Administrative United Kingdom
Bledian Dollomaja v The Secretary of State for the Home Department
First-tier Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber)
Appeal Number: HU/61771/2025
THE IMMIGRATION ACTS
Heard at Newport
On 4 November 2026
Before
JUDGE MCMAHON
JUDGE OF THE FIRST-TIER TRIBUNAL
Between
BLEDIAN DOLLOMAJA
Appellant
and
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent
Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Ahmed, no12 Chambers
For the Respondent: Mrs Williams, Home Office Presenting Officer
DECISION AND REASONS
Background
1. The Appellant is a 33-year-old national of Albania who is subject to an order for his deportation. He appeals against the Respondent’s decision of 8 August 2025 refusing his claim based on his private and family life.
The Hearing
2. The hearing was recorded using the Cloud Video Platform. That recording is the record of proceedings and should be consulted in the event of any dispute about what was said at the hearing.
i. Documents and witnesses
3. The hearing took place at Columbus House, Newport, with both representatives, the Appellant, and his witnesses – namely his wife and his wife’s grandmother – appearing in person. An interpreter had been arranged to assist the Appellant to give oral evidence. At the start of their evidence, the Appellant spoke with the interpreter and confirmed that they understood one another. No issues were raised with the interpretation provided during the hearing.
4. Both representatives confirmed that the relevant documents were contained in the stitched hearing bundle of 1311 PDF pages found on myHMCTS. In addition, the Appellant relied on a letter from the Appellant’s probation officer and a photograph of a prescription which were uploaded on 3 November 2026. I decided to admit these documents as late evidence because Mrs Williams confirmed she had received the documents, and had been given an opportunity to consider them.
ii. Evidence
5. I heard evidence from the Appellant, his wife (who I shall refer to as “W”), and W’s grandmother. All adopted their witness statements as their evidence-in-chief, and were cross-examined on the same.
6. With my permission, Mr Ahmed asked W additional questions by way of evidence-in-chief, so that an update on recent developments in C6’s health could be provided. Following cross-examination, W was asked several further questions by Mr Ahmed during the re-examination phase, which I permitted without any initial objection from Mrs Williams.
7. However, Mr Ahmed sought to continue asking questions of W during this re-examination phase which was opposed by Mrs Williams on behalf of the Respondent. Having considered submissions and the question Mr Ahmed wanted to ask, I declined to permit Mr Ahmed to ask further questions at that stage of W’s evidence. This was because the matters that could and should have been, and to a large extent already had been, set out in W’s witness statement. Allowing Mr Ahmed to elicit what was effectively further evidence-in-chief after W and the Appellant had been cross-examined would have given rise to procedural fairness issues. It was also at complete odds with the requirements of paragraph 8 of the Practice Direction of 1 November 2024, and the need for procedural rigour as set out by the Upper Tribunal in Lata [2023] UKUT 00163 (IAC).
8. In addition to the oral evidence, I also considered the documents identified above and the submissions of both parties. I reserved my decision.
The issues
9. Mr Ahmed confirmed that the Appellant pursued his appeal on the basis that the Respondent’s decision is contrary to Article 8 of the ECHR and did not seek to pursue an appeal on Article 3 or protection grounds.
10. Both representatives therefore agreed that the relevant legal framework was set out in section 117C of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (“the 2002 Act”).
11. Mr Ahmed conceded on behalf of the Appellant that he could not meet the requirements of the exception set out in section 117C(4) of the 2002 Act because he had not been lawfully resident in the UK for most of his life. Instead, the Appellant relied on the exception set out in section 117C(5) of the 2002 Act on the basis of his relationships with W and his 6-year-old step-daughter (“C6”), and his 1-year-old biological daughter (“C1”).
12. Both representatives agreed that if the Tribunal found that the Appellant did not satisfy the requirement of section 117C(5), he would need to argue that there are very compelling circumstances in this appeal (per NA (Pakistan) v SSHD [2016] EWCA Civ 662).
13. In addition to the above, Mr Ahmed on behalf of the Appellant –
(a) conceded that the Appellant is a “foreign criminal” within the meaning of the 2002 Act; and
(b) accepted the Appellant was convicted on 22 April 2024 at Teeside Crown Court of a single offence of producing cannabis, for which he received a sentence of 23 months imprisonment.
