Miscellaneous Etats-Unis

State v. Brown

Official source
[Cite as State v. Brown, 2026-Ohio-4280.]




                              COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                             EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

STATE OF OHIO,                                    :

                Plaintiff-Appellant,              :
                                                                  No. 115985
                v.                                :

ANTHONY BROWN,                                    :

                Defendant-Appellee.               :


                               JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

                JUDGMENT: VACATED IN PART; REMANDED
                RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: October 29, 2026


         Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
                            Case No. CR-25-699838-A


                                            Appearances:

                Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting
                Attorney, and Brian Callahan, Assistant Prosecuting
                Attorney, for appellant.

                Berkman, Gordon, Murray & DeVan and William C.
                Livingston, for appellee.


MARY J. BOYLE, P.J.:

                   Plaintiff-appellant, the State of Ohio (“State”), appeals the trial court’s

judgment with respect to defendant-appellee Anthony Brown’s (“Brown”) sentence

of one year and nine months in prison for two third-degree felony counts of having
weapons while under disability (Counts 1 and 4), with each count carrying a one-

year firearm specification. The State raises the following single assignment of error

for review:

      The trial court erred in ordering concurrent prison terms for firearm
      specifications when the underlying felonies were not committed as part
      of the same act or transaction.

              For the reasons set forth below, we find that this portion of Brown’s

sentence is contrary to law. Therefore, we vacate Brown’s sentence on Counts 1 and

4, and remand the matter to the trial court to impose consecutive sentences on the

firearm specifications attached to these counts.

      I. Facts and Procedural History

              In February 2025, Brown was charged in a five-count indictment

stemming from a video he posted of himself firing a gun outside his home. Counts

1, 3, and 4 charged him with having weapons while under disability (“HWWUD”),

with each count carrying a one-year firearm specification. Count 2 charged him with

the discharge of a firearm on or near a prohibited premises, and Count 5 charged

him with receiving stolen property. Relevant to this appeal, the indictment lists the

date of the offense for Count 1 as “[o]n or about December 31, 2024” and for the

firearm specification indicates that “Brown had a firearm on or about his person or

under his control while committing the offense firearm [sic] purchased at gun store.”

(Indictment, Feb. 27, 2025.) As to Count 4, the indictment lists the date of the

offense as “[o]n or about January 7, 2025” and for the firearm specification indicates

that “Brown had a firearm on or about his person or under his control while
committing the offense firearm [sic] located during search warrant.” (Indictment,

Feb. 27, 2025.)

              The matter proceeded to a plea hearing in October 2025. At the onset

of the hearing, the trial court noted that there was a recommended sentence. The

court explained:

      So what has happened is your attorney and the [State] agreed on a
      range that they’re requesting this Court to stay within, which means
      that a recommended sentence is simply that.               It’s just a
      recommendation to this Court.

      I can tell you that in seven years of being a judge I’ve gone against the
      recommended range less than a handful of times, less than five times.
      That doesn’t mean that it wouldn’t eventually apply to you. I can go
      below, I can go above. But the recommendation is a very strong
      recommendation that I stay within that.

      ...

      So that recommendation is 2 years and 9 months up to 5 years. And
      the way that they’ve decided to get there is to run the two firearm
      specifications consecutive to one another, so that’s 2 years of
      mandatory prison prior and consecutive to a minimum of 9 months up
      to 36 months. So 2 years mandatory prison plus anywhere between 9
      to 36 months. That’s where that recommended sentence is.

(Tr. 4-5.)

              The trial court then informed Brown of his constitutional rights and

explained the maximum penalties he would face based on his plea. The parties

agreed that the court had complied with Crim.R. 11. The court accepted Brown’s

guilty plea to Count 1 (HWWUD) with a one-year firearm specification; Count 2

(discharge of a firearm on or near a prohibited premises); Count 4 (HWWUD), with

a one-year firearm specification; and Count 5 (receiving stolen property). Count 3
was dismissed. Furthermore, Brown agreed to forfeit any right, title, or interest he

had in the Springfield XD-9 firearm bearing serial number BY242691, which was to

be returned to the rightful owner, Ashley Cook.

              The trial court held the sentencing hearing in December 2025. The

court began the hearing by noting the parties agreed that “the two firearm

specifications will run consecutive to one another, meaning that the minimum

sentence [the court can] impose is two years [to be served] prior and consecutive to

nine months[.]” (Tr. 18.) Before imposing its sentence, the trial court stated:

      This is a mandatory prison sentence, so there’s a requirement that you
      are sentenced to prison.

      ...

      [The State] did bring up the point that when I inform people of what a
      recommended sentence is, I can go higher, I can go lower. You did
      provide a significant amount of mitigation here from people in the
      community. You’ve stayed out of trouble. You’ve done everything else
      that is expected of people that come out of prison. You even saved a
      boy’s life.

