Administrative United Kingdom
AA v The Secretary of State for the Home Department
First-tier Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Appeal Number: PA/80094/2025
THE IMMIGRATION ACTS
Heard at Manchester
On 23rd October 2026
Before
first-tier tribunal JUDGE hollings-tennant
Between
AA
(anonymity order Made)
Appellant
and
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent
Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Gul, instructed by Kalsi Legal Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr Royle, Home Office Presenting Officer
DECISION AND REASONS
1. The Appellant is a citizen of Somalia. He appeals under section 82(1) of the Nationality, Immigration, and Asylum Act 2002 (‘the 2002 Act’) against the Respondent’s decision to refuse his claim for international protection lodged on 21st April 2025. His appeal is brought on grounds that his removal would breach the United Kingdom’s obligations under the Refugee Convention and is unlawful under section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998.
2. I have considered whether it is appropriate to make an anonymity order, bearing in mind the importance of the principle of open justice. I have decided to do so because this case involves matters relating to international protection and the importance of fulfilling the United Kingdom’s obligations under the Refugee Convention outweighs the principle of open justice.
BACKGROUND
3. The background to this appeal is set out in documentation contained on MyHMCTS, with relevant evidence included in a consolidated bundle of [170] pages and a separate bundle of [4] pages. The Appellant left Somalia towards the end of January 2024 and travelled by lorry to Ethiopia. From there, he travelled to Sudan and then to Libya. In March 2025, he went to Italy by boat and stayed there for two weeks before boarding a train to France. He entered the United Kingdom illegally by boat on 21st April 2025 and claimed asylum on arrival. The Respondent refused that claim by way of a decision dated 4th July 2025. That refusal is the subject of this appeal.
The Appellant’s claim
4. The Appellant claims to be a Somali citizen from Buq Aqable, in the Hiran region of Somalia. He moved to Jowhar for work but returned briefly to Buq Aqable in January 2024 to work in his mother’s shop whilst she was unwell. He claims that Al Shabaab approached him and said they knew who he was and where he was from. He returned to Jowhar on 27th January after his mother’s health had improved but on the day he left facilities belonging to Al Shabaab were targeted by government forces. The Appellant says he was informed by a work colleague that Al Shabaab came to his mother’s home after the bombing and told her they believed he was working with the government before detaining her. He was also told that two unknown men visited his workplace in Jowhar so he left Somalia. The Appellant fears he will be targeted and killed by Al-Shabaab on return because he is perceived as a spy.
The Respondent’s case
5. The Respondent accepts the Appellant is a Somali citizen but does not accept he came to the attention of Al Shabaab as claimed. In her reasons for refusal letter (RFRL), the Respondent argues the Appellant’s evidence is inconsistent and lacking in detail. It is argued he has been inconsistent and vague in his account as to why he believes Al Shabaab accused him of spying for the government, how he came to be aware of such accusations and regarding threats said to have been received. Reliance is also placed on section 8 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc) Act 2004 because the Appellant travelled through Italy and France on his journey to the United Kingdom but failed to claim asylum in a first safe country.
6. The Respondent argues the police in Somalia are generally willing and able to provide effective state protection against non-state actors, including Al Shabaab. Reference is made to country background evidence that the police and the Somali National Army (SNA) have launched recruitment drives to increase capacity and continue to form a successful safety buffer around Mogadishu despite ongoing attacks by Al Shabaab. It is also argued the Appellant can safely relocate to Mogadishu, Hargeisa or Las Anod because there is said to be insufficient evidence to demonstrate it is reasonably likely that Al-Shabaab would be able to locate him throughout the country and it is not unreasonable to expect him to do so. Reliance is placed on findings in MOJ & Ors (return to Mogadishu) Somalia CG [2014] UKUT 442, to support the contention that the general security and humanitarian situation in Mogadishu does not give rise to a real risk of serious harm so as to engage Article 15(C) of the European Qualification Directive, as reflected in paragraph 339C of the Immigration Rules.
