Miscellaneous Etats-Unis

Corewell Health William Beaumont University Hospital v. Kennedy

Official source
                            UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                            FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA


COREWELL HEALTH WILLIAM
BEAUMONT UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL,

              Plaintiff,

       v.                                             Civil Action No. 1:26-cv-03111 (CJN)

ROBERT F. KENNEDY JR.,
in his official capacity as Secretary, U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services,
et al.,

              Defendants.


                                  MEMORANDUM OPINION

        Since 2019, Corewell Health William Beaumont University Hospital has purchased drugs

from manufacturers at significantly discounted prices through the Section 340B program, a

statutory scheme administered by the Health Resources and Services Administration (“HRSA”).

Between 2024 and early 2026, Beaumont also qualified as a disproportionate share hospital

(“DSH”) for discounts on drugs designated for rare diseases or conditions—so-called “Orphan

Drugs.” But in January 2026, Beaumont feared that it no longer met the statutory criteria to qualify

as a DSH. To avoid losing access to Section 340B pricing altogether, it changed its designation

from a DSH back to a rural referral center (“RRC”) through HRSA’s centralized system. When

Beaumont later determined that its concern was unfounded, it sought to be re-registered as a DSH,

but HRSA permits registration only once per quarter and registration is prospective only (e.g.,

registration in January takes effect in April). Beaumont therefore lost access to discounted Orphan

Drugs for the second and third quarters of this year. Sure that this registration process is unlawful,

Beaumont moves for a preliminary injunction reinstating its access to those discounts. The


                                                  1
government opposes relief and moves to dismiss Beaumont’s claims for lack of Article III

standing.

       Although Beaumont does have standing, it has failed to show that it faces irreparable harm

absent relief and the other factors do not weigh strongly in favor of an injunction. The Court

therefore denies Beaumont’s motion.

                                       I.      Background

A.     Legal Background

       Section 340B of the Public Health Service Act caps the prices that drug manufacturers may

charge for medications sold to certain healthcare providers. See Astra USA, Inc. v. Santa Clara

County, 

563 U.S. 110, 113

 (2011); 42 U.S.C. § 256b. In exchange for Medicaid reimbursement,

drug manufacturers agree to provide “covered outpatient drugs” at discounted prices to “covered

entit[ies].” 42 U.S.C. §256b(a)(1); see also Novartis Pharms. Corp. v. Johnson, 

102 F.4th 452,

455

 (D.C. Cir. 2024). “Covered entit[ies]” are limited to certain “healthcare providers that fit

within narrow categories.” Novartis, 

102 F.4th at 456

 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 256b(a)(4)). Two of

those categories are relevant here: those known as disproportionate share hospitals (“DSHs”) and

rural referral centers (“RRCs”). See 42 U.S.C. § 256b(a)(4)(L), (O).

       A healthcare provider qualifies as a DSH, if, among other things, it “had a disproportionate

share adjustment percentage . . . greater than 11.75 percent” in its last cost reporting period. Id.

§ 256b(a)(4)(L). (The disproportionate share adjustment percentage relates to the number of low-

income patients treated by the healthcare provider. See id.; 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(d)(5)(F).) A

provider is an RRC if, inter alia, its disproportionate share adjustment percentage in its last cost

reporting period was “equal to or greater than 8 percent.” 42 U.S.C. § 256b(a)(4)(O). Both

providers who qualify as RRCs and providers who qualify as DSHs may participate in the

Section 340B program, but the statute excludes RRCs from receiving discounted prices on so-


                                                 2
called “Orphan Drugs”—which are designated under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act

as drugs for a rare disease or condition. See id. § 256b(e).

       Although Congress did not give the Secretary of Health and Human Services general

“rulemaking authority over the [S]ection 340B program,” Novartis, 

102 F.4th at 456

, it did task

the Secretary with facilitating certain aspects of it, and the Secretary delegated his responsibilities

to HRSA, see Astra USA, 

563 U.S. at 113

. As relevant here, HRSA administers a Section 340B

registration and pricing database known as the 340B Office of Pharmacy Affairs Information

System (OPAIS). See ECF No. 1 (“Compl.”) ¶ 50. Healthcare providers who qualify and wish to

participate in the Section 340B program register with HRSA through OPAIS.                    Id. ¶ 51.

Registration is open between the first and fifteenth day of the first month of each quarter (January,

April, July, and October). See 

77 Fed. Reg. 43342

, 43343 (July 24, 2012). A “hospital’s eligibility

status is prospective only,” Univ. Med. Ctr. of S. Nev. v. Shalala, 

173 F.3d 438, 439

 (D.C.

Cir. 1999), meaning it becomes effective the quarter following registration, see Compl. ¶ 56.

