Civil United Kingdom
MEX GROUP WORLDWIDE LIMITED v ADAM DUTHIE
Neutral Citation Number: [2026] EWHC 2803 (KB)
Case No: KB-2024-001296
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
KING’S BENCH DIVISION
Royal Courts of Justice
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL
Date: 30 October 2026
Before :
Mr Justice Cavanagh
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Between :
| MEX GROUP WORLDWIDE LIMITED | Claimant | |
| – and – | ||
| (1) ADAM DUTHIE (2) DUTHIE CONSULTANTS LIMITED |
Defendants |
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– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –
Caley Wright (instructed by Stephenson Harwood) for the Claimant
The First Defendant represented himself
Hearing date: 30 October 2026
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JUDGMENT
Mr Justice Cavanagh:
1. This has been a hearing to deal with a number of applications for directions that relate to a contempt hearing that is currently listed to take place next week, in a window starting on Wednesday 4 November 2026, with a time estimate of 3 days. This means that there are only two working days before the hearing is due to commence.
2. I am giving this judgment orally at the end of the hearing. I will arrange for it to be published in writing, and uploaded to CE-File, in case it may assist the judge who deals with the contempt hearing.
3. The contempt application was issued by the Claimant against the First Respondent, Mr Adam Duthie, on 25 September 2025 and was served on Mr Duthie on 21 October 2025.
4. By an order dated 13 March 2026, Andrew Kinneir KC, sitting as a Deputy High Court judge, gave directions for the contempt hearing. These included that Mr Duthie should file and serve any evidence on which he wished to rely by 10 April 2026 and the Claimant should serve evidence in reply by 24 April 2026. The judge ordered that the hearing of the contempt application would be listed for three days and would be concerned only with determination of whether the alleged contempt is proven to the required standard.
5. In a further order dated 15 May, Jeremy Brier KC, also a Deputy High Court Judge, ordered that there be expedition of the contempt hearing, to start on the first available date after 1 October 2026. The order for expedition was made by consent. As I have said, the hearing has been listed to begin next week. This has been known to the parties for some months. They were notified on or about 8 July 2026.
The applications
6. I have before me four applications which have been made by Mr Duthie, who is now a litigant in person. He is, however, also a very experienced solicitor, albeit a corporate lawyer rather than a litigator, and, as his skeleton argument makes clear, is very articulate and knowledgeable about law and procedure. He put his points very well in oral argument. He was previously represented by counsel in these proceedings. The Claimant is represented by Mr Caley Wright of counsel and I am also grateful to him for his helpful skeleton argument and oral submissions.
7. The first of Mr Duthie’s applications is an application made on 5 October 2026 for various directions in relation to next week’s hearing. Until last night, the most up to date draft of the order for directions that he seeks was at page 40 of the Application bundle, and runs to nearly 8 pages.
8. The second application is dated 20 October 2026. This is to rely upon the affidavits of Mr Raed Salahat and Mr Yazan Khalil Almashene.
9. The third application, dated 28 October 2026, is an application to adjourn next week’s contempt hearing. Mr Duthie says that this is necessary in order to enable there to be compliance with the orders that he seeks in his other applications. This is his primary application.
10. Late last night, after 10 pm, Mr Duthie filed a further draft order. This was sent informally by email. There has been no application notice. This proposes that the hearing next week should take place but should be limited to what Mr Duthie referred to as Stage 1. He proposed that Stage 1 would concern the proper construction of the Undertakings and the factual and legal issues arising under Grounds 1 and 2 of the Contempt Application, insofar as those issues can fairly be determined without resolving his separate abuse of process defence. Stage 2 would be dealt with at a separate hearing. This would concern the Mr Duthie's contention that the Contempt Application has been instituted or pursued as an abuse of process, including the evidence relevant to that contention and the relief, if any, appropriate upon its determination. Mr Duthie’s revised Draft Order also made provision for various directions to be made in advance of Stage 2, which broadly mirror the directions that he sought in his previous Draft Order.
11. The Claimant has issued one application notice. This is to rely upon the second affidavit of Benjamin Sigler, a partner in Stephenson Harwood, the Claimant’s solicitors, at the contempt hearing. The Claimant has also applied to the court for dismissal of Mr Duthie’s applications of 5 and 20 October 2026, save that he should be permitted to rely upon paragraphs 7-23 of his second affidavit dated 24 September 2026.
