Miscellaneous Etats-Unis

Ridgeway v. Ohio Bur. of Workers Comp.

Official source
[Cite as Ridgeway v. Ohio Bur. of Workers Comp., 

2026-Ohio-4291

.]


                             COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                            EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                               COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

HOWARD RIDGEWAY,                                     :

                Plaintiff-Appellant,                 :
                                                                    No. 116666
                v.                                   :

OHIO BUREAU OF WORKERS                               :
COMPENSATION, ET AL.,
                                                     :
                Defendants-Appellees.



                              JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

                JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
                RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: October 29, 2026


            Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
                                Case No. CV-25-118849


                                          Appearances:

                Howard Ridgeway, pro se.

                Battle & Polly LLC, Jake W. Aerni, and Steven C. Polly, for
                appellee.


MICHAEL JOHN RYAN, P.J.:

                In this accelerated appeal, plaintiff-appellant Howard Ridgeway

(“Ridgeway”), pro se, appeals from the trial court’s judgment granting the motion

for summary judgment of defendant-appellee Spooner Risk Control Services, Inc.
(“Spooner”).     App.R. 11.1 and Loc.App.R. 11.1 govern accelerated appeals; the

purpose of an accelerated appeal is to allow this court to render a brief and

conclusory opinion. State v. Priest, 

2014-Ohio-1735, ¶ 1

 (8th Dist.). For the reasons

that follow, we affirm.

               In June 2025, Ridgeway, pro se, filed this workers’ compensation

appeal in the court of common pleas.           He sought allowance of workers’

compensation for his glaucoma diagnosis, which he contended was caused by his

exposure to headlights and nighttime driving he performed for his job as a truck

driver for Spooner. Spooner disputed that Ridgeway’s glaucoma diagnosis was work

related.

               The trial court held a case-management conference on September 30,

2025, and, in a journal entry of the same date, established the following dates:

discovery cutoff on January 2, 2026; Ridgeway’s expert report due on February 2,

2026; Spooner’s expert report due on March 2, 2026; dispositive motions due by

March 16, 2026; and response and reply to dispositive motions due in accordance

with Civ.R. 6(C). Trial was set for June 1, 2026.

               On February 19, 2026, over one month after the discovery cutoff date

and two weeks after the due date of Ridgeway’s expert report, Ridgeway filed a

motion for an extension of time to respond to discovery. On March 2, 2026, the due

date for Spooner’s expert report to be filed, Spooner filed its motion for summary

judgment. On March 9, 2026, the trial court granted Ridgeway’s motion for an
extension of time, allowing him an additional seven days to respond to any

outstanding discovery.

              On March 13, 2026, Ridgeway filed two motions: a motion for an

extension of time to file an expert report and a motion for an extension of time to

respond to discovery. On March 27, 2026, Ridgeway filed a motion for an extension

of time to respond to discovery and Spooner’s summary judgment motion. On

April 27, 2026, Ridgeway filed a motion for leave to file a motion for summary

judgment.

              The trial court held the final pretrial hearing on April 29, 2026, at

which Ridgeway appeared pro se and counsel appeared on behalf of Spooner.

The trial court memorialized the hearing in a journal entry, noting that the “case

proceeds as scheduled subject to court ruling on pending motions. Rulings to be

issued in separate order.”

              On May 31, 2026, the trial court granted Spooner’s motion for

summary judgment. The court stated, in relevant part, the following in its judgment:

      [Ridgeway] has requested multiple extensions to obtain an expert
      report establishing that his eye condition (glaucoma) was caused by his
      employment. To date, [Ridgeway] has submitted his own statement
      and letters indicating his physical/mental health conditions. No expert
      has been identified, and no expert report has been generated to
      establish causation. See Civ.R. 26(B)(7)(C); Cuy. Cty. L.R. 21.1.

(Emphasis added.)

               Ridgeway now appeals, raising the following assignments of error for

our review:
      I.     The trial court’s judgment rested on a materially inaccurate
             description of the procedural record.

      II.    The March 13 motion presented circumstances relevant to
             Civ.R. 6(B)(2), but the final judgment does not show that those
             circumstances were evaluated accurately.

      III.   The May 29 filing does not independently prove glaucoma, but it
             confirms that the record had materially changed before
             judgment.

      IV.    The appropriate remedy is reversal and remand for a proper
             exercise of discretion before disposition on the expert-evidence
             ground.

               Initially, we note that Ridgeway proceeded pro se at the trial-court

level, as he does here on appeal. “‘It is well established that pro se litigants are

presumed to have knowledge of the law and legal procedures and that they are held

to the same standards as litigants who are represented by counsel.’” State ex rel.

