Family United Kingdom

A and C (Solicitors: Conflict of Interest), Re

Official source

Neutral Citation Number: [2026] EWHC 2842 (Fam)

Case No: FD26F00005

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE

FAMILY DIVISION

Royal Courts of Justice

Strand, London, WC2A 2LL

Date: 04 November 2026

Before :

MISS NAGEENA KHALIQUE KC SITTING AS A DEPUTY HIGH COURT JUDGE

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Re A and C (Solicitors: Conflict of Interest)

Between :

C Claimant
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A
Defendant

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Mr Simon Lillington (instructed by Birketts LLP) for the Claimant

Mr A as a litigant in person (the Defendant)

Hearing dates: 21-22 September 2026

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Approved Judgment

This judgment was handed down remotely at 10.30am on 4 November 2026 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives.

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This judgment was delivered in public and may be published. The judge has given leave for this version of the judgment to be published on condition that (irrespective of what is contained in the judgment) in any published version of the judgment the anonymity of the children and members of their family must be strictly preserved. All persons, including representatives of the media and legal bloggers, must ensure that this condition is strictly complied with. Failure to do so will be a contempt of court.

Miss Nageena Khalique KC sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge:

Introduction

1. This judgment concerns an application brought by the Defendant, “A” seeking an order that the Claimant's solicitors, Birketts LLP (“Birketts”), cease acting for the Claimant in these proceedings on the grounds of an alleged conflict of interest.

2. The Defendant appeared before me as a litigant in person, supported by his MacKenzie friend, Dr F.

3. The Claimant, “C”, was previously married to the Defendant until they were divorced in Italy in 2023. She is represented by Mr Simon Lillington of counsel instructed by Birketts.

4. Behind this application, there are ongoing TOLATA proceedings, brought by the Claimant, which concern a property in Tunbridge Wells (“the property”). It is registered at the Land Registry in the parties' joint names as tenants in common in equal shares. The Defendant currently lives at the property with the parties' two children, aged 19 and 14.

5. In brief, the relief sought by the Claimant includes a declaration that the parties hold the property as tenants in common in equal shares and an order for sale.

6. The present application arises from the fact that Mr Sebastian Burrows, now a partner at Birketts, was previously employed as a partner at Stowe Family Law (“Stowe”) at a time when Stowe acted for the Defendant.

7. The Defendant contends that this constitutes a breach of rule 6.5 of the Solicitors Regulation Authority Code of Conduct (“the SRA”) and that confidential information obtained during that retainer is now attributable to Birketts. As such, he argues that there is a clear conflict of interest and Birketts must be precluded from acting against him in these proceedings by virtue of imputed knowledge.

8. By an order dated 13 July 2026, a hearing was listed on 21 and 22 September to deal solely with the alleged conflict of interest issue, and a further hearing was listed in November 2026 to determine the following further preliminary issues:

a) What was the effect of the orders and judgment of the Italian courts in relation to the property;

b) Whether the Italian court had the jurisdiction to make an order transferring ownership of the property.

9. The latter preliminary issue hearing is listed before me on 16-18 November 2026.

Reasonable adjustments to assist the Defendant

10. Reasonable adjustments were made to enable the Defendant to participate fully with the proceedings despite his hearing impairment and his lack of legal representation. These included setting up and testing the court loop and audio systems and subsequently ensuring that the Defendant could hear using headphones with volume adjustment. Permission was also granted to allow Dr F to assist the Defendant as his MacKenzie friend. I reminded them that they should alert me if there were any difficulties with hearing, or if a break was needed. I have no doubt that this was fully understood by both of them.

11. The Defendant also told me that he is the sole carer for his younger teenage son, ‘M’ who has a visual impairment. In oral submissions, the Defendant stated that he was concerned about ongoing issues with M's school and/or other agencies in respect of M's special educational needs due to his visual impairment, which he said made it difficult for him to deal these proceedings; he has previously made repeated requests for a stay or variation of my previous directions, referring to his caring responsibilities. I was informed that M attends a mainstream school and M's older brother was able to assist with taking him to school on the morning of the hearing. I gave the Defendant further opportunity to make appropriate arrangements for M after school, which were put in place.

12. Although this court is not directly involved with matters relating to M, I took note of these concerns and the potential impact they were having on the Defendant. I was satisfied that the Defendant had considerable notice of the date of this hearing (almost three months from when I set the date in court when both parties were present) in which to prepare and make appropriate arrangements for M, but I accept that he was feeling the weight of his caring responsibilities. I took all these factors into account when timetabling and managing the evidence which ultimately enabled the hearing to take place and finish promptly.

13. Bearing in mind his status as a litigant in person, I gave the Defendant considerable latitude in how he presented his evidence (which often involved him making comments and submissions throughout the hearing).

