Miscellaneous Etats-Unis

Sandom Baumgardner v. Brazos River Authority

Official source
                        Court of Appeals
                   Tenth Appellate District of Texas

                               10-25-00196-CV


                           Sandom Baumgardner,
                                Appellant

                                       v.

                          Brazos River Authority,
                                 Appellee



                            On appeal from the
             170th District Court of McLennan County, Texas
                       Judge Jim Meyer, presiding
                   Trial Court Cause No. 2017-3971-4

JUSTICE HARRIS delivered the opinion of the Court.

                       MEMORANDUM OPINION

      In five points of error, Appellant Sandom Baumgardner contends that

the trial court erred in granting judgment for Appellee Brazos River

Authority (the “BRA”) on each of Baumgardner’s and the BRA’s claims for

relief. In his first point of error, Baumgardner argues that the BRA’s denials

of his permits to construct a concrete boat entryway and on-water boat dock

for the benefit of his property were arbitrary and capricious. Relatedly, in his
fourth and fifth points of error, Baumgardner asserts that the trial court

erred in entering judgment for the BRA on its trespass and breach of

restrictive covenant claims because the BRA’s denials of his permit

applications were arbitrary and capricious. Finally, in his second and third

points of error, Baumgardner argues that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to

enter an injunction requiring Baumgardner to remove his improvements and

that, even if the trial court had jurisdiction, injunctive relief is not proper in

this case. We affirm.

                       I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND
                           PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A.     Factual Background

       Appellee Brazos River Authority is a political subdivision of the State of

Texas established as a conservation and reclamation district under Article

XVI, Section 59 of the Texas Constitution. Baumgardner v. Brazos River

Auth., 

714 S.W.3d 597

, 600, 603 (Tex. 2025). The BRA was established in

1929 for the purpose of managing portions of the watershed of the Brazos

River. 

Id. at 600

.

       In 1941, the BRA completed construction of the Morris Sheppard Dam,

which impounded water up to 1000 feet above mean sea level—known as the

“1000’ contour line”—to create Possum Kingdom Lake (the “Lake”). The BRA

has owned all of the property beneath the 1000’ contour line since the BRA

Baumgardner v. Brazos River Authority                                     Page 2
created the Lake. Additionally, prior to 2009, the BRA owned certain lots

adjacent to the Lake above the 1000’ contour line. The BRA leased many of

these lots to both residential and commercial occupants. By 2009, there were

approximately 1,500 residential leased lots at the Lake owned by the BRA.

       In 2009, the Texas Legislature passed HB 3031, codified as TEX. SPEC.

DIST. CODE § 8502.020, requiring the BRA to divest itself of, among other

property, its “Leased Tract,” comprising several lots that the BRA leased

prior to 2009.     TEX. SPEC. DIST. CODE § 8502.020(b)-(c).    The Legislature

further required the BRA to encumber the lots sold with certain enumerated

restrictive covenants. TEX. SPEC. DIST. CODE § 8502.020(d).

       The BRA sold all of the roughly 1,500 leased lots to Patterson PK Land

Partnership in October of 2010.         The special warranty deed delivered to

Patterson excluded from the conveyance all property beneath the 1000’

contour line, leaving that property under the BRA’s ownership. The deed

further specified that Patterson took the property subject to certain deed

restrictions—including those required by HB 3031—listed in a Declaration of

Restrictive Covenants, Easements, and Conditions filed by the BRA in the

official public records of Palo Pinto County, Texas. The Declaration provided

that divested lots were subject to the BRA’s Shoreline Management Plan, a




Baumgardner v. Brazos River Authority                                  Page 3
document created by the BRA in 2006 to manage and restrict the use of

property adjacent to the Lake.

        Patterson subsequently sold various lots in the Leased Tract, including

Lot 11, Area 12, District Tract 32-1-48, the lot at issue in this suit.

Baumgardner is the current owner of Lot 11, Area 12, District Tract 32-1-48.

Baumgardner acquired the property from the estate of Elton Bridges, who

had     acquired       the     property       from   Patterson.   Both   Bridges’s   and

Baumgardner’s recorded deeds provide that the Lot is subject to the

restrictions in the Declaration. Baumgardner further testified at trial that he

received a copy of the Shoreline Management Plan when he purchased the

property from Bridges.

        At the time Baumgardner acquired the property, it contained a house

as well as a dock and adjoining walkway for the benefit of his property. 1 The

Shoreline Management Plan prohibited the construction of additional

improvements beneath the 1000’ contour line or on the surface of the Lake

without prior approval from the BRA.

        In 2014, Baumgardner sought to dredge the property located beneath

the 1000’ contour line but above the shoreline of the Lake, which was over

200 feet beneath Baumgardner’s dock at the time. Further, Baumgardner



1 These structures are not at issue in this suit.



Baumgardner v. Brazos River Authority                                            Page 4
sought to construct a “concrete boat entry way,” 2 purportedly for “erosion

control.” Baumgardner contacted Kent Edwards, an inspection supervisor for

the BRA at the Lake, who informed Baumgardner that the BRA could not

grant him a permit for the boat entryway. Baumgardner claims here that

Edwards also informed him that he would need a permit from the U.S. Army

Corps of Engineers prior to completing any dredging work. Baumgardner

received approval from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to complete the

work on September 10, 2014.

           Four days later, Baumgardner submitted an application to the BRA for

a permit to complete the dredging work and construct the boat entryway.

The BRA responded by email, approving Baumgardner’s dredging work but

denying him permission to construct the concrete boat entryway. As grounds

for its denial, the BRA cited Section 3.7 of the Shoreline Management Plan,

which prohibits the construction of new privately-held boat ramps on “leased

lots.” 3




2 We will refer to the concrete boat entryway as either the “boat entryway” or the “boat ramp”
throughout this opinion.

3
  In October of 2014, the BRA amended the Regulations applicable to properties at the Lake to, in
part, provide that “[n]ew privately held boat ramps and rail systems [were] no longer authorized for
installation” on properties subject to the Regulations. The parties dispute whether, prior to this
amendment, Baumgardner raised the issue that Section 3.7 only applied to “leased lots,” which
Baumgardner apparently believed did not include his property.


