Commercial United Kingdom
AIB Group (UK) Plc v Derek Arthur Richardson
Neutral Citation Number: [2026] EWHC 2788 (Comm)
Case No: LM-2025-000174
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
BUSINESS AND PROPERTY COURTS
LONDON CIRCUIT COMMERCIAL COURT
Royal Courts of Justice, Rolls Building
Fetter Lane, London, EC4A 1NL
Date: 29 October 2026
Before :
SHARIF A. SHIVJI K.C.
sitting as a Deputy Judge of the High Court
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Between :
| AIB GROUP (UK) PLC | Claimant / Applicant | |
| – and – | ||
| DEREK ARTHUR RICHARDSON | Defendant / Respondent |
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– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –
Pia Dutton (instructed by TLT LLP) for the Claimant / Applicant
Tim Benham-Mirando (instructed by Standley & Co) for the Defendant / Respondent
Hearing date: 30 June 2026
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JUDGMENT
This judgment was handed down by the Judge remotely by circulation to the parties' representatives by email and release to The National Archives. The date and time for hand-down is deemed to be 10:30 on Thursday 29 October 2026.
Sharif Shivji K.C. :
A. Introduction
1. This is an application by AIB Group (UK) Plc (“AIB” / the “Bank”) for summary dismissal of Mr Richardson’s Defence and Counterclaim to AIB’s claim for debts due under a personal guarantee and indemnity dated 29 October 2018 (the “Guarantee”). AIB’s position is that the Defendant’s Defence and Counterclaim, taken at its highest, discloses no reasonable grounds for defending the claim and / or has no real prospect of success, nor is there any other compelling reason why the matter should proceed to trial: CPR 3.4(2) and/or 24.3.
2. AIB was represented by Ms Dutton and Mr Richardson was represented by Mr Benham-Mirando. I am grateful to both counsel for the clarity with which they presented the case.
B. The Ownership of Wasps Holding Limited
3. This litigation relates to the ownership and financing of Wasps Rugby Football Club, which at the relevant time was owned by Wasps Holding Limited (“WHL”).
4. The Defendant alleges that, in 2013, he purchased Moonstone Holdings Limited (“Moonstone”), a Maltese company, which owned 98% of the shares in WHL. The Defendant alleges that he was at all material times a director of WHL.
5. During the relevant period, Mr Richardson received financial advice from an individual called Mr Robertson from Hottinger Private Office (“Hottinger”). Mr Richardson’s case is that:
i) Mr Robertson advised Mr Richardson to structure his shareholding in Moonstone using a Maltese legal structure called a ‘SICAV’, and that Mr Richardson subsequently exchanged his shares in Moonstone for “investor shares” in a sub-fund of a SICAV.
ii) By transferring his shares to the SICAV, he says that he inadvertently lost ultimate beneficial ownership and full control over Moonstone, WHL, their boards and subsidiaries.
iii) He was under the impression that he had ultimate beneficial ownership and full control at the point that he entered the Guarantee and only became aware that he had lost it at a later date.
6. Separate from the current proceedings there is now ongoing litigation between Mr Richardson and inter alia Mr Robertson and Hottinger in relation to the SICAV transaction (Claim No: BL-2023-000527 in the Business List of the Chancery Division in the High Court).
C. The Facility and the Guarantee
7. On or around 2 August 2018, AIB offered to provide three corporate entities, WHL, Arena Coventry Limited and IEC Experience Limited (together “the Borrowers”), with an overdraft facility of £2,500,000 (“the Overdraft Facility”). The offer of lending was made by way of a number of letters, the first dated 2 August 2018 (“the First Offer Letter”), which was amended by a letter dated 5 October 2018 (“theSecond Offer Letter”) and later renewal letters (collectively “theFacility Letters”).
8. The Bank’s terms and conditions, entitled “the Business Lending Terms and Conditions for Variable Rate Loan and Overdraft Facilities” (“the General Terms”) were incorporated into the agreement between the Borrowers and the Bank. Together, the Facility Letters and the General Terms constituted the agreement in respect of the Overdraft Facility (“the Overdraft Agreement”).
9. The Overdraft Facility was repayable on demand and subject to an annual review. Pursuant to the terms of the Overdraft Agreement, it was incumbent upon the Borrowers to procure delivery of the Security Documents as defined in the General Terms. Those Security Documents required inclusion of the Guarantee: a personal guarantee to be executed by Mr Richardson, in respect of all monies, debts and liability owed or incurred by the Borrowers to the Bank up to a maximum of £2,500,000 (plus interest and costs).
10. On 29 October 2018, the Defendant provided the Guarantee.
11. On 29 October 2018, Standley & Co (“Standley”), the Defendant’s solicitors, signed a letter confirming that the Defendant had received independent legal advice (“the Legal Advice Letter”).
12. On 20 November 2019 and 12 June 2021, the Defendant signed Guarantor Acknowledgment Deeds (“Deeds of Acknowledgment”) which were attached to the renewal letters and which confirmed the Defendant’s understanding of the Guarantee and the Overdraft Agreement.
13. On 30 June 2022, the Bank exercised its discretion under the terms of the Facility Letters not to renew the Overdraft Facility.
14. On 3 August 2022, the Bank sent a letter of demand to the Defendant in the amount of £2,513,741.48 which was comprised of £2,487,555.12 extant under the Overdraft Agreement together with interest and costs. No payment was made by Mr Richardson. However payments have been received from the liquidators of the Borrowers, which the Bank says it has given credit for.
D. The Terms of the Contractual and Other Documents
15. The front cover page of the Guarantee stated in bold as follows:
“This is an important legal document. If you sign it you may become liable instead of or as well as the Debtor for the Debtor’s liabilities to the Bank….
We recommend that before signing it you should obtain independent legal advice.”
