Miscellaneous Etats-Unis

Greater Boston Legal Services v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Security

Official source
United States Court of Appeals
                     For the First Circuit

No. 25-1799

GREATER BOSTON LEGAL SERVICES; ARAUJO & FISHER, LLC; ANNELISE M.
                    ARAUJO; STEFANIE FISHER,

                     Plaintiffs, Appellants,

  DEMISSIE & CHURCH; SUSAN CHURCH; GRAVES & DOYLE, Attorneys at
            Law; KERRY DOYLE; WILLIAM E. GRAVES, JR.,

                           Plaintiffs,

                               v.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY; MARKWAYNE MULLIN,
in the official capacity as United States Secretary of Homeland
 Security; UNITED STATES CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES;
JOSEPH B. EDLOW, in the official capacity as Director of United
  States Citizenship and Immigration Services; IMMIGRATION AND
   CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT; DAVID J. VENTURELLA, in the official
capacity as Senior Official Performing the Duties of Director of
 Immigration and Customs Enforcement; UNITED STATES CUSTOMS AND
BORDER PROTECTION; RODNEY S. SCOTT, in the official capacity as
  Commissioner of United States Customs and Border Protection,

                     Defendants, Appellees.*


          APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
               FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

          [Hon. Denise J. Casper, U.S. District Judge]

    *  Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 43(c)(2),
United States Secretary of Homeland Security Markwayne Mullin is
automatically substituted for former United States Secretary of
Homeland Security Kristi Noem.        Likewise, Senior Official
Performing the Duties of Director of Immigration and Customs
Enforcement David J. Venturella is automatically substituted for
former Senior Official Performing the Duties of Director of
Immigration and Customs Enforcement Todd M. Lyons as appellees.
                             Before

                   Gelpí, Howard, and Dunlap,
                        Circuit Judges.


     Sandra H. Masselink, with whom Adriana Lafaille, John T.
Montgomery,   American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of
Massachusetts, Inc., and Ropes & Gray LLP, were on brief, for
appellants.
     Susan M. Finegan, Emily Kanstroom Musgrave, Gabrielle Brown,
Alexa Greco, Cassandra Harris, Savannah Wormley, Mintz, Levin,
Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky, and Popeo, P.C., and Nicholas A. Butto on
brief for American Immigration Lawyers Association, amicus curiae
for appellants.
     Simon G. Jerome, with whom Brett A. Shumate, Assistant
Attorney General, Leah B. Foley, United States Attorney, and
Charles W. Scarborough, Attorney, Appellate Staff, Civil Division,
United States Department of Justice, were on brief, for appellees.


                        October 29, 2026
           GELPÍ,     Circuit        Judge.        A   group    of   two    immigration

attorneys,    a     law     firm,    and      a   legal     services       organization

(collectively,      the     "Appellants")          filed     suit     to   enjoin   the

Department of Homeland Security ("DHS") from routing discovery in

immigration       proceedings       through       Freedom      of    Information    Act

("FOIA")     requests.          Appellants         brought      claims      under   the

Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), 5 U.S.C. § 706, et seq.,

challenging this alleged "Nondisclosure Policy" as violative of

the Due Process Clause, the Immigration and Nationality Act, and

DHS regulations.          The district court dismissed all the claims at

the motion to dismiss and summary judgment stages.                           Appellants

appealed those decisions.            After our own review, we conclude that

Appellants     lack        Article     III        standing      to    challenge     the

Nondisclosure Policy.         Accordingly, we affirm the district court's

judgment for the government, albeit on different grounds.

                                    I. BACKGROUND

                                       A. Facts

           Appellants Annelise M. Araujo, Stefanie Fisher, Araujo

& Fisher, LLC, and Greater Boston Legal Services are immigration

attorneys, a law firm, and a legal services organization that

represent noncitizens in immigration matters                         and proceedings.