Material considered and procedural issues

14. I have considered the bundle filed for this hearing including a witness statement from the Defendant dated 6 July 2026, a document titled: “Addendum: the absolute regulatory and procedural bar of theimputed knowledge of Mr. Sebastian Burrows (Partner, Birketts LLP)” dated 24 July 2026 (“the Addendum document”), prepared by the Defendant, a witness statement from Mr Burrows dated 10 July 2026, an unofficial transcript of a conversation between the Defendant and Mr Burrows, and an audio recording of the same, dated 23 January 2025, produced by the Defendant, skeleton arguments filed by both parties and closing submissions filed by the Claimant. I have also seen a vast quantity of correspondence sent to the court by email from the Defendant.

15. Prior to the hearing on 16 June 2026, and persistently since, the Defendant has emailed the court office seeking to challenge the court's previous directions and/or requesting further or alternative directions. The Defendant was given information about lodging any appeal with the Court of Appeal.

16. Additionally, the Defendant has sent numerous documents to the court, including an N244 application with a bundle of 467 pages, an application to the Court of Appeal for permission to appeal various directions and matters (including the instruction of an expert) and a further C100 application which was filed on 21 September 2026, seeking, inter alia, an order to stay proceedings and extend the court timetable.I do not propose to expand on those matters here but simply record that the Defendant's applications to the High Court and his application for permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal have all been refused.

17. On the morning of the hearing on 21 September 2026, the Defendant made an application to adjourn this hearing. I refused that application and gave my reasons ex tempore. In balancing the needs of the Defendant against the need for fairness to the Claimant and the overriding objective CPR 1.1, 1.2, 1.4, I did not consider that any further delay was justified or that the Defendant was prevented from conducting this litigation by reason of his personal or domestic circumstances. I have seen a transcribed note of my decision which has been shared with the parties. I do not propose to repeat those reasons here.

18. In the course of giving his own evidence and during his cross examination of Mr Burrows, the Defendant strayed into making oral submissions. Although I had read the skeleton arguments filed by both parties, at the close of evidence on 21 September, I invited the parties to make any final closing oral submissions, if they should wish to do so, on the following day.

19. Unfortunately, the Defendant could not attend court the next day due to feeling unwell. He informed the court in the morning that he was at the A&E department of his local hospital in Tunbridge Wells, awaiting test results. In the event, it became clear that he would not be attending court on 22 September but was unable to confirm when or whether he would be able to in the near future. In light of this uncertainty, and having regard to the overriding objective and in the interests of proportionality, I exercised my case management powers and directed the Claimant to file any closing written submissions by 25 September and the Defendant to file his by 2 October 2026.

20. The Defendant failed to file closing submissions by the deadline but emailed the court requesting a six week extension of time to do so on the grounds that he was undergoing further outpatient medical investigations; he reiterated that he had sole caring responsibilities for M. I extended the deadline for him to file any further closing submissions to 9 October 2026 but the Defendant did not do so by that date either.

21. Keehan J considered the Defendant's application dated 12 October 2026 and accompanying correspondence which sought to vary the court timetable; he noted that the Defendant was in breach of the order dated 22 September 2026, for which an extension had already been granted and refused to extend the timetable on 15 October 2026.

22. The Defendant's C100 application dated 21 September 2026 was also refused by Keehan J on 16 October 2026 because he was (i) in breach of a court order, (ii) the applications and requests were not supported by cogent evidence, and (iii) were without merit.

Background

23. As noted above, the substantive proceedings concern the property registered at HM Land Registry in the parties' joint names as tenants in common in equal shares. The Claimant seeks declarations concerning beneficial ownership together with an order for sale, sole conduct of sale, occupation rent and associated accounting relief under the Trusts of Land and Appointment of Trustees Act 1996. The proceedings have already generated substantial interlocutory litigation.

24. The parties' relationship has an extensive history extending beyond England and Wales and involving proceedings in Italy. The Defendant maintains that various Italian orders and judgments are determinative of issues arising in these proceedings. The Claimant disputes the Defendant's interpretation of those orders and maintains that expert evidence is required. This will be a matter for determination at the hearing in November 2026. I emphasise that none of those substantive disputes falls for determination within this judgment. The sole question before me is whether Birketts should continue to act.

25. The issue first emerged following the Defendant's discovery that Mr Sebastian Burrows had joined Birketts LLP after leaving Stowe Family Law. The Defendant had engaged Stowe between January and December 2025 before terminating his retainer with that firm.

26. According to the chronology in the Defendant's Addendum document, on 23 January 2025, the Defendant had an initial telephone consultation with Mr Burrows which was recorded (as I understand it, without Mr Burrows' knowledge, although no issue is taken on this). I have read the transcribed note of that conversation which is not in dispute. The Defendant’s evidence refers to the advice Mr Burrows gave him at that consultation.