Baumgardner v. Brazos River Authority                                                     Page 5
       Baumgardner built the boat ramp anyway. Construction of the boat

ramp, which was completed in April of 2015, was largely beneath the 1000’

contour line.     In April and May of 2015, the BRA sent three letters to

Baumgardner demanding that he remove the boat ramp. Baumgardner did

not do so. Baumgardner also failed to remove the boat ramp after receiving

demands from the BRA in November of 2016 and November of 2017, and the

boat ramp remained on the BRA’s property at the time of trial of this cause in

January of 2024.

       In October of 2017, Baumgardner submitted another application to the

BRA, seeking a permit to modify his existing dock and adjoining walkway to

attach a floating boat dock. 4 The BRA denied his application on the grounds

that it would not consider granting him a permit until he had resolved the

issues with the boat ramp. The BRA further threatened to revoke his permit

for the existing on-water facilities on the grounds that Baumgardner was in

default of the permit.

       Baumgardner installed the floating boat dock anyway.                 The BRA

discovered the boat dock in March of 2020. On March 20, 2020, the BRA

notified Baumgardner that his failure to remove the boat dock within 30 days




4 Throughout this opinion, we will refer to the boat ramp and boat dock together as “the
improvements.”

Baumgardner v. Brazos River Authority                                           Page 6
would amount to a trespass and a violation of BRA regulations.

Baumgardner did not remove the boat dock.

B.     Procedural History

       Baumgardner filed suit against the BRA in McLennan County District

Court in November of 2017, seeking a declaration that the BRA could not

require him to remove the boat ramp. The BRA removed the suit to the

Western District of Texas, Waco Division, and that court remanded the suit

back to the McLennan County District Court. Before remand, the BRA filed

its answer and asserted counterclaims against Baumgardner for trespass,

breach of restrictive covenant, and attorneys’ fees.

       Baumgardner        subsequently   amended   his   petition   to   assert     a

substantive due process claim against the BRA. Baumgardner alleged that

the BRA’s denials of his permit applications were arbitrary and capricious

and requested the court to order that his permit applications be approved.

The BRA sustained its counterclaims through remand and requested an

injunction ordering Baumgardner to remove the boat ramp and boat dock.

       The parties tried the case to a jury in January of 2024. The jury found

that Baumgardner’s boat ramp and boat dock trespassed on the BRA’s

property, that Baumgardner had breached the restrictive covenants by

constructing the improvements, and that the BRA’s denials of Baumgardner’s


Baumgardner v. Brazos River Authority                                      Page 7
permit applications were not arbitrary or capricious.           After denying

Baumgardner’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the trial

court entered judgment in accordance with the jury verdicts.

       The trial court granted the BRA’s requested injunction.       The final

injunction required Baumgardner to remove the portion of the boat ramp

beneath the 1000’ contour line and the entirety of the floating boat dock.

       Baumgardner appealed to this Court. After we determined that the

case may fall under the Fifteenth Court of Appeals’s exclusive appellate

jurisdiction, the Supreme Court of Texas transferred the appeal to the

Fifteenth Court. The BRA moved to re-transfer the appeal to this Court, and

the Fifteenth Court of Appeals forwarded the motion to the Texas Supreme

Court. The Supreme Court issued an opinion, reported at Baumgardner v.

Brazos River Authority, 

714 S.W.3d 597

 (Tex. 2025), in which it determined

that the appeal did not fall within the Fifteenth Court’s exclusive

jurisdiction. Accordingly, the Supreme Court transferred the case back to

this Court.

                                  II. JURISDICTION

       Both parties make jurisdictional arguments on appeal. In response to

Baumgardner’s first, fourth, and fifth points of error, the BRA argues that

the trial court lacked jurisdiction to review the BRA’s decisions on


Baumgardner v. Brazos River Authority                                   Page 8
Baumgardner’s permit applications. According to the BRA, it is entitled to

immunity from suit, and neither this Court nor the trial court has

jurisdiction to decide Baumgardner’s claims absent waiver or abrogation of

immunity.

         In his third point of error, Baumgardner argues that the trial court

erred in granting the BRA’s requested injunction because the injunction can

only be awarded through successful pursuit of a forcible detainer action.

Because the justice court has exclusive jurisdiction over forcible detainer

actions, Baumgardner contends the trial court lacked jurisdiction to grant the

injunction. We will address each of the preceding jurisdictional arguments in

order.

A.       Governmental Immunity

         The BRA argues that governmental immunity deprived the trial court

of jurisdiction to hear Baumgardner’s substantive due process claim. The

BRA is entitled to governmental immunity, which makes it immune from

both suit and liability. See Karl v. Brazos River Auth., 

494 S.W.3d 168, 171


(Tex. App.—Eastland 2015, pet. denied). Governmental immunity from suit

divests Texas courts of jurisdiction to hear claims filed against a

governmental unit absent waiver or abrogation of immunity. See State v.




Baumgardner v. Brazos River Authority                                 Page 9
Lueck, 

290 S.W.3d 876, 880

 (Tex. 2009); see also City of Dallas v. Albert, 

354

S.W.3d 368, 375

 (Tex. 2011).

       Issues of subject matter jurisdiction, including governmental immunity,

may be raised for the first time on appeal. 5 Rusk State Hosp. v. Black, 

392

S.W.3d 88, 94

 (Tex. 2012). We review issues of subject matter jurisdiction de

novo. Tex. Dept. of Parks and Wildlife v. Miranda, 

133 S.W.3d 217, 226

 (Tex.

2004). Because we address jurisdiction for the first time in this Court, we

“must construe the pleadings in favor of the party asserting jurisdiction”—

here, Baumgardner—“and, if necessary, review the record for evidence

supporting jurisdiction.” Id. at 96. If the pleadings or the record conclusively

negate jurisdiction, we must dismiss the claims; however, if the pleadings

and record neither demonstrate jurisdiction nor conclusively negate it, then

the BRA bears the burden to establish that Baumgardner “would be unable

to show the existence of jurisdiction if the cause were remanded to the trial

court and such opportunity afforded.” See id.; see also Harris Cnty. Fresh

Water Supply Dist. No. 61 v. Magellan Pipeline Co., L.P., 

649 S.W.3d 630

, 640

(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2022, pet. denied) (applying the Black

5 The BRA asserted governmental immunity in the trial court. However, in the pretrial hearing, the

BRA conceded that immunity did not apply to Baumgardner’s claims except to the extent
Baumgardner sought to recover attorney’s fees if successful in his defense of the BRA’s claim for
breach of the deed covenant. The trial court deferred its ruling on the issue of governmental
immunity as a bar to Baumgardner’s claim for attorney’s fees, stating it would decide the issue if the
jury found for Baumgardner on the BRA’s claim for breach of restrictive covenant. Because the jury
decided that claim in favor of the BRA, the trial court did not address the issue of governmental
immunity, and we address it as a jurisdictional issue for the first time here.