Appellants' practice area implicates the regulatory framework set

forth by DHS, which is responsible for administering and enforcing

immigration laws in the United States.                         DHS carries out its


                                        - 3 -
responsibilities through component agencies such as the United

States Citizenship and Immigration Services ("USCIS"), Immigration

and Customs Enforcement ("ICE"), and Customs and Border Protection

("CBP") (collectively, and including DHS, the "Agencies").              USCIS

is responsible for adjudicating immigration benefit requests, such

as asylum; ICE enforces laws regarding removal proceedings; and

CBP enforces laws regarding the entry and exit of people and goods

at the United States border.        The Agencies, together with various

individuals serving in leadership positions within them, are the

Defendant-Appellees     in      this        appeal   (collectively,       the

"government").1

          The Agencies maintain records for every noncitizen with

whom they interact.        These records include prior application

materials, visa application materials, records of prior removal

proceedings,   notes   from    asylum   or     credible   fear   interviews,

criminal history records,       identification documents, and other

forms.   Some, but not all, of these documents are stored in the

noncitizen's   "A-file,"      the   primary     record    of   the   person's

immigration history.       These documents are used in immigration

proceedings.




     1 Markwayne Mullin, Joseph B. Edlow, David J. Venturella, and
Rodney S. Scott are the individual Defendant-Appellees, all sued
in their official capacities.


                                    - 4 -
            As alleged, when Appellants have requested documents in

the Agencies' possession, the Agencies have directed them to file

FOIA requests to obtain the records.              In the asylum context, for

instance,    applicants     cannot     conduct    discovery       of    the    records

utilized by USCIS asylum officers and instead "may" seek those

documents "through a [FOIA] request."                  8 C.F.R. § 208.12.            A

similar practice exists in removal proceedings, where ICE often

directs noncitizens to FOIA and has circulated form response

letters for its attorneys to refer noncitizens to this process.

Appellants lump these examples together to establish the purported

Nondisclosure       Policy -- or,      put    differently,        the   "systematic

failure of [DHS] to produce to noncitizens and their counsel the

records that are necessary to support their claims and defenses or

eligibility     for    benefits     in    a    range   of    civil      immigration

proceedings."

            Appellants       explain      that     the       drawback         of   the

Nondisclosure Policy        lies in      the content and timing of                 FOIA

responses.     Although the Agencies must respond to FOIA requests

within   twenty     business   days,     allowing      for   an    additional      ten

business     days     if   "unusual      circumstances"       arise,      5    U.S.C.

§ 552(a)(6)(A)(i), they regularly fail to meet that deadline. And,

even when FOIA responses arrive on time, the Agencies often omit

documents and/or redact information.




                                       - 5 -
           Because Appellants cannot know for certain whether they

will receive all of the requested documents or whether those

documents will arrive in a timely fashion, Appellants frequently

seek to obtain this information through alternative means.          These

efforts include anticipating what documents DHS might use in

proceedings; conducting interviews with clients, family members,

and prior attorneys; and collecting records from numerous courts.

Further, Appellants must seek continuances in immigration court as

they wait for documents to arrive; file, track, and appeal FOIA

matters;   and   prepare    alternative,   and   otherwise   unnecessary,

applications.

           These additional tasks require attorneys and support

staff to spend time and money submitting document requests and

retrieving records.    Because Appellants' representation is mostly

paid via flat fees, they are often not fully financially rewarded

for the time and resources they must spend in attempting to

recreate and recover records.         Further, the extensive efforts

required to seek documents limit Appellants' capacity to represent

more clients.

                           B. Procedural History

           In January 2021, Appellants filed suit in the United

States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, claiming

that the Agencies followed a Nondisclosure Policy that violated

the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 706.          They alleged that the policy was


                                  - 6 -
"arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, unconstitutional,

and otherwise incompatible with law" because it violated the

Agencies'    disclosure    obligations         under    two    provisions     of    the

Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1229a(a)(4)(B)

and (c)(2)(B), a DHS regulation, 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(16), as well

as the Due Process Clause, U.S. Const. amend. V.

            The government filed a motion to dismiss.                   In its order

addressing     the    motion,    the     district        court     concluded       that

Appellants had adequately pled interests within the protection of

the   INA    and     its   implementing         regulations,        but     not     the

Constitution's       Due   Process     Clause,         which     only     noncitizens

themselves could assert.             It then held that while Appellants

plausibly alleged they were denied access to records based upon an

agencywide policy covering certain asylum proceedings, they failed

to allege the existence of such a policy with respect to other

proceedings     described       in     the      complaint,        namely      removal

proceedings.       Accordingly, the district court granted the motion

to dismiss as to Appellants' due process claim and the APA claim

predicated on removal proceedings and denied it insofar as the APA

claim was predicated on asylum proceedings.