14. Mrs Williams confirmed that the Respondent –
(a) accepted that the Appellant has a genuine and subsisting relationship with W, and a genuine and subsisting parental relationship with C1;
(b) accepted that W, C1, and C6 are British citizens; and
(c) accepted that it would be unduly harsh for W and children to relocate to Albania.
15. The representatives therefore agreed that the principal controversial issues the Tribunal must decide are:
(a) is the Appellant socially and culturally integrated?
(b) does the Appellant face very significant obstacles to integration in Albania?
(c) does the Appellant have a genuine and subsisting parental relationship with C6?
(d) would it be unduly harsh on W and/or children if the Appellant were deported?
(e) are there very compelling circumstances so that the public interest in deportation is outweighed by the level of interference with the Appellant's private and family life?
Legal Framework
16. Section 117C of the 2002 Act states:
(1) The deportation of foreign criminals is in the public interest.
(2) The more serious the offence committed by a foreign criminal, the greater is the public interest in deportation of the criminal.
(3) In the case of a foreign criminal ("C") who has not been sentenced to a period of imprisonment of four years or more, the public interest requires C's deportation unless Exception 1 or Exception 2 applies.
(4) Exception 1 applies where—
(a) C has been lawfully resident in the United Kingdom for most of C's life,
(b) C is socially and culturally integrated in the United Kingdom, and
(c) there would be very significant obstacles to C's integration into the country to which C is proposed to be deported.
(5) Exception 2 applies where C has a genuine and subsisting relationship with a qualifying partner, or a genuine and subsisting parental relationship with a qualifying child, and the effect of C's deportation on the partner or child would be unduly harsh.
(6) In the case of a foreign criminal who has been sentenced to a period of imprisonment of at least four years, the public interest requires deportation unless there are very compelling circumstances, over and above those described in Exceptions 1 and 2.
(7) The considerations in subsections (1) to (6) are to be taken into account where a court or tribunal is considering a decision to deport a foreign criminal only to the extent that the reason for the decision was the offence or offences for which the criminal has been convicted.
17. Paragraphs 46 to 50 of HA (Iraq) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2022] UKSC 22 explained very compelling circumstances.
18. In addition, section 55 of the Borders Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009 (‘BCI Act 2009’) places a duty on the Respondent to ensure, when discharging her immigration functions, that regard is had to the need to safeguard and promote the welfare of children in the UK.
19. The best interests of a child in any assessment are a primary consideration and although they will not always determine the outcome of an immigration decision, no other factor should be given more weight. The best interests of a child must be considered first and are an integral part of the proportionality assessment under Article 8 of ECHR. A child must not be blamed for matters for which he or she is not responsible (ZH (Tanzania) [2011] UKSC 4; Zoumbas v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2013] UKSC 74).
Findings
20. I have given full and careful consideration to all the oral evidence, as well as the written and oral submissions from both representatives. Whilst I have necessarily recorded my findings one after another, I have considered all the evidence in the round in order to determine these findings.
i. The Appellant’s criminal conviction
21. The Respondent relies on the Appellant’s conviction following a guilty plea on 22 April 2024 as the basis for these deportation proceedings. The Appellant accepts that he was convicted by Teesside Crown Court of producing cannabis, and received an immediate custodial sentence of 23 months’ imprisonment.
22. The sentencing remarks of the HHJ Stead have been provided by the Respondent. They are brief. However, I found from those remarks that the Appellant, along with three others, were “…engaged to work in a cannabis production factory”. The Appellant was described – and accepted by the CPS – as having a “lesser role” in the factory, but HHJ Stead found that the quantities of plants and scale of the operation were somewhere between “significant” and “industrial”. The Appellant was given an immediate custodial sentence, with 1-month credit for his guilty plea, which led to the above sentence being imposed. The Appellant served half of that sentence in prison, and has also spent time on licence in the community.
23. I do not accept the Appellant’s oral evidence that he was “forced” into committing the criminal offence. Although HHJ Stead records that the Appellant had a “lesser role”, there is no suggestion in those sentencing remarks or indeed in the Appellant’s witness statement that he was “forced” to undertake that work. In addition, although I am not bound by it, I note that the Single Competent Authority did not find there were reasonable grounds to believe that the Appellant was a victim of trafficking and exploitation after the matter had been referred to it on an earlier occasion. I therefore proceed on the basis as set out in HHJ Stead’s sentencing remarks, namely that the Appellant played a “lesser role” in the operation of a cannabis production factory that was somewhere between “significant” and “industrial” in its scale and operation.
