 2019). When the government restricts or
prohibits commercial speech, we apply the test established
in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service
Commission of New York, 

447 U.S. 557, 566

 (1980). When
the government compels disclosure of commercial speech,
we apply the standard from Zauderer v. Office of
Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 

471
U.S. 626, 651

 (1985). Here, because the Ordinance regulates
deactivation standards and requires companies to
communicate those standards to their workers, the
appropriate test is the one articulated in Zauderer. Our
conclusion comports with that of the Second Circuit, which
applied Zauderer to the requirement that an employer
include in its handbook a notice about employees’ rights and
remedies under a state statute prohibiting discrimination
with respect to personal choices related to reproductive
health. CompassCare, 125 F.4th at 64–67; see also
DoorDash, Inc. v. City of New York, 

185 F.4th 1

, 7 (2d Cir.
2026) (citing with approval, but distinguishing, the
application of Zauderer in our original opinion, which
remains substantively the same in this amended opinion).


4
  During oral argument, both Plaintiffs requested that we resolve the case
before us on the merits rather than remand to the district court. The
record is sufficiently developed for us to decide how the law applies, so
we do. See X Corp., 

116 F.4th at 898

 (rejecting the district court’s
application of Zauderer and instead applying strict scrutiny).
16        UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC. V. CITY OF SEATTLE


    Subsection 8.40.050.A.1—which requires network
companies to inform app-based workers of their deactivation
policies—meets the test drawn from Zauderer. “[T]he
government may compel truthful disclosure in commercial
speech as long as the compelled disclosure is reasonably
related to a substantial governmental interest and involves
purely factual and uncontroversial information that relates to
the service or product provided.” CTIA, 

928 F.3d at 842

(citation modified). Additionally, if such compelled
disclosure is “unjustified or unduly burdensome,” it might
not pass constitutional muster. Zauderer, 

471 U.S. at 651

.
    “There is no question that protecting the health and
safety of [workers] is a substantial governmental interest.”
CTIA, 

928 F.3d at 845

. The provision requires network
companies to inform workers of what situations may lead to
account deactivation and resulting lost income, which is
reasonably related to Seattle’s goals. The notice is purely
factual and concerns only the service provided, because it
contains details of a company’s deactivation policies.
Because the disclosure does not “force [Plaintiffs] to take
sides in a heated political controversy,” 

id. at 848

, or purport
to compel speech on—or analogous to—matters we have
previously identified to be controversial, see, e.g., 

id. at 845

(noting abortion as a matter of controversy), it is
noncontroversial.
    The partial dissent asserts that the content of network
companies’ deactivation policies is not purely factual and
uncontroversial because the Ordinance “requires more than
a mere notice of rights”; the partial dissent claims that it also
requires Plaintiffs to “publish their opinions on what
behaviors or standards are reasonably related to safety or to
efficiency.” Partial Dissent at 32. We are unpersuaded by
this characterization. For one thing, once a deactivation
          UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC. V. CITY OF SEATTLE          17


policy is issued, it will be “literally true.” Whether or not the
network company issuing the deactivation policy would
have devised its policy differently had the City enacted
different labor regulations, or no regulations at all, the policy
will truthfully and accurately identify the conduct of app-
based workers that could lead to deactivation. The policy
will reflect facts. CTIA, 

928 F.3d at 847

.
    More broadly, as we recently observed, “a purely factual
statement does not become controversial simply because it
‘can be tied in some way to a controversial issue.’” Foothills
Christian Ministries v. Johnson, 

148 F.4th 1040

, 1054 (9th
Cir. 2025) (quoting CTIA, 

928 F.3d at 845

), cert. denied,

2026 WL 1377110

 (May 18, 2026). That observation applies
here. The recognition that the concepts of safety and
efficiency could generate differing views among various
stakeholders in the context of devising deactivation policies,
see Partial Dissent at 32, is insufficient to render the required
disclosure of the deactivation policies controversial. See
Foothills Christian Ministries, 148 F.4th at 1054 (“[A]
compelled statement is controversial when it takes ‘sides in
a heated political controversy,’ and forces the speaker ‘to
convey a message fundamentally at odds with its mission.’”
(quoting CTIA, 