16. By the terms of the first paragraph of the Recital to the Guarantee, the Defendant agreed to:
“…payment to the Bank on demand of all present, future actual and/or contingent liabilities whatsoever of the debtor to the Bank whether or not due and payable and whether incurred solely severally and/or jointly and without limitation whether on account of moneys advanced or paid in respect of bills, notes or other non-negotiable securities or instruments, guarantees, indemnities, or other liabilities or engagements, interest, commission, charges or otherwise together with all legal or other expenses (on a full indemnity basis)
[…]
as against the Guarantor interest shall be deemed to continue to accrue and be a liability of the debtor hereby guaranteed notwithstanding that for any reason interest may have ceased to accrue against the Debtor.”
17. By the terms of the second paragraph of the Recital to the Guarantee, the Defendant agreed:
“…the total amount recoverable under this Guarantee shall not exceed £2,500,000 principal monies together with all liabilities of the Debtor to the Bank in excess of the said amount (whether or not then due or payable) in respect of interest commission charges and legal and other expenses as aforesaid up to the date of demand by the Bank on the Guarantor”.
18. Clause 10 of the Guarantee provides:
“The Guarantee shall apply to all monies in fact borrowed from the Bank by or debited to the account of the Debtor notwithstanding that such monies (or part thereof) may not be or may cease to be recoverable from the Debtor by reason of…any provision of any enactment from the time being in force in relation to liquidation or administration or Bankruptcy and if and so far as such monies may not be recoverable by the Bank from the Debtor the Guarantor shall indemnify the Bank in respect thereof and shall be liable therefor as principal debtor.”
19. By the third paragraph of the Recital to the Guarantee:
“Any amount demanded under this Guarantee and for the time being unpaid shall bear interest…from the date of that demand until receipt of that amount in full by the Bank…at a rate calculated on a daily basis five per cent (5%) per annum above the Bank’s Base Rate or (if higher) calculated by reference to the most recent rate of interest agreed between the Bank and the Debtor…”
20. Further, the General Terms provided as follows:
“6.29.1 Unless expressly agreed in writing, the Bank does not hold itself responsible for providing advice or indicating the suitability of products for a person’s particular circumstances. The Borrower and any Guarantor or Mortgagor should always obtain independent professional advice on such matters and upon any security or guarantee required by the Bank.
6.29.2 The Bank does not, nor does it purport to, offer advice as to whether it is appropriate for the Borrowers and/or any Guarantor or Mortgagor to proceed with the Facility. The issue of the Loan Facility Letter, the Overdraft Letter and/or the Contingent Obligations Facility Letter does not imply that the Bank considers that the Facility is appropriate to the Borrower’s circumstances.
6.29.3 Each of the Borrower and any Guarantor or Mortgagor has been advised to take, and had been given full opportunity to take, independent legal advice on the Facility Letter and the actual and potential consequences of his/her/its execution of the Facility Letter, all security for the Facility or Facilities and any other document specified or contemplated by the Facility Letter to which he/she/it will be a party, including the terms and conditions of this booklet.”
21. The Legal Advice Letter states:
“… I have advised him of the amount of the facility the Bank is proposing to make available to Wasps Holdings Limited, Arena Coventry Limited and IEC Experience Limited and that the Bank might increase this amount without reference to him.
I have discussed with him the seriousness of the risks involved to him personally and advised him that he has a choice whether to proceed.
I confirm I have authority to confirm his understanding of the transaction the security he is providing and his willingness so to do…”
22. The Deeds of Acknowledgment are in materially identical terms and state:
“By signing this acknowledgement you, as Guarantor, acknowledge the terms and conditions of this Overdraft Letter and the General Terms and Conditions and you, as Guarantor, (each) confirm that:
“(a) you understand and agree with the terms and conditions of this Overdraft Letter and the General Terms and Conditions copies of which you have received and had the opportunity to consider;
(b) it has been suggested by the Bank that you take independent legal advice in respect of your liabilities under the Overdraft Letter and the General Terms and Conditions and you have been given an opportunity to take such advice;
(c) you understand that if the Borrower does not pay the amounts owing by the Borrower under this Overdraft Letter and the General Terms and Conditions when called upon to do so by the Bank, you will have to pay the amounts due together with interest and charges. If you fail to do so, the Bank may (a) take legal proceedings against you to recover the said sums; (b) enforce against any of your assets which comprise security that supports your guarantee; and (c) use the proceeds of any sale of such assets to discharge your liability as Guarantor;
(d) that the Guarantee remains in full force and effect and is a continuing guarantee for the obligations of the Borrower to the Bank; and
(e) you understand that if it is proposed that you will be one of two or more co-guarantors, for the Facility/Facilities. If you are “jointly and severally liable” for the Facility/Facilities along with other persons, this means that the Bank is entitled to recover the entire amount of any outstanding balance of the Facilities/Facilities from you and the Bank is not obliged to make demand on the other Guarantors or to enforce against them”.
E. Nature of these Proceedings
23. In these proceedings, AIB has brought a claim against Mr Richardson for payment under the Guarantee. This follows previous bankruptcy proceedings against Mr Richardson under the Guarantee which were dismissed by the Court on the basis that it was arguable that the claim was not for a liquidated amount.
24. Mr Richardson seeks to defend the present proceedings in his Defence and Counterclaim by alleging that he is not the ultimate beneficial owner of WHL, that he is the victim of misrepresentations made by the Bank and / or third parties which operated on his mind at the point that he entered the Guarantee, and that accordingly the Guarantee should be rescinded.
F. Legal Tests
25. AIB’s application is advanced for both strike out and summary judgment. The legal principles in relation to both were not disputed between the parties.
26. In relation to strike out, AIB applies under CPR 3.4(2)(a) on the grounds that the Defence and Counterclaim show no reasonable grounds for defending the claim. It is common ground that it is only in cases where it is plain and obvious that the claim will fail that an applicant will be entitled to strike out the whole, or part, of the defendant’s Defence: S v Gloucestershire County Council [2004] EWHC 1341 (QB) and Hughes v Colin Richards & Co [2004] EWCA Civ 266.
