Miscellaneous Etats-Unis

Bachman v. Murphy

Official source
      IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

KENNETH BACHMAN AKA                     )
KENNETH PETRINI,                        )
                                        )
              Plaintiff,                )
                                        )
       v.                               )       C.A. No: S26C-02-037 MHC
                                        )
TAYLOR RENE MURPHY,                     )
                                        )
              Defendant.                )
                                        )
                                        )


                            OPINION AND ORDER
                           Submitted: September 1, 2026
                            Decided: October 29, 2026




Upon consideration of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Superior Court
                          Rule 12(b)(6), GRANTED




Kenneth Bachman, Pro Se.


Jackson W. Zolper, Esquire, Abram, Gulab & Hutchinson, Attorney for Defendant.




CONNER, J.
                                INTRODUCTION
      Before the Court is Taylor Rene Murphy’s (“Ms. Murphy” or “Defendant”)

Motion to Dismiss an action filed pro se by Kenneth Bachman aka Kenneth Petrini

(“Mr. Bachman” or “Plaintiff”). Plaintiff brings breach of contract, fraud, and unjust

enrichment claims. Defendant moves to have the Complaint dismissed under

Delaware Superior Court Civil Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim on which

relief can be granted.

                           PROCEDURAL POSTURE
      Plaintiff filed his Complaint on February 27, 2026. On March 19, 2026,

Defendant filed a 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss. Defendant filed a Motion to Stay

Discovery pending resolution on Defendant’s 12(b)(6) motion, which was granted

by the Court. On April 21, 2026, Defendant filed her Opening Brief in support of her

Motion to Dismiss, and Plaintiff filed his Answering Brief in Opposition to

Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss on April 30, 2026. Defendant filed her Reply Brief

on June 2, 2026. Oral Argument on Defendant’s 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss was

held on September 1, 2026.




                                          1
                                  STATEMENT OF FACTS

       In the Spring of 2024, Mr. Bachman and Ms. Murphy met on the online dating

platform Seeking.com. 1 Seeking.com, formerly SeekingArrangements.com, is an

online dating service purposed with connecting individuals seeking mutually

beneficial relationships (colloquially known as “sugar dating”). 2 In “sugar dating”

relationships, the older party (the “sugar daddy” or “sugar mommy”) offers financial

or material support to their younger counterpart (the “sugar baby”) in exchange for

romantic or sexual gratification.3

       Mr. Bachman and Ms. Murphy were both frequent users of Seeking.com with

extensive “sugar dating” experience.4            On May 4, 2024, the parties began

exchanging text messages relating to their relationship. On May 5, 2024, Ms.

Murphy wrote:

       I would like something comfortable and relaxing. Hopefully it feels
       easy and natural at some point. Of course I prefer long term, because
       dating more than one person is exhausting, I’ve tried and I’m not a fan.5

To which Mr. Bachman replied:




1
  Compl. at ¶ 5.
2
  Id. at ¶ 6.
3
  Emma Bennett, The Appeal, and the Risks, of Sugar Daddy Relationships, Psychology Today
(July 18, 2025), https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/talking-about-trauma/202009/the-
appeal-and-the-risks-of-sugar-daddy-relationships.
4
  Compl. at ¶ 7.
5
  Id. at ¶ 12.

                                             2
        I understand fully, and I enjoy it. I really do. But I want so much more.
        Then again I am the sit and cuddle type of guy. It is so much better when
        you develop a deep bond. I view the site as a place that brings together
        2 people who might not get together traditionally but once you do, it is
        like any other relationship.6


        Days later, the parties met in person for the first time at Panera Bread in

Rehoboth Beach.7       Following their meeting, the parties began discussing the

financial aspect of their “sugar” relationship, with Ms. Murphy writing:

        For monthly I am looking for $4,500-$5,000. I’ve had that from one
        person in the past, which I prefer. But also between two arrangements
        which takes time away from each one. So it’s up to you what you’re
        comfortable with. 8


        At the time, Mr. Bachman was unable to pay $4,500-$5,000 but still wished

to help Ms. Murphy. He proposed the following:

        [C]an do $3,000 right now and I realize that may not be enough and
        that you may have to keep looking for someone more generous, but I
        want you covered for your rent this month regardless of whether you
        see again [sic] or not. I will take care of it when I’m in Pennsylvania.9




6
  Id. at ¶ 14.
7
  Id. at ¶ 15.
8
  Id. at ¶17.
9
  Id. at ¶¶ 19-20.

                                           3
        In the months that followed, the parties met infrequently. 10 Mr. Bachman

believed Ms. Murphy to be engaged in relationships with two former partners, one

of whom was known only to Mr. Bachman as “Bobby.”11 Despite Mr. Bachman’s

suspicions, the relationship continued and Mr. Bachman continued to pay Ms.

