Tax United Kingdom

Cambridge Park and Leisure Homes Limited v The Commissioners for HMRC

Official source

Neutral Citation: [2026] UKFTT 01492 (TC)

Case Number: TC 10073

FIRST-TIER TRIBUNAL

TAX CHAMBER

Appeal reference: TC/2026/01103

VAT – input tax – error correction – four-year cap – Regulations 29(1A) and 34(1A) Value Added Tax Regulations 1995 – Rule 8(3)(c) – strike out – no reasonable prospect of success

Heard on: 23 October 2026

Judgment date: 27 October 2026

Before

TRIBUNAL JUDGE GERAINT WILLIAMS

Between

CAMBRIDGE PARK AND LEISURE HOMES LIMITED

Appellant

and

THE COMMISSIONERS FOR HIS MAJESTY’S REVENUE AND CUSTOMS

Respondents

The Tribunal determined the appeal without a hearing pursuant to Rule 29(3) of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Tax Chamber) Rules 2009, having considered the Notice of Appeal dated 18 March 2026 and accompanying documents, HMRC’s application dated 10 July 2026 to strike out the appeal and the Tribunal’s direction dated 28 July 2026 inviting the Appellant to respond to that application. The Appellant did not do so.

DECISION

Introduction

1. By an application dated 10 July 2026, HMRC applies for the Appellant’s appeal to be struck out pursuant to Rule 8(3)(c) of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Tax Chamber) Rules 2009 (“Tribunal Rules”) on the basis that it has no reasonable prospect of success. HMRC’s case is that the Appellant’s claim falls outside the four-year time limits prescribed by Regulations 29(1A) and 34(1A) of the Value Added Tax Regulations 1995 (“VATR”) and that neither HMRC nor the Tribunal has power to disapply or extend those statutory limits.

Background

2. The Appellant is a VAT registered company which operates caravan, holiday and leisure parks.

3. On 28 January 2026 HMRC rejected the Appellant’s claim to recover VAT of £3,481.38 relating to the prescribed accounting periods 02/21 and 05/21 on the basis that the claim had been made outside the applicable four-year statutory time limit. HMRC accepted separate corrections relating to periods 08/21 and 11/21.

4. On 18 March 2026 the Appellant appealed HMRC’s decision to the Tribunal.

5. In its Notice of Appeal, the Appellant submits that it is a “fundamental principle of the tax system that a taxpayer should not be required to bear a higher tax burden than is properly due”. The Appellant contends that the input tax in question relates to legitimate business expenditure which would have been recoverable had it been processed within the relevant period and that denial of recovery “solely on timing grounds results in an inequitable outcome”.

6. The Appellant further contends that it made a “good-faith attempt to notify HMRC of the VAT errors by post at an earlier stage” and that it was reasonably believed that the notification had been received and was being processed. The Appellant asserts that HMRC did not indicate that the method of notification was incorrect or that further action was required and that “The delay in HMRC’s response contributed directly to the position whereby part of the claim fell outside the four-year time limit”.

7. The Appellant states that the delay in identifying and correcting the errors arose from “severe and prolonged ill health affecting the business owner, including multiple hospital admissions for life-threatening conditions”. The Appellant explains that, as a small organisation with no alternative personnel able to undertake the financial administration, the illness resulted in significant disruption which led to purchase invoices and associated input tax not being processed in the correct VAT periods. The Appellant maintains that the errors were “entirely unintentional and arose from circumstances beyond the Appellant’s control”.

8. The Appellant further states that, once the errors were identified, a review of its records was undertaken and corrective action taken. The Notice of Appeal refers to strengthened financial controls, engagement of external bookkeeping support and improvements to invoice capture and processing procedures. The Appellant also states that it acted in good faith throughout and that there was no deliberate or careless behaviour.

9. In summary, the Appellant contends that there was a “reasonable excuse for the delay” and that it is appropriate for the Tribunal to “allow the appeal and disapply or override the strict application of the four-year time limit in this case”. In the “Desired Outcome” section, the Appellant asks the Tribunal to determine that the VAT is recoverable, direct HMRC to make repayment and determine that application of the four-year time limit “would lead to an unjust outcome in this case and should not be applied”.

10. On 10 July 2026, HMRC applied for the appeal to be struck out pursuant to Rule 8(3)(c) of the Tribunal Rules on the basis that the appeal has no reasonable prospect of success.

11. By letter dated 28 July 2026, the Tribunal directed the Appellant to provide any response to HMRC’s application. The Appellant did not provide a response.

Relevant law

12. Rule 8(3)(c) of the Tribunal Rules provides that the Tribunal may strike out the whole or part of proceedings if:

“the Tribunal considers there is no reasonable prospect of the appellant’s case, or part of it, succeeding”.

13. The applicable principles were considered by the Upper Tribunal in HMRC v Fairford Group plc (in liquidation) [2014] UKUT 329 (TCC) (“Fairford”). The Upper Tribunal held at [41]:

“The tribunal must consider whether there is a realistic, as opposed to a fanciful (in the sense of it being entirely without substance), prospect of succeeding on the issue at a full hearing. A ‘realistic’ prospect of success is one that carries some degree of conviction and not one that is merely arguable. The tribunal must avoid conducting a ‘mini-trial’. As Lord Hope observed in Three Rivers, the strike out procedure is to deal with cases that are not fit for a full hearing at all.”