Baumgardner v. Brazos River Authority                                                       Page 10
standard of review where the governmental party did not raise governmental

immunity as a bar to jurisdiction prior to the entry of final judgment). Our

initial inquiry is whether the pleadings or record establish or conclusively

negate jurisdiction.

       Baumgardner argues on appeal that the BRA’s immunity is abrogated

since it asserted affirmative counterclaims for monetary relief, citing City of

Dallas v. Albert, 

354 S.W.3d 368, 375

 (Tex. 2011). The BRA’s assertion of

counterclaims, Baumgardner argues, required the BRA to participate in the

suit as a normal litigant not entitled to governmental immunity.             We

disagree.

       Where a governmental entity pursues affirmative claims for monetary

relief, including counterclaims, the entity’s immunity is judicially abrogated

as against opposing claims that are “germane to, connected with, and

properly defensive to” the entity’s claims and which serve to offset the entity’s

recovery on any of its claims. City of Dallas v. Albert, 

354 S.W.3d 368

, 374–

75 (Tex. 2011). An opposing party’s claim is germane to, connected with, and

properly defensive to the government’s claim where the opposing party’s

claim is relevant to and “would at least inferentially rebut” the government’s

claim.   

Id. at 375

.     An inferential rebuttal operates to rebut an essential




Baumgardner v. Brazos River Authority                                    Page 11
element of the claim relied upon for recovery. 

Id.

 (citing Dillard v. Tex. Elec.

Coop., 

157 S.W.3d 429, 430

 (Tex. 2005)).

       In its answer, the BRA asserted counterclaims for trespass, breach of

restrictive covenant, and injunctive relief. The counterclaims for trespass

and breach of covenant seek monetary relief. See Nazari v. State, 

561 S.W.3d

495

, 505–06 (Tex. 2018) (stating that Reata emphasizes a difference between

monetary relief “as opposed to injunctive and other types of relief”) (emphasis

orig.). Thus, governmental immunity does not apply if Baumgardner’s claims

are germane to, connected with, and properly defensive to the BRA’s trespass

and breach of covenant claims and if Baumgardner’s claims seek to offset any

recovery by the BRA on its affirmative claims.

       As provided in his Fourth Amended Petition, Baumgardner sought a

declaration that the BRA’s denial of his permit applications constituted

arbitrary and capricious conduct.       Baumgardner further alleged that the

BRA’s actions discriminated against him in violation of the Texas

Constitution and sought a declaration to that extent. Finally, Baumgardner

sought a declaration that the BRA does not have the right to fine or censure

him for his refusal to remove boat ramp or boat dock or to order him to

remove the improvements on the ground that the BRA’s denial of his permit

applications was wrongful.


Baumgardner v. Brazos River Authority                                   Page 12
          Baumgardner’s claims are not properly defensive to the BRA’s

counterclaims for monetary relief. The only issue on both the trespass and

breach of covenant claims is whether the BRA consented to Baumgardner’s

construction of the improvements on the BRA’s property. For Baumgardner

to show consent, he must have been authorized by the BRA to construct the

boat ramp and boat dock. 6 Baumgardner never obtained authorization from

the BRA.

          Notwithstanding his failure to obtain authorization, Baumgardner

requests that we order the permit applications to be granted if the BRA’s

denials of those applications were arbitrary and capricious. We do not have

authority to do so. See City of Shoreacres v. State, 

582 S.W.2d 211, 214

 (Tex.

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1979, writ ref’d n.r.e.). 7 In short, our power ends at

our determination, if any, that the BRA’s denials were arbitrary and

6 Section 7.01 of the Declaration provides that an owner or lessee of a Leased Tract—which the
evidence conclusively establishes includes Baumgardner’s property—must comply with the
restrictions found in the Shoreline Management Plan. Section 7(a) of Appendix A to the Plan
requires approval from a BRA Area Project Manager prior to installing new on-water facilities such
as the boat dock. Section 18(V) of the Plan prohibits “locating or constructing improvements on
Authority lands or waters without written permission (permit).” Hence, the Plan obligated
Baumgardner to obtain permits prior to constructing the boat ramp and boat dock.

7
    In Shoreacres, the First Court of Appeals stated:

          [A] court has no right to substitute its judgment and discretion for the judgment and
          discretion of the governing body upon whom the law visits the primary power and
          duty to act. Of course, if such governing body acts illegally, unreasonably, or
          arbitrarily, a court of competent jurisdiction may so adjudge, [b]ut there the power of
          the court ends.

    

Id.

 (quoting Barrington v. Cokinos, 

338 S.W.2d 133

 (Tex. 1960)).


Baumgardner v. Brazos River Authority                                                          Page 13
capricious. See, e.g., Lower Colo. River Auth. v. Tex. Dept. of Water Resources,

689 S.W.2d 873, 882

 (Tex. 1984) (setting aside, rather than issuing a denial

of, a permit erroneously granted by the Texas Department of Water

Resources); Starr Cnty. v. Starr Indus. Servs., Inc., 

584 S.W.2d 352, 356

 (Tex.

App.—Austin 1979, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (where governmental entity acted

arbitrarily and capriciously in denying the appellee’s permit application, “the

district court correctly… remanded the cause to the agency for further

proceedings”) (emphasis added). We cannot usurp the BRA’s statutory power

to make decisions on Baumgardner’s permit applications.         See TEX. SPEC.

DIST. CODE § 8502.020(d)(26).

       Even if we were to set aside the BRA’s permit denials, Baumgardner’s

claims would not be properly defensive to the BRA’s counterclaims because

Baumgardner never had the right to construct the improvements on the

BRA’s property.       Because setting aside the permit denials will not give

Baumgardner that right, Baumgardner’s claims cannot inferentially rebut

the lack of consent underlying the BRA’s counterclaims for trespass and

breach of restrictive covenant. See City of Dallas v. Albert, 

354 S.W.3d 368,

375

 (Tex. 2011). The BRA thus retains its immunity from suit despite its

assertion of affirmative counterclaims for monetary relief.