Murphy’s monthly allowance. The parties met again in person on July 18, 2024, and

subsequent discussions about their relationship ensued. Ms. Murphy wrote:


        Thank you. I really appreciate it! I know the mutual beneficial part has
        to begin for you soon. You’ve been very patient. . .[a]lso. If/when we
        begin a physical relationship I think I mentioned before that I was
        looking for a $5k allowance per month for that kind of thing. Are you
        open to that?12


        Mr. Bachman was unable to pay $5,000 per month, so Ms. Murphy’s monthly

allowance remained $3,000. Mr. Bachman also provided funds to Ms. Murphy for

a trip to Costa Rica with her grandmother, a trip to California to visit her friends, car

repairs, and veterinary bills. 13




10
    Id at ¶ 21.
11
   Id. at ¶¶ 22, 27.
12
    Id. at ¶ 18.
13
    Id. at ¶¶ 25-26.

                                           4
        In the Fall of 2024, Ms. Murphy sought $5,000 from Mr. Bachman so that she

could make a down payment on a car.             Mr. Bachman obliged, but further

reconsidered Ms. Murphy’s earlier proposition, indicating that he was “ready to take

the arrangement to that next, $5,000 level.” 14 By that time, Ms. Murphy decided

that she was unwilling to begin a physical relationship with Mr. Bachman and was

upset by the prospect of engaging Mr. Bachman sexually. Consequently, she asked

to limit contact with Mr. Bachman, and blocked him on social media. 15

        The parties met again on December 4, 2024, to discuss their relationship, and

again Mr. Bachman expressed his desire to “take it to that next, $5,000 level.”16 Ms.

Murphy reiterated her unwillingness to offer sex as a part of the relationship. 17 Mr.

Bachman alleges that the parties then agreed on a $3,500 allowance, and that he

would “have to look elsewhere for sex.” 18 The next day, Mr. Bachman alleges that

the parties modified the agreement and decided that Ms. Murphy’s allowance would

in fact increase to $5,000 per month, without sex, but with an effort by Ms. Murphy

to get “physically closer,” in a “non-sexual way.” 19 Mr. Bachman also alleges that




14
   Id. at ¶¶ 35-36.
15
   Id. at ¶ 37.
16
   Id. at ¶ 39.
17
   Id. at ¶ 40.
18
   Id. at ¶ 41.
19
   Id. at ¶ 41.

                                          5
during the December 5 conversation, the two agreed that the arrangement would be

exclusive.20

        On December 21, 2024, Ms. Murphy sent the following message:

        I’m not seeing anyone currently, but I’m probably going to. Not sure
        how that fits into your plans for a platonic ‘relationship’ with me.21
        What followed was a lengthy response by Mr. Bachman wherein he asserted

that, by his understanding of the arrangement, Ms. Murphy’s monthly allowance

would terminate if she began seeing someone else but was capable of revival if the

“real” relationship did not work out.22 Ms. Murphy expressed confusion over Mr.

Bachman’s characterization of the agreement, responding:

        You said you would be seeking sex elsewhere, so if I do the same
        thing, the arrangement ends? That’s the part that makes no sense to
        me. You want me as a girlfriend without sex but expect me to be
        celibate for possibly years?23


        Mr. Bachman penned another lengthy text message, writing in relevant part:

        I do think we crossed wires. I mentioned seeking sex elsewhere when
        we spoke that Wednesday. I then asked to speak to you the next day
        and said I was changing the 3500 to 5000. I was no longer looking for
        a sexual partner but I may not have been clear. . .If after time. . .you
        need a sexual partner you may find I grew [sic] on you or you may find



20
   Id. at ¶ 45.
21
   Id. at ¶ 46.
22
   Id. at ¶ 47.
23
   Id. at ¶ 48.

                                           6
        it still isn’t me and you need to move on. I am fully willing to be
        sexually faithful even in a platonic relationship. 24


        In January of 2025, Mr. Bachman became aware through mutual contacts that

Ms. Murphy was engaged in a sexual relationship with a former partner known only

as “Bobby.”25 Mr. Bachman alleges that on or around February 13, 2025, he

confirmed that the two were romantically involved.26 The following day, Mr.