14. In First De Sales Ltd Partnership v HMRC [2018] UKUT 396 (TCC) (“First De Sales”), the Upper Tribunal endorsed that approach and held that the principles applicable to applications under Rule 8(3)(c) are broadly similar to those applicable to applications under CPR 3.4, whilst recognising that the Tribunal Rules contain no equivalent jurisdiction to summary judgment under CPR Part 24.

15. In First De Sales, the Upper Tribunal also approved the principles summarised by Lewison J in Easyair Ltd v Opal Telecom Ltd [2009] EWHC 339 (Ch) (“Easyair”) concerning the summary disposal of proceedings. Those principles include that:

(1) the Tribunal must not conduct a mini-trial;

(2) a claim has a realistic prospect of success if it carries some degree of conviction and is not merely arguable;

(3) the Tribunal should take into account not only the evidence before it but also the evidence that can reasonably be expected to be available at trial;

(4) although factual assertions are not to be subjected to an impermissible trial on paper, the Tribunal is not required to accept without analysis everything asserted by a party; and

(5) it may be appropriate to determine a short point of law or construction where the Tribunal is satisfied that it has before it all material necessary for the proper determination of that issue.

16. Lewison J also observed that where a case turns on a short point of law, the court should not decline to determine the issue merely because disclosure, witness evidence or cross-examination might take place at a later stage. It is insufficient for a party resisting summary disposal simply to contend that something may emerge at trial which could affect the outcome.

17. In First De Sales, the Upper Tribunal applied those principles in the context of Rule 8(3)(c). The Upper Tribunal explained that cases turning upon a short issue of law or statutory construction may appropriately be determined under the strike-out jurisdiction where the Tribunal has all material necessary to determine the issue and the parties have had a fair opportunity to address it.

18. Accordingly, in determining HMRC’s application, I must consider the Appellant’s case at its highest. The question is not whether the Appellant is likely to fail. Rather, it is whether, assuming the facts relied upon by the Appellant to be correct, those facts disclose a realistic prospect of the appeal succeeding. If the appeal would necessarily fail even on that assumption, strike out will be appropriate.

19. Regulation 29 of VATR makes provision for the deduction of input tax. So far as material, Regulation 29(1A) provides:

“The Commissioners shall not allow or direct a person to make any claim under paragraph (1) after the expiry of 4 years after the relevant date.”

20. Regulation 34 of VATR makes provision for the correction of errors in VAT returns. So far as material, Regulation 34(1A) provides:

“An error shall be disregarded for the purposes of paragraph (1) to the extent that it arose in an accounting period ended more than 4 years before the end of the accounting period in which the error was discovered.”

21. The Tribunal is a statutory tribunal and possesses only those powers conferred upon it by Parliament.

22. The Tribunal does not possess a general equitable jurisdiction. In the absence of statutory authority permitting a different course, the Tribunal cannot disapply or override legislation because its operation produces a result that appears unfair or harsh in the circumstances of a particular case.

23. Accordingly, the central question raised by HMRC’s application is whether the matters relied upon by the Appellant, even if accepted in their entirety, are capable in law of overcoming the statutory limitations imposed by Regulations 29(1A) and 34(1A) of VATR.

Discussion

Has HMRC demonstrated that the appeal has no reasonable prospect of success?

24. I begin by emphasising that this application is not concerned with whether the matters set out in the Notice of Appeal are true. Applying the principles described in Fairford and First De Sales, I proceed on the basis most favourable to the Appellant and assume that the factual assertions contained in the Notice of Appeal are correct.

25. Accordingly, for the purposes of this application, I assume that:

(a) the delay in making the relevant claim arose because of severe and prolonged ill-health affecting the individual responsible for the Appellant’s financial affairs;

(b) that ill-health included multiple hospital admissions for serious medical conditions;

(c) the Appellant acted at all times in good faith;

(d) the VAT in question was incurred on genuine business expenditure;

(e) the Appellant made an earlier attempt to notify HMRC of the relevant errors; and

(f) the delay was not the result of deliberate or careless conduct.

26. The question is whether those matters, if established, would provide a basis upon which the appeal could succeed.

27. The Appellant’s case, summarised at paragraphs 5 to 9 above, proceeds from two central propositions. First, the Appellant contends that it would be unjust to deny recovery of VAT incurred on legitimate business expenditure solely because of the operation of the statutory time limits. Secondly, the Appellant submits that the delay arose because of exceptional circumstances outside its control and that the Tribunal should therefore “disapply or override the strict application of the four-year time limit in this case”.

28. For the purposes of this application, I accept the factual assertions upon which those submissions are based. I also accept that the circumstances described by the Appellant are capable of attracting considerable sympathy. However, the issue raised by HMRC’s application is not whether those circumstances existed. The issue is whether they are capable in law of producing the outcome sought by the Appellant.

