Miscellaneous United Kingdom

Sebastian Onyango v Ofsted

Official source

First-tier Tribunal Care Standards

The Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Health, Education and Social Care) Rules 2008

NCN: [2026] UKFTT 01494 (HESC)

2026-02043.EY-SUS

Hearing held by video-link

On 28 September 2026

Before

Tribunal Judge S Goodrich

Specialist E Stuart-Cole

Between:

Mr Sebastian Onyango

Appellant

-v-

Ofsted

Respondent

REASONS FOR DECISION ON APPEAL AGAINST SUSPENSION

Representation

Appellant: Mr Onyango in person.

Respondent: Ms Wolfson, counsel, instructed by Ofsted Legal Services.

Preamble

We delivered a decision dismissing the appeal dated 12 October 2026. We now provide our reasons.

The Appeal

1. By notice of appeal dated 7 September 2026 the Appellant, Mr Onyango, appeals against the Respondent’s decision, made on 4 September 2026, to suspend his registration as a childcare provider on the compulsory part of the Childcare Register and the voluntary part of the Childcare Register at:

• 46 Rhodes Place, Oldbrook, Milton Keynes, MK6 2 LY, (hereafter “Rhodes Place”) and at

• Suite F Regency Court 206 Upper Fifth Street, Milton Keynes, MK9 2HR (hereafter “Suite F Regency Court”)

for a period of six weeks from 4 September 2026 until midnight on 15 October 2026.

2. The Appellant is registered with the Respondent as a childminder on the compulsory and voluntary parts of the Childcare Register at Rhodes Place, and is also registered/approved to operate from non-domestic premises at Suite F Regency Court for up to 50% of the time spent caring for children.

3. The basis of the decision made on 4 September 2026 was set out in the Notice of suspension. It was that Ofsted reasonably believes that the continued provision of childcare by the Appellant may expose children to a risk of harm. It was said that the purpose of suspension is to allow time for enquiries to be made and/or for steps to be taken to eliminate or reduce the risk of harm.

4. The right of appeal lies under regulation 12 of the Childcare (Early Years and General Childcare Registers (Common Provisions) Regulations 2008.

5. The Appellant seeks a direction that the suspension shall cease to have effect. The Respondent resists the appeal and requests that the decision to suspend registration is confirmed.

Restricted Reporting Order

6. At the outset of the hearing and with the agreement of the parties, the Tribunal made a restricted reporting order under Rule 14 (1) (a) and (b) of the 2008 Rules, prohibiting the disclosure or publication of any documents or matter likely to lead members of the public to identify any minor child and/or parents in order to protect the privacy and best interests of the children involved.

The Bundles and additional evidence and documents

7. The judge explained at the outset that the panel had received and read:

• the indexed e-bundle consisting of 254 pages (PDF) (the contents of which are fully set out in the index to that bundle and included three witness statements by Mr Onyango between 7 and 14 September 2026 and two statements dated 7 and 14 September 2026 from his wife, Mrs Ochieng, tutor and childcare assistant.

• the Appellant’s skeleton argument of some 9 pages dated 24 September 2026.

• the Respondent’s skeleton argument of some 10 pages also dated 24 September 2026.

• the Appellant's proposed Scott Schedule regarding “Proposed Common Ground, Material Disputed Facts, Evidence and Current Safeguards”, consisting of 16 pages.

8. The panel has also received T109 applications dated 23 September 2026 regarding a supplemental evidence bundle consisting of 20 pages which includes a second supplemental statement and exhibits SOO/18 – SOO/22, as well as a supplementary index re S1-18. We also had before us other documents from the Appellant: a further skeleton consisting of four pages and 33 paragraphs: a document headed “Relevant Authorities” (nine pages) and an Appellant’s List of Authorities (two pages).

9. The Respondent did not object to the reception of the late evidence/material. We agreed that it was in the interests of justice to receive it.

10. In cross examination Ms Wolfson had put parts of the Notice of Decision to cancel to Mr Onyango. We agreed to receive the NoD for the limited forensic purpose advanced. We are not concerned with the merits of the pre-existing decision to cancel registration which, as will be seen below, is subject to appeal.