24. In terms of the Appellant’s conduct since his release, I have the benefit of a detailed letter from the Appellant’s probation officer, which is dated 23 September 2026. I found from that probation officer’s assessment that the Appellant now presents a low risk of harm, has responded positively to his period of supervision, and no “significant concerns” were identified regarding his behaviour. There is no suggestion of any further offending or breaches of any licence requirement or condition of immigration bail, and I make findings to that effect.
ii. The Appellant’s circumstances in the UK
25. It is common ground that the Appellant entered the UK illegally in October 2022 and initially claimed asylum. I found from the Home Office records (which the Appellant did not seek to challenge) that his claim for asylum was ultimately voided in August 2024 on the basis that the Appellant did not attend interviews. I found that the Appellant has never been granted permission to enter or remain in the UK, but I accept that for some of the past 4 years, he has had a pending asylum claim, albeit one that was ultimately voided and has not been pursued since, or was awaiting a decision on the current human rights claim.
26. The evidence provided about the Appellant’s circumstances in the UK stems almost entirely from the various witness statements provided by members of W’s family. I turn to those statements and the weight I give to them in due course. However, it is clear that the extent of the Appellant’s ties to the UK are confined to those family members. There is no evidence of any broader social or cultural ties to the UK, for example through friends or members of the community, although I accept that the conditions of the Appellant’s presence in the UK mean that he is not permitted to undertake paid employment, and as such it would not be possible for the Appellant to create ties in that respect. However, the absence of any broader evidence causes me to doubt whether the Appellant is in fact completely socially and culturally integrated in the UK. Aside from physically being in the UK and having a family, there is no evidence to speak of about that broader integration.
iii. The Appellant’s family in the UK
27. It is now common ground that the Appellant is in a genuine and subsisting relationship with W. I found from the evidence of the Appellant and W that both met in November 2022, therefore around 1 month after the Appellant entered the UK illegally, and have been in a relationship ever since. Their relationship has therefore existed for around 4 years.
28. I found that the Appellant and W have lived with one another since November 2022, except for those periods when the Appellant was remanded in custody, serving his custodial sentence, or held in immigration detention, which would have been approximately 1 year in duration. Although the Appellant’s assertion in his prison induction log that he was “single” is a curious feature of the evidence in this case, I found I could accept the consistent evidence given by the Appellant and W, coupled with the numerous prison logs which confirm W and C6 were regularly visiting the Appellant during his time in prison, that their relationship subsisted during the Appellant’s incarceration.
29. Since the Appellant’s release, I found from the evidence that the Appellant and W married in May 2025, having obtained the Home Office’s permission to do so. I found from the marriage certificate provided that W’s mother and father attended that wedding as witnesses.
30. W’s father, grandmother, stepmother and mother have all provided witness statements in support of the Appellant’s appeal. All speak in very similar terms about the strong bond the Appellant has with his children and W, and describe the Appellant in remarkably glowing terms. However, only W’s grandmother attended the hearing to submit herself to cross-examination. Although W spoke about there being some sort of breakdown in the relationship between her and her mother, I did not find there to be any reasonable explanation for the absence of the other witnesses and found that I am bound to give less weight to the witness evidence given by W’s father, stepmother and mother as a result of them not attending.
31. The evidence given by W’s grandmother deserves greater weight because she has attended to submit herself to cross-examination and has provided broadly consistent evidence throughout. Although I found it surprising that she did not know W had visited Albania despite her written evidence describing how she had observed the family unit “closely”, I found, overall, I could give significant weight to the evidence provided by W’s grandmother.
32. After considering all the evidence in the round, I have no hesitation in concluding that the Appellant clearly plays an important part in the lives of W, C1 and C6. He cares for C1 and C6 jointly with W. He is also someone who also clearly has contact with W’s broader family, and has been involved in helping W’s grandmother with tasks around their smallholding. W’s father describes how he has developed a “strong bond” with the Appellant and refers to various trips. Even though W’s father did not attend the hearing, I found from the written evidence relied on by the Appellant that W’s father, like W’s other relatives, are active relatives who have involved themselves in the lives of W, C1, C6 and the Appellant for a number of years.