The issues for the contempt hearing
12. Before I address the parties’ applications, I must begin by identifying the issues that will be considered at next week’s contempt hearing. There is a fundamental disagreement between the parties about the scope of the hearing, and resolution of this issue will go a considerable way towards helping the court to determine what should be done in relation to the applications.
13. Mr Duthie is, as I have said, a practising solicitor and was previously General Counsel to the MultiBank Group, the group of companies of which the Claimant is the holding company. Mr Duthie (and the Second Defendant, a service company through which Mr Duthie provided legal services) ceased acting for the Claimant and the MultiBank Group on or around 30 July 2023.
14. The underlying claim relates to allegations by the Claimant that Mr Duthie has retained, disclosed, and misused confidential information belonging to the Claimant, in breach of contractual and equitable obligations owed to the Claimant. Mr Duthie’s main defence is the “fraud” or iniquity defence.
15. The claim was filed on 23 April 2024. On 2 May 2024, the Claimant applied for interim relief to restrain Mr Duthie from continuing to misuse the confidential information in his possession, to cease assisting parties adverse to the MultiBank Group in litigation, and to return the confidential information in his possession.
16. An interim hearing was listed for July 2024, but the application was ultimately compromised by Mr Duthie giving undertakings (“the Undertakings”). These were set out in the schedule to an order made by consent by Sweeting J on 26 July 2024. The order contained a penal notice. The Undertakings provide, in relevant part:
“The First Defendant and the Second Defendant, whether by its employees or agents or otherwise howsoever, shall not until the trial of this matter or further order of the Court:
a. disclose to any person or make any use of any of the information which is the subject of this claim and identified in Schedule 1 to this Order (the "Information'') other than:
i. by way of disclosure to the Defendants' legal advisers for the purpose of obtaining legal advice in relation to these proceedings;
ii. for the purpose of carrying this Order into effect; or
iii. as required by law.
b. assist the defendants in:
i. Proceedings in the King's Bench Division of the High Court, claim number KB-2023-004010;
ii. Proceedings in the Court of Session in Scotland, claim number CA94/23; or
iii. Any related proceedings;
in the defence of those proceedings (collectively "the Proceedings'').
c. (save in so far as it is reasonably necessary for the First Defendant to receive updates on the status of the Proceedings in his capacity as a director of Melville Consulting Partners, the Fifth Defendant in the Proceedings) communicate with the defendants in the Proceedings concerning any matters relating to the subject matter of the Proceedings or any other related proceedings involving the Multibank Group in any jurisdiction;”
17. The Claimant claims that Mr Duthie breached these Undertakings. The evidence in support is set out in a witness statement of Mr Mark Hastings, a partner in the Claimant’s then solicitors, and in the affidavit of a Mr Ali Hasan. The alleged contempts are that Mr Duthie breached the Undertakings in the following manner:
“Ground 1
1. On 1 April 2025, the Defendants filed a skeleton argument (the “Duthie Skeleton”) in these proceedings, relating to the Claimant’s application to strike out their defence and/or for summary judgment in its favour.
2. Just under two weeks later, on 14 April 2025, the Third Defendant, Mr Colm Smith, to the proceedings in the King’s Bench Division of the High Court, claim number KB-2023-004010 (the “WFO Proceedings”), between the Claimant and a number of defendants, filed a witness statement in the WFO Proceedings (“Smith 5”). The witness statement contains long passages which are substantially identical to the Duthie Skeleton, with only minor sense changes. Mr Smith, in drafting Smith 5, had access to and copied from the Duthie Skeleton.
3. It is to be inferred (and it is the Claimant’s case) that Mr Duthie provided the Duthie Skeleton to Mr Smith (whether directly or otherwise). This is to be inferred from: (1) the substantial identicality of the documents as stated above such that it is clear that Smith 5 was in large part drawn from the Duthie Skeleton; (2) the fact that the Duthie Skeleton was used at a hearing of which at least parts were in private, and no one other than the parties and their legal advisers attended the hearing. There was no way for Mr Smith to obtain the Duthie Skeleton otherwise than from (whether directly or indirectly) Mr Duthie; and (3) Mr Duthie, through his solicitors, has failed to deny that Mr Duthie had provided the Duthie Skeleton to Mr Smith.