27. In relation to summary judgment, the principles applicable to summary judgment were summarised by Lewison J in EasyAir Ltd v Opal Telecom Ltd [2009] EWHC 339 (Ch) at [15], and approved by the Court of Appeal in A.C. Ward Ltd v Catlin (Five) Ltd [2009] EWCA Civ 1098 at [24] as follows.
i) The court must consider whether the claimant has a “realistic” as opposed to a “fanciful” prospect of success: Swain v Hillman [2001] 2 All ER 91;
ii) A “realistic” claim is one that carries some degree of conviction. This means a claim that is more than merely arguable: ED & F Man Liquid Products v Patel [2003] EWCA Civ 472 at [8]
iii) In reaching its conclusion the court must not conduct a “mini-trial”: Swain v Hillman
iv) This does not mean that the court must take at face value and without analysis everything that a claimant says in his statements before the court. In some cases it may be clear that there is no real substance in factual assertions made, particularly if contradicted by contemporaneous documents: ED & F Man Liquid Products v Patel at [10]
v) However, in reaching its conclusion the court must take into account not only the evidence actually placed before it on the application for summary judgment, but also the evidence that can reasonably be expected to be available at trial: Royal Brompton Hospital NHS Trust v Hammond (No 5) [2001] EWCA Civ 550;
vi) Although a case may turn out at trial not to be really complicated, it does not follow that it should be decided without the fuller investigation into the facts at trial than is possible or permissible on summary judgment. Thus the court should hesitate about making a final decision without a trial, even where there is no obvious conflict of fact at the time of the application, where reasonable grounds exist for believing that a fuller investigation into the facts of the case would add to or alter the evidence available to a trial judge and so affect the outcome of the case: Doncaster Pharmaceuticals Group Ltd v Bolton Pharmaceutical Co 100 Ltd [2007] FSR 63;
vii) On the other hand it is not uncommon for an application under Part 24 to give rise to a short point of law or construction and, if the court is satisfied that it has before it all the evidence necessary for the proper determination of the question and that the parties have had an adequate opportunity to address it in argument, it should grasp the nettle and decide it. The reason is quite simple: if the respondent's case is bad in law, he will in truth have no real prospect of succeeding on his claim or successfully defending the claim against him, as the case may be. Similarly, if the applicant's case is bad in law, the sooner that is determined, the better. If it is possible to show by evidence that although material in the form of documents or oral evidence that would put the documents in another light is not currently before the court, such material is likely to exist and can be expected to be available at trial, it would be wrong to give summary judgment because there would be a real, as opposed to a fanciful, prospect of success. However, it is not enough simply to argue that the case should be allowed to go to trial because something may turn up which would have a bearing on the question of construction: ICI Chemicals & Polymers Ltd v TTE Training Ltd [2007] EWCA Civ 725.
28. Mr Richardson also relies on the following passage from a decision of HHJ Paul Matthews (sitting as a High Court Judge) in Sofer v Swissindependent Trustees [2019] EWHC 2071 (Ch) in explaining the distinction between summary judgment and strike out:
“27 … the first application (by the defendant) is one in the alternative to strike out the claim under CPR rule 3.4(2) or for reverse summary judgment under CPR part 24. As it was argued before me, in the former alternative the defendant relied on CPR rule 3.4(2)(a), that is, “that the statement of case discloses no reasonable grounds for bringing or defending the claim”. In general, such an assertion is tested without the need of any evidence. The court assumes for the purposes of the argument the truth of the allegations made in the claim, and considers whether, as a matter of law, such allegations amount to a cause of action known to the law. If they do not, there are no reasonable grounds for bringing the claim and it is struck out.
28. But an application for summary judgment is different. Usually it is not so much about whether what is alleged amounts to a claim – or a defence – at all (though that is at least possible), but about how strong that claim (or defence) is. Even where the facts alleged amount to a claim, if the claimant has “no real prospect of succeeding on the claim” and there is no other “compelling reason” for a trial, summary judgment can be given for the defendant. This involves an assessment of the strength of the case. Here “real prospect” does not require a particularly high level of probability. “Real” is the antithesis of “unreal” or “illusory”. So if the prospect of success is not so low as to be illusory, the claim cannot be shut out by summary judgment.” [Emphasis in original.]
29. Mr Benham-Mirando, acting for Mr Richardson, was also keen to emphasise that the bar required to avoid summary judgment is a low one. He pointed to the Supreme Court’s decision in Evans v Barclays [2025] UKSC 48 at §102 that a claim can be “very weak” and yet meet the ‘real prospect of success’ standard for resisting summary judgment.
Misrepresentations and Implied Representations
30. As to implied representations: “The scope of what counts as a representation for this purpose is very broad”: Credit Suisse v Ivanishvili [2025] UKPC 53 at §129.
31. A summary of the test for implied representations is set out in European Real Estate Debt Fund v Treon [2021] EWHC 2866 (Ch) at §345:
“In relation to implied representations the court has to consider what a reasonable person would have inferred was being implicitly represented by the representor’s words and conduct in their context. That involves considering whether a reasonable representee in the position and with the known characteristics of the actual representee would reasonably have understood that an implied representation was being made and being made substantially in the terms or to the effect alleged: Vald Nielsen at [136]. A “helpful test” for implied representations is “whether a reasonable representee would naturally assume that the true state of facts did not exist and that, had it existed, he would in all the circumstances necessarily have been informed of it”. But this is not to “water down the requirement that there must be clear words or clear conduct of the representor from which the relevant representation can be implied”: Vald Nielson [sic] at [136].”
32. I note, for the purpose of the present application, that this is in part a fact sensitive enquiry. It involves consideration of whether:
i) There are “clear words or clear conduct of the representor from which the relevant representation can be implied”;
ii) The “position” and “known characteristics of the actual representee”;
iii) Whether “a reasonable representee” in that position “would reasonably have understood that an implied representation was being made and being made substantially in the terms or to the effect alleged”.
33. As to whether such an allegation could be considered by the Court on a summary basis will depend on the nature of the allegation and the factual issues arising.
