Property United Kingdom

Stephen William Bett & Anor v Rollo Patrick & Anor

Official source

[2026] UKFTT 01519 (PC)

REF/2023/0059 (LEAD CASE); REF 2017/0591; REF 2024/0714

PROPERTY CHAMBER, LAND REGISTRATION DIVISION

FIRST-TIER TRIBUNAL

LAND Registration act 2002

IN the matter of a reference from hm land registry

Before Ian Clarke KC, sitting as a judge of the Property Chamber, Land Registration Division, 9 – 11 June 2026 (and with a site visit on 8 June 2026)

BETWEEN

(1) STEPHEN WILLIAM BETT

(2) JAMES KENRICK MORGAN

(As Trustees of the Thornham Common CL41 Statutory Trust)

APPLICANTS

and

(1) ROLLO PATRICK

(2) JOCELYN BROWNLOW PATRICK

RESPONDENTS

Title No: NK456424

Property: Land comprised in Commons Unit CL41 at Thornham,

Hunstanton

Applicants’ representative: David Taylor, barrister.

Respondents’ representative: Paul Letman, barrister.

___________________________________________________________________________

SUBSTANTIVE DECISION

___________________________________________________________________________

COMMONS REGISTRATION – entitlement to be registered as proprietor at HM Land Registry – interpretation of the Register and Register Map in relation to Thornham Common – application of the Commons Registration (Gen) Regulations 1966, reg 16

Commons Registration Act 1965, ss, 10, 21

Commons Registration (General) Regulations 1966, reg 16

R (Hampshire County Council) v Environment Secretary [2022] QB 103

Rushmer v Central Bedfordshire Council [2023] EWHC 1341 (Ch)

Jourdan & Radley-Gardener, Adverse Possession (second edition, 2011) paragraph 13:18

1. The picturesque coastal village of Thornham lies some 22 miles to the east of King’s Lynn and has a rich and varied history, pre-dating the Norman Conquest. More recently, it has proved a very significant source of references to the First-tier Tribunal, Property Chamber (Land Registration Division), there already being judgments in two references (REF 2017/0458, 0459) by Judge Brilliant (23, 24 May 2018) and on appeal by Judge Cooke (14 September 2021) and by me in REF 2017/0591 (9 April 2020). This is my judgment in relation to the outstanding matters between the parties in various references as contained within the parties’ agreed Case Summary and a List of Issues. For ease of reference and because of my adoption in this judgment of the nomenclature employed in that document, I have included it as Annex 1 to this judgment (“the List of Issues”). I also include as Annex 2 a copy of HMLR’s Illustrative Plan for title number NK45624, which identifies the areas in dispute (or not – see footnote 1 below).

2. The Applicants are the current Trustees of the Thornham Common Statutory Trust and have applied to be registered proprietors of commons registration unit CL41 (“CL41”) by virtue (and only by virtue) of that registration. Following earlier determinations of the Tribunal, various parts of CL41 have been registered and the remaining issues represent (potentially, at least)[1] the totality of the outstanding issues between the parties.

3. Both the First and Second Respondents have objected to the registration sought by the Applicants in relation to the referred, disputed land. The First Respondent is the son of the Second Respondent; he has objected to the Applicants’ registration. The Second Respondent is the joint proprietor of Marsh House (which lies to the east of the Western Strip with his wife and the sole proprietor of the fields lying to the north of the Southern Strip. As is apparent from Annex 2, to the immediate south of the Southern Strip lies a public highway which runs (broadly speaking) east-west and which itself lies to the north of the houses facing on to Thornham Common. If one travels east from the right-angled bend known as Cobb’s Corner, this public highway extends from the land lying at the foot of the Western Strip, past two ponds, the Queen of Sheba and (turning right, and heading south) Monty’s Pit, and onwards to the A149 which lies further to the south. This road is often described as “The Green”, which admits of some confusion with the broader area known as such or “Thornham Green”, which surrounds the former Coastguard Cottages further to the east from Marsh House and the fields which I have just described. For the sake of clarity, I will refer to the roadway as simply “the Road”.

