Civil European Court of Human Rights

CASE OF SALVADOR COUTINHO DOS SANTOS AMADO v. PORTUGAL

ECLI ECLI:CE:ECHR:2026:0203JUD004479419

 

FOURTH SECTION

CASE OF SALVADOR COUTINHO DOS SANTOS AMADO v. PORTUGAL

(Application no. 44794/19)

 

JUDGMENT
 

Art 6 § 1 (civil) • Fair hearing • Ordinary inspection procedure by High Council of Judiciary (CSM) to appraise applicant’s performance as judge resulting in “poor” rating, automatic suspension from duty and opening of disciplinary proceedings against him • Alleged unfairness of proceedings brought by applicant before Supreme Court to challenge CSM’s decision • Art 6 applicable • Waiver by applicant of right to public hearing before Supreme Court • Sufficient judicial review afforded to applicant in view of issues he raised before Supreme Court

 

Prepared by the Registry. Does not bind the Court.

 

STRASBOURG

3 February 2026

 

FINAL

 

03/05/2026

 

This judgment has become final under Article 44 § 2 of the Convention.
It may be subject to editorial revision.

 

In the case of Salvador Coutinho dos Santos Amado v. Portugal,

The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:

 Lado Chanturia, President,
 Faris Vehabović,
 Lorraine Schembri Orland,
 Anja Seibert-Fohr,
 Ana Maria Guerra Martins,
 Anne Louise Bormann,
 András Jakab, judges,
and Simeon Petrovski, Deputy Section Registrar,

Having regard to:

the application (no. 44794/19) against the Portuguese Republic lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Portuguese national, Mr Sérgio Jorge Salvador Coutinho dos Santos Amado (“the applicant”), on 14 August 2019;

the decision to give notice to the Portuguese Government (“the Government”) of the complaints concerning the lack of independence of the High Council of the Judiciary (Conselho Superior da Magistratura – “the CSM”), the insufficient judicial review conducted by the Judicial Division of the Supreme Court and the lack of a public hearing, and to declare the remainder of the application inadmissible;

the parties’ observations;

Having deliberated in private on 13 January 2026,

Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:

INTRODUCTION

1.  The case concerns the alleged unfairness of the ordinary inspection procedure (processo de inspeção) used to appraise the applicant’s performance as a judge (“the inspection procedure”), which resulted in a rating of “poor”, his automatic suspension from duty and the opening of disciplinary proceedings against him. Relying on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, the applicant complained that the CSM lacked independence, as it was composed of more non-judicial members appointed by the political authorities than judicial members. He also alleged that he had not been afforded a full judicial review by the Judicial Division of the Supreme Court. Lastly, he complained that no public hearing had been held in the proceedings in issue.

THE FACTS

2.  The applicant was born in 1974 and lives in São Félix da Marinha. He was represented by Mr P. Venâncio, a lawyer.

3.  The Government were represented by their Agents, Mr Ricardo Bragança de Matos and Mr Manuel Aires Magriço, Public Prosecutors, and Ms Helena Martins Leitão, Deputy Attorney General.

  1.         ORDINARY PERIODIC INSPECTION OF THE APPLICANT AND CSM’S DECISION OF 24 APRIL 2018 (PROCEDURE No. 2018‑54/IO)

4.  The applicant has been a judge since 2006.

  1.    Inspection of the applicant for the purposes of appraising his performance

5.  On an unspecified date, in accordance with section 36(1) of the Status of Judges Act (Estatuto dos Magistrados Judiciais, “the Act” – see paragraph 33 below), the CSM ordered the ordinary inspection of the applicant for the purposes of appraising his professional performance from 17 September 2013 to 6 September 2017. During that period, he had been a judge at Ovar Criminal Court, Oliveira do Bairro and Estarreja Family Courts and, from 1 September 2014, Albergaria-a-Velha District Court.

6.  J.G., an appeal court judge, was tasked by the CSM with conducting the appraisal, in his capacity as a judicial inspector (inspetor judicial).

7.  On 20 November 2017 Judge J.G. informed the CSM about the applicant’s absences, which had required several hearings to be postponed. That information triggered the opening of a review procedure (procedure no. 2017/427/IN), which was subsequently converted into disciplinary proceedings for breach of the duty to work diligently (see paragraph 30 below). Those proceedings were nevertheless stayed pending the outcome of the inspection procedure.

  1.      Judge J.G.’s inspection report

8.  On 16 January 2018 Judge J.G. sent the applicant his inspection report. It was based, among other things, on an interview with the applicant, an analysis of his cases and work orders, audio recordings of hearings, law reports, and interviews with other judges, registrars and lawyers. It presented an appraisal of the applicant’s performance over the period in question using the criteria set out in Article 12 of the regulations of the CSM’s inspection services (see paragraph 35 below).

9.  In terms of the applicant’s individual abilities, the report noted that despite his good intellectual abilities and interpersonal skills, his continual absences and lateness had caused hearings to be adjourned and had disrupted the schedules of numerous participants in proceedings, thereby tarnishing the image of judicial office. With regard to the list of the applicant’s absences, it focused in particular on those governed by section 10 of the Act (see paragraph 33 below) as in force at the material time. It noted that under that provision the applicant had been absent for six days in 2015, seven days in 2016 and eight days in 2017. It observed that those absences had caused seven hearings to be adjourned or had required the applicant to be replaced by other judges of the court. It concluded that the applicant had made improper (indevido) use of the benefit afforded to him under section 10 of the Act. It also pointed out that the applicant had had a cumulative total of 12 unjustified absences in 2016 and 2017. Moreover, it noted that the adjournment of the hearings had not only caused inconvenience to the individuals summoned, in particular lawyers, but had also added to the workload of the court registrars, since they had been obliged to inform the relevant people of the adjournments in question.

10.  Judge J.G.’s report also observed that the applicant’s lack of dedication and low output had resulted in a backlog of cases at Albergaria‑a‑Velha District Court. In particular, it noted delays in the scheduling of hearings and the adoption of judgments.