The Regulatory History

11. Ofsted’s position is that this includes the following:

a) The Appellant first registered on the compulsory and voluntary parts of the Childcare Register in October 2019.

b) In February 2021 he applied to register an additional premises, namely Regency Court. This is an office block where the Appellant also runs a tutoring business.

c) In March 2021 Regency Court was inspected by Mrs Hayley Marshall-Gowen, an Early years Regulatory Inspector, (EYRI) who considered that the premises were unsuitable for childminding due to safety concerns. The application to register Regency Court as an additional premises for childminding was refused and a referral to the fire service was made.

d) On 14 May 2021 registration of the non-domestic premises at Regency court was granted.

e) In December 2022 an inspection was conducted which resulted in a ‘met’ outcome.

f) On 23 March 2026 an inspection was conducted after Ofsted received concerns relating to unvetted individuals working at the setting. The grading of this inspection was one of ‘not met’, due to breaches in requirements that had an impact on children’s safety and welfare.

g) During the inspection in March 2026, Mrs Marshall-Gowen considered that the Appellant was not meeting the requirements of his registration, as the Appellant’s documentation showed he had been caring for Early Years children for which he was not registered. It was also considered that not all individuals employed by the Appellant had been appropriately vetted, meaning their suitability could not be assured. It was identified that the Appellant did not demonstrate suitable knowledge of safeguarding matters, including the action to take should an allegation or child welfare concern be raised. It was also considered that the premises and the arrangements for children’s care, such as toileting and indoor/outdoor play areas, were not safe or suitable for children. As a result, actions were raised.

h) Following the inspection in March 2026, officers had considered whether a suspension was necessary but concluded it was not as it was unclear whether childminding was actually taking place on the premises, despite the Appellant making financial claims for childminding, including for Early Years children. The Appellant gave assurances that he would abide to the terms of his registration.

i) Following receipt of additional information from the student loans company (SLC) which confirmed that the Respondent had made claims for Early Years children, the Respondent commenced cancellation proceedings on the grounds of the Appellant’s integrity. Ofsted’s view was that the information at the time did not suggest there was a risk of harm to children.

j) The Respondent’s decision to cancel the Appellant’s registration dated 18 June 2026 is subject to appeal, to be heard in January 2027.

The Decision under appeal.

12. The suspension decision which is the subject of this appeal was made following a visit to Regency Court by Mrs Marshall-Gowen on 2 September 2026. In the notice of decision the Respondent stated in support of its belief that children may be exposed to the risk of harm that:

“despite many reassurances, you are still not operating within the requirements of your registration, with no clear definition between your tutoring and childminding businesses. Young children can come into contact with unvetted individuals, up to 16 years of age, and share toileting facilities with these young adults, which puts them at risk of harm. During the visit the inspector identified further risks to minded children including children running up and down the stairs without any behaviour management strategies or discouragement, the room being used for childminding was not appropriate for the ages of the children attending and children are able to play in a dark car park during the dark evenings. The inspector also noted that you have been caring for children younger than your registration allows and we have, on many occasions, reminded you of this. We are not assured that you are able to keep minded children safe”.

The Parties’ respective positions

13. In essence, the Appellant’s position is that the threshold test in regulation 9 is not met and so the suspension should be lifted. Mr Onyango strongly disputes many aspects of Mrs Marshall-Gowen’s evidence. He is supported by his wife, Mrs Ochieng. He places particular emphasis on the fact that there were no early years’ children at Regency Court at the time of Mrs Marshall-Gowen’s visit. He maintains that the three children who were present on 2 September 2026 were there for tutoring only, so the issue of risk to children being cared for under his childcare registration does not arise. There was no evidence of any harm caused to the children. He believes that Mrs Marshall-Gowen formed views having regard to the needs of Early Years Foundation Stage children, but there were none present.

14. Mr Onyango maintained that the threshold test was not met. Even if, contrary to the Appellant’s case, the threshold test is considered to be met, suspension is not necessary or justified and is, in any event, disproportionate. He also submitted that suspension should not, in any event, relate to both premises. The Appellant contends that any residual concerns can be reasonably and proportionately be met by ‘targeted safeguards’.

15. The Respondent’s position is that the suspension decision was and remains necessary, justified and proportionate.

The Legal Framework

16. The statutory framework for the registration of nursery provision is provided under the Childcare Act 2006.

17. Section 32 of the Act provides for the maintenance of two childcare registers. The Early Years Register relates to those registered to provide early years care for children (from birth to 31 August following the child’s fifth birthday) and, in respect of which registration is compulsory.