Baumgardner v. Brazos River Authority                                   Page 14
       We hold that the pleadings and record in this case conclusively negate

the existence of jurisdiction. The record reveals that Baumgardner’s claims

are not properly defensive to the BRA’s counterclaims, and the BRA’s

immunity is not abrogated. Baumgardner has not pointed to any statute

waiving the BRA’s immunity. 8 Accordingly, the trial court lacked jurisdiction

to hear Baumgardner’s substantive due process, equal protection, 9 and

declaratory judgment claims. We overrule Baumgardner’s first, fourth, and

fifth points of error.

B.     Jurisdiction to Grant Injunctive Relief

       In his third point of error, Baumgardner contends the trial court lacked

jurisdiction to issue a mandatory injunction requiring Baumgardner to

remove his improvements from the BRA’s property. Baumgardner argues

that this type of mandatory injunction can be awarded only in a forcible-

detainer proceeding over which the justice court has exclusive jurisdiction,

and that the trial court in this case did not have jurisdiction to grant the

injunction. We disagree.


8 Although Baumgardner did not raise it as a basis for waiver of immunity, the BRA argues that the

Texas Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act does not waive its immunity here because Baumgardner
has not challenged the validity of an ordinance or statute. See Schmitz v. Denton Cnty. Cowboy
Church, 

550 S.W.3d 342

, 353–54 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2018, pet. denied) (mem. op.). We agree.

9
 Though we do not address the equal protection claim, we note that the success of that claim would
also require invalidation of the BRA’s permit denials rather than a judicial grant of those permits to
Baumgardner. The equal protection claim thus fails to abrogate the BRA’s immunity for the same
reason as the substantive due process claim.

Baumgardner v. Brazos River Authority                                                       Page 15
       The justice court has original jurisdiction in cases of forcible entry and

detainer. Kassim v. Carlisle Interests, Inc., 

308 S.W.3d 537, 541

 (Tex. App.—

Dallas 2010, no pet.). The only issue in a forcible detainer action is the right

to immediate possession of the premises. Marshall v. Housing Auth. of San

Antonio, 

198 S.W.3d 782, 787

 (Tex. 2006).        The remedy for a successful

forcible detainer is a writ of possession, entitling the prevailing party to

immediate possession of the property enforceable by an officer of the

executive branch. TEX. PROP. CODE § 24.0061.

       Baumgardner relies solely on Kassim v. Carlisle Interests, Inc. to

support his jurisdictional argument.      

308 S.W.3d 537

 (Tex. App.—Dallas

2010, no pet.). In Kassim, a landlord terminated a lease after discovering

that the tenant had withheld sublease revenue in violation of the lease

agreement. 

Id. at 539

. The tenant filed suit against the landlord seeking a

temporary injunction requiring the landlord to reinstate the lease. 

Id.

 The

Fifth Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s grant of the injunction,

holding that, because the nature of the requested injunction concerned only

matters pertaining to the tenant’s right to immediate possession of the leased

premises, jurisdiction to award the injunction rested in the justice court. 

Id.

at 541

. According to that court, the requested injunction was available only




Baumgardner v. Brazos River Authority                                    Page 16
in a forcible detainer proceeding in the justice court. 

Id.

 We decline to follow

Kassim under the circumstances present in this suit.

       As the BRA points out, numerous Texas courts—including this Court—

recognize injunctive relief as a proper remedy for a trespass. E.g., Matador

Pipelines, Inc. v. Watson, 

626 S.W.2d 139, 141

 (Tex. App.—Waco 1981, writ

ref’d n.r.e.) (“The injunction was likewise proper as appellant was trespassing

on appellees’ property”); Beathard Joint Venture v. W. Houston Airport Corp.,

72 S.W.3d 432

 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2002, no pet.) (“where a trespass

invades the possession of a person’s land, or destroys the use and enjoyment

of that land, an injunction is a proper remedy”); Bass v. Champion Intl. Corp.,

787 S.W.2d 208, 211

 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 1990, no writ) (“an injunction

suit is proper against a ‘naked trespasser who forcibly or fraudulently

intrudes upon the land of an owner in possession’”) (quoting Frost v. Mischer,

463 S.W.2d 166

 (Tex. 1971)); Peter and Camella Scamardo, FLP v. 3D Farms,

No. 10-15-00163-CV, 

2016 WL 102633

 at *5 (Tex. App.—Waco Jan. 7, 2016,

pet. denied) (mem. op.).

       In Scamardo, Scamardo brought suit for trespass against 3D Farms,

the owner of property adjacent to Scamardo’s, after 3D Farms—similar to

Baumgardner—constructed             an   irrigation   canal   that   encroached   on

Scamardo’s property. See Scamardo, No. 10-15-00163-CV, 

2016 WL 102633



Baumgardner v. Brazos River Authority                                        Page 17
at *1. Scamardo, like the BRA, sought a mandatory permanent injunction

requiring 3D Farms to remove the encroachment. 

Id.

 We reversed the trial

court’s denial of the injunction and remanded for the trial court to grant the

injunction ordering the removal of the encroachments. Id. at *5. In doing so,

we recognized that a mandatory injunction is a proper remedy for trespass

provided the prerequisites for obtaining an injunction are met. See id.; see

also Allen v. Virginia Hill Water Supply Corp., 

609 S.W.2d 633, 635

 (Tex.

App.—Tyler 1980, no writ) (“when structures are placed on one’s property

without his consent, remedy may be had… by obtaining an injunction”).

       Texas courts have also recognized the propriety of injunctive relief as a

remedy for breach of restrictive covenant claims. E.g., Jim Rutherford Invs.,

Inc. v. Terramar Beach Cmty. Assoc., 

25 S.W.3d 845, 849

 (Tex. App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. denied) (affirming trial court’s grant of

injunction to homeowners’ association seeking to enforce restrictive

covenant); Musgrave v. Brookhaven Lake Prop. Owners Assoc., 

990 S.W.2d

386, 399

 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1999, pet. denied) (same); Park v. Escalera

Ranch Owners’ Assoc., 

457 S.W.3d 571, 600

 (Tex. App.—Austin 2015, no pet.)