Registration in April, for instance, takes effect in July. If a healthcare provider qualifies for more

than one type of covered entity, HRSA requires the provider to choose just one and register as a

single category. Id. ¶ 59. Providers must report any changes in their eligibility immediately

through OPAIS. Id. ¶ 60.

B.     Factual and Procedural Background

       Beaumont is a private nonprofit hospital located in suburban Detroit. Compl. ¶ 1. For the

years 2019 through 2023, Beaumont registered and purchased drugs through the Section 340B

program as an RRC. See ECF No. 28-2 (“Schaible Decl.”) ¶ 6. Starting in 2024, Beaumont also

met the qualifications to participate in Section 340B as a DSH, and it changed its registration in

January 2024. Id. ¶¶ 8–10. That meant starting April 1, 2024, Beaumont could purchase Orphan




                                                  3
Drugs at discounted prices, something it could not do as an RRC. Id. ¶ 10; see also 42 U.S.C.

§ 256b(e).

        Then, in January 2026, Beaumont identified a possibility that its disproportionate share

adjustment percentage would fall below 11.75 percent in its 2025 cost reporting period, meaning

the hospital would no longer qualify as a DSH. See Schaible Decl. ¶ 17. To ensure no interruption

in its Section 340B participation if those projections proved to be true, Beaumont applied to

register as an RRC on January 14. Id. ¶ 18. HRSA approved Beaumont’s registration, and

Beaumont’s RRC status became effective on April 1, 2026. Id. ¶ 19. It therefore no longer

qualified to purchase discounted Orphan Drugs.

        Beaumont realized in early April that its projections were overly pessimistic; its

disproportionate share adjustment percentage turned out to have been higher than 11.75 percent.

Id. ¶ 21. Beaumont then applied to re-register as a DSH on April 15, 2026, intending to regain

DSH status as of July 1, 2026. Id. ¶ 22. On April 17, HRSA informed Beaumont that its

application was incomplete, and that it should reply with the required documentation by April 22.

Id. ¶¶ 25–26. After uploading the documents, Beaumont received a notification from OPAIS

explaining that its application had nonetheless been rejected because Beaumont had failed to

include an attestation from its authorizing official. Id. ¶¶ 30–31. As a result, Beaumont had to

reapply for DSH status during the July enrollment period, which became effective October 1, 2026.

See id. ¶ 35.

        On September 3, 2026, Beaumont brought claims against HHS and HRSA under the

Administrative Procedure Act, 

5 U.S.C. § 700

 et seq., alleging that the registration requirements

that caused Beaumont to lose its DSH status between April 1 and October 1 are unlawful. See

generally Compl. Beaumont simultaneously filed a motion for preliminary injunction, asking the




                                                 4
Court to order HRSA to reinstate Beaumont’s DSH status as of April 1. See generally ECF No. 28-

1 (“Pl. Mot.”). Beaumont claims that during the six months that it was registered as an RRC rather

than a DSH, it lost millions of dollars because it could not purchase Orphan Drugs at discounted

prices, see ECF No. 28-3 (“Field Decl. I”) ¶ 12; ECF No. 21-1 (“Field Decl. II”) ¶ 6; 42 U.S.C.

§ 265b(e), which then forced it to divert financial resources away from other priorities like hiring

pharmacy staff and an oncology program that treats patients using Orphan Drugs, see Field Decl. I

¶¶ 14–17.

        In its motion, Beaumont seeks reinstatement of its DSH status so that it can try to recoup

at least some of its lost savings from the drug manufacturers through so-called “credit-and-rebill”

transactions.   Id. ¶ 20.   If HRSA revises the dates of Beaumont’s DSH status in OPAIS,

manufacturers may reimburse Beaumont what it paid above the Section 340B price. Id. ¶ 21. But

the opportunity to seek credit-and-rebill is apparently fleeting; manufacturers impose deadlines

after which providers can no longer seek reimbursement, typically one, three, six, nine, or twelve

months after the initial sale. See id.

        The government opposes Beaumont’s motion, and itself moves to dismiss on the theory

that Beaumont lacks Article III standing. See ECF No. 20 (“Def. Mot. & Opp. Br.”).

                                         II.   Legal Standard

        To obtain the “extraordinary remedy” of a preliminary injunction, Cobell v. Norton, 

391

F.3d 251, 258

 (D.C. Cir. 2004), a plaintiff must show “that he is likely to succeed on the merits,

that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of

equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest,” Winter v. Nat’l Res. Def.

Council, Inc., 

555 U.S. 7, 20

 (2008). Where, as here, the government is the opposing party, “[t]he

balance-of-equities and public-interest factors merge.” Glob. Health Council v. Trump, 

153 F.4th

1

, 12 (D.C. Cir. 2025).