27. On 24 January 2025 the Defendant sent an email to Mr. Burrows attaching the original Italian judgment dated May 2024, and an English translation of that judgment obtained by him. (I note that those documents have been subsequently disclosed by the Defendant to Birketts, in any event, as part of his defence to the claim in the TOLATA proceedings).

28. Mr Burrows had been a partner at Stowe from 2019 until December 2025. Although the day-to-day handling of the Defendant's case was undertaken principally by another solicitor, Ms Maya Bhatiani, Mr Burrows was identified in client care documentation as the partner with overall responsibility for the matter:

a) In February 2025, Mr Burrows wrote to the Defendant confirming:

“I have now had the opportunity to discuss your position with my colleague Maya Bhatiani, who is copied into this email. I will now open up a substantive file for you at the firm. Then a request for the payment on account will follow, as discussed (£1,500). Then Maya will be in touch with you to organise a time that is convenient for you and her to have a Teams meeting to discuss the details of the next steps and letter to Isabella.”

b) On 18 February 2025 Ms. Bhatiani sent a formal Letter of Advice which included the following reference to Mr Burrows' role:

“The person with overall responsibility for your matter is Sebastian Burrows who is a Managing Partner in our team. He will have regular discussions with me about your case to ensure it is on track, that the strategy is clear and they will also provide input as and when required.”

29. There does not appear to be any further correspondence or record of Mr Burrows' direct or indirect involvement. In fact, Mr Burrows resigned from Stowe on 27 September 2025 and was on sick leave for two weeks thereafter. He was subsequently placed on ‘garden leave’ from 11 October to the end of December 2025; he no longer had access to any documents or material or client information at Stowe between those dates or after leaving Stowe.

30. The Defendant states he escalated his “serious concerns directly to Sebastian Burrows in late October, but he ignores the emails”. The Defendant was told on 31 October 2025 by Ms. Bhatiani that Mr. Burrows was "no longer in the business". The Defendant considers that Ms Bhatiani was ‘lying' because although Mr Burrows was on garden leave and not dealing with any cases, he was technically still a paid employee of Stowe.

31. On 4 December 2025 Birketts sent a Letter Before Action on behalf of the Claimant in respect of the TOLATA claim.

32. On 11 December 2025, the Defendant informed Ms Bhatiani that she was no longer instructed due to his dissatisfaction with Stowe.

33. Mr Burrows commenced working with Birketts on 13 April 2026. By this time, i.e. before Mr Burrows joined Birketts, the Claimant’s case was already fully pleaded by her legal team in a different department to the one Mr Burrows later joined, and no new evidence has been disclosed, shared or relied upon since he joined the firm.

34. The Defendant thereafter raised concerns that Birketts could not continue acting because of Mr Burrows' previous involvement with him at Stowe. The issue was litigated extensively through correspondence, position statements, witness evidence and skeleton arguments.

The parties’ positions

35. The Defendant's argument has evolved over time, but consistently at its core is a proposition advanced repeatedly in his written and oral submissions, in the course of his oral evidence and during cross examination of Mr Burrows, namely that a firm must not act where it holds confidential information belonging to a former client (relying on paragraph 6.5 of the SRA Code of Conduct) and, that the knowledge of Mr Burrows became "instantly imputed" to Birketts upon his arrival there. He further contends that no subsequent undertakings or ‘information barrier’ can cure what the Defendant characterises as a structural and irremediable conflict. This is encapsulated at paragraph 2.2 of his skeleton argument:

"The governing legal principle, established in Prince Jefri Bolkiah v KPMG, dictates that the knowledge of a solicitor is instantly imputed to their entire firm. A retroactive information barrier cannot cure a structural conflict where a partner inherently holds privileged, case-destroying evidence belonging to the opposing party."

36. The Defendant argues that whilst employed by Stowe, Mr Burrows had supervisory responsibility for matters undertaken on behalf of the Defendant and that he supplied Stowe with material which he regards as central to his defence of the TOLATA proceedings, including English translations of Italian court decisions. The Defendant submits that because Mr Burrows formerly worked for him, and because Mr Burrows now works within Birketts, confidential information belonging to him is necessarily imputed to Birketts as a whole. The Defendant submits that this principle arises from the case of Prince Jefri Bolkiah v KPMG(A Firm) [1999] 2 AC 222 (see below).