34. The representation does not need to originate from the other party to the contract (Chitty on Contracts (36th ed., 2025) at §10-031) and can arise where the other party indicated that they approved or adopted a representation made by a third person.
35. It is also apparently possible for a representee to bring a case for misrepresentation against the other party to a contract based on a misrepresentation by a third party of which the other party has knowledge or notice. This possibility is canvassed in Cartwright on Misrepresentation, Mistake and Non-Disclosure (7th edition, 2025) at 4-81 where it is said that: “The courts have accepted that the representee may avoid the contract on the basis of a misrepresentation made by a third party where the other party has knowledge of it at the time of the contract”, citing, inter alia, Royal Bank of Scotland Plc v Etridge (No.2) [2001] UKHL 44; [2002] 2 A.C. 773 at [144] (Lord Scott, discussing both misrepresentation and undue influence by third parties).
G. Mr Richardson’s misrepresentation defences
36. Mr Benham-Mirando ably explained in his written and oral submissions that there were essentially four limbs to Mr Richardson’s defences.
i) First that Mr Richardson received representations from his financial adviser at the time, Mr Robertson, about the ownership and control of Moonstone and / or WHL which were untrue but which AIB manifestly adopted and approved (the “2017 Representations”).
ii) Second that by sending a particular email and asking Mr Richardson for a guarantee, AIB impliedly represented that Mr Robertson’s representations (referred to in (i) above) were accurate, when they were not (the “2017 Implied Representation”).
iii) Third, that as a result of AIB’s statements and conduct over the course of 2018 that AIB made implied misrepresentations about Mr Richardson’s ultimate beneficial ownership and control (the “2018 Implied Representations”).
iv) Fourth, AIB knew or had notice of the misrepresentations by Mr Robertson regarding Mr Richardson’s ultimate beneficial ownership and control (the “Notice of False Representations Defence”).
H. AIB’s grounds for seeking strike out or summary judgment
37. AIB relies on five grounds in support of its application. It alleges that:
i) The Bank did not make the 2017 Implied Representation nor adopt the 2017 Representations;
ii) The Bank did not make the 2018 Implied Representations;
iii) It is fanciful to suggest that the Defendant relied on the alleged representations;
iv) It is fanciful to suggest that the Bank had notice or knowledge of “falsity” as set out in the Notice of False Representations Defence;
v) Quantum should be assessed by reference to the Default Interest Rate.
38. Each of these grounds is considered below.
I. Ground 1: The Bank did not make the 2017 Implied Representation nor adopt the 2017 Representations
The Pleaded Case
39. Mr Richardson’s pleaded case is as follows:
i) On 27 September 2017, Mr Robertson sent Mr Richardson and Mr John Parker (the Group Finance Director of WHL) an email stating that it attached a “UBO chart for Derek [i.e. Mr Richardson] and WASPS” (the “Ownership Structure Email”). The attachment to that email was a document entitled “Flowchart of Beneficial Ownership – Moonstone Limited.pdf” (the “Ownership Structure Chart”).
ii) The Ownership Structure Email and the Ownership Structure Chart contained representations that:
a) Mr Richardson was the ultimate beneficial owner of Moonstone and / or WHL; and / or
b) Mr Richardson had control of Moonstone and all of its subsidiaries.
iii) AIB made enquiries regarding the ultimate beneficial ownership and control of WHL. As part of those enquiries, Mr Richardson was told by Mr Aspinall (Finance Director of WHL) that AIB were looking to trace the control and ownership structure from Mr Richardson into WHL.
iv) In response to those enquiries, Mr Parker forwarded the Ownership Structure Email and the Ownership Structure Chart to Mr Mike Tierney (Senior Relationship Manager at AIB).
v) On 20 October 2017, Mr Tierney responded to the email from Mr Parker stating: “I have checked with Sophie [Sophie Court, Assistant Relationship Manager] and she advises that we can accept Hottinger confirmation of shareholding as they are FCA registered” (the “Acceptance Email”).
vi) AIB (through Mr Tierney) contemplated, expected and / or intended that Mr Richardson would receive the Acceptance Email through Mr Parker, which Mr Richardson subsequently received (albeit at a much later date).
vii) On 2 August 2018, AIB sent an offer letter addressed to the directors of WHL for an overdraft facility on the condition that Mr Richardson provided a guarantee in the sum of £2,500,000 for the obligations of WHL.
viii) In accordance with “commercial common sense”, it is appropriate to infer that “in these circumstances”, AIB would not seek a personal guarantee from an individual who was not the ultimate beneficial owner and / or in control of the company that AIB was lending money to, and that is what Mr Richardson understood from the circumstances prior to entering into the Guarantee.
ix) In accordance with “commercial common sense”, it is appropriate to infer that AIB would, as a reputable bank with legal and regulatory obligations acting to further its commercial interests, conduct its own independent due diligence regarding the ultimate beneficial ownership and control of the company that it was proposing to lend money to, and this is what Mr Richardson understood from the circumstances prior to entering the Guarantee.
x) In the above premises, by sending the Acceptance Email and the First Offer Letter:
a) AIB adopted and approved the representations in the Ownership Structure Chart.
b) AIB made the implied representation that the contents of the Ownership Structure Chart were accurate.