928 F.3d at 845

)).
    It also bears emphasis that, if a network company
disagrees with the Ordinance’s examples of policies that are
not reasonably related to safe and efficient operations, the
company may elect to express its disagreement, even
alongside the policy itself. This matters because the ability
to register one’s disagreement, even while complying with
the Ordinance, dispels any “forced association” between the
discloser (the network company) and the disclosure (the
Ordinance-compliant      deactivation     policy),   thereby
undermining any suggestion of compulsion. See Pharm.
18        UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC. V. CITY OF SEATTLE


Rsch. & Mfrs. of Am. v. Stolfi, 

153 F.4th 795

, 812 (9th Cir.
2025), petition for cert. filed, No. 25-1018 (U.S. Feb. 24,
2026) (quoting Pharm. Care Mgmt. Ass’n v. Rowe, 

429 F.3d
294, 316

 (1st Cir. 2005)).
    Further, the notice requirement can be satisfied by a
single webpage and is therefore not unduly burdensome.
     Subsection 8.40.050.A.2—which requires that the
deactivation policies be “reasonably related” to the
companies’ “safe and efficient operations”—regulates at
most speech related to what Seattle has designated as
unlawful activity: the unwarranted deactivations of worker
accounts. Any challenge involving the restriction of
commercial speech must first satisfy a threshold inquiry that
the communication be “neither misleading nor related to
unlawful activity.” World Wide Rush, LLC v. City of Los
Angeles, 

606 F.3d 676, 684

 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Cent.
Hudson, 

447 U.S. at 564

). Even if we accept Plaintiffs’
contention that the Ordinance regulates commercial speech,
it is not an impermissible regulation of that speech.
    The partial dissent faults us for conflating the two tests
for commercial speech. Partial Dissent at 33–34.
Specifically, it observes that the threshold inquiry of whether
the purported speech relates to unlawful activity is an
element of the Central Hudson test for regulation of
commercial speech, not the Zauderer test for compulsion of
commercial speech. Partial Dissent at 33–34. The threshold
inquiry is indeed an element of Central Hudson, and we do
not purport to import it into Zauderer. Rather, in considering
Plaintiffs’ assertion that Central Hudson applies, we
conclude that their argument falters at Central Hudson’s
doorstep. This matters because we have already observed
that Zauderer sets forth a “more permissive standard” than
          UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC. V. CITY OF SEATTLE       19


that articulated in Central Hudson. See Pharm. Rsch. &
Mfrs. of Am., 153 F.4th at 808; see also id. at 810–11
(explaining that, if a “law[] that compel[s] certain
information to be communicated directly from one private
entity to another” regulates commercial speech, “courts
apply either intermediate scrutiny,” pursuant to Central
Hudson, “or a lower level of scrutiny akin to rational basis
review,” pursuant to Zauderer). Plaintiffs fail to show that
the Ordinance violates the First Amendment even under the
more rigorous test in Central Hudson; a fortiori, the
Ordinance passes the more permissive standard in Zauderer.
    Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that the Ordinance
violates the First Amendment.
III. Vagueness claim
    A municipal ordinance violates the Fourteenth
Amendment if it either fails to provide a “person of ordinary
intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is
prohibited” or is so standardless that it may be applied in an
arbitrary or discriminatory manner. Vill. of Hoffman Ests. v.
Flipside, Hoffman Ests., Inc., 

455 U.S. 489, 498

 (1982)
(quoting Grayned v. City of Rockford, 

408 U.S. 104

, 108–09
(1972)).
    Plaintiffs argue that the Ordinance’s deactivation
standard provision in subsection 8.40.050.A.2 is void for two
reasons. First, the word “reasonable” does not supply
adequate guidance to follow the law. Second, the examples
of what is not reasonably related to safety and efficiency are
so contradictory as to be more confusing than clarifying. We
are unpersuaded by both arguments.
    The term “reasonable” is a well-established standard that
is widely employed in both statutory and common law. As
20        UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC. V. CITY OF SEATTLE


the district court pointed out, Plaintiffs must satisfy a
reasonableness inquiry to succeed on their vagueness claim.
Additionally, the Ordinance’s text supplements the term by
delineating between what is and is not a permissible reason
to deactivate an account. See First Resort, Inc. v. Herrera,

860 F.3d 1263, 1274

 (9th Cir. 2017) (“[I]mprecise terms
may avoid vagueness problems when used in combination
with terms that provide sufficient clarity.” (quoting Human
Life of Wash., Inc. v. Brumsickle, 

