Civil United Kingdom

AAM v The Secretary of State for the Home Department

Official source

Neutral Citation Number: [2026] EWCA Civ 1411

Case No: CA-2025-000946

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)

ON APPEAL FROM THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE

KING’S BENCH DIVISION

ADMINISTRATIVE COURT

THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE MACDONALD

[2025] EWHC 447 (ADMIN)

Royal Courts of Justice

Strand, London, WC2A 2LL

Date: 4 November 2026

Before:

LORD JUSTICE BEAN (VICE-PRESIDENT OF THE COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)

LORD JUSTICE EDIS (VICE-PRESIDENT OF THE COURT OF APPEAL (CRIMINAL DIVISION)
and

LORD JUSTICE LEWIS

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Between:

THE KING (on the application of AAM) Respondent
– and –
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT Appellant

– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –

– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –

Jack Anderson (instructed by Government Legal Department) for the Appellant

Samantha Knights KC and Miranda Butler (instructed by Duncan Lewis) for the Respondent

Hearing dates: 15 October 2026

– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –

Approved Judgment

This judgment was handed down remotely at 10.30am on 4 November 2026 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives.

………………………..

LORD JUSTICE LEWIS:

INTRODUCTION

1. This appeal concerns the proper interpretation of one part of the definition of a victim of human trafficking. The statutory provision is regulation 3 of the Slavery and Human Trafficking (Definition of Victim) Regulations 2022 (“the Regulations”). Regulation 3(1) provides that:

“(1) For the purposes of Part 5 of the 2022 Act, "victim of human trafficking" means a person ("V") whose travel is arranged or facilitated by another person ("P")—

(a) using any of the methods mentioned in paragraph (5), and

(b) with a view to V being exploited.”

2. The various elements of the definition are then further defined. For the purpose of this appeal, the relevant part of the regulations is that dealing with when a person is being exploited. That includes the circumstances set out in paragraph 3(6)(d) which provides so far as material:

“(6) For the purposes of paragraph (1)(b), a person is being exploited if the person is—

…..

(d) subjected to force, threats or deception designed to induce that person—

(i) to provide services of any kind;

(ii) to provide another person with benefits of any kind, or

(iii) to enable another person to acquire benefits of any kind.”

3. The sole issue that arises on this appeal is whether kidnapping a person, and forcing that person to contact his family in order to have them pay a ransom for his release, falls within the definition of being exploited in regulation 3(6)(d) of the Regulations.

4. The facts in essence were that the respondent, AAM, left Syria and went to Libya in 2021. He was travelling between Benghazi and Tripoli when he was kidnapped and driven to a place where he was held captive for one month. He was forced to speak to his family by telephone and tell them to send money. A ransom was paid and AAM was released. He subsequently travelled to the United Kingdom. He claimed that he was a victim of modern slavery. The appellant, the Secretary of State, held that he was not a victim of modern slavery as he was not a victim of exploitation. The Secretary of State considered that the fact that AAM was held in captivity and was forced to communicate with his family in order to extort a ransom did not amount to exploitation as he was not required to work or perform any service for his captors.

5. AAM brought a claim for judicial review of the decision that he was not a victim of modern slavery. He contended that being kidnapped and being used to extort a ransom did amount to exploitation within the meaning of one of the limbs of regulation 3(6)(d)(i) to (iii). Macdonald J (“the judge”) held that the appellant, the Secretary of State for the Home Department, had adopted too narrow an approach to the question of whether AAM’s kidnap for ransom was for the purposes of exploitation. The judge considered that whether, in a given case, kidnap for the purpose of extracting payment of a ransom from family members constitutes exploitation would depend upon the facts. He therefore quashed the decision and remitted the matter to the appellant to reconsider.

6. The appellant appeals on two grounds, namely, that the judge was wrong to conclude that :

(1) kidnap for the purposes of ransom is modern slavery or trafficking within the meaning of the Regulations; and

(2) the Secretary of State failed adequately to consider AAM’s claim to be a potential victim of modern slavery.

THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK

The International Framework

7. A protocol to prevent, suppress and punish trafficking in persons especially women and children was adopted to supplement the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime. It is known as the Palermo Protocol. Article 2 provides that the purposes of the protocol include the prevention and combatting of trafficking in persons and the protection and assistance of victims of such trafficking. Article 3 defines certain terms and provides, amongst other things, that:

“(a) “Trafficking in persons” shall mean the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purposes of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs….”

8. The Council of Europe subsequently adopted a Convention on Trafficking in Human Beings (known as “ECAT”) to which the United Kingdom is a signatory. Article 1 provides that the purposes of ECAT were, amongst other things, to prevent and combat trafficking in human beings and to protect the human rights of victims of trafficking, and design a comprehensive framework for the protection of and assistance of victims. Article 2 provides that ECAT shall apply “to all forms of trafficking in human beings, whether national or transnational.”