                                                   5
        The plaintiff “bear[s] the burden of persuasion on all four preliminary injunction factors.”

Open Top Sightseeing USA v. Mr. Sightseeing, LLC, 

48 F. Supp. 3d 87, 90

 (D.D.C. 2014).

Likelihood of success on the merits is a “key issue,” and “there is no need to consider the remaining

factors” when a plaintiff fails to make that showing. Greater New Orleans Fair Hous. Action Ctr.

v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urb. Dev., 

639 F.3d 1078, 1083, 1088

 (D.C. Cir. 2011). The same goes

for irreparable harm: A “failure to show a likelihood of irreparable harm [is], standing alone,

sufficient to defeat the motion.” Navajo Nation v. Azar, 

292 F. Supp. 3d 508, 512

 (D.D.C. 2018);

see also Chaplaincy of Full Gospel Churches v. England, 

454 F.3d 290, 297

 (D.C. Cir. 2006)

(explaining that “failure to show any irreparable harm” alone is reason enough to deny a

preliminary injunction).

        “To survive a motion to dismiss for lack of standing, a complaint must state a plausible

claim that the plaintiff has suffered an injury in fact fairly traceable to the actions of the defendant

that is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision on the merits.” Humane Soc’y of the U.S. v.

Vilsack, 

797 F.3d 4, 8

 (D.C. Cir. 2015). The Court must “accept facts alleged in the complaint as

true and draw all reasonable inferences” in the plaintiff’s favor, 

id.,

 but the Court may also consider

materials outside of the complaint, Food & Water Watch, Inc. v. Vilsack, 

808 F.3d 905, 913

 (D.C.

Cir. 2015).

                                           III.    Analysis

        Beaumont contends that HRSA’s registration requirements for covered entities are

unlawful under the APA because (1) nothing in the text of Section 340B gives HRSA the authority

to enforce its registration scheme, and (2) its requirements are arbitrary and capricious. See

generally Pl. Mot. The hospital argues that, without a preliminary injunction ordering HRSA to

retroactively reinstate its DSH status as of April 1, it will suffer irreparable harm because the

opportunity to seek reimbursement from drug manufacturers is limited. See 

id.

 at 31–36. For the


                                                   6
reasons discussed below, the Court concludes that Beaumont has failed to demonstrate it will suffer

irreparable harm absent relief (and the other Winter factors do not weigh decisively in Beaumont’s

favor).

A.        Although Beaumont Has Standing, It Fails to Show Irreparable Harm.

          The Court begins with Article III standing and irreparable harm. Although the former is

relevant to the merits inquiry (because Beaumont must show it likely has standing to show it is

likely to succeed on the merits), here the concepts are related and so the Court takes up the standing

question first.

          1.      Beaumont Has Article III Standing.

          The government argues that Beaumont lacks standing because its injuries are not “fairly

traceable” to HRSA’s registration requirements. Humane Soc’y of the U.S. v. Vilsack, 

797 F.3d 4,

8

 (D.C. Cir. 2015); see also Def. Mot. & Opp. Br. at 11–12. According to the government, because

Beaumont voluntarily applied to change its status from DSH to RRC in January, and then failed to

attach the attestation to its application, it is Beaumont (and not HRSA’s registration scheme) that

is to blame for its loss of DSH status and savings on Orphan Drugs. See Def. Mot. & Opp. Br. at

11–12. For the purposes of standing, an injury is self-inflicted “where the plaintiff’s claimed injury

[i]s clearly independent of agency action,” Scahill v. District of Columbia, 

271 F. Supp. 3d 216,

230

 (D.D.C. 2017), aff’d, 

909 F.3d 1177

 (D.C. Cir. 2018), and that is not clearly the case here.

Assuming the merits of Beaumont’s allegations in its complaint, which the Court must do, see In

re Navy Chaplaincy, 

534 F.3d 756, 760

 (D.C. Cir. 2008), Beaumont’s loss of DSH status would

not have occurred but for HRSA’s quarterly registration scheme and its requirement that providers

register as just one type of covered entity, see Compl. ¶¶ 59–61, 66–70. Put differently, but for

HRSA’s allegedly unlawful actions, even with its own independent decisions, Beaumont would




                                                  7
have been treated as a DSH beginning on April 1, 2026, and it would not have lost the discounted

prices for Orphan Drugs over the next six months.

       The government also contends that Beaumont’s injury is not redressable because relief

depends on future third-party conduct, i.e., the manufacturers honoring the credit-and-rebill

transactions. To show redressability in circumstances involving third-party conduct, the plaintiff

must prove a “substantial likelihood” that the third party will act as expected. Competitive Enter.

Inst. v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 

970 F.3d 372, 384

 (D.C. Cir. 2020); see also Waterkeeper All.,

Inc. v. Regan, 

41 F.4th 654, 660

 (D.C. Cir. 2022). Contrary to the government’s view, Beaumont

has done so here by asserting in a sworn declaration that it has a contractual right to seek credits

for prior purchases under its agreements with manufacturers. See Field Decl. II ¶ 4.