Bachman appeared to end the relationship with a lengthy message regarding his

advance payment of Ms. Murphy’s March allowance. It said in relevant part:

        [It] was very clear you had someone else in your heart. You were a
        wonderful friend. I am gonna miss you very much. I hope you have a
        wonderful time and I hope to God everything works out for you as much
        as my heart is breaking. . .I’m not going to send you a request for
        payment. You can figure out for yourself whether you should keep the
        March allowance or send it back.27


        Despite the apparent Valentine’s Day break-up, Mr. Bachman fulfilled a

request from Ms. Murphy for $3,000 on February 17 so that she could take a trip to

Puerto Rico.28 The parties saw each other infrequently in the following months to




24
   Id. at ¶ 49.
25
   Id. at ¶ 53.
26
   Id. at ¶ 55.
27
   Id. at ¶ 62.
28
   Id. at ¶ 73.

                                         7
play golf and share meals, and Mr. Bachman paid Ms. Murphy’s $5,000 allowance

for the months of April, May, and June of 2025.29

        In June of 2025, Mr. Bachman, through mutual friends, was again apprised of

Ms. Murphy’s ongoing relationship with Bobby.30 With the relationship in dire

straits, the parties met at Bethany Diner on June 12, 2025, to discuss their future.31

No resolution was reached at that time and the two continued discussions by phone,

which culminated in Ms. Murphy blocking Mr. Bachman’s phone number.32

        On July 19, 2025, the parties again spoke over the phone. Mr. Bachman, on

belief that Ms. Murphy was with Bobby, considered the conversation the “final straw

ending the arrangement.” 33 The parties did not communicate until July 29, 2025,

when Ms. Murphy emailed Mr. Bachman and asked for her August allowance “even

if it was the final month.”34 When she received no reply from Mr. Bachman, Ms.

Murphy sent a request for $5,000 on PayPal, which provoked a text exchange about

Ms. Murphy’s lack of effort in their relationship.35




29
   Id. at ¶¶ 77-78.
30
   Id. at ¶ 79.
31
   Id. at ¶ 80.
32
   Id. at ¶¶ 80, 83, 87.
33
   Id. at ¶¶ 90-91, 93.
34
   Id. at ¶ 95.
35
   Id. at ¶ 97.

                                          8
        On August 2, 2025, Mr. Bachman fulfilled Ms. Murphy’s PayPal request for

her August allowance, and attached the following message:

        Keep this money if you will refriend me on social media and actually
        keep your promises from December and New Year’s Eve. Otherwise,
        send it back. I have not broken a single promise yet, But I have reached
        my limit. Time for us to shit or get off the pot.36
        It is unclear from the record what the “promises from December and New

Year’s Eve” meant, but Ms. Murphy did not return her August allowance, nor did

she re-friend Mr. Bachman on social media. 37

        On September 4, 2025, Ms. Murphy changed her Facebook profile to a photo

of herself and Bobby, once again alerting Mr. Bachman that the two were

romantically involved.       Mr. Bachman alleges that Ms. Murphy denied the

relationship when asked, and as a result he continued to pay her monthly

allowance.38

        Finally, in October of 2025, the parties once again discussed their relationship

and Mr. Bachman provided Ms. Murphy with $30,000, representing her allowance

for November and December of 2025, January and February of 2026, and a “two-

month cushion.” 39



36
   Id. at ¶ 99.
37
   Id. at ¶¶ 100-101.
38
   Id. at ¶ 107.
39
   Id. at ¶¶ 115, 121.

                                            9
       Mr. Bachman’s payments to Ms. Murphy, including monthly allowances and

other cash gifts, total $180,000.40 Mr. Bachman seeks recovery on claims of breach

of contract, fraud, and unjust enrichment in the amount of $85,000.