A summary of the parties’ respective cases

The Applicants

4. Historically, the Applicant’s trace their title from the Thornham Enclosure Act 1794 and the ensuing Award of 1797, under which the residue of the Commonable Marshes west of Staith Road were allotted to George Hogg III and became known as Thornham Common. However, the applications they have made (and the arguments that have been advanced on their behalf by Mr Taylor) rest firmly on the foundation that they are the statutory trustees of CL41 and (consonant with the purpose of the Commons Registration Act 1965 (“CRA 1965”)), they submit that this registration is conclusive evidence under CRA 1965, s.10, subject to the exception in section 21(2) in relation to deciding whether any land forms part of a highway.

5. The parcel of common land with which I am concerned, CL41, was provisionally registered in 1967. I have not been shown the application or any declaration in support of that provisional registration in support of any party’s case. The registration was made final (with immaterial modifications) in 1976. As a consequence, the Applicants submit that this entitles them to be registered as proprietors at HMLR of whatever CL41 comprises and therefore the question for me is whether it includes the disputed parcels of land.

6. As to the extent of CL41, the Register describes it in the following terms: –

“The tract of land known as Thornham Common, in the parish of Thornham, Norfolk, as marked with a green verge line inside the boundary on Sheet No 59 of the register map and distinguished by the number of this register unit.”

Interpretation of the map's colouring is said to rest on regulation 16(4) of the Commons Registration (General) Regulations 1966 (“the 1966 Regulations”).

7. The Applicants argue that the Land Section of the Commons Register describes the unit both by its reputed bounds ("the tract of land known as Thornham Common") and “as marked” by a green verge line on the register map. Allowing for the small-scale of the map and errors and distortions which have arisen from copying, the Applicants submit the green colouring can be seen inside the black lines immediately to the west of the Second Respondent’s land (i.e. in connection with the Western Strip) and that green and red colouring can be seen along the southern boundary of the Respondents’ land, broadly in the vicinity of the Southern Strip, the Road, the Queen of Sheba and Monty’s Pit. They contend that registration is conclusive evidence of the matters registered, subject only to CRA 1965, s.21(2) which relates to highways. Accordingly, they submit that I must decide whether the disputed parcels fall within the green verge line, or, if that is uncertain, whether it. Within Thornham Common's reputed bounds and then whether any part is highway. If I were to do so, Mr Taylor submits that the references will be determined in the Applicants’ favour.

8. In terms of the evidence in relation to the “generally reputed bounds” of the Common: –

8.1. The Applicants rely on witness evidence of historic gates across the roadways to the south, and on the purpose, use, and maintenance of ponds and ditches.

8.2. In terms of the Western Strip, the Applicants’ primary case is that the Western Strip falls within the register map's green verge lines, consistent with the Crown Estate's interpretation; alternatively it falls within the reputed bounds by reason of the gates and physical features. I am reminded that (at least for the purposes of the references themselves) I am not being asked to determine a boundary but to give effect to an application for LRA 2002 registration, subject to the general boundaries rule.

8.3. In relation to Monty’s Pit, the Queen of Sheba, the Southern Strip and the Road, the Applicants rely on the register map and a number of other plans, principally drawn up by Norfolk County Council and the Crown Estate to establish title, and (in terms of reputed-bounds) the evidence summarised in para 8.1 above. In relation to the Road, they accept that the surface is highway maintainable at public expense but argue that the statutory vesting of title is limited to the surface and necessary subsoil/airspace; the remainder (it is submitted) remains vested in the Applicants.

9. As a result, the Applicants submit that the combination of their registration and the operation of CRA 1965, s. 10 are conclusive that all disputed parcels form part of CL41 save for the highway surface, which Land Registry's proposed entry (that title does not include the surface of the highway) will exclude. I am asked to give effect to the application as if the Respondents' objections had not been made.