HEARING
7. The hearing took place by way of a hybrid hearing with the Appellant and both legal representatives attending in person and a Court appointed Somali language interpreter dialling in by remote means using Cloud Video Platform (CVP). There were no technical issues arising during proceedings and neither party raised any concerns about the remote aspect of the hearing. The hearing was recorded by the Tribunal and that shall stand as the record of proceedings. As a preliminary matter at the start of the hearing, I confirmed with the parties that all necessary documentary evidence was included in the bundles uploaded and discussed the issues to be decided.
8. Mr Gul made a formal application to adduce late evidence amounting to a four page bundle. He explained that a document was provided by the Appellant on 21st October 2026 and arrangements were made immediately for an urgent translation. Mr Royle raised no specific objections and confirmed he had sufficient time to consider the late evidence. In the circumstances, I decided it was in the interests of justice to admit the additional bundle given this appeal involves matters relating to international protection, the document is of direct relevance to the issues in dispute and there is no prejudice to the Respondent. During preliminary discussions, both parties agreed the key issues are whether the Appellant was accused of spying as claimed and, if so, whether there is effective state protection available to him or a viable internal relocation option.
Issues in dispute
9. As such, it was agreed with the parties at the start of the hearing that the following principal disputed issues fall to be decided by the Tribunal:
(i) whether the Appellant has given a credible account as to the reasons why he came to the adverse attention of Al Shabaab such that gives rise to a well-founded fear of treatment amounting to persecution on return to Buq Aqable;
(ii) if so, whether there is effective state protection available to the Appellant in Somalia or a safe and reasonable internal relocation alternative.
Evidence and submissions
10. Thereafter, I heard oral evidence from the Appellant, who gave his evidence in Somali through the interpreter having confirmed he fully understood the interpreter. I then heard submissions from the legal representatives before reserving my decision. In his submissions, Mr Gul referred to a concession set out in the Respondent’s review (at paragraph [23]) that state protection and internal relocation would not be available to the Appellant if his account is found to be credible. It is unfortunate this was not raised during preliminary discussions. Nevertheless, I invited Mr Royle to address me on the matter. He simply maintained his position that state protection is available and internal relocation viable, though gave no reasons as to why the concession was made.
11. In considering this issue, I take into account guidance in MH (Appendix EU; withdrawal of concession) Albania [2025] UKUT 351, in which the Tribunal made clear there must be good reasons for permitting a party to withdraw a concession and there is a procedural duty upon that party to clearly and expeditiously apply for permission setting out the reasons and clearly articulating why the concession was made, why it is wrong and the extent of any prejudice. There was no such application in this case and on the evidence before me it appears Mr Royle simply took a different view to that taken by the caseworker conducting the review. On the other hand, I consider the extent of any prejudice is limited because the Appellant’s skeleton argument explicitly cites state protection and internal relocation as issues to be decided and addresses both matters. Nevertheless, there is a need for procedural rigour and in the absence of any explanation as to why the concession was made and why it is wrong, I find there are insufficient reasons to permit the withdrawal of such. However, for purposes of completion, I have considered both issues in my findings below.
12. I am grateful to Mr Gul and Mr Royle for their assistance and I have taken note of all relevant documentary evidence presented, the oral evidence from the Appellant and submissions on behalf of the Appellant and the Respondent, which are contained in the record of proceedings.
LEGAL FRAMEWORK
13. To succeed in an appeal on asylum grounds, the Appellant must establish he is a refugee as defined in Article 1(A) of the Refugee Convention. The burden of proof rests on the Appellant. Given his asylum claim was lodged after 28th June 2022, I must apply a two-stage test pursuant to section 32 of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 (‘the 2022 Act’). I must first determine the following matters on the balance of probabilities:
(a) whether the Appellant has a characteristic which could cause him to fear persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, political opinion (or has such a characteristic attributed to him by an actor of persecution); and
(b) whether he does in fact fear persecution in Somalia as a result of that characteristic.