11.  Lastly, the report noted that in a decision of 3 December 2014, the CSM had already imposed a sanction on the applicant for his many absences, in the form of a 20-day suspension from duty, with enforcement suspended for one year.

12.  In the light of what he considered to be the established facts, Judge J.G. recommended, pursuant to Article 19 of the regulations of the CSM’s inspection services (see paragraph 35 below), that the CSM give the applicant a rating of “poor” for his professional performance over the period in question, in accordance with sections 33 and 34 of the Act (see paragraph 33 below). He appended statistics to the report, showing the applicant’s overall output for the period covered by the inspection, the number of decisions he had delivered and the hearings that had had to be postponed on account of his absences. The report also included an analysis of more than 50 judgments prepared by the applicant, taking into account the structure, reasoning and delivery times.

13.  In accordance with section 37(2) of the Act as in force at the material time and Article 17 § 8 of the regulations of the CSM’s inspection services (see paragraphs 33 and 35 below), Judge J.G. gave the applicant ten days to exercise his right of reply (direito de resposta) and to produce evidence in his defence.

  1.      The applicant’s defence

14.  On 26 January 2018 the applicant, represented by a lawyer, presented his defence. He disputed the interpretation that had been made of section 10(1) of the Act (see paragraph 9 above). In that regard, he contended that the president of the court had been informed of the reasons for the absences in question and had found them to be justified. He added that those absences had been brought to the attention of the CSM, which had never called them into question. He explained that for that reason, he had not considered it necessary to apply for a certificate of incapacity for work in order to justify them. He further stated that since the CSM had raised no issue during the period in question, he had believed the absences to be lawful.

15.  The applicant then alleged that disciplinary proceedings were under way to review whether the absences in question should be regarded as justified (see paragraph 7 above) and that the outcome of those proceedings had to be awaited before the issues raised in the inspection procedure could be settled.

16.  Furthermore, he challenged the inspector’s recommended rating for failing to give sufficient credit to, inter alia, the positive aspects of his judicial performance, such as his independence, his previous ratings and the legal soundness of his decisions.

17.  In conclusion, he sought the production of additional evidence, requesting Judge J.G. to order Estarreja and Oliveira do Bairro Family Courts, where he had served as a judge, to produce the daily lists of all the decisions and judgments he had delivered, to provide copies of all the evidence submitted to the CSM regarding his absences and to supply an itemised backlog of cases in Albergaria-a-Velha District Court starting on 1 March 2016 (asserting that he had replaced a colleague from that date onwards).

18.  On 6 February 2018 Judge J.G. refused the applicant’s request for the production of additional evidence. In his decision he noted that the applicant had not indicated why he wanted such evidence to be produced. Observing that the applicant’s performance appraisals in Estarreja and Oliveira do Bairro Family Courts had not been negative, he contended that the evidence sought by the applicant concerning those courts was irrelevant. He also pointed out that the purpose of an appraisal was not to review each decision but rather to make an overall evaluation. In relation to the backlog of cases at Albergaria-a-Velha District Court, he indicated that those data were already appended to the appraisal report.

  1.    The applicant’s request of 9 February 2018 and the decision of the plenary CSM of 24 April 2018

19.  In a letter sent to the CSM on 9 February 2018, the applicant, represented by his lawyer, complained of a violation of his defence rights on account of the refusal of his request for the production of additional evidence (see paragraph 18 above). He also alleged that disciplinary proceedings (see paragraph 7 above) regarding his disputed absences were pending and that their outcome had to be awaited before the inspection procedure could be concluded.

20.  On 24 April 2018 the plenary CSM delivered a unanimous decision, sitting in a formation composed of the President and Vice-President of the Supreme Court as well as five judges elected by their peers (two of whom were from courts of appeal) and five members elected by the Assembly of the Republic in accordance with Article 218 § 1 (b) and (c) of the Constitution (see paragraph 32 below).

21.  As regards the applicant’s request for a suspension of the inspection procedure, the plenary CSM found that regardless of the pending disciplinary proceedings, it had sufficient evidence to rule on his appraisal. As to the applicant’s request for the production of additional evidence, it held that he could have adduced such items himself, particularly the decisions he had delivered during the appraisal period, as he was entitled to do under Article 17 § 3 of the regulations of the CSM’s inspection services (see paragraph 35 below).

22.  On the basis of Judge J.G.’s inspection report (see paragraphs 8-12 above), the plenary CSM decided to give the applicant the rating of “poor”, as recommended. It noted that it was the third ordinary periodic inspection of the applicant and that, in the two previous appraisals, his performance had been rated as “good”. Concerning the appraisal period in question, it found that the applicant’s repeated absences had tarnished the image of the court by causing various hearings to be adjourned after witnesses and lawyers had been summoned to appear. It also found that the applicant’s output at Albergaria-a-Velha District Court was low despite that court having only a reasonable number of pending cases.

23.  In accordance with section 34(2) of the Act as in force at the material time (see paragraph 33 below), the plenary CSM decided to suspend the applicant from duty pending the outcome of the disciplinary proceedings against him, which were to be expanded in order to determine his fitness to hold the office of judge (see paragraph 7 above).

24.  On 7 May 2018 the decision of the plenary CSM was notified to the applicant.

  1.       PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE JUDICIAL DIVISION OF THE SUPREME COURT
    1.    Appeal by the applicant

25.  On 6 June 2018 the applicant, still represented by his lawyer, lodged an appeal under section 168 of the Act as in force at the material time (see paragraph 33 below) against the CSM’s decision with the Judicial Division of the Supreme Court (Secção do Contencioso do Supremo Tribunal de Justiça – “the Supreme Court”).