The Respondents

10. The Respondents object to the registration sought by the Applicants in relation to the various parcels of land. In relation to the Western Strip, they deny that it forms any part of CL41 and that the Register of Common Land and the definitive Commons Register Map are clear, meticulously showing each CL41 area with both a green verge line and the CL41 designation, neither of which appears in relation to this parcel. They argue the Western Strip is the sea defence itself, which cannot be common land as it accommodates no grazing or common usage, and the bank is shown outside the green verge line on the Register Map, which itself accords with the scheme of the Thornham Enclosure Act 1794 and the Award of 1797, under which owners of "Frontage Lands" were required to raise their own fences (here, sea defences) absent alternative provision being made, of which there is no record. In terms of the boundary agreement, the Respondents deny agreeing the land fell within CL41, noting it was expressly agreed the northerly sea defences (of which this is a continuation) are outside CL41. In the alternative, the Second Respondent claims adverse possession of the Western Strip since his acquisition of Marsh House in 1978, with the result that he is entitled to be registered as proprietor by virtue of the provisions of section 75(1) of the Land Registration Act 1925.

11. In relation to the Southern Strip, the Respondents contend that it is not part of CL41 because it appears only as a bold black line consistent with a public road and later a publicly maintainable highway, with no green verge line or CL41 designation. They argue that this is also consistent with the land being an entirely a public road under the Enclosure Act 1794, the Award and the Map of 1797 since the Enclosure Act 1794, (at p.9) required the Commissioners to set out public roads at least 40ft broad between ditches and fences on both sides by the relevant owners. They point to the rights of Grass and Herbage awarded to the frontagers in support of the submission that the land is not common land.. Alternatively, the Respondents advance a case on the basis that the Southern Strip is highway maintainable at public expense and the land is excluded from CL41 under the CRA 1965 to its full width, which includes a 2m refuge strip on either side. They rely on the Second Respondent’s evidence that there is no scope for the Blue Land forming part of CL41's "reputed bounds" and contend that the Applicants' evidence is simply self-serving assertion.

12. As to the Road, it is not in dispute that it is highway maintainable at public expense. As such, the Respondents submit that it cannot be common land registrable under the CRA 1965, ss. 21 and 22 (and thus consonant with the bold black lines on the Register Map and reflective of the position adopted by HM Land Registry in correspondence dated 18 November 2020 and 23 July 2021, albeit subject to the issue of underlying ownership). I have been referred to the historic evolution of the Road, comprising as it does the Eleventh and Twelfth Public Roads on the basis that the same were to be set out and appointed so as to be excluded from common land under the Enclosure Act 1794 and the Award. For The Queen of Sheba and Monty's Pit, the Respondent’s draw to my attention the fact that the draftsman of the Register Map drew the green verge lines precisely to exclude both features. Responding to the Applicants’ “reputed bounds” case, the Respondents argue the time to object to these exclusions was before the registration became final on 1 October 1976 and there is no scope to revisit the matter now. Accordingly, the Respondents invite the Tribunal to uphold the objections, confirm registration of CL41 subject to the exclusion of the Western Strip, the Southern Strip and the two ponds and to confirm and express a view that the Eastern Highway Section be excluded from title NK523590.

Jurisdiction

13. During the course of preparing my judgment and whilst focusing in particular on the extent of the Western Strip and the Southern Strip as identified on the Register Map, I had cause to consider whether what I am being asked to do in the context of this reference and the disputed parcels amounts to a “clarification” of the extent of common land, for which exercise Thompsell J (as he now is) concluded that the proper process was that under section 19(3) of the 2006 Act: see Rushmer v Central Bedfordshire Council [2023] EWHC 1341 (Ch) at [47]. I accordingly invited further submissions which I have received and considered, having indicated some preliminary observations within the context of my invitation.

14. As a result of those further submissions, it is common ground that I must interpret the Register Map and give effect to it in the context of the application for first registration and that such an exercise would be within my jurisdiction. Indeed, both go so far as to say that because the Register is clear and admits of no ambiguity (although I pause to note that both reach opposite conclusions as a result of that exercise), the concerns I voiced as to whether what I was being asked to do amounted to an impermissible “clarification” do not arise. Furthermore, no party is arguing that the Register is conclusive and that in reaching my conclusions, I am precluded from considering any extrinsic evidence. Both accept that I can do so in order to resolve any ambiguity but (and here the parties’ positions diverge), the Applicants accept that any decision which might necessitate an amendment to the Register amounts to a clarification, which would be within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commons Registration Authority.