AIB’s Objections
40. AIB relies on nine grounds in support of its case that the implied representation case is unsustainable:
i) AIB says this is exactly the kind of allegation that was dismissed in Bank Negara Indonesia 1946 v Taylor [1995] CLC 255.
ii) Mr Richardson describes himself as a "very successful businessman" in his Defence. AIB says there is therefore no arguable basis for inferring that it expected him not to read and check the Guarantee or matters he considered material.
iii) Standley's Legal Advice Letter records a face-to-face meeting at which the nature and practical implications of the Guarantee were explained, consistent with the procedure in Etridge (No 2). Mr Richardson says he received no advice on ultimate beneficial ownership. AIB replies that it was open to him to ask Standley for that advice.
iv) Mr Robertson of Hottinger, Mr Richardson's own financial adviser, sent him the Ownership Structure Chart. Any representations in the Chart are therefore Mr Robertson's, not the Bank's.
v) Clauses 6.29.1–6.29.3 of the General Terms show that the Bank was not taking on responsibility or risk for any advice or representations given to Mr Richardson about the Guarantee.
vi) The Acceptance Email does not address, expressly or by implication, whether the Ownership Structure Chart is accurate.
vii) The misrepresentation point now relied on was not taken in the bankruptcy proceedings or in pre-action correspondence.
viii) Mr Richardson’s Account Opening Form stated he held a 98% shareholding in Wasps and carried his signed declaration that the statement was true.
ix) AIB says the Defence runs together an implied representation with the factual inferences from which it is said to arise, and that it is not properly pleaded. The pleaded inference is that a bank would only take a guarantee from the ultimate beneficial owner. AIB calls this a non-sequitur. It says it was concerned with creditworthiness and credit risk, and that its ownership enquiries were made for regulatory reasons. The pleaded inference is that AIB carried out its own due diligence. AIB says the fact that it did so endorses nothing.
41. In addition, AIB relies on the following two points in support of its argument that there was no adoption of the 2017 Representations.
i) In order to “manifestly adopt and approve” implied representations, more than mere silence is required.
ii) The sending of the First Offer Letter is not sufficient in itself.
Analysis
42. AIB argued that its conduct as alleged in the pleaded case could not sustain a case in misrepresentation, whether by adoption or implication.
43. Much of the argument at the hearing revolved around the Acceptance Email and whether it could sustain Mr Richardson’s case. However, it is important to note that the pleaded case relies on the conduct of sending both the Acceptance Email and the First Offer Letter. It is said that these matters gave rise to a misrepresentation by adoption or implication. In doing so, Mr Richardson relied on a number of factual allegations set out in paragraphs 8 to 15 of the Defence. These included the allegations that:
i) As part of the discussions in relation to the possible provision of a facility to WHL, AIB had made enquiries regarding the ultimate beneficial ownership and control of WHL (at paragraph 10);
ii) AIB (through Mr Tierney) contemplated, expected and / or intended that Mr Richardson would receive the Acceptance Email through Mr Parker (paragraph 12);
iii) “In the circumstances”, AIB would not seek a personal guarantee from an individual who was not the ultimate beneficial owner and / or in control of the company that AIB was lending money to, and this is what Mr Richardson “reasonably understood from the circumstances” (paragraph 14);
iv) AIB would as a reputable bank with legal and regulatory obligations acting to further its commercial interests, conduct its own independent due diligence regarding the ultimate beneficial ownership and control of the company that it was proposing to lend money to, and this is what Mr Richardson “reasonably understood from the circumstances” (paragraph 15).
44. Although some of these factual allegations are rather vague, in particular the allegation in paragraph 10 that AIB made enquiries regarding the ultimate beneficial ownership and control of WHL, I do not understand AIB to have served a Request for Further Information under Part 18 on Mr Richardson in order to obtain further particulars on his factual case. In the circumstances, I must proceed on the basis of the allegations as currently articulated.
45. AIB’s argument was essentially that neither the tendering of the First Offer Letter nor sending of the Acceptance Email could sustain a case of adoption or implied representation.
46. Although I have some real scepticism as to aspects of Mr Richardson’s case (as explained further below), I have ultimately reached the view that the Court should not make a summary determination on this issue at this stage.
i) In relation to the tendering of the First Offer Letter, AIB’s argument was Mr Richardson’s case was exactly the sort of allegation made and summarily dismissed by Hoffmann LJ (as he then was) in Bank Negara, and that accordingly this court ought to dismiss the allegation summarily too.
ii) In Bank Negara, the first instance judge did reach the view that, based on the undisputed facts, no misrepresentation did arise. That decision was upheld on appeal.
iii) However, AIB’s argument overlooked the express terms of the judgment of Hoffmann LJ (as he then was) in Bank Negara which explained that “It seems to me that whether the tendering of a document for signature is any kind of representation about its contents must depend on the facts of the particular case”. In the circumstances, the authority does not support the proposition that the mere tendering of a document can never sustain a case of misrepresentation. It is ultimately a question which has to be considered by reference to the factual issues in the case.
iv) Contrary to the suggestion by AIB, this is not a case where Mr Richardson relies on the mere silence of the Bank. Instead, he relies on a positive act (inter alia, the tendering of the First Offer Letter). As regards the adoption case, I consider that the tendering of the First Offer Letter (coupled with the context) could sustain the case that AIB had manifestly adopted and approved the representations. I note that the First Offer Letter was addressed to the directors of WHL, of which Mr Richardson was one.
v) AIB seeks to draw a parallel with Bank Negara by suggesting that the factual circumstances are very similar, in that in our case Mr Richardson described himself in his pleadings as a “very successful businessman” and “sophisticated, experienced, successful”, and that he received independent legal advice. These matters are of course relevant factors that the Court will have to take into account in assessing Mr Richardson’s defence but I do not see how, at this stage, the Court can simply ignore or summarily determine the factual allegations which Mr Richardson contends provide important context for assessing whether AIB’s conduct gave rise to the adoption of a representation or an implied representation.
vi) In particular, I note that Mr Richardson alleges as a matter of fact that AIB had made enquiries regarding the ultimate beneficial ownership and control of WHL. He also alleges that, in the particular factual circumstances arising, AIB would not seek a personal guarantee from an individual who was not the ultimate beneficial owner and / or in control of the company that AIB was lending money to, and this is what Mr Richardson “reasonably understood from the circumstances”.
vii) In my view, on the facts of this case, the pleaded factual allegations are potentially relevant to assessing whether AIB’s conduct, in tendering the First Offer Letter, gave rise to the adoption of a representation or an implied misrepresentation.
