Administrative United Kingdom

AT v Entry Clearance Officer

Official source

First-tier Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber)

Appeal Number: HU/52168/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Heard at Newport
On 20 October 2026

Before

FIRST-TIER TRIBUNAL JUDGE L Salkeld

Between

AT
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)

Appellant

and

ENTRY CLEARANCE OFFICER

Respondent

The Tribunal may publish the final decision. Any anonymity order or other restricting disclosure or publication of information made in these proceedings will continue to apply.

Representation:

For the Appellant: No representative and did not attend

For the Respondent: Mr Jenkins, Counsel

DECISION AND REASONS

1. This is the decision of the Tribunal in the appeal of the Appellant against the decision of the Respondent made on 9 January 2025.

Anonymity

2. In making this decision I have considered that justice being administered openly and in public is a fundamental tenet of the justice system but it may be qualified by the interests of the parties and family members. Neither party applied for an anonymity order. However, the Appellant is a recognised refugee in Uganda and the evidence includes details of the Sponsor’s previous claim for international protection, although he is now a British citizen. I am satisfied that publication of their identities could disclose sensitive protection-related information. I therefore consider it appropriate to make an anonymity order.

Background

3. The background to the appeal is contained in the documentation in MyHMCTS.

4. The Appellant is a citizen of Eritrea, born in January 2007. He applied for entry clearance on 11 November 2024 to join his elder brother in the United Kingdom, to whom I refer as “the Sponsor”. The application was refused on 9 January 2025.

5. The Appellant was under the age of 18 at the date of application and decision. He is now 19 years old.

6. The Appellant appeals against the Respondent’s decision on human rights grounds.

The Hearing

7. The hearing took place by video on the Cloud Video Platform. It was recorded. That recording is the record of proceedings and should be consulted in the event of any dispute about what was said at the hearing.

Issues

8. The parties agreed that the issues the Tribunal must decide are:

(a) whether there are serious and compelling family or other considerations which make the Appellant’s exclusion undesirable for the purposes of paragraph 297(i)(f) of the Immigration Rules;

(b) whether family life exists between the Appellant and the Sponsor for the purposes of Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights; and

(c) if family life exists, whether the refusal of entry clearance amounts to a disproportionate interference with that family life.

Evidence

9. The Sponsor gave oral evidence and was cross-examined by Mr Jenkins. Mr Jenkins made submissions, following which the Sponsor made submissions in reply. I reserved my decision.

10. During the Sponsor’s evidence, it transpired that he had a witness statement from the person said to be currently accommodating the Appellant, together with supporting documents which he had understood were already contained in the hearing bundle. I refer to that person as “H”. As the Appellant was unrepresented, I considered that fairness required a short adjournment to enable the Sponsor to upload the documents and to allow Mr Jenkins and the Tribunal sufficient time to consider them. The documents were subsequently admitted into evidence.

Legal Framework

11. The relevant provisions of the Immigration Rules in this appeal are set out at paragraph 297.

12. So far as relevant, paragraph 297(i)(f) required the Appellant to establish that he was seeking to join a parent or relative who was present and settled in the United Kingdom, that there were serious and compelling family or other considerations which made his exclusion undesirable, and that suitable arrangements had been made for his care.

13. It is for the Appellant to show on the balance of probabilities that he satisfies the relevant provisions of the Rules.

14. In considering paragraph 297(i)(f), I have regard to the guidance in Mundeba (s.55 and para 297(i)(f)) [2013] UKUT 88 (IAC). “Serious” requires considerations which are more than the parties simply desiring a state of affairs to obtain, while “compelling” requires considerations which are persuasive and powerful.

15. Although the duty under section 55 of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009 does not apply directly to a child outside the United Kingdom, the spirit of that duty informs the assessment. I have therefore considered the Appellant’s best interests as a primary consideration and have considered his welfare and emotional needs, including the nature and stability of the care available to him while he was a child, the availability of parental or other family care in Uganda, and the proposed arrangements in the United Kingdom.

