Property United Kingdom
Ian George Boyd v Andrew Donaghey & Ors
[2026] UKFTT 01520 (PC)
REF/2025/0043 & 0044
PROPERTY CHAMBER, LAND REGISTRATION DIVISION
FIRST-TIER TRIBUNAL
IN THE MATTER OF REFERENCES FROM HM LAND REGISTRY
BETWEEN
IAN GEORGE BOYD
Applicant
and
(1) ANDREW DONAGHEY & EMMA CUSACK
(as personal representatives of the estate of Julie Wright)
(2) HARRY POLLARD & LESLEY POLLARD
Respondents
Property Address: Land on the North Side of Pilsley Road, Lower Pilsley, Chesterfield
Title Number: DY582696 (part of DY405312)
Before: Judge Laura D’Cruz
Sitting at: Derby Justice Centre
On: 2nd, 3rd & 4th September 2026
Representation: Lawrence McDonald of Counsel for the Applicant, instructed by Taylor Emmet Solicitors; Emma Cusack in person on behalf of the First Respondents
Key words: adverse possession – Schedule 6 of the Land Registration Act 2002 – sufficiency of acts – permission
Cases referred to:
Powell v McFarlane (1977) 38 P & CR 45
J A Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2003] UKHL 30
Buckinghamshire County Council v Moran [1990] Ch 623
DECISION
1. The matter that has been referred to the Tribunal is the Applicant’s application for adverse possession of part of another registered title brought under paragraph 1 of Schedule 6 to the Land Registration Act 2002.
2. The lie of the land is best explained by reference to the plan below, whose labels I adopt in this Decision. The various parcels are as follows:
(a) Field 2 is the field to the south of the River Rothay, bounded by the river, the railway, and the road;
(b) Field 1 is the field to the northeast, and contains a building known as Mill Cottage;
(c) Field 3 is the field to the northwest;
(d) Hagg Hill Farm is to the north and east of Fields 1 & 3;
(e) Field 4A is owned by the Wildlife Trust, and Field 4B is (now at least) part of Hagg Hill Farm.
Field Plan
3. The application was initially made in respect of Field 2, which is the whole of the registered title registered under title number DY405312. Field 2 is presently registered in the name of Julie Wright (“Julie”). Julie passed away in 2017. The First Respondents are two of her children. They objected to the application. They were later granted probate on 7th July 2025. I consider them to be parties to these proceedings as personal representatives of Julie’s estate.
4. On receipt of the application, HM Land Registry carried out a survey. This identified and mapped a fence to the south of the river. HM Land Registry was not satisfied that the Applicant could show he was in possession of the part of Field 2 beyond the fence. The application therefore proceeds in relation to part of Field 2 only.
5. The part in relation to which the application proceeds is edged green on the plan below, provisional title number DY582696 (“the Disputed Land”). The land edged red is the full extent of Field 2.
Disputed Land
6. The Second Respondents are the registered proprietors of two titles which make up Fields 1 & 3. They also objected, but have been barred from taking part in these proceedings as parties, having failed to provide a statement of case. They did, however, give evidence on the First Respondents’ behalf. I will refer to the Second Respondents as the Pollards, to make clear their involvement is not as parties but as witnesses. Where I refer to the Respondents, I mean the First Respondents, unless otherwise stated.
Legal principles
Schedule 6
7. Paragraph 1 of Schedule 6 provides that “a person may apply to the registrar to be registered as the proprietor of a registered estate in land if he has been in adverse possession of the estate for the period of ten years ending on the date of the application”. This is the adverse possession requirement.
8. Paragraph 2 provides that the registrar must give notice of an application to certain persons, including the proprietor of the estate to which the application relates (subparagraph (1)(a)), and that notice shall include notice of the effect of paragraph 4.
9. Paragraph 3 provides that a person given notice under paragraph 2 “may require that the application… be dealt with under paragraph 5”. Paragraph 5 requires an applicant to meet one or more of three stated conditions. This essentially means that, if notice is given under paragraph 3, an applicant must satisfy a further hurdle over and above 10 years’ adverse possession ending on the date of the application under paragraph 1.