624 F.3d 990, 1021

 (9th
Cir. 2010))). For example, the bar on deactivations based on
customer ratings is limited by the word “solely.” Ordinance
§ 8.40.050.A.2.e. (“Any policy that would result in a
deactivation based solely on a quantitative metric derived
from aggregate customer ratings of an app-based worker’s
performance[.]” (emphasis added)).
    Seattle passed the Ordinance out of its concern that
companies like Uber and Instacart relied on algorithms to
deactivate accounts automatically. Its concern was
magnified by the City’s belief that customer ratings are
“highly likely” to be influenced by bias against workers of
certain races and ethnicities. Id. § 1.L. For those reasons, the
Ordinance dictates that an account deactivation may not be
based “solely” on customer ratings. Id. § 8.40.050.A.2.e.
Deactivation based on more than that—for instance,
including review of comments that accompany customer
ratings—is not prohibited.
    Plaintiffs may be right that a person of ordinary
intelligence could “reasonably think [that quantitative
metrics] relate to safety and efficiency,” but that same person
could also understand, once the concern for discrimination
was identified, that deactivation based solely on customer
ratings is unreasonable. We also note that the services
covered by the Ordinance and at issue here are delivery
          UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC. V. CITY OF SEATTLE         21


services, not ridesharing. An Uber rideshare passenger has
an obvious basis to evaluate the safety of a ride; the recipient
of a delivery by Uber Eats does not. Because of this
distinction, Seattle may have thought it wise to designate
customer ratings as a less reliable indicator to assess safety
and efficiency in the context of delivery services. Regardless
of the policy considerations the City took into account when
enacting the Ordinance, in the context of a vagueness
challenge, what matters is not whether a person of ordinary
intelligence would agree with the content of or motivations
for a law, but rather whether they would understand its
dictates. Here, given the clarity afforded to the word
“reasonable” when that word is read within the context of
neighboring text and provisions in the Ordinance, we
conclude that they would.
    Plaintiffs’ argument that the other examples are more
confusing than clarifying fare no better. There are multiple
throughlines of policies in the list of examples. One of them
is safety. The bar on deactivations based on background
checks creates a carveout for reports that raise evidence of
“egregious misconduct,” id. § 8.40.050.A.2.h, or any “action
or behavior” that involves physical, economic, or emotional
harm, id. § 8.40.020. So, too, with the bar on deactivations
related to driving records: the Ordinance contains a carveout
for unsafe behavior, id. § 8.40.050.A.2.h, as defined by more
than three “moving violations or at-fault collisions” in less
than three years, id. § 8.40.020. These limitations help to
make clear what is and is not permitted under the law.
    The Ordinance provides fair notice to a person of
ordinary intelligence as to what grounds for deactivation are
reasonably related to safety and efficiency. Plaintiffs may
disagree with standards imposed by the Ordinance or may
wish for more unfettered discretion in terminating a worker
22        UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC. V. CITY OF SEATTLE


or deactivating an account, but that does not make the
regulation vague.
IV. Conclusion
    The Supreme Court has said, “[P]laintiff[s] seeking a
preliminary injunction must establish that [they are] likely to
succeed on the merits, that [they are] likely to suffer
irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the
balance of equities tips in [their] favor, and that an injunction
is in the public interest.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council,
Inc., 

555 U.S. 7, 20

 (2008). The first factor is “the most
important.” Baird v. Bonta, 

81 F.4th 1036, 1040

 (9th Cir.
2023) (quoting Env’t Prot. Info. Ctr. v. Carlson, 

968 F.3d
985, 989

 (9th Cir. 2020)). If a movant cannot show a
likelihood of success on the merits, then a court “need not
consider the other factors.” 

Id.

 (quoting Disney Enters., Inc.
v. VidAngel, Inc., 

869 F.3d 848, 856

 (9th Cir. 2017)).
    Assuming, without deciding, that the Ordinance
regulates speech, it is commercial speech, and the Ordinance
overcomes the appropriate level of scrutiny under the First
Amendment. Plaintiffs also fail to show that the law is
unconstitutionally vague. Because Plaintiffs are unlikely to
succeed on the merits of their claim, the district court did not
abuse its discretion when it denied the preliminary
injunction.
    By affirming the authority of Seattle to enact and enforce
the Ordinance, we do not express a view on the merits of the
policy. Seattle has decided to enact the Ordinance, and the
policy judgments reflected in the Ordinance are the City’s.
Plaintiffs are not required to agree with this or any other
regulation but remain subject to them.
     AFFIRMED.
            UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC. V. CITY OF SEATTLE                23


