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Tiffany Yvonne Conley v. the State of Texas

Official source
                       Court of Appeals
                  Tenth Appellate District of Texas

                             10-25-00447-CR


                         Tiffany Yvonne Conley,
                                Appellant

                                     v.

                           The State of Texas,
                                Appellee



                           On appeal from the
              278th District Court of Walker County, Texas
                    Judge Tracy Sorensen, presiding
                     Trial Court Cause No. 31481

CHIEF JUSTICE JOHNSON delivered the opinion of the Court.

                     MEMORANDUM OPINION

     A jury found Tiffany Yvonne Conley guilty of possessing less than one

gram of methamphetamine.        See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN.

§ 481.115(a), (b). After Conley pleaded true to two enhancement allegations,

the trial court assessed her punishment at five years’ confinement in the

penitentiary. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.425(a). Conley raises two issues
on appeal regarding (1) the admission of prior convictions and (2) sufficiency of

the evidence. We affirm.

                                A. Background

       Sergeant Ringo of the Walker County Sheriff ’s Office obtained a warrant

to search a three-story residence in Huntsville. The warrant focused on the

owner, Amber Vanriper, whom Ringo had known to have sold narcotics to a

confidential informant from the residence on two occasions.

       Officers executed the warrant early in the morning on July 28, 2023.

After knocking and announcing without a response, they breached the front

door. In the ensuing commotion, Vanriper came down from the third floor,

where her bedroom was located, and was detained.                 Officers found

methamphetamine in Vanriper’s bedroom. While clearing the house, officers

found Conley asleep in bed in a second-floor bedroom.          Conley was also

detained.

       A nightstand stood beside the bed in which Conley had been sleeping.

Inside the nightstand’s drawer, officers found two glass pipes that Ringo

identified, based on the black residue in their bulbs, as pipes “commonly used

to smoke methamphetamine,” a glass dish containing loose, crystal-like

shards, a pipe commonly used to smoke marihuana, a marihuana grinder, and

a jar of marihuana cigarette butts. A Department of Public Safety chemist

later determined that the shards in the dish were 0.27 grams of a substance


Conley v. State                                                          Page 2
containing methamphetamine. Underneath the nightstand was a black bag

containing Conley’s wallet, her driver’s license, and a bag of marihuana. On

top of the nightstand were cigarettes and a lighter.

       Conley was arrested for possession of marihuana and possession of a

controlled substance in an amount of less than one gram.

                                   B. Issue One

       In her first issue, Conley contends that the trial court erred by admitting,

over her objection under Rule of Evidence 404(b), two judgments reflecting her

prior convictions for possession of methamphetamine.

1. Authority

       To preserve a complaint for appellate review, a party must make a timely

and specific objection and obtain a ruling. TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a). “When the

court hears a party’s objections outside the presence of the jury and rules that

evidence is admissible, a party need not renew an objection to preserve a claim

of error for appeal.” TEX. R. EVID. 103(b). However, a later statement of “no

objection” when the evidence is offered ordinarily forfeits the earlier-preserved

objection. Thomas v. State, 

408 S.W.3d 877

, 881–82 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).

The rule is “context-dependent.” 

Id. at 885

. “If the record as a whole plainly

demonstrates that the defendant did not intend, nor did the trial court

construe, his ‘no objection’ statement to constitute an abandonment of a claim

of error that he had earlier preserved for appeal, then the appellate court


Conley v. State                                                            Page 3
should not regard the claim as ‘waived,’ but should resolve it on the merits.”

Id.

 But “if from the record as a whole the appellate court simply cannot tell

whether an abandonment was intended or understood, then, consistent with

prior case law, it should regard the ‘no objection’ statement to be a waiver of

the earlier-preserved error.” 

Id.

 at 885–86.

2. Discussion

       During defense counsel’s cross-examination, Ringo acknowledged that

nothing in the drawer bore Conley’s name, that officers did not test the dish or

the pipes for fingerprints or DNA, and that no officer questioned Conley about

the items. He agreed that, other than finding Conley asleep in the bed and

finding the marihuana in the bag with her wallet, law enforcement did nothing

to connect her to the methamphetamine or the paraphernalia.

