Miscellaneous Etats-Unis

Brown v. Cleveland

Official source
[Cite as Brown v. Cleveland, 

2026-Ohio-4285

.]


                              COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                             EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

PATRICE M. BROWN,                                :

                Plaintiff-Appellant,             :
                                                           No. 116117
                v.                               :

CITY OF CLEVELAND, ET AL.,                       :

                Defendant-Appellee.              :


                               JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

                JUDGMENT: REVERSED AND REMANDED
                RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: October 29, 2026


            Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
                                Case No. CV-25-128843


                                           Appearances:

                Nager, Romaine & Schneiberg Co., L.P.A., and Jennifer L.
                Lawther, for appellant.

                Mark D. Griffin, Cleveland Director of Law, and Jonathan
                L. Cudnik, Assistant Law Director, for appellee City of
                Cleveland.

                Dave Yost, Ohio Attorney General, and Christopher A.
                Gray, Assistant Attorney General, Bureau of Workers’
                Compensation, for appellee Administrator, Ohio Bureau
                of Workers’ Compensation.
EMANUELLA D. GROVES, P.J.:

               This cause came to be heard on the accelerated calendar pursuant to

App.R. 11.1 and Loc.App.R. 11.1.1 Plaintiff-appellant Patrice M. Brown (“Brown”)

appeals the decision of the trial court granting defendants-appellees the Bureau of

Workers’ Compensation (“BWC”) and the City of Cleveland’s (“Cleveland”)

(collectively, the “Appellees”), motions to dismiss. Her sole assignment of error

states:

       The trial court erred in granting defendant-appellee’s motion to
       dismiss for lack of jurisdiction because Ohio’s Saving Statute permits a
       plaintiff to refile a claim within one year of its dismissal otherwise than
       on the merits.

               For the reasons that follow, we reverse and remand the case to the

trial court.

I.   Factual and Procedural History

               The within matter began when Brown applied for workers’

compensation benefits after a workplace injury while working for Cleveland. She

was granted benefits and subsequently applied for an additional allowance because

of a spinal injury that she claimed was a result of the original incident. The

Industrial Commission of Ohio denied her claim in November 2022. Brown filed a

timely notice of appeal and a petition and complaint in the Cuyahoga County

Common Pleas Court listing BWC and Cleveland as defendants. In June 2023,

Brown filed a notice of voluntary dismissal pursuant to Civ.R. 41(A).


       1 “The purpose of an accelerated appeal is to allow this court to render a brief and

conclusory opinion.” State v. Priest, 

2014-Ohio-1735, ¶ 1

 (8th Dist.).
               Brown refiled the complaint less than a year after the dismissal.

When Brown failed to appear for a deposition and for the final pretrial, Appellees

made a joint oral motion to dismiss. The trial court subsequently dismissed the

complaint, without prejudice, pursuant to Civ.R. 41(B)(1). Brown filed a motion for

relief from judgment pursuant to Civ.R. 60(B) and a notice of appeal on the same

date. Later that day, the trial court denied Brown’s motion, finding that the case was

dismissed with prejudice and Brown could appeal the ruling. The following day, this

court dismissed the appeal for lack of a final appealable order.

               Less than a year after the dismissal, Brown refiled the complaint for

the third time. In December 2025, BWC filed a motion to dismiss, citing Civ.R.

12(B)(1) and R.C. 2305.19, the saving statute. In January 2026, Cleveland filed a

motion to dismiss, citing the same authority. Both defendants argued that the trial

court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to hear the complaint because the statute of

limitations had expired on Brown’s claim and she previously used the saving statute

to refile her case and could not use it again. Brown filed a responsive brief to BWC’s

motion, but did not file a response to Cleveland’s motion. Brown argued that she

was permitted to refile the complaint because the case was dismissed otherwise than

on the merits and the saving statute allowed her to file the complaint a third time,

citing McCullough v. Bennett, 

2024-Ohio-2783

.          The trial court granted both

motions to dismiss. In its journal entry addressing BWC’s motion, the court noted

that it granted the motion to dismiss “based on lack of jurisdiction due to [the] filing

date.”
              Brown filed the instant appeal.

II. Law and Analysis

              As a preliminary matter, we address the scope of this appeal. Brown’s

notice of appeal only references the January 12, 2026 entry dismissing her claims

against BWC and not the January 19, 2026 entry dismissing her claims against

Cleveland. Because the issues are the same and Cleveland fully participated in this

appeal, we find that Brown’s notice of appeal was timely filed with respect to both

decisions and address both rulings.       With that in mind, we analyze Brown’s

assignment of error.

              This case hinges on the interpretation of R.C. 2305.19 and whether

the procedural history of this case would permit Brown to file her workers’

compensation appeal a third time after a dismissal “otherwise than on the merits.”

We review the interpretation of a statute under the de novo standard of review. Real

Est. Tax Investors Retirement Equity v. Butler, 

2025-Ohio-545, ¶ 10

 (8th Dist.),

citing State v. Straley, 

2014-Ohio-2139, ¶ 9

. We therefore must undertake an

independent review without deference to the trial court’s determination. 

Id.,

 citing

Matrix Technologies, Inc. v. Kuss Corp., 

2008-Ohio-1301, ¶ 11

 (6th Dist.), citing

Brown v. Cty. Commrs. of Scioto Cty., 

87 Ohio App.3d 704, 711

 (4th Dist. 1993).