18. The second register, the General Childcare Register, is divided into two parts: a. A register for those registered to provide later years care for children aged between 5 and 8, in respect of which registration is compulsory;

b. A register for those registered to provide later years care for children aged over 8, in respect of which registration is voluntary.

19. Section 69 (1) of the Act provides for regulations to be made dealing with an appeal against the suspension of a person’s registration: see regulations 8-13 of the Childcare (Early Years and General Childcare Registers) (Common Provisions) Regulations 2008 (hereafter “the 2008 Regulations”).

20. When deciding whether to suspend registration the applicable test is that set out in regulation 9 of the 2008 Regulations. It is that:

“…the Chief Inspector reasonably believes that the continued provision of childcare by the registered person to any child may expose such a child to a risk of harm.”

21. “Harm” is defined in regulation 13 as having the same definition as in section 31(9) of the Children Act 1989 which, (as amended by s 120 of the Adoption and Fostering Act 2002) provides as follows:

“ill-treatment or the impairment of health or development including, for example, impairment suffered from seeing or hearing the ill treatment of another;

“development” means physical, intellectual, emotional, social or behavioural development;

“health” means physical or mental health; and

“ill-treatment” includes sexual abuse and forms of ill-treatment which are not physical.”

22. The immediate duration of suspension under regulation 9 is for a period of six weeks. It may, however, be extended to 12 weeks under regulation 10. This provides that:

“Suspension of registration: further provisions

10. —(1) Subject to paragraph (2), the period for which the registration of a registered person may be suspended is six weeks beginning with the date specified in the notice of suspension given in accordance with paragraph (4).

(2) Subject to paragraph (3), in a case in which a further period of suspension is based on the same circumstances as the period of suspension immediately preceding that further period of suspension, the Chief Inspector’s power to suspend registration may only be exercised so as to give rise to a continuous period of suspension of 12 weeks.

(3) Where, however, it is not reasonably practicable (for reasons beyond the control of the Chief Inspector)—

(a) to complete any investigation into the grounds for the Chief Inspector’s belief referred to in regulation 9, or

(b) for any necessary steps to be taken to eliminate or reduce the risk of harm referred to in regulation 9, within a period of 12 weeks,

the period of suspension may continue until the end of the investigation referred to in sub-paragraph (a), or until the steps referred to in sub-paragraph (b) have been taken.”

23. Under regulation 11, suspension “must” be lifted by Ofsted if the circumstances described in regulation 9 cease to exist. This effectively imposes an ongoing obligation upon the Respondent to keep the need for suspension under review.

24. The first issue to be addressed by the panel is whether it reasonably believes that the continued provision of childcare by the registered person to any child may expose such a child to a risk of harm (the threshold test).

25. The burden of satisfying us that the threshold test under regulation 9 is met lies on the Respondent. The standard of proof ‘reasonable cause to believe’ falls somewhere between the balance of probability test and ‘reasonable cause to suspect’. The belief is to be judged by whether a reasonable person, assumed to know the law and possessed of the information, would believe that a child may be exposed to a risk of harm.

26. We are guided by Ofsted v GM and WM[2009] UKUT 89 (AAC) at [21]:

“Although the word “significant” does not appear in regulation 9, both the general legislative context and the principle of proportionality suggest that the contemplated risk must be one of significant harm.”

27. Even if the threshold test is met, the Respondent bears the overall burden of persuading the panel that the decision under appeal is in accordance with the law, justified in terms of a legitimate public interest objective, and is proportionate in all the circumstances.

The Evidence

28. We heard oral evidence from the following witnesses:

For the Respondent:

• Mrs Hayley Marshall-Gowen, (EYRI)

• Mrs Paula Sissons, Early Years Senior Officer (EYSO)

For the Appellant:

• Mr Sebastian Onyango

• Mrs Consela Ochieng, Tutor and Childminding Assistant

The Tribunal’s consideration of the appeal

29. We have considered all of the material before us including the evidence on which each party relies, the skeleton arguments, other written submissions, the oral evidence and the closing oral submissions. If we do not refer to any particular parts of the statements, other evidence, argument, or any particular submission, it should not be assumed that these have not been considered.

30. There were no significant difficulties with the video connection during the hearing.

31. Whilst reference is drawn from case law to our “placing ourselves in the shoes of the Chief Inspector”, we are an independent panel making a risk assessment against the threshold set out in paragraph 9, and on the basis of the information available as at today.