      I’ve actually never done this before, but I am going to go against the
      recommended sentence. I’m going to give you on the firearm
      specification one year on each of those firearm specifications. I’m
      actually going to run those concurrent to one another because it is not
      required that I run those mandatory consecutive.

(Tr. 46-47.) The court issued a nunc pro tunc journal entry following the hearing to

clarify that “all counts shall be served concurrent to one another, and all

specifications be served concurrent to one another.” (Journal Entry, Dec. 9, 2025.)

As a result, the trial court sentenced Brown to serve one year in prison on each of

the firearm specifications in Counts 1 and 4, to be served concurrently to one
another, and prior and consecutive to the nine months on the underlying HWWUD

charge. For Count 5, the court sentenced Brown to nine months in prison, to be

served concurrently to the other counts, making his total sentence one year and nine

months in prison. The State did not object to the sentence at the hearing.

              The State now appeals, raising a single assignment of error for review.

      II. Law and Analysis

              The State argues that Brown’s sentence on Counts 1 and 4 is contrary

to law because the trial court was required to run the firearm specifications

consecutively under R.C. 2929.14(C)(1)(a) and failed to do so.

              When reviewing the imposition of consecutive sentences, we must

apply the standard of review set forth in R.C. 2953.08(G)(2). State v. Polizzi, 2026-

Ohio-2588, ¶ 25. Under this statute, an appellate court may modify the imposition

of consecutive sentences only if “the record clearly and convincingly does not

support the trial court’s consecutive-sentence findings [R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(a)] or

if “‘the sentence is otherwise contrary to law.”’” (Emphasis in original.) Id.,

quoting State v. Glover, 2024-Ohio-5195, ¶ 42, quoting R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(b).

              “Otherwise contrary to law” has been defined as “‘“in violation of

statute or legal regulations at a given time.””’ State v. Bryant, 2022-Ohio-1878,

¶ 22, quoting State v. Jones, 2020-Ohio-6729, ¶ 34, quoting Black’s Law Dictionary

(6th Ed. 1990). This court has previously found that a sentence is contrary to law

when it “‘falls outside the statutory range for the particular degree of offense[.]”’
State v. Robinson, 2017-Ohio-8162, ¶ 9 (8th Dist.), quoting State v. Price, 2016-

Ohio-591, ¶ 12 (8th Dist.).

               As an initial matter, we must first address Brown’s reliance on State

v. Ross, 2023-Ohio-1185 (9th Dist.), and his contention that the State forfeited its

right to challenge his sentence because it did not object to the imposition of

concurrent firearm specifications in the proceedings below and it did not raise the

issue of plain error in its appellate brief. Brown further argues that even if we were

to consider plain error, the State failed to demonstrate such because the offenses in

Counts 1 and 4 were committed as part of the same act or transaction and

R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(b) provides an exception to the imposition of consecutive

sentences of firearm specifications under these circumstances. The State counters,

for the first time in its reply brief, that it has not forfeited its right to challenge

Brown’s sentence because Brown’s reliance on Ross is misplaced, Brown’s sentence

is contrary to law, and the State may appeal as a matter of right under

R.C. 2953.08(B)(2). As a result, the State contends that Brown’s sentence may be

reviewed for plain error.

               In Ross, the Ninth District Court of Appeals found that ““‘an appellant

may not assert a claim of plain error for the first time in a reply brief.”’” Id. at ¶ 68,

quoting State v. Andrews, 2020-Ohio-2703, ¶ 51 (9th Dist.), quoting State v. Irvine,

2019-Ohio-959, ¶ 45, fn. 1 (9th Dist.).        The defendant in Ross appealed his

convictions, and the State cross-appealed, challenging the defendant’s sentence. At

the sentencing hearing, the State did not object to the court’s failure to sentence the
defendant on the firearm specifications attached to the defendant’s two most serious

offenses. Id. at ¶ 59. The State, however, filed a motion to correct sentence before

the trial court journalized its sentencing order. In the motion, the State argued the

law required the trial court to impose separate, consecutive sentences on

defendant’s firearm specifications for the aggravated murder of one victim and the

murder of another victim. Id. at ¶ 62.

               In its first cross-assignment of error, the State in Ross argued that the

defendant’s sentence was contrary to law because the trial court failed to impose

prison terms for the two most serious firearm specifications as required by

R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(g). Id. at ¶ 58. The Ninth District Court of Appeals found that

while the State did not object at the sentencing hearing, it sufficiently preserved its

argument for appeal by virtue of its motion. Id. at ¶ 62. The Ross Court then

concluded that the defendant’s sentence was contrary to law because the trial court

was required to impose a three-year prison term for each of those specifications and

run those terms consecutively. Id. at ¶ 64.

