Miscellaneous Etats-Unis

State of West Virginia v. Michael Lane Pinkerman

Official source
         IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA
                                 Fall 2026 Term
                                                                              FILED
                            _____________________                     October 29, 2026
                                                                          released at 3:00 p.m.
                                  No. 24-234                            C. CASEY FORBES, CLERK
                            _____________________                     SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
                                                                           OF WEST VIRGINIA

                          STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA,
                           Plaintiff Below, Respondent,
                                        v.
                         MICHAEL LANE PINKERMAN,
                           Defendant Below, Petitioner.
       ___________________________________________________________
                  Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cabell County
                     The Honorable Gregory Howard, Judge
                               Case No. 20-F-226


                               AFFIRMED
        _________________________________________________________
                          Submitted: September 10, 2026
                             Filed: October 29, 2026


Thomas Peyton, Esq.                          John B. McCuskey, Esq.
Peyton Law Firm, PLLC                        Attorney General
Nitro, West Virginia                         Holly M. Mestemacher, Esq.
Counsel for Petitioner                       Assistant Attorney General
                                             Office of the Attorney General
                                             Charleston, West Virginia
                                             Counsel for Respondent


JUSTICE FLANIGAN delivered the Opinion of the Court.
                             SYLLABUS BY THE COURT



              1.     “To successfully challenge the validity of a search warrant on the basis

of false information in the warrant affidavit, the defendant must establish by a

preponderance of the evidence that the affiant, either knowingly and intentionally or with

reckless disregard for the truth, included a false statement therein. The same analysis

applies to omissions of fact. The defendant must show that the facts were intentionally

omitted or were omitted in reckless disregard of whether their omission made the affidavit

misleading.” Syl. Pt. 1, State v. Lilly, 

194 W. Va. 595

, 

461 S.E.2d 101

 (1995).



              2.     “‘Failure to observe a constitutional right constitutes reversible error

unless it can be shown that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.’ Syl. pt. 5,

State v. Blair, 

158 W.Va. 647

, 

214 S.E.2d 330

 (1975).” Syl. Pt. 14, State v. Salmons, 

203

W. Va. 561

, 

509 S.E.2d 842

 (1998).



              3.     “Except for willful, intentional fraud the law of this State does not

permit the court to go behind an indictment to inquire into the evidence considered by the

grand jury, either to determine its legality or its sufficiency.” Syl., Barker v. Fox, 

160 W.

Va. 749

, 

238 S.E.2d 235

 (1977).



              4.     “Once the defendant establishes a prima facie case of willful,

intentional fraud in obtaining an indictment he is entitled to a hearing with compulsory
                                              i
process.” Syl. Pt. 3, State ex rel. Pinson v. Maynard, 

181 W. Va. 662

, 

383 S.E.2d 844


(1989).



              5.     “In reviewing the qualifications of a jury to serve in a criminal case,

we follow a three-step process. Our review is plenary as to legal questions such as the

statutory qualifications for jurors; clearly erroneous as to whether the facts support the

grounds relied upon for disqualification; and an abuse of discretion as to the reasonableness

of the procedure employed and the ruling on disqualification by the trial court.” Syl. Pt. 5,

State v. Benny W., 

242 W. Va. 618

, 

837 S.E.2d 679

 (2019).



              6.     “A trial court's failure to remove a biased juror from a jury panel, as

required by W. Va. Code § 62–3–3 (1949) (Repl.Vol.2010), does not violate a criminal

defendant's right to a trial by an impartial jury if the defendant removes the juror with a

peremptory strike. In order to obtain a new trial for having used a peremptory strike to

remove a biased juror from a jury panel, a criminal defendant must show prejudice.” Syl.

Pt. 3, State v. Sutherland, 

231 W. Va. 410

, 

745 S.E.2d 448

 (2013).