                            APPENDIX

    Seattle, Wash., Ordinance 126878, § 8.40.050 (Aug. 14,
                           2023) 5

8.40.050 Deactivation requirements

A. A network company shall adopt the following measures
prior to deactivating an app-based worker, except as
provided in subsections 8.40.050.C and 8.40.050.D:

         1. Fair notice of deactivation policy. A network
company must inform the app-based worker in writing of the
network company’s deactivation policy, defining what
constitutes a violation that may result in deactivation. The
network company’s written deactivation policy must be
specific enough for an app-based worker to understand what
constitutes a violation and how to avoid violating the policy.
The deactivation policy must be available to the app-based
worker in English and any language that the network
company knows or has reason to know is the primary
language of the app-based worker. The deactivation policy
must be accessible to the app-based worker at least three
years after deactivation. The Director may issue rules
governing the form and description of the deactivation
policy, the manner of its distribution, and required languages
for its translation.

       2. Reasonable policy. The policy that may lead to a
deactivation must be reasonably related to the network

5
      Ordinance        126878,     Off.    of    the     City     Clerk,
https://clerk.seattle.gov/search/ordinances/126878 (last visited Oct. 29,
2025) [https://perma.cc/E24S-UCNQ].
24        UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC. V. CITY OF SEATTLE


company’s safe and efficient operations. Examples of
policies that are not reasonably related to the network
company’s safe and efficient operations include, but are not
limited to:

       a. Any rule or policy that would result in a
       deactivation based on an app-based worker’s
       availability to work or number of hours worked,
       consistent with subsection 8.37.080.A.1;

       b. Any policy that would result in a deactivation
       based on an app-based worker’s acceptance or
       rejection of any individual offer, any types of offers,
       or any number or proportion of offers, consistent
       with subsection 8.37.080.A.2;

       c. Any policy that would result in a deactivation
       based on an app-based worker’s cancellation of an
       offer with cause, consistent with subsection
       8.37.080.C;

       d. Any policy that would result in a deactivation
       based on an app-based worker contacting the
       network company;

       e. Any policy that would result in a deactivation
       based solely on a quantitative metric derived from
       aggregate customer ratings of an app-based worker’s
       performance;

       f. Any policy that would result in a deactivation
       based on statements by an app-based worker
       regarding compensation and/or working conditions
          UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC. V. CITY OF SEATTLE        25


       made to customers, other app-based workers,
       network companies, the media, public officials,
       and/or the public;

       g. Any policy that would result in a deactivation
       based on an app-based worker asserting their legal
       rights, whether in court or via procedures provided
       by any local, state, or federal agency; and

       h. Any policy that would deactivate a worker based
       on the results of a background check, consumer
       report, driver record, or record of traffic infractions,
       except in cases of egregious misconduct or where
       required by other applicable law.

        3. Investigation. A network company must conduct a
fair and objective investigation prior to deactivating an app-
based worker. The investigation must be sufficiently
thorough to justify the deactivation and demonstrate an
unbiased and neutral view of facts collected. If the app-based
worker does not participate in the investigation or provide
relevant information, the network company may complete
the investigation based on available sources of information.

        4. Confirmation of violation. The network company
must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that
the alleged violation of the network company’s policy or rule
occurred.

       5. Consistent application. The network company
must apply the rule or policy, and penalty for violations, in a
consistent manner.
26        UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC. V. CITY OF SEATTLE


        6. Proportionate penalty. The penalty of deactivation
must be reasonably related to the offense, and account for
mitigating circumstances, such as the app-based worker’s
past work history with the network company.

B. Deactivation of an app-based worker will be considered
unwarranted if the action is intended to or results in
discrimination or a discriminatory act.

C. Subject to the provisions of this Section 8.40.050 and
rules issued by the Director, a network company may
immediately deactivate an app-based worker if such action
is required to comply with any applicable court order or
local, state, or federal laws or regulations, or where an app-
based worker has engaged in egregious misconduct.