               In its second cross-assignment of error, the State in Ross contended

that the trial court’s sentence was contrary to law because the court improperly

merged the one-year firearm specification linked to the defendant’s tampering

conviction and the one-year firearm specification linked to his HWWUD conviction

with the firearm specification linked to his aggravated-murder conviction because

these offenses were not allied offenses of similar import. Id. at ¶ 67. The Ross Court

noted that because the State failed to make an allied offense argument of this nature
at the sentencing hearing and its motion to correct sentence, it forfeited all but plain

error. Id. at ¶ 68, citing Andrews. The Ross Court rejected the State’s merger

argument regarding the firearm specifications for tampering and HWWUD with the

firearm specification for aggravated murder, noting that while the State attempted

to raise plain error in its reply brief, an appellant may not assert a claim of plain

error for the first time in a reply brief. Id., citing Andrews, citing Irvine.

               We find that Brown’s reliance on Ross is misplaced because the State

did not need to object to the trial court’s imposition of a concurrent sentence on the

firearm specification to preserve the issue on appeal. Rather, the State can challenge

the sentence through an appeal under R.C. 2953.08(B)(2), which provides that the

State may appeal as a matter of right a sentence that is contrary to law. A sentence

that fails to impose a mandatory provision “may be appealed because such a

sentence is ‘contrary to law’[.]” State v. Underwood, 2010-Ohio-1, ¶ 21. “Otherwise

contrary to law” has been defined as “‘“in violation of statute or legal regulations at

a given time.””’ Bryant, 2022-Ohio-1878, at ¶ 22, quoting Jones, 2020-Ohio-6729,

at ¶ 34, quoting Black’s Law Dictionary (6th Ed. 1990).

               Moreover, we are mindful that a court may “impose sentences only as

provided by statute.” State v. Williams, 2016-Ohio-7658, ¶ 22, citing State v.

Fischer, 2010-Ohio-6238, ¶ 21-22.             This tenet “‘reflects a fundamental

understanding of constitutional democracy’ that the power to define criminal

offenses and prescribe punishment is vested in the legislative branch of

government[.]” Id., quoting id.; see also State v. Hitchcock, 2019-Ohio-3246 (“[I]n
Ohio, judges have no inherent power to create sentences, and the only sentence that

a trial judge may impose is that provided for by statute.” Id. at ¶ 18, citing State v.

Anderson, 2015-Ohio-2089.).

               Here, Brown was convicted of two separate one-year firearm

specifications under R.C. 2941.141(A) that were attached to two counts of HWWUD

under R.C. 2923.13(A)(2) (Counts 1 and 4), both being third-degree felonies.

R.C. 2923.13(A)(2) provides in relevant part: “Unless relieved from disability under

operation of law or legal process, no person shall knowingly acquire, have, carry, or

use any firearm or dangerous ordnance, if . . . [t]he person is under indictment for

or has been convicted of any felony offense of violence[.]”

               R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(a)(iii) provides that if an offender is convicted of

a firearm specification under R.C. 2941.141(A), the court shall impose a one-year

prison term on the specification. R.C. 2929.14(C)(1)(a) provides that when the trial

court imposes a prison term on a firearm specification, the court must run the prison

term consecutively to all other prison terms. This statute states, in relevant part:

      [I]f a mandatory prison term is imposed upon an offender pursuant to
      division (B)(1)(a) of this section for having a firearm on or about the
      offender’s person or under the offender’s control while committing a
      felony . . . the offender shall serve any mandatory prison term imposed
      . . . consecutively to any other mandatory prison term imposed [for a
      firearm specification] . . . consecutively to and prior to any prison term
      imposed for the underlying felony . . . and consecutively to any other
      prison term or mandatory prison term previously or subsequently
      imposed upon the offender.

R.C. 2929.14(C)(1)(a).
               While R.C. 2929.14(C)(1)(a) generally requires consecutive service of

all firearm specifications, R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(b) provides an exception to the

consecutive service of firearm specifications if the felonies and attendant firearm

specifications were committed as part of the same act or transaction. State v.

Adkins, 2021-Ohio-1294, ¶ 23 (8th Dist.). However, if the felonies and attendant

firearm specifications were committed separately, “then the trial court must follow

the default rule set forth in R.C. 2929.14(C)(1)(a), which requires mandatory

consecutive service of all firearm specifications.” Id.

               The Ohio Supreme Court has defined the term “transaction” for

purposes of R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(b) as “a series of continuous acts bound together by

time, space and purpose, and directed toward a single objective.” (Cleaned up.)