16. In so far as the Appellant relies on Article 8 outside the Rules, it is for the Appellant to show that Article 8(1) of the ECHR is engaged and if so, it is for the Respondent to show that the decision was in accordance with the law, made in pursuance of a legitimate aim and that it was proportionate to the legitimate aim. The standard of proof is the balance of probabilities. Sections 117A to 117D of the 2002 Act are relevant to any assessment under Article 8 of the ECHR outside the Rules.

Findings and Reasons

17. I first consider whether the Appellant met the requirements of the Immigration Rules in relation to his application as a child. If he did not, I will then consider whether the refusal nevertheless amounts to a disproportionate interference with the family life of the Appellant and Sponsor under Article 8 outside the Rules.

18. I found the Sponsor to be a credible witness. I accept that he genuinely considers himself responsible for the Appellant, has provided him with sustained financial and emotional support, and wishes the Appellant to live with him in the United Kingdom. However, the Sponsor’s genuine commitment to the Appellant and his belief that they should live together do not, without more, establish that the requirements of paragraph 297(i)(f) are met. That question must be determined by reference to the evidence as a whole.

Immigration Rules

19. The Appellant was under the age of 18 at the date of application and remained a child when the application was decided. I therefore consider whether he met the requirements of paragraph 297(i)(f) at the date of the Respondent’s decision. I take account of all the evidence now before the Tribunal insofar as it assists me in determining his circumstances at that time. Developments occurring after the Respondent’s decision are considered separately in my assessment of Article 8 at the date of the hearing.

Relationship to the Sponsor and Sponsor’s Status

20. The Appellant and Sponsor are full brothers. Their relationship is established by the DNA evidence and is not disputed by the Respondent.

21. The Sponsor was granted legal guardianship of the Appellant in Eritrea in 2013. The evidence indicates that this occurred because their parents were experiencing health difficulties and were unable to provide appropriate care.

22. The Sponsor is now a British citizen and was present and settled in the United Kingdom at the relevant time. As the Appellant’s brother, he is a relative for the purposes of paragraph 297(i)(f). It is not necessary for the Sponsor to establish that he is the Appellant’s parent.

23. The guardianship does not alter their biological relationship. It is, however, relevant to the nature and history of the responsibility assumed by the Sponsor and to the quality of the relationship between them.

24. The Respondent does not dispute the guardianship document. The Respondent’s case is that, notwithstanding the guardianship, the Sponsor left Eritrea in 2014 and did not thereafter provide the Appellant’s day-to-day physical care. I accept that the Sponsor did not provide such care after leaving Eritrea. That does not invalidate the guardianship but is relevant to the practical effect it retained.

The Appellant’s Age and Personal Circumstances

25. The Appellant was born in January 2007. He was 17 years and approximately ten months old when he applied for entry clearance in November 2024. He remained under the age of 18 when the application was refused in January 2025.

26. The Appellant had not formed an independent family unit. There is no evidence that he was married or living an independent life at the relevant time. I am satisfied that the relevant age and personal-status requirements of paragraph 297 were met.

Suitable arrangements in the United Kingdom

27. The Sponsor intended that the Appellant should live with him in the United Kingdom. There was no challenge to the availability or suitability of the proposed accommodation.

28. The evidence of remittances demonstrates that the Sponsor has provided regular and substantial financial support to the Appellant. There was no challenge to the Sponsor’s willingness or ability to continue supporting him.

29. The Respondent did not contend that the proposed maintenance and accommodation arrangements failed to meet the requirements of the Immigration Rules. In view of my finding that paragraph 297(i)(f) is not satisfied, it is unnecessary to determine those matters further.

Serious and Compelling Family or Other Considerations

30. The central issue under paragraph 297(i)(f) is whether there were serious and compelling family or other considerations which made the Appellant’s exclusion undesirable.

31. I have considered the Appellant’s circumstances cumulatively, including his age, his family circumstances, the nature and stability of the care available to him at the relevant time, his physical and emotional needs, and his welfare and best interests.

32. The Appellant left Eritrea in October 2023 and later arrived in Uganda. I accept the Sponsor’s explanation that the practical and documentary difficulties associated with leaving Eritrea meant that an application could not reasonably have been made while the Appellant remained there.

33. At the date of decision, the Appellant was living in Uganda with the Sponsor’s wife. She provided him with accommodation and day-to-day care. The Sponsor provided financial support and funded private English-language tuition for the Appellant.