26.  He complained, firstly, about the refusal of his request for the production of evidence as part of the inspection procedure (see paragraphs 18 and 21 above). As to the merits, he argued that the reason for many of his delays was that he had taken on extra duties to assist a fellow judge in the same court, at the request of the president of the court. According to the applicant, that demonstrated that conditions within the court were not as favourable as Judge J.G. had suggested in his report. The applicant further submitted that since his absences had influenced his rating, the inspection procedure should have been suspended pending the outcome of the disciplinary proceedings, which were intended to determine whether or not his absences could be regarded as justified, in particular under section 10(1) of the Act (see paragraphs 7 above and 33 below). He contended that the rating which had been assigned to him was neither reasonable nor proportionate to the facts, nor did it take sufficient account of the independence and impartiality he displayed in office.

  1.    Judgment of the Judicial Division of the Supreme Court of 21 February 2019

27.  In a judgment of 21 February 2019, the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal. Regarding the rejection of his request to suspend the inspection procedure pending the outcome of the disciplinary proceedings, the Supreme Court found that the inspection procedure already included an assessment of whether or not the disputed absences were justified and that it was therefore not necessary to await the end of the disciplinary proceedings for that reason. It also held that the question whether or not an absence was justified fell within the scope of interpretation of section 10 of the Act.

28.  As regards the refusal of his request for the production of evidence, the Supreme Court found that the case file already contained statistics relating to Albergaria-a-Velha District Court and that the evidence relating to the other courts was irrelevant, as the inspection was not an evaluation of each case dealt with by the judge under inspection.

29.  As to the issues relating to the applicant’s performance appraisal itself, the Supreme Court found that they were purely administrative matters falling within the discretion of the administrative authorities, over which it had no jurisdiction. It could not therefore take the place of those authorities, as that would interfere with the separation of powers. The Supreme Court observed that there had been no manifest or gross error, and the applicant had not argued otherwise. It noted that the CSM’s decision referred (i) to absences by the applicant that had required hearings to be postponed, (ii) to certain absences which had not been entered in the official register of absences, and (iii) to uneven and unsatisfactory output on his part despite a perfectly reasonable caseload. The Supreme Court also observed that the applicant had previously had a sanction imposed on him for absenteeism. Having regard to those factors, it concluded that no breach of the principle of proportionality had been made out.

  1.     SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS

30.  On 4 June 2019 the plenary CSM gave its decision on the disciplinary proceedings opened in response to the information provided by Judge J.G. (see paragraph 7 above). It held that the applicant had failed to uphold his duties to pursue the public interest and to work diligently. It nonetheless found that he did not appear to be permanently unfit for office, and accordingly suspended him from duty for 180 days. In addition, it decided to transfer him to another court in accordance with section 104(3)(b) of the Act (see paragraph 33 below) in order to preserve the image of the courts and of the applicant himself.

31.  The applicant did not specify whether he had appealed against that decision to the Supreme Court.

RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORK

  1. DOMESTIC LEGAL FRAMEWORK
    1.    Portuguese Constitution

32.  Article 218 of the Constitution, concerning the CSM, provides:

“1.  The High Council of the Judiciary shall be presided over by the President of the Supreme Court and shall be composed of the following members:

(a)  two members appointed by the President of the Republic;

(b)  seven members elected by the Assembly of the Republic;

(c)  seven judges elected by their peers …

2.  The rules concerning the guarantees enjoyed by judges shall apply to all members of the High Council of the Judiciary.”

  1.    Status of Judges Act

33.  The relevant provisions of the Status of Judges Act (Law no. 21/85 of 30 July 1985) (Estatuto dos Magistrados Judiciais – “the Act”), as in force at the material time, read as follows:

Section 10 – Absences

“1.  Where there are compelling reasons, judges may be absent [from the judicial district in which they perform their duties] for up to three days per month and ten days per year, provided that they notify [the reason for their absence] to the CSM in advance or, where this is not possible, immediately upon their return.

2.  Absences on working days outside the registry’s normal opening hours shall not be counted as absences where they do not entail a failure to perform an official duty or disrupt the performance of such a duty.

…

5.  Any unjustified absence shall result not only in disciplinary action but also in loss of pay for the period in question.”

[Chapter III – Ratings]

Section 33 – Rating (classificação) of judges

“Judges shall be appraised, on the basis of performance, using the following ratings: ‘very good’, ‘quite good’ (bom com distinção), ‘good’ and ‘poor’.”

Section 34 – Criteria and consequences of ratings

“1.  The rating shall take into account the manner in which judges perform their duties, the volume, difficulty and management of their caseload, their ability to streamline procedural steps, the conditions under which the work is carried out, their technical skills, their intellectual abilities (categoria intelectual), any role they may play in training trainee judges, any legal publications, and their integrity.

2.  A rating of ‘poor’ shall result in the judges’ suspension from duty and the opening of an investigation into whether they are unfit for office.”

Section 36 – Rating frequency

“1.  Judges shall be rated following an ordinary inspection. The inspection shall be conducted for the first time one year after they take up duties in their first place of assignment, and then every four years thereafter.

2.  … [J]udges may be required to undergo an extraordinary inspection, upon a reasoned request by those concerned, if the last ordinary inspection took place more than three years ago, or at any time, on the initiative of the CSM.

…”

Section 37 – Aspects taken into consideration in the rating

“1.  Length of service, results of previous inspections, disciplinary proceedings and any other relevant information contained in the individual’s file shall be taken into account in the rating.

2.  The judge shall be given the opportunity to comment on the inspection report; he or she may provide any information he or she deems relevant.

…”

Section 44 – Assignment …

“1.  Judges shall be assigned to posts on the primary basis of the needs of the service, with the least possible disruption to their personal and family life.

…

4.  … [R]atings and length of service shall be criteria that may be taken into account in assigning posts, in descending order of preference.

…”

Section 104 – [Suspension from duty]

“…

3.  Where the suspension from duty is longer than 120 days, it may entail …:

…

(b)  the judge’s transfer from the post in which he or she was serving at the time of the misconduct to an identical post in a different court or service.”

[Chapter X – High Council of the Judiciary]

Section 136 – Definition

“The High Council of the Judiciary shall be the body responsible for management and disciplinary matters relating to judges.”