14. If I am satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the Appellant does have such a characteristic and fears persecution as a result, I must determine whether, applying the lower standard of proof, there is a reasonable degree of likelihood that he would face persecution for a Refugee Convention reason, there would not be effective state protection available to him and he could not safely relocate to another part of Somalia.
15. If I am not satisfied the Appellant is a refugee, I must consider whether he meets the requirements for humanitarian protection under paragraph 339C of the Immigration Rules. To qualify, he must show there are substantial grounds for believing he faces a real risk of serious harm in Somalia and is unable or, owing to such risk, unwilling to avail himself of state protection there. I must consider whether the decision to refuse, and as a consequence of that decision his removal to Somalia, breaches his human rights on grounds that he faces a real risk of inhuman or degrading treatment contrary to Articles 2 and 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (‘the ECHR’).
FINDINGS
16. In coming to a decision in this appeal, I have taken into account all relevant evidence adduced. I have referred in my findings to material aspects of the claim and considered all the evidence in the round, applying the relevant standard of proof, that of a balance of probabilities, when assessing whether the Appellant genuinely fears persecution and the lower standard of proof, that of a reasonable degree of likelihood, when considering whether he would face persecution on return. Any absence of a reference to a particular piece of evidence should not be taken to mean I have not considered that evidence before reaching my decision.
17. In assessing the Appellant’s credibility, I have given full consideration to the guidance provided in KB & AH (credibility-structured approach) Pakistan [2017] UKUT 491, in which it was made clear that indicators such as sufficiency of detail, internal consistency, external consistency and plausibility provide a helpful framework within which to conduct a credibility assessment. I have also taken into account relevant country guidance in MOJ & Ors and OA (Somalia) [2022] UKUT 33.
Issue (i) – was the Appellant targeted by Al-Shabaab?
18. I turn first to the question as to whether the Appellant has a characteristic (or would have such a characteristic attributed to him), which could cause him to fear persecution under section 32(2)(a) of the 2022 Act. Following JCK (s.32 NABA 2022) (Botswana) [2024] UKUT 100, this question is to be considered taking the claim at its highest. Plainly, if the Appellant was targeted by Al-Shabaab because they suspected him of being a spy or informant for the Somali government, this could cause him to fear persecution due to an imputed political opinion. The nature of his claim brings him within the scope of the Refugee Convention, as acknowledged by the Respondent in her RFRL and review of that decision.
19. The second question under section 32(2)(b) of the 2022 Act is whether the Appellant does in fact fear persecution as a result of that characteristic (the ‘subjective fear test’). In considering whether the Appellant has a genuine fear on account of an imputed political opinion, his account of events leading up to his departure from Somalia and relevant country background material is of relevance. Having considered the evidence presented before me, I find he has provided sufficient evidence to discharge the burden of proof upon him to establish he holds a genuine subjective fear of being killed by Al-Shabaab for the reasons advanced. I have reached this conclusion for the reasons set out in paragraphs [20] to [31] below.
20. First, the Appellant’s account of having been targeted as a perceived spy or informant is broadly consistent with relevant country background evidence. The Home Office Country Policy and Information Note (CPIN) on Al Shabaab and the security situation in Mogadishu, published in June 2025, states the group targets people who support or are perceived to support the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) and remains the primary militant group seeking to establish an Islamic state across the country (see sections [3.1.2] and [3.1.3]). Al Shabaab continue to represent the main threat to peace and security in south and central Somalia, including in Mogadishu. In light of such evidence, I consider it is plausible that the Appellant would be targeted if Al Shabaab had reason to believe he was a spy or an informant.
21. In her RFRL, the Respondent also refers to background evidence relating to operations by the Somali National Army against Al Shabaab facilities in Buq Aqable. Whilst the article is dated 18th August 2023, there is reference to a campaign against Al Shabaab gaining momentum in the Hiran region. The Appellant’s claim that there was a strike against Al Shabaab close to his mother’s shop in Buq Aqable is broadly consistent with the background evidence demonstrating that the Somali National army have attacked facilities in that area. This is capable of carrying some weight in the Appellant’s favour, though there is no specific country evidence before me to establish a strike took place in January 2024 and I take into account that the Appellant is likely to have a general awareness of events in the area even if he was not directly targeted himself as claimed.