10. Paragraph 4 provides that, if an application is not required to be dealt with under paragraph 5, the applicant is entitled to be registered as the new proprietor (assuming, of course, that the applicant has satisfied paragraph 1).
11. Rules 189 & 190 of the Land Registration Rules 2003 provide that:
(a) notice under paragraph 3 can be given up until 12noon on the 65th working day after the registrar has issued notice of the application under paragraph 2;
(b) notice under paragraph 3 must be given in form NAP;
(c) form NAP must accompany the registrar’s notice under paragraph 2.
12. The registrar may also give notice of the application to other persons who do not fall within the list at paragraph 2 if it is necessary or desirable (rule 17). However, only persons listed in paragraph 2 can give a counter notice in form NAP.
13. HM Land Registry’s Practice Guide 4 confirms that its practice is to give notice to successors in title to the registered proprietor, but this is not a notice that is issued under paragraph 2, and it does not enclose form NAP. Moreover, this notice allows only 15 working days for a reply.
14. The Case Summary confirms that Julie and the Respondents were given notice of the application, albeit it does not detail what sort(s) of notice.
15. Here, it is not in dispute that there is no NAP form, that is, there has been no objection to the application requiring the Applicant to also satisfy one of the additional conditions in paragraph 5. The matter before the Tribunal is therefore the adverse possession requirement only.
16. This was not a contentious issue. However, it did come up during the hearing (Counsel for the Applicant had addressed paragraph 5 in his skeleton argument, making submissions as to how the Applicant had met the estoppel condition), and so I set out the detail for completeness.
Adverse possession
17. The Applicant must show that he was in adverse possession of the Disputed Land for a period of ten years ending on the date the application. According to the Case Summary, the application was made on 8th July 2024, albeit based on an ADV1 form dated 18th June 2024 (happily, on the particular facts of this case, nothing is likely to turn on the difference). What I am concerned with is whether the Applicant can show that he went into adverse possession on or before 8th July 2014, and remained in possession until 8th July 2024 (“the Relevant Period”).
18. To show adverse possession, the Applicant must demonstrate both factual possession of, and an intention to possess, the Disputed Land for the Relevant Period.
19. Factual possession “signifies an appropriate degree of physical control… The question what acts constitute a sufficient degree of exclusive physical control must depend on the circumstances, in particular the nature of the land and the manner in which land of that nature is commonly used or enjoyed… Everything must depend on the particular circumstance, but broadly, I think what must be shown as constituting factual possession is that the alleged possessor has been dealing with the land in question as an occupying owner might have been expected to deal with it and that no-one else has done so" [Slade J in Powell v McFarlane (1977) 38 P & CR 452 at 470-1, cited with approval in J A Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2003] UKHL 30].
20. An intention to possess is the intention “to exclude the world at large, including the owner with the paper title… so far as is reasonably practicable and so far as the processes of the law will allow” [Slade J in Powell at 471, cited with approval in Pye].
21. The evidence of factual possession will often be sufficient to demonstrate the intention to possess, but this will not always be so: “It is in cases where the acts in relation to the land of a person claiming title by adverse possession are equivocal and are open to more than one interpretation that those acts will be insufficient to establish the intention to possess” [Lord Hutton in Pye at paragraph 76].
22. In those cases, an applicant must make it “perfectly plain to the world at large by his actions or words that he has intended to exclude the owner as best he can” [Slade J in Powell at 472]; he “should be required to adduce compelling evidence that he has the requisite [intention to possess]” [at 476].
23. The burden is on the Applicant to demonstrate, on the balance of probabilities, adverse possession throughout the Relevant Period.
24. Part of the Respondents’ case is that any possession by the Applicant was not adverse because it was pursuant to permission. The Respondents rely on Slade J in Buckinghamshire County Council v Moran [1990] Ch 623 at 636: “Possession is never ‘adverse’… if it is enjoyed under a lawful title. If, therefore, a person occupies or uses land by licence of the owner with the paper title and his licence has not been duly determined, he cannot be treated as having been in ‘adverse possession’ as against the owner of the paper title”.