            Appellants     subsequently        filed     an    amended    complaint,

adding allegations to support the removal-specific portion of the

APA claim.    They alleged that ICE updated its internal procedures

in the wake of Dent v. Holder, 627 F.3d 365 (9th Cir. 2010), which


                                       - 7 -
held that noncitizens who must show lawful presence in removal

proceedings shall have access to their A-files.        Id. at 374.

According to Appellants, ICE decided to follow Dent only in the

Ninth Circuit, and maintained FOIA as the designated mechanism to

obtain documents in other jurisdictions.    Even within the Ninth

Circuit, the allegations stated, ICE narrowly interpreted the

decision to apply to a limited set of documents and continued to

direct noncitizens to the FOIA process.       Further, Appellants

alleged that ICE had developed form response letters to refer A-

file requestors to the FOIA process.

          The government again moved to dismiss.       The district

court granted that motion, permitting Appellants' case to proceed

only with respect to affirmative asylum proceedings.   The district

court reasoned that, even assuming the existence of both a policy

and discrete agency action, Appellants pointed to no authority

that imposed a disclosure obligation on ICE in removal proceedings.

Thus, Appellants failed to plead that any such policy was arbitrary

and capricious.

          After the resolution of the motions to dismiss, each

side moved for summary judgment on the surviving claim: whether

DHS' practice of routing document requests through FOIA in asylum

proceedings violated the APA.   The district court granted summary

judgment for the government and denied Appellants' motion for

summary judgment.   The district court determined that, on the


                                - 8 -
summary judgment record, Appellants did not establish that a formal

policy existed within DHS and, even if they did, such a policy did

not violate the disclosure requirement in 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(16)

and was neither arbitrary nor capricious.

          Appellants     timely    appealed   the   district   court's

decisions granting the government's motion to dismiss in part and

the motion for summary judgment.      During oral argument on May 7,

2026, this Court ordered the parties to file supplemental briefs

addressing the question of Appellants' Article III standing under

FDA v. Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine, 602 U.S. 367 (2024).

                            II. DISCUSSION

          Appellants raise two issues on appeal. First, they argue

that the district court erred in granting the government's partial

motion to dismiss.     Specifically, they claim that the court erred

in (1) dismissing the portions of the APA claim that alleged

statutory and regulatory violations, except as to the affirmative

asylum context, and (2) dismissing the portions of the APA claim

that alleged violations of due process rights.      Second, Appellants

maintain that the district court erred in granting the government's

motion for summary judgment as to the affirmative asylum claim.

The threshold question we face, however, is whether Appellants

have established that they have Article III standing to present

these claims.   Our answer is in the negative.




                                  - 9 -
            As federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, we

begin by ensuring that we have jurisdiction to answer the questions

presented in this appeal.    Hochendoner v. Genzyme Corp., 823 F.3d

724, 730 (1st Cir. 2016).     Although the district court did not

analyze standing -- and the government, for its part, did not

challenge it -- we are obliged to address it as a jurisdictional

prerequisite.    See Fideicomiso De La Tierra Del Caño Martin Peña

v. Fortuño, 604 F.3d 7, 15-16 (1st Cir. 2010) ("Article III limits

our jurisdiction to 'cases and controversies,' and our 'obligation

to inquire sua sponte into our jurisdiction over the matter' exists

in every case.    That obligation extends to determining whether a

party has constitutional standing to sue . . . ." (quoting Doyle

v. Huntress, Inc., 419 F.3d 3, 6 (1st Cir. 2005))).    In doing so,

"we 'take the complaint's well-pled (i.e., non-conclusory, non-

speculative) facts as true, drawing all reasonable inferences in

the pleader's favor, and see if they plausibly narrate a claim for

relief.'"    Kolackovsky v. Town of Rockport, 165 F.4th 114, 119

(1st Cir. 2026) (quoting Lyman v. Baker, 954 F.3d 351, 360 (1st

Cir. 2020)).