15. The Respondents considered that I would have jurisdiction to perform that task, applying O’Reilly v Mackman [1983] 2 AC 237 (cited in Rushmer at [55]) by analogy. I am not persuaded by that argument on the facts of this case. The essence of the Applicants’ case is their entitlement to be registered by virtue of the estate held by dint of the registration of CL41 under the Commons Registration Act 1965; the decision I have to make (the extent of the land with which they are registered) therefore has both private and public implications and the parties in the reference before me do not include (as in Rushmer) the relevant Commons Registration Authority. It seems to me that even if I had jurisdiction to determine this aspect from a purely private-rights perspective, I could only do so with all relevant parties before me.

The Commons Registration Act 1965

16. Since the sole basis for the Applicants’ registration as proprietors of the land in question rests upon (and only upon) the title vested in them pursuant to the CRA 1965, the effect of that registration and the extent of the land falling within CL41 must (at the very least) be the starting point of any enquiry.

17. Section 10 of the CRA 1965 provides that: –

The registration under this Act of any land as common land…. shall be conclusive evidence of the matters registered, as at the date of registration….”.

As was stated in R (Hampshire County Council) v Environment Secretary [2022] QB 103, 116 at [28], per Andrews LJ:

“The purpose of the 1965 Act was to create a definitive record, maintained by local authorities, of all commons, town or village greens, and rights of common then in existence. Registration (or non-registration) conclusively determined the status of the land in this regard, though the 1965 Act also made provision for subsequent changes to the status of land (e g by the extinguishment of rights of common over it).”

To underline the definitive nature of the statutory record, Andrews LJ went on to consider (at paragraph [33]), circumstances where errors were made in relation to land registered under the CRA 1965, which required rectification. To that end, later statutory intervention was required, none of which concern this case.

18. The precise extent of the land registered under the CRA 1965 in the land section is recorded in paragraph 5 above. At trial, I was provided with what I understand to be a first-generation copy of the relevant plan held by Norfolk County Council (the relevant registration authority) at a copy ratio of 1:1 (i.e not otherwise enlarged or reduced). It is to be found in the bundle at [2419]. I was also provided with a JPEG of that document.

The Register Map

19. Regulation 4 of the 1966 Regulations provides that every register shall consist of a number of prescribed parts, including (a) a general part and (b) a register map. These Regulations are reasonably prescriptive as to the form of the general part of the register, providing for three sections – the land section, the rights section and the ownership section. Regulation 16(5) makes provision as to what every provisional register map must show and what (by extension) the register map must show following provisional registration. Insofar as material, the register map is required to show:-

“(b) by black lines verged green inside the boundary, and the appropriate register unit number, the boundaries of the land comprised in each register unit;

(c) by red lines suitably lettered, or by lettering alone, the limits of any land over which a registered right of common is exercisable, or to which a registration of ownership applies, so far as those limits do not coincide with the boundaries of the land comprised in a register unit, and cannot conveniently be described by reference to any feature appearing on the said map”.

20. In light of the wording used, I agree with Mr Taylor that it is the outer edge of the black lines which (verged green on the inside) show the boundaries of the common land.

21. Under the regulations, red lines can be used to demonstrate first, the limits of any land over which a registered right of common is exerciseable; secondly, the limits of any land to which a registration of ownership applies but (in either case) insofar as those limits do not coincide with the boundaries of the land comprised in a register unit.

Colouring on the Register Map

22. Against that statutory background, it is necessary to consider the manner in which colouring is employed on the Register Map. My conclusions in relation to the colouring on the Register Map are as follows.

23. First, there are a number of parcels of land adjacent to the Road (some of which are marked “CL41”), which appear to be edged in black and green with “red centres”.

24. I posed the question of counsel as to the consequences if I were to conclude that the Southern Strip were marked by (only) a redline on the Register Map; since I do not reach such a conclusion, this particular line of enquiry falls away, although I am grateful for the assistance of Counsel in that regard. Looking at the Register Map as a whole, in my judgment, there are 4 small areas of open space immediately adjacent to the Road which (with varying degrees of clarity) appear to be filled in with red on the Register Map – three of them are obvious, two lying either side of the Queen of Sheba (and marked “CL41”) and with one further to the east towards Monty’s Pit. The fourth area, in my judgment, lies on the inside of Cobb’s Corner at the western end of the Roadway as it turns south towards the Church and the A149. I return to the question of the Southern Strip below.