22. I find that the Appellant has provided a broadly coherent and consistent account of the incident which gave rise to him fleeing Somalia in January 2024, particularly when his evidence is considered in light of his profile as a young man with a limited education from a rural area. I also take into account his unchallenged evidence that he is a victim of modern slavery, having been forced to work by smugglers whilst travelling through Libya (screening interview, question [2.5]). In his screening interview, the Appellant says he was accused of being an informant following government air strikes on Al Shabaab in the area and refers to militants having visited his family home and taken his mother (at question [4.1]). During his substantive interview, he gave more detail relating to these incidents in response to questions asked of him and has also provided a witness statement in which he explains why he believes Al Shabaab targeted him. In oral evidence, I found the Appellant to be a broadly credible witness who gave candid replies to questions put to him during cross-examination relating to core aspects of his claim. As such, I find I can place considerable weight on his oral and written testimony.
23. The Respondent argues the Appellant has given inconsistent evidence as to why Al Shabaab accused him of spying for the Somali government. I do not agree with this contention. He cannot be expected to know for certain why militants came to suspect him of being an informant. His evidence is that he came back to Buq Aqable from Jowhar to help his mother run her shop whilst she was not feeling well and left on the day of an air strike close to that location. He subsequently heard from a neighbour that Al Shabaab came to the house, accused him of spying and took her with them. Whilst his assertion that he came under suspicion because he arrived from a government controlled area several days prior to the bombing and left just before the attack after closing a shop in close proximity earlier than usual is necessarily speculative, it is not an unreasonable inference to draw if events occurred as claimed and I consider his evidence in this regard cannot reasonably be regarded as inconsistent.
24. The Respondent also argues it is implausible that Al Shabaab would have been aware as to when the Appellant left Buq Aqable so as to give rise to suspicion. However, it seems to me that his movements in returning home, opening and closing his mother’s shop on a daily basis and subsequently leaving the area are likely to have been noticed by locals in that area. Even if Al Shabaab militants were themselves unaware of his presence, I take into account relevant country background evidence that the group maintains a network of informants (see CPIN on Al Shabaab and the security situation, sections [3.1.2] and [9.4.5]). When his evidence is properly assessed in the context of the modus operandi of Al Shabaab, the area in which the attack is said to have taken place and the prevailing security situation, I find it is plausible that militants noticed his movements directly or were informed of such by local sympathisers after the incident.
25. In his closing submissions, Mr Royle argued the Appellant’s account is inconsistent as to whether he had any contact with Al Shabaab prior to the incident. This assertion is based on the Appellant’s answer to question [63] of his interview. When asked whether he had any other contact with Al Shabaab before the incident he said no, whereas in oral evidence he referred to having been approached at the shop. However, he did mention such contact earlier in the same interview, referring to a man coming into the shop whose job was to exert control and collect money from local businesses (Asylum Interview Record (AIR), questions [50] to [52]). Having made reference to this, I do not consider his response to a later question asking about any other[my emphasis] contact with Al Shabaab can properly be regarded as inconsistent with his oral evidence.
26. The Respondent argues the Appellant’s evidence is inconsistent as to how he found out he had been accused of being an informant and his mother’s abduction. First, the points raised at paragraph [12] of the Respondent’s RFRL are not in fact discrepancies at all on a proper analysis of the evidence to which that paragraph refers. He has been consistent in his evidence that he received a call from a neighbour who informed him about the raid on his family home, that he was accused of spying and that his mother was beaten and taken by Al Shabaab. His answer to question [86], in which he refers to receiving a direct call after the incident, does not contradict his evidence as to how he came to be aware of the accusations levelled against him. Further, whilst he does not explicitly refer to a neighbour in his screening interview, I take into account he was asked to briefly explain the reasons why he left Somalia.