33. In terms of W’s circumstances, I found from the evidence that W is a 28-year-old British citizen who has only ever lived in the UK. I found that W has previously worked in care roles involving disabled children, and undertook this role both before and during her relationship with the Appellant. I found from the evidence that W took maternity leave in 2025 and, whilst she returned to work briefly following maternity leave, is no longer in employment. I accept her evidence that she intends to return to employment as soon as she is able to because she needs the income to run the family home, but that is subject to finding a role that has the flexibility she needs to work around the childcare needs of C1 and C6. I also accept W’s evidence that she is currently prescribed sertraline and has found this process to be particularly distressing and upsetting, and I accept that she derives support from the Appellant, like any couple would do. I did not find on the evidence before me that W has any particular health problems that mean she is seriously ill or otherwise dependent on the Appellant. She is, I accept, experiencing the inevitable distress caused by the Appellant’s uncertain immigration status, but I did not find any broader evidence of any significant medical concern in respect of W.
34. Although I am prepared to accept that W was initially ignorant as to the Appellant’s immigration status when they first began their relationship, it is clear on the evidence before me that W knew the Appellant had been made the subject of a deportation order when they entered into their marriage and for approximately a year before C1 was born. I find it surprising that W was under some belief that the Home Office’s decision to permit her to marry the Appellant in some way implied that the Appellant’s deportation matter had been resolved: that is plainly at odds with immigration law, and perhaps crucially inconsistent with W’s account of being the person who has managed all the paperwork relating to the claim giving rise to this appeal, which was lodged just one month after their marriage.
35. I found from the evidence that W has previously had the support from her mother and grandmother in bringing up C6. Clearly, W brought up C6 without the Appellant’s support for the first two years of C6’s life, and W continued to bring up C6 during the Appellant’s time in custody. The documentary evidence is clear that during these periods, W undertook work that involved overnight stays and paid employment that clearly involved family members supporting W in dropping off and picking up C6 from school, as well as C6 staying with at least one relative overnight. The content of the witness statements given by W’s father, grandmother, mother and stepmother all speak about how they have observed the Appellant in close terms being an active and loving father, and I find from the contents of those statements that those family members must therefore play an active part in the broader family unit.
iv. The Appellant’s children
36. C1 was born in 2025. The Appellant is C1’s biological father and she will plainly treat the Appellant as such even at this young age. I have been provided with C1’s medical records but did not find from those records or indeed any of the other evidence that C1 has any particular medical or developmental concerns.
37. C6 was born in 2020. I have no hesitation in concluding that C6 will consider the Appellant to be a father in substance, even though he is not her biological father. The Appellant has clearly been in C6’s life since she was around 2 years old, and given the absence of C6’s biological father, the Appellant is clearly the only ‘father’ C6 has ever known. He clearly plays an active part in the lives of C1 and C6, as evidenced by the witness statements and the various photographs.
38. I have been provided with some, but not all, of C6’s medical records. I should note at the outset that I do not have any medico-legal report or similar, and W’s evidence acknowledged that C6’s medical records are incomplete because they do not contain records dealing with a mobility problem which I turn to in due course.
39. Collectively, I found from the medical records and the witness evidence that C6 has a number of medical problems. I found from the evidence that she has asthma which causes her to be prescribed steroids. Due to the consequential weakness in C6’s lungs, she is susceptible to chest infections for which she has had various admissions and treatments in a hospital setting. I also found from the evidence that C6 has been treated for a kidney problem which means she is susceptible to UTIs. The most recent medical evidence before me records that her kidney function is “within normal limits”, but I accept W’s evidence that this will be a condition that C6 will continue to be monitored for as she gets older.
40. I also found from the medical evidence and the evidence given by W that there are concerns about other aspects of C6’s health. However, I found these concerns to be just that: they are concerns as opposed to any formal diagnosis or confirmation of any illness, condition or disability.
41. In respect of the first concern, I found that W reported to her GP in December 2024 that C6 has displayed signs of “meltdowns”, difficulty in understanding emotions and has spoken about how she requires “a lot of support”. An entry in C6’s medical records from 18 December 2024 records that W suspected C6 has autism, and a referral for a diagnosis was therefore issued by that GP.