25. I pause to note that the Road (being an unclassified road) is (as specified in the Reference at the foot of the Register Map) itself marked on the Register Map by a continuous black line, although it can be seen from the middle and its eastern end to be a relatively thin black line. On the Applicants’ case and if the Regulations were to be applied to the letter in relation to this area, one might expect (starting from the northern edge of the Southern Strip and heading south) a black line (verged in green) marking the southern boundary of Marsh House, a black line representing the Road, with a green line verging a black line lying to the south and touching the northern boundaries of the properties to the south. On the scale of the Register Map, such sequential colouring simply cannot exist.

The extent of the land registered as common

26. Having considered the definitive nature of the registration under the CRA 1965 and the visible coloration of the lines employed upon the Register Map, it is convenient to set out some overarching principles I have employed when considering the extent of the land comprising CL41:

(1) First, the statutory scheme and the definitive nature of the records to be kept by local authorities, discussed above. There can be no question of admitting extrinsic evidence in order to contradict the Register Map (and none of the parties are so submitting); since it is common ground that regard can be had to extrinsic evidence whether in order to resolve ambiguities or to demonstrate the accuracy of the Register Map, I consider this evidence below.

(2) Secondly, I am not assisted by the various iterations of the Register Map prepared by unknown persons within Norfolk County Council or the Crown Estate which represent their “interpretations” of the (definitive) Register Map for other purposes; I do not consider these to have any evidential value. At best, they can only represent an individual’s subjective interpretation of the Register Map at the time and on the basis of unknown information. Ultimately, the interpretation of the Register Map is a question for me.

(3) Thirdly, I do not consider it right to approach the interpretation of the Register Map by reference to enlarged photocopies of any particular area in order to establish ambiguity; the Register Map was drawn, as it is, at the scale it employs, in order to communicate the extent of the subject to registration. For better or for worse, the information it contains as drawn represents the information contained and referred to in the Register.

The witnesses

27. Before turning in detail to the Issues, the following points are worth recording. First, I had the benefit of hearing evidence of Robert Howell, Anthony Needham, Stephen Bett and James Morgan on behalf of the Applicants. Likewise, and on behalf of the Respondents I heard from both Jocelyn Patrick and Rollo Patrick. Whilst I have no doubt that all were endeavouring to give honest evidence to the best of their recollection, I formed a clear view that Applicants were very heavily invested in the successful outcome of this matter and that Mr Morgan, in particular, had invested sufficient time and energy such that it was difficult to tell where his evidence finished and his advocacy began. In contrast, Jocelyn Patrick was candidly prepared to accept points against him with the minimum of fuss. I do not find the general and untested hearsay evidence provided on behalf of the Applicants of any assistance in resolving this matter and accord it no weight.

28. Secondly, much of the evidence I heard viva voce was supposition or that pertaining to events and conduct spanning 200 years and self-evidently outside of the knowledge and experience of the witnesses. So, for example, I heard at some length about the location of Cattle Gates said to mark the southern road boundary of Thornham Common. Aside from a photograph of a gate somewhere adjacent to Monty’s Pit, there was no direct evidence of the location of these gates, none of the witnesses having seen them, still less so was there any evidence of who erected them and for what purpose. The Applicants submit that they should lead me to conclude that the land to the north comprised common land, but that (in my judgment) is an overly generalised statement and not one which I can accept. Similarly, the Respondents’ evidence focused on the narrowness of the Road adjacent to the Southern Strip and by a series of measurements sought to demonstrate that because it was less than 40 feet adjacent to the Southern Strip, that Strip must comprise part of the road. Since these measurements were all taken from modern structures or plantings and presuppose that the locus in quo was laid out in the late 18th-century or thereafter in accordance with the provisions of the Act and the Award, I similarly find no assistance in that line of evidential extrapolation. Two mind, the starting point is the extent of the land with which the Applicants are registered by dint of the registration of CL41, subject to any aspects which I can resolve by admissible and persuasive evidence in the event of ambiguity. It is that exercise that I will now turn.