27. In her review, the Respondent argues that the Appellant’s evidence with regards to his mother’s cause of death is inconsistent. In his witness statement, he does say that she died due to injuries inflicted by Al Shabaab (at paragraph [4]) whereas in both his screening and substantive asylum interviews he is less certain, saying he thinks this is the case but she also suffered from diabetes and may not have had access to suitable medication in detention (screening, question [4.1]; AIR, question [91]). In oral evidence, he said he thinks she died due to a combination of injuries sustained and uncontrolled diabetes. In fairness, the Appellant’s evidence about his mother’s death is based on what he was told by his neighbour and later his aunt. In the circumstances described, he cannot be expected to know for certain whether she died of injuries sustained or a lack of access to medication for her medical condition. Further, if events unfolded as claimed she may well have died as a result of both factors, with Al Shabaab unlikely to have shown sufficient concern for her welfare so as to provide her with medication.
28. The Appellant’s oral evidence that he found out his mother had been killed when his aunt called him at the border with Ethiopia does not sit well with his earlier assertion, as recorded in the interview transcript, that he reported her death to the local police before he decided to leave the country (AIR, question [92]). When this was put to him in cross-examination, he said he had referred in interview to having reported his mother had been beaten and taken away by Al Shabaab. As Mr Royle pointed out, there is no evidence to suggest the Appellant or his legal representative sought to make any amendments to the interview transcript and instead he relies on interpreter error when the apparent discrepancy was highlighted. On the other hand, the point was not taken against him in the Respondent’s review and the Appellant does refer in his witness statement to having reported his mother’s abduction, rather than her murder, and the threatening call he received to the police in Jowhar (at paragraph [4]).
29. The Appellant seeks to rely on a letter said to be from the commander at Jowhar Police Station, who confirms the Appellant reported having received threats via telephone call from Al Shabaab. In accordance with Tanveer Ahmed [2002] UKIAT 439, he must show this document can be relied upon. First, there is no documentary evidence to establish the provenance of this document. In oral evidence, the Appellant says he received it from a friend via a WhatsApp message but he has not provided copies of the messages exchanged or any evidence from his friend. Whilst the Appellant may not have fully appreciated the significance of such documentary evidence, he has had the benefit of competent legal representation. It is also of some significance that the document was uploaded just one day prior to the hearing, despite his oral evidence that he received it in March 2026. I find these factors undermine the extent to which I can place any weight on the document as corroborative of the Appellant’s claim.
30. I also have some concerns about the contents of the document itself. Whilst there is reference to threats having been made, the author makes no reference whatsoever to the fact the Appellant’s mother was beaten and abducted by Al Shabaab, despite his evidence that he reported this to police. Whilst I accept Mr Gul’s submission that the Appellant cannot be expected to explain the omission, the lack of any reference to his mother does not assist him in establishing this document is reliable, particularly given the reference to ‘thorough investigations’ having been carried out, which would surely have led to police discovering the Appellant’s mother had been killed. Mr Gul was also unable to assist as to why a document said to be from a Somali police station would have a logo and header in the English language alongside both Arabic and Somali text. I find I can place no weight on this document as corroborative of the Appellant’s claim.
31. I must also have regard to section 8 of the 2004 Act. By his own account, the Appellant travelled through Italy and then France on his way to the United Kingdom. He plainly ought to have claimed asylum in the first safe country rather than risking his life to enter this country illegally. Whilst I take into account his evidence that it was difficult for him in France because he had no accommodation (AIR, question [135]) and his assertion that he tried to claim there (screening, question [3.6]), I find he has failed to provide an adequate explanation for failing to pursue a claim in Italy or France. However, it is noteworthy that whilst Mr Royle sought to argue this damages the Appellant’s general credibility, this was not the position taken in the Respondent’s RFRL in which the decision-maker states explicitly that whilst section 8 behaviours are present these are not taken to damage the Appellant’s credibility (see paragraph [17]). It is unclear why Mr Royle resiled from that concession. On balance, I do not consider the Appellant’s failure to claim in a first safe country undermines his credibility to any significant extent.