4. In providing the Duthie Skeleton to Mr Smith, Mr Duthie was communicating with one of the “defendants to the Proceedings”, which included the WFO Proceedings, concerning a matter “relating to the subject matter of the Proceedings or any other related proceedings involving the Multibank Group in any jurisdiction”, in breach of paragraph 1(c) of the undertakings given by Mr Duthie.
Ground 2
1. Secondly, the Claimant has recently discovered that Mr Duthie has been acting in concert with (and communicating with) Mr Michael Gollits, since at least 12 August 2025 and thereafter until at least 25 September 2025, the Fourth Defendant to the WFO Proceedings and the Fourth Defender to the Proceedings in the Court of Session, in attempting to induce a former consultant of a company formerly within the Multibank Group, named Raed Salahat, to produce and/or give (false) documents and evidence regarding the conduct of proceedings involving a MultiBank Group company, Multibank FX International Corporation, in the BVI, number BVIHCOM 2020/0215, 2021/0003 & 2021/0073 (the “BVI Proceedings”). The BVI Proceedings are “related proceedings involving the Multibank Group in any jurisdiction”. (For the avoidance of doubt the falsity or otherwise of those documents and evidence does not affect the fact of the breach asserted below).
2. In particular, Mr Duthie attended various meetings, one or more of which were held by video, including meetings with Mr Gollits and Mr Ali Hasan on or around 12 August 2025, 19 August 2025 and 23 August 2025.
3. In communicating with Mr Gollits in relation to the BVI Proceedings, Mr Duthie was in breach of paragraph 1(c) of the undertakings given by Mr Duthie. The BVI Proceedings fall within the definition of “related proceedings involving the MultiBank Group in any jurisdiction”, as set out in 1(c) of the Undertakings. MBFX, which is a member of the MultiBank Group, is a defendant to the BVI Proceedings: they are accordingly “proceedings involving the MultiBank Group”.
18. Mr Duthie denies that he is in contempt.
19. The Claimant says that there are two issues that will need to be determined at the contempt hearing in order to determine whether Mr Duthie has acted in breach of the Undertakings and so has been in contempt. The first is the true interpretation of the nature and scope of the Undertakings. The second is what Mr Duthie did or did not do.
20. The Claimant says, therefore, that the scope of the hearing is relatively narrow.
21. Mr Duthie, on the other hand, whilst denying that he has breached the Undertakings, says that he will argue in addition at the contempt hearing that the Claimant, or its Chairman and controlling mind, a Mr Tahar, are making use of the contempt proceedings for an improper collateral purpose, namely to intimidate and to put pressure on him, and that this means that the contempt application is an abuse of process. He says that the Claimant is not really interested in enforcing the undertakings but has an ulterior motive, and that the contempt application is being deployed as an instrument of punishment and intimidation by Mr Taher, acting through the Claimant, as part of a much wider course of egregious litigation which is summarised in the skeleton argument and in its annexe. He contends that Mr Taher and the Claimant act spitefully and improperly towards their litigation opponents. In this case, the Claimant has made very serious allegations about the circumstances in which the contempt is alleged to have taken place. It goes beyond an allegation of a simple breach of the Undertakings.
22. At paragraph 49 of his skeleton argument for this hearing, Mr Duthie said:
“The Respondent's case is that the Contempt Application is being used not for the legitimate enforcement of the Undertakings but to punish, intimidate and exert pressure upon him. He intends to invite the substantive judge to consider whether the evidence, taken as a whole, establishes an abuse of the Court's process warranting dismissal or a stay.”
23. Mr Duthie referred in his skeleton argument to the judgment of Briggs J in Sectorguard plc v Dienne plc [2009] EWHC 2693 (Ch), at paragraphs 44-47, in which Briggs J said that an application which leads merely to the establishment of a purely technical contempt may lead to the applicant having to pay the respondent’s costs. At paragraph 47, Briggs J said:
“Committal proceedings are an appropriate way, albeit as a last resort, of seeking to obtain the compliance by a party with the court’s order (including undertakings contained in orders), and they are also an appropriate means of bringing to the court’s attention serious rather than technical, still less involuntary, breaches of them. In my judgment the court should, in the exercise of its case management powers be astute to detect cases in which contempt proceedings are not being pursued for those legitimate ends. Indications that contempt proceedings are not so being pursued include applications relating to purely technical contempt, applications not directed at the obtaining of compliance with the order in question, and applications which, on the face of the documentary evidence, have no real prospect of success. Committal proceedings of that type are properly to be regarded as an abuse of process, and the court should lose no time in putting an end to them, so that the parties may concentrate their time and resources on the resolution of the underlying dispute between them.”