                                             ii
FLANIGAN, Justice:
             The petitioner, Michael Lane Pinkerman. Sr., appeals the March 18, 2024,

sentencing order of the Circuit Court of Cabell County following his conviction of

misdemeanor obstructing an officer. The petitioner contends the circuit court erred in (1)

denying his motion to suppress evidence based upon a warrantless search and/or a faulty

search warrant, (2) denying his motion to dismiss the indictment for false or misleading

testimony to the grand jury, and (3) refusing to strike two potential jurors for cause. For

the reasons set forth below, we find that the circuit court committed no reversible error.

Consequently, we affirm.




                 I.   FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

             On October 28, 2019, the petitioner’s twenty-six-year-old son, Michael

Pinkerman, Jr. (“Junior”), was terminated from his position at the Ona Volunteer Fire

Department. On October 29, 2019, the fire department reported that shots had been fired

at and struck the fire station at some point overnight into the early morning hours. Cabell

County Sheriff's Department (“CCSD”) investigating officers determined that

approximately thirteen shots had been fired into three bay doors of the fire station

damaging the doors and firetrucks inside. A 9mm shell casing was found on scene.

Junior’s name was given as a possible suspect due to his recent termination and concerning

statements made to fire department personnel upon his termination.




                                            1
              On October 30, 2019, four CCSD officers visited the petitioner’s property to

speak with his son Junior, who resided at the property with his parents. After the officers

knocked several times at different doors and windows, Junior exited the home holding a

9mm pistol and assumed a “tactical stance.” Officers ordered Junior to place the firearm

down, but instead he attempted to hand it to a deputy. They then ordered Junior to place

the firearm on a nearby woodpile. Junior removed the magazine, rolled the slide, and

ejected a bullet from the chamber, catching it in his hand. He also engaged the safety before

placing the gun on the woodpile. Sgt. McQuaid1 of the CCSD escorted Junior away from

the firearm to speak with him about the incident at the fire station. Meanwhile, Lt. Steve

Vincent picked up the firearm and confirmed it was rendered safe. Thereafter, Cpl. Jared

Cremeans photographed one side of the firearm, picked the firearm up, placed it on the

opposite side, and photographed it again.




              When Sgt. McQuaid began questioning Junior about the fire station incident,

he indicated that he no longer wished to speak with the officers and ordered them off the

property. Officers again moved the firearm further away from Junior and asked him not to

pick up or reassemble the firearm until they had left the driveway. However, by the time

officers reached their vehicles, Junior had already inserted the clip and chambered a round.




1
       Sgt. McQuaid’s first name does not appear in the record.
                                             2
              After the officers left the petitioner’s property, Deputy Preston Stephens

phoned 911 dispatch to run what he thought was the serial number of the 9mm Beretta

through the National Crime Information Center (“NCIC”) database. However, Deputy

Stephens did not realize that he provided dispatch the model number of the 9mm Beretta,

not the serial number. Dispatch indicated that the “serial number” given returned to a 9mm

Beretta that was reported stolen out of the State of Arizona.2 The make and caliber matched

the firearm photographed at the petitioner’s residence. A second firearm of a different

make and caliber also appeared on the NCIC report. Dispatch asked the officers if they

had the model number or any other identifying information and the officers responded that

they did not.3 Based upon dispatch’s report of the 9mm Beretta being stolen, Cpl.

Cremeans applied for and was granted a search warrant for the petitioner’s property to

retrieve the 9mm Beretta and an arrest warrant for Junior for transferring or receiving stolen

property.




              CCSD officers, along with their tactical “S.W.A.T.” team, arrived at the

petitioner’s property at approximately 6:00 p.m. on October 30, 2019, to execute the

warrants. Officers announced their presence and purpose at the door of the residence, but


2
       It appears from all the information provided that law enforcement in the State of
Arizona made the same mistake in reporting the model number of the firearm and not the
correct serial number.
3
       Deputy Stephens began to ask dispatch to call and verify the status as stolen but
backtracked as CCSD policy was not to verify the status until the 9mm Beretta was in the
officers’ possession.
                                              3
the occupants did not open the door. Officers attempted to force open the door; however,

it was immediately pushed shut. Officers observed that the petitioner had shut and

barricaded himself against the door, blocking the officers from entering. A struggle ensued

over the door. Shortly thereafter, officers could see Junior emerge from a bedroom

brandishing a firearm and shots were exchanged.4 Ultimately, two law enforcement

officers were shot, the petitioner was grazed by a bullet, and Junior was shot multiple times.