       After Ringo and a DPS chemist testified and outside the presence of the

jury, the State announced its intention to offer evidence of Conley’s prior

convictions, arguing that defense counsel’s cross-examination of Ringo had

opened the door under Rule 404(b) to proof of knowledge and absence of

mistake or accident. Defense counsel objected that his questions had focused

on what Ringo failed to do in collecting evidence of possession, that they had

not opened the door, and that Rule 404(b) is not “a catchall if a defendant has

prior crimes.” The trial court ruled that it would admit the evidence “for the

limited purpose of . . . proving knowledge, absence of mistake, or lack of


Conley v. State                                                         Page 4
accident,” and, when defense counsel asked the court to “note my objection,”

stated, “Your objection is overruled.”

       The jury returned, and the State called an investigator with the district

attorney’s office who had run Conley’s criminal history. When the State offered

two certified judgments for possession of methamphetamine defense counsel

asked to approach and told the trial court that Conley’s criminal history

included “arrests that involv[e] possession of drugs, but there’s also other

arrests that involve other things that have nothing to do with the possession

of drugs.” The trial court directed counsel to “look at what they’re offering.”

Defense counsel responded, “That would help, wouldn’t it?” and the bench

conference ended. Before the jury, the trial court asked, “Any objections to

State’s 13 or 14?” Defense counsel answered, “No, your Honor.”

       “Preservation of error is a systemic requirement,” and a court of appeals

may not reverse a conviction without first addressing it, “regardless of whether

the issue is raised by either of the parties.” Darcy v. State, 

488 S.W.3d 325

,

327–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016); see Ford v. State, 

305 S.W.3d 530

, 532–33 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2009) (A court of appeals should review preservation of error on its

own motion.).

       Defense counsel’s reply when asked if he had any objections was an

affirmative representation that the defense had no objection to the exhibits,

made after defense counsel had examined them and minutes after the trial


Conley v. State                                                         Page 5
court had ruled on the Rule 404(b) objection. Nothing in the record indicates

that defense counsel intended to preserve the earlier objection when defense

counsel stated “no objection” to the very exhibits subject to the prior objection;

the only concern defense counsel voiced at the bench was that the criminal

history contained unrelated arrests, and that concern was resolved when

defense     counsel   saw   that   the   exhibits   were   limited   to   the   two

methamphetamine convictions. Nor does anything indicate that the trial court

understood the earlier objection to persist. Unlike the trial court in Thomas,

which admonished the defendant that she could appeal the suppression ruling

and described that ruling as a “close call,” the trial court here simply admitted

the exhibits. See Thomas, 

408 S.W.3d at 886

. Even when read most favorably

to Conley, the record does not make clear whether an abandonment was

intended or understood. Under Thomas, the “no objection” statement is then

regarded as a waiver of the earlier complaint. See 

id.

 at 885–86. We therefore

conclude that Conley’s complaint was not preserved.          See TEX. R. APP. P.

33.1(a).

       We overrule Conley’s first issue.

                                   C. Issue Two

       In her second issue, Conley challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to

support her conviction. She contends that nothing in the record shows that

she knew what the nightstand drawer contained, that the paraphernalia and


Conley v. State                                                            Page 6
drugs inside it belonged to someone else, and that her presence in the room

established no more than proximity.             The State responds that the

circumstantial evidence, considered together, affirmatively links Conley to the

methamphetamine and supports the jury’s finding of knowing possession.

1. Standard of Review

       The Court of Criminal Appeals has expressed the standard of review of

sufficiency issues as follows:

              When addressing a challenge to the sufficiency of the
       evidence, we consider whether, after viewing all of the evidence in
       the light most favorable to the verdict, any rational trier of fact
       could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a
       reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 

443 U.S. 307, 319

 (1979);
       Villa v. State, 

514 S.W.3d 227, 232

 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017). This
       standard requires the appellate court to defer “to the responsibility
       of the trier of fact fairly to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to
       weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic
       facts to ultimate facts.” Jackson, 

443 U.S. at 319

. We may not re-
       weigh the evidence or substitute our judgment for that of the
       factfinder. Williams v. State, 