32. Standing in the shoes of the Chief Inspector, we must make our own assessment of both risk and proportionality in the light of the evidence as at today’s date. We also take fully into account the ongoing obligation imposed on Ofsted (and therefore this panel standing in Ofsted’s shoes) to actively consider the necessity and justification for suspension on an ongoing basis.

33. Although the word “harm” in Regulation 9 is not qualified by the word “significant”, we consider that the significance of any potential harm is relevant to the issues of necessity, justification and proportionality.

34. Applying Ofsted v GM and WM, we remind ourselves that regulation 9 sets a low threshold. However, the mere fact that the regulation 9 threshold is met does not necessarily mean that the exercise of the power of suspension is necessary, justified or proportionate.

35. It needs to be emphasised that we are not today involved in making any findings regarding any disputed facts. Our task is that of a risk assessment in the light of the nature and apparent substance of the evidence regarding the concerns/allegations before us.

36. Assessing the issue of risk requires us to consider the disputed evidence before us to assess whether the concerns/allegations raised do, or do not, have apparent substance, and to consider the nature, seriousness and/or potential impact of the allegations made, if true, to the issue of potential risk to children. This is a very different exercise to fact finding.

37. We have considered all the material before us.

38. On the evidence before us it appears that some matters of concern present on 2 September 2026 had also been present at the March 2026 inspection.

39. The Respondent’s position at the hearing is that at the March 2026 inspection Mrs Marshall-Gowen found evidence that a five-year-old child i.e. an Early Years child had been minded. This was outside the scope of the Appellant’s registration. Mrs Marshall-Gowen’s evidence was that she spoke to the Appellant at length about this and he had assured her that this would not happen again. The Respondent’s case is that the register provided by the Appellant on 2 September 2026 shows that an Early Years child (J) had been looked after in May 2026. The Appellant’s explanation (which the Respondent does not accept) is that he had not understood that the definition of an Early Years child extends until 31 August after the child’s fifth birthday. He refers to government guidance which, on occasions, refers to the age of five years without further qualification. He also relies on the fact that by 2 September 2026 the child was no longer on the active register.

40. Pausing here, as we have said, it is not our role to make findings regarding disputed issues. Suffice to say that childcare being provided outside of the scope of registration is a very serious allegation. This is because there are specific requirements regarding suitable provision for children based upon their age, stage and associated vulnerabilities. Apart from unregistered childcare being an offence, it has potentially serious implications regarding insurance cover.

41. Mrs Marshall-Gowen had several other concerns, which are largely disputed. The main matters appear to be as follows:

a) In 2021 Mr Onyango had assured Ofsted that the operating times of childminding and tutoring would be separate. However, on 2 September 2026 Mr Onyango said that minding of children did take place while tutoring services were in operation. Young children could therefore come into contact with unvetted individuals, and share toilet facilities with young adults. Mr Onyango said that he or his assistants would watch children using the bathroom. This is of concern.

b) The room being used for childminding was not appropriate for children for whose care the setting was registered. Mrs Marshall-Gowen’s account was that Mr Onyango told her that all minded children were cared for in the childminding room. Mrs Marshall-Gowen chose a random day to review the numbers of children in attendance and found that 20 children were present aged between 6 and 16 years in a room that consisted of only four tables with chairs. Mr Onyango said that the children were divided into groups with some children going to a local green where they would sit on the floor and eat their lunch. She said that Mr Onyango could not explain what happened in inclement weather.

c) When asked about outdoor provision Mr Onyango said he in the dark takes children to the public open car park behind the offices and lets them play there. She says that when she asked him if this seemed safe he referred to it being quieter as people go home from work.

d) Mrs Marshall-Gowen was concerned by the fact that the three 11 year old children present (who were said to be there for tutoring and therefore not receiving registered care) were jumping between steps/floors on the staircase without any discouragement or behaviour management strategies employed. We noted that the evidence of Mr Onyango and Mrs Ochieng was that the three children only ran down the stairs because they were visibly distressed and concerned because they had heard Mrs Marshall-Gowen refer to the possibility of closure of the provision. Mrs Marshall-Gowen said that when she raised her concern that Mr Ochieng should be looking after the children, he said, “They are only children, they are just playing”.

42. We have considered the evidence regarding the up-to-date position of the parties. We have considered with care the various documents on which the Appellant relies. The Appellant’s case is that the revised documents regarding risk assessment and operational controls will meaningfully address the risks perceived by the Respondent. We noted that some of the risk assessment documents had been signed as approved by Mr Onyango on 9 April 2026.