Section 137 – Composition [of the High Council of the Judiciary]

“1.  The High Council of the Judiciary shall be presided over by the President of the Supreme Court and shall comprise the following members:

(a)  two members appointed by the President of the Republic;

(b)  seven members elected by the Assembly of the Republic;

(c)  seven members elected by judges from among their number.

2.  Judges may not decline membership of the High Council of the Judiciary.”

Section 138 – Vice-President …

“1.  The Vice-President of the High Council of the Judiciary shall be the Supreme Court judge referred to in section 141(2) and shall be appointed on a full-time basis.

…”

Section 139 – Form of appointment

“1.  The members referred to in section 137(1)(b) shall be those appointed in accordance with the Constitution and the Regulation on the Assembly of the Republic.

2.  The members referred to in section 137(1)(c) shall be elected by universal suffrage, in accordance with the principle of proportional representation and the highest-averages method …”

Section 141 – Organisation of lists

“1.  The members referred to in section 137(1)(c) shall be elected from lists drawn up by a minimum of 20 electors.

2.  The lists shall include a deputy for each actual candidate. Each list must contain the names of one judge of the Supreme Court of Justice, two appeal court judges and one judge from each judicial district.

…”

Section 147 – Performance of duties

“1.  The members referred to in section 137(1)(c) shall be elected for a three-year term of office, renewable once.

…”

Section 148 – Status of CSM members

“1.  Members of the High Council of the Judiciary who are not judges shall be subject to the same rules concerning guarantees as judicial members.

2.  Members of the High Council of the Judiciary shall perform their duties on a full-time basis, unless they waive such entitlement, in which case a reduction in working hours corresponding to their original post shall apply.

…”

Section 149 – Responsibilities

“The High Council of the Judiciary shall:

(a)  appoint, assign, transfer, promote and remove judges, assess their performance, take disciplinary action against them and, in general, perform any acts of a similar nature, without prejudice to the provisions governing elected posts;

…

(e)  order inspections, reviews and investigations within the judicial services;

…”

Section 150 – Functioning

“1.  The High Council of the Judiciary shall sit in plenary session (plenário) or as a Permanent Council.

2.  The plenary formation shall comprise all the members of the Council, in accordance with section 137(1).

…”

Section 151 – Responsibilities of the plenary formation

“The High Council of the Judiciary, sitting in plenary session, shall be responsible for:

…

(d)  ruling on the rating recommendations provided for in section 34(2);

…”

Section 153 – Responsibilities of the President

“1.  The President of the High Council of the Judiciary shall:

(a)  represent the Council;

(b)  perform the duties delegated to him or her by the Council, with the option of sub‑delegating to the Vice-President;

(c)  swear in the Vice-President, the judicial inspectors and the Secretary;

(d)  direct and coordinate inspection services;

…

2.  The President may delegate to the Vice-President responsibility for swearing in the judicial inspectors and the Secretary, as well as the responsibilities referred to in sub-paragraphs (d) and (e) above.”

Section 156 – Functioning of the plenary formation

“…

2.  Decisions shall be taken by a majority of the votes cast. The President shall have a casting vote.

3.  In order for the decisions to be valid, the presence of at least 12 members is required.”

[Chapter XI – Complaints and appeals]

Section 168 – Appeals

“1.  The decisions of the High Council of the Judiciary shall be open to appeal before the Supreme Court.

2.  For the purposes of examining the appeals referred to in the previous paragraph, the Supreme Court shall sit in a formation comprising the most senior Vice-President, who shall have a casting vote, and one judge from each of the divisions, appointed annually and in order of seniority.

…

5.   The grounds for appeal shall be those provided for by law for the purpose of challenging government acts.”

  1.    Administrative Courts Code

34.  Article 91 of the Administrative Courts Code was derived from Law no. 15/2002 of 22 February 2002. The relevant provisions, as in force at the material time, read as follows:

“1.  Once the taking of evidence is complete, the judge or rapporteur may, if the complexity of the facts warrants it, order of his or her own motion a public hearing in order to debate the facts.

2.  The public hearing referred to in the previous paragraph may also be held at the request of one of the parties. However, the judge may refuse the request by means of a reasoned order if he or she considers that no hearing is warranted because the facts established on the basis of the documentary evidence are not disputed.

3.  Where a public hearing is held on the initiative of the parties, the legal arguments shall also be presented orally.

…”

  1.    Regulations of the CSM’s inspection services

35.  The regulations of the CSM’s inspection services were adopted by decision no. 1777/2016 of 25 October 2016 and published in the Official Gazette of 17 November 2016. The relevant parts read as follows:

Article 12

Appraisal criteria

“1.  Judges are inspected on the basis of their individual ability to perform their duties, their fitness for office and their technical skills.

2.  With regard to their individual ability to perform their duties, the inspection gives general consideration to factors including:

(a)  independence, impartiality, dignified conduct and civic integrity;

(b)  relations with the parties and participants in proceedings, other judges, lawyers, other forensic professionals, court officials and the general public;

(c)  the professional and personal image of judges in the performance of their duties;

(d)  the composure and discretion with which they discharge their duties;

(e)  their ability to understand the specific situations brought before them and their sense of justice, having regard to the socio-cultural environment in which their duties are performed;

(f)  the skill and dedication they display in training judges.

3.  Fitness for office is assessed in terms of such aspects as:

(a)  attendance, diligence and dedication;

(b)  output, in particular with regard to the clearance rate – calculated by dividing the number of completed cases by the number of new cases within the same year – and the recovery rate, corresponding to the ratio of the number of completed cases to the sum of new cases and pending cases;

(c)  their working method, with a view to reaching final decisions in an organised, logical and systematic manner;

(d)  decision times and length of proceedings;

(e)  ability to streamline proceedings;

(f)  management of hearings and other aspects of proceedings, in particular with regard to punctuality, planning, discipline and careful time management;

(g)  management of the list of pending cases assigned to the individual under inspection and participation in the management of the case processing unit;

(h)  judges’ contribution to the achievement of approved procedural objectives.