The Western Strip

29. At the site view, I walked along the length of the Western Strip. It comprises a mound of earth, higher than the surrounding land with a ditch to the seaward side and (as far as I could tell, it being much overgrown) some form of ditching on the landward side. Both would be consistent with this earthwork having been built/enlarged from the surrounding, available materials. A public footpath runs along the top of it and, if one were to continue along that footpath, the journey would run round to the north of the Western and Eastern Fields.

30. The Applicants claim the Western Strip as part of CL41, although they have eschewed any claim to the continuation of the Western Strip which comprises the sea defences lying further to the north and east on the basis of the costs of maintenance. The Second Respondent asserts that the Western Strip was raised by his predecessors in title in discharge of obligations under the 1794 Act and Award and that accordingly it belongs to him and, in any event, does not form part of CL41. In REF 2017/0591, the Second Respondent advanced a case in relation to adverse possession on the basis that he has “constructed and maintained the sea defence since he became the owner of the [Marsh House]”. During the course of the hearing before me, the Applicants abandoned any claim to a relevant boundary agreement and I therefore consider it no further.

31. During the site visit, I was shown a derelict gate 60% of the way along the Western Strip if one starts from the Road. The Applicants’ evidence is that this gate was erected historically in order to stop animal stress passing from the Common onto the bank; again, like the Cattle Gates, there was no admissible evidence from anybody to that effect and I consider this aspect simply to be an assumption which I reject by dint of my preference for the Second Respondent’s evidence that the gate itself came from his parents estate and was erected by him.

32. Despite the Applicants’ efforts to persuade me otherwise, to my mind there can be no doubt that the Western Strip operates primarily, if not exclusively as a sea defence, forming part of a raised, continuous bank between Marsh House and the marshes beyond, even though it may not be the first point of contact of any high, incoming tide. To confirm what appears to me to be obvious, there is a photograph within the bundle indicating water standing to the seaward side.

33. Are the Applicants entitled to be registered as proprietors? In my judgment, the answer is in the negative. I have no doubt, looking at the Register Map, that the Western Strip falls outside of the CL41 registration and thus does not form part of the land to which the Applicants are entitled to be registered as proprietors. The black line forming the relevant boundary between C41 and the Western Strip clearly follows to the east of the line of seaward triangles indicating its western edge and that this delineation continues for the totality of the Western Strip. Further, that conclusion is consistent with and in clear continuation of the line adopted in relation to the northern sea defences, which it is accepted do not form part of CL41.

34. Is the Second Respondent the registered proprietor? Whilst it is a fair inference that the Western Strip was raised by the owner of the land upon which Marsh House is situated, it is fair to say that the Western Strip lies outside (i.e. to the west) of the redline indicating the boundary on the title plan to Marsh House, which line is some way to the east of the marked footpath which runs along the top of the Western Strip. The relevant boundary is, of course, a general boundary and as such does not follow the exact line, which is undetermined. However, from the site view, the difference between where the general boundary is shown and where the Second Respondents contends it should be is measured in some metres and cannot fairly be said to be included within his registered title by reference to the general boundaries rule. I therefore proceed on the basis that it falls outside of the Second Respondent’s registered title.

35. However, as noted above, the Second Respondent advances a claim of title by adverse possession in the alternative. I do not consider that he can make good a claim by adverse possession on the evidence before me.

36. The most detailed account of the works undertaken in relation to the Western Strip are contained in a proof of evidence, updated to 28 March 1995 contained within the bundle as an exhibit (JP 2) to the Second Respondent’s witness statement dated 8 July 2025. It details the works and correspondence between 1977 and 1995, during which period of time the bank and fences comprising the Western Strip was repaired and raised by the Second Respondent. There is no detail of any works undertaken since. The contents of the Proof of Evidence was not put to any witness on behalf of the Applicants and in any event (and for the same reasons given by Judge Brilliant at paragraph [84] of his judgment dated 1 August 2018), works of maintenance or repair of boundary features, by themselves, do not comprise acts indicative of the assertion of exclusive control against the paper owner, which is a necessary ingredient in order to establish adverse possession: Jourdan & Radley-Gardener, Adverse Possession (second edition, 2011) paragraph 13:18. I cannot, for myself, see that the paper-title owner would, as a result, see himself as having been dispossessed by these periodic works over a protracted period and accordingly, I make no order in favour of the Second Respondent.