       The government relies on University Medical Center of Southern Nevada v. Shalala, a case

in which a hospital similarly sought reinstatement of its covered entity status under Section 340B

to obtain retroactive discounts from manufacturers. See 

173 F.3d 438

, 440 (D.C. Cir. 1999). The

Court of Appeals held that the hospital had not shown redressability because “the retroactive

discounts apparently depend[ed] on whether the manufacturers—who [we]re not parties to th[e]

action—could be persuaded to pay them.” Id. at 441–42. But the court went on to say that “[i]f it

could be said that UMC was legally entitled to get the discounts . . . then we might have a different

situation.” Id. at 442. That “different situation” is presented here, where Beaumont says just that.

       2.      Beaumont Has Not Shown Irreparable Harm.

       Although Beaumont has Article III standing, it has failed to show irreparable harm. Its

claimed harm is, at bottom, a financial loss: Beaumont paid millions of dollars more for Orphan

Drugs than it otherwise would have between April 1 and October 1. Economic harm, however,

generally cannot constitute irreparable harm unless “the loss threatens the very existence of the

movant’s business.” Wis. Gas Co. v. FERC, 

758 F.2d 669

, 674 (D.C. Cir. 1985); see also id. (“It


                                                 8
is . . . well settled that economic loss does not, in and of itself, constitute irreparable harm.”)

Beaumont makes no claim that its loss is so dire, and it otherwise fails to show why its economic

loss rises to the level of irreparable harm.

        As an initial matter, the nature of Beaumont’s economic harm is mismatched to the types

of harms preliminary injunctions are typically intended to address. Successful plaintiffs show that

“irreparable injury is ‘likely’ to occur” by providing either “proof that the harm has occurred in

the past and is likely to occur again, or proof indicating that the harm is certain to occur in the near

future.” Id. at 674. In other words, the injury is “of such imminence that there is a ‘clear and

present’ need for equitable relief to prevent irreparable harm.” Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting

Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 

409 F.Supp. 297, 307

 (D.D.C. 1976)). Here, because

Beaumont has had DSH status since October 1, it argues neither that its previous overpayment for

Orphan Drugs is likely to occur again nor that a new overpayment will happen soon. In that sense,

Beaumont’s injury has no imminence at all—it is complete. 1 To be sure, Beaumont argues that

those overpayments forced it to make changes to its operations and staffing. But those decisions

were also made in the past, and because such changes could follow any financial hit to a business,

that alone cannot turn past monetary losses into imminent harm.

        Perhaps because of its unusual position, Beaumont hangs its case for irreparable harm on

the fact that those losses will be unrecoverable if manufacturers’ lookback periods expire before

Beaumont gets relief. See Pl. Opp. & Reply Br. at 21–22. Although economic loss generally does

not constitute irreparable harm absent dire circumstances, some courts have held that “a lesser



1
  This is evident in one of Beaumont’s supporting declarations, which says that the preliminary
injunction would allow the hospital to “mitigate the financial losses” it incurred. Field Decl. II
¶ 13 (emphasis added). Preliminary injunctive relief is generally intended to prevent harm, not
mitigate it.



                                                   9
showing is permissible when the economic injury at issue is unrecoverable.” Whitman-Walker

Clinic, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., 

485 F. Supp. 3d 1

, 58 (D.D.C. 2020). It is true

that Beaumont cannot recover monetary damages from HRSA under the APA, and Beaumont

otherwise assumes HRSA has sovereign immunity for other claims it might assert. But stepping

back, Beaumont’s contention that its overpayments are (or will be) unrecoverable is in some

tension with its stance for the purposes of standing that it will be able to recover the funds from

manufacturers. As the Court explained above, Beaumont has demonstrated that at least some of

the funds are recoverable, even if the period in which that is true may be shrinking. 2

       But even assuming that Beaumont’s funds would be largely unrecoverable absent an

injunction, the hospital still cannot meet the “high standard for irreparable injury.” Chaplaincy of

Full Gospel Churches v. England, 

454 F.3d 290, 297

 (D.C. Cir. 2006).               First, Beaumont

erroneously suggests that the irreparable harm factor is automatically met when financial losses

are unrecoverable. Pl. Opp. & Reply Br. at 21–22. The “inability to recover economic losses can

more accurately be considered as a factor in determining whether the movant has shown irreparable

harm.” ConverDyn v. Moniz, 

68 F. Supp. 3d 34, 49

 (D.D.C. 2014). After all, if Beaumont was

right, “a litigant seeking injunctive relief against the government would always satisfy the

irreparable injury prong,” effectively “nullifying that requirement.” Id.; see also Air Transp. Ass’n

of Am., Inc. v. Exp.-Imp. Bank of the U.S., 

840 F. Supp. 2d 327, 335

 (D.D.C. 2012) (explaining

that unrecoverable damages are not irreparable per se because “[a]ny movant that could show any