42. W spoke in her oral evidence about the concerns she has regarding C6’s development. She reiterated the account recorded by the GP in December 2024 about C6 having “meltdowns”, difficulties engaging and interacting with other people, and struggles with changes in her life. W spoke about a recent incident during a holiday in the UK which she found particularly difficult because of C6’s behaviour. I do not doubt W’s account of that holiday because it was presented in detail and was consistent with W’s account elsewhere about the behavioural difficulties experienced by C6.
43. W’s oral evidence was that she continues to await that diagnosis. However, W confirmed that C6 attends a mainstream school and any additional support provided by the school is currently informal and not underpinned by an education, health and care plan, because one has not yet been prepared.
44. I have considered this evidence carefully. Unlike the kidney problem and C6’s asthma, there is just one recorded GP entry about C6’s developmental concerns from December 2024. I found it surprising that despite the medical records showing C6 being assessed by the GP on several occasions since that referral, there is no further reference in those GP records to any behavioural concerns exhibited by C6. C6 is described in various entries in the GP records in August, September and October 2025 as being “well” and “very well”, and “happy”. Put simply, there is a complete lack of any medical record beyond that entry in December 2024 which explains or elaborates upon the nature or extent of C6’s behavioural difficulties, and the records that do exist are at odds with W’s account of C6 being a child with such significant concerns.
45. I recognise W’s evidence that C6 was being supported by other professionals, which could explain the absence of such records in the GP log provided. However, I found overall there to be an inconsistency in what W says about C6’s behaviour, and what is recorded in the evidence elsewhere. I do not find there to be a contradiction in the evidence, but a lack of any medical evidence which is consistent with W’s account of C6’s behaviour.
46. I must make findings on the evidence before me. Having considered all the evidence, I accept that W has consulted her GP with concerns about C6’s development as recently as December 2024. I also accept, as W asserts, that there are concerns about C6’s emotional behaviour and her development. However, I do not find there to be any diagnosis of autism or similar, and I do not find that C6’s behaviour is of such severity that the Appellant’s presence is essential to C6’s wellbeing because of the lack of evidence to support such a finding.
47. A similar issue emerges in relation to the second concern. W also reports that C6 is being tested for what W described in her oral evidence as a “life-limiting condition”. W elaborated in her oral evidence that this concern relates to “issues with [C6’s] legs”, which is believed to be some sort of muscle disease. W described in detail how C6 has been tested for this condition by specialists in the USA, and the results are expected back in approximately 6 months.
48. As with the concerns about C6’s behavioural development, I have very limited medical evidence before me about these concerns. The only medical records before me linked to these mobility concerns appear to be an entry in C6’s GP records from 16 March 2021 in which concerns were expressed about C6’s gait, the consequential GP referral letter at page 270, and a passing reference to C6 undertaking physiotherapy in an entry on 18 December 2024. W explained in her oral evidence that C6 has been treated as an outpatient at a hospital, but suggested that data-sharing arrangements between her GP (in Wales) and that hospital (in England) did not exist, meaning the GP records did not reveal what was going on in relation to this condition. I accept that is more likely than not to be the case and given the entry from December 2024, and I accept that it is more likely than not that C6 has been treated for this muscle condition and the absence of any reference to it in her GP records is for the reason given by W. That account is further supported by the evidence that W is in receipt of disability living allowance in relation to C6, and has been since an assessment in December 2022 in which support was considered necessary because C6 required “..continual supervision right through the day to prevent danger to yourself or others”.
49. As acknowledged by Mr Ahmed in his closing submissions, I am once again limited in the findings I can make on this point. I cannot speculate about what might or might not be diagnosed in the future. My findings must be based on the evidence before me at the date of the hearing. In this respect, W is not medically qualified, but the description of C6 potentially having a “life-limiting condition” is as stark and distressing an assertion that any parent would make about their own child. W’s evidence, coupled with the GP referral from 2021, and the DLA assessment, lead me to accept that C6 is therefore being assessed for some unexplained mobility issues, which has the potential to be a serious condition, but that condition is currently under investigation and greater supervision is required in the meantime during her completion of daily tasks.
v. The Appellant’s connections with Albania
50. I found that the Appellant has lived in Albania since his birth until 2022. He has therefore spent the vast majority of his life in Albania. I found from the evidence that the Appellant undertook paid employment in Albania in the form of construction work.