235 S.W.3d 742, 750

 (Tex. Crim. App.
       2007). The court conducting a sufficiency review must not engage
       in a “divide and conquer” strategy but must consider the
       cumulative force of all the evidence. Villa, 

514 S.W.3d at 232

.
       Although juries may not speculate about the meaning of facts or
       evidence, juries are permitted to draw any reasonable inferences
       from the facts so long as each inference is supported by the
       evidence presented at trial. Cary v. State, 

507 S.W.3d 750, 757

       (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (citing Jackson, 

443 U.S. at 319

); see also
       Hooper v. State, 

214 S.W.3d 9

, 16–17 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). We
       presume that the factfinder resolved any conflicting inferences
       from the evidence in favor of the verdict, and we defer to that
       resolution. Merritt v. State, 

368 S.W.3d 516, 525

 (Tex. Crim. App.
       2012). This is because the jurors are the exclusive judges of the
       facts, the credibility of the witnesses, and the weight to be given to
       the testimony. Brooks v. State, 

323 S.W.3d 893, 899

 (Tex. Crim.

Conley v. State                                                            Page 

7
App. 2010

). Direct evidence and circumstantial evidence are
       equally probative, and circumstantial evidence alone may be
       sufficient to uphold a conviction so long as the cumulative force of
       all the incriminating circumstances is sufficient to support the
       conviction. Ramsey v. State, 

473 S.W.3d 805, 809

 (Tex. Crim. App.
       2015); Hooper, 

214 S.W.3d at 13

.

              We measure whether the evidence presented at trial was
       sufficient to support a conviction by comparing it to “the elements
       of the offense as defined by the hypothetically correct jury charge
       for the case.” Malik v. State, 

953 S.W.2d 234, 240

 (Tex. Crim. App.
       1997).    The hypothetically correct jury charge is one that
       “accurately sets out the law, is authorized by the indictment, does
       not unnecessarily increase the State’s burden of proof or
       unnecessarily restrict the State’s theories of liability, and
       adequately describes the particular offense for which the
       defendant was tried.” Id.; see also Daugherty v. State, 

387 S.W.3d
654, 665

 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). The “law as authorized by the
       indictment” includes the statutory elements of the offense and
       those elements as modified by the indictment. Daugherty, 

387
S.W.3d at 665

.

Zuniga v. State, 

551 S.W.3d 729

, 732–33 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018).

2. Authority

       Texas Health and Safety Code subsection 481.115(a) provides that a

person commits an offense if “the person knowingly or intentionally possesses

a controlled substance listed in Penalty Group 1.” TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY

CODE ANN. § 481.115(a). Methamphetamine is listed as a Penalty Group 1

controlled substance.    Id. § 481.102(6).   “Possession” means “actual care,

custody, control, or management.” Id. § 481.002(38); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.

§ 1.07(a)(39). To establish unlawful possession, the State must prove that “(1)

the accused exercised control, management, or care over the substance; and (2)


Conley v. State                                                          Page 8
the accused knew the matter possessed was contraband.” Evans v. State, 

202

S.W.3d 158, 161

 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).

       The evidence, whether direct or circumstantial, “must establish that the

defendant’s connection with the drug was more than fortuitous.” 

Id.

 This

requirement, historically called the “affirmative links” rule, “protects the

innocent bystander—a relative, friend, or even stranger to the actual

possessor—from conviction merely because of his fortuitous proximity to

someone else’s drugs.” 

Id.

 at 161–62. “Mere presence at the location where

drugs are found is thus insufficient, by itself, to establish actual care, custody,

or control of those drugs.” 

Id. at 162

. “However, presence or proximity, when

combined with other evidence, either direct or circumstantial . . . may well be

sufficient to establish that element beyond a reasonable doubt.”               

Id.


Accordingly, “[w]hen the accused is not in exclusive possession of the place

where the substance is found, it cannot be concluded that the accused had

knowledge of and control over the contraband unless there are additional

independent facts and circumstances which affirmatively link the accused to

the contraband.” Poindexter v. State, 

153 S.W.3d 402, 406

 (Tex. Crim. App.