2
  The government argues that Beaumont’s waiting until September 3, 2026 to file its complaint
and motion for preliminary injunction in this case weighs against a finding of irreparable harm.
See Def. Mot. & Opp. Br. at 24; see Mylan Pharms., Inc. v. Shalala, 

81 F. Supp. 2d 30, 43

(D.D.C. 2000) (finding that “delay in bringing th[e] action further undercuts” the plaintiff’s
“allegation of irreparable harm”). While Beaumont surely would have benefitted by bringing its
claims earlier, the Court does not rest its irreparable harm analysis on that fact.



                                                 10
damages against an agency with sovereign immunity—even as little as $1—would satisfy the

standard”). That Beaumont’s “economic losses may be unrecoverable does not absolve” the

hospital “from its ‘considerable burden’ of proving that those losses are ‘certain, great and

actual.’” Nat’l Mining Ass’n v. Jackson, 

768 F. Supp. 2d 34, 52

 (D.D.C. 2011) (emphasis in

original) (quoting Power Mobility Coal. v. Leavitt, 

404 F. Supp. 2d 190, 204

 (D.D.C. 2005)).

Unlike for Article III standing, under which Beaumont need only show, say, $1 of harm, Beaumont

must show that its economic harm absent an injunction, even if unrecoverable, will be

“significant.” Air Transp. Ass’n, 

840 F. Supp. 2d at 335

. And to do so it must “adequately describe

and quantify the level of harm” that it faces. 

Id.

 at 336 (quoting Nat’l Ass’n of Mortg. Brokers v.

Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys., 

773 F. Supp. 2d 151, 181

 (D.D.C. 2011)).

       The government argues that Beaumont fails to offer specific evidence to support a showing

of certain, great, and actual losses absent a preliminary injunction, see ECF No. 26 (“Def. Reply

Br.”) at 9, and the Court agrees. “Conjecture and ‘vague and unsupported’ assertions of harm are

not sufficient.” Jones v. District of Columbia, 

177 F. Supp. 3d 542, 548

 (D.D.C. 2016) (quoting

Brodie v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., 

715 F. Supp. 2d 74, 84

 (D.D.C. 2010)). Beaumont

has failed to adequately explain how its millions of dollars in lost Section 340B savings, see Field

Decl. I ¶ 12; Field Decl. II ¶ 6, lead to a present threat of irreparable harm. Beaumont asserts that

it “has identified numerous historical transactions” and “a significant percentage of the orphan

drug purchases” during the relevant “period that would qualify for credit-and-rebill under its

agreements with” manufacturers. Field Decl. II ¶¶ 6, 8. But the hospital does not say what portion

of the millions of dollars in losses is encompassed by those transactions. While the hospital does

state that manufacturers’ lookback periods are “typically one, three, six, nine, or twelve months,”

Field Decl. I ¶ 21, it does not specify which of those periods actually applies to the transactions




                                                 11
occurring in the six-month period here.        Based on Beaumont’s evidence, the Court is left

wondering whether $5,000, $500,000, or $5 million is still eligible for reimbursement. And

critically, Beaumont does not offer any evidence to show how its millions in losses (or however

much is still recoupable) actually affect its bottom line, e.g., what percentage of its annual revenues

the losses constitute. 3

        Lastly, Beaumont asserts that its employees “have expended considerable time and effort

securing alternative funding sources, assessing clinically appropriate therapeutic alternatives, and

implementing cost-containment measures to manage the higher acquisition costs of Orphan

Drugs.” Field Decl. I ¶ 13. But the hospital does not specify how much alternative funding it

secured. That would affect whether Beaumont will suffer future irreparable harm absent relief,

and it is yet another loose end that Beaumont has left untied. It is Beaumont’s burden to

demonstrate that its harm in the absence of a preliminary injunction will be “significant,” Air

Transp. Ass’n, 

840 F. Supp. 2d at 335

, and it has failed to do so here. 4

B.      The Likelihood of Success on the Merits Factor Does Not Outweigh Beaumont’s
        Failure to Show Irreparable Harm.

        While Beaumont’s motion for a preliminary injunction fails for lack of irreparable harm,

the Court also addresses the three other Winter factors. To start, Beaumont’s likelihood of success




3
 Beaumont does offer evidence that Corewell, the nonprofit health system to which Beaumont
Hospital belongs, laudably devoted more than $1.3 billion in 2024 to community benefit programs.
See Field Decl. I ¶ 7.
4
  Beaumont also asserts reputational injury: its loss of savings “threatens lasting damage to [its]
reputation and the goodwill it has developed with patients, referring physicians, and the
communities that rely on its services.” Pl. Mot. at 34. But that alleged reputational harm is entirely
dependent on how much money Beaumont stands to lose in the absence of a preliminary injunction,
and for the reasons described, Beaumont fails to meet its burden to show that amount is “great.”
Nat’l Mining Ass’n, 

768 F. Supp. 2d at 52

.