24. In Sectorguard itself, Briggs J said that the application was an abuse of process because the application had been brought with no real prospect of success. See paragraph 53.
25. In Vseukrainskyi Aktsionernyi Bank PJSC v Maksimov [2014] EWHC 4370 (Comm), at paragraph 22, Hamblen J said:
“An increasing amount of this court’s time is being taken up with contempt applications. Claimants should give careful consideration to proportionality in relation to the bringing and continuance of such proceedings. In appropriate cases respondents should give consideration to applying to strike out such applications for abuse of process. The court should be astute to detect when contempt proceedings are not being pursued for legitimate aims. Adverse costs orders may follow where claimants bring disproportionate contempt applications.”
26. In that case, Hamblen J did not reject the contempt application as being an abuse of process, but, as the application resulted only in the establishment of a technical contempt, rather than something that merited a significant penalty, the applicant was ordered to pay the bulk of the respondent’s costs.
27. In his skeleton argument, at paragraph 63, Mr Duthie said that he recognises that personal hostility or a desire for retribution does not, without more, establish abuse of process where an application properly brings a serious and arguable contempt before the Court: see Navigator Equities Ltd and Deripaska and Hadcliffe Properties Ltd v Rind Foundation [2022] 1 WLR 3656, at paragraph110.
28. It is important to note that, in the Deripaska case, Carr LJ pointed out at paragraph 114 that Sectorguard was first and foremost a case in which the relevant undertaking was found to be impossible at all material times. She made clear that purpose, not motive, is what matters. The legitimate purposes of contempt proceedings are enforcement and to bring to the court’s attention serious rather than technical breaches.
29. Carr LJ said, in the same paragraph: “but the clear thrust of para 47 [of Sectorguard] is that proceedings which are hopeless or relate to purely technical contempts are the signs to look for when searching for abuse, not questions of subjective motive.”
30. At paragraph 110 of her judgment, Carr LJ said:
“Where a civil contempt application…. (iii) has the effect (and so at least the objective purpose) of drawing to the attention of the court to an allegedly serious contempt, then the fact that the application is motivated, whether predominantly or even exclusively, by a personal desire for revenge on the part of the applicant is not a good reason for striking out the application as an abuse of process.”
31. In my judgment, in light of the guidance in the authorities, and bearing in mind that the purpose of the contempt hearing is to decide whether the Claimant is in contempt, not whether, if so, he should be punished for it, or in what way, the issues that the court will need to decide are:
(1) What is the meaning and scope of the Undertakings?;
(2) Did the First Defendant, Mr Duthie, act in breach of the Undertakings?;
(3) Was the contempt application so hopeless as to amount to an abuse of process?; and/or
(4) Was the breach purely technical so that the contempt proceedings might be an abuse of process?
32. It will be no part of the task of the judge at the contempt hearing to consider the subjective motive of the Claimant or Mr Tahar in commencing the contempt proceedings. If Mr Duthie has acted in breach of the undertakings, and it is not merely a technical breach, then there will be no abuse of process, regardless of motive, because the objective of the contempt procedure is to ensure that undertakings given to the court and orders made by the court are complied with. Even if a litigant’s motive is to punish the other party by means of the contempt application, this does not mean that there is an abuse of process which would defeat an otherwise legitimate contempt application.
33. Similarly, the question of how the Claimant or Mr Tahar have behaved in other proceedings is of no relevance to whether the Defendant has committed contempt of court by breaching the Undertakings.
34. Moreover, the Claimant made clear in the September 2025 Application Notice that it is no part of the contempt proceedings to allege that Mr Duthie had paid for evidence to be falsified in the BVI proceedings or in any proceedings.
35. I emphasise that I am not determining any of these issues. Rather I am identifying the issues before I move on to deal with the various applications that have been made. The decisions that I make today are not based on any view of the merits of the various allegations and counter-allegations that have been made. I am not in any position to form such a view. They are based upon my conclusions as to the scope of, and relevant issues for, the contempt hearing. I also express no view about whether the matters relied upon in relation to the abuse of process arguments would be relevant to sanction if contempt is found to have taken place. That is a separate matter.