2005), overruled on other grounds by Robinson v. State, 

466 S.W.3d 166

, 173

& n.32 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015); see Mixon v. State, 

481 S.W.3d 318, 323

 (Tex.

App.—Amarillo 2015, pet. ref ’d).




Conley v. State                                                            Page 9
       Courts have identified a number of non-exclusive factors that may link

an accused to contraband, including:

       (1) the defendant’s presence when a search is conducted; (2)
       whether the contraband was in plain view; (3) the defendant’s
       proximity to and the accessibility of the narcotic; (4) whether the
       defendant was under the influence of narcotics when arrested; (5)
       whether the defendant possessed other contraband or narcotics
       when arrested; (6) whether the defendant made incriminating
       statements when arrested; (7) whether the defendant attempted to
       flee; (8) whether the defendant made furtive gestures; (9) whether
       there was an odor of contraband; (10) whether other contraband or
       drug paraphernalia were present; (11) whether the defendant
       owned or had the right to possess the place where the drugs were
       found; (12) whether the place where the drugs were found was
       enclosed; (13) whether the defendant was found with a large
       amount of cash; and (14) whether the conduct of the defendant
       indicated a consciousness of guilt.

Tate v. State, 

500 S.W.3d 410, 414

 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (citing Evans, 

202

S.W.3d at 162

 n.12; Olivarez v. State, 

171 S.W.3d 283, 291

 (Tex. App.—Houston

[14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.)). These factors are not a checklist. “It is not the

number of links that is dispositive; rather, it is the logical force of all the

evidence.” Mixon, 

481 S.W.3d at 324

; see Evans, 

202 S.W.3d at 162, 166

. Nor

does the absence of some factors weigh against the verdict: the “absence of

various links does not constitute evidence of innocence to be weighed against

the links present.”    Williams v. State, 

313 S.W.3d 393, 398

 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, pet. ref ’d); see Mixon, 

481 S.W.3d at 324

.




Conley v. State                                                         Page 10
3. Discussion

       Conley does not dispute that the substance in the dish was

methamphetamine or that it was found in the drawer of the nightstand beside

the bed in which she was sleeping. She concedes that her proximity to the

drawer while sleeping, together with the placement of her bag beneath it,

showed that she had the ability to exercise control over the drawer’s contents

“if desired.” Her complaint is directed to the knowledge element: she contends

that nothing showed she knew the nightstand drawer contained a controlled

substance, and that the items in it, including broken pipes, smoked marihuana

cigarettes, and other odds and ends, were presumably her host’s or another

unnamed guest’s. She notes that the methamphetamine was not in plain view

and that the only property in the room unquestionably established to be hers

was her purse, with its wallet and marihuana, and her cigarettes and lighter.

On this record, she argues, her connection to the methamphetamine was

merely fortuitous, and the affirmative-links rule exists precisely to protect a

person in her position. See Evans, 202 S.W.3d at 161–62. She adds that the

State filled the gap in its proof with the evidence of her prior convictions. The

rule she invokes is settled: proximity to hidden contraband, without more, will

not sustain a conviction. See Hernandez v. State, 

517 S.W.2d 782, 785

 (Tex.

Crim. App. 1975); Allen v. State, 

249 S.W.3d 680

, 694–95 (Tex. App.—Austin

2008, pet. ref ’d) (“Where the contraband is hidden or secreted, the State, in a


Conley v. State                                                          Page 11
possession of contraband case, must address whether the accused knew of the

existence of the secreted place and its contents.”).

       Conley testified in her own defense. She said that she had been renting

the second-floor room from Vanriper for $100 a week for “[t]wo, three months,

maybe,” after losing her prior residence, and that she had known Vanriper for

about a week before moving into Vanriper’s spare bedroom.            She worked

weekdays as the activities director of a nursing home in Willis, “stayed up at

[her] boyfriend’s a lot,” and kept her clothes in a rolling suitcase. She described

her use of the room this way: “[I] put my purse under the nightstand in that

hole right there and lay down and go to sleep.” She testified that the bed,

sheets, and comforter belonged to Vanriper; “everything in there was hers,”

Conley said, “[e]xcept for my purse and my bag.” Conley acknowledged that

the black bag was her purse, that the marihuana inside it was hers, that she

was smoking marihuana in 2023, and that the cigarettes and lighter on top of

the nightstand were hers, but she denied that the contents of the drawer were

hers. Asked whether she ever opened the drawer, she answered, “I’m not nosy

like that.”       She agreed that she had “a history with methamphetamine,”

testified that she quit using it after her 2020 arrest, and agreed that she knew

what a methamphetamine pipe looks like and could see methamphetamine

pipes in the photograph of the open drawer. She testified that she had not seen

them before and “would not have been okay with that.”