51. Prior to leaving Albania, I found that the Appellant lived by himself. Although there was some ambiguity in the written evidence about the whereabouts of the Appellant’s father, I am prepared to accept, on balance, that he moved to Greece a number of years ago and the Appellant has limited contact with him. I have no reason to doubt his account that his mother passed away a number of years ago.
52. However, it is clear from the evidence that the Appellant has a sister who has 4 children of her own in Albania. It is clear that the Appellant and W have a good relationship with the Appellant’s sister as, on W’s evidence, W has permitted that sister and her husband to use W’s bank account for various transactions in Albania. The Appellant clearly continues to speak the language used in Albania and given the significant amount of time he has spent in the country and the continued contact he has with his sister, will be familiar with the culture and societal norms.
53. I found that W, C6 and W’s mother have visited the Appellant’s family in Albania. Although there is some ambiguity in the bank statements about the frequency of those visits due to the descriptions of certain transactions, I am prepared to accept, on balance, that there has only been one visit by W and C6. Nonetheless, there has been a visit and there has been subsequent contact between W and the Appellant’s family through phone calls.
Application of the Law to My Findings
54. I bring forward all my findings of fact and apply them to the law as set out above.
Article 8 Claim – The Public Interest
55. Parliament has determined through section 117C(1) of the 2002 Act that there is a public interest in the deportation of foreign criminals.
56. By virtue of the Appellant’s conviction and sentence, he is a foreign criminal for the purposes of the 2002 Act. Therefore, the public interest requires the Appellant’s deportation unless one ofe the statutory exceptions are made out (per sections 117C(3), (4) & (5) of the 2002 Act) or there are very compelling circumstances over and above those exceptions (per NA (Pakistan) v SSHD [2016] EWCA Civ 662).
Exception 1
57. The Appellant concedes that he cannot satisfy the requirements of exception 1, as provided by section 117C(4) of the 2002 Act due to him spending the majority of his life in Albania. It follows that Exception 1 is not met.
Exception 2
58. The Respondent accepts that the Appellant is in a genuine and subsisting relationship with W and has a genuine and subsisting parental relationship with C1. There is no dispute that W, C1 and C6 are British citizens, thereby enabling the Appellant to rely on this exception.
59. I need to decide whether the Appellant has a genuine and subsisting parental relationship with C6. Given my findings about the Appellant’s role in C6’s life and how she considers the Appellant to be her father, and after having regard to the Upper Tribunal’s decision in R (on the application of RK) v SSHD (s.117B(6); "parental relationship") [2016] UKUT 00031 (IAC), I have no hesitation in concluding that the Appellant has a genuine and subsisting parental relationship with C6. Even though the Appellant is not C6’s biological father, he has clearly stepped into the shoes of that role and C6 treats him as her father.
60. Consequently, the key issue to determine under this exception is whether it would be unduly harsh on W and/or either of the children for the Appellant to be deported to Albania. The Respondent accepts that it would be unduly harsh for W and the children to relocate with the Appellant to Albania, and therefore my assessment is focused on the consequences of them remaining in the UK without him (the ‘stay’ scenario).
61. The assessment of whether the Appellant’s deportation would be unduly harsh on W and/or the children necessitates an evaluation of the consequences and impact of deportation solely on W and the children. There is no balancing exercise against the severity of the Appellant’s criminal conduct (per KO (Nigeria) v SSHD [2018] UKSC 53). In HA (Iraq), Lord Hamblen identified the best approach to the unduly harsh test was to follow the guidance in KO (Nigeria):
“… ‘unduly harsh’ does not equate with uncomfortable, inconvenient, undesirable or merely difficult. Rather, it poses a considerably more elevated threshold. ‘Harsh’ in this context, denotes something severe, or bleak. It is the antithesis of pleasant or comfortable. Furthermore, the addition of the adverb ‘unduly’ raises an already elevated standard still higher.”
62. According to HA (Iraq), the underlying test is whether the level of harshness on W and the children reached the elevated threshold to outweigh the public interest –
“It recognises that the level of harshness which is “acceptable” or “justifiable” in the context of the public interest in the deportation of foreign criminals involves an “elevated” threshold or standard. It further recognises that “unduly” raises that elevated standard “still higher” – ie it involves a highly elevated threshold or standard.”