36. It follows from all of this that, in my judgment, the Claimant is right to say that the scope of the forthcoming hearing is relatively narrow in its compass. The key questions are whether Mr Duthie has breached the Undertakings and, whether, if so, the breach is technical only. The hearing is not an opportunity for Mr Duthie to challenge the Claimant’s or Mr Tahar’s subjective motivation, or to bring into evidence his criticisms of their conduct in other litigation, or in other parts of this litigation. I should add that it was a theme of Mr Duthie’s skeleton argument that the points he made about the way in which Mr Tahar or the Claimant have behaved in other litigation does not go so far as to prove abuse of process in this case, but provides relevant context. In my judgment, these matters do not even have any relevance as context.
37. If, on the state of the evidence relied upon by the Claimant, it cannot make good its allegation of contempt, that is the risk that the Claimant has taken by inviting the court to proceed without an adjournment.
38. I should add that I accept the submission by Mr Wright that the abuse of process argument was not advanced by Mr Duthie in his original lengthy affidavit in opposition to the contempt application, dated 10 April 2026, though he did refer in detail to allegations against Mr Taher and the Claimant which he now says support his abuse of process argument.
The proposal that the contempt trial be dealt with in two stages, with next week’s hearing being limited to the interpretation of the Undertakings and evidence as to whether Mr Duthie breached them
39. I am not prepared to accede to this proposal. It was made at an extremely late stage, very late last night. There is no application notice, but I do not reject it for this reason alone. The proposal has not previously been suggested by Mr Duthie. I have already said that there issues for the contempt hearing are narrower than Mr Duthie asserts. There is no need for there to be a separate hearing to deal with the abuse of process argument that Mr Duthie now wishes to advance.
40. Mr Duthie has made clear that, if the proposal for a split hearing is rejected, he will maintain his application for an adjournment and for the various directions that he previously sought. I will, therefore, go on to consider them.
The fresh evidence that Mr Duthie seeks to rely upon
41. The deadline for filing the evidence to be relied upon by Mr Duthie in the contempt proceedings was 10 April 2026. This is over six months ago. This means that in order to rely upon the fresh evidence, the principles relating to relief from sanctions must be considered.
42. Although Mr Duthie has not formally made an application for relief from sanctions, applications to rely on fresh evidence out of time have to be determined using the principles governing applications for relief from sanctions under CPR 3.9: see Aslani v Sobierajska [2024] EWHC 1045 (KB) at [20]-[21]. Those principles are, of course, set out in Denton v TH White [2014] EWCA Civ 906, [2014] 1 WLR 3926.
43. The court proceeds in three stages under CPR r.3.9.
44. First, the court identifies and assesses the seriousness and significance of the breach. Trivial breaches will rarely justify refusal of relief. The question is whether the default imperils future hearing dates, disrupts the conduct of the litigation, or otherwise undermines efficient case management.
45. Secondly, the court considers why the default occurred. A good reason may justify relief. Examples include circumstances outside the party's control, such as serious illness or unforeseen events. Mere oversight, pressure of work, inefficiency, or misunderstanding of the rules will rarely constitute a good reason.
46. Thirdly, the court evaluates all the circumstances of the case so as to deal justly with the application. CPR r.3.9 identifies two factors of particular importance:
a) The need for litigation to be conducted efficiently and at proportionate cost.
b) The need to enforce compliance with rules, practice directions and court orders.
47. I bear these considerations in mind. I also bear in mind the overriding objective, and my general case management powers under CPR 32.1 which include the power to exclude evidence that is irrelevant or extraneous to the matters properly before the Court. It is also important to bear in mind the rule in Hobbs v Tinling [1929] 2 K.B. 1, which prevents a party from adducing evidence in chief on collateral issues going only to credibility. I bear in mind also that Mr Duthie is a litigant in person and, though a solicitor, is not a litigator. Finally, I bear in mind that these are contempt proceedings, and the potential consequences for Mr Duthie if he loses may be serious.