37. The Claimant resists the application. On her behalf, Mr Lillington submits that the Defendant's analysis misunderstands both the facts and the law. Whilst it is accepted that Mr Burrows held a supervisory role at Stowe, it is strongly argued that he has had no involvement whatsoever in these proceedings, possesses no recollection of the Defendant or his case, retains no documents belonging to him, cannot access the file at Birketts, has had no communications with those conducting the litigation, and has at all times complied with his professional obligations. As such, the Claimant submits there is no evidence that Mr Burrows possesses confidential information relevant to these proceedings at all.

38. Moreover, the Claimant acknowledges paragraph 6.5 of the SRA Code of Conduct, which provides that a firm must not act where it holds confidential information belonging to a former client, but highlights that it also states that this does not apply where effective measures have been taken resulting in no real risk of disclosure. The Claimant submits that the rule itself recognises the possibility that effective information barriers may eliminate risk. The Claimant further relies upon a series of undertakings offered by both Mr Burrows and Birketts LLP and submits that the authorities demonstrate that such safeguards are more than sufficient.

The issues

39. The application raises a question which is not uncommon in modern legal practice: namely the extent to which a solicitor's move from one firm to another may prevent the new firm acting against a former client.

40. It is not whether Mr Burrows once acted in a supervisory capacity whilst employed by Stowe. That fact is not disputed. Nor is the issue whether the Defendant was entitled to expect confidentiality from his former solicitors; it is fully understood and accepted that he was so entitled. What is unusual is the breadth of the Defendant's submissions and the prominence given to the concept of "imputed knowledge" as a freestanding doctrine of disqualification.

41. The first issue is whether Mr Burrows holds confidential information relevant to these proceedings. Secondly whether there exists a present and real risk that confidential information belonging to the Defendant may be disclosed to those conducting the Claimant's case.

42. Thirdly, if there is a real risk of disclosure of confidential information, then I am bound to consider whether effective safeguards eliminate that risk.

My decision

43. For reasons which are set out below, there is no conflict of interest such that Birketts should cease to act for the Claimant. I have concluded that the Defendant has failed to establish the factual foundation necessary to justify the relief sought and that, even if I am wrong about that, there is no real risk of disclosure. The application must therefore be dismissed.

The law

44. The Defendant places reliance upon paragraph 6.5 of the SRA Code of Conduct (“the rule”). Although the source of the court's jurisdiction is not the Code itself, the rule accurately reflects the policy which underpins the authorities concerning former client confidentiality.

45. Paragraph 6.5 provides [emphasis added]:

"You do not act for a client in a matter where that client has an interest adverse to the interest of another current or former client of you or your business or employer, for whom you or your business or employer holds confidential information which is material to that matter, unless:

(1) effective measures have been taken which result in there being no real risk of disclosure of the confidential information; or

(2) the current or former client whose information you or your business or employer holds has given informed consent, given or evidenced in writing, to you acting, including to any measures to protect their information".

46. The Code provides a definition of ‘client' as follows:

“client means the person for whom you act and, where the context permits, includes prospective and former clients”

47. The rule in paragraph 6.5 of the Code itself is notable because it recognises two propositions simultaneously. First, confidential information must exist and be held. Secondly, effective measures may eliminate any real risk of disclosure. The rule therefore does not support the absolute proposition advanced by the Defendant.

48. Moreover, the facts regarding the Claimant do not actually sit perfectly squarely within that rule which can be illustrated thus [emphasis added]:

“You (Birketts/Lucia Mills) do not act for a client (the claimant) in a matter where that client (the claimant) has an interest adverse to the interest of another current or former client of you or your business or employer (the defendant has never been a former client of Lucia Mills or Birketts), for whom you or your business or employer holds confidential information which is material to that matter.”

49. The relevant principles are, however, derived from the authorities concerning the court's equitable jurisdiction to protect confidential information. The starting point is Prince Jefri Bolkiah v KPMG (A Firm)2 AC 222; [1998] UKHL 52. Lord Hope, agreeing with Lord Millett, explained the nature of the continuing duty owed to a former client at [226]:

"A solicitor is under a duty not to communicate to others any information in his possession which is confidential to the former client. But the duty extends well beyond that of refraining from deliberate disclosure. It is the solicitor's duty to ensure that the former client is not put at risk that confidential information which the solicitor has obtained from that relationship may be used against him in any circumstances. Particular care is needed if the solicitor agrees to act for a new client who has, or who may have, an interest which is in conflict with that of the former client. In that situation the former client is entitled to the protection of the court if he can show that his solicitor was in receipt of confidential information which is relevant to a matter for which the solicitor is acting, against the former client's interest, for a new client. He is entitled to insist that measures be taken by the solicitor which will ensure that he is not exposed to the risk of careless, inadvertent or negligent disclosure of the information to the new client by the solicitor, his partners in the firm, its employees or anyone else for whose acts the solicitor is responsible”

50. The House of Lords made clear that where a former client establishes that confidential information has been imparted and that the firm proposes to act against that former client in a matter to which the information is or may be relevant, the burden shifts to the firm to satisfy the court that there is no real risk of disclosure. Lord Millett stated at [237]:

"The court should intervene unless it is satisfied that there is no risk of disclosure. It goes without saying that the risk must be a real one and not merely fanciful or theoretical."