The petitioner and officers suffered non-lethal injuries; however, Junior died from his

wounds.




              A few weeks after the incident, officers learned that the 9mm Beretta firearm

alleged to be stolen was lawfully purchased and owned by the petitioner since 1999.




              In October of 2020, the Cabell County grand jury indicted the petitioner on

two counts of attempted murder, two counts of malicious assault, two counts of wanton

endangerment, and one count of misdemeanor obstructing an officer. During the grand

jury proceedings, Trooper G. Losh of the West Virginia State Police as well as Deputy

Nate Rogers of the CCSD testified about what transpired when officers arrived at the

petitioner’s property to serve the warrants. During their testimony, they referred to the

9mm Beretta multiple times as being “stolen.” The officers never informed the grand jury


4
       The firearm used by Junior in this exchange was not the 9mm Beretta that was the
subject of the search warrant.
                                              4
that the 9mm Beretta was eventually determined to be lawfully purchased and owned by

the petitioner.




              The circuit court heard testimony regarding the search warrant at a pretrial

hearing on February 21, 2023. The court determined that given the manner in which Junior

approached the officers, the handling of the 9mm Beretta was for officer safety. The court

also found that the 9mm Beretta was in plain view when the photographs were taken.

Further, the court found that law enforcement acted in good faith both in providing the

information to dispatch and applying for the warrants. In a subsequent order, the court

found that the petitioner had not made a prima facie showing of willful or intentional fraud

regarding the testimony officers presented to the grand jury, and it therefore denied a

hearing on the motion. The court noted that neither officer was directly asked if they knew

the 9mm Beretta was stolen. The court found that whether the officers knew at the time of

their testimony that the 9mm Beretta was not stolen was irrelevant to the charges contained

within the indictment, reasoning that the status of the 9mm Beretta (whether stolen or not)

was not an element of any offense charged in the indictment.




              The petitioner’s trial commenced on January 23, 2024. During voir dire, two

prospective jurors disclosed they knew testifying officers. The first juror, juror number

104, was friends with the mother of Deputy Brady Hinchman and stated that Hinchman

“grew up with my son” and that “[o]ur sons went all through school together.” This juror
                                             5
stated that she had known the officer since his childhood, having babysat him. However,

juror number 104 indicated that she had not discussed this matter with him or his mother.

Ultimately, she indicated this relationship would not impact her ability to be impartial. The

second juror, number 8, had a nephew who was in law enforcement in the area and had

family who lived near the residence in question. This juror thought her nephew might have

been called to the scene but was unsure. Juror number 8 indicated that she had heard about

the incident through news media but did not speak to any law enforcement about the case.

She ultimately stated that she could remain impartial. Juror number 8 stated that she also

knew Deputy Stephens from school, church, and the neighborhood, but again stated she

could remain impartial. The court denied both challenges for cause, and the petitioner

removed both jurors using peremptory strikes.




              Evidence admitted at trial included law enforcement testimony regarding the

petitioner shutting the door to his home and barricading himself against the door thereby

blocking the officers from entering, after officers announced their presence and purpose at

the door of the residence.




              Following trial, the jury acquitted the petitioner of malicious assault and

wanton endangerment, hung on the two attempted-murder counts, and convicted him of




                                             6
misdemeanor obstructing an officer.5 The circuit court sentenced him to twelve months in

jail. The court entered its sentencing order on March 18, 2024, and the petitioner timely

appealed.




                            II.    STANDARD OF REVIEW

              The petitioner first contends the circuit court erred in denying his motion to

suppress.

                      When reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress, an
              appellate court should construe all facts in the light most
              favorable to the State, as it was the prevailing party below.
              Because of the highly fact-specific nature of a motion to
              suppress, particular deference is given to the findings of the
              circuit court because it had the opportunity to observe the
              witnesses and to hear testimony on the issues. Therefore, the
              circuit court's factual findings are reviewed for clear error.