                                STANDARD OF REVIEW

       Superior Court Rule 12(b)(6) empowers the Court to dismiss an action for

failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted. The Court will accept all

well-pleaded allegations as true and draw every reasonable factual inference in favor

of the nonmovant. A complaint will not be dismissed for failure to state a claim on

which relief can be granted unless it appears to a certainty that the plaintiff could not

recover under any reasonably conceivable set of circumstances susceptible to

proof.41 The trial court is not required to accept conclusory allegations as true

“without specific supporting factual allegations.” 42 “With this in mind, the trial court

must not accept every strained interpretation of the allegations proposed by the




40
   Oral Argument at 1:48.
41
   McMahon v. McMahon, 

2024 WL 1905462

, at *1 (Del. Super. Ct. Apr. 29, 2024), aff’d, 

340
A.3d 543

 (Del. 2025) (internal citations omitted).
42
   Outdoor Techs. Inc. v. Allfirst Fin. Inc., 

2000 WL 141275

, at *3 (Dl. Super. Ct. 2000) (quoting
In re Santa Fe Pac. Corp S’holder Litig., 

669 A.2d 59, 65-66

 (Del. 1995)).

                                                10
plaintiff, but the plaintiff is entitled to all reasonable inferences that logically flow

from the face of the complaint.”43

                                      DISCUSSION
     I.      Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the Breach of Contract Claim is
             Granted
          Plaintiff brings a breach of contract claim against Defendant that must be

dismissed. In Delaware, a breach of contract claim requires (1) the existence of a

contract, (2) a breach of a contractual obligation, and (3) damages resulting from the

breach.44 In the present case, Plaintiff has failed to establish the requisite elements

necessary to state a claim for breach of contract. There are insufficient facts to prove

that there was an enforceable contract between the parties.

          Under Delaware law, a valid contract requires (1) intent by the parties to be

bound by the contract, (2) sufficiently definite terms, and (3) an exchange of legal

consideration.45 The Court finds that none of these elements are satisfied.

          A. Defendant did not Manifest an Intent to be Bound by the Agreement.


          Plaintiff has presented no reasonably conceivable set of facts from which the

Court can infer that Defendant intended to be bound by the alleged December




43
   McMahon, 

2024 WL 1905462

, at *1.
44
   VLIW Tech., v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 

840 A.2d 606, 613

 (Del. 2003).
45
   Osborn ex rel. Osborn v. Kemp, 

991 A.2d 1153, 1159

 (Del. 2010).

                                              11
agreement. Whether a party intended to be bound by a contract is a question of

fact.46 “Under Delaware law, overt manifestation of assent—not subjective intent—

controls the formation of a contract.”47 To ascertain whether a contracting party

intended to be bound by an agreement, Delaware courts look for “objective,

contemporaneous evidence indicating that the parties have reached an agreement.”48

     Plaintiff contends that Defendant assented to the alleged December 5 exclusivity

agreement. This assertion is unsupported by the record. Plaintiff states conclusively

that the parties agreed to exclusivity in consideration for a $2,000 increase in

Defendant’s allowance. However, the contemporaneous text exchanges offered in

support of this assertion contradict an inference of mutual assent. When informed

by Plaintiff that her allowance was contingent on remaining sexually and

romantically faithful to Plaintiff, Defendant stated that the exclusivity requirement

“made no sense” 49 to her. In response, Plaintiff acknowledged that there was a

misunderstanding as to Defendant’s obligations under the alleged arrangement but

pled no additional facts from which the Court can infer that acceptance by Defendant




46
   Shilling v. Shilling, 

332 A.3d 453

, 461-2 (Del. 2024) (citing Eagle Force Hldgs., LLC. V.
Campbell, 

235 A.3d 727

, 735 (Del. 2020)).
47
   Black Horse Capital, 

2014 WL 5025926

, at *12 (Del. Ch. Ct. 2014) (quoting Industrial
America, Inc. v. Fulton Industries, Inc., 

285 A.2d 412, 414

 (Del. 1971).
48
   Black Horse Capital, LP v. Xstelos Hldgs, Inc 

2014 WL 5025926

 (Del. Ch. Ct 2014) (quoting
Debbs v. Berman, 

1986 WL 1243

 at *7 (Del. Ch. Ct. 1986).
49
   Compl. at ¶ 48.