9. Article 4 of ECAT provides that:

For the purposes of this Convention:

“a "Trafficking in human beings" shall mean the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs;

b The consent of a victim of “trafficking in human beings” to the intended exploitation set forth in subparagraph (a) of this article shall be irrelevant where any of the means set forth in subparagraph (a) have been used;

c The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of a child for the purpose of exploitation shall be considered "trafficking in human beings" even if this does not involve any of the means set forth in subparagraph (a) of this article;

d "Child" shall mean any person under eighteen years of age;

e "Victim" shall mean any natural person who is subject to trafficking in human beings as defined in this article”

10. Chapter II of ECAT deals with the prevention of trafficking in human beings. Chapter III of ECAT deals with measures to protect and promote the rights of victims. Article 10 deals with the identification of victims and requires, amongst other things, that each contracting state will adopt legislative or other measures to identify victims.

11. Article 13 provides for a recovery period for those identified as victims of trafficking. It provides so far as material that:

“1 Each Party shall provide in its internal law a recovery and reflection period of at least 30 days when there are reasonable grounds to believe that the person concerned is a when victim. Such a period shall be sufficient for the person concerned to recover and escape the influence of traffickers and/or to take an informed decision on cooperating with the competent authorities. During this period it shall not be possible to enforce any expulsion order against him or her. This provision is without prejudice to the activities carried out by the competent authorities in all phases of the relevant national proceedings, and in particular when investigating and prosecuting the offences concerned. During this period, the Parties shall authorise the persons concerned to stay in their territory.

2 During this period, the persons referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article shall be entitled to the measures contained in Article 12, paragraphs 1 and 2.

3 The Parties are not bound to observe this period if grounds of public order prevent it or if it is found that victim status is being claimed improperly.”

12. Article 14 provides that a contracting state shall issue a residence permit to victims in one (or both) of two situations, namely if their stay is considered necessary owing to their personal situation or if it is necessary for investigations or criminal proceedings.

The Modern Slavery Act 2015

13. The Modern Slavery Act 2015 (“the 2015 Act”) provides for the creation of criminal offences for persons who commit, amongst other things, human trafficking. Section 2 provides that:

“2 Human trafficking

(1) A person commits an offence if the person arranges or facilitates the travel of another person (“V”) with a view to V being exploited.

(2) It is irrelevant whether V consents to the travel (whether V is an adult or a child).

(3) A person may in particular arrange or facilitate V's travel by recruiting V, transporting or transferring V, harbouring or receiving V, or transferring or exchanging control over V.

(4) A person arranges or facilitates V's travel with a view to V being exploited only if—

(a) the person intends to exploit V (in any part of the world) during or after the travel, or

(b) the person knows or ought to know that another person is likely to exploit V (in any part of the world) during or after the travel.

(5) “Travel” means—

(a) arriving in, or entering, any country,

(b) departing from any country,

(c) travelling within any country.

(6) A person who is a UK national commits an offence under this section regardless of—

(a) where the arranging or facilitating takes place, or

(b) where the travel takes place.

(7) A person who is not a UK national commits an offence under this section if—

(a) any part of the arranging or facilitating takes place in the United Kingdom, or

(b) the travel consists of arrival in or entry into, departure from, or travel within, the United Kingdom.”

14. Exploitation is defined in section 3 and, for present purposes, includes the following:

“Securing services etc by force, threats or deception

(5) The person is subjected to force, threats or deception designed to induce him or her—

(a) to provide services of any kind,

(b) to provide another person with benefits of any kind, or

(c) to enable another person to acquire benefits of any kind.”

15. There is also a defence in section 45 of the 2015 Act which provides so far as material that:

“45 Defence for slavery or trafficking victims who commit an offence

(1) A person is not guilty of an offence if—

(a) the person is aged 18 or over when the person does the act which constitutes the offence,

(b) the person does that act because the person is compelled to do it,

(c) the compulsion is attributable to slavery or to relevant exploitation, and

(d) a reasonable person in the same situation as the person and having the person's relevant characteristics would have no realistic alternative to doing that act.

(2) A person may be compelled to do something by another person or by the person's circumstances.

(3) Compulsion is attributable to slavery or to relevant exploitation only if—

(a) it is, or is part of, conduct which constitutes an offence under section 1 or conduct which constitutes relevant exploitation, or

(b) it is a direct consequence of a person being, or having been, a victim of slavery or a victim of relevant exploitation.

(4) A person is not guilty of an offence if—

(a) the person is under the age of 18 when the person does the act which constitutes the offence,

(b) the person does that act as a direct consequence of the person being, or having been, a victim of slavery or a victim of relevant exploitation, and

(c) a reasonable person in the same situation as the person and having the person's relevant characteristics would do that act.

(5) For the purposes of this section—

“relevant characteristics” means age, sex and any physical or mental illness or disability;

“relevant exploitation” is exploitation (within the meaning of section 3) that is attributable to the exploited person being, or having been, a victim of human trafficking.

…..”.

16. Section 49 of the 2015 Act provides for the Secretary of State to issue guidance to public authorities and other persons about the “sorts of things which indicates that a person may be a victim of slavery or human trafficking”. The Secretary of State has issued guidance on Modern Slavery.