Syl. Pt. 1, State v. Lacy, 

196 W. Va. 104

, 

468 S.E.2d 719

 (1996). “On appeal, legal

conclusions made with regard to suppression determinations are reviewed de novo. Factual

determinations upon which these legal conclusions are based are reviewed under the clearly

erroneous standard. In addition, factual findings based, at least in part, on determinations

of witness credibility are accorded great deference.” Syl. Pt. 3, State v. Stuart, 

192 W. Va.

428

, 

452 S.E.2d 886

 (1994).




5
        The State moved to dismiss the attempted murder counts with prejudice which the
circuit court granted.
                                             7
              Regarding the petitioner’s motion to dismiss, “[o]ur standard of review of a

motion to dismiss an indictment is generally de novo.” State v. Davis, 

205 W. Va. 569,

578

, 

519 S.E.2d 852, 861

 (1999).




              Additionally, the petitioner alleges error in the denial of motions to strike

certain jurors for cause.

                      In reviewing the qualifications of a jury to serve in a
              criminal case, we follow a three-step process. Our review is
              plenary as to legal questions such as the statutory qualifications
              for jurors; clearly erroneous as to whether the facts support the
              grounds relied upon for disqualification; and an abuse of
              discretion as to the reasonableness of the procedure employed
              and the ruling on disqualification by the trial court.

Syl. Pt. 5 State v. Benny W., 

242 W. Va. 618

, 

837 S.E.2d 679

 (2019).




                                   III.   DISCUSSION

              As noted above, the petitioner asserts three assignments of error. We

consider each alleged error in turn, below.



A.     Motion to Suppress

              The petitioner first argues that the circuit court erred in denying his motion

to suppress all evidence that flowed from officers handling and photographing the 9mm

Beretta. He contends that their conduct constituted an illegal search and seizure of his


                                              8
property or in the alternative, the search warrant was obtained by false and misleading

testimony. The State responds that handling and photographing the 9mm Beretta was not

a search or seizure as it was in plain view. The State contends the statements in the warrant

applications were based on information the officers possessed at the time and that mere

errors do not constitute false or misleading statements.




              As previously stated, this claim involves differing standards of review; we

review legal conclusions de novo and review factual determinations under the clearly

erroneous standard. Stuart, 

192 W. Va. at 429

, 

452 S.E.2d at 887

, Syl. Pt. 3. In addition,

we give great deference to factual findings based on determinations of witness credibility.

Id.

 “To successfully challenge the validity of a search warrant on the basis of false

information in the warrant affidavit, the defendant must establish by a preponderance of

the evidence that the affiant, either knowingly and intentionally or with reckless disregard

for the truth, included a false statement therein.” Syl. Pt. 1, in part, State v. Lilly, 

194 W.

Va. 595

, 

461 S.E.2d 101

 (1995); accord Franks v. Delaware, 

438 U.S. 154

, 155–56 (1978).

“Mere negligence or innocent mistake is insufficient to void a warrant.” Lilly, 

194 W. Va.

at 601

, 

461 S.E.2d at 107

 (citing Franks, 

438 U.S. at 171

).




              The petitioner does not contend that Cpl. Cremeans knowingly stated a

falsehood; he argues only that the officers acted recklessly. However, the record does not

support that characterization. The number relayed to dispatch—in fact the firearm’s model
                                              9
number rather than its serial number—returned a matching make and caliber in the NCIC

database as a weapon reported stolen in Arizona, and the officer repeated and verified that

number with dispatch. The same confusion between the serial number and the model

number occurred with at least one other law enforcement agency. See supra n.2. When

the officer relayed a number that returned a database match for the same make and caliber

of firearm, and who verifies that number with dispatch, he at most made the kind of

negligent or innocent mistake that Franks and Lilly place beyond the reach of suppression.

Construing the facts in the light most favorable to the State, the officer reasonably relied

on the information relayed by dispatch, and the circuit court did not err in declining to void

the warrant. To the extent the circuit court also found that law enforcement acted in good

faith, that finding corroborates the absence of any reckless disregard for the truth. We need

not, and do not, decide whether the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule

recognized in United States v. Leon, 

468 U.S. 897

 (1984), applies in these circumstances.