                                             12
occurred. The first element fails because Plaintiff has failed to establish that

Defendant intended to be bound by the alleged December agreement.

         B. The Terms of the Agreement are not Sufficiently Definite.

         Valid contracts under Delaware law require sufficiently definite terms to be

enforceable. Contract terms are sufficiently definite where they “provide a basis for

determining the existence of a breach and for giving an appropriate remedy.” 50 In

other words, a contract is sufficiently definite if the Court can, based on the contract

terms and proper rules of construction, ascertain what the parties have agreed to do.51

         The terms of the alleged December agreement elude the Court. Plaintiff

describes their agreement as a “personal services contract with a morality clause,” 52

but has failed to establish with any clarity what “personal services” mean. Plaintiff

makes mentions of companionship and attempts to “get physically closer in a non-

sexual way,” but the Court is unable to ascertain what Defendant’s obligations were

under the agreement, and how it would enforce those terms. As such, the terms of

the alleged December agreement are not sufficiently definite, and the second element

fails.

         C. The Agreement Violates Public Policy.


50
   Eagle Force Holdings v. Campbell, 

187 A.3d 1209, 1232

 (Del. 2018).
51
   

Id. at 1232

.
52
   Oral Argument at 1:04.

                                             13
     Assuming arguendo that the alleged December agreement otherwise meets the

requirements for a valid contract under Delaware law, the arrangement would be

nonetheless unenforceable as a matter of public policy.

     Contracts that offend public policy or harm the public are void under Delaware

law.53 No agreement may be sustained if it is inconsistent with the public interest,

or detrimental to the public good.54 “Public policy eludes precise definition and may

have diverse meanings in different contexts,” 55 Public policy may be determined by

examining the federal and state constitutions, the laws, the decisions of the courts,

and the course of administration.56             Courts apply this standard with great

apprehension, and this authority must be exercised only in instances where the

illegality of the contract is clear, certain, and free from doubt.57 Particularly,

“[c]ontracts founded on consideration for romantic involvement including sexual

favors are void against public policy and unenforceable by the courts.” 58

     It is clearly inferred that the alleged December agreement was made in

contemplation of sexual contact. At the outset of their relationship, Defendant told


53
   PHL Variable Ins. Co. v. Price Dawe 2006 Ins. Trust, ex rel. Christiana Bank and Trust Co., 

28
A.3d 1059, 1067

 (Del. 2011) (citing Sann v. Renal Care Centers Corp., 

1995 WL 161458

 at *5
(Del. Super. Ct.1995)).
54
   Sann v. Renal Care Centers Corp., 

1995 WL 161458

, at *5 (Del. Super. Ct.1995) (internal
citations omitted).
55
   

Id.

 (quoting Vasquez v. Glassboro Service Ass’n, 

415 A.2d 1156

 (N.J. 1980)).
56
   

Id.

57
   

Id.

58
   Siple v. Corbett, 

447 A.2d 1184, 1186

 (Del. 1982).

                                               14
Plaintiff that she would need an allowance of at least $5,000 if Plaintiff wanted

physical intimacy. Plaintiff, by his own admission, declined to raise her allowance

because he was unable to do so at the time. When Plaintiff was ready, willing and

able in November of 2024 to “take the arrangement to that next, $5,000 level,”59

Defendant declined the offer because she was uninterested in sexually engaging

Plaintiff. From that rejection came the alleged December agreement, wherein

Plaintiff required Defendant to abstain from having sex with other people but

suggested that one day she may grow to want a sexual relationship with him. The

Court can infer that, though Defendant’s allowance was not explicitly contingent on

her sexual performance, Plaintiff hoped that the terms of the agreement would one

day evolve into a sexual relationship. Despite Plaintiff’s contention that public

policy was not offended by the alleged December agreement because it “did not

include sex,” 60 the Court disagrees. Sex was at the center of all negotiations between

the parties leading up to the agreement on which Plaintiff brings this action. When

it became clear that Plaintiff would not be able to physically engage Defendant, he

substituted physical intimacy for chastity. The prospect of a sexual relationship




59
     Compl. at ¶ 36.
60
     Compl. at ¶ 51.

                                          15
clearly infects the alleged December agreement and renders it unenforceable as a

matter of public policy. 61

           Plaintiff has failed to establish the requisite elements of a valid contract under

Delaware law, therefore Plaintiff’s breach of contract claim (Count II) fails to state

a claim.