34. There is no evidence that the arrangement with the Sponsor’s wife had broken down by the date of the Respondent’s decision. There is also no evidence that the Appellant was then without suitable accommodation, food, clothing, adult guidance or access to education.

35. The Sponsor’s wife subsequently travelled to the United Kingdom in February 2025. The Appellant was then accommodated by a cousin and, later, by H. Those later developments indicate that the arrangements made for the Appellant in Uganda were not permanent. They do not, however, establish that the care available to him at the date of decision was unsuitable or inadequate.

36. I accept that living with the Sponsor would have provided the Appellant with greater permanence and the benefit of the Sponsor’s direct support. It was plainly the Sponsor’s wish that the Appellant should live with him, and I accept that this was also the Appellant’s preference. However, the question is not whether living with the Sponsor would have been preferable, but whether the evidence established serious and compelling family or other considerations which made the Appellant’s exclusion undesirable.

37. The Appellant was approaching his eighteenth birthday but remained a child. His best interests were therefore a primary consideration. Those interests included secure accommodation, appropriate adult guidance, financial support, access to education and, where reasonably possible, the opportunity to live with a family member who had assumed responsibility for him.

38. At the relevant time, however, the Appellant had accommodation, adult care and continuing financial support. There is no evidence that he had any illness, disability, developmental difficulty or other particular vulnerability requiring specialist or intensive care. Nor is there evidence that his essential physical or emotional needs were not being met.

39. I accept that the Sponsor was concerned about the Appellant’s safety in Uganda. He referred to disorder, the conduct of the police and the position of refugees. I accept that those concerns were genuinely held.

40. There was, however, no objective country evidence before me concerning the treatment of Eritrean refugees in Uganda. Nor was there evidence that the Appellant had personally been assaulted, threatened, detained or mistreated, that he had been deprived of his refugee documentation, or that he was at risk of removal to Eritrea.

41. The Appellant held recognised refugee status in Uganda. The evidence does not establish that this status provided him with no meaningful protection or that he was personally unsafe there. I am therefore unable to place material weight upon the Sponsor’s general concerns about conditions in Uganda.

42. I have considered cumulatively the Sponsor’s guardianship, the parental quality of his commitment, the financial and emotional support he provided, the Appellant’s age, his separation from the Sponsor and his circumstances in Uganda.

43. I accept that the Sponsor had assumed significant responsibility for the Appellant and that living with him would have provided the Appellant with greater stability. Nevertheless, at the date of decision the Appellant had suitable accommodation and day-to-day care from the Sponsor’s wife, together with continuing financial and emotional support from the Sponsor.

44. I am not satisfied that, at the date of the Respondent’s decision, there were serious and compelling family or other considerations which made the Appellant’s exclusion undesirable. The requirements of paragraph 297(i)(f) were therefore not met.

Article 8 outside the Immigration Rules

45. I have approached the Appellant’s claim under Article 8 by applying the structured approach set out in R (Razgar) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] UKHL 27. The relevant questions are whether the Appellant enjoys family life within the meaning of Article 8(1); whether the refusal of entry clearance constitutes an interference with that family life of sufficient gravity to engage Article 8; whether the interference is in accordance with the law and in pursuit of a legitimate aim; and whether it is proportionate.

46. The test for engagement of Article 8(1) is fact-sensitive. In IA & Ors v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ 1516, the Court of Appeal confirmed, in the context of relationships between parents and adult children, that there must be “additional elements of dependence involving more than normal emotional ties”. The Court confirmed that complete, total or exclusive dependence is not required. However, the word “dependency” denotes a significant relationship.The present appeal concerns adult siblings, and there is likewise no presumption of family life. I must assess the substance of this particular relationship and determine whether it contains the necessary additional elements of dependency.

47. The Respondent submits that the Appellant and Sponsor have lived apart for a considerable period, that the Appellant has been accommodated and supported in his daily life by other family members and friends, and that the evidence establishes no more than a close relationship between brothers. The Respondent also relies upon the limited content of the WhatsApp evidence and submits that the Sponsor can continue to provide financial and emotional support to the Appellant while he remains in Uganda.