viii) In particular, in relation to the case of implied misrepresentation, the case will involve an enquiry into how a reasonable representee would have understood the representation to have been made in the factual context. These are questions of fact which are contested between the parties and I do not think that they are open to summary determination here. Although I recognise that in some cases of implied representation, it may be appropriate for there to be a summary determination; see Greenstein v Broome & Wellington LP [2009] EWCA Civ 589. I do not consider this to be such a case.
ix) AIB also relies on Greenstein to arguethat Mr Richardson’s defence on implied misrepresentation was raised late in the process and he did not mention it as part of the bankruptcy proceedings. I note in this regard that Mr Richardson argues that the bankruptcy petition was resisted on a separate and successful ground and that rescission has been raised in its proper place in the defence. In my view, this is a point which goes to Mr Richardson’s credibility at trial which is a factual matter. I do not think that I should rely on it at this stage to shortcut the factual enquiry which ought to occur at trial. Similarly, I do not consider that the information stated in the account opening form or the contents of the Companies House records are determinative of the issue. I note that Mr Richardson contends that these documents simply reflect his own honest but mistaken belief at the time.
x) At one point, AIB appeared to be relying on clauses 6.29.1–6.29.3 of the General Terms in support of a contractual estoppel argument. In the event, that was not pursued. Instead it was prayed in aid of an argument that the Bank was disavowing any responsibility for advice. That argument does not in my view, change my assessment set out above.
47. In those circumstances, I do not think that the case reaches the threshold required for a strike out. Mr Richardson’s pleaded case discloses a recognised potential defence. Nor do I consider that it would be appropriate to order summary judgment as there are sufficient prospects of success to survive an application for summary judgment.
48. As noted above, there are a number of aspects of Mr Richardson’s case which appeared weak and I have considered in reaching a conclusion on this matter. In particular, I note that:
i) Mr Richardson relies on the Ownership Structure Email and the Ownership Structure Chart as containing two representations by Mr Robertson as to ownership and control. Given that Hottinger were acting as advisers, there is a question of whether the email and chart were intended to be a statement of fact (which might found a case for misrepresentation) or simply a summary of advice received (which would arguably not).
ii) The Ownership Structure Chart sets out in summary form the ownership of Moonstone and WHL. Nothing was said expressly about the control of Moonstone and its subsidiaries. In the circumstances, there is a real question as to whether it contains any representation about control. However, for present purposes, I have reached the view that there is a weak argument that the references to Mr Richardson having substantial ownership of Moonstone might carry with it the implication that he was also in control.
iii) As regards the Acceptance Email, looked at in isolation (albeit that I recognise at trial that it will be examined in context), I am sympathetic to AIB’s contention that Mr Richardson seeks to place greater weight on it than the language of the email may be capable of bearing. In the email, Mr Tierney explained that the Bank could accept the confirmation of shareholding from Mr Richardson’s financial advisers, Hottinger “as they are FCA registered”. The language of the email does not suggest that the Bank had independently verified the information. Instead, the point being made in the Acceptance Email was that Hottinger was a reliable source of information because of its status as an FCA registered entity.
iv) The Bank’s enquiries may have been limited to checks for money laundering purposes and this may have been understood by all but none of that is clear at this stage since no evidence has been advanced directly from the Bank’s personnel. AIB’s case is that it was concerned with credit risk and Mr Richardson’s net worth which is said at the relevant time to have been in excess of £10 million. Mr Richardson contends that there are good commercial reasons why a bank may want a guarantee from the ultimate owner and controller, who will have a commercial incentive to ensure that the borrower succeeds and the ability (through the right of control) to exercise influence. These are contested factual matters for trial.
v) More generally, I am particularly sceptical of the notion that a bank can be said to have made an implied representation in tendering a transactional document for signature that it had independently verified the rights and interests of its counterparty (in relation to beneficial ownership and control) such that the counterparty could rely on the bank’s representation.
49. However, notwithstanding my reservations set out above, I can see that the claims involve factual matters which in my view would need to be heard at trial to reach a view on whether the 2017 Representations and 2017 Implied Representation allegations could be made out. I note Mr Richardson’s submissions that on the Bank’s side only two custodians’ emails have been searched and that the evidence from the Bank so far has only been given by the Bank’s solicitor, Mr Curling rather than a factual witness. I disagree with AIB’s submission that no further evidence on such matters would assist at trial. In this regard, I rely on Royal Brompton Hospital NHS Trust v Hammond cited in EasyAir above.
50. I do not think that it is appropriate to seek to determine such matters on a summary basis. In all these circumstances, I decline to make an order for summary judgment / strike out. In doing so, I note in relation to summary judgment that the bar is low and that a “very weak” case can meet the ‘real prospect of success’ standard.
J. Ground 2: Whether the Bank made the 2018 Implied Representations
The Pleaded Case
51. Mr Richardson’s pleaded case is as follows:
i) On 4 September 2018, AIB requested a signed letter from a Maltese lawyer confirming the ultimate beneficial ownership of WHL;
ii) An individual called Mr Hyzler from a Maltese law firm called GVZH Advocates wrote to AIB on 6 September 2018, on the instructions of the SICAV behind WHL;
iii) This letter is alleged to have caused the Bank to make further enquiries which in turn led to Mr Aspinall contacting Mr Richardson’s financial adviser and Mr Richardson himself.
iv) It also led to a discussion between Mr Richardson and his financial adviser about the operation of the structure including ownership and voting rights.
v) Mr Aspinall subsequently confirmed to Mr Richardson’s financial adviser that AIB had all they needed.
vi) AIB proceeded to issue an offer letter (the Second Offer Letter) which agreed to provide a facility of £2,500,000 on the condition that Mr Richardson provide a guarantee for the same amount. AIB then took steps to put in place the guarantee.
vii) Mr Richardson relies on the same allegations as advanced in support of the 2017 Representations. He also alleges that the relevant factual context included that:
a) He reasonably believed that AIB was very interested in, and concerned by, the question of the ultimate beneficial ownership and control of Moonstone and / or WHL;
b) AIB had conducted its own independent due diligence regarding the ultimate beneficial ownership and control of Moonstone and / or WHL;
c) AIB had raised doubts about Mr Richardson’s ultimate beneficial ownership and control of Moonstone and / or WHL;
d) Following those doubts, in relation to matters which Mr Richardson believed were important to AIB and independent due diligence which Mr Richardson believed that AIB had undertaken, AIB nonetheless made an offer of finance conditional on a personal guarantee from Mr Richardson.
viii) Against this factual context, by AIB’s conduct and statements, AIB made implied representations that Mr Richardson was the ultimate beneficial owner of Moonstone and / or WHL; and / or Mr Richardson had control of Moonstone and all of its subsidiaries.