See Lilly, 

194 W. Va. at 605

 n.16, 

461 S.E.2d at 111

 n.16 (declining to address the good-

faith exception).




              The petitioner argues that when Cpl. Cremeans picked the 9mm Beretta up

and turned it over to photograph its opposite side, he conducted a search under Arizona v.

Hicks, 

480 U.S. 321

 (1987), in which the Supreme Court held that moving an object to

expose a concealed surface is a search distinct from the lawful objective that first brought

the officer into contact with the object. However, in this case it is unnecessary for us to


                                             10
decide whether the handling and photographing of the 9mm Beretta was a search or seizure.

The petitioner was not charged with or convicted of any offense relating to the 9mm Beretta

the officers photographed. Rather, he was indicted on charges stemming from the use of a

different firearm and his own overt actions.




              Still, even assuming the manipulation of the 9mm Beretta was an unlawful

search, suppression of the resulting photograph would not alter the outcome in this case.

“Failure to observe a constitutional right constitutes reversible error unless it can be shown

that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Syl. pt. 5, State v. Blair, 

158 W.

Va. 647

, 

214 S.E.2d 330

 (1975).” Syl. Pt. 14, State v. Salmons, 

203 W. Va. 561

, 

509 S.E.2d

842

 (1998). The burden of establishing that a constitutional error is harmless beyond a

reasonable doubt rests on the State as the beneficiary of the error. State v. Blevins, 

231 W.

Va. 135, 158

, 

744 S.E.2d 245, 268

 (2013)(citing Syl. Pt. 3 State v. Frazier, 

229 W. Va. 724

,

735 S.E.2d 727

 (2012)); see Chapman v. California, 

386 U.S. 18, 24

 (1967). The inquiry

is whether the record contains any indication that the challenged evidence “could have

influenced the jury’s verdict.” Blevins, 

231 W. Va. at 157

, 

744 S.E.2d at 267

.




              The petitioner was convicted of obstructing an officer under West Virginia

Code § 61-5-17. That offense requires “forcible or illegal conduct that interferes with a

police officer’s discharge of official duties.” State v. Carney, 

222 W. Va. 152, 157

, 

663

S.E.2d 606, 611

 (2008). It is established by the petitioner’s own conduct—refusing to open
                                               11
the door and barricading it against officers executing facially valid warrants—not by any

physical evidence recovered from the 9mm Beretta. The challenged evidence revealed

nothing incriminating as to the obstruction charge and could not have contributed to that

verdict.   On this record, any error in denying suppression was harmless beyond a

reasonable doubt.




B.     Grand Jury

              The petitioner next alleges the circuit court erred in denying his motion for a

hearing regarding “misrepresentations” officers made to the grand jury about the 9mm

Beretta being stolen when they were aware, at that time, that it was lawfully owned by the

petitioner. The State responds that no misrepresentations were made before the grand jury.

The testimony elicited reflected what officers knew at the time and therefore the petitioner

has failed to make a showing of willful, intentional fraud.




              This Court has long held that, “[e]xcept for willful, intentional fraud the law

of this State does not permit the court to go behind an indictment to inquire into the

evidence considered by the grand jury, either to determine its legality or its sufficiency.”

Syl., Barker v. Fox, 

160 W. Va. 749

, 

238 S.E.2d 235

 (1977). The defendant must first make

a prima facie case of willful, intentional fraud before he is entitled to a hearing with

compulsory process. 

Id. at 753

, 

238 S.E.2d at 237

; see also Syl. Pt. 3, State ex rel. Pinson

v. Maynard, 

181 W. Va. 662

, 

383 S.E.2d 844

 (1989). Testimony that is merely misleading
                                             12
does not satisfy that threshold; in State ex rel. Pinson v. Maynard, testimony that was

misleading but did not emanate from the State and involved no prosecutorial misconduct

presented no prima facie showing of willful, intentional fraud. 