D. In the case of allegations of egregious misconduct, the
network company may deactivate the app-based worker
before completing an investigation. Except in extraordinary
circumstances, the investigation shall not take longer than 14
days. If the investigation is delayed due to extraordinary
circumstances, the network company must provide the app-
based worker with written notice that the investigation is
delayed, the reason(s) for the delay, and the date on which
the completion of the investigation is anticipated.
            UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC. V. CITY OF SEATTLE                27


BENNETT, Circuit Judge, dissenting in part:

    I agree with the Majority that the Ordinance is not
unconstitutionally vague. I disagree, however, with the
majority’s decision to “[a]ssum[e] without deciding[] that
the Ordinance regulates speech,” Maj. Op. at 12, because the
Ordinance does compel speech and is thus subject to the First
Amendment. As for the majority’s alternative reasoning that
the speech at issue is commercial speech and “overcomes the
appropriate level of scrutiny,” id. at 22, I am unpersuaded
and believe Plaintiffs have at least raised serious questions
going to the merits. Here, the district court found that the
Ordinance had no First Amendment implications, 1 and I
believe that to be error. I would therefore vacate and remand
to have the district court redo its analysis on the merits and
reexamine the Winter factors in light of a determination that
the Ordinance is subject to intermediate scrutiny, and in light
of the current facts. 2 Thus, I respectfully dissent, in part.
    i. The Ordinance compels speech.
    While the Ordinance does regulate conduct by
prohibiting   unwarranted    deactivations,    Ordinance
§ 8.40.060.A.1, it also compels speech, triggering First
Amendment scrutiny. The Ordinance requires Plaintiffs to
draft and provide workers a written “deactivation policy,
defining what constitutes a violation that may result in

1
 “The starting point of the Court’s analysis is whether the Ordinance
presents a restriction on speech. The Court finds that the Ordinance does
not, and that the First Amendment claim is unlikely to succeed on the
merits.”
2
  Because the district court found that the Ordinance had no First
Amendment implications, its analysis of the other Winter factors was
cursory.
28        UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC. V. CITY OF SEATTLE


deactivation,” id. § 8.40.050.A.1, and which “must be
reasonably related to the network company’s safe and
efficient operations,” id. § 8.40.050.A.2. Based on these
requirements, I would find that Sections 8.40.050.A.1–2 of
the Ordinance compel speech for four reasons.
    First, and most importantly, the drafting and publication
of such a policy is speech. In a recent case, we specifically
noted that the publication of “existing [terms of service] and
content moderation policies may be commercial speech,” X
Corp. v. Bonta, 

116 F.4th 888, 901

 (9th Cir. 2024), if not
pure compelled speech subject to even more rigorous
scrutiny. See 

id.

 at 901–03. And the Supreme Court has held
that “the creation and dissemination of information are
speech within the meaning of the First Amendment.” Sorrell
v. IMS Health, Inc., 

564 U.S. 552, 570

 (2011). Indeed, “[i]f
the acts of ‘disclosing’ and ‘publishing’ information do not
constitute speech, it is hard to imagine what does fall within
that category . . . .” Bartnicki v. Vopper, 

532 U.S. 514, 527

(2001) (alteration in original) (quoting Bartnicki v. Vopper,

200 F.3d 109, 120

 (3d Cir. 1999)). Because it is “well-
established that the forced disclosure of information, even
purely commercial information, triggers First Amendment
scrutiny,” NetChoice, LLC v. Bonta, 

113 F.4th 1101, 1117

(9th Cir. 2024), the Ordinance’s deactivation policy
requirement compels speech subject to the First
Amendment.
    Second, the Ordinance’s compulsion of speech is not
incidental to its prohibition on unwarranted deactivations.
The prohibition on unwarranted deactivations and the
requirement to promulgate a deactivation policy of a certain
kind are distinct and separately enforceable. See Ordinance
§ 8.40.140 (“The failure of any respondent to comply with
any requirement imposed on the respondent under this
            UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC. V. CITY OF SEATTLE                29


Chapter 8.40 is a violation.”); id. § 8.40.170.E (empowering
the Director of the Office of Labor Standards to “assess fines
for a violation of this Chapter” including under Section
8.40.050). In fact, while the Office of Labor Standards has
been empowered since January 1, 2025, to “administer and
enforce” the deactivation policy requirement, the Office is
prohibited from enforcing the prohibition on unwarranted
deactivations until June 1, 2027. Id. §§ 8.40.130.A, B.
Thus, for the thirty-eight months following enactment,
including now, the Ordinance empowers the Office to assess
fines only for violations of the speech regulation, and not for
violations of the conduct regulation. And we have held that
we cannot “ignore that the [challenged] requirement
compels speech simply because other parts of the
[challenged law] may primarily or exclusively regulate non-
expressive conduct.” NetChoice, 

113 F.4th at 1117

. 3 That
is because the government “cannot insulate a specific
provision of law from a facial challenge under the First
Amendment by bundling it with other, separate provisions
that do not implicate the First Amendment.” 