…

5.  In the appraisal referred to in the preceding paragraphs, account is always taken of the circumstances in which the duties were performed, namely working conditions, caseload, any particular difficulties in the performance of duties, level of experience within the judiciary combined with the classification and complexity of the court or division [and] work spanning multiple services, courts or divisions …”

Article 13

Ratings

“1.  Judges’ ratings are determined using the following criteria:

…

(e)  a rating of ‘poor’ means that the judge’s professional performance was unsatisfactory.

4.  Where there is a significant body of delays in dealing with cases, an improvement in the rating may only be granted in exceptional, duly justified circumstances.

…”

Article 17

Inspection procedure

“1.  The inspection for rating purposes begins with the decision by the judicial inspector to declare the procedure open.

2.  In that decision, the judicial inspector carries out such formalities as:

(a)  setting the date of the first interview with [the judge concerned by the procedure] within 15 to 30 days …;

(b)  notifying the start date of the inspection to the CSM’s Department of Judicial Boards and Inspections [and] to the [judge concerned] …;

3.  Up to five days before the date set for the first interview, the [judge concerned] may, if so desired, provide the judicial inspector with up to ten legal works prepared and a statement on his or her performance during the relevant period.

…

5.  Within a maximum of 45 days from the date of the first interview with the [judge concerned], a final interview is held, during which the judicial inspector, in so far as possible, informs the [judge concerned] of the recommended rating.

…

7.  Within a maximum of 30 days from the final interview, the judicial inspector prepares the inspection report …

8.  The inspection report is notified to the [judge concerned], who may, within ten days, submit further information and request any procedural measures he or she deems appropriate.

9.  If additional measures prove necessary, the judicial inspector orders them within 30 days. …

…

11.  If, during the inspection, the judicial inspector observes any abnormal situations requiring urgent corrective measures, he or she informs the Vice-President of the CSM in a summary report, including a recommendation of measures to be taken, which must be brought to the attention of the [judge concerned].”

Article 18

Suspension of the inspection procedure

“1.  Where disciplinary proceedings or an investigation is ongoing concerning matters that arose during the period covered by the inspection and may influence the rating to be assigned, the CSM, after hearing the [judge concerned], may suspend the inspection procedure until the disciplinary proceedings have concluded.

…”

Article 19

Inspection report

“1.  The inspector must assess each of the criteria described in paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of Article 12; those assessments must be substantiated [concretizadas], in so far as possible, by the relevant established facts, in particular where they are unfavourable.

2.  The rating to be recommended to the High Council of the Judiciary is obtained by weighing up all the assessments referred to in the preceding paragraph …”

  1.       RELEVANT COUNCIL OF EUROPE MATERIALS

36.  The Court refers to Council of Europe instruments concerning the status, independence and efficiency of judges, including Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)12 to member states on judges: independence, efficiency and responsibilities, adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 17 November 2010; the European Charter on the Statute for Judges (DAJ/DOC(98)23); and the Magna Carta of Judges (Fundamental Principles) (CCJE(2010)3 Final) of the Consultative Council of European Judges (CCEJ). These instruments are cited in Baka v. Hungary ([GC], no. 20261/12, §§ 77-79 and 81, 23 June 2016); Denisov v. Ukraine ([GC], no. 76639/11, §§ 33-36, 25 September 2018); and Guðmundur Andri Ástráðsson v. Iceland ([GC], no. 26374/18, §§ 121 and 124-25, 1 December 2020).

37.  The Group of States against Corruption (GRECO), in its fourth evaluation round report on Portugal, which was adopted at its 70th Plenary Meeting (Strasbourg, 30 November-4 December 2015), addressed the following recommendations to Portugal:

“…

vi.  that i) the role of the judicial councils as guarantors of the independence of judges and of the judiciary is strengthened, in particular, by providing in law that not less than half their members are judges elected by their peers; …

…

viii.  ensuring that periodic evaluations of first instance court judges and inspections/assessments of second instance court judges ascertain, in a fair, objective and timely manner, their integrity and compliance with the standards of judicial conduct …

…”

38.  In its last interim compliance report (GrecoRC4(2023)17), adopted at its 95th Plenary Meeting (Strasbourg, 27 November-1 December 2023) GRECO observed that the law still did not provide that half of the members of judicial councils were judges elected by their peers. It further noted that no concrete action had been taken to formalise periodic evaluations and assessments that would include a “more elaborated assessment of the ethical dimension of a judge’s comportment based on standards of conduct”.

THE LAW

  1. SCOPE OF THE CASE

39.  The Court points out that on 19 November 2022 the President of the Section decided to give notice to the Government of the applicant’s complaints under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention concerning the CSM’s lack of independence, the insufficiency of the judicial review conducted by the Judicial Division of the Supreme Court and the lack of a public hearing. In addition, sitting as a single judge (Rule 54 § 3 of the Rules of Court), she declared the remainder of the application inadmissible.

40.  The applicant, in his observations in reply to those of the Government, reiterated complaints that had been declared inadmissible. The Court emphasises, however, that under Article 27 § 2 of the Convention and Rule 54 § 3, the decision of the President of the Section to declare part of the complaints inadmissible is final. In these circumstances, the Court will not take account of the applicant’s arguments concerning those complaints.

  1.        ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION

41.  The applicant complained of the CSM’s lack of independence and the unfairness of the proceedings he had brought before the Supreme Court to challenge the CSM’s decision following the periodic inspection to appraise his professional performance. He relied on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, the relevant parts of which read as follows:

“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations … everyone is entitled to a fair … hearing … by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law.”