43. The nature and substance of the material before us is such that we consider that the threshold test was satisfied at the date of the decision under appeal, and it remains satisfied as at the date of hearing. We consider that there is clear and cogent evidence which, if true, supports the Appellant is unable or unwilling to make adequate risk assessments or to ensure that children in his care are safeguarded. The information before us is such that we reasonably believe that a child may be exposed to a risk of significant harm.

44. For all the reasons we have given the Respondent has satisfied us that the threshold test in regulation 9 is met.

45. Regulation 8 of the 2008 Regulations provides that registration may be suspended generally or in respect of particular premises. We have considered the point made by Mr Onyango (as an alternative argument) which is to the effect that, even on the Respondent’s case at its highest, the evidence relates to alleged breaches or concerns regarding Regency Court, and not Rhodes Place, so suspension of the latter cannot be justified.

46. In our view there is cogent evidence that supports the overarching concern regarding Mr Onyango’s willingness and/or ability to recognise and assess risk, and to appropriately safeguard children. Since the childcare registration covers both premises, the effect of a suspension order regarding one location only would mean that childcare could be undertaken at the other location. Whilst we consider that the locational circumstances at Regency Court provide pose particular safeguarding risks, the overarching issue relates to the ability or willingness of the provider to recognise and safeguard children from the risk of harm in whichever location might be used.

47. We are satisfied that the decision made by the Respondent was and remains in accordance with the law and was/remains necessary to protect the public interest in the protection of the health, safety and welfare of children pending further investigation and/or steps to be taken to eliminate or reduce risk.

Proportionality

48. Whilst we make the decision based on evidence as at today (i.e. the date of hearing) our essential task is to decide whether the decision should be confirmed or set aside. This inevitably requires us to consider in our redetermination whether the decision made on 4 September 2026 is today proportionate.

49. Mr Onyango urged upon us that conditions could be imposed by the Tribunal and that suspension should be considered as a last resort.

50. We explained during the hearing the Tribunal’s power on appeal against a decision to suspend registration is either to confirm the decision or to direct that the suspension shall cease to have effect. There is no provision under Regulation 12 to enable this panel to impose conditions. (By way of contrast, there is, however, the power to impose conditions in an appeal against a substantive decision regarding cancellation – see section 74 (5) of the Childcare Act 2006).

51. As we explained in the hearing, as a matter of principle, consideration of whether the Respondent could itself impose conditions or written requirements can be relevant when assessing proportionality. However, we do not consider that any conditions or written requirements could realistically be devised by the Respondent that would be capable of adequately addressing or mitigating the risk in this case. The issues in this case fundamentally involve the Appellant’s attitude and understanding of the needs of children in his care, and his ability to assess risk.

52. Looking at the matter in the round we accept, of course, that the Respondent’s decision made on 4 September 2026 has very obvious reputational and financial implications. The Appellant can, of course, still operate the tutoring business. Mr Onyango told us that the registered childcare side of his business accounts for about 45% of the overall income generated. We have little doubt that the fact of suspension, although intended to be a neutral act pending elimination or reduction of risk, has had an ongoing and significant adverse impact on the reputation, income and livelihood of the Appellant, and with ongoing effects for his business, family and others.

53. We have carefully considered all the matters raised before us. A decision whether or not to suspend registration is never a decision to be taken lightly. Suspension is always a very serious matter because of the continuing adverse impact on livelihood, professional reputation, standing and business viability.

54. We balanced the harm to the interests of the Appellant and others affected against the risk of harm to the children looked after at the Appellant’s setting, pending further consideration.

55. Having considered the weight and apparent substance of the material before us, we consider that the need to protect children against the risk of significant harm outweighs the adverse impacts of suspension on the Appellant and all those affected.

56. The Respondent has satisfied us that the decision under appeal was/is fair, reasonable and proportionate to the public interest in the protection of the health, safety and well-being of children.

57. We confirm the decision made on 4 September 2026 to suspend the Appellant’s registration for the period of six weeks until 15 October 2026.

Decision

The decision to suspend registration dated 4 September 2026 is confirmed.

The appeal is dismissed.

Tribunal Judge S Goodrich

First-tier Tribunal (Health Education and Social Care)

Date issued: 28 October 2026

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