63. In considering that ‘stay’ scenario, I take into account the following findings I have reached:
(a) C1 is a 1-year-old child and is still in the very early stages of childhood development. There is no suggestion of any medical or developmental issues which are such that would give rise to the need for any additional support. By all accounts, she is a healthy, happy, little girl.
(b) C6 is a 6-year-old child who recognises the Appellant as her father. Since C6 was very young, she has had asthma and kidney problems, which have made her more susceptible to chest infections and UTIs. There are ongoing concerns about C6’s emotional development and concerns she may have autism. C6 also has mobility issues which are currently being investigated, and these issues could be serious.
(c) It would be in the best interests of C1 and C6 for the Appellant to continue to play an active part in their lives, which is best achieved by them living together as a single family unit.
(d) Although W has expressed her own concerns about her mental health, I have not found them to be of such seriousness or significance that they mean she is seriously ill or dependent on the care of the Appellant or others. W has, on her own evidence, worked previously and taken responsibility for the care of C6 both before she met the Appellant and during his time in custody. She has expressed a willingness to work but has explained she is unable to do so due to the need to juggle caring responsibilities.
(e) I have found that W has a mother, father, stepmother and grandmother who live nearby and have previously supported W. All have spoken in their written evidence about their involvement in the family unit.
64. Having considered all my findings and applied the legal tests as set out above, I do not find that it would be unduly harsh for W or the children if the Appellant were to be removed to Albania for the following reasons:
(a) First, although I have found it to be in the best interests of both children that the Appellant continues to play an active part in their lives which is best achieved through him living with them, the interests of the children are not determinative of this appeal (per [26] and [33] of ZH (Tanzania) v SSHD [2011] UKSC 4). Whilst I have no hesitation in concluding that W and the children do not want the Appellant to be removed, such a situation would not be unduly harsh upon the children. They would continue to benefit from the care of W, as C6 experienced during the first two years of her life, and during the Appellant’s time in custody. W has the benefit of a family network within her local community that consists of her parents, stepmother and grandparents. Even after accepting that relations may be strained between W and her mother, W’s own evidence is that her mother continues to want to have contact with the children. It is clear on the evidence before me that W’s family stepped in to provide considerable support prior to the Appellant and W beginning their relationship, and during the Appellant’s time in custody. I see no reason in the evidence before me why that support would not be forthcoming should the Appellant be returned to Albania.
(b) Second, although I have found that C6 has a number of medical problems, I did not find on the evidence before me that the Appellant’s presence is integral to those medical problems being treated, or that his absence would be unduly harsh on her. C6 exhibited many of the medical problems she currently experiences prior to the Appellant and W starting their relationship and during the Appellant’s time in custody, and there is nothing in the evidence which suggests to me that W was unable to manage those problems during those periods. The evidence before me shows that she regularly engaged with healthcare services and had the support and assistance of family members, and further, was able to hold down employment whilst C6’s medical problems persisted. Although I have found there to be some concerns about C6’s other medical problems, I have found them to be just that: concerns. As noted in HA (Iraq) at [98], I must base my conclusions on the evidence before me, and not engage in speculation or conjecture about what might or might not happen in the future.
(c) Third, although I accept there is now a factual difference through the arrival of C1, I do not find that this would mean C6’s medical problems, as I have found them to be on the evidence currently available, would be neglected or deteriorate in a manner which would amount to a situation that equates to being unduly harsh. I fully accept that C6 will be distressed by the separation from the Appellant, but I do not find on the evidence before me that this distress would reach that elevated threshold of being “unduly harsh”.
(d) Fourth, I accept it will clearly cause W difficulty in continuing her relationship with the Appellant – any continuation of that relationship will be confined to visits and through technology. However, W and the Appellant began their relationship after the Appellant entered the UK and did not have any formal leave to remain. They married after he was issued with a deportation order. It cannot be said, in my judgment, that W could not have anticipated this outcome when she continued her relationship with the Appellant: she went into that relationship with her eyes open as to the potential consequences. I fully accept that such a relationship would be undesirable, inconvenient, and potentially even bleak. However, I do not find it to reach that elevated threshold of being unduly harsh, which is the test I must apply.
