Miscellaneous Etats-Unis

Thomas Aaron Lamb v. the State of Texas

Official source
                                   Court of Appeals
                           Tenth Appellate District of Texas

                                           10-25-00387-CR


                                       Thomas Aaron Lamb,
                                           Appellant

                                                     v.

                                         The State of Texas,
                                              Appellee



                                   On appeal from the
                      278th District Court of Walker County, Texas
                            Judge Tracy Sorensen, presiding
                             Trial Court Cause No. 32019

JUSTICE HARRIS delivered the opinion of the Court.

                                MEMORANDUM OPINION

          Thomas Aaron Lamb was convicted of continuous sexual abuse of a

young child. A jury assessed punishment at life in prison. We affirm the trial

court’s judgment.

BACKGROUND

          Molly 1 was only seven years old and in the second grade when she made


1
    “Molly” is an alias for the child which was used during trial.
an outcry of sexual abuse by her mom’s boyfriend, Lamb. Molly lived with her

dad for the school year, visiting her mom every other weekend. During the

summer, she spent more time with her mom, sometimes weeks at a time. She

was nine years old when she testified against Lamb.

SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

       In his first issue, Lamb contends the trial court erred in denying Lamb’s

motion for a directed verdict because, he argues, there was no evidence

showing the acts of sexual abuse occurred over a period of 30 days or more. We

review an issue complaining about a trial court's failure to grant a motion for

directed verdict as a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. See Williams

v. State, 

937 S.W.2d 479, 482

 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996); Mills v. State, 

440 S.W.3d

69, 71

 (Tex. App.—Waco 2012, pet. ref'd).

       The Court of Criminal Appeals has expressed our standard of review of

a sufficiency issue as follows:

       When addressing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we
       consider whether, after viewing all of the evidence in the light most
       favorable to the verdict, any rational trier of fact could have found
       the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
       Jackson v. Virginia, 

443 U.S. 307, 319

, 

99 S. Ct. 2781

, 

61 L. Ed. 2d
560

 (1979); Villa v. State, 

514 S.W.3d 227, 232

 (Tex. Crim. App.
       2017). This standard requires the appellate court to defer "to the
       responsibility of the trier of fact fairly to resolve conflicts in the
       testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable
       inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts." Jackson, 

443 U.S. at
319

. We may not re-weigh the evidence or substitute our judgment
       for that of the factfinder. Williams v. State, 

235 S.W.3d 742

, 750

Lamb v. State                                                              Page 2
       (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). The court conducting a sufficiency review
       must not engage in a "divide and conquer" strategy but must
       consider the cumulative force of all the evidence. Villa, 

514 S.W.3d
at 232

. Although juries may not speculate about the meaning of
       facts or evidence, juries are permitted to draw any reasonable
       inferences from the facts so long as each inference is supported by
       the evidence presented at trial. Cary v. State, 

507 S.W.3d 750, 757

       (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (citing Jackson, 

443 U.S. at 319

); see also
       Hooper v. State, 

214 S.W.3d 9, 16-17

 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). We
       presume that the factfinder resolved any conflicting inferences
       from the evidence in favor of the verdict, and we defer to that
       resolution. Merritt v. State, 

368 S.W.3d 516, 525

 (Tex. Crim. App.
       2012). This is because the jurors are the exclusive judges of the
       facts, the credibility of the witnesses, and the weight to be given to
       the testimony. Brooks v. State, 

323 S.W.3d 893, 899

 (Tex. Crim.
       App. 2010). Direct evidence and circumstantial evidence are
       equally probative, and circumstantial evidence alone may be
       sufficient to uphold a conviction so long as the cumulative force of
       all the incriminating circumstances is sufficient to support the
       conviction. Ramsey v. State, 

473 S.W.3d 805, 809

 (Tex. Crim. App.
       2015); Hooper, 

214 S.W.3d at 13

.

       We measure whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient
       to support a conviction by comparing it to "the elements of the
       offense as defined by the hypothetically correct jury charge for the
       case." Malik v. State, 

953 S.W.2d 234, 240

 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).
       The hypothetically correct jury charge is one that "accurately sets
       out the law, is authorized by the indictment, does not
       unnecessarily increase the State's burden of proof or unnecessarily
       restrict the State's theories of liability, and adequately describes
       the particular offense for which the defendant was tried." Id.; see
       also Daugherty v. State, 

387 S.W.3d 654, 665

 (Tex. Crim. App.
       2013). The "law as authorized by the indictment" includes the
       statutory elements of the offense and those elements as modified
       by the indictment. Daugherty, 

387 S.W.3d at 665

.

Zuniga v. State, 

551 S.W.3d 729, 732-33

 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018).

       To establish the offense of continuous sexual abuse of a child, the State


Lamb v. State                                                              Page 3
must prove the following elements: (1) the defendant committed two or more

acts of sexual abuse—which includes as charged in this case, aggravated

sexual assault of a child and indecency with a child by sexual contact,

(2) during a period that is 30 or more days in duration, and (3) at the time of

the commission of each of the acts of sexual abuse, the defendant was 17 years

of age or older and the victim was a child younger than 14 years of age. TEX.

PENAL CODE § 21.02(b); see also id. §§ 21.11, 22.021.

       Lamb only challenges the sufficiency of the evidence as it relates to the

30 day or more duration element, number (2) above. He does not challenge the

evidence supporting any other element. Thus, we confine our discussion of this

issue to that element.

       The testimony showed that Molly asserted the sexual abuse by Lamb

occurred when she was seven years old.         Molly’s mom moved to an RV

park/trailer house on May 19, 2023 shortly after Molly’s seventh birthday.