25. It is not in dispute that the burden is on the Respondents to demonstrate, on the balance of probabilities, their positive case that any use was with permission.
Chronology
26. It is helpful to start by introducing the Applicant’s brother, James Stuart Boyd (“Stuart”, as he was known). Stuart passed away in 2019 and so there is no evidence from him directly, but he is a central figure in these proceedings.
27. In 2001, Stuart purchased land known as Mill Cottage, registered under title number DY338640. The extent of the title was the buildings and surrounding area; it did not include all of Field 1 or any of Field 3.
28. In 2006, Stuart purchased land known as Land at Mill Cottage, registered under title number DY405032. This is the reminder of Field 1 and all of Field 3. Since then, these two titles have been dealt with together. When I refer to Mill Cottage, I mean the whole strip to the north of Field 2, that is, the buildings, Field 1 and Field 3 collectively, unless otherwise stated.
29. It is at this point helpful to introduce Julie’s husband Steve Wright (“Steve”), who gave evidence on behalf of the Respondents.
30. In 2006, that is, at around the same time as Stuart purchased the second part of Mill Cottage, Steve purchased Field 2 (it was later transferred into Julie’s name, in 2014). His evidence is that Julie wanted a field as a wildlife area (rather than for farming), and that it was purchased in his name for convenience.
31. Steve’s evidence is that, in 2008, Stuart asked if he could rent Field 2 from April to December. Steve says this was agreed, and then extended on an annual basis, with rent being paid in advance.
32. It is not in dispute that Stuart erected/installed structures that were used as bridges across the river between Mill Cottage and Field 2, one at each end (“the Bridges”).
33. In 2013, Stuart moved to Thailand. At around that time, the Applicant ran a community care farm (later known as the Chesterfield Community Care Farm – “CCCF”), which was then in Clowne but needed more space. The Applicant/CCCF rented Mill Cottage from Stuart, and used it to run the CCCF, and also as office space for businesses. The Applicant’s case is that he began using Field 2 at the same time.
34. Steve’s evidence is that Stuart’s agreement to rent Field 2 continued to be extended on an annual basis. He says the last payment of rent was paid in December 2016 (paying for rental throughout 2017). He says that he went to Mill Cottage in 2018 and was told that Stuart lived abroad. He went to Field 2 in 2019, and left notices to quit.
35. In 2019, Stuart passed away.
36. In or around spring 2020, the Applicant left Mill Cottage in preparation for it being put on the market, moving items such as cabins onto Field 2, which, he says, he carried on using.
37. In autumn 2020, Mill Cottage was purchased by the Pollards. It is accepted that, shortly after the Pollards moved in, they removed the fence at the south of Mill Cottage, just to the north of the river, which they say was a partial fence and in some disrepair. It is not in dispute that they also removed the Bridges. The removal of this fence led to the Applicant installing the fence at the northern boundary of the Disputed Land.
The parties’ cases
Applicant
38. The Applicant’s case is that he has used Field 2 exclusively since March 2013, when he/CCCF began renting Mill Cottage from Stuart. He avers that he continued to use Field 2 even after the tenancy of Mill Cottage ended.
39. Much of the Applicant’s written case refers to the CCCF, various documents refer to the CCCF, and many of his witnesses give evidence based on their involvement with the CCCF. Based on the written case, one might be forgiven for thinking his case is that Field 2 was used as part of the CCCF. However, during the evidence, it became clear that this is not correct – his case is that he used Field 2 for his own personal use, to keep his own cattle, these being cattle that in fact had previously belonged to Stuart, and which he took over when Stuart left.
40. In broad terms, his case is that Field 2 was used for keeping cattle, with cattle being there most – but not all – of the time, due to rotational grazing. He says he was there almost every day, even when cattle were not there, carrying out maintenance, particularly of the fences. He says he kept the gate locked. He says no-one else (apart from people with his permission) had access to or went onto Field 2.
41. The Applicant relies primarily on his own evidence, but also supporting evidence from his sons and former employees, all of whom attended to give oral evidence.