                                                  12
on the merits presents a close question that does not militate strongly in favor of granting a

preliminary injunction.

        1.      HRSA’s Quarterly Delay in Registration May Be Unlawful, But It Is a Close
                Question.

        Beaumont contends that HRSA’s refusal to recognize the hospital as a DSH between

April 1 and October 1 is unlawful because HRSA lacks the statutory authority to impose its

prospective registration scheme, which includes a three-month delay between registration and

effective date. See Pl. Mot. at 17–25. In Beaumont’s view, once a healthcare provider satisfies

the statutory criteria to be a covered entity, HRSA has no authority to withhold Section 340B

pricing for a quarter or more. 

Id.

 As a result, the hospital contends, HRSA acted in excess of its

statutory authority by denying Beaumont DSH status between April 1 and October 1 even while

Beaumont met all statutory criteria. 

Id.


        To support its view, Beaumont starts by pointing out that, of the requirements that

Section 340B expressly imposes on covered entities, none expressly grants the agency authority

to make prospective registration a condition of participating in the Section 340B program. 

Id.

 at

19–20. In addition to the threshold DSH eligibility requirements (e.g., a disproportionate share

adjustment percentage greater than 11.75 percent in the last cost reporting period, 42 U.S.C.

§ 256b(a)(4)(L)), Section 340B requires covered entities to refrain from “resell[ing] or otherwise

transfer[ring] the drug to a person who is not a patient of the entity” and double dipping, i.e., taking

“duplicate discounts” by “receiving the [S]ection 340B discount on drugs also subject to a

Medicaid rebate.” Novartis Pharms. Corp. v. Johnson, 

102 F.4th 452, 456

 (D.C. Cir. 2024) (citing

42 U.S.C. § 256b(a)(5)(A)(i), (a)(5)(B)). According to Beaumont, Congress imposed those three

requirements at the exclusion of all others. Pl. Mot. at 19–20. Nothing, it says, permits HRSA to




                                                  13
withhold covered entity status for three months or more for lack of registration from otherwise

qualifying providers.

       The government counters that its registration requirement is a procedural mechanism that

is necessarily implied by the agency’s powers under Section 340B. Def. Mot. & Opp. Br. at 13–

19. It principally relies on Section 340B(a)(9), which mandates that the agency “notify [drug]

manufacturers . . . of the identities of covered entities under this paragraph, and of entities that no

longer meet the requirements [prohibiting resale and duplicate discounts] or that are no longer

certified pursuant to paragraph (7).” 42 U.S.C. § 256b(a)(9). To identify covered entities and

inform manufacturers of providers that no longer meet the covered entity requirements, the

government argues, HRSA must have some way to know which providers intend to participate in

Section 340B and which of those are eligible to participate. See Def. Mot. & Opp. Br. at 14. In

the government’s view, some type of up-front registration is therefore necessary, and its quarterly

scheme “is simply the procedural mechanism the agency has selected to facilitate providers’ opting

in to participation.” Id. at 16; see also id. at 13–14 (“[I]t is a ‘very basic tenet of administrative

law that agencies should be free to fashion their own rules of procedure.” (quoting Vt. Yankee

Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 

435 U.S. 519, 544

 (1978))). And the

government rejects Beaumont’s argument that the three-month delay is a substantive requirement

imposed on providers, arguing that “[a] requirement governing the means by which a regulated

party avails itself of a statutory scheme is classically procedural.” Def. Mot. & Opp. Br. at 16.

       The government is correct that HRSA’s responsibilities under Section 340B necessarily

imply that it must have the authority to verify that participating healthcare providers meet all

statutory requirements. Beaumont does not disagree. At oral argument, counsel for Beaumont

explained that the hospital does not challenge HRSA’s authority to evaluate whether a healthcare




                                                  14
provider meets the requirements for DSH status at some point. See ECF No. 27 (“Oct. 19, 2026

Hearing Tr.”) 7:3–18. Beaumont thus does not necessarily take issue with registration itself, but

rather with HRSA’s imposing a three-month delay after registration before covered entity status

becomes effective. 

Id.

 Thus, the question is whether HRSA has the authority to use its prospective

registration to withhold covered entity status from an otherwise qualified healthcare provider for

at least three months.

       That is a difficult and close question, although Beaumont’s view of the statute has

significant force. The hospital points to a recent decision by another judge of this Court holding

that HRSA lacked authority to condition participation in the Section 340B program on registration

for offsite facilities of qualified hospitals. See Albany Med. Health Sys. v. Health Res. and Servs.