17. Finally, section 56(A1) of the 2015 Act (which was inserted by the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 (“the 2022 Act”) provides that:

“(A1) For the purposes of section 48 to 53 (identification and protection of victims) “victim of slavery” and “victim of human trafficking” have the meanings given in regulations made by the Secretary of State under section 69 of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022”.

The 2022 Act

18. The 2022 Act contains the provisions most immediately relevant to this appeal. It is an act, as its long title indicates, to make provision, amongst other things, about nationality, asylum, immigration and victims of slavery or human trafficking. Part 5 is headed “Modern Slavery”. Section 61 provides for what is described as a recovery period, i.e. a period of time during which a person may not be removed from the United Kingdom. It provides so far as material that:

“61 Identified potential victims of slavery or human trafficking: recovery period

(1) This section applies to a person (an "identified potential victim") if—

(a) a decision is made by a competent authority that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the person is a victim of slavery or human trafficking (a "positive reasonable grounds decision"), and

…

(2) Subject to section 63(2), the identified potential victim may not be removed from, or required to leave, the United Kingdom during the recovery period.

(3) The "recovery period" , in relation to an identified potential victim, is the period—

(a) beginning with the day on which the positive reasonable grounds decision is made, and

(b) ending with whichever of the following is the later—

(i) the day on which the conclusive grounds decision is made in relation to the identified potential victim;

(ii) the end of the period of 30 days beginning with the day mentioned in paragraph (a).”

19. Section 63 of the 2022 Act provides that the prohibition on removal ceases to apply if the relevant authority is satisfied that the person is a threat to public order or has claimed to be a victim of slavery or human trafficking in bad faith.

20. Section 65 of the 2022 Act deals with the grant of leave to remain for victims of slavery or human trafficking. It provides, so far as material, that:

“65 Leave to remain for victims of slavery or human trafficking

(1) This section applies if a positive conclusive grounds decision is made in respect of a person—

(a) who is not a British citizen, and

(b) who does not have leave to remain in the United Kingdom.

(2) The Secretary of State must grant the person limited leave to remain in the United Kingdom if the Secretary of State considers it is necessary for the purpose of—

(a) assisting the person in their recovery from any physical or psychological harm arising from the relevant exploitation,

(b) enabling the person to seek compensation in respect of the relevant exploitation, or

(c) enabling the person to co-operate with a public authority in connection with an investigation or criminal proceedings in respect of the relevant exploitation.

…..”

21. Section 69 provides certain definitions. A “positive reasonable grounds decision” has the meaning given by section 61(1) (cited above). A “conclusive grounds decision” is a decision by the relevant authority on whether a person is a victim of slavery or human trafficking. The Trafficking Convention means ECAT. Finally, “victim of slavery” and “victim of human trafficking” are defined as “having the meanings in regulations made by the Secretary of State”. Regulations are subject to the affirmative resolution procedure, that is, a draft of the regulations must be laid before and approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament (see section 69(2) of the 2022 Act). It was pursuant to that power that the Secretary of State made the Regulations after a draft had been approved by each House of Parliament.

The Regulations

22. Regulation 2 of the Regulations defines victim of slavery. Regulation 3 defines victim of human trafficking. Regulation 3(1) is set out above but, for convenience, the whole of Regulation 3 is set out again. It provides that:

“3 Victim of human trafficking

(1) For the purposes of Part 5 of the 2022 Act, "victim of human trafficking" means a person ("V") whose travel is arranged or facilitated by another person ("P")—

(a) using any of the methods mentioned in paragraph (5), and

(b) with a view to V being exploited.

(2) P may in particular arrange or facilitate V's travel by recruiting V, transporting or transferring V, harbouring or receiving V, or transferring or exchanging control over V.

(3) The consent of V (whether V is an adult or a child) to the travel is not relevant to a determination as to whether V is a victim of human trafficking.

(4) It is irrelevant for the purpose of paragraph (1)(a) whether the person using the method is P or another person.

(5) The methods are—

(a) in a case where V is an adult at the time the method is used—

(i) the threat or use of force or other coercive behaviour;

(ii) abduction, kidnap or false imprisonment;

(iii) fraud or other deception;

(iv) abuse of power or a position of vulnerability;

(v) the giving of payments or other benefits to achieve the consent of a person who has control over V;

(b) in a case where V is a child at the time the method is used, any method.

(6) For the purposes of paragraph (1)(b), a person is being exploited if the person is—

(a) prostituted by another person or otherwise subject to sexual exploitation;

(b) subjected to slavery or servitude or forced or compulsory labour;

(c) encouraged, required or expected to—

(i) do anything which involves the commission, by that person or another person, of an offence under section 32 or 33 of the Human Tissue Act 2004 (prohibition of commercial dealings in organs and restrictions on use of live donors);

(ii) do anything which involves the commission, by that person or another person, of an offence under section 17 or 20 of the Human Tissue (Scotland) Act 2006 (prohibition of commercial dealings in organs and restrictions on use of live donors), or

(iii) do anything outside the United Kingdom that, if it were done in any part of the United Kingdom, would involve the commission of an offence mentioned in paragraph (i) or (ii), or

(d) subjected to force, threats or deception designed to induce that person—

(i) to provide services of any kind;

(ii) to provide another person with benefits of any kind, or

(iii) to enable another person to acquire benefits of any kind.