Respondents
42. The Respondents very frankly accept that they have no personal knowledge of Field 2, and neither gave evidence. They rely primarily on the evidence of Steve, but also supporting evidence from the Pollards, neighbours, and friends, most of whom attended to give oral evidence.
43. The Respondents’ case falls into two parts, which can usefully be described as possession and permission:
(a) in relation to possession, the Respondents aver that the Applicant cannot show possession throughout the Relevant Period. Importantly, the Respondents do not dispute that cattle were kept on the Disputed Land. Rather, they say that the cattle were not there continuously, the Applicant was not in possession continuously, and this sort of agricultural use is not enough to amount to adverse possession;
(b) in relation to permission, the Respondents aver that any possession was not adverse, in reliance on a rental agreement between Stuart and Steve/Julie, which they say means that any use of Field 2 was with permission.
Evidence generally
44. I have considered written and/or oral evidence from a dozen or so witnesses. Most were only able to give evidence on a small aspect of the dispute, and it seemed to me that no one witness was fully appraised of the whole picture. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the evidence revealed a number of disputes/inconsistencies. It is not, however, necessary for me to rehearse all the evidence, or resolve every dispute. Rather, I focus on the parts relevant to my decision.
Possession
Cattle & other acts on the Disputed Land
45. The Applicant says Field 2 was always used for cattle, albeit there would be times when cattle were not there. The Respondents accept that cattle were kept on the Disputed Land from time to time. It is not in dispute (and I particularly note I heard from various witnesses with experience of cattle farming) that rotational grazing means that there will be times when cattle are moved and a cattle field is left empty.
46. However, the Respondents do question whether cattle being there from time to time is sufficient to amount to possession. It is therefore necessary to consider the evidence to understand exactly how the Disputed Land was being used.
47. The Applicant’s witnesses gave evidence about animals on Field 2. This was largely based on their involvement with CCCF, meaning that their evidence relates to the period 2013-2019/20. It is right to note that it was not always clear which animals were kept on which field, or whether the animals belonged to CCCF or the Applicant, but I am satisfied that, broadly, the evidence was supportive of the Applicant’s contention that cattle were regularly kept on Field 2.
48. The Respondents’ witnesses gave quite varied evidence about cattle on Field 2. Taking it in roughly chronological order:
(a) Steve’s written evidence does not mention what was happening on Field 2 until 2019. In oral evidence, he accepted that he drove past the Disputed Land, when he was “going that way”, and that he saw “cattle, horses, a couple of sheep” a few times, although there were also times he saw nothing at all. He was asked how many cows – he said no more than 20;
(b) Dean Sutton was at Hagg Hill Farm from 2007 until 2014. When asked about cattle on Field 2, he recalled sheep and a couple of pigs, and said that cows did appear later;
(c) Claire Witham provided a witness statement giving evidence that she used Field 2 during the period 2008-2013. She refers to sharing it alongside Stuart’s sheep, rather than cattle, but she did not attend to give oral evidence and so could not be tested on this point. I note for completeness I refused a very late application to allow her to give evidence remotely;
(d) Steve’s written evidence in relation to the period from 2019 onwards is that he visited on several occasions, there was never anybody there, and he assumed it was vacant;
(e) Andrew Newlands-Jackson was at Hagg Hill Farm from 2014. He said he did not remember cattle until 2020;
(f) Harry Pollard purchased Mill Cottage in 2020. His witness statement states, “Mr Boyd has on many occasion not occupied the land in questions since cattle have been removed for as long as 12 weeks for reasons unknown to ourselves”;
(g) Miles Palmer (farmer) gave evidence was that he visited the Disputed Land a dozen times on or after July 2020 and did not see cattle or evidence of cattle;
(h) Lance Hughes (shooter) gave evidence was that he visited the Disputed Land a few times on or after July 2020, but that he could not recall whether there were cattle.
49. There are various inconsistencies in this evidence. However, what is notable is that:
(a) the evidence of Steve himself, and to a lesser extent Dean Sutton, supports the contention that cattle were kept on Field 2 before 2019;
(b) the evidence of Andrew Newlands-Jackson and Harry Pollard supports the contention that cattle were kept on Field 2 on or after 2020;
(c) Harry Pollard talks about cattle being removed “for as long as 12 weeks”, suggesting that the gaps when cattle were not on the Disputed Land should be measured in weeks rather than months.