51. Lord Hope summarised the position as follows at [226-227]:

‘As for the circumstances in which the court will intervene by granting an injunction, it will not intervene if it is satisfied that there is no risk of disclosure. But if it is not so satisfied, it should bear in mind that the choice as to whether to accept instructions from the new client rests with the solicitor and that disclosure may result in substantial damage to the former client for which he may find it impossible to obtain adequate redress from the solicitor. It may be very difficult, after the event, to prove how and when the information got out, by whom and to whom it was communicated and with what consequences. In that situation everything is likely to depend on the measures which are in place to ensure that there is no risk that the information will be disclosed. If the court is not satisfied that the measures will protect the former client against the risk, the proper course will be for it to grant an injunction.’

52. Equally important for present purposes, the House of Lords in Bolkiah at [234] expressly rejected any rigid rule of automatic disqualification referring to an earlier decision of the Court of Appeal in Rakusen v. Ellis, Munday and Clarke [1912] 1 Ch. 831:

“The facts of that case were unusual. It concerned a small firm of solicitors with only two partners who carried on what amounted to separate practices, each with his own clients, without any knowledge of the other's clients and with the exclusive services of some of the clerks. The plaintiff consulted one of the partners in relation to a contentious matter. After he had terminated his retainer, the other partner, who had never met the plaintiff and was not aware that he had consulted his partner, was retained by the party opposite in the same matter. The judge granted an injunction to restrain the solicitor from acting. The Court of Appeal found that there was no risk of disclosure of confidential information and discharged the injunction.

The case is authority for two propositions: (i) that there is no absolute rule of law in England that a solicitor may not act in litigation against a former client; and (ii) that the solicitor may be restrained from acting if such a restriction is necessary to avoid a significant risk of the disclosure or misuse of confidential information belonging to the former client.”

53. The House of Lords in Bolkiah also recognised that information barriers may, in an appropriate case, be effective.

54. The principles were subsequently considered by the Court of Appeal in Koch Shipping Inc v Richards Butler (A Firm)[2002] EWCA Civ 1280. Ward LJ at [61] reminded himself of the importance of protecting confidential information referring to Lord Millett’s dicta in Bolkiah at [236]:

"It is of overriding importance to the proper administration of justice that a client should be able to have complete confidence that what he tells his lawyer will remain secret. This is a matter of perception as well as substance. It is of the highest importance to the administration of justice that a solicitor or other person in possession of confidential and privileged information should not act in any way that might appear to put that information at risk by coming into the hands of someone with an adverse interest."

55. In Koch a solicitor who possessed confidential information concerning one party joined a firm acting for the opposing party in the same arbitration. The Court of Appeal, in a judgment delivered by Clarke LJ, set out the governing principles derived from Bolkiah. The Court stated at [24]:

"(5) The former client must establish that the defendant solicitors possess confidential information which is or might be relevant to the matter and to the disclosure of which he has not consented."

56. Only once that threshold is crossed does the burden pass to the solicitors to show that there is no real risk of disclosure. The Court further emphasised: "each case turns on its own facts" and identified as highly significant that there was only one potential source of disclosure. Clarke LJ observed at [29]:

"A key factor in the instant case is that there is only one potential discloser."

57. Ultimately, despite the existence of genuinely confidential information remembered by the solicitor concerned, the Court of Appeal discharged the injunction. Clarke LJ concluded at [46-48] that any risk of disclosure in the light of the undertakings was fanciful.

58. I have also considered the case of ZS v FS (Application to Prevent Solicitor Acting) [2017] EWHC 2660 (Fam), a decision of Williams J in the Family Division, it provides a particularly useful analysis of the authorities and the evidential exercise required of the court. Although arising on different facts, Williams J summarised the following propositions at paragraph [10] of his judgment:

(a) the duties arising in confidentiality and legal professional privilege arise whether the information is imparted to a solicitor directly by a principal, or by an agent on behalf of his principal. It would therefore apply to any confidential information or legally privileged material which arose between Raymond Tooth and OE.

(b) the duty arises whether the parties formally entered into a legal relationship or not. The imparting of information in contemplation of such a relationship would suffice. Thus a preliminary meeting between solicitor and client in the course of a beauty parade could suffice, probably even if pro bono or not charged for.

(c) the rules apply in family cases just as much as in civil actions. There is no absolute rule though that a solicitor cannot act in litigation against a former client.