(same); Dao v. Mission Bend Homeowners Assoc., 

667 S.W.3d 304

, 319 (Tex.

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2022, no pet.) (same); Gigowski v. Russell, 718




Baumgardner v. Brazos River Authority                                   Page 

18
S.W.2d 16, 21

 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1986, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (affirming trial court’s

award of injunction to homeowners seeking to enforce restrictive covenant).

       Moreover, the injunction in this case does not pertain to Baumgardner’s

right to possession of the BRA’s property because Baumgardner never had

the right to possess that property. Rather, the injunction simply gave effect

to the BRA’s right to remove Baumgardner’s wrongful improvements. See

Allen v. Virginia Hill Water Supply Corp., 

609 S.W.2d 633, 635-36

 (Tex.

App.—Tyler 1980, no writ). Kassim is thus inapposite, and the injunction

here is not one which the justice court has exclusive jurisdiction to grant.

       We hold that the trial court had jurisdiction to grant the injunction.

Baumgardner’s third point of error is overruled.

                             III. INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

       In his second point of error, Baumgardner contends the trial court

erred in awarding an injunction to the BRA ordering Baumgardner to remove

the improvements. To support this contention, Baumgardner makes several

distinct arguments. We will consider each of these arguments in turn.

       We review a trial court’s grant of injunctive relief for an abuse of

discretion. See Operation Rescue-National v. Planned Parenthood of Houston

and Se. Tex., Inc., 

975 S.W.2d 546, 560

 (Tex. 1998). A trial court abuses its

discretion when its decision is arbitrary, unreasonable, or without reference


Baumgardner v. Brazos River Authority                                    Page 19
to guiding rules or principles. Gilbreath v. Horan, 

682 S.W.3d 454

, 542 (Tex.

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2023, pet. denied). Specifically, a trial court has no

discretion to grant injunctive relief violative of constitutional guarantees or

without supporting evidence. Operation Rescue-National, 

975 S.W.2d at 560

.

In reviewing the trial court’s decision on injunctive relief, we do not

substitute our judgment for that of the trial court unless the trial court’s

action was so arbitrary that it exceeded the bounds of reasonable discretion.

Butnaru v. Ford Motor Co., 

84 S.W.3d 198, 204

 (Tex. 2002).

       To be entitled to a permanent injunction, a party must prove (1) a

wrongful act, (2) imminent harm, (3) an irreparable injury, and (4) the

absence of an adequate remedy at law. Pike v. Texas EMC Mgmt., LLC, 

610

S.W.3d 763

, 792 (Tex. 2020). Texas distinguishes between mandatory and

prohibitive injunctions—a mandatory injunction compels affirmative action

while a prohibitive injunction forbids status-quo-altering conduct.       Tex.

Health Huguley, Inc. v. Jones, 

637 S.W.3d 202

, 214-15 (Tex. App.—Fort

Worth 2021, no pet.). The injunction in this case is a mandatory injunction.

A.     Adequate Remedy at Law

       First, Baumgardner argues that the trial court abused its discretion by

granting the injunction because the BRA has an adequate remedy at law to

recover possession through either a forcible detainer action or through an


Baumgardner v. Brazos River Authority                                  Page 20
action for trespass to try title with an ancillary writ of sequestration. We

disagree.

       Texas courts are authorized to grant injunctive relief where there is no

“clear, full, and adequate relief at law.” Huynh v. Blanchard, 

694 S.W.3d

648

, 684 (Tex. 2024) (quoting Storey v. Cent. Hide & Rendering Co., 

226

S.W.2d 615, 619

 (Tex. 1950)). The remedy available at law as an alternative

to injunctive relief must be “as practical and efficient to the ends of justice

and its prompt administration as the remedy in equity.” Huynh, 694 S.W.3d

at 685 (quoting Brazos River Conservation and Reclamation Dist. v. Allen,

171 S.W.2d 842, 846

 (Tex. 1943)).

       The BRA does not have an action for forcible detainer. Such an action

requires proof of a landlord-tenant relationship. Aguilar v. Weber, 

72 S.W.3d

729, 733, 735

 (Tex. App.—Waco 2002, no pet.). In the absence of evidence in

the record establishing a landlord-tenant relationship between the BRA and

Baumgardner, 10 we cannot agree with Baumgardner that the BRA had an

adequate remedy in the form of a writ of possession granted from a successful

forcible detainer action.

       Further, a writ of sequestration does not constitute an adequate

remedy at law in this case. Although Baumgardner is correct that a writ of

10
   Indeed, Baumgardner made the lack of a landlord-tenant relationship an integral part of his
substantive due process claim.      In his appellate brief, Baumgardner states emphatically,
“[Baumgardner’s] purchase was of a fee simple interest. He did not lease the property[.]”

Baumgardner v. Brazos River Authority                                                Page 21
sequestration may be an adequate remedy at law preventing the issuance of

injunctive relief, Westside Airways, Inc. v. JR Aircraft Corp., 

694 S.W.2d 100,

103

 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, no writ), an injunction is a proper

remedy “against a naked trespasser who forcibly or fraudulently intrudes

upon the lands of an owner in possession.” Frost v. Mischer, 

463 S.W.2d 166,

168

 (Tex. 1971); McMahon v. Fender, 

350 S.W.2d 239

, 240–41 (Tex. App.—

Waco 1961, writ ref’d n.r.e.). Frost and McMahon stand for the proposition

that a writ of sequestration is a proper remedy only where the question of

title to the disputed property is at issue. Frost, 

463 S.W.2d at 168

 (citing

McMahon, 

350 S.W.2d 239

). Conversely, where the trespasser asserts no

legitimate claim to title of the disputed property—a “naked trespasser”—

trespass to try title is excused and an injunction is proper. See Frost, 

463

S.W.2d at 168

 (citing Ives v. Karnes, 

452 S.W.2d 737

, 740–41 (Tex. App.—

Corpus Christi 1970, no writ)).         Baumgardner is a naked trespasser who

cannot claim title to the land at the Lake beneath the 1000’ contour line.

Accordingly, an injunction is proper to remove Baumgardner’s improvements

from the BRA’s property.