State v. Wills, 69 Ohio St.3d 690, 691 (1994). “In other words, courts generally

evaluate whether the offenses and attendant firearm violations occurred at separate

times, locations, and to different victims.” State v. Williams, 2020-Ohio-1368, ¶ 16

(1st Dist.), citing State v. Dean, 2015-Ohio-4347, ¶ 214; State v. Kennedy, 2018-

Ohio-4997, ¶ 42 (2d Dist.).

               A review of the record in this case demonstrates that the firearm

specifications and the underlying felonies were not committed as part of the same

act or transaction because the offenses occurred on different days and separate

firearms were utilized. The indictment provides that Counts 1 and 4 were committed

on separate dates — December 31, 2024, and January 7, 2025, respectively. The

indictment further identifies that two separate and different firearms were used in
these offenses — “firearm purchased at gun store” by Brown’s girlfriend in Count 1

and a separate “firearm located during search warrant” in Count 4. Lastly, the

indictment included a specific serial number for the firearm that was recovered at

Brown’s home (Count 4), which belonged to the victim named in Count 5, not

Brown’s girlfriend. The State explained to the trial court at the time of sentencing

that Brown’s girlfriend purchased the firearm at the gun store on December 31,

2024, which was “never actually found[.]” (Tr. 24.) The State further explained that

the gun found at Brown’s home during the execution of a search warrant was a stolen

handgun and was not the gun purchased by Brown’s girlfriend on December 31,

2024.

               Based on the foregoing, we agree with the State that Counts 1 and 4

were not part of the same act or transaction. As a result, the trial court was required

under R.C. 2929.14(C)(1)(a) to run the one-year firearm specifications

consecutively, not concurrently. Accordingly, Brown’s sentence on Counts 1 and 4

is unauthorized by statute and contrary to law. R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(b) provides that

we may vacate a sentence and remand for resentencing when a felony sentence is

contrary to law. State v. Williamson, 2023-Ohio-932, ¶ 10 (8th Dist.) (noting that

there was no objection to the codefendants’ sentence at the hearing, but the

sentencing error was challenged by the State through a direct appeal, and finding

that “because the trial court failed to impose indefinite sentences on the

codefendants’ qualifying offenses in accordance with the [Reagan] Tokes Law, the

sentences were contrary to law [and] R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(b) provides [that] we may
vacate a sentence and remand for resentencing when a felony sentence is contrary

to law”). As a result, we vacate the trial court’s sentence with respect to Counts 1 and

4 and remand for the trial court to resentence Brown on the mandatory firearm

specifications in accordance with the law.

               Having found that Brown’s sentence on Counts 1 and 4 is contrary to

law, we need not reach the plain-error analysis.

               The State’s sole assignment of error is sustained.

               Accordingly, the trial court’s judgment is vacated only as to Brown’s

sentence on Counts 1 and 4, and the matter is remanded to the trial court for the sole

purpose of resentencing Brown on the firearm specifications in accordance with the

law.

       It is ordered that appellant recover from appellee costs herein taxed.

       The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

       It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the

common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.

       A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.


_______________________________
MARY J. BOYLE, PRESIDING JUDGE

KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, J., and
TIMOTHY W. CLARY, J., CONCUR

Our criminal law attorney in Paris assists clients in matters of this kind.


Neighbouring decisions

Preliminary case review

Send your documents. Receive an analysis.

Send us the documents in your case. Hassan KOHEN reviews them personally and sends you a first written analysis of your situation within 24 working hours.

  • Written analysis by the lawyer, €80 incl. VAT
  • Personal reply within 24 working hours
  • 100% confidential, legal professional privilege guaranteed
  • Up to 1 GB of documents in total, folders and sub-folders accepted
80 €incl. VAT

Preliminary review of your case. Review of your documents and a first written analysis by Hassan KOHEN within 24 working hours. Payment is made online after this form is submitted.

  • Up to 1 GB of documents in total, folders and sub-folders accepted
  • Secure payment, no card details stored
  • Terms and fee agreement

Click or drag your files here
All formats accepted (PDF, Word, images, etc.)

Sending...

Payment constitutes a request for immediate performance of your analysis. Your data is used solely to process your request.
Terms · Privacy policy.

IA juridique gratuite

Une question de droit ? Demandez à Judith.

Judith cherche dans les codes, la Constitution, la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme et les décisions des juges, puis vous montre les textes et les passages d’arrêts qui pourraient répondre à votre question, avec leur source officielle. Gratuite, sans compte, elle ne rédige rien à votre place. Découvrir Judith, l’IA juridique gratuite du cabinet.

Trois recherches par jour, sans compte. Votre question est enregistrée et relue par le cabinet pour améliorer l’outil : n’y mettez ni nom ni information sensible.