Admin., No. 1:23-cv-03252, 

2026 WL 592593

, at *7–10 (D.D.C. Mar. 3, 2026).                The court

concluded that nothing in the text of Section 340B “allow[s] HRSA to delay a statutorily qualified

child site from 340B participation until the agency has signed off on eligibility. That is a

precondition that finds no basis in the statutory text.” Id. at *9.

       Here, that would mean that Section 340B does not authorize HRSA to delay a provider’s

DSH status for a quarter or more while the statutory criteria are otherwise met. That view is

supported by Section 340B’s expressly including agency certification for certain covered entities,

but not DSHs. In particular, certain healthcare providers receiving government funding related to

treatment of HIV, sexually transmitted diseases, or tuberculosis may qualify for covered entity

status “only if the entity is certified by the Secretary.” 42 U.S.C. § 256b(a)(4)(J)–(K), (a)(7)

(emphasis added). The statute’s use of “certify” suggests that, for those categories of entities, the

agency has some authority over when those providers obtain covered entity status. The verb

“identify,” in the provision on which the government relies here, may not confer the same power.




                                                  15
       Beaumont’s take is further bolstered by the responsibilities that Congress expressly gave

the agency under Section 340B, which concern identification and verification of covered entity

status rather than gatekeeping. Each relevant responsibility requires that the agency determine

whether the healthcare provider is eligible for covered entity status when it submits its information,

but none necessarily permits the agency to delay when that status takes effect. For instance,

Congress tasked the Secretary with “[t]he development of procedures to enable and require

covered entities to regularly update (at least annually) the information on the [agency’s website]

relating to this section,” id. § 256b(d)(2)(B)(i), and the agency must “verify the accuracy of [that]

information,” id. § 256b(d)(2)(B)(ii). Section 340B further requires HRSA to make available

online “the applicable ceiling prices for covered outpatient drugs . . . in a manner (such as through

the use of password protection) that limits such access to covered entities and adequately assures

security . . . .” 5 Id. § 256b(d)(1)(B)(iii). HRSA could satisfy its obligations under each of these

provisions without a three-month delay in qualification.

       On the other hand, even if Beaumont is right that Section 340B does not permit HRSA to

delay the effective date of an otherwise eligible provider’s DSH status, the statute does not

necessarily require the agency to permit access to Section 340B pricing without successful



5
  The government contends that Congress ratified HRSA’s registration scheme when it amended
Section 340B in 2010. Def. Mot. & Opp. Br. at 15. It is true that, in some circumstances,
Congress’s later amendments may bless an agency’s interpretation of a statute. See Ardelyx, Inc.
v. Kennedy, 

179 F.4th 947

, 960 (D.C. Cir. 2026) (“When Congress revisits a statute giving rise to
a longstanding administrative interpretation without pertinent change, the congressional failure to
revise or repeal the agency’s interpretation is persuasive evidence that the interpretation is the one
intended by Congress.” (quoting CFTC v. Schor, 

478 U.S. 833, 846

 (1986))). But that is not
necessarily the case here. Unlike in Ardelyx, where Congress “expressly acknowledged” the
agency’s interpretation in subsequent enactments, 

id.,

 Congress here said nothing about HRSA’s
registration scheme. Instead, Congress tasked the agency with additional responsibilities like
“verify[ing] the accuracy of” providers’ information, language that does not strongly endorse the
agency’s ability to delay the effective date of status.



                                                 16
registration in OPAIS. For example, it may be consistent with the statute for HRSA to continue

to require healthcare providers to wait to purchase Section 340B drugs until they are approved by

the agency, perhaps so long as the effective date of their covered entity status is backdated to the

date on which they applied. 6 To be sure, that reading may be at odds with the decision in Albany,

which seems to say that access to Section 340B pricing should be automatic as soon as the

healthcare provider meets—or believes it meets—the statutory criteria. See 

2026 WL 592593

, at

*10. But automatic access makes more sense in the context of offsite facilities of hospitals already

participating in the Section 340B program than hospitals themselves. Here, it is hard to imagine

that Section 340B requires manufacturers to sell drugs at discounted prices to any hospital that

simply declares itself eligible. HRSA could not fulfill its express duty to limit disclosure of

discounted prices to covered entities only (through means like password protection), see 42 U.S.C.

§ 256b(d)(1)(B)(iii), if entities had the right to just knock on the manufacturers’ doors.

