Civil United Kingdom
Daniel Makin v Protec Security Group Limited
Neutral Citation Number: [2026] EWCA Civ 1367Case No: CA-2025-001268
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
ON APPEAL FROM THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
KING’S BENCH DIVISION
MANCHESTER DISTRICT REGISTRY
His Honour Judge Pearce (sitting as a Judge of the High Court)
[2025] EWHC 895 (KB)
Royal Courts of Justice
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL
Date: 27 October 2026
Before:
LADY JUSTICE KING
LORD JUSTICE STUART-SMITH
and
LADY JUSTICE COCKERILL
– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –
Between:
DANIEL MAKIN
(by his mother and litigation friend Ms Victoria Barber)
Claimant / Appellant
-and-
THE RESTAURANT MUSE LIMITED
PROTEC SECURITY GROUP LIMITED
Second Defendant
QBE INSURANCE (EUROPE) LIMITED
Third Defendant / Respondent
– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –
– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –
Charles Bagot KC and Thomas Bell (instructed by NewLaw Solicitors) for the Appellant
Angus Withington KC (instructed by DWF Law LLP) for the Respondent
Hearing dates: 14-15 October 2026
– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –
Approved Judgment
This judgment was handed down remotely at 10.30am on 27 October 2026 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives.
………………………..
Lord Justice Stuart-Smith:
Introduction
1. On 6 August 2017 Mr Makin was ejected from the Muse Bar and Restaurant in Oldham by two door supervisors, Mr Diallo and Mr Coupe. There was an altercation outside, in the course of which Mr Diallo forced Mr Makin to the ground and held him in a headlock. After the incident Mr Makin immediately stood up and walked away, taking a taxi home. Two days later he was found to have suffered a stroke which has left him with serious neurological difficulties.
2. At the time of the incident the Muse Bar and Restaurant was operated by The Restaurant Muse Limited [“the Restaurant”]. The door supervisors were engaged by Protec Security Group Limited [“Protec”]. QBE Insurance (Europe) Limited [“QBE”] were Protec’s public liability insurers. On 3 August 2020 Mr Makin issued proceedings against the Restaurant as first Defendant and Protec as second Defendant alleging that his stroke was caused by the actions of Mr Diallo. In due course, the claim against the Restaurant was discontinued. On 10 July 2023 Protec went into liquidation. The following day, on a trial of a preliminary issue, HHJ Sephton KC found that Mr Makin’s stroke and consequent injury were caused by his being assaulted by Mr Diallo. He therefore entered judgment against Protec for damages to be assessed.
3. QBE were not a party to the proceedings at the time and they took no part in the preliminary issue before HHJ Sephton, having declined liability under the policy. In September 2023 Mr Makin applied to join QBE, to which they ultimately consented. He claimed against them as Protec’s public liability insurer, founding his claim on the provisions of the Third Parties (Rights Against Insurers) Act 2010 [“the 2010 Act”]. QBE disputed liability because, they contended, they were entitled to rely upon terms of the policy (which I set out below) requiring prompt notification by an insured, which Protec allegedly failed to give.
4. In December 2024 a trial of the preliminary issue of QBE’s liability to Mr Makin pursuant to the 2010 Act was heard by HHJ Pearce. For the reasons set out in his judgment, which was handed down on 11 April 2025, he held that QBE is not liable to Mr Makin: [2025] EWHC 895 (KB).
5. Mr Makin now appeals against HHJ Pearce’s decision.
The policy
6. The policy is evidently designed to provide cover for businesses against a range of conventional risks. It is divided into sections A to J, each section covering an area of risk, with General Conditions and Claims Conditions appearing at the end of the policy document. Section B of the policy provides public and products liability cover. The primary coverage clause provides:
“COVER
We will indemnify you up to the limit of indemnity against liability incurred by you during the period of insurance arising out of and in the course of business within the territorial limits.”
7. For Section B of the policy, “liability” is defined by Definition clause 8:
“8 Liability
Liability means legal liability to pay damages including interest and claimant costs recoverable from you in respect of or as a result of
8.1 accidental bodily injury to any person other than an employee
8.2 …
8.3 accidental damage or bodily injury caused by deliberate acts of your employees or sub-contractors
8.4 …,
8.5 …
8.6 …
occurring during the period of insurance in connection with any occurrence which is or may be the subject of indemnity under this Section.”
8. Standard Clause 19 provides for cover against criminal acts:
“19 Criminal acts
We will indemnify you for your liability to pay damages including interest and claimants costs recoverable from you as a result of bodily injury or damage in respect of criminal acts of arson, theft, malicious damage, assault, fraud, dishonesty or embezzlement by your employees provided that the events insured by this clause:
19.1 were committed during the period of insurance, and
19.2 arose in connection with a contract with a customer.”
9. The central battle ground for this appeal is the policy’s Claims Conditions, which provide:
“CLAIMS CONDITIONS
The following Conditions 1-10 must be complied with after an incident that may give rise to a claim under your policy. Breach of these conditions will entitle us to refuse to deal with the relevant claim.