29. The Appellant does not contend that the relevant claim was made within the four-year period prescribed by Regulations 29(1A) or 34(1A) of VATR. Nor does the Appellant identify any provision within VATR which permits either HMRC or the Tribunal to extend those statutory time limits because of illness, hardship or exceptional circumstances.

30. Instead, the Appellant invites the Tribunal to disapply the statutory provisions because their operation would otherwise produce an unjust result.

31. In my judgment, that submission faces an insurmountable legal obstacle.

32. So far as material, Regulation 29(1A) provides that HMRC:

“shall not allow or direct a person to make any claim under paragraph (1) after the expiry of 4 years after the relevant date.”

33. So far as material, Regulation 34(1A) provides that qualifying errors arising outside the specified four-year period:

“shall be disregarded”.

34. The language employed by both provisions is mandatory. Neither provision contains any mechanism by which the relevant period may be extended because a taxpayer acted reasonably, had a reasonable excuse, suffered illness or would otherwise experience hardship.

35. Equally, neither provision confers any discretion upon the Tribunal to dispense with the statutory requirements where their application produces a result which appears unfair in the circumstances of an individual case.

36. The Tribunal is a statutory tribunal. It possesses only those powers conferred upon it by Parliament. Whilst the Tribunal may consider whether HMRC has correctly applied the legislation, it cannot create a discretion which Parliament has not provided.

37. The difficulty for the Appellant is therefore that, even if every factual assertion in the Notice of Appeal were established after a substantive hearing, those facts would not address the legal obstacle identified by HMRC. The appeal would still depend upon the Tribunal possessing a power to disapply or override Regulations 29(1A) and 34(1A) of VATR. No such power has been identified.

38. I have also considered the Appellant’s contention that it made a “good-faith attempt” to notify HMRC of the relevant errors at an earlier stage and that HMRC’s response contributed to the claim ultimately falling outside the relevant period.

39. Even taking that contention at its highest, the Appellant does not contend that the earlier correspondence itself constituted a valid claim for the purposes of Regulations 29 or 34 of VATR. Nor does the Notice of Appeal identify any legal basis upon which the Tribunal could conclude that the statutory requirements were thereby satisfied. It follows that the earlier correspondence does not disclose a realistic basis upon which the appeal could succeed.

40. This is therefore not a case in which a fuller investigation of the facts might realistically affect the outcome. The appeal turns upon a short point of law. I am satisfied that I have all material necessary to determine that issue and that the Appellant has had a fair opportunity to advance its position.

41. Applying the principles identified in Fairford, First De Sales and Easyair, I conclude that the appeal has no realistic prospect of success. Even accepting the Appellant’s case in its entirety, the Tribunal has no power to grant the relief sought.

Conclusion

42. For those reasons, I am satisfied that the appeal has no reasonable prospect of success within the meaning of Rule 8(3)(c) of the Tribunal Rules.

43. The appeal must therefore be struck out.

Decision

44. Pursuant to Rule 8(3)(c) of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Tax Chamber) Rules 2009, the appeal is struck out.

Right to apply for permission to appeal

45. This document contains full findings of fact and reasons for the decision. Any party dissatisfied with this decision has a right to apply for permission to appeal against it pursuant to Rule 39 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Tax Chamber) Rules 2009. The application must be received by this Tribunal not later than 56 days after this decision is sent to that party. The parties are referred to “Guidance to accompany a Decision from the First-tier Tribunal (Tax Chamber)” which accompanies and forms part of this decision notice.

Release date:

27 October 2026

Our tax lawyer assists clients in matters of this kind.


Open Justice Licence (The National Archives).

Neighbouring decisions

Preliminary case review

Send your documents. Receive an analysis.

Send us the documents in your case. Hassan KOHEN reviews them personally and sends you a first written analysis of your situation within 24 working hours.

  • Written analysis by the lawyer, €80 incl. VAT
  • Personal reply within 24 working hours
  • 100% confidential, legal professional privilege guaranteed
  • Up to 1 GB of documents in total, folders and sub-folders accepted
80 €incl. VAT

Preliminary review of your case. Review of your documents and a first written analysis by Hassan KOHEN within 24 working hours. Payment is made online after this form is submitted.

  • Up to 1 GB of documents in total, folders and sub-folders accepted
  • Secure payment, no card details stored
  • Terms and fee agreement

Click or drag your files here
All formats accepted (PDF, Word, images, etc.)

Sending...

Payment constitutes a request for immediate performance of your analysis. Your data is used solely to process your request.
Terms · Privacy policy.

IA juridique gratuite

Une question de droit ? Demandez à Judith.

Judith cherche dans les codes, la Constitution, la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme et les décisions des juges, puis vous montre les textes et les passages d’arrêts qui pourraient répondre à votre question, avec leur source officielle. Gratuite, sans compte, elle ne rédige rien à votre place. Découvrir Judith, l’IA juridique gratuite du cabinet.

Trois recherches par jour, sans compte. Votre question est enregistrée et relue par le cabinet pour améliorer l’outil : n’y mettez ni nom ni information sensible.