            Appellants, as the party invoking federal jurisdiction,

bear the burden of establishing Article III standing.       Spokeo,

Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 338 (2016).      To do so, Appellants

must demonstrate "(i) that [they] ha[ve] suffered or likely will

suffer an injury in fact, (ii) that the injury likely was caused


                               - 10 -
or will be caused by the defendant, and (iii) that the injury

likely would be redressed by the requested judicial relief."                    All.

for Hippocratic Med., 602 U.S. at 380.             "The asserted injury must

be    'concrete,    particularized,          and   actual       or    imminent.'"

California v. Trump, 183 F.4th 52, 64 (1st Cir. 2026) (quoting

TransUnion LLC v. Ramírez, 594 U.S. 413, 423 (2021)).                  To satisfy

the   causation    element,   Appellants      must   demonstrate       "a   causal

connection between the injury and the conduct complained of, where

the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the

defendant and not the result of the independent action of some

third party not before the court.'"                Lyman, 954 F.3d at 361

(citation modified).      Lastly, "it must be likely, as opposed to

merely   speculative,    that    the   injury      will    be   redressed    by    a

favorable decision."      Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,

561 (1992) (citation modified).

            First and foremost, in response to our request for

supplemental briefing, the government argues that Appellants have

failed to adequately allege standing because they cannot show that

the     unlawful    government       action -- namely,          the     purported

Nondisclosure Policy -- actually exists.                  Given that "critical

deficiency," says the government, it is impossible for Appellants

to    "satisfy[]   the   causation     and    redressability         elements     of

standing."




                                   - 11 -
           As previously noted, to plead the existence of the

alleged   Nondisclosure     Policy,   Appellants     provide    a    slew    of

allegations centered on removal proceedings and asylum matters.

As to the removal context, Appellants allege that FOIA "remain[s]

the   appropriate    mechanism     for     obtaining     documents      in   a

noncitizen's A-file" in all circuits except the Ninth Circuit.               As

to the asylum context, Appellants point to DHS regulations which

provide that asylum applicants, while not entitled to conduct

discovery of the materials used by asylum officers, may nonetheless

seek documents through FOIA requests.

           Appellants' sweeping challenge is based on examples of

FOIA referrals which occurred within different component agencies

of DHS, i.e., removal proceedings undertaken by ICE, and asylum

adjudications   conducted    by   USCIS.      But   specific,       disjointed

instances of such referrals, without more, do not amount to an

"agency action" in the form of an agency-wide policy.               See Norton

v. S. Utah Wilderness All., 542 U.S. 55, 62 (2004).                   Further,

because   the   "action"    Appellants     allege   is   a   collection      of

decentralized immigration interactions that vary in their details

among the varying Agencies, it is not even entirely clear whether

the harm that is asserted (i.e., the withholding or delay in making

information available) will even occur in any specific instance.

For example, the complaint itself alleges, and the summary judgment

record confirmed, that the information a noncitizen obtains in


                                  - 12 -
affirmative asylum proceedings depends on a wide range of factors,

including the discretion of the asylum officer.                   The purported

Nondisclosure Policy is simply Appellants' conclusory label that

describes practices whereby various Agencies make varying degrees

of information available by varying means in various proceedings.2

As we see it, because Appellants have failed to establish the

existence        of   the   so-called     Nondisclosure        Policy     occurring

throughout the entirety of DHS in a uniform manner, we cannot

conclude that their alleged injury is "concrete."                 Spokeo, 578 at

340 ("A 'concrete' injury must be 'de facto'; that is, it must

actually exist.").          Instead, it is impermissibly "speculative" or

"attenuated."         Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA, 568 U.S. 412 (2013).