32. The next question, under section 32(4)(a) of the 2002 Act, is whether or not there is a reasonable degree of likelihood that the Appellant will face treatment amounting to persecution on return to Buq Aqable now. There is perhaps a question as to whether Al Shabaab are likely to identify the Appellant as a person of adverse interest based on one incident which took place in January 2024, bearing in mind he has no links to the Federal government or its allies, the security forces or international organisations. However, I have found he was perceived to be an informant and held to be responsible for an air strike on Al Shabaab facilities near his mother’s shop. In the circumstances, I find it is at least reasonably likely that Al Shabaab would target him again if he returns to Buq Aqable given relevant background evidence indicating that Al Shabaab targets people who are perceived to support the government.
Issue (ii) – state protection or internal relocation
33. It is not strictly necessary for me to consider these issues given the Respondent’s explicit concession as set out at paragraph [23] of her review (see consolidated bundle, page [170]) and my findings on the matter of withdrawing that concession (at paragraph [11] above). However, for purposes of completion I will briefly address both factors. My findings set out below are ‘in the alternative’ findings based on the concession either not having been made at all or accepted as having been withdrawn at the hearing.
34. Whilst I accept the Appellant has a genuine and well-founded fear of returning to Buq Aqable, he must also establish there is no effective state protection available to him there, in accordance with sections 32(4)(b) and 34 of the 2022 Act. In considering this issue, I first note the principles set out in Horvath [2000] UKHL 37. It is the duty of the home state to provide effective protection but if that system is lacking, international protection is available as a substitute. However, no state in the world can achieve complete protection against isolated or random attacks by non-state agents. The relevant standard is therefore not that which eliminates all risk or provides guarantees of protection but rather a practical standard that takes into account the duty a state owes to its citizens (see also Bagdanavicius [2005] EWCA Civ 1605).
35. In her RFRL, the Respondent argues that the police in Somalia are generally willing and able to provide protection against non-state actors, including Al Shabaab, though her review understandably does not engage with this issue given the concession made therein. Whilst the decision-maker refers to relevant country information, there is no indication they considered the CPIN on Al Shabaab and the security situation when assessing the extent to which state protection is likely to be available. Sections [4.1.1] and [4.1.2] of that Home Office document concludes that a person who has a well-founded fear of persecution or serious harm at the hands of Al Shabaab is unlikely to be able to obtain protection because whilst the state may be willing it is unable to offer effective protection, even in Mogadishu.
36. Further, the background evidence indicates that Al Shabaab maintains a presence and has the capacity to conduct operations throughout most of Somalia, despite efforts by security forces to eradicate the group. The CPIN refers to an Al-Shabaab offensive in Hiran and Middle Shabelle in March 2025 (section [9.2.7]) and includes maps depicting areas under Al Shabaab control as of 31st March 2025 and showing the group’s territorial gains since January 2025 (sections [11.1.5] and [11.1.6]), though it is unclear whether Buq Aqable falls under their direct control. Neither party referred me to any country information as to the current security situation in south and central Somalia, though it is sufficiently clear the area remains highly volatile and there continues to be targeted and indiscriminate attacks by Al Shabaab.
37. Having considered the evidence presented, I find that it is at least reasonably likely the Appellant would not be afforded effective state protection in Buq Aqable against any further reprisals from Al Shabaab in that area. Whilst the Somali government are willing and currently engaged in armed conflict with the group, the evidence indicates their capacity to protect civilians who have been directly threatened is limited, particularly outside Mogadishu and in areas under Al Shabaab control. In the circumstances, I find the Appellant cannot be expected to return to Buq Aqable and instead the question arises as to whether there is a viable internal relocation alternative.