              Relevant to this appeal, R.C. 2305.19 provides:

      In any action that is commenced or attempted to be commenced . . . if
      the plaintiff fails otherwise than upon the merits, the plaintiff . . . may
      commence a new action within one year after the date of . . . plaintiff’s
      failure otherwise than upon the merits or within the period of the
      original applicable statute of limitations, whichever occurs later.
              R.C. 2305.19 has been the subject of many appellate cases, most of

which seek to balance the right of a plaintiff to litigate their case and attempts to

prevent protracted litigation. To that end, in McCullough v. Bennett, 2024-Ohio-

2783, ¶ 2, the Ohio Supreme Court noted that

      [t]he defendant in the underlying action asks us to go beyond the
      language of the saving statute and impose a “one-use” limitation, such
      that the saving statute cannot be used in this case because the plaintiff’s
      two previous complaints had been dismissed. We decline to do so. We
      adhere to what the statute says.

              Interpreting the Ohio Supreme Court’s ruling this court found that

      the Ohio Supreme Court held that Ohio’s saving statute is not limited
      by a one-use restriction, meaning that a plaintiff may refile a claim a
      third time as long as the second refiling occurs prior to the expiration
      of the statute of limitations. 

McCullough at ¶ 17-21

. The Court
      reasoned that complaints filed before expiration of the statute of
      limitations do not need to be “saved.” 

Id.


Kohn v. Glenmede Trust Co., 

2025-Ohio-1058, ¶ 26

 (8th Dist.).

              In Kohn this court determined that some of the plaintiff’s claims were

barred by the applicable statute of limitations and by Kohn’s prior use of the saving

statute. In addition, we found that some of the claims in the plaintiff’s third

complaint were filed before the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations,

the saving statute applied to those claims, and the trial court improperly dismissed

them. Id. at ¶ 27-30. This court certified a conflict between the Kohn decision and

McGowan v. Family Medicine, Inc., 

2002-Ohio-4071

 (5th Dist.). This court framed

the question on certification as, “Does the saving statute, R.C. 2305.19(A), apply to

save a refiled ‘action’ as a whole or does it apply to save refiled ‘claims’

independently?”
               The Ohio Supreme Court reversed, in part, our decision in Kohn and

further clarified its ruling in McCullough. The Court found:

       Nothing in the saving statute provides that it may be used only once.
       And nothing in the saving statute provides that it applies only when a
       second filing of an action occurred within the original statute-of-
       limitations period. Rather, once an action has been timely commenced,
       R.C. 2305.19(A) does not limit the number of times a new action may
       be commenced in accordance with the statute’s terms. If an action
       commenced in accordance with the saving statute subsequently fails
       other than on the merits, R.C. 2305.19(A) permits the plaintiff to
       commence a new action within one year of that failure or within the
       original applicable statute-of-limitations period, whichever is later.

Kohn v. Glenmede Trust Co., N.A., 

2026-Ohio-4001, ¶ 15

.

               The Court further noted that

       when the saving statute permits the commencement of a new action,
       the expiration of the statute of limitations for a claim that was asserted
       in the previous action does not preclude that claim from proceeding in
       the new action merely because its statute of limitations period had also
       expired before a previous use of the saving statute. . . .

Id. at ¶ 18.

               The Ohio Supreme Court recognized that its ruling could lead to

multiple refilings of a case, but noted that it was adhering to the plain language of

R.C. 2305.19 and the trial court had other remedies to prevent “abusive refilings”

under Civ.R. 41. Id. at ¶ 14, 17.

               On appeal, Brown’s arguments align with the Ohio Supreme Court’s

ruling in Kohn, that she was permitted to refile her complaint because the case had

been dismissed otherwise than on the merits and she refiled within a year of the

dismissal. BWC acknowledged in its brief and Cleveland noted at oral argument that

under binding Eighth District precedent this court must affirm the trial court’s
decision, but if the Ohio Supreme Court overruled our decision in Kohn this court

must reverse the trial court’s decision. We agree.

               Based on the foregoing, the sole issue is whether Brown refiled her

case in compliance with R.C. 2305.19, i.e., whether (1) Brown’s second complaint

was commenced or attempted to be commenced, (2) the second complaint was

dismissed otherwise than on the merits and (3) the third complaint was commenced

within one year of that failure or within the original applicable statute of limitations,

whichever occurs later.

               Based on the record before us, Brown timely filed her initial appeal

with petition and complaint.       Subsequently, Brown voluntarily dismissed her

complaint pursuant to Civ.R. 41(A)(1). She refiled her complaint within one year of

that dismissal. The trial court dismissed the refiled complaint without prejudice,

pursuant to Civ.R. 41(B)(1). Brown then refiled her complaint for a third time and

within one year of that dismissal. Because the parties do not dispute that Brown met

all of the requirements of the saving statute and given the Ohio Supreme Court’s

recent ruling, the trial court erred when it dismissed her complaint.

               Accordingly, Brown’s assignment of error is sustained.

               Judgment reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

                It is ordered that appellant recover from appellees costs herein taxed.

      The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

      It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the

common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.
      A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.


__________________________________
EMANUELLA D. GROVES, PRESIDING JUDGE

SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J., and
TIMOTHY W. CLARY, J., CONCUR

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