  1.    Admissibility
    1.      The parties’ submissions

42.  The Government submitted at the outset that the complaints were incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention. They argued that neither the criminal nor the civil limb of Article 6 was applicable in the instant case, since the proceedings in issue were purely administrative and concerned solely the applicant’s performance appraisal. As regards, more specifically, the applicability of Article 6 under its civil limb, they submitted that although a “poor” rating automatically triggered disciplinary proceedings, inspection procedures were not conducted with a sanction in mind, and any such sanction, moreover, could only be applied following disciplinary proceedings. Thus, according to the Government, given that the inspection procedure had not directly called into question the applicant’s right to perform his duties as a judge – such an outcome being too remote –, the civil limb of Article 6 was not applicable to the facts of the instant case. In that regard, the Government cited Marušić v. Croatia ((dec.), no. 79821/12, §§ 74-75, 23 May 2017) and contrasted the situation with that in Eminağaoğlu v. Turkey (no. 76521/12, § 66, 9 March 2021).

43.  The applicant disputed the Government’s objection.

  1.      The Court’s assessment
    1.    General principles

44.  The Court refers to the general principles relevant to the applicability of the civil limb of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, as summarised in Grzęda v. Poland ([GC], no. 43572/18, §§ 257-62, 15 March 2022).

45.  In the light of these principles, the Court has acknowledged the applicability of Article 6 § 1 in various types of disputes concerning judges, including those relating to recruitment/appointment (see Juričić v. Croatia, no. 58222/09, §§ 51-57, 26 July 2011), career/promotion (see Dzhidzheva-Trendafilova v. Bulgaria (dec.), no. 12628/09, 9 October 2012, and Tsanova-Gecheva v. Bulgaria, no. 43800/12, §§ 85-87, 15 September 2015), transfer (see Tosti v. Italy (dec.), no. 27791/06, 12 May 2009, and Bilgen v. Turkey, no. 1571/07, § 79, 9 March 2021) and disciplinary proceedings (see Ramos Nunes de Carvalho e Sá v. Portugal [GC], nos. 55391/13 and 2 others, § 120, 6 November 2018; Di Giovanni v. Italy, no. 51160/06, §§ 36-37, 9 July 2013; Albuquerque Fernandes v. Portugal, no. 50160/13, § 54, 12 January 2021; and Eminağaoğlu v. Turkey, cited above, § 80). The Court has also found Article 6 § 1 of the Convention to be applicable under its civil limb in cases concerning disputes in which judges were temporarily suspended from duty in the context of disciplinary proceedings against them (see Paluda v. Slovakia, no. 33392/12, §§ 29-35, 23 May 2017; Camelia Bogdan v. Romania, no. 36889/18, § 70, 20 October 2020; and Juszczyszyn v. Poland, no. 35599/20, §§ 134-37, 6 October 2022) or on account of criminal proceedings brought against them (see Pengezov v. Bulgaria, no. 66292/14, § 37, 10 October 2023).

  1.    Application of these principles to the present case

46.  As a preliminary consideration, the Court notes that the complaints raised before it concern only the ordinary inspection procedure carried out with respect to the applicant by the CSM-appointed judicial inspector, J.G., for the purposes of appraising the applicant’s professional performance for the period from 17 September 2013 to 6 September 2017 (see paragraph 5 above). Those complaints do not, therefore, concern the disciplinary proceedings opened against the applicant (see paragraphs 7 and 30 above).

47.  Admittedly, the performance appraisal did not immediately call into question the applicant’s right to serve as a judge. It was capable, however, of having consequences not only for his career advancement but also for his ability to change post, as provided for in section 44(4) of the Act (see paragraph 33 above).

48.  In addition, the Court observes that under section 34(2) of the Act as in force at the material time (see paragraph 33 above), a rating of “poor” automatically triggered a judge’s temporary suspension and the opening of proceedings to determine whether he or she was unfit for office. While the temporary suspension did not amount to a sanction, it was nevertheless a precautionary measure with legal force. Thus, in the instant case, the rating did indeed have tangible consequences for the applicant’s ability to perform his duties as a judge (see paragraph 23 above).

49.  Furthermore, the Court considers that the applicant’s right under domestic law to perform his duties as a judge was accompanied by an inspection procedure that was lawful and fair, since the domestic legislation set out precise rules as to how it should be conducted. In particular, section 37(2) of the Act and Article 17 of the regulations of the CSM’s inspection services (see paragraphs 33 and 35 above) gave any judge concerned by the procedure in question the right to be heard by the inspecting judge and the right to comment on the inspection report, produce evidence and request additional procedural measures (see paragraphs 13-14, 33 and 35 above). Moreover, had the Supreme Court allowed his claims, the CSM’s decision to rate his performance as “poor” would have been set aside and his temporary suspension from duty as a result of that rating would have been lifted accordingly. The Court concludes that the inspection procedure in issue was, in the present case, directly decisive for the manner in which the applicant exercised his right to serve as a judge (compare Sturua v. Georgia, no. 45729/05, § 24, 28 March 2017).

50.  As to whether the applicant had a “civil” right within the meaning of Article 6 of the Convention, the Court observes that this is not precluded under the test established in Vilho Eskelinen and Others v. Finland ([GC], no. 63235/00, § 62, ECHR 2007-II), as the national law did not exclude access to a court for judges wishing to challenge a CSM decision concerning them, and therefore the first condition of that test is not fulfilled. In fact, section 168 of the Act (see paragraph 33 above) provides for the possibility of appealing against any CSM decision to the Supreme Court (compare Catană v. the Republic of Moldova, no. 43237/13, § 43, 21 February 2023).

51.  It follows that Article 6 applies in the present case under its civil limb.

  1.    Conclusion

52.  The Court notes that the complaints raised by the applicant are neither manifestly ill-founded nor inadmissible on any other grounds listed in Article 35 of the Convention. They must therefore be declared admissible.

  1.    Merits
    1.      The parties’ submissions
      1.    The applicant

53.  The applicant complained that the CSM lacked independence because it was composed of a majority of members elected by the political authorities pursuant to Article 218 § 1 of the Constitution (see paragraph 32 above).