       But the government’s view that HRSA’s scheme is a procedural rule rather than a

substantive requirement also has some force. “In general, a procedural rule ‘does not itself alter

the rights or interests of parties, although it may alter the manner in which the parties present

themselves or their viewpoints to the agency.’” Elec. Priv. Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland

Sec., 

653 F.3d 1, 5

 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (quoting Chamber of Com. of U.S. v. U.S. Dep’t of Lab., 

174

F.3d 206, 211

 (D.C. Cir. 1999)). And HRSA does not appear to require healthcare providers to

submit any information through OPAIS that goes beyond or “alters” the eligibility requirements

listed in the statute. In that sense at least, quarterly registration is not an additional requirement

but simply the way the agency decided it was best for healthcare providers to “present themselves”


6
  Beaumont acknowledges that the flipside could be true: The agency could retroactively revoke
a healthcare provider’s DSH status if it later discovered the provider did not actually meet the
eligibility requirements. See Oct. 19, 2026 Hearing Tr. 6:11–18.



                                                 17
for participation in the Section 340B program. 

Id.

 That the agency may need to use a quarterly

system to, say, manage the volume of applications, does not strike the Court as unreasonable. At

the very least, for the purposes of granting the “extraordinary remedy” of a preliminary injunction,

Cobell v. Norton, 

391 F.3d 251, 258

 (D.C. Cir. 2004), the Court cannot conclude that Beaumont

is very “likely” to demonstrate that HRSA’s prospective registration regime is a substantive barrier

to covered entity status rather than a reasonable procedural mechanism.

       2.      HRSA’s Denial of Beaumont’s Registration Because It Failed to Submit Its
               Attestation Within Five Days Was Not Arbitrary and Capricious.

       Beaumont next argues that HRSA’s denial of its registration in April because of its failure

to submit the required attestation within five days was arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of

discretion. Pl. Mot. at 25–31. Its arguments here are less compelling.

       Beaumont contends that denying its application for DSH status was arbitrary and

capricious because the attestation requirement and five-day deadline are not found in the text of

Section 340B. Pl. Mot. at 27–29. The Court has little trouble concluding, however, that the

attestation and a five-day response deadline are procedural rules that reasonably arise out of the

agency’s power to verify the eligibility of covered entities. HRSA is “free to fashion” such

procedural rules to carry out its statutory duties. Vt. Yankee, 

435 U.S. at 544

. And Beaumont has

failed to show that it was arbitrary or capricious for the agency to rely on the hospital’s violation

of these procedural rules to deny its application. A rule can be procedural even if “failure to

observe it might cause the loss of substantive rights.” JEM Broad. Co. v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n,

22 F.3d 320, 327

 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (quoting Ranger v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 

294 F.2d 240

, 244

(D.C. Cir. 1961)). Plus, Beaumont makes no case for why a five-day response deadline in

particular is unreasonable.




                                                 18
       Beaumont also claims that HRSA acted arbitrarily and capriciously for rejecting its

application for lack of attestation when the agency had evidence from previous filings that could

have established Beaumont’s DSH eligibility. Pl. Mot. at 29–30. But healthcare providers’

eligibility can change over time, which means that historical submissions cannot substitute for

evidence of current status. For instance, private nonprofit hospitals that wish to participate as a

DSH must have “a contract with a State or local government to provide health care services to low

income individuals,” 42 U.S.C. § 256b(a)(4)(L)(i), and the government notes that a provider’s

contract with the state could be many years old, see Def. Reply Br. at 3. In that case, a recent

attestation may be the only proof that the contract is still in effect. That previous submissions may

not reflect a provider’s current status is further illustrated by Beaumont’s own concern in January

that it might lose DSH status in 2026 due to its 2025 cost reporting. See Schaible Decl. ¶ 17.

Beaumont fails to persuade the Court that an attestation is not a reasonable way to confirm that a

provider’s documentation is accurate and up to date.

C.     The Balance of Equities and Public Interest Factors Also Do Not Militate in Favor
       of Granting an Injunction.

       Neither the balance of equities nor the public interest, which merge here because the

government is a party, see Glob. Health Council v. Trump, 

153 F.4th 1

, 12 (D.C. Cir. 2025), work

strongly in Beaumont’s favor. “There is generally no public interest in the perpetuation of

unlawful agency action,” League of Women Voters of U.S. v. Newby, 

838 F.3d 1, 12

 (D.C. Cir.

2016), but as discussed, it is not clear that HRSA’s actions were unlawful. As for the balance of

equities, while there might be little harm to HRSA from an order directing it to reinstate

Beaumont’s DSH status, Beaumont has also failed to establish it will suffer significant irreparable

harm absent such an order. This factor is at best a wash.




                                                 19
                                      IV.    Conclusion

       For the foregoing reasons, the Court denies both Beaumont’s Motion for Preliminary

Injunction, ECF No. 28, and the government’s Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 20. The Court will

issue an order contemporaneously with this decision.


DATE: October 29, 2026
                                                          CARL J NICHOLS
                                                          United States District Judge




                                              20

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