181 W. Va. at 666

, 

383

S.E.2d at 848

. The prima facie showing of willful or intentional fraud must precede the

court’s consideration of the impact of the false or misleading testimony. See State v. Back,

241 W. Va. 209

, 

820 S.E.2d 916

 (2018).




              Here, the petitioner argues that the State had a duty to disclose to the grand

jury the fact that the 9mm Beretta was later determined not to be stolen, but rather lawfully

owned by the petitioner. He argues that the State knew the 9mm Beretta was not stolen at

the time of the presentment to the grand jury and that its failure to elicit evidence of that

fact constituted fraud in obtaining the indictment. However, the status of the 9mm Beretta,

whether stolen or not, had no bearing upon the charges contained in the indictment

(attempted murder, malicious assault on a law enforcement officer, wanton endangerment,

and obstructing an officer) or upon the charge for which the petitioner was convicted

(obstructing an officer). The witnesses were asked about the 9mm Beretta in the context

of what was known on October 30, 2019; the information about the 9mm Beretta explained

why a warrant was obtained and why law enforcement returned to the property that

evening. Because the petitioner identified no willful, intentional fraud, he did not make

the threshold showing required to go behind the indictment, and the circuit court did not

err in denying a hearing on that basis.


                                             13
              The petitioner’s remaining argument invokes the alternative procedure of

Syllabus Point 5 of Pinson: where “perjured or misleading testimony presented to the grand

jury is discovered before trial and there is no evidence of prosecutorial misconduct, the

State may withdraw the indictment without prejudice, or request the court to hold an in

camera hearing to inspect the grand jury transcripts and determine if other sufficient

evidence exists to support the indictment.” Pinson, 

181 W. Va. at 663

, 

383 S.E.2d at 845

,

Syl. Pt. 5. The petitioner reads that syllabus point to require an in-camera hearing

whenever misleading testimony surfaces, without regard to the threshold showing of fraud.

However, this Court rejected that reading in Back, 

241 W. Va. 209

, 

820 S.E.2d 916

. In

Back, this Court explained that “Pinson did not eliminate the requirement for a prima facie

showing of willful, intentional fraud before a circuit court may go behind an indictment,”

and that “[w]ithout such a showing, the circuit court simply could not inquire into the

evidence presented to the grand jury.” Id. at 214, 

820 S.E.2d at 921

. Because the petitioner

made no prima facie showing of willful, intentional fraud, Syllabus Point 5 of Pinson was

never triggered, and the circuit court was not required to hold an in-camera hearing.




              In any event, Barker v. Fox, 

160 W. Va. at 752

, 

238 S.E.2d at 237

 (1977),

confirms that no relief is warranted in this case. In Barker, we explained that where an

indictment rests on insufficient evidence and the State produces no other evidence at trial

than what was before the grand jury, “the prisoner will be vindicated as fully by an acquittal

                                             14
as he would be by quashing the indictment.” 

Id. at 752

, 

238 S.E.2d at 237

. That is what

occurred here. The petit jury—informed at trial that the 9mm Beretta was lawfully

owned—acquitted the petitioner of malicious assault and wanton endangerment and hung

on the attempted-murder counts, which the State then dismissed with prejudice.              It

convicted only on the obstructing an officer charge, a charge resting on the petitioner’s own

conduct and wholly independent of the 9mm Beretta’s status. Therefore, any deficiency in

the grand jury’s information about the pistol’s status could not have prejudiced the one

charge on which the petitioner stands convicted.




C.     Jurors

              The final error the petitioner raises is that the circuit court erred by denying

his motions to strike for cause two potential jurors who either knew a State’s witness or

recalled media reports surrounding the events at issue. The State responds that each juror

indicated that their relationships and/or prior knowledge would not influence their

decision-making process. Additionally, the State argues that this claim fails because the

petitioner used peremptory strikes to remove these jurors and so no prejudice ensued.