     II.      Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Fraud Claim is Granted

     Plaintiff’s fraud claim against Defendant should be dismissed. The elements of

fraud under Delaware law are:

           (1) A false representation, usually one of fact, made by the defendant;
           (2) the defendant’s knowledge or belief that the representation was
           false, or was made with reckless indifference to the truth; (3) an intent
           to induce the plaintiff to act or to refrain from acting; (4) the plaintiff’s
           action or inaction taken in justifiable reliance upon the representation;
           and (5) damage to the plaintiff as a result of such reliance. 62


     Plaintiff contends that a fraud claim can stand with or without a breach of contract

claim. Although true, Delaware law does not allow a plaintiff to “bootstrap” a breach


61
   Akin to Patronizing a Prostitute, it is the act of propositioning, not the physical act that makes
it contrary to public policy. See also 11 Del. C. § 1343(a).
62
   Outdoor Techs., Inc. v. Allfirst Fin., Inc., 

2001 WL 541472

 at *3 (Del. Super. Ct. 2001)
(quoting State v. Gardiner 

2000 WL 973304

 at n7 (Del. Super. Ct. 2000)).

                                                  16
of contract claim into a tort claim, “merely by intoning the prima facie elements of

the tort while telling the story of the defendant’s failure to perform under the

contract.”63

        A. Plaintiff Fails to Establish that Defendant Breached a Duty Independent

           of her Alleged Contractual Obligations.

     Claims for fraud and breach of contract may survive in a single action only if the

plaintiff alleges that the defendant breached a duty independent of the duties

imposed by the contract.64 That independent duty “must arise from a source other

than the contractual relationship itself. 65

     Whether breach of contract and fraud claims arise out of the same operative facts

can be decided on a motion “testing the viability of a plaintiff’s complaint accepting

all of the allegations therein as true.” 66

     In Cornell Glasgow, LLC v. La Grange Properties, the plaintiff brought

concurrent fraud and breach of contract claims based on the defendants’ failure to

make contractual payments, and representations made by the defendant that




63
   Cale Johnson Const. Co. v. Bucher, 

2025 WL 1090200

 at *1 (Del. Super. Ct. 2025) (citing
Continental Fin. Co., LLC. V. ICS Corp., 

2020 WL 836688

 at *3 (Del. Super. Ct. 2020)).
64
   Id. at *8 (internal citation omitted).
65
   Byborg Enterprises v. Vertex, 

2025 WL 1911338

 at *4 (Del. Super. Ct. 2025).
66
   Cornell Glasgow, LLC. v. La Grange Properties, 

2012 WL 2106945

, at *8 (Del. Super. Ct.
2012).

                                               17
performance would occur “on receipt of additional information.”67 The Court

concluded that the fraud claim was impermissibly bootstrapped, as the alleged

misrepresentations concerned the defendant’s performance of their contractual

obligations and arose during the course of performance. 68

     By contrast, the Court in ITW Global Investments v. American Industrial Partners

found that the plaintiff’s fraud and breach of contract claims could coexist in a single

action, because the allegedly fraudulent behavior occurred before the contract was

executed, with the intent to induce the plaintiff’s assent to the contract at the outset.

The Court concluded that the alleged misrepresentations that predated execution

were separate and distinct from the contractual relationship and formed an

independent basis to claim fraud. 69

        On Plaintiff’s own admission, his fraud claim is premised entirely on the

alleged December agreement.70           The Court finds Plaintiff’s fraud allegations

indistinguishable from the allegations that form his breach of contract claim.

Plaintiff asserts that a material term to the parties’ agreement was that Defendant

remained romantically exclusive to Plaintiff. 71 Plaintiff then alleges that Defendant



67
   

Id.

68
   

Id.

69
   ITW Global Investments Inc. v. American Industrial Partners Capital Fund IV, L.P, 

2015 WL
3970908

 at *6-7 (Del. Super. Ct. 2015).
70
   Oral Argument at 1:40.
71
   Compl. at ¶ 138.