(7) For the purposes of paragraph (6)(a), a person is prostituted by another person ("A") where that person is compelled by A to offer or provide sexual services to a different person in return for payment or a promise of payment (whether to A or anyone else).

(8) For the purposes of paragraph (6)(a), a person is subject to sexual exploitation if—

(a) something is done to that person which involves the commission of an offence under—

(i) section 1(1)(a) of the Protection of Children Act 1978 (indecent photographs of children);

…..

(b) something is done to that person outside the United Kingdom that, if it were done in any part of the United Kingdom, would involve the commission of an offence mentioned in sub-paragraph (a).”

THE FACTUAL BACKGROUND

AAM’s background

23. AAM was born on 27 January 2001. On 31 July 2021, he left Syria. He said that he was under threat of forcible conscription into the Syrian Army and he did not wish to fight his fellow citizens or participate in war crimes committed by the Syrian Army. He said that he would have been imprisoned and would be likely to have been tortured if he had refused to be conscripted. He travelled to Libya.

The kidnapping

24. AAM’s account of what he says happened to him in Libya is set out in the judgment of the judge in the following terms:

“8. [AAM] asserts that whilst in Libya and travelling between Benghazi and Tripoli he was abducted, along with other Syrian nationals by armed men and held in captivity for a month, between August and September 2021. There is a detailed account of [AAM’s] ordeal set out in his statement dated 17 November 2022. I consider the following elements of that account, which are broadly accepted by the defendant for the purposes of this hearing, to be relevant to the determination of this claim:

(i) [AAM] was taken captive with others by unidentified armed men whilst travelling between Benghazi to Tripoli in August 2021 and his money and phone were taken. Thereafter, the captives were driven through the desert for 24 hours. During the journey [AAM] heard gunshots, was not fed and was given only a small amount of water. On occasion the kidnappers would beat the captives with their weapons.

(ii) [AAM] was detained with other captives in a jail in Sabha, about 600 kilometres south of Tripoli. The kidnappers began to beat them and took their passports. They were told that they would not be released until each paid $7,000 in ransom. One of the captives was very badly beaten after he voiced objection.

(iii) In his second week in captivity [AAM] spoke directly with his family and informed them of the $7,000 ransom demand, which his father stated was an impossible amount of money for the family to raise. [AAM] was then instructed to inform his family that the ransom was $5,000 and then instructed to tell his family that they would have to pay $4,000 for his release.

(iv) [AAM] was tied up and often beaten by his kidnappers on his hands and feet. During phone calls with his family, the kidnappers would beat other prisoners and his family would hear them cry out. The kidnappers wanted his family to hear that he and the other captives were being beaten and wanted him to tell his family to send money to save him. When other captives were speaking to their families, [AAM] would be beaten with sticks for the same purpose. On occasion during the claimant's calls to his family the kidnappers would tell his family that they would kill [AAM] unless they sent the money the kidnappers were demanding. During these telephone calls, [AAM] could hear his mother and father crying.

(v) After two weeks [AAM] was moved to another, smaller location and held with 18 other men in cramped and hot conditions. He was not fed properly and not given enough water. [AAM] was no longer permitted to speak to his family and the kidnappers no longer spoke to the captives about money, instead speaking directly with the families. By the fourth week, eight captives remained.

(vi) [AAM] was released from captivity during the fourth week. He does not know how much his family paid to secure his release but his sister has informed him that, from conversations between her parents that she overheard, she believes his parents paid about $1,500 through a third party.

(vii) [AAM] was released with two other men and driven for 12 hours before being dropped off near a town and given a phone. The people of the town treated them kindly and fed and took care of them for two days before they could arrange transport to Tripoli.

(viii) [AAM] considered himself to have been in a terrifying and dangerous situation. He and those with him expected that they would be trafficked onwards or have their organs harvested, even were their families to pay the ransom. [AAM] encountered captives of other nationalities at the first location who had been held for several months, many of whom stated that their families had paid ransom but that they had still not been released.”

AAM’s travel from Libya to the United Kingdom

25. AAM travelled from Libya to Italy by boat in April 2022. In his witness statement, he asserted that he had always intended to claim asylum in the United Kingdom because he had heard it was a tolerant country where people do not experience racism. In any event, it seems that he did not claim asylum in Italy, or France, which he travelled through on the way to the United Kingdom. On 16 May 2022, he crossed the Channel by small boat and arrived in the United Kingdom. He was detained as an illegal immigrant. On 17 May 2022, AAM claimed asylum on the grounds of his fear of persecution by the Syrian authorities.