(e) Fifth, although W remarked in her evidence that the Appellant’s removal would lead to her ending up “being a single mother”, there is no suggestion that W would lose her home if the Appellant returned to Albania. I see no reason why W would be unable to continue financially supporting herself and her children, as she has done to date, following the Appellant’s return. The Appellant has never been in paid employment in the UK, and W’s income (either through employment or benefits or both) has therefore been capable of supporting the family unit throughout the past 4 years. That might have been challenging for W, but those financial difficulties do not give rise to any undue harshness for W.
65. In conclusion, my focus in applying Exception 2 is on W and the children, both individually and cumulatively. In doing so, I accept that the Appellant’s deportation would cause hardship, disruption and upset for W, and the children. I have no doubt that W and the Appellant would prefer to remain in the UK and their aspiration is to continue doing so.
66. However, whilst I can find that this is a case where the Appellant’s deportation will cause a degree of difficulty for W and the children and may even be considered “harsh”, I am unable to find based on the evidence that it reaches that elevated threshold of being unduly harsh on either W or the children.
Very compelling circumstances
67. I now turn to the question of whether there are “very compelling circumstances, over and above those described in Exceptions 1 and 2”. In assessing this question, I remind myself of the factors set out in HA (Iraq)and the framework set out in section 117C of the 2002 Act.
68. In assessing the competing factors, I take into account the following factors in favour of the public interest:
(a) As a starting point, there is a public interest in the deportation of foreign criminals. However, there is a greater public interest in deportation in relation to more serious offences. In this regard, I recognise that the sentence imposed in this case was at the lower end of the scale to fall within the definition of “foreign criminal” in the 2002 Act and therefore whilst the public interest is elevated, it is not significant, albeit one still comfortably falling within the framework provided by section 117C of the 2002 Act.
(b) As noted in OH (Serbia) v SSHD [2008] EWCA Civ 694, there is a need to deter foreign nationals from committing offences in the UK.
(c) There is (per Underhill LJ in Zulfiqar v SSHD [2022] EWCA Civ 492) the need to maintain public confidence in the system of deportation.
(d) The Appellant entered the UK illegally in 2022 and has lacked any formal leave or permission to remain ever since. His relationship with W began and has subsisted during a time when he lacked any formal leave to remain.
69. There is no evidence that the Appellant has offended since the conviction and sentence that led to the deportation proceedings. This would tend to suggest he has been rehabilitated, though no material weight can be attached to that in any event because it is expected that people should not commit crimes.
70. I also take into account the following factors in the Appellant’s favour:
(a) The Appellant has a family life in the UK with W and his two children, albeit that family life began and has continued during a time when the Appellant has lacked any form of leave to remain in the UK;
(b) It is in the best interests of the two children that the Appellant remains in the UK, and the Appellant’s return would be particularly difficult for C6 given the current concerns about her health;
(c) Although I have found that the Appellant’s removal would be difficult and may even be considered “harsh” upon W and the children, I have not found that the Appellant has demonstrated on the evidence before me that the impact would cross that threshold in being unduly harsh upon either W or the children.
71. In conclusion, I recognise that the Appellant has been in the UK for a relatively short period. I did not find on the evidence before me that there would be very significant obstacles to any reintegration into Albania given that the Appellant has spent the majority of his life in the country, is familiar with the culture and societal norms, and continues to have contact with family in the country. I also acknowledge he has a relationship with W and their children, who are British citizens. I have found that W and C6 have previously visited Albania, and although concerns were expressed about C6’s ability to undertake a future visit on account of her health, I did not find evidence before me to suggest that such a visit would not be possible on health grounds.
72. I have found that the children’s best interests can be safeguarded notwithstanding the Appellant’s removal. I have found that the Appellant’s deportation would not be unduly harsh on either W or the children for the reasons already outlined, and further that the Appellant would not face any real obstacle to reintegrating in Albania.
73. I accept the Appellant’s deportation would be difficult for him and W. However, this is not a case where the circumstances of the Appellant, W or the children outweigh the public interest in the Appellant’s deportation.
Decision
74. I therefore conclude that the Appellant’s deportation is proportionate in all the circumstances.
75. The Article 8 appeal must therefore be dismissed.
TO THE RESPONDENT
FEE AWARD
I have dismissed the appeal and therefore there can be no fee award.
Signed Date 9 November 2026
Judge McMahon
Judge McMahon
Judge of the First-tier Tribunal
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