                Moreover, even if we assume, for the sake of argument,

that       a   Nondisclosure   Policy    does    exist,   we   find     Appellants'

arguments in support of organizational standing unpersuasive.3


       On these points, we need say little more than has already
       2

been said by the district court. See Greater Boston Legal Svcs.
v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 2025 WL 1725826, at *4-5, 8 (D.
Mass. June 20, 2025); see also Greater Boston Legal Svcs. v. U.S.
Dep't of Homeland Sec., 2022 WL 138629, at *6-7 (D. Mass. Jan. 14,
2022).
       Appellants contend that we need not conduct separate
       3

standing analyses for the individual attorneys and the legal
organizations, as the "injuries suffered by the organizational
Plaintiffs, a private law firm and a nonprofit providing legal
services, are indistinguishable from those suffered by the
individual Plaintiff attorneys." Although the government does not
explicitly adopt this position, its standing arguments do not
distinguish between the attorneys and organizations.          Since
"organizations must satisfy the usual standards for injury in fact,
causation, and redressability that apply to individuals," and


                                        - 13 -
Appellants    liken      their    bid    for     standing     to    the    plaintiff

organization in Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363

(1982).    There, says Appellants, the Supreme Court found that the

plaintiff    organization        suffered      an   injury     in   fact      because

defendants' actions affected their "core business activities."

All. for Hippocratic Med., 602 at 395 (referencing id. at 379).

Here, Appellants posit that the Nondisclosure Policy likewise

affects their "mission and work [] to provide legal assistance to

noncitizens" by making their representation "vastly more costly

and time-consuming."       Specifically, Appellants maintain that they

must engage in "repeated travel to state courthouses, the hiring

of   out-of-state     counsel     to     obtain     needed    records,       numerous

communications with anyone who might have relevant information or

records,    and   even    the    preparation        of   otherwise        unnecessary

applications."      The government contests Appellants' analogy to

Havens, arguing that they better resemble the medical associations

involved in Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine.                  Id. at 369.       The

government    believes          that     Appellants,         like    the      medical

associations, are impermissibly attempting to manufacture standing

"by means of voluntary expenditures."




without disagreement from the parties, we adopt this approach.
All. for Hippocratic Med., 602 U.S. at 369 (citing Havens, 455
U.S. at 378-79).


                                        - 14 -
            Given the parties' contested readings, a brief overview

of Havens and Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine is in order.               In

Havens, a nonprofit organization, Housing Opportunities Made Equal

("HOME"), operated a housing counseling service and investigated

complaints of housing discrimination.               455 U.S. at 368.       The

defendant, Havens, owned two apartment complexes in Richmond,

Virginia.      Id.      Two   HOME    employees -- one       white   and   one

Black -- inquired as to the availability of apartments in Havens'

properties.     Id. at 368.      Havens told the white employee that

apartments were available, whereas the Black employee was told

that none were available.           Id.    As a result, HOME, alongside

various    individual   plaintiffs,       brought    suit    alleging   racial

steering practices in violation of § 804 of the Fair Housing Act

of 1968.     Id. at 366.      To establish standing, HOME argued that

Havens'     steering    practices     "frustrated      the     organization's

counseling and referral services, with a consequent drain on

resources."    Id. at 369.     The Supreme Court agreed, holding:

            If, as broadly alleged, [Haven's] steering
            practices have perceptibly impaired HOME's
            ability to provide counseling and referral
            services   for   low-   and    moderate-income
            homeseekers, there can be no question that the
            organization has suffered injury in fact.
            Such concrete and demonstrable injury to the
            organization's     activities -- with      the
            consequent   drain   on   the   organization's
            resources -- constitutes far more than simply
            a setback to the organization's abstract
            social interests.



                                    - 15 -
Id. at 379.

          Thereafter, in Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine, the

Supreme Court considered the standing of medical associations

challenging FDA regulations related to the drug mifepristone.      602

U.S. at 372-74.   The medical associations' claimed injury was that

the FDA regulations caused them to "spend considerable resources

to the detriment of other spending priorities" -- particularly,

resources diverted towards conducting studies on mifepristone and

engaging in public advocacy.    Id. at 394.   In support, the medical

associations argued that Havens stands for the proposition that

"standing exists when an organization diverts its resources in

response to a defendant's actions."     Id. at 395.   The Supreme Court

explicitly disavowed such a reading of Havens, concluding that the

case did not support "such an expansive theory of standing."       Id.