                                             18
breached this obligation when she re-engaged Bobby romantically. In turn, Plaintiff

contends that Defendant committed fraud by misrepresenting her relationship with

Bobby to induce Plaintiff’s continued payments under the terms of the alleged

agreement. Unlike the plaintiff in ITW Global Investments, Plaintiff alleges no fraud

in the inducement of the contractual relationship itself, only misrepresentations to

cover up Defendant’s breach of their preexisting agreement. Plaintiff has failed to

demonstrate separate and distinct conduct by Defendant to form independent fraud

and breach of contract claims.

     “Delaware precedent requires a legal duty to support a fraud claim, not a vague

reference to a moral duty to be truthful.” 72 In Continental Finance Co. v. ICS Corp.,

the plaintiff brought claims for fraud and breach of contract, alleging intentional

misrepresentations over the course of their business relationship that went “over and

above its breach of its contractual obligations to [the plaintiff].” 73 The Court found

that the plaintiff’s fraud allegation failed to state a claim, because the plaintiff failed

to identify a duty independent of their contractual obligations beyond a “duty not to

lie.”74




72
    Continental Fin. Co. v. ICS Corp., 

2020 WL 836608

 at *3 (Del. Super. Ct. 2020).
73
   

Id.

74
   

Id.


                                              19
   Plaintiff finds himself similarly situated to the plaintiffs in Continental. The only

duties that Plaintiff alleges Defendant breached were the duties to remain exclusive

to Plaintiff, and the duty to be truthful about it. The former duty is prescribed by the

alleged December agreement, and the latter, standing alone, is insufficient to sustain

a fraud claim under Delaware law.




                                          20
        B. Plaintiff Fails to Plead Fraud Damages Distinct from his Breach of

            Contract Damages.

        To successfully plead a fraud claim, Delaware courts require that an allegedly

     defrauded plaintiff “must have sustained damages as a result of a defendant’s

     actions.” 75 Damages allegations may not simply “rehash the damages allegedly

     caused by the breach of contract.”76

        Plaintiff has failed to plead any damages independent of his alleged

     contractual damages. Plaintiff’s prayers for relief in Counts I, II, and III of the

     Complaint are identical. “Plaintiff seeks actual damages in excess of $85,000,

     plus costs and such punitive damages as the Court shall see fit.” 77 Plaintiff does

     not distinguish between damages caused by Defendant’s alleged fraud, and those

     caused by her alleged breach of contract.

        Plaintiff’s fraud claim (Count I) is barred by the bootstrapping doctrine and

     therefore fails to state a claim.




75
   Cornell Glasgow, LLC, 

2012 WL 2106945

, at *8.
76
   Id. at *9.
77
   Compl. at ¶¶ 136, 141, 147.

                                            21
     III.   Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Unjust Enrichment Claim is

            Granted

        Plaintiff’s claim for unjust enrichment is duplicative and must be dismissed.

Furthermore, the Court will not afford Plaintiff a remedy because to do so would

frustrate the purpose of public policy limitations on the freedom to contract.

        Unjust enrichment is a remedy available “only in the absence of a formal

contract,”78 therefore unjust enrichment claims premised on an express, enforceable

contract fail to state a claim. 79 Unjust enrichment claims and breach of contract

claims may coexist as alternative claims, however those circumstances are limited

to instances where “there is doubt surrounding [the relevant contract’s]

enforceability. . .or existence.”80

        A claim for unjust enrichment is unavailable when the rights and obligations

of the parties are governed by contract. 81 A breach of contract action need not be

likely to succeed to preclude a coexistent unjust enrichment claim. “At bottom, an




78
   Intermec IP Corp. v. Transcore, 

2021 WL 3620435

 at *16 (Del. Super. Ct. 2021) (internal
citations omitted).
79
   

Id.

 at *16 (quoting Stone & Paper Investors, LLC v. Blanch, 

2020 WL 3496694

, at *12 (Del.
Ch. 2020)).
80
   

Id.

 at *17 (quoting Khushaim v. Tullow, Inc., 

2016 WL 359752

, at *8 (Del. Super. Ct. 2016)).
81
   Khushaim v. Tullow, Inc., 

2016 WL 359752

, at *8 (Del. Super. Ct. 2016) (internal citation
omitted); see also Kuroda v. SPJS Hldgs., LLC, 

971 A.2d 872, 891

 (Del. 2009).