       Moreover, the remedies suggested by Baumgardner as alternatives to

the injunction are neither as practical nor as efficient because injunctive

relief allowed the judge to tailor the remedy to the particular injuries present


Baumgardner v. Brazos River Authority                                   Page 22
in this case.     Baumgardner’s suggested remedies do not allow the same

tailoring, which is required to permit the BRA to fulfill its public duty under

the Texas Constitution to preserve the natural resources at the Lake. See

TEX. SPEC. DIST. CODE § 8502.001(a)-(c) (providing that the BRA “is created

under and is essential to accomplish the purposes of Section 59, Article XVI,

Texas Constitution”); TEX. CONST. ART. XVI, § 59(a) (“The preservation and

conservation of all such natural resources of the State [are]… hereby declared

public rights and duties”).

       For example, enforcement of writs of possession or sequestration may

create issues of federal preemption if approval from the U.S. Army Corps of

Engineers is required prior to removal of Baumgardner’s boat ramp. See

Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899 § 10, 

33 U.S.C. § 403

; Clean Water Act § 404,

33 U.S.C. § 1344

; see also BIC Pen Corp. v. Carter, 

251 S.W.3d 500, 504

 (Tex.

2008) (“state law is impliedly preempted if… state law obstructs

accomplishing and executing Congress’ full purposes and objectives”). The

injunction, on the other hand, mandates that Baumgardner seek approval

from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers prior to removing the installations.

Further,    writs    of   possession    and   sequestration   could   not   prevent

Baumgardner from using the boat ramp and boat dock prior to removal,

while the injunction in this case expressly prohibited Baumgardner from


Baumgardner v. Brazos River Authority                                       Page 23
doing so. 11 The inability of writs of possession and sequestration to prevent

Baumgardner’s use of the ramp prior to removal make them inadequate in

comparison to the injunction issued here.

       The BRA cannot pursue a forcible detainer action, and an injunction is

proper in lieu of a writ of sequestration against a naked trespasser like

Baumgardner.          Further, neither a writ of possession nor a writ of

sequestration could redress the BRA’s injury as efficiently or practically as

the injunction issued in this suit. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse

its discretion in deciding the BRA had no adequate remedy at law.

B.     Irreparable Harm

       Baumgardner argues that the trial court erred in granting the

injunction because the BRA failed to sufficiently establish irreparable harm.

Baumgardner’s arguments to this extent may be divided among the trespass

and breach of covenant claims. On the trespass claim, Baumgardner argues

that, to qualify for a mandatory injunction, 12 the BRA was required to

present evidence of irreparable harm.               On the breach of covenant claim,

11 Michael McClendon, the Upper Basin Regional Manager for the BRA, testified at trial that the

introduction of contaminants from boats launched in the Lake was one of the BRA’s particular
concerns in denying applications to construct boat ramps.

12
   Baumgardner asserts that the BRA was required to show extreme hardship to obtain a mandatory
injunction. We disagree. A showing of extreme hardship to obtain a mandatory injunction is only
required for temporary injunctions, where mandatory injunctive relief is viewed as problematic
because it alters the status quo. Henry v. Smith, 

637 S.W.3d 226

, 244 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2021,
pet. denied). Moreover, we have authorized mandatory injunctions in the absence of a finding of
extreme hardship. Peter and Camella Scamardo, FLP v. 3D Farms, No. 10-15-00163-CV, 

2016 WL
102633

 at *5 (Tex. App.—Waco 2016, pet. denied).

Baumgardner v. Brazos River Authority                                                   Page 24
Baumgardner argues that, in the absence of irreparable harm, the trial court

erred in granting the injunction because it did not find that Baumgardner’s

breach was substantial or distinct.        Even if it did make such a finding,

Baumgardner argues, the evidence is legally insufficient to support the

finding.     Finally, Baumgardner argues that, even if his breach was

substantial or distinct, the trial court erred in granting the injunction

because the BRA failed to establish that it suffered any injury arising from

his breach. We address each of these contentions in turn.

       1.     Trespass

       Baumgardner asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in

granting the injunction because the BRA failed to establish irreparable harm.

We disagree.

       Texas courts have recognized that where a person repeatedly or

continuously trespasses on another’s property, an injunction is the proper

remedy because the requirements of inadequate remedy at law and

irreparable harm are satisfied.         E.g., Bass v. Champion Intl. Corp., 

787

S.W.2d 208, 211

 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 1990, no pet.) (“when a person

repeatedly trespasses on one’s property, the remedy of injunction is

appropriate to restrain such continued trespasses. Thus the requirements of

no adequate remedy at law and irreparable damage are satisfied.”);


Baumgardner v. Brazos River Authority                                   Page 25
Beathard, 72 S.W.3d at 432 (“an injunction is also a proper remedy to

restrain repeated or continuing trespasses… In such situations, the

requirements of no adequate remedy at law and irreparable damage are

satisfied”); Aguilar v. Morales, 

162 S.W.3d 825, 836

 (Tex. App.—El Paso

2005, pet. denied) (stating that injunctive relief is a proper remedy on a

successful claim for repeated or continuous trespass); Henry v. Smith, 

637

S.W.3d 226

, 241–43 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2021, pet. denied) (holding trial

court abused its discretion in denying permanent mandatory injunction

where “the evidence conclusively established that Lessees trespassed on

Surface Owners’ estate, which trespass started prior to the filing of suit and

continued through the time of trial”).

       In Henry, the owners of a mineral surface estate brought a trespass

claim seeking a permanent mandatory injunction requiring several mineral

lessees to remove “junk, trash, discarded equipment, and other personal

property” left on the surface owners’ land. Henry, 637 S.W.3d at 242. The

trial court denied the injunction. Id. at 241. In reversing and remanding for

the trial court to enter a permanent injunction against the lessees, the Henry

court did not require the surface owners to show that additional harm beyond

the continuing or repeated trespass occurred, instead relying on the well-

settled rule that, where a trespasser engages in repeated or continuous


Baumgardner v. Brazos River Authority                                 Page 26
trespasses, an injunction is a proper remedy.        See id. at 242–243 (citing

Aguilar v. Morales, 

162 S.W.3d 825, 836

 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2005, pet.

denied)).