(d) in the first instance it is a matter for the solicitor involved to consider whether, consistent with his professional conduct rules and the proper administration of justice, he can continue to act. If he concludes he cannot, that will usually be the end of the matter. If he concludes he can continue to act then the Court retains the power to grant an injunction to prevent him from acting.

(e) where a former client has imparted information in confidence in the course of a fiduciary relationship, and /or where that information is privileged, there are strong public policy reasons rooted in the proper administration of justice which support the approach that a solicitor in possession of such information should not act in a way that might appear to put that information at risk of coming into the hands of someone with an adverse interest.

(f) it must be established that the confidential or privileged information is relevant or may be relevant to the matter on which the solicitor is now instructed by the person with an adverse interest to that of the former client.

(g) where it is established that a solicitor is in possession of such confidential and/or privileged information, the Court should intervene to prevent the information coming into the hands of anyone with an adverse interest, unless there is no real risk of disclosure. Once it is established that a person is in possession of such information the burden is on them to show that there is no such real risk. In this context "real" means it is not merely fanciful or theoretical, but it does not need to be substantial.

(h) the risk of disclosure may arise from deliberate act, inadvertent disclosure or unconscious influence or subconscious influence. In the latter case in particular it might be quite fact specific whether that risk arises or not.

(i) in the context of family litigation it is hard to conceive of a situation where the risk of disclosure would not satisfy that test where the Court had concluded that detailed, confidential financial information and/or privileged information had been disclosed to a solicitor by one party to a marriage which was, or might be relevant to a potential dispute between them. In most cases that would create a real risk where that solicitor was subsequently instructed by the other party.

(j) a party advancing such an application may decline to waive privilege or confidentiality, or may elect to partially waive privilege. If he partially waives privilege the Court may order full disclosure in relation to that transaction in order to determine an issue such as an application for an injunction like this, and the Court may take steps to ensure that the privilege is not waived for all purposes, but to ensure that the cat can be put back into the bag. In cases such as this the question should be considered at the directions stage, in particular where, as here, partial disclosure in the form of the attendance note has been made.

(k) if the principles on which an order can be made are established an order should usually be made, unless it is established that there are other more significant public policy reasons for not granting it, including that the Court concludes that the injustice to the respondent in granting the order outweighs the injustice to the applicant in not granting it. Relevant considerations might include, firstly, whether the information had been imparted during an exercise designed either wholly or in part to conflict out other solicitors who the respondent might seek to instruct; whether there are other firms who might now be able to act for the respondent; whether the application was made promptly; the additional expense and delay that might be occasioned to the respondent if they were obliged to instruct new solicitors; whether any such expense could appropriately be off-set by the applicant.

The evidence

59. I heard oral evidence from Mr Sebastian Burrows and the Defendant. Mr Burrows was, in my assessment, an impressive witness. He did not seek to distance himself artificially from his previous role. To the contrary, he readily accepted that he was identified within Stowe's client care documentation as the partner with overall responsibility for the Defendant's matter. He accepted that correspondence relied upon by the Defendant existed. What he did not accept was the proposition that he retained any memory of the Defendant's case. His evidence was straightforward on this issue: he said in unambiguous terms that he had no recollection of the Defendant or the case, no recollection of receiving or reviewing the materials now relied upon by the Defendant and no recollection of any strategic discussions.

60. On cross examination by the Defendant, Mr Burrows explained that whilst employed at Stowe, he was responsible for supervising a very substantial caseload involving numerous clients and multiple fee-earners. The Defendant's file had not been conducted by him day to day. The principal fee-earner was Ms Bhatiani. In those circumstances he did not regard it as surprising that he was unable to recall the Defendant or the detail of the matter.

61. Furthermore, he was no longer dealing with cases at Stowe after resigning at the end of September 2025. Nor was he accessing any files after being placed on garden leave for a period of approximately 3.5 months. All files at Stowe were inaccessible to him as the computer was ‘locked down' from the beginning of October 2025. Although Mr Burrows was unable to confirm that an ‘out of office’ auto-reply was operating from his email account, his understanding was that in similar circumstances such as these, auto-replies would usually be switched on with all mail being forwarded to other members of the team; they would therefore not be seen by him or be within in his control. However, the Defendant confirmed in evidence that he did not receive any such auto-reply messages.

62. Mr Burrows said that he has never accessed or attempted to access the Birketts file in relation to the parties and indeed is not permitted such access; he has had no contact with those conducting the litigation; the Claimant's litigation team operates from a different office and department in a different city and no confidential information has ever been disclosed by or to him.

63. Mr Burrows explained that when inquiries were made of him after these allegations emerged, he was unable to remember either the Defendant or the matter itself. Importantly, that evidence was not confined to memory. Mr Burrows also stated that he retained no documents whatsoever relating to the Defendant. No electronic records had been brought with him from Stowe. No hard-copy files or notes existed in his possession.