Internal relocation
38. To qualify for international protection, the Appellant must also show he cannot relocate to another area of Somalia in which he would not face persecution or serious harm, or where there is a place of safety, that it would be unreasonable to expect him to do so given his personal circumstances. This is reflected in section 35 of the 2022 Act and paragraph 339O of the Immigration Rules. In her RFRL, the Respondent argues the Appellant can relocate within Somalia and this would not be unreasonable or unduly harsh. In assessing this issue, I have undertaken an holistic assessment of all relevant factors, both individually and cumulatively, applying relevant guidance in Januzi [2006] UKHL 5 and AS (Afghanistan) [2019] EWCA Civ 873.
39. Given my findings of fact as set out above, that the Appellant has a well-founded fear of being targeted by Al Shabaab as a perceived informant, there is first a question as to whether he can safely relocate to Mogadishu or elsewhere within Somalia. It is noteworthy that the CPIN on Al Shabaab and the security situation states that a person is likely to be able to relocate if they are not able to demonstrate risk from Al Shabaab (see section [5.1.1]). This does not apply to this Appellant, who has established such risk to the requisite evidential standard, at least in his home area. Whilst I consider he is less likely to be identified as a person of adverse interest in Mogadishu, bearing in mind he did not actually work with the government, security forces or international organisations, there is nevertheless an element of risk, albeit somewhat reduced when compared with the level of risk in Buq Aqable, given relevant background evidence that Al Shabaab is able to infiltrate Mogadishu and maintains a network of informants and members there (CPIN, section [3.1.2]). As the group actively targeted him in Buq Aqable, and there is some evidence to suggest they visited his place of work in Jowhar, I find there is a risk he would be identified as a person of adverse interest sooner or later, applying the lower standard of proof.
40. Even if I am wrong about that and he would not be identified as an informant on return to Mogadishu or other areas within Somalia, there is a question as to whether it would be reasonable to expect the Appellant to relocate. In MOJ & Ors, the Tribunal found that ordinary civilians returning to Mogadishu will in general face no real risk of serious harm. It was also found there has been durable change in the sense that Al Shabaab no longer have a presence in the city, there is no real prospect of a re-established presence, and the level of civilian casualties does not give rise to a real risk of indiscriminate violence such that engages Article 15(C) of the European Qualification Directive (reflected in paragraph 339C of the Immigration Rules). In OA (Somalia), the Tribunal considered background country information up to May 2021 and concluded the guidance at paragraph [407] of MOJ & Ors remained applicable at that time.
41. The most recent CPIN on Al Shabaab and the security situation in Mogadishu refers to evidence of continued targeted attacks by Al Shabaab against government officials, security forces and international personnel, with ongoing armed conflict in the Lower Shabelle region continuing to give rise to civilian deaths, injuries and displacement, though there is insufficient evidence to justify departure from extant country guidance. The threat has been ever present for some time but I find the evidence does not establish this has reached a level of indiscriminate violence in Mogadishu so as to engage Article 15(C). However, there is some evidence of a deepening humanitarian crisis since OA (Somalia) was decided. Background country information refers to civilians continuing to bear the brunt of devastating conflict and floods, erratic rainfall an disease combining to cause massive internal displacement, a dire humanitarian crisis and acute food insecurity (see Amnesty International report 2024, consolidated bundle, pages [87] to [90]). It is in the context of the prevailing security and humanitarian situation at the date of hearing that I must consider whether internal relocation is reasonable in the Appellant’s particular circumstances.