Conley v. State                                                            Page 12
        On cross-examination, Conley testified that she “definitely didn’t use the

drawer” but she “didn’t say never.” She then testified that “out of all of the

time that I spent there, I’m sure I opened the drawer once or twice,” without

seeing pipes or drugs. She suggested that others stayed in the room while she

was at her boyfriend’s house and could have used the drawer, but she did not

identify anyone. She again acknowledged that she had been convicted of

possessing methamphetamine on at least two prior occasions, most recently in

2020.

        We agree with Conley that the State could not rest on her presence in

the room and her proximity to the drawer alone. See Evans, 

202 S.W.3d at

162

. But the record contains considerably more, and we must consider it in

combination rather than one link at a time. See 

id. at 166

.

        First, Conley had the right to possess the place where the

methamphetamine was found, and she had exercised that right for an extended

period. By her own account, she had rented the room from Vanriper for $100

a week for two to three months, and it was where she slept with some

regularity. Ringo agreed that the room appeared to be one “that somebody

was living in full-time” and distinguished it from the rest of the house, stating

it was “quite cleaner than Ms. Vanriper’s room.” This is not the situation in

Allen, where the accused lived elsewhere, was present for a few hours as a




Conley v. State                                                           Page 13
babysitter in another person’s apartment, and left nothing of hers in the rooms

where the contraband was hidden. Allen, 

249 S.W.3d at 687

.

       Second, the contraband was not hidden somewhere in the house at large;

it was in the drawer of the one piece of furniture that Conley admittedly used

and around which her belongings were arranged. She was found in the bed

beside it, within reach. She kept her cigarettes and lighter on top of it and her

purse beneath it. The drawer was enclosed within the nightstand that Conley

treated as hers to use, and she ultimately conceded that she had opened the

drawer “once or twice.” A rational jury could infer that a tenant who slept

beside that nightstand for months, kept her belongings on top of it and beneath

it, and opened its drawer knew what the drawer contained. See also Hoover v.

State, No. 10-19-00048-CR, 

2021 WL 4595805

, at *4 (Tex. App.—Waco Oct. 6,

2021, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (concluding that

contraband “effectively hidden” inside a wallet within the defendant’s reach

supported the knowledge element when combined with other links). Cf. Allen,

249 S.W.3d at 695

 (finding no link where “[t]here was no evidence that

appellant ever opened the doors or had any need to do so”).

       Third, Conley possessed other contraband, and the drawer contained

paraphernalia connected to it. At trial, Conley admitted that the marihuana

in the purse under the nightstand was hers and that she was smoking

marihuana in 2023.      The drawer directly above her purse contained a


Conley v. State                                                          Page 14
marihuana pipe, a marihuana grinder, and a jar of marihuana cigarette butts

alongside the two methamphetamine pipes and the dish of methamphetamine.

A rational jury could infer that the marihuana paraphernalia in the drawer

belonged to the person whose marihuana was beneath it, and that the person

who kept her marihuana paraphernalia in the drawer knew what else was kept

there.    See Mixon, 

481 S.W.3d at 324

 (relying on paraphernalia “present

throughout the house and the shed” and on the defendant’s status as “primary

resident”).

         Fourth, the evidence supports the finding that Conley knew the

substance in the dish was contraband.      She acknowledged her history of

methamphetamine use, agreed that she knew what a methamphetamine pipe

looks like, and, looking at the photograph of the open drawer, identified the

pipes in it as methamphetamine pipes. See 

id.