48. I accept that the Sponsor left Eritrea in 2014 and has not since provided the Appellant’s day-to-day physical care. The Appellant remained in Eritrea with other family members and has subsequently been accommodated in Uganda by the Sponsor’s wife, a cousin and H. The Appellant and Sponsor have therefore not shared a household for more than a decade.

49. Those matters are relevant, but they are not determinative. The assessment is not confined to cohabitation or the provision of physical care. I must consider the nature, extent and context of the support provided and the relationship as a whole.

50. The Sponsor was formally appointed as the Appellant’s legal guardian in 2013. The guardianship does not establish family life by itself and did not result in the Sponsor continuing to provide day-to-day physical care after he left Eritrea. It nevertheless provides relevant context for the responsibility which the Sponsor assumed towards the Appellant and the parental quality which their relationship subsequently acquired.

51. The documentary evidence demonstrates sustained and substantial financial support. The Sponsor initially sent money to his wife while she accommodated the Appellant. He subsequently sent money directly to the Appellant and to those accommodating him. He also paid for the Appellant’s English-language tuition and maintained contact with the school concerning his progress.

52. I accept the Sponsor’s evidence that he maintains regular contact with the Appellant and provides advice, reassurance and emotional encouragement. The untranslated WhatsApp messages provide limited assistance in determining the content of their communications. However, the evidence of regular contact, considered together with the financial evidence, the guardianship and the Sponsor’s credible oral evidence, demonstrates involvement extending beyond occasional assistance or ordinary concern between brothers.

53. The fact that the Appellant has been accommodated by other people does not mean that he ceased to depend upon the Sponsor. Those individuals provided accommodation and immediate practical assistance. The Sponsor continued to fund the Appellant’s needs and assumed responsibility for arranging and maintaining his support. The Appellant remains materially dependent upon him.

54. I also take account of the fact that the Appellant was a child when the application was made and that the relationship had already acquired these features before he attained adulthood. There is no evidence of any material interruption or change in the substance of the relationship when he turned 18. His attainment of adulthood did not, of itself, bring any existing family life to an end.

55. I therefore find that the relationship involves significant financial, practical and emotional dependency. The practical dependency is demonstrated by the Sponsor’s role in arranging and funding the Appellant’s relocation to Uganda, arranging for others to accommodate and care for him, funding his living and educational expenses, and continuing to assume responsibility for his accommodation and welfare.

56. Although the Appellant is not completely or exclusively dependent upon the Sponsor, that is not required. Taking the evidence cumulatively, I am satisfied that there are additional elements of dependency going beyond the normal emotional ties between adult siblings. Family life exists between the Appellant and Sponsor for the purposes of Article 8(1).

57. The Respondent’s submission that financial and emotional support can continue while the Appellant remains in Uganda is relevant to the proportionality of the interference. It does not prevent the support from contributing to the existence of family life.

58. The refusal of entry clearance maintains the physical separation of the Appellant and the Sponsor and prevents them from enjoying their established family life together in the United Kingdom. In the particular circumstances, I am satisfied that the consequences are of sufficient gravity to engage Article 8.

59. The refusal is in accordance with the law and pursues the legitimate aim of maintaining effective immigration control. I therefore turn to whether that interference is proportionate.

Proportionality

60. In conducting the proportionality assessment, I have regard to the public interest considerations in section 117B of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, insofar as they are relevant to an application for entry clearance.

61. The maintenance of effective immigration control is in the public interest. The Appellant does not meet the requirements of the Immigration Rules. That is an important consideration in the proportionality assessment, although it is not determinative.

62. In the Appellant’s favour, I take account of the Sponsor’s longstanding commitment to him, the parental quality of their relationship and the significant financial practcial and emotional support which the Sponsor provides. I also take account of the fact that the Appellant applied as a child and that the Sponsor had been appointed as his legal guardian. I accept that both would prefer to live together and that the Appellant would benefit from the greater stability and direct support which the Sponsor could provide in the United Kingdom.

63. I have considered the changes in the Appellant’s circumstances since the Respondent’s decision. Following the departure of the Sponsor’s wife from Uganda, the Appellant was accommodated by a cousin. Since approximately October 2025, he has lived with H.