42. Whilst the Appellant is a young man of working age who benefitted from at least some education, he would be returning to a city in which he has no lived experience, and has never visited, during a period of significant uncertainty and ongoing humanitarian crisis. His evidence that he has no family members or other connections in Mogadishu was not challenged by the Respondent and there is no suggestion that the Appellant can rely on remittances from abroad. In MOJ & Ors, the Tribunal noted a person returning to Mogadishu after a period of absence will look to their nuclear family for assistance in re-establishing themselves and securing a livelihood. I find that the lack of any meaningful support for this Appellant in Mogadishu or elsewhere in Somalia is likely to give rise to considerable difficulties to integration in an unfamiliar area, though I take into account he previously moved from Buq Aqable to Jowhar for work, has some work experience there and can take advantage of the financial support offered through the voluntary returns scheme. Nevertheless, the combination of him being unfamiliar with the area and the prevailing humanitarian situation and food crisis, are factors likely to give rise to considerable challenges in finding work and making a living for himself.
43. I take into account that in OA (Somalia), the Tribunal found Somali culture is such that family and social links are extensive and social ties very tight. A returnee with family and diaspora links is unlikely to be more than a small number of degrees of separation away from establishing contact with a member of their clan or extended family in Mogadishu through friends of friends, if not direct contact. However, it is of some relevance that the Appellant claims he did not know his father and therefore does not know his clan status, which is patrilineal (see AIR, questions [17] to [19]). Given clan identity is a prominent aspect of Somali culture, it seems unusual that a citizen would not be aware of the clan to which they belong, though it is plausible if the Appellant was conceived outside of marriage and never met his father. He has been consistent in his evidence in this regard, referring to such matters in both his screening and substantive interviews and it is noteworthy he was not asked any questions about this aspect of his claim during cross-examination. Whilst there is insufficient evidence to suggest he would face significant discrimination as a result of this factor, I find it is at least reasonably likely he would not be able to secure meaningful clan support.
44. Overall, I find the Appellant has established it is unduly harsh to expect him to relocate to Mogadishu or elsewhere in Somalia. I have reached that conclusion based on the cumulative effect of several factors weighing in his favour, the fact that there is an element of risk that he may be identified by Al Shabaab as an informant, the lack of any family or meaningful ties in the proposed areas of relocation, the fact that he would be returning to an area experiencing significant humanitarian issues and cannot rely on remittances from abroad. In the circumstances, I find it would be unreasonable to expect him to relocate within Somalia.
Application of the law to the facts
45. Having considered all the evidence presented in the round to the appropriate standard of proof, that of a balance of probabilities when assessing whether the Appellant holds a genuine fear of persecution for a Refugee Convention reason, and applying the lower standard to the assessment of risk, I find that the Appellant is a broadly credible witness who has provided sufficient evidence to establish he was targeted by Al Shabaab as a perceived informant and as a consequence he faces a real risk of being subjected to treatment amounting to persecution or serious harm on return to Buq Aqable.
46. Further, I find that whilst the relevant state authorities are willing to protect citizens and the Somali National Army are actively engaged in armed conflict with Al Shabaab, they are at present unable to offer effective protection for those who have been directly threatened by the group and face a real risk of being targeted on return. I also find that internal relocation to Mogadishu or elsewhere within Somalia is not a viable option as there remains a risk from Al Shabaab throughout the country and, in any event, this would be unreasonable given the Appellant’s personal characteristics and in light of the prevailing security and humanitarian situation. In the circumstances, his appeal on asylum grounds falls to be allowed.
NOTICE OF DECISION
I allow the appeal on asylum and human rights grounds.
TO THE RESPONDENT
FEE AWARD
No fee was paid therefore there can be no fee award.
Signed: D. Hollings-Tennant Date: 4th November 2026
First-tier Tribunal Judge Hollings-Tennant
ANONYMITY ORDER
Unless and until the Tribunal, the Upper Tribunal, or, a Court orders otherwise, pursuant to Rule 13(1)(b) of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Rules 2014, the Appellants are granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal either directly or indirectly any information, including their name or address, that is likely to lead members of the public to identify him. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of Court.
This order does not restrict disclosure of information relating to this appeal to law enforcement or regulatory agencies, the Bar Council, the Solicitors Regulatory Authority, the Law Society, the Immigration Advice Authority, or where disclosure is otherwise required by law.
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Official sources: view the source page
Open Justice Licence (The National Archives).