Rather, Haven's actions -- providing HOME's Black employee with

false   information   about    apartment    availability -- "directly

affected and interfered with HOME's core business activities,"

that is, its "ability to provide counseling and referral services

for low- and moderate-income homeseekers."       Id. (quoting Havens,

455 U.S. at 379).     Thus, Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine made

clear that "an organization that has not suffered a concrete injury

caused by defendant's action cannot spend its way into standing

simply by expending money to gather information and advocate




                               - 16 -
against     the   defendant's    action.       An   organization    cannot

manufacture its own standing in that way."          Id. at 394.

            We do not think Appellants' alleged injury is analogous

to the harm present in Havens.       While it is true that HOME had to

expend more time and money to offset the impediment of Haven's

falsehood, the simple expenditure of resources did not establish

HOME's injury in fact for standing purposes.           Rather, the false

information caused a direct injury to HOME's ability to counsel

prospective tenants.      Id. at 395 ("[W]hen Havens gave HOME's

employees         false         information         about         apartment

availability . . . Havens's        actions     directly     affected    and

interfered with HOME's core business activities -- not dissimilar

to a retailer who sues a manufacturer for selling defective goods

to the retailer."). The additional expenses incurred were a result

of the injury, not the injury itself.         See Havens, 455 U.S. at 379

("[Havens'] steering practices have perceptibly impaired HOME's

ability to provide counseling and referral services . . . -- with

[a] consequent drain      on the organization's resources . . . ."

(emphasis added)).

            Here, however, the alleged injury is the additional

monetary and temporal costs that result from the Nondisclosure

Policy.     While the falsehood in Havens made HOME incapable of

providing housing counseling -- as it would be impossible for

HOME's employees to advise prospective tenants that apartments are


                                  - 17 -
available when, to their knowledge, they are not -- Appellants are

not similarly impeded.        Appellants' allegations make clear that

there are alternative avenues to secure the information needed for

their clients' legal representation.        Although the procedure may

be more tenuous than preferred, it is nonetheless a feature of the

battle    that   Appellants    have   volunteered   to   fight.    Thus,

Appellants' voluntary expenditures to "gather information and

advocate against the [government's] action" cannot serve as the

basis for an injury in fact.      All. for Hippocratic Med., 602 U.S.

at 394.

           Moreover, the Supreme Court characterized "Havens []as

an unusual case," and cautioned "not to extend the Havens holding

beyond its context."     Id. at 396.       We believe that Appellants'

rationale for standing would do just that.          It would expand the

meaning of "interfere[nce] with [] core business activities" to

encompass the routine costs that all lawyers bear when they

represent clients.     Id. at 395.     It is not sufficient to allege

that a challenged policy makes legal representation more costly.

All procedural rules, to the extent that they require a lawyer's

help to navigate, "cost money" and marginally "increase the time

the Plaintiff attorneys spend on each case."             It is similarly

insufficient to allege that a challenged policy constrains a firm's

ability to represent as many clients as it would like.            For a

lawyer with finite time and resources, all client engagements


                                  - 18 -
"prevent[]    [the   lawyer]   from    taking    on    additional      clients."

"Lawyers who devote their time to one case are unavailable for

others, and in deciding whether it is prudent to pursue a given

case   a     firm    must   decide     whether        the   cost -- including

opportunities foregone in some other case . . . -- is worthwhile."

Cent. States, Se. & Sw. Areas Pension Fund v. Cent. Cartage Co.,

76 F.3d 114, 116 (7th Cir. 1996).

           Havens' core-business-activities exception cannot mean

that any lawyer, law firm, or "organization that provides free

legal assistance" may assert organizational standing, in lieu of

representing    an    individual      plaintiff,      by    alleging    that   a

challenged policy increases the cost of representation or limits

the size of a client roster.           If such an "income" injury were

enough for Article III standing, a "medical malpractice attorney

could assert an abstract, generalized challenge to tort reform

statutes by asserting the rights of some hypothetical malpractice

victim (or victims) who might sue," or an "attorney specializing

in Social Security cases could challenge implementation of a new

regulation by asserting the rights of some hypothetical claimant

(or claimants)." Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125, 134 n.5 (2004).