                                               22
unjust enrichment claim cannot be used to circumvent an inadequate breach of

contract claim.”82

       Plaintiff alleges that an express, enforceable contract was created in December

of 2024. Plaintiff does not contest, nor otherwise cast doubt on the validity of the

alleged December agreement. In his Complaint, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant was

unjustly enriched because she “failed to perform under the agreement between the

parties.”83 Plainly, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant was unjustly enriched at his

expense because she breached the obligations prescribed by the alleged December

agreement. It follows that the alleged December agreement governs the rights and

obligations of the parties, and allowing an unjust enrichment claim to stand would,

as the Court in Intermec put it, allow Plaintiff to secure his inadequate breach of

contract claim, and potentially recover twice for the same conduct. The facts alleged

in the Complaint do not give rise to any circumstance for which Delaware law allows

coexisting breach of contract and unjust enrichment claims.

       Notwithstanding the duplicity of Count III, Plaintiff would nonetheless be

unable to recover under a theory of unjust enrichment for public policy reasons.84


82
   Intermec IP Corp., 

2021 WL 3630435

 at *17.
83
   Compl. at ¶ 144.
84
   See Tulalip Shores, Inc. v. Mortland, 

511 P.2d 1402, 1404

 (Wash. Ct. App. 1973) (citing 66
Am.Jur.2d Restitution and Implied Contracts S3 (1973) (“Unjust enrichment is a general
principle that one person should not be permitted unjustly to enrich himself at the expense of
another, but should be required to make restitution of or for property or benefits received,
retained, or appropriated, where it is just and equitable that such restitution be made, and where

                                                23
All three claims in the Complaint arise out of the same alleged agreement that the

Court has deemed void as contrary to public policy. Allowing Plaintiff to recover

under an alleged agreement that is flagrantly contrary to public policy would in

essence allow him, and those who follow, to recover under agreements that Delaware

law has deemed so unsavory as to warrant judicial intervention in the freedom to

contract.

       Plaintiff’s Unjust Enrichment claim (Count III) is duplicative and contrary to

public policy, therefore it fails to state a claim.

                                        CONCLUSION

   It is the Court’s view that all payments made by Plaintiff to Defendant, including

the monthly allowance payments underlying the present controversy, were gifts.

Under Delaware law, a gift is executed by (a) the donor’s complete and unconditional

delivery of the property that is the subject of the gift, and (b) the donee’s acceptance

of the gift. 85

   Plaintiff admitted that he gave Defendant cash gifts totaling approximately

$95,000 in excess of Defendant’s monthly allowance.                       The Court draws no

distinction between payments made under the alleged agreement and the other cash



such action involves no violation or frustration of law or opposition to public policy, either
directly or indirectly.”) (emphasis added).
85
   Hudak v. Procek, 

806 A.2d 140, 151

 (Del. 2002).

                                                 24
gifts. Plaintiff insists that his allowance payments were conditioned on Defendant’s

compliance with the alleged December agreement, but these conditions were

effectively illusory. When Plaintiff became aware in January of 2025 and again in

February of 2025 that Defendant was not holding up her end of the deal, he continued

to pay her. In March of 2025, Plaintiff told the Defendant it was “up to her” whether

to return her allowance after he discovered her romantic forays. In July of 2025

Plaintiff states that he considered the agreement over but still paid Defendant’s

August allowance. In fact, Defendant’s monthly allowance payments continued for

a full year after Plaintiff alleges both that she breached the agreement and that he

became aware of her breach. Defendant’s noncompliance with the purported terms

of the agreement had no effect on her receipt of payments from Plaintiff.

      “The law does not govern trifles. One may not drain scarce judicial resources in

furtherance of petty domestic disagreements absent a cognizable claim.”86 As such,

and for the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Count I Fraud is

GRANTED, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Count II Breach of Contract is

GRANTED, and Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Count III Unjust Enrichment is

GRANTED.




86
     McMahon v. McMahon, 

2024 WL 1905462

, at *6 (Del. Super. Ct. 2024).

                                             25
      IT IS SO ORDERED.

                               /s/ Mark H. Conner
                               Mark H. Conner, Judge


oc:   Prothonotary




                          26

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