              “As a general matter we have held that a ‘trial court has broad discretion in

determining whether to strike jurors for cause, and we will reverse only where actual

prejudice is demonstrated.’” State v. Benny W., 

242 W. Va. 618

, 628, 

837 S.E.2d 679

, 689

(2019) (quoting State v. Miller, 

197 W. Va. 588, 605

, 

476 S.E.2d 535, 552

 (1996)). A
                                             15
prospective juror’s “social relationship with an employee of a law enforcement agency

does not operate as a per se disqualification for cause ... unless the law enforcement official

is actively involved in the prosecution of the case.” State v. Mills, 

221 W. Va. 283, 287

,

654 S.E.2d 605, 609

 (2007) (quoting Syl. Pt. 6, in part, State v. Beckett, 

172 W. Va. 817

,

310 S.E.2d 883

 (1983)). Where such a relationship exists, a party may conduct individual

voir dire, but a juror’s acquaintance with a witness is not disqualifying unless the

relationship is sufficient to preclude the juror from rendering a fair verdict. Mills, 

221 W.

Va. at 288

, 

654 S.E.2d at 610

.




              Here, both challenged jurors affirmed they could remain impartial, and the

petitioner developed no facts showing that either relationship would preclude a fair verdict.

However, even assuming the court should have granted either challenge for cause, the

petitioner would not be entitled to relief, because he removed both jurors by peremptory

strike and has shown no resulting prejudice. This Court has held that:

                       A trial court’s failure to remove a biased juror from a
              jury panel, as required by W. Va. Code § 62–3–3 (1949)
              (Repl.Vol.2010), does not violate a criminal defendant’s right
              to a trial by an impartial jury if the defendant removes the juror
              with a peremptory strike. In order to obtain a new trial for
              having used a peremptory strike to remove a biased juror from
              a jury panel, a criminal defendant must show prejudice.

Syl. Pt. 3, State v. Sutherland, 

231 W. Va. 410

, 

745 S.E.2d 448

 (2013). Further,

                      [t]o make a showing of prejudice a challenge must show
              that the appellant was forced to accept a juror who should have
              been excused for cause. That is, appellate courts will not find

                                              16
              reversible error based on the trial court’s refusal to remove that
              juror for cause unless the resulting jury was not fair and
              impartial.

State v. Rollins, 

233 W. Va. 715, 729

, 

760 S.E.2d 529, 543

 (2014).




              The petitioner has not alleged that a juror who actually participated in the

trial and verdict should have been removed for cause. Rather, he urges this Court to

reconsider Sutherland and to hold that the forced use of a peremptory strike alone

constitutes prejudice. This Court has declined that invitation before and we decline it again.

See State v. White, No. 15-0344, 

2016 WL 2977322

, at *3 (W. Va. May 23, 2016)

(memorandum decision). Sutherland adopted the prejudice requirement deliberately,

reasoning that a defendant tried before an unbiased jury “has received exactly what the

constitution guarantees,” and it expressly overruled the automatic-reversal rule of Syllabus

Point 8 of State v. Phillips, 

194 W. Va. 569

, 

461 S.E.2d 75

 (1995). Sutherland, 

231 W. Va.

410

, 

745 S.E.2d 448

. We adhere to Sutherland and its progeny. Because the petitioner has

not shown the prejudice those cases require, we find no error regarding the seating of the

jury.




                                  IV.    CONCLUSION

              For the foregoing reasons, the Circuit Court of Cabell County’s March 18,

2024, sentencing order is hereby affirmed.


                                             17
     Affirmed.




18

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  • Up to 1 GB of documents in total, folders and sub-folders accepted
  • Secure payment, no card details stored
  • Terms and fee agreement

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All formats accepted (PDF, Word, images, etc.)

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IA juridique gratuite

Une question de droit ? Demandez à Judith.

Judith cherche dans les codes, la Constitution, la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme et les décisions des juges, puis vous montre les textes et les passages d’arrêts qui pourraient répondre à votre question, avec leur source officielle. Gratuite, sans compte, elle ne rédige rien à votre place. Découvrir Judith, l’IA juridique gratuite du cabinet.

Trois recherches par jour, sans compte. Votre question est enregistrée et relue par le cabinet pour améliorer l’outil : n’y mettez ni nom ni information sensible.