Id.

    Third, any argument that the speech regulation is
incidental to the conduct regulation based on the
Ordinance’s “purpose” of preventing unwarranted
deactivations applies the wrong test. We consider a law’s
“stated purpose” when determining whether the conduct that
the law regulates is sufficiently expressive to fall within the

3
  Seattle argues that NetChoice is distinguishable on this point because,
in that case, we found the regulation was subject to the First Amendment
because the regulated speech was “disconnected from any economic
transaction.” 

113 F.4th at 1119

. But Seattle misreads NetChoice. The
absence of a connection to an economic transaction is the reason we
applied strict scrutiny in NetChoice—it is not the reason we found the
statute to regulate speech. 

Id.

 at 1119–21.
30          UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC. V. CITY OF SEATTLE


purview of the First Amendment. HomeAway.com, Inc. v.
City of Santa Monica, 

918 F.3d 676, 685

 (9th Cir. 2019)
(quoting Sorrell, 

564 U.S. at 565

). That test is inapplicable
here because the Ordinance’s speech regulation is separate
from its conduct regulation, and we can consider the
statutory purpose only if the law regulates conduct rather
than speech.
    Fourth, even if we considered the Ordinance’s “stated
purpose,” it is ambiguous. According to the Ordinance’s
findings and declarations, the Ordinance “protects and
promotes public health, safety, and welfare by establishing
protections against unwarranted deactivations for app-based
workers.” Ordinance § 1.C. A casual reader might naturally
assume from that language that the purpose of the Ordinance
is to prevent unwarranted deactivations and not to compel
speech. But the same section of the Ordinance also reflects
a purpose to compel Plaintiffs’ publication of deactivation
policies, separate from the prevention of any deactivation
decisions. See id. § 1.H (“App-based workers often do not
have the information they need to know about how they will
be evaluated.”). At least one purpose of the Ordinance is,
therefore, to compel Plaintiffs to share information about
how app-based workers will be evaluated. Because
disclosure of such information is speech subject to First
Amendment scrutiny, see Sorrell, 

564 U.S. at 570

;
NetChoice, 

113 F.4th at 117

; X Corp., 

116 F.4th at 901

, the
Ordinance’s stated purpose was, in part, to compel speech. 4



4
  To be clear, the Ordinance aims not only at decreasing unwarranted
deactivations, but also at increasing transparency. I do not misconstrue
the Ordinance by noting that it compels speech, Ordinance
§§ 8.40.050.A.1–2, based on separate policy findings, id. § 1.H, and that
            UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC. V. CITY OF SEATTLE               31


    Because the Ordinance compels speech, I therefore
disagree with the majority’s conclusion to only “[a]ssum[e]
without deciding[] that the Ordinance regulates speech.”
Maj. Op. at 12.
    ii. Plaintiffs raise at least serious questions on the
        merits.
     I agree with the majority that 1) the speech at issue is
commercial speech, and 2) the so-called Zauderer standard
applies to the commercial speech compelled by the
Ordinance. See Zauderer v. Off. of Disciplinary Counsel,

471 U.S. 626

 (1985); see also Maj. Op. at 12, 15. But I
disagree with the majority’s decision to conduct the
Zauderer analysis in the first instance. Because the district
court concluded that the Ordinance does not compel speech,
it “had no occasion to conduct a further inquiry into whether
[the Ordinance], as a speech regulation, survived First
Amendment scrutiny.”          Expressions Hair Design v.
Schneiderman, 

581 U.S. 37, 48

 (2017). We should therefore
remand for the district court to consider, in the first instance,
“whether the law can be upheld as a valid disclosure
requirement under Zauderer.” 

Id.

    Moreover, unlike the majority, I believe that Plaintiffs at
least raise a serious question on the merits as to whether the
Ordinance satisfies the Zauderer standard. “Under Zauderer
as we interpret it today, the government may compel truthful
disclosure in commercial speech as long as the compelled
disclosure is ‘reasonably related’ to a substantial
governmental interest and involves ‘purely factual and
uncontroversial information’ that relates to the service or


it establishes an enforcement regime separate from the regime regulating
unwarranted terminations, 

id.