50. The overall picture presented by the evidence is that Field 2 was used as a cattle field, with cattle on it regularly. The evidence of the Respondents’ witnesses gives me no real cause to think this was not the case throughout the entirety of the Relevant Period.
51. In terms of other acts of possession, the Applicant gave evidence that he would be at Field 2 just about every day, even when the cattle were not there, carrying out repairs and maintenance.
52. It was put to him that it did not look, from a Googe Streetview image from 2016, like he was going around Field 2 every day. He replied that the image just showed weeds in the field, and did not show the whole field.
53. I pause to note that I walked the Disputed Land on a site visit and saw that it is a large field, not flat, with only a small part visible from the road.
54. The evidence of Steve, Miles Palmer & Lance Hughes was that no-one was on the Disputed Land when they visited. However, I do not consider this evidence to necessarily be inconsistent with the Applicant’s case, especially as they visited a relatively small number of times.
Access
55. Another aspect of the Respondents’ case appears to be that the Applicant did not have exclusive use of the Disputed Land because Steve accessed it during the later part of the Relevant Period.
56. Access to the Disputed Land is through the gate at its southern tip. The Applicant’s evidence was that he changed the lock on this gate when Claire left (so, 2013, at the start of the Relevant Period) and it has been locked since.
57. There was some focus on evidence from the Applicant and Joseph Fowkes, who both said that the gate was taken down for a day or two whilst the cabins were moved onto Field 2 in 2020.
58. The Respondents’ evidence about the gate is again varied:
(a) Steve’s written statement does not say very much about the gate, only that, on one occasion, Lance Hughes reported to him that there was a new lock on the gate, which he replaced. It does not, for example, make clear whether the gate was locked or not the first time he visited in 2019;
(b) in oral evidence, Steve said that the gate was sometimes locked but sometimes wasn’t. He accepted taking a lock off and taking a gate off;
(c) Miles Palmer gave evidence that, on two occasions, Steve took the gate off;
(d) Lance Hughes gave evidence that, on one occasion, the gate was open, but Steve was already on Field 2. He also gave evidence that a lock was cut off.
59. It is clear even from the evidence of the Respondents’ own witnesses that much, if not all, of the access by Steve and others has been gained by removing locks and/or gates.
Analysis
60. To succeed, the Applicant has to demonstrate factual possession of and an intention to possess the Disputed Land. The acts relied on in respect of one will often satisfy the other.
61. As to factual possession, the Applicant must show a sufficient degree of exclusive physical control, bearing in mind the nature of the land, essentially dealing with it as an occupying owner might.
62. In her submissions, Ms Cusack repeatedly talked about this agricultural use as being insufficient. I do not really follow this argument – the land is agricultural, and so using it for agricultural purposes is exactly what an occupying owner might do.
63. I do not accept that cattle have to be on the Disputed Land at all times for it to be considered a cattle field. The evidence is that the times when cattle were not there were relatively short, and can in any event be explained by rotational grazing.
64. Perhaps most importantly, whatever was happening on the Disputed Land, I am satisfied that the Applicant has shown a sufficient degree of exclusive physical control of it. It is not necessary (nor would it be practically possible) to ensure that no-one ever enters a parcel of land. Here, I accept that the Applicant controlled access by means of a locked gate, and that it was only by removing locks and/or gates that Steve was able to gain access. In particular, I note there seems to have been some back and forth with the gate – it is not as though Steve changed the lock/gate once and in so doing regained control of the access; rather, the Applicant continued to exert control himself. I do not accept that the gate being down for a day or two detracts from this.
65. I also at this point mention notices. It is the Respondents’ case that Steve posted and attached to the Disputed Land notices to quit in or around 2019, an assertion which is denied by the Applicant. As at 2019, I am satisfied that the Applicant was in possession of the Disputed Land for the reasons given above. Even if notices to quit were posted and/or attached to the Disputed Land, I do not see how this alone can be considered to be a retaking or ouster of possession, just as I do not see how repeatedly changing the lock/gate is. There is therefore no need for me to resolve the factual dispute.