       Baumgardner’s wrongfully constructed improvements have remained

on the BRA’s property for the better part of a decade and were not removed

prior to trial. Like in Henry, the continuing trespass is the imminent and

irreparable injury for which no adequate remedy at law exists. See Henry,

637 S.W.3d at 243 (citing Beathard Joint Venture v. W. Houston Airport

Corp., 

72 S.W.3d 432

 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2002, no pet.)).              Unless

enjoined, Baumgardner would continue to use the BRA’s property without

permission or consent, subjecting the BRA to an indefinite loss of its

exclusive right to use the property beneath the 1000’ contour line at the Lake.

See Sunrise Helicopters, Inc. v. Nw. Airport Mgmt., Inc., No. 14-99-00274-CV,

2001 WL 253591

 at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Mar. 15, 2001, pet.

denied) (not designated for publication) (“absent an injunction, Sunrise would

continue to trespass on Northwest’s airport facilities… These repeated

trespasses on Northwest’s airport satisfy the requirements for issuance of a

permanent injunction”).         The trial court did not abuse its discretion in

granting an injunction under these circumstances.




Baumgardner v. Brazos River Authority                                   Page 27
       Considering the substantial precedent in Texas finding that an

injunction is proper to restrain repeated or continuing trespasses, we hold

that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting an injunction to

remedy Baumgardner’s trespass.

       2.     Breach of Restrictive Covenant

       Baumgardner contends that the BRA failed to establish irreparable

harm resulting from his breach of the restrictive covenants. According to

Baumgardner, in the absence of a showing of irreparable harm, the trial

court abused its discretion in granting the injunction because it did not find

that Baumgardner’s breaches were substantial or distinct. Even if the trial

court did make such a finding, Baumgardner argues, the evidence is legally

insufficient to support it.       Even if his breach was substantial or distinct,

Baumgardner furthers, the BRA failed to make the requisite showing of harm

to justify the grant of the injunction.             We disagree with each of

Baumgardner’s contentions.

              a.     Substantial or Distinct Breach

       The BRA argues that when a breach of a covenant was substantial or

distinct, evidence of irreparable harm is not required to obtain an injunction

enforcing the covenant. According to the BRA, the trial court found that




Baumgardner v. Brazos River Authority                                     Page 28
Baumgardner’s breach was substantial or distinct, and, thus, the BRA was

not required to establish irreparable harm. We agree.

       Texas follows the well-settled rule that a restrictive covenant may be

enforced through injunctive relief where the party seeking to enforce the

covenant shows a substantial or distinct breach of the covenant. Protestant

Episcopal Church Council of Diocese of Tex. v. McKinney, 

339 S.W.2d 400,

403-04

 (Tex. Civ. App.—Eastland 1960, writ ref’d). Indeed, a party seeking

an injunction to enforce a restrictive covenant “is not required to show proof

of irreparable injury.” Munson v. Milton, 

948 S.W.2d 813, 815

 (Tex. App.—

San Antonio 1997, pet. denied); see also Jim Rutherford Invs., Inc. v.

Terramar Beach Cmty. Assoc., 

25 S.W.3d 845, 849

 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th

Dist.] 2000, pet. denied) (holding that the rule from Munson applies to

permanent injunctions).

       Baumgardner is correct that neither the jury nor the trial court

expressly found that Baumgardner had distinctly or substantially breached

the covenants. 13 The BRA first raised the question at a post-trial hearing on

Baumgardner’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, where

Baumgardner’s counsel argued, as he does here, that the BRA cannot obtain

an injunction because it failed to show irreparable harm at trial. The trial


13 The question of substantial or distinct breach was not submitted to the jury, and neither the BRA

nor Baumgardner objected to its omission.

Baumgardner v. Brazos River Authority                                                     Page 29
court rejected Baumgardner’s argument after the BRA contended that a

showing of irreparable harm is not required to grant injunctive relief

remedying a substantial or distinct breach.                   We believe this record is

sufficient to constitute a finding by the trial court that Baumgardner’s

breaches were substantial or distinct.              See PDT Holdings, Inc. v. City of

Dallas, 

712 S.W.3d 597

, 603 (Tex. 2025) (implying factual findings necessary

to support the trial court’s conclusion on a question of law).

       Baumgardner further asserts that, even if the trial court did find that

Baumgardner substantially or distinctly breached the covenant, the evidence

is legally insufficient to support such a finding. 14                   The test for legal

sufficiency is whether the evidence would enable reasonable and fair-minded

people to reach the decision under review.                 City of Keller v. Wilson, 

168

S.W.3d 802, 827

 (Tex. 2005).             We must credit evidence favorable to the

decision if reasonable jurors could and disregard contrary evidence unless

reasonable jurors could not. 

Id.


       We hold that the evidence in the record is legally sufficient to support

an implied finding of substantial or distinct breach. A substantial or distinct

breach of a restrictive covenant occurs where the breaching party intends to

breach the covenant by engaging in conduct precisely prohibited by the

14 To the extent Baumgardner also sought to challenge the factual sufficiency of the evidence, we

agree with the BRA that Baumgardner has waived such a challenge by failing to file a motion for
new trial. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 324(b)(2).

Baumgardner v. Brazos River Authority                                                   Page 30
covenant. Munson v. Milton, 

948 S.W.2d 813, 815

 (Tex. App.—San Antonio

1997, pet. denied); see also WLR, Inc. v. Borders, 

690 S.W.2d 663, 668

 (Tex.

App.—Waco 1985, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (affirming trial court’s finding of

substantial breach where the defendant’s conduct was “precisely the type of

conduct sought to be prohibited by the covenant”). Based on the evidence in

the record, a reasonable factfinder could conclude that Baumgardner directly

violated the restrictive covenants by constructing the improvements on the

BRA’s property. 15 Accordingly, the evidence is legally sufficient to support

the trial court’s implied finding that Baumgardner’s breaches were

substantial or distinct. See Jim Rutherford Invs., Inc. v. Terramar Beach

Cmty. Ass’n, 

25 S.W.3d 845, 850

 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet.

denied) (finding substantial breach where party purchased land with

knowledge of restrictions and “promptly violated” them).

               b.     Proof of Injury

       Baumgardner contends that, although a party need not show an

irreparable harm to obtain an injunction remedying a substantial or distinct

breach of covenant, the BRA was required to show some evidence of harm

resulting from Baumgardner’s breaches to obtain the injunction. Because the

15 Specifically, Baumgardner violated both Section 18(V) and Section 7(a) of Appendix A to the

Shoreline Management Plan by failing to obtain approval from the BRA prior to constructing either
improvement. Because Section 7.01 of the Declarations obligated Baumgardner to comply with the
restrictions in the Plan, a reasonable factfinder could conclude that Baumgardner substantially and
distinctly breached Section 7.01 of the Declaration with regard to both improvements.