 §§ 8.40.140, 170.E.
32          UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC. V. CITY OF SEATTLE


product provided.” CTIA – The Wireless Ass’n v. City of
Berkeley, 

928 F.3d 832, 842

 (9th Cir. 2019) (first quoting
Zauderer, 

471 U.S. at 651

; then quoting Nat’l Inst. of Fam.
& Life Advocs. v. Becerra, 

585 U.S. 755, 768

 (2018)).
    The speech compelled here is not purely factual and
uncontroversial information. The speech regulation requires
more than a mere notice of rights—that is separately
required by a distinct section of the Ordinance. See
Ordinance § 8.40.100. The speech regulation instead
requires Plaintiffs to formulate and publish their opinions on
what behaviors or standards are reasonably related to safety
or to efficiency. These are not purely factual determinations
but are instead Plaintiffs’ opinions. And they are likely to
be controversial opinions. This is especially so because
safety and efficiency are often in tension, and Plaintiffs’
policies will have to balance these two values. Plaintiffs will
likely also balance these two values against others, such as
customer satisfaction, profitability, and administrability,
because the Ordinance does not require that the policy be
related solely to safety and efficiency. Any balance of these
oft-competing values is likely to be controversial. Different
stakeholders—including users, workers, employees,
shareholders, and traffic authorities—are bound to have
different perspectives on where the best balance lies. 5

5
  I disagree with the majority that this material is purely factual and
uncontroversial simply because “once a deactivation policy is issued, it
will be ‘literally true.’” Maj. Op. at 16–17. Yes, once the policy is
published, there will be a “fact” as to what the policy says. But that is
true of all speech. And there will remain, after publication, no “fact” as
to the best balance of safety, efficiency, and other values, and no “fact”
as to which internal regulations are “reasonably related” to these values.
Nor, contrary to the majority’s suggestion, could the injury to the
companies’ First Amendment rights be fully ameliorated by the
            UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC. V. CITY OF SEATTLE              33


Because the Ordinance compels commercial speech that is
not or at least may not be “purely factual and uncontroversial
information,” it potentially violates the First Amendment.
See CTIA, 

928 F.3d at 842

.
     The majority states that the speech regulation is
nonetheless permissible because any challenge to it “must
first satisfy a threshold inquiry that the communication be
‘neither misleading nor related to unlawful activity.’” Maj.
Op. at 18 (quoting World Wide Rush, LLC v. City of Los
Angeles, 

606 F.3d 676, 684

 (9th Cir. 2010)). The majority
finds that the speech regulation “regulates at most speech
related to . . . unlawful activity: the unwarranted
deactivations of worker accounts,” and thus fails this
“threshold inquiry.” 

Id.

 But the majority’s threshold inquiry
does not apply to challenges to compelled speech—it
governs only challenges to restrictions on speech. See World
Wide Rush, 606 F.3d at 684–85. And, in any case, the speech
here is unrelated to (or not solely related to) unlawful
activity.
    The majority’s “threshold inquiry” is taken from World
Wide Rush, a case involving a challenge to a restriction on
speech, not to a compulsion of speech. 

Id. at 680, 685

.
World Wide Rush, in turn, derived this test from Metro
Lights, L.L.C. v. City of Los Angeles, which was also a
speech restriction case. 

551 F.3d 898 900, 903

 (9th Cir.
2009). And Metro Lights identifies this “threshold matter”
as an element of the Central Hudson test, not the Zauderer
test. See Metro Lights, 551 F.3d at 903–04 (describing the

company’s ability “to express its disagreement, even alongside the
policy itself.” Id. at 17. The Ordinance requires the companies to make
and publish their judgment about what is “reasonably related.”
Ordinance §§ 8.40.050.A.1–2.
34        UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC. V. CITY OF SEATTLE


requirement that “the communication [be] neither
misleading nor related to unlawful activity” as an “element[]
of the Central Hudson test” (citing Cent. Hudson Gas &
Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 

447 U.S. 557

, 564–66
(1980))). Because, as even the majority acknowledges, Maj.
Op. at 18, the Central Hudson test is not applicable to this
case, Plaintiffs need not show that their speech is unrelated
to unlawful activity.
    This distinction matters because, even though
Zauderer’s rational basis standard is “more permissive” than
Central Hudson’s intermediate scrutiny standard, see
Pharm. Rsch. & Mfrs. of Am. v. Stolfi, 