Mr Duthie’s second affidavit
48. I will deal first with Mr Duthie’s second affidavit dated 24 September 2026. In relation to this, the Claimant does not object to it being admitted into evidence in part, namely paragraphs 7-23, provided that the Claimant is also permitted to rely upon Mr Sigler’s second affidavit, which is the subject of the Claimant’s application and was filed a few days ago.
49. I am prepared to allow Mr Duthie to rely upon these paragraphs of his second affidavit. Mr Duthie’s second affidavit was filed and served very late but the Claimant does not object to this part of it going before the court at the contempt hearing. This evidence is relevant, because it goes directly towards whether or not Mr Duthie was in breach of the undertaking in relation to his dealings with Mr Smith.
50.
51. I am not prepared to allow Mr Duthie to rely upon the other parts of his second affidavit (apart from the formal parts). These other parts are Sections C and D, at paragraphs 28 to 54. They largely amount, as Mr Sigler points out, to further commentary on the affidavits of Mr Hasan and Mr Taher. Mr Duthie has given evidence about Mr Hasan and Mr Taher in his first affidavit, which will be before the Court. These parts of his second affidavit are either primarily comments on the evidence, rather than evidence themselves, or they are comments on the proposed evidence of Mr Salahat and Mr Almashene, which I will deal with in a moment. If and to the extent that this part of the witness statement contains any fresh evidence to which Mr Duthie can attest, it is far too late. It would not be fair to the Claimant, or just, to permit Mr Duthie to rely upon it.
The evidence of Mr Sahalat
52. Both this affidavit and Mr Almashene’s affidavit were prepared, or drafted, or assisted by, Mr Duthie.
53. There is now a sworn version of Mr Salahat’s affidavit, dated 18 October 2026, though it still has some technical faults, such as his address not being given. Those faults might not, in themselves, be of sufficient importance to justify the affidavit’s rejection on this ground alone.
54. In his statement, Mr Salahat says that, at a meeting in Dubai on 20 August 2025, Mr Taher offered him financial compensation and other favours in exchange for providing false evidence against Mr Duthie in the English High Court proceedings. He does not say that he gave any such false evidence. He also said that he was told by Mr Taher that Mr Hasan had been offered money and a job by Mr Taher. He did not say in terms that this was in return for Mr Hasan giving false evidence in relation to the contempt proceedings.
55. Mr Salahat is alleged to have been involved in the events relating to Ground 2 of the contempt allegations, but he does not deal with this in his affidavit.
56. I have decided that this affidavit should not be admitted in evidence for the purpose of the contempt hearing. These are very serious allegations indeed. However, they have no relevance to the issues that the judge dealing with the contempt application must deal with. They are not, on the face of it, relevant to whether Mr Duthie breached the Undertakings and, as I have said, to the extent, if at all, they shed light on Mr Taher’s motivation for the contempt proceedings, they are of no relevance to whether those proceedings are an abuse of process. This is a collateral attack on the credibility of a party, or someone connected with a party, when the real issue for the contempt proceedings is what Mr Duthie did or did not do.
57. This evidence is rejected therefore, primarily on the ground of relevance, but I also reject it on the ground of delay. Mr Duthie indicated in advance of the deadline of 10 April 2026 that he was intending to rely on evidence from Mr Salahat, and there is no explanation for the delay in serving it. Moreover, if the evidence were admitted, fairness would require that the contempt hearing be adjourned, potentially for a substantial period, and this would not be in the interests of justice. The three-day time estimate might, in addition, be jeopardised.
58. Also, as Mr Wright pointed out, Mr Salahat cannot give direct evidence to support the contention that Mr Hasan was given an inducement or reward in return for giving false evidence in the contempt proceedings.
The affidavit of Mr Almashene
59. Mr Almashene alleges that Mr Hasan was provided with employment by Mr Taher in Tunisia, shortly after making the affidavit in support of the contempt application.
60. This document is unsworn. For this reason alone, it should not be admitted in evidence.
61. Furthermore, once again, these are serious allegations. The suggestion is made that Mr Hasan was being rewarded for what he said in his affidavit. Once again, the sources of information for various serious and important assertions about Mr Hasan being given rewards for his evidence, are not given.
62. Still further, there is no explanation as to why this evidence was not provided in advance of the 10 April 2026 deadline for evidence and it is now far too late. The Claimant will not have a reasonable opportunity to deal with it. Mr Duthie can give his own evidence about the circumstances leading to the alleged breaches of the Undertakings.