64. The Defendant challenged Mr Burrows’ recollection and suggested that there may have been inadvertent disclosure to the Claimant's legal team at Birketts by him or even by employees at Stowe, but Mr Burrows did not accept this. Quite apart from him not having any recollection of the Defendant or the case and his limited role in it, Mr Burrows emphasised that he was fully aware of his own professional obligations regarding confidential information and would not jeopardise his own or his employer's professional reputation by such careless conduct. He further described that high standards of professional conduct in this regard were practised not only by himself, but by Ms Bhatiani and other members of the team with whom he had worked at Stowe.

65. After repeated questioning of Mr Burrows on this issue, I asked the Defendant whether he was suggesting Mr Burrows was lying or mistaken. The Defendant submitted that Mr Burrows' account was inherently implausible and that although he could not point to any evidence in support of his proposition, he argued that it was entirely possible that confidential information had somehow been conveyed by Mr Burrows to the Claimant’s team at Birketts.

66. Mr Burrows repeated that his own professional standards were maintained throughout and that his professional reputation is rooted in integrity; in his working life neither he, nor any lawyer he had worked with, had behaved in a manner which was “loose-tongued”, unprofessional or lacking in integrity. He therefore did not accept the Defendant's suggestion of inadvertent or deliberate disclosure to Birketts. Contrary to the Defendant's assertions, I found Mr Burrows’ evidence wholly credible and inherently plausible. His answers were measured and entirely consistent with the documentary evidence.

67. Conversely, the Defendant was combative; at times I observed him turning to face counsel for the Claimant and interrupt with audible, critical comments. I also observed that in cross examination by Mr Lillington, the Defendant was reluctant to accept uncontroversial points and often strayed into making comments or submissions. He did however, accept that there was no evidence that he could identify to contradict Mr Burrows' evidence.

68. When I asked the Defendant to clarify the basis for his challenge, he submitted that disclosure of confidential information to Birketts could be inferred or presumed. Ultimately, the Defendant was limited in terms of evidence on these issues; however, his position was made sufficiently clear by a combination of his skeleton argument, including references to relevant case law, his documents within the bundle, and his oral submissions during the course of his own oral evidence and whilst questioning Mr Burrows.

Findings and analysis

69. Having considered all of the evidence, I begin by reminding myself of the observations of Williams J in ZS v FS (Application to Prevent Solicitor Acting) [2017] EWHC 2660 (Fam) that applications of this nature are intensely fact-sensitive and require the court to examine carefully not only the legal principles but also the reliability of the evidence upon which the application is founded. The court must determine what confidential information is said to exist, whether it was communicated, whether it remains possessed by those against whom relief is sought and whether there is a real risk of disclosure.

70. Williams J stated in ZS that in the context of family litigation it is hard to conceive of a situation where the risk of disclosure would not satisfy that test where the Court had concluded that detailed, confidential financial information and/or privileged information had been disclosed to a solicitor by one party to a marriage which was, or might be relevant to a potential dispute between them. In most cases that would create a real risk where that solicitor was subsequently instructed by the other party. However, in this case, Mr Burrows was self evidently not instructed by the other party (i.e. the Claimant).

71. The Defendant's case proceeds on the footing that the doctrine of what he describes as "imputed knowledge" is itself sufficient to prevent Birketts from acting. In paragraph 2.2 of his skeleton argument he submits that "the knowledge of a solicitor is instantly imputed to their entire firm" and that no subsequent information barrier can cure the position. I am unable to accept that proposition. Neither Bolkiah nor Koch establishes any such rule.

72. Indeed, the result in Koch would have been impossible had such a rule existed because the Court of Appeal permitted the firm to continue acting notwithstanding the fact that the solicitor concerned undeniably possessed and remembered relevant confidential information. Importantly, however, Bolkiah does not establish what the Defendant says it establishes. It does not create an irrebuttable doctrine of automatic firm-wide imputation. Nor does it establish that information barriers are necessarily ineffective. Indeed Lord Millett expressly recognised that information barriers might in appropriate circumstances eliminate risk.

73. I have also considered whether there is any risk of disclosure which may have arisen from a deliberate act, inadvertent disclosure or unconscious influence or subconscious influence per Williams J in ZS at [10]. Having considered the facts in the present case (see findings of facts below), there is simply no evidence which leads me to conclude that disclosure has arisen on any of those bases.

74. I turn then to the questions which genuinely divide the parties are:

a) First, does Mr Burrows presently possess confidential information belonging to the Defendant which is relevant to these proceedings?

b) Secondly, if he does, is there any real risk that such information could be disclosed to those conducting the Claimant's case?