The Southern Strip

37. Translated to the Registered Map, the Southern Strip comprises the thicker black line identified above.

38. More specifically and in terms of relevant maps and plans, the Southern Strip lies to the north of the Road from (broadly speaking) in line with the western boundary of “Poppylands” to the corner where the footpath which runs along the Western Strip joins the highway. From comparing HMLR’s Illustrative plan at page [353] and the Norfolk County Council definitive Highways Plan at page [2187], the Southern Strip comprises that sliver of land lying (a) to the north of the 2m refuge strip indicated on the latter plan and (b) to the south of the physical boundary of Marsh House and the Western and Eastern Fields. The Applicants accepted that whatever the outcome, it would have no bearing on access to the land to the north.

39. A careful inspection of the Register Map reveals the following. First, at Cobb’s corner a rectangle of land, of which the centre is coloured red. There is then what I consider to be a broad, dark line to the north of that rectangle and coextensive with the Southern Strip and the Road which has unmistakable red coloration extending beyond the rectangle of land at Cobb’s Corner. Whatever colours are present on the Register Map at this point, it seems clear that red is one of them and, when interpreting the Register Map and the extent of CL41, I must give effect to that. Where this broader, darker line ceases, one can see a thin line representing the Road heading east.

40. Picking up on the analysis in paragraph 25 above, there is no visible green verging indicating that the black line with which I am concerned represents the boundary of common land. However, I recognise and accept that there simply is not the space to follow the statutory delineation with respect to this strip of land. Moreover, I do not consider that the dark colouration represents solely the Road, given the breadth of the line at the point of the Southern Strip and its noticeably thinner representation elsewhere. Further, I should record that I see no impediment to a highway also forming part of a commons registration unit, albeit the land comprising the highway would be subject to the usual incidents associated therewith. Section 21(2) of the Commons Registration Act does not provide the highway shall not form part of land registered under that Act but rather that section 10 (and its conclusive evidence provisions) shall not apply. I fortified by the fact that my conclusion accords with the position adopted by HM Land Registry in correspondence.

41. What then might I make of these conclusions? The Applicants invited me to consider a number of factors, ranging from the open nature of the land as demonstrated in 1797 map and the “historic gates” that were across the Road where it runs north-south both at the western and eastern ends (of which there is a photograph of the latter within the bundle) and the evidence of cleaning and maintenance of ditches and partly by reference to Judge Brilliant’s findings at paragraph [85] where (in proceedings to which the Applicants and the Second Respondent were parties), the Judge determined that the Second Respondent did not have paper title to the ditch which runs along the southern boundaries of the Western and Eastern Fields. It is worth recording, however, that this case was not concerned with the totality of the Southern Strip.

42. In contrast, the Respondents submit that the black line which is visible comprises only roadway, which is consistent with the provisions of the Enclosure Act 1794 and the Award and map of 1797, given the obligation that roads should be at least 40 feet wide between ditches and fences and should be fenced out on both sides by the relevant owners and proprietors who had rights of Grass and Herbage in the absence of the land being common land. In addition, it is said that because the Road is a highway maintainable at public expense and the Southern Strip falls to be excluded from CL41 to its full width, including the 2 m refuge strip to which I have referred, there being no width for any common land in this area.

43. The starting point must be the Register Map. In circumstances where the Southern Strip is delineated by dark lining which does not follow the classic formulation in the Regulations, I consider that it is permissible to have regard to evidence in order to resolve this ambiguity.

44. However, first it is worth recording that my conclusion of the visible presence of red coloration leads me to the conclusion (consistent with the 4 other instances, which I have identified above) that parts of the land adjacent to the Road were considered to be (to the extent that the scale of the Register Map permitted) worthy of delineation with some form of red colouring and thus not to be land over which a either registered right of common is exerciseable or to which a registration of ownership applied.

