Administrative United Kingdom
OM v The Secretary of State for the Home Department
First-tier Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Appeal Number: PA/87721/2025
THE IMMIGRATION ACTS
| Heard at Manchester | |
| On 28 October 2026 |
Before
FIRST-TIER TRIBUNAL Judge MCQUILLAN
Between
OM
(anonymity direction MADE)
Appellant
and
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent
Representation:
For the Appellants: Appellant in person
For the Respondent: Mr Payne, Home Office Presenting Officer
DECISION AND REASONS
1. The Appellant, who is a citizen of Egypt, appeals under the provisions of the Nationality, Immigration, and Asylum Act 2002 against the Respondent’s decision dated 10 July 2025, to refuse their protection claim made on 19 July 2024.
Anonymity Direction
2. I have decided to make an anonymity direction because the importance of facilitating the discharge of the obligations of the United Kingdom (‘UK’) under the Refugee Convention outweighs the principle of open justice.
Background
3. The background to this appeal is set out in the documentation contained on myHMCTS. The Appellant is a 24 year old Egyptian man.
4. The Appellant claims to fear persecution if returned to Egypt on the basis that his father used to beat him when he was drunk and on drugs and would take the Appellant’s money. The Appellant ran away from home and he now fears that his father will kill him if he is returned to Egypt.
5. The Respondent accepts his identity and nationality but in the reasons for Refusal letter (RFRL) they did not accept his account.
Hearing
Issues in dispute
6. The issues were discussed and it was agreed that the issues to decide were as follows;
(a) Convention reason.
(b) Credibility
(c) Risk upon Return
(d) Internal Relocation
(e) Sufficiency of Protection
7. Mr Payne accepted in his closing submissions that the Appellant’s account of being assaulted by his father was not far fetched and he concentrated his submissions on the existence of a convention reason, whether the Appellant would be at risk from his father now and if he was at risk whether he could seek protection and/or relocate.
Evidence and submissions
8. The Appellant gave evidence with the assistance of an Arabic interpreter. He had not submitted a bundle with a witness statement but adopted the answers he gave in his interviews and the appeal reasons as his main evidence and was cross examined. Mr Payne and the Appellant made submissions.
Legal Framework
9. To succeed in an appeal on asylum grounds, the Appellant must show a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason (race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, political opinion). The burden of proof rests on the Appellant. As the asylum claim was made on or after 28 June 2022, pursuant to s32 of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 (‘the 2022 Act’), in considering whether the Appellant qualifies as a refugee, I must apply a two stage test. I must first determine the following matters on the balance of probabilities:
(a) whether the Appellant has a characteristic which could cause them to fear persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion (or has such a characteristic attributed to them by an actor of persecution), and
(b) whether the Appellant does in fact fear such persecution in their country of nationality as a result of that characteristic.
10. If I am satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the Appellant does have such a characteristic, and fears persecution as a result of that characteristic, I must go on to determine whether, applying the lower standard of proof, there is a reasonable likelihood that:
(a) the Appellant would be persecuted for a Convention reason on return;
(b) that there would be insufficient protection; and
(c) they could not internally relocate.
11. To succeed on an appeal on humanitarian protection grounds the Appellant must not be a refugee; they must show substantial grounds for believing that they would face a real risk of suffering serious harm in their country of origin. The burden of proof rests on the Appellant.
Findings
12. In this decision, I refer to JCK (Botswana) [2024] UKUT and DS (NABA s.32(2)(a); JCK amended) [2026] UKUT 00413. I am directed by those cases to address each of the questions posed by section 32 NABA 2022 expressly and sequentially and I do so. I have taken account of everything I have heard, and considered all the documentary evidence I have been referred to by the parties. I have carefully considered all the evidence in the round, in line with the guidance in Ravichandran v SSHD [1996] Imm AR 97 and Karanakaran v SSHD 2000 EWCA Civ.
Credibility
13. Although this was raised by the Respondent as an issue in dispute, as mentioned above, it was not the main thrust of the Appellant’s submissions and questioning and I found that the Appellant had given a largely credible account. Mr Payne very fairly conceded that it was not far fetched that the Appellant was beaten as a child by a drunken and drug abusing father and tailored his submissions accordingly. Taking the evidence in the round, I accept that this aspect of the Appellant’s account is credible.