75. As alluded to above, I accept the evidence of Mr Burrows who I found to be measured and straightforward. The Defendant's position ultimately rested upon the proposition that because Mr Burrows once supervised the matter at Stowe, he must necessarily retain memory of it. That proposition is not evidence. It is an inference which the Defendant invites the court to draw. On the evidence before me I decline to draw it. I find that there is no evidential basis upon which I can conclude that Mr Burrows presently retains any confidential information relevant to these proceedings. In the absence of such information, there can be no risk of disclosure.

76. I make the following findings of fact:

a) Mr Burrows has no recollection of the Defendant or his case;

b) His role as supervisory partner was limited and he did not have day-to-day management of the Defendant’s case at Stowe between January and 27 September 2025; this was delegated to Ms Bhatiani;

c) Mr Burrows was ‘locked out' of Stowe's case files including the Defendant's case file when he was on sick leave for two weeks from 27 September 2025 and thereafter during his garden leave from 11 October 2025 until the end of his notice period with Stowe at the end of December 2025;

d) Mr Burrows left Stowe at the end of December 2025 and joined Birketts LLP in April 2026; he works in the family law team at the Cambridge office, whereas the legal team dealing with the Claimant's case deals with property disputes and is based in Bristol;

e) Mr Burrows has not been involved with and is not in contact with the team conducting the Claimant's litigation at Birketts; there is no evidence he has discussed the case with them or shared any information whatsoever;

f) Mr Burrows cannot access, and is locked out of the system at Birketts which contains the Claimant's case file; there is no evidence he has accessed it or has ever attempted to do so;

g) Mr Burrows has no confidential information relating to the Defendant's case at Stowe in documentary, electronic or any other format;

h) There is no risk of, and has been no actual deliberate or inadvertent disclosure by Mr Burrows to Birketts or vice versa;

i) Mr Burrows is fully cognisant of his professional obligations and conduct in respect of former clients and has not breached them; his integrity can be relied upon to continue to uphold those professional standards.

77. Despite extensive allegations, the Defendant points to no communication, email, discussion, attendance note, file access log, meeting or document which might suggest confidential information has migrated from Mr Burrows to the Claimant's legal team. The Defendant's case therefore depends not upon actual disclosure but upon the proposition that disclosure must be presumed. For reasons which I have set out above, the authorities do not justify such a presumption.

78. I therefore reject the Defendant's submission that Mr Burrows' arrival at Birketts automatically and permanently conflicted the entire firm. In my judgment any suggestion that information might somehow pass from Mr Burrows to those conducting the litigation can properly be characterised as wholly speculative and fanciful. I accordingly find that the Defendant has not established that Birketts have received confidential information belonging to him through Mr Burrows. That finding is sufficient to dispose of the application. Nevertheless, because the Defendant made extensive submissions in his written and oral evidence addressing the issue of risk, I shall also deal with that question.

79. Even if I assume that the Defendant is correct that some vestigial recollection survives and relevant confidential information remains within Mr Burrows' memory, the circumstances remain far weaker than those considered by the Court of Appeal in Koch. In that case, the solicitor positively remembered the case and confidential information unquestionably existed within the solicitor's knowledge. Here, Mr Burrows does not remember the case and the Defendant has not established that Mr Burrows possesses any knowledge of such material. In Koch, the Court of Appeal nevertheless concluded that disclosure was fanciful. The same conclusion follows even more strongly on the present facts.

80. Further, I accept the following matters:

a) Mr Burrows works in a different department;

b) He works in a different office/city;

c) He has no involvement in the litigation;

d) He cannot access the Claimant’s file;

e) No documents exist in his possession;

f) No confidential information has been disclosed;

g) His evidence demonstrates a clear awareness of his professional obligations.

81. Taken together, these amount to effective information barriers which eliminate risk. I therefore find that there is no real risk of disclosure.

82. The court is not required to intervene where the Defendant has failed to establish that Birketts possess confidential information belonging to him through Mr Burrows and as such undertakings are not required. However, I note that such undertakings have been unconditionally offered on behalf of Birketts and by Mr Burrows. Taken together, they provide substantial additional protection.

Conclusions

83. The Defendant's case therefore falls into the evidential difficulty identified by Williams J in ZS. The existence of a former professional relationship does not itself establish current possession of confidential information. Nor does the mere possibility that information was once known. Evidence is required. The application in ZS accordingly failed before questions of risk truly arose. In my judgment, that approach is directly applicable here. The evidence before me is that Mr Burrows remembers nothing. I accept that evidence.

84. The Defendant's application for any order restraining Birketts from acting is dismissed. The proceedings shall continue with Birketts LLP remaining on the record for the Claimant.

That is my judgment

28 October 2026


Open Justice Licence (The National Archives).

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