66. I am satisfied that these acts are also sufficient to demonstrate an intention to possess, that is, an intention to exclude the world at large.
67. For all these reasons, I am satisfied that the Applicant can demonstrate that he was in possession of the Disputed Land throughout the Relevant Period.
Permission
68. The Respondents’ second argument is that any use of the Disputed Land was with permission, and so was not adverse.
69. The Applicant confirmed in cross-examination that he thought Stuart owned Field 2, and that Stuart never told him of any rental agreement. His evidence is that he did not pay (or cause to be paid) any rent to Steve or Julie. Beyond that, there is nothing he can say directly on this issue.
70. The Respondents rely on the evidence of Steve, Claire Witham and Dean Sutton:
(a) Steve’s evidence, as set out above, is that Stuart asked if he could rent Field 2 from April-December 2008. Steve says this was agreed, and then extended on an annual basis, with rent being paid in advance;
(b) the gist of Steve’s evidence was that Field 2 was rented out to Stuart, both initially from April-December 2008, and then later when it was extended, because Julie’s illness was getting worse;
(c) Claire Witham’s written statement says, “Stuart told me he was renting [Field 2] off [Steve] for £1200 per annum”, and that “I was always under the impression that an agreement was in place between [Stuart] and [Steve] or family for the rental of the field in question”. She left in 2013 and does not expressly say anything about the period after that;
(d) Dean Sutton’s written statement says Stuart“had managed to find the owner of the land and had set up an agreement with them to rent this parcel of land…. The agreement between [Stuart] and the owner of the land as far as I’m aware continued, even when [Stuart] left the UK and was in place for numerous years before [Stuart’s] death”;
(e) in cross examination, Dean Sutton gave evidence he tried to rent Field 2 himself, but Stuart said the Applicant would continue renting it. It seems this was a conversation they had before Stuart moved to Thailand – he said they had no contact afterwards – although he was not direct in his evidence on this point. Then, in re-examination, he gave evidence that he had a conversation with Stuart in which Stuart said that he was renting Fields 1 & 3 (that is, Mill Cottage) and Field 2 to the Applicant;
(f) Steve’s evidence was that Stuart would come round in December to pay for the following year in advance, which he did until December 2012 (paying for rental throughout 2013). After that, a woman came round to pay, with the last payment being made in December 2016 (paying for rental throughout 2017). He did not know who this woman was, and was not at all clear about whether he was there when she came to make the payments or not – he said he was not always there, and that Julie would tell him when the woman had “been up” to pay. He vaguely suggested it might be Stuart’s sister, until it became clear that was not correct (for completeness, I note she provided a short statement overnight, which was not challenged). It was then in 2018 that he started to chase what was going on.
.
71. The change in the manner of payment between December 2012 and December 2013 is key because it accords with when Stuart moved to Thailand – the later payments could not have been made by him personally.
72. It is right to note, as Ms Cusack very fairly accepted, that Steve struggled in cross-examination. He was unable to provide dates and details with any confidence, and sometimes needed prompting. His evidence in relation to the payments after December 2012 was particularly poor.
73. That said, I do not accept that Steve is completely mistaken in saying that Field 2 was rented out to Stuart. A rental agreement makes sense, inasmuch as we know Stuart did not own Field 2. Moreover, some support is provided by the evidence of Claire Witham and Dean Sutton, who both say Stuart told them about it.
74. What is more difficult is whether this rental agreement lasted beyond 2013. The identity of the payer beyond December 2012 remains a mystery. Steve himself said that Julie dealt with the paperwork and the payments. In my judgment, hecannot offer any convincing evidence that these later payments were made.
75. Nor can he glean any support from Claire Witham’s statement, which does not directly deal with the position after 2013.
76. In this regard, the Respondents place great reliance on Dean Sutton’s evidence that Stuart told him the Applicant was renting Mill Cottage and Field 2 from him, and that this would continue after he left for Thailand. If correct, this arguably provides Stuart with a reason to continue paying the rent to Steve/Julie.