 (noting that the defendant “was

familiar with and admitted using methamphetamine at various points in the

past”). The jury also had before it the two prior judgments for possession of

methamphetamine. Conley argues that those judgments should not count

because they were improperly admitted, but a reviewing court asks only

whether a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements “based

on all of the evidence admitted at trial.” Poindexter, 153 S.W.3d at 406–07.

Here, the knowledge finding does not depend solely on the judgments; Conley’s




Conley v. State                                                        Page 15
own testimony established her familiarity with methamphetamine and its

paraphernalia.

       Fifth, Conley’s account shifted in ways the jury was entitled to weigh

against her. On direct examination she explained that she had not looked in

the drawer because “I’m not nosy like that.” On cross-examination she testified

that she “definitely didn’t use the drawer” but that she “didn’t say never” about

touching it. When pressed, she stated, “I am saying that out of all of the time

that I spent there, I’m sure I opened the drawer once or twice. I mean, but did

I use it? No. Are those my things in it? No.” Asked whether, on the occasions

she opened the drawer, she ever saw “any kind of pipes or drugs or something

else in there,” she answered, “Nothing.” The jury could weigh that answer

against Ringo’s description of the drawer’s contents, her earlier statements,

and the photograph of the open drawer, in which Conley herself identified

methamphetamine pipes. She suggested that unnamed others slept in the

room and used the nightstand while she was away, although she had earlier

testified that everything in the room was either hers or Vanriper’s. The Austin

court in Allen identified “conflicting statements, or an implausible account of

events” as the kinds of additional circumstances that can supply the knowledge

element when contraband is secreted. Allen, 

249 S.W.3d at 694

. A rational

jury could find both here. The jury was not required to accept Conley’s denial.

Her testimony that the drawer’s contents were not hers was uncontradicted,


Conley v. State                                                          Page 16
but uncontradicted testimony from an interested witness is not an undisputed

fact, and “[t]he jury was entitled to believe this evidence, but it was not

required to do so.” Evans, 

202 S.W.3d at 165

.

       Conley emphasizes links that are missing from this record. But the

absence of some links is not evidence of innocence to be weighed against the

links that are present. See Mixon, 

481 S.W.3d at 324

. In Hernandez, the Court

of Criminal Appeals listed the absence of fingerprints among the many missing

circumstances in a record that otherwise showed only a one-night guest

sleeping near another person’s paraphernalia; it did not hold that forensic

proof is required. Hernandez, 

517 S.W.2d at 785

. Nor does it matter that

Vanriper, too, had access to the room or that more methamphetamine was

found in her bedroom. “The mere fact that a person other than the accused

might have joint possession of the premises does not require the State to prove

that the defendant had sole possession of the contraband, only that there are

affirmative links between the defendant and the drugs such that [s]he, too,

knew of the drugs and constructively possessed them.” Poindexter, 

153 S.W.3d

at 412

; see Mixon, 481 S.W.3d at 324–25.

       Conley’s argument that her connection to the methamphetamine was

“fortuitous” asks us to view each circumstance in isolation.      That is the

approach the Court of Criminal Appeals rejected in Evans. Evans, 

202 S.W.3d

at 166

. Conley rented and slept in the room for months, used the nightstand


Conley v. State                                                        Page 17
for her own belongings, admittedly opened its drawer, kept her marihuana

beneath        a   drawer   holding   marihuana   paraphernalia   beside   the

methamphetamine, knew what methamphetamine and its paraphernalia look

like, and gave an account of the drawer that changed under cross-examination.

Based on the combined and cumulative force of that evidence and the

reasonable inferences from it, the jury was rationally justified in finding

beyond a reasonable doubt that Conley knew of the methamphetamine and

exercised actual care, custody, control, or management over it. See Tate, 

500

S.W.3d at 414

; Evans, 

202 S.W.3d at 166

.

       We overrule Conley’s second issue.

                                  D. Conclusion

       Having overruled both of Conley’s issues, we affirm the judgment of the

trial court.




                                            MATT JOHNSON
                                            Chief Justice

OPINION DELIVERED and FILED: October 29, 2026
Before Chief Justice Johnson,
       Justice Harris, and
       Justice Westerfeld
Affirmed
Do not publish
CR25


Conley v. State                                                        Page 18

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