45. In determining the purpose for which such coloration might have been applied in relation to the Southern Strip, both Mr Howell (born in 1955 and who grew up in the village) and Mr Needham (who has lived in Thornham since 1950) both give evidence that the Southern Strip formed part of the Common as they understood it. I accept that evidence, particularly since it speaks to that land being so considered prior to and at and around the time of registration. In my judgment, it is substantially more compelling than arguments built upon a hypothesis of what would or should have happened in the late 18th century in terms of the laying out of roads. However, given the nature of the Southern Strip and its proximity to the highway, it seems to me probable that it comprised land within the boundaries of the land comprised in the register unit but over which a registered right of common is not exerciseable. Accordingly, and to that extent, I would accede to the Applicants’ Application in relation to the Southern Strip.

The Queen of Sheba and Monty’s Pit

46. REF 2024/0714 duplicates the Applicants’ claim for registration in relation to the Western Strip (which I have addressed above) and also seeks registration of the Queen of Sheba and Monty’s Pit.

47. In support of their case, the Applicants point two plans produced by the Crown Estate (as to which, see above) and the reputed-bounds of the Common and the historic gates as supporting the inclusion within the Common of the two ponds. Mr Bett and Mr Howell both spoke of drainage works to the Queen of Sheba, but since this is not a case in which such works could have relevance, I make no findings in that regard. Mr Bett recognise that the Queen of Sheba was (as he put it) “mistakenly left out” of the Register Map.

48. I can deal with the issue of the ponds in short order. The question is whether the Applicants’ registration as proprietors of CL41 justify their registration as proprietor of the ponds at HMLR. In my judgment, the answer to that question is in the negative. It is clear from the Register Map that neither are included within CL41. The coloured lines depicting the edge of the land subject to registration run markedly and clearly to the north of the Queen of Sheba and do not include Monty’s Pit lying (as it does) in the right-angle as the Road turns south at its eastern end. In my judgment, there is no ambiguity or uncertainty in this regard and I have no jurisdiction to make the order sought, even if I accepted the evidence in support.

Conclusion

49. In my judgment: –

(1) the Applicants are not entitled to be registered as proprietors of the Western Strip, the Queen of Sheba or Monty’s Pit;

(2) the Second Respondent is not the registered proprietor of the Western Strip nor is he entitled to be registered as such by reason of adverse possession;

(3) the Applicants are entitled to be registered as proprietors of the Road (subject to the appropriate entry at HM Land Registry) and the Southern Strip, which comprises land over which no right of common is exercisable.

Further matters

50. As a result of this judgment, directions will need to be issued to HM Land Registry and there will no doubt be consequential matters to be determined as a result. Given that orders have been made in part in relation to some of the references before me, I invite the parties to submit agreed orders in word format for each of the references by 5 PM on 13 November 2026, directing (as appropriate) the Chief Land Registrar to give effect to the relevant references in whole, in part or not at all. (To the extent they are not agreed, I would invite a single draft order with tracked suggestions). In addition, I direct that any party seeking an order for costs in their favour should file and serve brief written submissions to that end, together with a schedule of costs in Form N260 by 5 PM on 30 November 2026 together with a certificate that those costs are incurred after the date of the reference to which they relate. Any party receiving such submissions may file and serve submissions in reply by 5 PM on 20 November 2026. My current proposal is to deal with these matters on the papers alone. In light of the conclusions reached above, the parties may wish to consider whether no order as to costs is the appropriate order.

51. In terms of time for seeking permission to appeal, I hereby extend it to 28 days after the date of the orders to HMLR giving effect to my judgment above. I should add that if costs are a live issue, I would be minded to extend the period for seeking permission to appeal to 28 days after my judgment on any such applications.

Dated this 27th day of October 2026

Ian Clarke K.C.

By Order of The Tribunal

Notes

[1] I say “potentially” because it is common ground that part of the land in relation to which the Applicants will seek to be registered, being the Eastern Highway Section (being that part of the Road not coloured yellow on Annex 2 immediately to the west of Monti's Pit has not been referred to me. A however, it is an aspect on which the Respondents wish me to express a view, nonetheless. In the absence of a referral, it is an aspect outside of my jurisdiction and accordingly I decline to express a view on it. However, the reasoning below may afford some insight into how this aspect might be determined if it were referred.


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