Lamb moved in a few months later but had been coming to the residence as

soon as the mom moved in. Between her forensic interview and her testimony

at trial, Molly disclosed two instances of abuse by Lamb at the RV/trailer.

Molly’s mom then moved to a green or white house on December 1, 2023 and

lived there until June of 2024. Again, between her forensic interview and her

testimony at trial, Molly disclosed seven instances of abuse by Lamb at the


Lamb v. State                                                           Page 4
green/white house with one more instance disclosed during her SANE exam

occurring at an unnamed location. On April 4, 2024, Molly made an outcry of

sexual abuse by Lamb to a school employee.

       Lamb contends the State failed to present any evidence that the acts of

sexual abuse occurred over a period of 30 days. He faults the State for failing

to obtain testimony from Molly at least as to the time of the year or other

“reference point that might be familiar to a nine-year-old child in the fourth

grade.” He asserts that the acts could have occurred within 30 days, and

because of the State’s failure, the jury inappropriately speculated that the acts

occurred beyond the required time period.

       We agree that the State is required to prove that acts of sexual abuse

occurred “during a period that is 30 or more days in duration.” TEX. PENAL

CODE § 21.02(b)(1). In other words, there must be some proof, circumstantial

or direct, that the last act of sexual abuse occurred on at least the twenty-ninth

day after the day of the first act, although the exact dates of the abuse need

not be proven. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 21.02(b); Garrett v. State, 

693 S.W.3d

490

, 496 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2023, pet. ref'd); Turner v. State, 

573

S.W.3d 455, 461

 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2019, no pet.). However, in this case,

Molly was only seven years old and in the second grade when the abuse

occurred, and courts “give wide latitude to the testimony of child sexual abuse


Lamb v. State                                                             Page 5
victims.” Garrett, 693 S.W.3d at 496-97, quoting Turner, 

573 S.W.3d at 459

.

Further, “a child victim's description of what happened and when it occurred

need not be expressed with the same level of sophistication and detail that an

adult might use.” 

Id.


       Further, Lamb’s argument on appeal disregards the applicable standard

of review. We review the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury's

verdict. Viewed in that light and based on the testimony, the jury could

reasonably infer that the first act of sexual abuse occurred as early as May 19,

2023 when Molly and her mom moved to the RV/trailer with Lamb visiting

regularly and then moving in a few months later. Likewise, the jury could

reasonably infer that the last instance of sexual abuse occurred as late as

April 4, 2024, when Molly made her outcry and after she and her mom and

Lamb had been living together at the green/white house since December of

2023. This is especially compelling since Lamb had less access to Molly at the

green/white house during the school year, which was limited to every other

weekend, thus making it less likely that Lamb could have committed all the

offenses at that house within 30 days. Further, even if the jury had believed

that Molly delayed in her outcry, as Lamb posits, it still could have reasonably

determined that the first and last instances of sexual abuse occurred during “a

period that is thirty or more days in duration.”       See TEX. PENAL CODE


Lamb v. State                                                           Page 6
§ 21.02(b).

       Accordingly, because the evidence supports a reasonable inference and

conclusion by the jury that Lamb committed two or more acts of sexual abuse

over a period of thirty or more days, the evidence is sufficient to support Lamb’s

conviction. See Garrett v. State, 

693 S.W.3d 490

, 496 (Tex. App.—Houston

[14th Dist.] 2023, pet. ref'd); Turner v. State, 

573 S.W.3d 455, 461

 (Tex. App.—

Amarillo 2019, no pet.). Lamb’s first issue is overruled.

PAROLE INSTRUCTION

       In his second issue, Lamb contends the trial court erred by failing to

instruct the jury that he was ineligible for parole. Subsection 4(a) of article

37.07 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that, with certain exceptions,

in the punishment phase of a felony trial, a trial court must instruct a jury in

writing about a defendant's parole eligibility. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art.

37.07, § 4(a); Love v. State, 

706 S.W.3d 584

, 612 (Tex. App.—Austin 2024, pet.

ref'd). As one of the noted exceptions, the parole instruction is not required for

offenses arising under section 21.02 of the Penal Code, Continuous Sexual

Abuse of a Young Child.      See id.; TEX. PENAL CODE § 21.02.        Subsection

508.145(a)(2) of the Texas Government Code also provides that inmates

serving sentences for continuous sexual abuse are not eligible for release on

parole. See TEX. GOV'T CODE § 508.145(a)(2); Love, 706 S.W.3d at 612.


Lamb v. State                                                             Page 7
       Lamb has not pointed us to any authority, and we have found none, for

the proposition that a trial court errs by failing to instruct the jury on parole

ineligibility in a trial for continuous sexual abuse of a young child. Accordingly,

because there is case authority which holds to the contrary of Lamb’s

proposition, we conclude that the trial court's failure to include such an

instruction in the written charge was not error. See Love, 706 S.W.3d at 612

(failure to include parole instruction not error). See also Cross v. State, No. 09-

11-00406-CR, 

2012 Tex. App. LEXIS 10487

 at *13 (Tex. App.—Beaumont

Dec. 19, 2012, pet. ref'd) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (same).

Lamb’s second issue is overruled.

CONCLUSION

       Having overruled each of Lamb’s issues on appeal, we affirm the trial

court’s judgment.




                                             LEE HARRIS
                                             Justice

OPINION DELIVERED and FILED: October 29, 2026
Before Chief Justice Johnson,
       Justice Harris, and
       Justice Westerfeld
Affirmed
Do Not Publish
CRPM


Lamb v. State                                                              Page 8

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