14. The Appellant gave evidence that the worst injury he had suffered was when his father hit him with a wooden stick when he was approximately 16 that fractured his leg. His neighbours took him to the hospital but he was too scared to tell anyone what had happened. He said that his father hit him every day. He worked as a Tiler but was not a skilled tiler and was more of a labourer and his father would take his money from him. His siblings were similarly abused and left the family home.
15. The Appellant claimed that his family ‘wouldn’t leave him alone’ as he had disgraced the family by talking about them and they may even harm he. At the same time he said he had no contact with his family, didn’t know where his siblings were and did not wish to have a relationship with them. Whilst I find that this aspect of his claim has little coherence it is not material for the reasons I give later in this decision
The 2022 Act
16. Adopting the approach of the Upper Tribunal I now turn to the specific provisions of section 32 of the 2022 Act.
Section 32(2)(a): Convention Ground.
17. Under s32(2)(a) I am firstly required to determine, on the balance of probabilities:
(a) whether the asylum seeker has a characteristic which could cause them to fear persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion (or has such a characteristic attributed to them by an actor of persecution)
18. I have accepted that Appellant as a largely credible witness and therefore I must assess whether the personal circumstances he describes establish that, on balance, he has a characteristic that would come within the provisions of the Refugee Convention. In this case, and having regard to the Appellant representing himself I consider firstly whether as a child victim of domestic violence the Appellant is a member of particular social group (PSG).
19. Mr Payne submitted that whilst it is possible that a person in the Appellant’s position may be treated differently it wasn’t clear how the disgrace that the Appellant claimed he had brought on his family by talking about them applied to the convention. He also submitted that there were no innate characteristics attaching to someone in the Appellant’s position and as this is a case to which the 2022 Act applies it would be necessary for both parts of the test to be met. The act says at section 33;
(2) A group forms a particular social group for the purposes of Article 1(A)(2) of the Refugee Convention only if it meets both of the following conditions.
(3) The first condition is that members of the group share—
(a) an innate characteristic,
(b) a common background that cannot be changed, or
(c) a characteristic or belief that is so fundamental to identity or conscience that a person should not be forced to renounce it.
(4) The second condition is that the group has a distinct identity in the relevant country because it is perceived as being different by the surrounding society.
20. Whilst it can be the case that in some countries female victims of domestic violence can constitute a PSG there was no evidence presented to me that someone in the Appellant’s position as a male child victim of violence would meet the test above. They would not have an innate characteristic or a common background with others in the same position that could not be changed. Not withstanding Mr Payne’s partial concession I do not consider that the Appellant would be perceived as different by the surrounding society for this reason either. There was nothing provided to evidence what Egyptian society attitude was to physical abuse of children within a family and whilst it could be speculated that it would be negative there was no evidence to that effect or that it would not be considered as a private familial matter.
21. I have gone on to consider whether the Appellant would be a member of a PSG as a member of his own family. Whilst it is the case that a person can come under the definition above of a PSG as a member of a family[1], the persecution they fear must be as a result of membership of that family. In this case the Appellant says he fears persecution by his father as a result of being his child and he says his siblings were beaten by their father also. Members of the Appellant’s family, and specifically his siblings, would have an innate characteristic or in the alternative, a common background that cannot be changed and as a family they, the siblings, would be perceived as being different by society as member of the specific family. The persecution they fear (and I am not yet considering the future risk) would be from their abusive father who has been violent to them in the past. I accept that, on balance the reason for his violence, which I accept as persecution, would be, in part at least, because they were his children. In all the circumstances of the case I find that the Appellant would be a member of a PSG, namely his family, and this characteristic could cause him to fear persecution.
Section 32(2) (b); Subjective Fear
22. Section 32(2)(b) requires the decision-maker to also determine, on the balance of probabilities.
(b) whether the asylum seeker does in fact fear such persecution in their country of nationality (or in a case where they do not have a nationality, the country of their former habitual residence) as a result of that characteristic.
23. For this question I must consider the Appellant’s own evidence about how he feels and any other evidence that may be relevant when assessing his subjective fear. The Appellant has stated on several occasions that he fears return to Egypt as his father would hit him and may kill him. In answer to the question in his screening interview at 4.1, why he cannot go back home, the Appellant replied as follows;
Because my father isn’t going to let me go back home and if I do go back home, he is going to hit me and abuse me again. He used to do drugs, powdered drugs. He used to drink a lot too. My brother also got abused, he ran away from home
and I know nothing about him.