The referral to the National Referral Mechanism

26. On 13 October 2022, AAM’s case was referred to the National Referral Mechanism which is the relevant means of identifying potential victims of slavery and trafficking and ensuring that they have the relevant support. On 24 November 2022, the Secretary of State decided that there were no reasonable grounds for suspecting that AAM was a victim of slavery or human trafficking. On 21 December 2022, she agreed to reconsider that decision.

The decision letter

27. On 12 January 2023, the Secretary of State again decided that there were no reasonable grounds for suspecting that AAM was a victim of slavery or modern trafficking. The decision letter set out AAM’s account which was that AAM had arrived in Benghazi and stayed for about a month while making arrangements to travel to Tripoli. That was not an illegal journey but it was dangerous and so AAM had to employ the services of people who helped others to make the trip from Benghazi to Tripoli. AAM travelled with 18 other Syrian men in two vehicles. It was during that trip that, shortly after it commenced, the vehicles were stopped by about 15 men with guns. They were kept in an enclosure for about an hour before all 19 were loaded onto a vehicle and driven for 24 hours. AAM and the others were detained initially in a jail. The decision letter then recounts the details given by AAM about the fact that he could not contact his family for the first week. Then he was allowed to speak directly with them and ask them to pay the ransom money. Eventually, after four weeks, AAM and the other 18 men were released, a ransom having been paid. The kidnappers took AAM and others close to a town but refused to take them to Tripoli. People in the town looked after AAM for two or three nights and arranged for his onward travel to Tripoli. AAM is recorded as saying he spent one month with a cousin in Tripoli to recuperate. He then spent a further four months working in a sweet shop whilst making enquiries about travelling from Libya to Europe. He made contact with men who were arranging travel from Benghazi to Italy through a smuggler and, after a two month wait, left by boat for Italy. He travelled on to Calais and then to the United Kingdom.

28. The decision letter then considered what was understood to be the three elements of the definition of a victim of slavery or human trafficking. The first was “action”, i.e. that AAM had to “have been subjected to an act of transportation/recruitment/transfer/harbouring/receipt”. As he had been held captive in Libya, it was accepted that AAM had been subjected to “an act of transportation and harbouring”. Next, the decision letter considered the “means” by which AAM had been transported and harboured. It said that the transportation would have had to have occurred:

“by means of threat or use of force or other form of coercion/of abduction/or fraud/of abuse of power/of a position of vulnerability / of giving or receiving payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person.

You said that you were kidnapped and that your captors would beat you and threaten to kill you if you parents could not pay the ransom that they demanded. It is, therefore, considered that you experienced a threat or use of force or other form of abduction and being in a position of vulnerability.”

29. Finally, the decision letter considered the purpose. It said that:

“… consideration must be given to whether you were recruited/transported/transferred/harboured/received for the purposes of exploitation.

The description of forced labour is contained in the decision annex attached to this letter.

You said that you were held captive for 1 month while you and then your captors were in communication with your family in order to extort a ransom. There is no indication, from the evidence that has been provided that you were required to perform any form of work or service for your captors or anyone else.

After your family paid middle-men for your release and you were left … in a town and refused to take you to Tripoli.

It is therefore considered that you were not subjected to forced labour, nor was there an intention to subject you to this.”

30. The decision was expressed in the following terms:

“Decision

Taken cumulatively, there are not considered to be reasonable grounds to believe that you were trafficked within Libya and that you are a victim of modern slavery (human trafficking and or slavery, servitude or forced/compulsory labour.)”

The claim for judicial review

31. AAM brought a claim for judicial review of that decision. He claimed that the Secretary of State had misdirected herself as to the meaning of exploitation. He claimed, amongst other things, that being kidnapped for ransom satisfied the definition of being exploited in the Regulations. He contended the exploitation comprised him being induced to enable another person (the captor) to acquire benefits (the ransom money) and so fell within regulation 3(6)(d)(iii). Alternatively, he contended that he was forced to communicate with his family to pressure them into paying a ransom and that amounted to the provision of services to his captors within the meaning of regulation 3(6)(d)(i).

The judgment

32. At paragraph 48 of his judgment, the judge observed that:

“48. Para 2.4 of the Statutory Guidance makes clear that human trafficking consists of three basic components, namely, action, means and purpose, the purpose being exploitation. The defendant accepts that the claimant was subjected to an act of transportation and harbouring whilst in Libya, fulfilling the “action” element of the definition of trafficking. The defendant further accepts that the claimant experienced a threat or use of force or other form of kidnap and being in a position of vulnerability, fulfilling the “means” element of the definition of trafficking. This leaves the question of exploitation. I am satisfied that the defendant's approach to that question was too narrow in this case.”