Mr Sigler’s second affidavit
63. Mr Duthie does not oppose the admission of this affidavit provided it is limited to the narrow issues relating to the question whether the Undertakings have been breached. He says that this acceptance is subject to appropriate safeguards. In my judgment, this statement should be admitted. It essentially reflects the fact that the Claimant has changed solicitors. It reflects the contents of Mr Hastings’s affidavit, which sets out, in essence, the Claimant’s case and draws together the relevant documents. Neither Mr Hastings nor Mr Sigler claims to have direct first-hand knowledge of the events which are the basis for the contempt application. Mr Duthie is not prejudiced by this affidavit. As I hope I have made clear, the purpose of the hearing next week is to deal with the narrow issues relating to whether the Undertakings have been breached. It follows that this is the only purpose for which Mr Sigler’s second affidavit can be used at the contempt hearing.
The other directions sought by Mr Duthie
64. I begin with some general observations. Directions for the contempt hearing were made by Mr Kinneir KC and by Mr Brier KC. At both hearings, Mr Duthie was represented by counsel, but on neither occasion was any application made for the directions that are now being sought. It is far too late for the wide-ranging and onerous directions that are being sought by Mr Duthie to be made, even if they were otherwise sensible. We are two working days from the hearing. It would be wholly inappropriate to derail the hearing that has been listed for some time in order to secure compliance with a whole raft of new directions which, as I will explain, are of no, or at best very limited, value.
65. I will deal with the proposed directions in the latest version of Mr Duthie’s Draft Order (prior to last night’s version), adopting the headings used in the Draft, as follows:
66. A. Directions requiring further identification and narrowing of the Claimant’s case. I agree with the Claimant that its case on contempt is entirely clear, is narrowly focused, and requires no such steps. In any event this application is made far too late. Moreover, this request for identification of the Claimant’s case is in effect a request for what used to be called interrogatories or for the Claimant to plead out in great detail its case for contempt. There is no need to do so, and it would be onerous and contrary to the overriding objective to require the Claimant to do so.
67. B. Directions relating to the Evidence of Mr Hasan and Mr Hastings, who filed affidavits filed in support of the Claimant’s Contempt Application, and in particular directions about the status of their affidavits if they do not give evidence at the hearing. There is no need for any such directions. This has been dealt with by the directions given by Mr Kinnier KC at paragraph 9 of his order, which makes provision for the possibility of a witness not attending trial.
68. C. Directions concerning evidence from Mr Taher. By this section, Mr Duthie seeks to compel answers and/or evidence from Mr Taher, and seeks an order from the court to compel Mr Taher to give evidence. There is no legal basis for the orders that are sought, and, to a large extent, the request for these orders is predicated on the admission of the affidavits of Mr Salahat and Mr Almashene, which I have refused.
69. D. Orders permitting reliance on Mr Duthie’s second affidavit and the affidavits of Mr Salahat and Mr Almashene. I have already dealt with this.
70. E. Orders to deal with alleged interference with a material witness. This part of the Draft Order seeks an order to require preservation of evidence relating to the allegations made by Mr Salahat and Mr Almashene. This has no direct relevance to the contempt hearing and I have already ruled that these affidavits will not be admitted. The breadth of the proposed order is in any case far too wide. I refuse this application.
71. Mr Duthie also seeks a number of further procedural directions. These are, in summary, for:
72. F. A list of issues. Mr Duthie proposes that the parties agree a list of issues for the contempt trial. It is too late for this and it is not necessary. It would impose an unduly onerous burden on the parties. Moreover, there is plainly a risk of disagreement, and further argument about the list of issues, which will not be helpful. The issues are clear.
73. G. Skeleton arguments. Mr Duthie proposes that skeleton arguments be exchanged by 12 noon on Monday, 2 November 2026 (less than 2 days before the first day of the trial window), along with other directions as to the content of those skeletons. In fact, there is already a direction in the Kinneir order for exchange of skeleton arguments by 4 pm today, so this would postpone the time for exchange of skeleton arguments. The Claimant agrees to the revised deadline. I am concerned that the judge who deals with the matter should have a proper opportunity to read and consider the skeleton arguments in advance of the hearing. The sooner that the skeleton arguments are filed and exchanged the better. During the course of delivering this judgment, the parties were contacted by the court on behalf of the judge who will deal with the hearing next week, Sheldon J, and was told that he was content for skeleton arguments to be provided by Tuesday 3 November. I have specified that the skeleton arguments should be exchanged and filed by 12 noon on that day. Both parties must comply with this revised deadline. I do not consider it appropriate to be prescriptive about the contents of the directions.