Q: How long has this been going on for? How often does it occur?
– A: This happen long time ago since I was young. It happens the whole time, every time he comes home he would ask my money and take my money and throw me outside.
Q: More than one perpetrator?
– A: Yes, I’ve also got hit at work in Egypt.
Q: Have you informed anyone about this?
– A: No
Q: What do you fear will happen to you on return to your home country?
– A: It will be a big problem and he might even kill me because I ran away from him.
24. In his Asylum Interview the Appellant, after explaining that his father beat him and took his money, said at question 7 when asked what he feared said;
I will be beaten, humiliated, he will beat me to death.
25. In other places, however, it is less clear whether he fears persecution by his father on return. In his submissions and his oral evidence he said that his family would not leave him alone for disgracing them by talking about the family. He stated that he did not want to be with his family and did not know where they were. When asked why he came to the UK in his screening interview he stated that it was the ‘best country in the world’ and there was no racism. It is unclear on what basis the Appellant claims to fear return in light of these answers and there is evidence that he wishes to remain in the UK because he likes it and wants to remain. He stated in his oral evidence that he was playing football in a team and wished to fulfil his dreams. It is, of course, possible to feel like this and still fear persecution.
26. Having looked at all the evidence in the round I am prepared to accept that, on balance, the Appellant does fear persecution by his father if returned to Egypt. He gave credible evidence of abuse on him and his siblings and although the evidence of fearing his family because of the disgrace he says he brought on them was weak that does not undermine his evidence about his father. It is recognised that otherwise truthful witnesses will embellish and even fabricate parts of their claim for asylum to increase their chances of success.
27. Having satisfied myself on the balance of probabilities that the Appellant does have a convention reason, and fears persecution as a result of that reason, I must go on to determine whether, applying the lower standard of proof, there is a reasonable likelihood that:
(a) the Appellant would be persecuted for a Convention reason on return;
(b) that there would be insufficient protection; and
(c) they could not internally relocate.
28. The Upper Tribunal characterised the first of these questions as an evaluation of objective risk.
Section 32(4)(a); risk of persecution
29. To answer this question I must ask myself whether there is a reasonable likelihood that if the Appellant were returned to Egypt:
(a) they would be persecuted as a result of the characteristic mentioned in subsection (2)(a)
30. The risk that I am assessing is, I find, that the Appellant would be abused by his father as a result of being his child. For the purposes of this question I set aside the protections available to the Appellant from the authorities and from relocation. The Appellant states his father was an alcoholic and drug abuser who beat him, and his siblings, and took his money when he lived with him. He ran away from home, as his siblings did before him. He was a child when abused and he is now a fit and healthy 24 year old. Although he gave evidence about recently injuring himself he appears to have no physical ailments and is, on his own evidence, playing sport at what appears to be a reasonable level. He stated, when asked about defending himself against his father interview, that he could not defend himself out of respect to his father.
31. The burden is on the Appellant to show to the lower standard that there is a real risk of persecution on return. It is well established that this ‘standard of proof’ could more accurately be described as an assessment of risk and that even with a risk as low as 10% an Appellant could succeed[2]. Having considered all the evidence in the round I do not consider that the Appellant has shown that there is a real risk that he would be persecuted if returned. I have accepted that he does, in fact, fear this but in the context of the evidence I do not consider that this fear is well founded. He is a fit young man and his father is an alcoholic and drug user. If his father is, in fact, inclined to confront his son who is now an older and more physically mature person I think that the Appellant would be able to defend himself or avoid persecution even if he did not leave his home area or go to the Police. I am aware that in reaching this conclusion I am, to some extent, speculating about both the Appellant physical capabilities and willingness to use them and his father’s also. In those circumstances, and in case I am wrong about the risk faced, I will go on to consider the other questions dealing with protection and relocation.
Section 32(4)(b): protection
(b) they would not be protected as mentioned in section 34.
32. Section 34 states
Article 1(A)(2): protection from persecution
(1)For the purposes of Article 1(A)(2) of the Refugee Convention, protection from persecution can be provided by—
(a)the State, or
(b)any party or organisation, including any international organisation, controlling the State or a substantial part of the territory of the State.