Baumgardner v. Brazos River Authority                                                     Page 31
BRA did not show proof of any injury, Baumgardner argues the trial court

erred in granting the injunction. We agree with Baumgardner that the BRA

had to show some harm to obtain the injunction; however, we hold that the

trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the injunction because the

evidence establishes that the BRA suffered harm resulting from the breaches.

       Our Court’s only prior reported case applying the breach-of-covenant

exception to the ordinary injunction framework is instructive. See WLR, Inc.

v. Borders, 

690 S.W.2d 663, 668

 (Tex. App.—Waco 1985, writ ref’d).            In

Borders, Borders, the owner of a grocery store, sued WLR, a proprietor of a

purported convenience store, seeking to enforce by injunction a restrictive

covenant prohibiting WLR from selling groceries on its property. 

Id. at 665

.

We approved Borders’s requested injunction because WLR’s breach of the

covenant created direct competition for Borders’ grocery store—the very harm

the covenant sought to prevent. See 

id. at 668

. Notably, we only required

Borders to show that he suffered some injury but did not require Borders to

establish any particular amount of damages resulting from the breach. See

id. at 668

.

       The BRA established an injury caused by Baumgardner’s breach of the

covenant sufficient to justify the issuance of an injunction. A loss of exclusive

rights to use and possess real property is a concrete injury. See Musgrave v.


Baumgardner v. Brazos River Authority                                    Page 32
Brookhaven Lake Prop. Owners Ass’n, 

990 S.W.2d 386, 399

 (Tex. App.—

Texarkana 1999, pet. denied); see also City of Killeen v. Oncor Elec. Delivery

Co. LLC, 

709 S.W.3d 746

, 758 (Tex. App.—Austin 2025, no pet.) (“Oncor’s

claims are ripe because it has shown a threat of litigation in the immediate

future that could lead to the concrete injury of the loss of possession of the

Streetlight System”) (emphasis added). The record in this case conclusively

establishes that Baumgardner’s boat dock and boat ramp deprived the BRA

of its exclusive rights to use and possess the property. As such, we hold that

the BRA established an injury sufficient to justify the grant of an injunction

in this case.

C.     Insolvency

       Finally, Baumgardner argues that the trial court abused its discretion

because a mandatory injunction should not be granted in the absence of

evidence establishing that Baumgardner is insolvent.          To support this

argument, Baumgardner relies on Bagley v. Higginbotham, 

353 S.W.2d 868,

869

 (Tex. Civ. App.—Beaumont 1962, writ ref’d n.r.e.).        There, the court

stated:

       Appellant did not offer any evidence that appellee was insolvent
       and unable to respond in damages; hence he failed in his proof to
       negative the existence of an adequate legal remedy… The granting
       of an injunction in violation [sic] of this time honored provision,
       that is, in the face of an adequate remedy at law, constitutes an


Baumgardner v. Brazos River Authority                                   Page 33
       erroneous abuse of the discretionary powers vested in the
       chancellor.

Bagley, 

353 S.W.2d at 869

 (emphasis added).

       Baumgardner’s argument misconstrues the Bagley opinion. Bagley did

not posit a general rule—as Baumgardner seems to contend—that mandatory

injunctions are unavailable absent proof of insolvency of the party resisting

the injunction. Rather, as the above language shows, the court determined

that monetary damages could redress the appellant’s injury and that the

absence of proof that the appellee was insolvent meant that the appellee

could afford to pay a monetary judgment. See 

id.

 Monetary damages, then,

were an adequate remedy at law precluding the grant of injunctive relief. See

id.


       Monetary damages are not adequate in this case. The BRA continues

to suffer a deprivation of its rights to exclusive use and possession of its

property. Monetary damages are clearly insufficient to restore the BRA’s

exclusive use and possession. 16        See, e.g., Sunrise Helicopters, Inc. v. Nw.

Airport Mgmt., Inc., No. 14-99-00274-CV, 

2001 WL 253591

 at *2 (Tex. App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] Mar. 15, 2001, pet. denied) (not designated for

publication) (“absent an injunction, Sunrise would continue to trespass on

Northwest’s airport facilities”). Bagley is thus inapposite to this case, and

16 Additionally, Baumgardner does not contend here that monetary damages are an adequate

remedy for the BRA’s injuries.

Baumgardner v. Brazos River Authority                                           Page 34
Baumgardner’s solvency is irrelevant to whether an adequate remedy at law

exists for the BRA.

       We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the

injunction. The BRA has no adequate remedy at law. Injunctions are proper

to remedy a trespass under these circumstances. Additionally, the evidence

sufficiently establishes injunctive relief was proper for Baumgardner’s

substantial and distinct breach of the covenant. 17 Finally, Baumgardner’s

solvency is not relevant to the grant of injunctive relief in this case.

Baumgardner’s second point of error is overruled.

                                      IV. CONCLUSION

       We affirm the trial court’s entry of judgment in favor of the BRA on its

affirmative counterclaims and the grant of an injunction requiring

Baumgardner to remove the concrete boat entryway and on-water boat dock

to the extent those installations transcend the 1000’ contour line.



                                                         LEE HARRIS
                                                         Justice




17 Because we uphold the grant of injunctive relief on the BRA’s breach of restrictive covenant claim,

we hold that the trial court did not err in granting attorney’s fees to the BRA as the prevailing party
on that claim. See TEX. PROP. CODE § 5.006.

Baumgardner v. Brazos River Authority                                                         Page 35
OPINION DELIVERED and FILED: October 29, 2026
Before Chief Justice Johnson and
       Justice Harris 18
Affirmed
CV06




18
  This matter was argued on September 17, 2026, before Chief Justice Johnson, Justice Smith, and Justice Harris.
Justice Steve Smith retired effective September 30, 2026, so this Opinion is not before Justice Smith and can be
decided by two justices. TEX. R. APP. P. 41.1.

Baumgardner v. Brazos River Authority                                                                Page 36

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