77. What it does not do, however, is explain how these payments actually came to be made. It seems more likely that Stuart would try and pass on the rental agreement to the Applicant, or at least arrange for the Applicant to make the payment on his behalf, rather than arranging for payments to be made by a mystery woman. But there is no evidence that this happened, nor was it put to the Applicant.
78. Moreover, there are a number of reasons to be cautious about Dean Sutton’s evidence:
(a) neither of these two key points were in his written statement, which simply states that, as far as he was aware the agreement continued, without providing any explanation as to why. Indeed, the second point, that Stuart told him the Applicant was renting Mill Cottage and Field 2, only came out in re-examination;
(b) he said he had no issue with the Applicant, but was at the same time keen to raise a complaint that the Applicant moved Claire Witham’s horses onto his field, something that she does not mention in her statement. He was also somewhat non-committal when asked if he had sent an abusive message about the Applicant (he said he “may have”). In my judgment, he did have an issue with the Applicant, and this may have coloured his evidence.
79. I note for completeness that the Applicant was cross-examined about whether he rented Field 2 from Stuart. He was insistent that he did not – when he was asked about paying rent for Mill Cottage, but not Field 2, he said “that’s different”, and later said, “why would I rent it off [Stuart] when [Claire’s] on it?” (which was true at the time).Neither of these reasons strike me as being particularly implausible.
80. I also accept the point made on behalf of the Applicant that the last payment was in December 2016, a few years before Stuart passed away, and that there is no particular reason why payments would have stopped at that time if Stuart was still renting Field 2. It does, I note, coincide with the last time Julie would have received payment before she passed away. I do wonder whether Steve has made an assumption that rent continued to be paid when that was not in fact the case.
81. In relation to whether the rental agreement lasted beyond 2013, there is no convincing evidence of payments being made, nor is there any convincing evidence of Stuart having a reason to make the payments.
82. In my judgment, Steve is not confused or mistaken about the existence of a rental agreement, but he is about the payments that were made and how long it lasted.
83. I am not satisfied that the rental agreement lasted beyond the end of 2013.
84. For completeness, I do not accept Ms Cusack’s argument that non-payment of rent does not mean there is no permission. On the facts here, the rental agreement was extended by 12 months on payment of rent in advance. If the rent was not paid in December, the rental agreement would not extend into the following year.
85. Even if the rental agreement lasted beyond 2013, I am not sure it provides the Respondents with a complete answer to the application. An ongoing rental agreement would mean that Stuart had Steve and/or Julie’s permission to use Field 2. It would not mean that the Applicant did, unless the Respondents can additionally show that the Applicant was there with Stuart’s permission.
86. The only evidence about this is from the Applicant and indirectly from Dean Sutton. Given the caution with which I treat the latter’s evidence, I prefer the evidence of the Applicant, that is, that he did not rent Field 2 from Stuart.
87. For all of these reasons, I am not satisfied that the Respondents can demonstrate that use of the Disputed Land was with permission at any stage during the Relevant Period. I am therefore satisfied that possession was adverse throughout.
Conclusion
88. For the reasons given above, I am satisfied that the Applicant can show adverse possession of the Disputed Land, and I shall direct the Chief Land Registrar to give effect to his original application dated 8th July 2024, made in form ADV1 dated 18th June 2024, as if the objections of the Respondents had not been made.
89. I turn to consider costs. Ordinarily, the unsuccessful party will be ordered to pay the costs of the successful party: see rule 13(1)(c) of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal)(Property Chamber) Rules 2013 and paragraph 9.1(b) of the Practice Direction. Here, that would mean an order that the First Respondents pay the Applicant’s costs, unless there is some good reason to make a different order.
90. Costs are potentially recoverable from the date of the reference to the Tribunal, which in this case took place on 21st January 2025.
91. Any application for costs shall be sent to the Tribunal and the other side by 5pm on 26th November 2026 and shall include an estimate of the amount of costs sought. Further directions will then be given as appropriate.
Dated this Thursday 29th October 2026
Laura D’Cruz
By Order of The Tribunal
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