74. The remaining directions proposed in relation to the skeleton are unnecessary.
75. H. A direction about hearing bundles. The Kinneir order has already made provision for hearing bundles and a trial bundle has been prepared by the Claimant’s solicitors. Mr Duthie proposes that a further direction should be made to require the Claimant to identify by 4pm on Monday 2 November 2026, by a “concise schedule”, the passages from documents that it relies upon, for the purposes of which ground of contempt those passages are relied upon, and specifying which disputed issue of fact the passages are relied upon in support of. I do not consent to this. It would impose an impossible burden on the Claimant’s legal advisers in the time available. It is unnecessary. The evidence in support of the Contempt Application has made it clear as to what evidence is relied upon. As the Claimant pointed out, Mr Duthie has never previously expressed any uncertainty as to what evidence that is.
76. Standing back,the directions for the trial have already been set. Subject to the one slight variation of the date for exchange of the skeleton arguments, there is no basis for any further directions, let alone the onerous directions suggested by Mr Duthie at the eleventh hour. Such directions would obfuscate, rather than clarify, the issues and would make it impossible in practice for the hearing, which has been expedited, to go ahead next week.
Adjournment
77. The final issue that has been raised by Mr Duthie is whether next week’s hearing should be adjourned. Mr Duthie emphasised that he did not want to seek an adjournment, and does so with reluctance, but feels that he has been placed in a position where he has no alternative. He says that further evidence has emerged since March 2026. As is no doubt already apparent, I refuse an adjournment. I have refused to give directions which would make it impractical for the hearing to go ahead next week. In my judgment, Mr Duthie has sought to expand the issues to be decided in a way that goes far beyond the actual scope of the hearing. The actual scope of the hearing has been clear from the outset and there is therefore no reason why the hearing should not proceed as listed. It is also relevant that the allegations of abuse of process are new. As Mr Duthie himself points out at paragraph 12 of his witness statement, the evidential points were expressly advanced in his first affidavit dated 10 April 2026, at paragraphs 44-45 and paragraphs 429-496, but there was no allegation that the contempt application should be dismissed for abuse of process. Rather, he said that these matters demonstrated the need for careful scrutiny of the Claimant’s allegations relating to contempt, and that they were part of the context and were evidence of a pattern of litigation conduct which should affect the court’s view of reliability of the Claimant’s evidence. I do not accept that the Salahat and Alshene evidence, which I have excluded, gave rise to a new abuse of process argument, which was not previously available. The hearing next week will, in fact, reflect what Mr Duthie described as Stage 1 and which he is ready and willing to deal with. An adjournment at this late stage also would have an adverse effect on litigants in other proceedings, as more court time would have to be set aside.
Conclusion
78. In summary, therefore:
(1) I permit Mr Duthie to rely upon paragraphs 7-23 of his second affidavit;
(2) I permit the Claimant to rely upon Mr Sigler’s second affidavit.
(3) Time for filing and exchange of skeleton arguments is extended to 12 pm on Tuesday 3 November 2026. This deadline must be complied with by both parties so as to give the judge a proper opportunity to read into the case.
(4) The application for an adjournment of the contempt hearing is refused and the other applications made by Mr Duthie are refused.
Costs
79. On behalf of the Claimant, Mr Wright made an application for costs. He asked that I order that the entirety of the costs incurred by the Claimant in relation to these applications should be awarded to the Claimant on an indemnity basis, summarily assessed as £42,719.
80. It is true that Mr Duthie has, in effect, been entirely unsuccessful in his applications and it is true also that the making of these applications at such a late stage will have diverted the energies of the Claimant’s legal team when they should have been focussed on the forthcoming contempt hearing. However, I have decided that costs should be reserved to the judge dealing with the contempt application. Exceptionally, I think that the judge will be better placed that I am to decide on the costs of these applications. He will have available a copy of my written ruling, and he will be able to consider the matter in the wider context of the outcome of the contempt application.
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