A law firm could sue to vacate a newly enacted state law by alleging

that it increases the probability that favorable rulings in some

of the firm's existing fixed-fee engagements will be appealed.                 Or

a Second Amendment legal advocacy group could challenge a firearm


                                   - 19 -
ban in one state by alleging that the cost of helping its clients

comply with the ban in that state forces the group to divert

resources from providing similar help to clients in another state.

Or, finally, an attorney could "raise a rulemaking challenge

whenever an agency promulgates a regulation that could negatively

impact a client's ability to obtain benefits."            Mil.-Veterans

Advoc. v. Sec'y of Veterans Affs., 7 F.4th 1110, 1126 (Fed. Cir.

2021).

          This is not to say that a provider of legal services

never has standing to challenge a government policy on its own

behalf.   See, e.g., Marasco & Nesselbush, LLP v. Collins, 6 F.4th

150, 161 (1st Cir. 2021) (involving a law firm's challenge of a

Social Security Administration policy which hindered its ability

to collect payment for its services due to the "intricacies of the

SSA's procedures" for the disbursement of attorney's fees).         Nor

does this mean that lawyers are barred from suing to vindicate the

rights of third parties.        See, e.g., U.S. Dep't of Lab. v.

Triplett, 494 U.S. 715, 720 (1990) (concluding that an attorney

had third-party standing to challenge a provision of the Black

Lung Benefits Act of 1972 which prohibited the collection of

attorney's fees and failed to provide alternative means of attorney

compensation, thus "render[ing] claimants unable to obtain legal

representation   for   their   black   lung   claims").   Importantly,

however, enforcement of the challenged provisions in both of these


                                - 20 -
cases "directly affected and interfered with [the attorneys'] core

business activities."      All. for Hippocratic Med., 602 U.S. at 395

(emphasis added).     The same cannot be said of the Nondisclosure

Policy.

            In sum, if we accepted Appellants' theory of standing in

this case, it could functionally eliminate the Article III standing

requirements for any lawyer who seeks to invalidate a government

policy.     If a lawyer wished to package his disagreement with the

policy in a case or controversy, all he would have to do is

represent a client whom the policy regulates.             Then the lawyer

could walk into court, leave the client at the door, and claim for

his own sake that the policy makes it harder to represent the

client.     We do not think that this is what the Supreme Court had

in   mind   as   falling   within    Havens'   context.    Cf.   All.   for

Hippocratic Med., 602 U.S. at 396 (warning against extending Havens

"beyond its context").       Because we hold that Appellants do not

have standing to assert their claims, we need not reach the merits

of the same.

                             III. CONCLUSION

            For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the

district court.




                                    - 21 -

Our immigration lawyer assists clients in matters of this kind.


Neighbouring decisions

Preliminary case review

Send your documents. Receive an analysis.

Send us the documents in your case. Hassan KOHEN reviews them personally and sends you a first written analysis of your situation within 24 working hours.

  • Written analysis by the lawyer, €80 incl. VAT
  • Personal reply within 24 working hours
  • 100% confidential, legal professional privilege guaranteed
  • Up to 1 GB of documents in total, folders and sub-folders accepted
80 €incl. VAT

Preliminary review of your case. Review of your documents and a first written analysis by Hassan KOHEN within 24 working hours. Payment is made online after this form is submitted.

  • Up to 1 GB of documents in total, folders and sub-folders accepted
  • Secure payment, no card details stored
  • Terms and fee agreement

Click or drag your files here
All formats accepted (PDF, Word, images, etc.)

Sending...

Payment constitutes a request for immediate performance of your analysis. Your data is used solely to process your request.
Terms · Privacy policy.

IA juridique gratuite

Une question de droit ? Demandez à Judith.

Judith cherche dans les codes, la Constitution, la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme et les décisions des juges, puis vous montre les textes et les passages d’arrêts qui pourraient répondre à votre question, avec leur source officielle. Gratuite, sans compte, elle ne rédige rien à votre place. Découvrir Judith, l’IA juridique gratuite du cabinet.

Trois recherches par jour, sans compte. Votre question est enregistrée et relue par le cabinet pour améliorer l’outil : n’y mettez ni nom ni information sensible.