153 F.4th 795

, 808
(9th Cir. 2025), petition for cert. filed, No. 25-1018 (U.S.
Feb. 24, 2026), “one size does not fit all in commercial
speech cases,” CTIA, 

928 F.3d at 842

. The two tests have
different triggering conditions, see 

id.,

 and a regulation that
survives Central Hudson review is therefore not guaranteed
to survive Zauderer review.
    In any event, the majority is wrong to conclude that the
speech in this case is related to unlawful activity. The
majority concludes that by requiring that deactivation
policies be reasonably related to safe and efficient
operations, the Ordinance simply regulates speech related to
unlawful activity—namely, speech related to unwarranted
deactivations. Maj. Op. at 18. I believe that this conclusion
is both circular and incorrect. The Ordinance defines
“unwarranted deactivation” as “a deactivation that does not
comply with Section 8.40.050.” Ordinance § 8.40.020. But
Section 8.40.050 does not contain any freestanding limits on
when deactivation is prohibited. In other words, it does not
proscribe the firing of an app-worker for a reason unrelated
to safe and efficient operations. Instead, it prohibits only
certain forms of deactivation policy and describes when a
          UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC. V. CITY OF SEATTLE       35


policy would fail to be reasonably related to safe and
efficient operations. Id. §§ 8.40.050.A.1–2. It then prohibits
companies from deactivating a worker without the results of
an investigation finding that the worker violated the
company’s deactivation policy. Id. §§ 8.40.050.A.3.1–5. In
other words, it is not unlawful to deactivate workers for
reasons unrelated to safe and efficient operations. But it is
unlawful to speak a policy that is unrelated to safe and
efficient operations; and it is unlawful for a company to
violate its own deactivation policy. Taken together, this is
not a regulation of speech related to unlawful activity, but a
direct regulation of speech itself.
    I think it is far from clear that “the Ordinance overcomes
the appropriate level of scrutiny under the First
Amendment.” Maj. Op. at 22. At the very least, I believe
that Plaintiffs have raised serious questions going to the
merits.
   iii. We should remand for the district court to reanalyze
        the Ordinance under intermediate scrutiny and to
        reexamine the other Winter factors.
    In addition to likelihood of success on the merits, a
district court considering a motion for a preliminary
injunction must consider whether the movant will likely
suffer irreparable harm without the injunction, whether the
balance of the equities favors the movant, and whether a
preliminary injunction is in the public interest. Winter v.
Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 

555 U.S. 7, 20

 (2008). “It is
well-established that the first factor is especially important
when a plaintiff alleges a constitutional violation and
injury.” Baird v. Bonta, 

81 F.4th 1036, 1040

 (9th Cir. 2023).
A determination a plaintiff alleging such an injury is likely
to prevail on the merits “usually demonstrates he is suffering
36        UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC. V. CITY OF SEATTLE


irreparable harm” and “tips the public interest sharply in his
favor.” 

Id.

 “As a general matter, district courts ‘must
consider’ all four Winter factors.” 

Id.

 (quoting Vivid Ent.,
LLC v. Fielding, 

774 F.3d 566, 577

 (9th Cir. 2014)). But
because the first factor is most important, if a movant fails
to show likelihood of success on the merits, “the court need
not consider the other factors in the absence of ‘serious
questions going to the merits.’” Disney Enterps, Inc. v.
VidAngel, Inc., 

869 F.3d 848, 856

 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting
All. for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 

632 F.3d 1127

, 1134–
35 (9th Cir. 2011)).
    Plaintiffs have at least raised a serious question going to
the merits. In my view, the district court must consider all
four Winter factors, see Baird, 

81 F.4th at 1040

, and must
also decide in the first instance whether the Ordinance
survives Zauderer review. Expressions Hair Design, 

581
U.S. at 48

. Here, its review of the other three factors was
cursory, dividing only four sentences between them.
Further, the district court’s analysis of these three factors
was based on what I believe was its erroneous analysis of
questions going to the merits. And after the district court’s
decision, Plaintiffs have issued deactivation policies in light
of the Ordinance. The district court has had no opportunity
to consider how the issuance of these policies, and Seattle’s
response or lack thereof, has affected the equities or the
existence of irreparable harm.
    Accordingly, I would remand for reconsideration of all
four Winter factors. I therefore respectfully dissent, in part.

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