Fuller v. Mengel, 

2003-Ohio-6448, ¶ 10

, quoting Sabouri v. Ohio Dept. of Job &

Family Servs., 

145 Ohio App.3d 651, 654

 (10th Dist. 2001). Indeed, “‘[p]ro se

litigants are not entitled to greater rights, and they must accept the results of their

own mistakes.’” Fazio v. Gruttadauria, 

2008-Ohio-4586, ¶ 9

 (8th Dist.), quoting

Williams v. Lo, 

2008-Ohio-2804, ¶ 18

 (10th Dist.). With these concepts in mind,

we turn to Ridgeway’s assignments of error, which are all subject to an abuse-of-

discretion standard of review. An abuse of discretion occurs when a court exercises

“its judgment, in an unwarranted way, in regard to a matter over which it has

discretionary authority.” Johnson v. Abdullah, 

2021-Ohio-3304, ¶ 35

.

               In his first assignment of error, Ridgeway contends that the trial court

abused its discretion because its judgment “rests on a materially inaccurate
description of the procedural record.” Specifically, Ridgeway cites to the trial court’s

findings that he requested “multiple” extensions of time to file his expert report and

that “no expert has been identified.” According to Ridgeway, he only requested one

extension of time to file his expert report on March 13, 2026, and he identified his

expert in his pretrial statement filed on May 29, 2026.

               Ridgeway is correct that of the four motions for extensions of time he

filed, only one of the motions, filed on March 13, 2026, specifically sought an

extension of time to file an expert report. However, the trial court’s characterization

of “multiple” requests by Ridgeway for an extension of time to file an expert report

does not change the fact that Ridgeway failed to file such a report. The report was

originally due on February 2, 2026. Ridgeway let that date pass without either filing

a report or requesting an extension of time. It was not until over one month after

Ridgeway’s report was due — on March 13, 2026 — that he requested an extension

of time. A trial court has broad latitude in discovery and pretrial matters. Nakoff v.

Fairview Gen. Hosp., 

75 Ohio St.3d 254, 257

 (1996). Here, the trial court enforced

its deadline; it did not abuse its discretion in doing so.

               Further, Ridgeway’s May 29, 2026 pretrial statement did not identify

an expert who was prepared to establish glaucoma causation; the medical

professional referenced in the pretrial statement opined on other conditions

Ridgeway allegedly suffers from, but did not state anything about his glaucoma

being related to his job. Moreover, Ridgeway’s pretrial statement identified himself
as his sole witness; it did not identify an expert witness that he expected would testify

on his behalf.

                 The first assignment of error is overruled.

                 In his second assignment of error, Ridgeway contends that the trial

court abused its discretion by not evaluating his March 13, 2026 motion under

Civ.R.6(B)(2).

                 Civ.R. 6(B)(2) governs continuances and extensions of time and

provides in relevant part that “[t]he court may act on motion made after the

particular date or the expiration of the specified time if the moving party failed to

act because of excusable neglect.” Civ.R. 6(B)(2)(d). As ground for his motion for

an extension of time to file an expert report, Ridgeway contended that he had not

received Spooner’s discovery propounded on him. That reason did not establish

excusable neglect; that is, it did not prevent him from obtaining an expert to

establish causation on his glaucoma diagnosis. The trial court did not abuse its

discretion by not applying Civ.R. 6(B)(2)(d) to Ridgeway’s motion for an extension

of time to file an expert report.

                 The second assignment of error is overruled.

                 In his third assignment of error, Ridgeway admits that the medical

documentation he provided in his May 29, 2026 pretrial statement “does not

independently prove glaucoma causation, but it confirms that the record had

materially changed before judgment.” According to Ridgeway, the documentation

demonstrated that he “was actively attempting to obtain medical-opinion evidence
before judgment.” It was not the documentation that Ridgeway needed to survive

Spooner’s motion for summary judgment, however. The trial court did not abuse its

discretion by ruling on Spooner’s motion for summary judgment in the absence of

Ridgeway’s expert report.

               The third assignment of error is overruled.

               In his final assignment of error, Ridgeway sets forth his request for

relief: for us to reverse the trial court’s judgment granting summary judgment in

favor of Spooner and remand the case “so that the trial court may exercise its

Civ.R. 6(B)(2) discretion on an accurate procedural record, including the fact that

there was one expert-report extension and the fact that a provider had been

identified before final judgment.” Because we have found no merit to Ridgeway’s

contentions, his request for relief is without merit.

               The fourth assignment of error is overruled.

               Judgment affirmed.

      It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.

      The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

      It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this judgment

into execution.
      A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule

27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.


                            ______
MICHAEL JOHN RYAN, PRESIDING JUDGE

EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, J., and
TIMOTHY W. CLARY, J., CONCUR

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