54.  Referring to the Court’s judgment in Ramos Nunes de Carvalho e Sá (cited above), he also alleged that his right to a fair hearing had been infringed, as the Judicial Division of the Supreme Court, in dealing with his appeal against the CSM’s impugned decision, had performed only a limited judicial review. More specifically, the Supreme Court had neither examined his arguments in the light of the allegations against him, nor accepted the evidence he had produced in support of his appeal. Lastly, he complained that he had not had a public hearing before that court.

  1.    The Government

55.  The Government disputed the applicant’s complaints. Regarding the CSM’s alleged lack of independence (see paragraph 53 above), they acknowledged, with reference to the criteria set out in Denisov v. Ukraine ([GC], no. 76639/11, § 68, 25 September 2018), that the CSM was composed of eight judges (including the president, who had a casting vote) and nine non-judicial members. That small majority of non-judicial members was intended to avoid corporatism within the CSM and was counterbalanced by clear rules to ensure the independence and impartiality of all its members, including non-judicial members, in accordance with section 148(1) of the Act (see paragraph 33 above). In addition, non-judicial members in principle performed their duties on a full-time basis, with certain exceptions. Lastly, no representative of the public prosecutor’s office was a member of the CSM. In conclusion, referring to the Court’s finding in Ramos Nunes de Carvalho e Sá (cited above, § 160) that there were no serious issues in terms of structural deficiencies or an appearance of bias within the Portuguese CSM, the Government submitted that that body could be regarded as an independent tribunal within the meaning of Article 6 of the Convention.

56.  As regards the limited scope of the review by the Judicial Division of the Supreme Court (see paragraph 54 above), the Government submitted that the procedure in issue in the present case concerned a purely administrative matter falling within the discretion of a CSM inspection unit specialised in judicial inspections by peer-elected judges. The Supreme Court could not take the place of the administrative authorities without breaching the principle of the separation of powers. The judicial review carried out by the Supreme Court in the present case had been sufficient, with no manifest or gross errors found.

57.  As to the lack of a public hearing before the Supreme Court (see paragraph 54 above), the Government submitted that in so far as its judicial review had been limited to questions of lawfulness, a public hearing could be dispensed with, as the Court had noted in Ramos Nunes de Carvalho e Sá (cited above, § 190). Furthermore, comparing the present situation to that examined in Marcolino de Jesus v. Portugal ((dec.), no. 2388/15, § 49, 1 June 2021), they observed that in the present case the applicant had not asked to be heard by the Supreme Court. Lastly, there had been no reason for the Supreme Court to order a hearing of its own motion under Article 91 of the Administrative Courts Code (see paragraph 34 above), since it had a comprehensive case file before it. In any event, the applicant had been interviewed twice as part of the inspection procedure, in accordance with Article 17 §§ 2 (a) and 5 of the regulations of the CSM’s inspection services (see paragraph 35 above).

  1.      The Court’s assessment

58.  As the Court has already noted (see paragraph 50 above), section 168 of the Act (see paragraph 33 above) provides that any CSM decision can be challenged before the Judicial Division of the Supreme Court. In these circumstances, the Court does not consider it necessary to determine whether the CSM can be regarded as an “independent tribunal” within the meaning of Article 6 of the Convention. It will therefore focus its examination solely on the complaints based on the unfairness of the proceedings before the Supreme Court.

  1.    General principles

59.  The Court reiterates its well-established case-law according to which, where an administrative authority determining disputes over “civil rights and obligations” does not comply with Article 6 § 1 in some respect, no violation of the Convention can be found if the proceedings before that authority are “subject to subsequent control by a judicial body that has full jurisdiction and does provide the guarantees of Article 6 § 1” (see Denisov, cited above, § 65, and the cases cited therein), that is, if any structural or procedural shortcomings identified in the proceedings before an administrative authority are remedied in the course of the subsequent control by a judicial body that has full jurisdiction (see Ramos Nunes de Carvalho e Sá, cited above, § 132).

60.  The requirement that a court or tribunal should have “full jurisdiction” will be satisfied where it is found that the judicial body in question has exercised “sufficient jurisdiction” or provided “sufficient review” in the proceedings before it. The Court’s case-law thus contains an autonomous definition of “full jurisdiction” in the light of the object and purpose of the Convention, one that does not necessarily depend on the legal characterisation in domestic law (ibid., § 177, and the cases cited therein).

61.  In adopting this approach the Convention organs have had regard to the fact that it is often the case in relation to administrative-law appeals in the member States of the Council of Europe that the extent of judicial review over the facts of a case is limited, and that it is characteristic of review proceedings that the competent authorities review the previous proceedings rather than taking factual decisions. It can be derived from the relevant case-law that it is not the role of Article 6, in principle, to guarantee access to a court which can substitute its own assessment or opinion for that of the administrative authorities. In this regard, the Court has placed particular emphasis on the respect which must be accorded to decisions taken by the administrative authorities on grounds of expediency and which often involve specialised areas of law (ibid., § 178, and the cases cited therein).

62.  In relation to administrative-law appeals, the question whether the extent of judicial review afforded was sufficient may depend not only on the discretionary or technical nature of the subject matter of the decision appealed against and the particular issue that the applicant wishes to ventilate before the courts as being the central issue for him or her, but also, more generally, on the nature of the “civil rights and obligations” at stake and the nature of the policy objective pursued by the underlying domestic law (ibid., § 180).

63.  In consequence, the Court must have regard to the powers of the judicial body in question and to such factors as: (a) the subject matter of the decision appealed against, and in particular, whether or not it concerned a specialised issue requiring professional knowledge or experience and whether it involved the exercise of administrative discretion and, if so, to what extent; (b) the manner in which that decision was arrived at, in particular, the procedural guarantees available in the proceedings before the administrative body; and (c) the content of the dispute, including the desired and actual grounds of appeal (ibid., § 179, and the cases cited therein). Whether the review carried out was sufficient depends on the circumstances of a given case (ibid., § 181).