33. He rejected the submission of the Secretary of State that kidnapping for ransom could not amount to exploitation for the purposes of the Regulations. He said that:

“51. In so far as it purports to exclude kidnap for ransom as a form of human trafficking, the defendant's case is accordingly undermined by the express terms of the 2022 Regulations. It is plain from reading article 4 of ECAT and regulation 3 of the 2022 Regulations as a whole that kidnap for ransom can, depending on the facts of the individual case, be for the purpose of or with a view to exploitation, such that the victim of kidnap for ransom is a victim of trafficking as defined by article 4 of ECAT and regulation 3 of the 2022 Regulations. In these circumstances, and in line with the ECAT Explanatory Report, the domestic legislation is drafted to “target other forms of exploitation” in addition to the non-exhaustive examples provided in article 4 of ECAT, the 2022 Regulations going further than both the Palermo Protocol and ECAT (which refer to “abduction”) when referring to “abduction, kidnap and false imprisonment”. In the foregoing circumstances, I cannot accept the defendant's submission that kidnap for ransom or extortion is simply outside the contemplation of the international and domestic provisions defining exploitation for the purposes of identifying victims of human trafficking.”

34. He then held that the Secretary of State had erred by failing to consider whether, on the facts of his particular case, AAM had been exploited. The judge said:

“54. In the circumstances, in determining whether there were reasonable grounds to believe that the claimant is a victim human trafficking, the questions that arose for the defendant were (i) did the claimant have his travel arranged or facilitated (the action), (ii) did those arrangements or that facilitation involve the threat or use of force or other coercive behaviour, abduction, kidnap or false imprisonment, fraud or other deception, abuse of power or a position of vulnerability or the giving of payments or other benefits to achieve consent (the means) and (iii) were those arrangements or that facilitation for the purpose of, or with a view to, the claimant being exploited in one or more of the ways described in regulation 3(6), including being subjected to force, threats or deception designed to induce that person to provide services of any kind, to provide another person with benefits of any kind, or to enable another person to acquire benefits of any kind pursuant to regulation 3(6)(d) (the purpose).

55. The decision of the defendant of 12 January 2023 that the actions taken in respect of the claimant in Libya by the means described were not for the purposes of exploiting him, and therefore there were no reasonable grounds to believe he was the victim of trafficking, was reached on the basis that the claimant was not subjected to forced labour, nor was there any intention to subject him to this. There was no consideration by the defendant at all of whether the kidnap of the claimant was for the purpose of, or with a view to, his exploitation through being subjected to force, threats or deception designed to induce that him to provide services of any kind, to provide another person with benefits of any kind, or to enable another person to acquire benefits of any kind.

56. The defendant took this narrow approach, notwithstanding that kidnap is expressly referred to in the 2022 Regulations as a means capable of leading to exploitation of a person for the purposes of regulation 3(6) and, ordinarily, a person kidnapped is utilised or taken advantage of against their will and for the kidnapper's own ends, with both the act of kidnap itself, and actions taken by the kidnappers subsequently being designed, in part, to prevail on or persuade the person kidnapped to act in a manner that furthers the kidnapper's aims. The person kidnapped may be induced to enable the kidnappers to achieve their aims in many ways. For example, by being forcefully detained, discouraged from escape, providing the kidnappers with details of relatives or friends who may be willing to pay ransom or communicating with relatives or friends in order to plead for payment of ransom. The person kidnapped may be thus induced by a spectrum of behaviour covering persuasion, coercion and torture. In this case, the defendant accepted that the claimant was taken captive with others by unidentified armed men, had his money, phone and passport taken, was isolated in the desert and deprived of food and water, witnessed violence and was beaten, was required to speak to his family and tell them to send money in the sum of a $7,000 ransom demand, thereafter to inform his family that the ransom was $5,000 and then inform them that they would have to pay $4,000 for his release and that when other captives were speaking to their families the claimant would be beaten with sticks, so that his cries could be heard as an inducement to payment. Once again, The Statutory Guidance makes clear at para 2.3 that “The essence of human trafficking is that the victim is coerced or deceived into a situation where they are exploited”.

57. In the foregoing circumstances, I am satisfied that in taking her decision on 12 January 2023 that there were no reasonable grounds to believe that the claimant had been trafficked, the defendant erred in law in adopting too narrow an approach to the question of whether the claimant's kidnap for ransom was for the purpose of or with a view to his exploitation, such that he was a victim of trafficking as defined by article 4 of ECAT and regulation 3 of the 2022 Regulations. I am further satisfied that the defendant did not engage fully with the case advanced by the claimant in not considering the extent to which the facts of the case accepted by the defendant supported the conclusion that the claimant had been subjected to force, threats or deception designed to induce him to provide services of any kind, to provide another person with benefits of any kind, or to enable another person to acquire benefits of any kind for the purposes of regulation 3(6)(d) of the 2022 Regulations. As I have noted, within the context of the 2022 Regulations, the claimant is required to demonstrate only that his kidnap was undertaken with a view to exploiting him and that he was subjected to force, threats or deception designed to induce him to enable his kidnappers to acquire a benefit. It is clear from the defendant's decision that there was no consideration by the defendant at all of whether the action (the arrangement or facilitation of travel by another person pursuant to regulation 3(1) ) and the means (kidnap pursuant to regulation 3(5)(a)(ii) ) accepted by the defendant as having befallen the claimant was for the purpose of or with a view to his exploitation for the purposes of regulation 3(6).”