AIB’s Objections
52. AIB relies on the points identified above in relation to the 2017 Representations. It also contends that:
i) there is no dispute of fact that need concern the Court;
ii) it would be impossible for Mr Richardson to establish at trial that a representation can be implied;
iii) there is nothing that the Bank has in fact done or said to the Defendant;
iv) the case arises purely on the basis of the Defendant’s own assumptions and representations made by those in communication with the Defendant to AIB.
53. AIB also relies on a passage from a decision of Hamblen J in Foster v Action Aviation Ltd [2013] EWHC 2439 (Comm) at [100] where he referred to intricate cases of implied representations being advanced and noted that these were often “more a reflection of the ingenuity of the pleader than reality or the evidence”.
54. AIB also relies on three further points:
i) First, an implied representation can only be found where there are “clear words or conduct”;
ii) Second, save that the Bank requested a letter from a Maltese Lawyer and issued the Second Offer Letter, none of the conduct is the Bank’s conduct. Insofar as the 2018 Implied Representations were said to arise in relation to the mere tendering of the Second Offer Letter then that is vulnerable to summary dismissal under Bank Negara.
iii) Third, AIB was under no duty to disclose the Hyzler letter to Mr Richardson before he entered the Guarantee.
Analysis
55. As noted above, this part of the case is advanced solely on the basis of implied representation. In considering these allegations, I have taken into account the points made in Foster v Action Aviation referenced above. Ultimately, I note that the case is advanced on the basis of the “factual context” set out in paragraph 24 of the Defence and Counterclaim and that in turn is based on the “premises of paragraphs 8 to 23”. It is clear from those allegations that a case is advanced that the Bank was conducting enquiries into the ownership and control of Mr Richardson’s holding, and that the Bank had requested a letter from a Maltese lawyer. In the circumstances, as framed, this is not a case based on a duty to disclose or mere silence but rather one that relies on positive acts. The above factual allegations make it inappropriate, in my view, for the Court to seek to reach a summary determination on implied misrepresentation at this stage.
56. Further, I note that Mr Richardson’s allegations about the 2018 Implied Representations also rely on the matters pleaded in support of the 2017 Representations and the 2017 Implied Representation. I have concluded not to strike out or give summary judgment in respect of the 2017 Representations and the 2017 Implied Representation because the pleaded factual context is potentially relevant and how a reasonable representee would understand the conduct is a question of contested fact. The 2018 Implied Representations give rise to the same factual matters which cannot be determined on a summary basis. Accordingly, by the same logic, I decline to strike out or give summary judgment on the 2018 Implied Representations.
57. As regards witness evidence and disclosure, I repeat my views set out above in relation to the 2017 Representations and the 2017 Implied Representation on Royal Brompton Hospital NHS Trust v Hammond. The issues arising for the 2018 Implied Representations are areas where further evidence would assist at trial.
58. As noted above, I reject the argument that it is not possible to found a misrepresentation claim on the tendering of a document for signature under Bank Negara. Accordingly, as noted above Bank Negara does not support the proposition that a case of this nature could never succeed.
K. Ground 3: Whether the Defendant relied on the alleged Representations
59. Mr Richardson relies on the presumption of inducement for material representations. For present purposes, AIB accepts that it bears the evidential burden on reliance. I note that Mr Richardson’s case on reliance is pleaded in his Defence and Counterclaim which is supported by a statement of truth. It is also set out in greater detail in his Witness Statement dated 26 January 2026 which also contains a statement of truth. It is apparent from his statement that these are factual matters which will need to be determined by the Court in these proceedings.
60. I note that these factual matters include the scope of the advice that Mr Richardson says that he received. He contends that the advice received did not cover ownership or control. They also concern the ownership of two other borrowers: IEC and ACL, which Mr Richardson says were held through WHL.
61. I understand that the authorities provide that, at a summary stage, I should assume that the facts alleged are true unless they are demonstrably untrue or unsupportable: Okpabi v Shell [2021] 1 WLR 1294 at §22. I also note that in Long v Farrer [2004] EWHC 1774 (Ch) Rimer J said at [57] and [61] where witness evidence is provided on paper, the Court cannot or should not disbelieve the evidence in the absence of cross-examination unless it is manifestly incredible. Rimer J added that “it will require a fairly extreme case for untested paper evidence to be rejected on that basis.”
62. In oral submissions, Ms Dutton invited me to reject Mr Richardson’s evidence on reliance contending it was unsupportable. However, as noted above, it would be a fairly extreme case for the Court to take that course and I do not think that it would be appropriate to do so on the evidence before the Court.
63. As for the argument on clause 6.29, this is only a factor to be taken into account and does not shortcut the factual enquiry: see paragraph 46(x) above.
64. In the circumstances, I do not consider it would be appropriate to reject Mr Richardson’s evidence on reliance at this stage. It will be a matter for the trial judge to consider its credibility, including as noted above in light of the fact that the allegation was raised some time after the dispute initially arose. This is a further area where disclosure and witness evidence will assist the Court at trial.