64.  For the purposes of the present case, the Court also reiterates that while Article 6 of the Convention guarantees the right to a fair hearing, it does not lay down any rules on the admissibility of evidence or the way in which evidence should be assessed, these being primarily matters for regulation by national law and the national courts. In principle, issues such as the weight attached by the national courts to particular items of evidence or to findings or assessments submitted to them for consideration are not for the Court to review (see De Tommaso v. Italy [GC], no. 43395/09, § 170, 23 February 2017, and the cases cited therein). The same applies to the probative value of evidence and the burden of proof (see Grosam v. the Czech Republic [GC], no. 19750/13, § 131, 1 June 2023). The Court should not act as a court of fourth instance and will not therefore question under Article 6 § 1 the judgment of the national courts, unless their findings can be regarded as arbitrary or manifestly unreasonable (see De Tommaso, cited above, § 170, and López Ribalda and Others v. Spain [GC], nos. 1874/13 and 8567/13, § 149, 17 October 2019, and the cases cited therein).

65.  The Court’s sole task in connection with Article 6 of the Convention is to examine applications alleging that the domestic courts have failed to observe specific procedural safeguards laid down in that Article or that the conduct of the proceedings as a whole did not guarantee the applicant a fair hearing (see De Tommaso, cited above, § 171).

66.  For the principles applicable to the right to a public hearing, the Court refers to Ramos Nunes de Carvalho e Sá (cited above, §§ 187-92).

67.  In particular, the Court reiterated in that judgment that a public hearing was not necessary where there were no issues of credibility or contested facts and the courts could fairly and reasonably decide the case on the basis of the case file (ibid., § 190).

  1.    Application of these principles to the present case

68.  The present case concerns an inspection procedure following which the CSM decided to rate the applicant’s performance as “poor” and to impose on him an automatic temporary suspension from his judicial duties pending the outcome of disciplinary proceedings against him (see paragraphs 22‑23 above).

69.  Regarding the grounds of appeal submitted to the review of the Supreme Court, the Court notes that the applicant challenged his performance appraisal for the period from 17 September 2013 to 6 September 2017 (see paragraph 5 above). More specifically, he complained of the criticism levelled at him in relation to his alleged low output and his absenteeism, submitting that the “poor” rating was disproportionate (see paragraph 26 above).

70.  The Court sees no reason to call into question the manner in which the Supreme Court distributed the burden of proof in the present case with regard to the issues raised before it by the applicant. Like the domestic authorities, it is of the view that there was nothing to prevent the applicant himself from producing the additional evidence he had requested in support of his appeal (see paragraphs 18, 21 and 28 above).

71.  As to the lack of a public hearing, the Court notes that the CSM based its findings regarding the applicant’s low output and absenteeism on statistics and caseload analyses included in the inspection report prepared by the judicial inspector (see paragraph 12 above). Neither the applicant’s nor any witnesses’ credibility was in issue. In view of the matters submitted for its review, the Court accepts that the Supreme Court thus had a comprehensive case file before it. The Court further notes that, as indicated by the Government, the applicant had been interviewed twice as part of the inspection procedure, in accordance with Article 17 §§ 2 (a) and 5 of the regulations of the CSM’s inspection services (see paragraphs 35 and 57 above). There was therefore no reason for the Supreme Court to order a hearing of its own motion under Article 91 § 1 of the Administrative Courts Code (see paragraph 34 above). Moreover, the applicant did not request a hearing before that court, despite having the option to do so under Article 91 § 2 of that same Code. In the Court’s view, it can therefore reasonably be considered that he waived his right to a public hearing before the Supreme Court (compare Marcolino de Jesus, cited above, §§ 49-51).

72.  It remains to be determined whether the extent of the Supreme Court’s review was sufficient in view of the grounds of appeal. On this point, the Court notes, as a preliminary consideration, that the Supreme Court’s powers of review were limited to questions of lawfulness (see, in this connection, the observations in Ramos Nunes de Carvalho e Sá, cited above, §§ 178 and 204), meaning that purely factual matters did not come under its scrutiny. Moreover, it could not substitute its own assessment for that of the CSM. Nevertheless, it was empowered to set aside a decision wholly or in part in the event of a “gross, manifest error”, and in particular if it was established that the substantive law or procedural requirements of fairness had not been complied with in the proceedings leading to the adoption of the decision. Thus, it could refer the case back to the CSM for the latter to give a fresh ruling in conformity with any instructions issued by it regarding possible irregularities (ibid., § 212).

73.  Turning back to the present case, the Court notes that although the Supreme Court held that it could not re-examine the issues concerning the applicant’s performance appraisal, which fell within the discretion of the CSM, it took note of the evidence on which the overall assessment of the applicant’s performance had been based. The Supreme Court also observed that a sanction had previously been imposed on the applicant for absenteeism, concluding that his rating could not therefore be regarded as disproportionate (see paragraph 29 above). The applicant was represented by a lawyer before the Supreme Court (see paragraph 25 above), and was able to present his arguments adversarially, producing his evidence under the same conditions as the CSM. Moreover, the Court considers that the Supreme Court’s assessment appears neither arbitrary nor manifestly unreasonable; it was also duly reasoned (see, in this connection, the principles set out in Bochan v. Ukraine (no. 2) [GC], no. 22251/08, § 61, ECHR 2015). The applicant was therefore afforded a sufficient judicial review in respect of the issues he had raised before the Supreme Court (compare Marcolino de Jesus, cited above, § 50, and contrast Ramos Nunes de Carvalho e Sá, cited above, § 211).

  1.    Conclusion

74.  In view of the foregoing, the Court finds that the proceedings before the Supreme Court were conducted as a whole in compliance with the applicant’s right to a fair hearing under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.

75.  Accordingly, there has been no violation of that provision.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,

  1. Declares the application admissible;
  2. Holds that there has been no violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.

Done in French, and notified in writing on 3 February 2026, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.

 

 Simeon Petrovski Lado Chanturia
 Deputy Registrar President

 

If you are facing a similar issue in France, you may contact our administrative lawyer in Paris.


HUDOC, Council of Europe / European Court of Human Rights.

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