64. I accept H’s evidence that he has applied to relocate to Canada and intends to leave Uganda if that application succeeds. The present arrangement cannot therefore be regarded as necessarily permanent. However, the evidence does not establish whether H’s application will succeed or when any departure might occur. At the date of the hearing, H continued to accommodate the Appellant.

65. The uncertainty surrounding that arrangement is relevant, but it does not establish that the Appellant is presently without accommodation or that he will be unable to obtain suitable alternative accommodation if the arrangement ends.The Sponsor is willing and able to continue funding the Appellant’s living expenses. There is no evidence that rented or shared accommodation has been sought and found to be unavailable or unaffordable, or that the Sponsor could not assist the Appellant in making such arrangements.

66. The Appellant is now 19 and approaching the age of 20. There is no evidence that he has an illness, disability or other particular vulnerability requiring day-to-day personal care. Nor is there evidence that he is unable to manage ordinary daily activities, live in rented or shared accommodation, continue his education, seek such employment as may lawfully be available to him, or otherwise move towards a greater degree of independence.

67. I accept that the Appellant remains practically dependent upon the Sponsor. However, that does not establish that he requires the Sponsor’s physical presence. The practical assistance provided by the Sponsor has principally involved arranging and funding accommodation and support through others. The evidence does not establish that those arrangements cannot continue, or that the Sponsor cannot assist the Appellant to move towards greater independence while he remains in Uganda.

68. I accept that the Sponsor genuinely believes that the Appellant requires his direct care. However, the evidence does not adequately explain why the Appellant now requires the Sponsor’s direct or day-to-day care. The support upon which he depends consists principally of financial provision, assistance with accommodation, advice and emotional encouragement. Those are important forms of support, but they can continue to be provided by the Sponsor from the United Kingdom.

69. I also accept that continued separation causes distress to the Appellant and the Sponsor. However, they have lived apart since 2014 and their family life has been maintained through regular communication, financial support and arrangements made by the Sponsor for the Appellant’s accommodation and welfare. Refusal does not prevent those features of their family life from continuing. The Sponsor confirmed that he would continue to support the Appellant if the appeal were unsuccessful.

70. I have considered the Sponsor’s concerns about the Appellant’s safety in Uganda. There was no objective country evidence before me and no evidence that the Appellant had personally experienced violence, detention or mistreatment. The evidence does not establish that his refugee status provides him with no meaningful protection or that remaining in Uganda exposes him to a specific risk.

71. The evidence does not establish that refusal will leave the Appellant homeless, destitute or unable to meet his essential needs. Although H may leave Uganda in the future, it has not been shown that reasonable alternative accommodation cannot be arranged with the Sponsor’s financial assistance.

72. The question is not whether the Appellant would benefit from living with the Sponsor or whether the Sponsor could offer him greater stability and opportunity in the United Kingdom. The question is whether the consequences of refusal are sufficiently serious to outweigh the public interest in maintaining effective immigration control.

73. I give weight to the Sponsor’s genuine and longstanding commitment to the Appellant and to the family life which exists between the Appellant and the Sponsor. However, the principal forms of support upon which the Appellant depends can continue notwithstanding refusal. The evidence does not establish that the present needs cannot reasonably be met without the Sponsor being physically present in Uganda.

74. Having considered the evidence cumulatively, I find that the refusal strikes a fair balance between the family life of the Appellant and the Sponsor and the public interest in maintaining effective immigration control. The interference is proportionate. The appeal is therefore dismissed on human rights grounds.

Notice of Decision

75. The appeal is dismissed on human rights grounds.

ANONYMITY ORDER

76. Unless and until the Tribunal, the Upper Tribunal, or, a court orders otherwise, pursuant To rule 13(1)(b) of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Rules 2014, the Appellant, Sponsor and any person who is likely to identify them is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal either directly or indirectly any information, including their names or their addresses, that is likely to lead members of the public to identify them. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

To the Respondent – Fee Award

77. I have dismissed the appeal and therefore there can be no fee award.

Signature

Signed Date 26 October 2026

L Salkeld

First-tier Tribunal Judge L Salkeld

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