L. Ground 4: Whether the Bank had notice or knowledge of “falsity”
The Pleaded Case
65. Mr Richardson’s pleaded case is as follows.
i) He contends that AIB had actual notice and / or actual knowledge that the misrepresentations had been made to Mr Richardson by his financial adviser and Hottinger prior to him entering the Guarantee. AIB received the Ownership Structure Email which had been sent by Mr Robertson to Mr Richardson;
ii) The Hyzler Letter said that Mr Richardson held investor shares in the Sub-Fund and that these were non-voting participating shares with no par value in the company. It is alleged that AIB therefore had actual notice and / or actual knowledge that the representations were false because Mr Richardson was not the ultimate beneficial owner of Moonstone and / or WHL and Mr Richardson did not have control of Moonstone and all of its subsidiaries;
iii) It is appropriate to infer, and is inferred and alleged, that a commercial bank such as AIB knew that representations to Mr Richardson concerning his ownership and control of WHL were material to his decision to enter the guarantee;
iv) Based on the factual context already pleaded, it is appropriate to infer that AIB had actual notice and / or actual knowledge that Mr Richardson had relied on the representations made by his financial adviser;
v) On 4 September 2018, AIB requested a signed letter from a Maltese lawyer confirming the ultimate beneficial ownership of WHL.
66. In support of his case that this was a separate ground of Defence, Mr Benham-Mirando showed me the passage from Cartwright cited in paragraph 35 above.
67. Mr Benham-Mirando argued that this claim was inappropriate for summary determination for three reasons:
i) First, it was an issue concerning the knowledge of AIB;
ii) Second, the documents show that there is a real prospect that they knew the misrepresentation was made to Mr Richardson by his adviser;
iii) Third, that this is a novel area of law.
AIB’s Objections
68. AIB contends that in circumstances where the alleged falsity of the representations has not been resolved in other proceedings, Mr Richardson cannot himself know the position for certain. Further, it is said that the Bank had no notice or knowledge of those matters.
Analysis
69. On the question of whether the representations were in fact false, for the purposes of this application, it is appropriate to proceed on the basis of Mr Richardson’s case that they were. As noted above, on the basis of Okpabi, I ought not to reject that allegation at this stage.
70. As regards the Bank’s knowledge, AIB has not filed any evidence from any personnel from the Bank on this issue but it has filed a witness statement from Nicholas Curling, solicitor for AIB, which seeks to address the arguments on knowledge and in some areas appears to stray into providing an explanation as to why the Bank was pursuing certain enquiries.
71. AIB accepted in oral submissions that the issue “certainly has a factual dimension to it”. For my part, I cannot see that it would be appropriate to determine this issue on a summary basis. The question does turn on the Bank’s knowledge. Court-ordered disclosure has not yet been given. The Bank has not yet filed any evidence from its personnel and there would likely need to be cross-examination on that evidence. Accordingly I decline to strike out or give summary judgment on the defence on this basis.
72. Further, I recognise that this is a novel area which is fact sensitive. In line with Altimo Holdings v Kyrgyz Mobil [2012] 1 WLR 1804 at [84], such matters are better resolved at trial.
73. Mr Benham-Mirando also submitted that if the Court agreed with him that this part of the claim ought to go to trial, then it was a factor to take into account in assessing whether to strike out or give summary judgment in respect of the other grounds identified above. In this regard, he relied on a decision of Laddie J in Barrett v Universal-Island Records [2003] EWHC 625 which considered whether there were other compelling reasons why the case or issue should be disposed of at trial. In that judgment, the Judge said at [47]:
It is not normally in the public interest that court time should be taken up hearing a full trial when the outcome can be confidently predicted in advance. Similarly it is not normally just and proportionate for a party to be put to the delay, expense and dislocation of a trial when it is clear, well in advance, that it will succeed. What, then, are the circumstances in which a court can refuse to strike out or grant summary judgment notwithstanding the apparent inevitability of the outcome at the trial? The discretion referred to above is unqualified. It is neither possible to foresee all circumstances in which it should be exercised nor useful to try to do so. However in some cases it may be appropriate to exercise the discretion where a strike out or summary judgment would not result in the saving of court time or relieve the winning party of the need to fund and participate in the trial. If, notwithstanding a strike out or summary judgment, there is still likely to be a trial in which, in substance, the same parties will be involved and substantially the same issues will need to be tried, then the court may exercise its discretion to refuse summary relief. The same result may be reached another way. Even when a party has a very weak claim or defence, it may not be appropriate to deprive it of the remote chance of succeeding at the trial where there is going to be a trial of those issues even were the application to succeed. Allowing a party to advance a weak claim or defence which puts no significant additional burden on his opponent nor adds significantly to the time to be taken up by the court in determining the dispute, imposes no significant hardship on the opponent and does not significantly inconvenience other parties waiting for an opportunity to come before the court…
74. As noted above, I have refused to strike out or give summary judgment on the Grounds 1 to 3 identified above. However, if, contrary to my view, Grounds 1 to 3 had no reasonable grounds and no real prospects of success, my view is that:
i) it remains appropriate not to strike out or give summary judgment on Ground 4;
ii) with Ground 4 going to trial and noting the high degree of overlap between the factual allegations in Grounds 1 to 3 and Ground 4, I would have exercised my discretion to refuse summary relief on Grounds 1 to 3 in line with the considerations identified by Laddie J in Barrett.
M. Whether quantum should be assessed by reference to the Default Interest Rate
75. In circumstances where I have declined to order strike out or summary judgment, it is not necessary to make a ruling on this point.
76. I note that during the course of oral argument, AIB accepted Mr Richardson’s construction argument on the interest provisions. As I understood the position, AIB intends to rely on clause 4.8.4 on interest in the alternative. That narrows the claim to a two-month period. However, the claim under clause 4.8.4 is not pleaded and it seems to me that for good order, it ought to be.
N. Conclusion
77. For the reasons set out above, I decline to grant the application. I consider that AIB has not established the threshold for either strike out or summary judgment on the Defence and Counterclaim.
78. On the issue of costs, I will await the parties’ submissions. It would be helpful to understand from the parties whether an available course is to reserve costs until trial.
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