(2)An asylum seeker is to be taken to be able to avail themselves of protection from persecution if—
(a)the State, party or organisation mentioned in subsection (1) takes reasonable steps to prevent the persecution by operating an effective legal system for the detection, prosecution and punishment of acts constituting persecution, and
(b)the asylum seeker is able to access the protection.
33. Mr Payne submitted that there was no evidence that it would be culturally accepted in Egypt for an individual to attack his adult son. It is the Appellant’s evidence that his father was unemployed when he lived with him and had no connections with the Police. The Appellant never reported the abuse he received to the Police saying he would not know where to find the Police. I note he was a child at the time and it may be that accessing the Police was not something that a child could easily do. He also said in interview that he was scared to go to the Police after seeing them in the street.
34. I find that there is nothing to suggest that the Appellant could not now approach the Police if I was wrong about the risk in this case and that having done so the Police would permit the Appellant’s father, a man with no connections or influence, to persecute the Appellant. There was nothing to suggest to me that the Egyptian authorities and those in the Appellant’s home area did not operate an effective legal system for the detection, prosecution and punishment of acts constituting persecution or that the Appellant could not access it. I do not consider that there is a reasonable degree of likelihood that the Appellant would not be protected if returned to Egypt.
Section 32(5): internal relocation
(5) The determination under subsection (4) must also include a consideration of the matter mentioned in section 35 (internal relocation).
35. I can deal with this briefly. As above the Appellant’s father is an alcoholic drug abusing man of no power or influence. There is nothing to suggest he would have the capacity to find the Appellant if he relocated elsewhere in Egypt. As Mr Payne submitted it is a country of 100 million people with sizeable cities many hundreds of miles from the Appellant’s home. The Appellant would have no family support but he has not had for the last 4 years and professes no wish to establish any contact with his family. He has shown fortitude to travel first to Libya where he lived and worked for a year and onwards through Europe to the UK. He worked in Egypt before he left and no reason has been provided to me that he could not find work away from his home. There is nothing to suggest that relocation would be unreasonable in the particular circumstances of the Appellant who, despite raising some minor health complaints in his interview, is a fit and healthy young man who plays sport regularly and I do not find there is a real risk that, if needed, the Appellant could not find protection by means of relocation.
36. The Appellant has not shown that he has a well founded fear of persecution and his Asylum claim must fail.
Humanitarian protection
37. I have found earlier in this decision that there is not a reasonable degree of likelihood that the Appellant would be persecuted if returned or if I was wrong that he would not be able to seek the protection of the authorities or relocate. For the same reasons and applying the same standard of proof I find that the Appellant has not shown substantial grounds for believing that they would face a real risk of suffering serious harm if returned. Their Humanitarian Protection claim fails also.
Human Rights
38. Although not raised by the Appellant I have considered, having reviewed all the evidence, whether there would be any basis for concluding that return would be a breach of the Appellant’s Human rights under article 8. He has not established a family life in the UK and only a very limited private life whilst his status has been precarious. I note that he plays football for a team and this constitutes a private life to some degree but this and the other evidence does not come close to establishing that his removal would be a disproportionate interference with his rights under article 8 of the ECHR.
Notice Of Decision
The appeal is dismissed on all grounds.
Anonymity Direction
Unless and until the Tribunal, the Upper Tribunal, or, a Court orders otherwise, pursuant to rule 13(1)(b) of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Rules 2014, the appellant is granted anonymity.
No-one shall publish or reveal either directly or indirectly any information, including their names or addressed, that is likely to lead members of the public to identify him. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.
To The Respondent
Fee Award
No fee has been paid or is payable and therefore there can be no fee award.
Signed CA McQuillan Date: 2 November 2026.
First-tier Tribunal Judge C McQuillan
Notes
[1] SSHD (Respondent) v. K (FC) (Appellant) Fornah (FC) (Appellant) v. SSHD (Respondent) [2006] UKHL 46
[2] MAH (Egypt) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2023] EWCA Civ 216 paragraphs 51-52, Singh LJ.
If you are facing a similar issue in France, you may contact our immigration lawyer.
Official sources: view the source page
Open Justice Licence (The National Archives).