35. At paragraph 59, the judge made it clear that he was basing his conclusion on regulation 3(6)(d)(iii) and his view that kidnapping for ransom might, depending on the facts, amount to force, threats or deception designed to induce a person “to enable another person to acquire benefits of any kind”. He rejected the submission that being forced to request the family to pay a ransom amounted to the provision of services to the captor within the meaning of regulation 3(6)(d)(i) of the Regulations.

36. The judge set out his conclusions in the following terms:

“60. For the reasons set out above, I am satisfied that the claimant's claim for judicial review must be allowed. The defendant's decision was unlawful for applying an incorrect and unduly restrictive approach to the question of whether there were reasonable grounds for believing that the claimant was a victim of trafficking. In the circumstances, the decision of the defendant that there were no reasonable grounds that he was a victim of trafficking must be quashed and the defendant must make a lawful decision as to whether the claimant was a victim of trafficking. I will invite counsel to draw up an order accordingly.

61. It was submitted on behalf of the claimant that his claim raises an important point of principle, namely, whether abduction, detention and torture for the purpose of extracting payment from family members of a ransom for release constitutes “exploitation” for the purposes of ECAT and regulation 3(6)(d) of the 2022 Regulations. However, whilst I have reached the conclusion in this case that the defendant's decision was unlawful, for applying an incorrect and unduly restrictive approach, it is important once again to emphasise that whether, in a given case, kidnap for the purpose of extracting payment from family members of a ransom for release constitutes “exploitation” for the purposes of ECAT and regulation 3(6)(d) of the 2022 Regulations will be fact-specific, having regard to the principles articulated above.”

37. In his order, the judge quashed the decision of 12 January 2023 and ordered that the Secretary of State make a lawful decision as to whether AAM is a victim of trafficking.

THE APPEAL

The Issue

38. There are two grounds of appeal, although Mr Anderson, for the Secretary of State accepts that ground 2 only arises if he succeeds on ground 1. The sole issue that arises on this appeal therefore is whether the judge was correct to conclude that, depending on the facts, kidnap for the purpose of extorting money by way of ransom is capable of being exploitation within the meaning of regulation 3(6)(d)(iii) of the Regulations.

Submissions

39. Mr Anderson submits that the purpose underlying the Regulations is set out in the explanatory memorandum to the Regulations. He relied on paragraph 7.3 of the memorandum which refers to the need to have definitions that enable a victim to be identified and “which align with … international obligations”. He also relied upon paragraph 7.5 of the memorandum which says that when drafting the definitions, the drafters sought to define terms using the 2015 Act, operational practices and “our international obligations”. He submitted that the obligation imposed by ECAT were owed to victims of trafficking as defined in Article 4 of ECAT. That provided that exploitation shall include the prostitution of others, other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs. Kidnapping for ransom was not included as a form of exploitation which the United Kingdom was obliged to include within the definition of trafficking.

40. In those circumstances, submitted Mr Anderson, the proper interpretation of regulation 3(6)(d)(iii) was to recognise that it was the fact of captivity which enabled a person (the kidnapper) to acquire a benefit (the ransom paid by the victim’s family). It was artificial to treat the fact that a victim might be made to communicate with his family as enabling the kidnapper to obtain benefits.

41. Mr Anderson also referred to the consequences of treating kidnapping as exploitation for the purpose of regulation 3(6)(d)(ii). The kidnapping might be incidental to the underlying travel of the individual and might be done by persons unconnected with those primarily responsible for arranging or facilitating a person’s travel. It might also have occurred many years before the person concerned was the subject of any arranging or facilitating of travel of that person from one location to another.

42. Ms Knights KC, with Ms Butler, for AAM, submits that the Palermo Protocol and Article 4 of provides that exploitation must at a minimum include certain forms of conduct. A state could ECAT, however, go further and provide that other forms of conduct, such as kidnapping for ransom, also amounted to exploitation. In the present case, the judge was correct to conclude, for the reasons he gave, that kidnapping for ransom was capable in principle of amounting to exploitation for the purpose of regulation 3 of the Regulations.

Discussion

Preliminary observation

43. The issue here turns on the proper interpretation of the Regulations and, in particular, regulation 3(6)(d)(iii). That involves considering the words of the statutory provision, read in its statutory context and having regard to the purpose underlying the statute, and bearing in mind any legitimate aids to statutory interpretation. See, generally, the observations of Lord Hodge in R (O) (A child) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] UKSC 3; [2023] AC 255”.

44. The statutory context includes the provisions of Part 5 of the 2022 Act as the regulations are intended to provide definitions for the purposes of various provisions in Part 5. Further, the statutory context may include sections 48 to 53 of the 2015 Act as the definitions given in the Regulations made under section 69 of the 2022 Act. It is also right to note that certain terms are also used in the 2015 Act dealing with the offences of human trafficking and the defences available to a person who is the victim of such trafficking and consideration may need to be given as to whether the Regulations are intended to reflect the meaning given to the definition of a victim of trafficking in those contexts.

45. It was accepted that the explanatory memorandum was a legitimate aid to interpretation of the Regulations. I assume that is so. However, in the present case, I did not find the memorandum of great assistance. It is clear that the purpose of the Regulations was to ensure that the United Kingdom complied with its obligations. That follows from the terms of the 2022 Act and the Regulations themselves (which adopt certain definitions in ECAT). In terms of the definition of victims of trafficking, however, it is clear that Article 4 of ECAT sets a minimum of acts that must be considered as exploitation and it is permissible for contracting states to include other acts as exploitation. The references in the explanatory memorandum to “aligning” with international obligations or “using” international obligations are not a sufficiently clear indication that the Regulations were, or were not, intended to go further than the definition of exploitation in Article 4 of ECAT. That issue turns, ultimately, on the meaning of the words used in the Regulations themselves.

The interpretation of the Regulations

46. As indicated, the statutory context in which the Regulations were made is Part 5 of the 2022 Act. That imposes a prohibition on the removal from the United Kingdom of persons where there are reasonable grounds to believe that the person is a victim of slavery or human trafficking and, in certain circumstances, requires leave to remain in the United Kingdom to be granted.

47. Regulation 3(1) defines a victim of human trafficking as “a person (“V”) whose travel is arranged or facilitated by another person (“P”) using any of the methods mentioned in regulation 3(5) with a view to V being exploited.

48. The first part of the definition, therefore, is that the victim, V, is a person whose “travel is arranged or facilitated”. Regulation 3(2) gives examples of what may constitute arranging or facilitating V’s travel, namely recruiting V, transporting or transferring V, harbouring or receiving V, or transferring or exchanging control over V.

49. The second part of the definition deals with the methods used for arranging or facilitating travel. These are defined in regulation 3(5). The methods include the threat or use of force or other coercive behaviour and “abduction, kidnap or false imprisonment”.

50. The third part of the definition, which is the subject of this appeal, concerns whether the travel has been arranged or facilitated “with a view to V being exploited” (regulation 3(1)(b)). Regulation 3(6) provides that “a person is being exploited if the person is” subjected to one of the things mentioned in regulation 3(6). That includes a situation where a person is “subjected to force, threats, or deception designed to induce that person” – “to enable another person to acquire benefits of any kind” (regulation 3(6)(d)(iii).

51. On a natural reading of the words in regulation 3(6)(d)(iii), it is possible to envisage circumstances where a person has been kidnapped and is subjected to force, threats or deception “designed to induce” that person to enable his captor to acquire benefits. To take a simple hypothetical example (which is a variant of the facts in the present case), a person may have kidnapped a person, V, in order to transport him from one place to another with a view to forcing V to work for him. The kidnapper may also plan to subject V during the travel to force or threats that he will kill or harm V unless he contacts his family and persuades them to pay the kidnapper a ransom. Those threats or force may be “designed” to induce V to enable another person (the kidnapper) to acquire benefits, namely the ransom money (if V contacts his family and if they pay a ransom). In those circumstances, the requirements of 3(1)(b) and (6)(d)(iii) may be met. The person may have arranged or facilitated V’s travel, by kidnapping him, with a view to exploitation.

52. Consequently, the judge was correct to say that exploitation by seeking to extort money by ransom might, depending on the facts, be capable of satisfying the definition in regulation 3(1)(b) and 3(6)(d)(iii). In those circumstances, the judge was correct to conclude that the Secretary of State had erred by failing to consider whether or not the circumstances in which AAM was kidnapped in Libya involved the arrangement or facilitation of travel with a view to exploitation.

53. In the circumstances, it is not necessary to consider the examples raised by Mr Anderson as to when kidnapping might, or might not, be capable of falling within regulation 3(1). Nor is it necessary to consider the example discussed in oral argument concerning a person being smuggled from one location to another, for example from France to the United Kingdom, with a view to being exploited in the United Kingdom by being made to work or provide services. Whilst waiting in France, someone quite unconnected with the travel of the person from France to the United Kingdom might take the person at knife point in a car to a cash point, force him to withdraw money and hand the money to criminal, and the criminal might then return the person to his original location. It is not necessary to decide whether those circumstances fall within regulation 3(1) or amounts to exploitation within the meaning of regulation 3(6)(d)(iii). The question of whether such cases involving the arranging or facilitating of travel with a view to exploitation can be considered in a case where they arise for decision.

CONCLUSION

54. I would dismiss this appeal. The judge was correct to conclude that where a person has been kidnapped and is subjected to threats, force or deception, designed to induce him to get others to pay a ransom for his release may, depending on the facts, be exploitation within the meaning of regulation 3(6)(d)(iii) of the Regulations. The judge was correct, therefore, in concluding that the Secretary of State erred in this case by not considering the question of whether the kidnapping amounted to exploitation.

LORD JUSTICE EDIS

55. I agree.

LORD JUSTICE BEAN

56. I also agree.

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