…
2 Writ, summons, etc
You must not respond to any letter, writ or summons or other document sent to you in connection with any accident, incident or occurrence that may relate to any claim under your policy or which may give rise to a claim under any Section of your policy. You must immediately send them to Sutton Specialist Risks Ltd unanswered by return of post, or to us or legal representatives as may otherwise be advised by us.
3 Notification of claims
You or any other party insured by your policy must inform Sutton Specialist Risks Ltd:
3.1 immediately you have knowledge of any impending prosecution, inquest or inquiry in connection with any accident or disease, which may be the subject of claim, give notice in writing and give us any further information and assistance we may require,
3.2 as soon as practically possible (and, in any event, within two (2) working days) of receipt of notice of any impending inquest, fatal accident inquiry or other legal proceedings,
…
3.5 within as soon as practical [sic] but in any event within thirty (30) days in the case of any other damage, bodily injury, incident, accident or occurrence, that may give rise to a claim under any your policy [sic] but not separate [sic] specified above.”
10. It will immediately be noticed that, whatever else is said about the Claims Conditions, the policy does not state in terms that they are “conditions precedent” to liability. It may also be noted that, elsewhere in the policy, terms are expressly described as being “conditions precedent” on three occasions:
i) In Section B of the policy, Standard Clause 22 states that “it is agreed as a condition precedent to our liability under this clause that you undertake” to do numerous things including notifying Insurers in relation to receipt of documents relating to a potential or current adjudication pursuant to the Housing Grants, Construction and Regeneration Act 1996;
ii) The Cover provisions in Section I (Directors and Officers Liability) state that “it is a condition precedent to our liability that where cover is provided for this Section 1 [sic] you have complied with any subjectivities or condition precedents set out in our quotation …”;
iii) Section J (Fidelity Guarantee) under the main heading “Conditions Precedent” states “Compliance with the minimum standards listed below shall be a condition precedent to any liability on us and if not observed by you and your employees you forfeit all rights to indemnity under this Section.”
11. The words “will entitle”, which appear at the head of the Claims Conditions as set out above, also appear at the head of the General Conditions, as follows:
“The following Conditions must be complied with before we can confirm that we will deal with any claim under your policy. Breach of these Conditions will entitle us to void your policy from the date the policy began.”
The conditions that follow are conventional and relate to, for example, the insured’s duty of fair presentation, fraudulent claims, material changes during the policy period, and policy observance.
12. Whether these features affect the interpretation of the clauses that we have to interpret is addressed later in this judgment.
The factual background in greater detail
13. The primary facts were set out by HHJ Pearce at [J15] ff and are not materially in dispute. Mr Lucas, the sole director and shareholder of Protec, was away on leave on the date of the incident. The Judge was unable to determine the date on which he returned from holiday. The disclosed documents include two pages headed “Incident Form”. The Judge does not appear to have placed any significant weight upon their existence or contents, which seems sound given that: (a) one purports to be dated 6/9/17 and to be signed by someone who Protec said (in an email dated 31 August 2020) was not employed by Protec and was not known to them; and (b) the other is undated but is on a form which Protec say was not introduced until May 2019. Neither gives an indication of wrong-doing by the door supervisors or injury being suffered by Mr Makin.
14. An ambulance was called for Mr Makin on 8 August 2017 when his mother found him unwell at his home. On 12 August 2017 Mr Makin’s mother spoke to the police about the incident. On 16 August 2017, DC Dawson of the Manchester Police spoke to various potential witnesses. On 13 August, 28 August and 3 September 2017 DC Dawson attempted to speak to other potential witnesses. She spoke to Mr Coupe and Mr Diallo on 17 and 21 August 2017 respectively. The Judge records that Mr Lucas became aware after his return from holiday that the doormen were to be interviewed. According to Mr Jaques, a witness called on behalf of QBE, the police officer’s notes suggest that the police spoke to Mr Lucas on or about 16 August 2017. Mr Lucas confirmed in an email that the police contacted him on his return from holiday. The email gives no detail of what he was told by the police but confirms that he gave them various documents relating to the incident: see below at [19]. The police closed their investigation on 22 September 2019. It is apparent from the police report that they considered that there was no sufficient evidence of an unlawful assault to justify taking matters further. DC Dawson recorded her view that “there is nothing medical to say that the lawful ejection (which it is in my eyes) has caused the trauma to [Mr Makin’s] neck.”
15. Protec did not notify QBE about the incident in 2017. QBE were not notified of a potential claim by Mr Makin against Protec (or anyone else) until July 2020. The Judge traced the relevant documentary evidence at [J16] ff. What follows is largely drawn verbatim from his account.
16. By letter dated 29 October 2019 addressed to Mr Norbury, the director of the Restaurant and headed "Letter of Claim – Catastrophic Injury", solicitors for Mr Makin intimated a claim against the Restaurant for Mr Makin’s injuries. The letter alleged that Mr Makin had been assaulted “by door staff either employed directly by you or via an agency.” After giving an outline of the alleged assault, the letter asserted that Mr Makin had sustained serious injury as a result of the attack including a stroke leading to partial blindness, neck trauma and speech difficulties. The solicitors asked for copies of a number of relevant documents (e.g. any accident book entry). Early in the letter, the solicitors urged on Mr Norbury that the company’s insurers “will need to see this letter as soon as possible and it may affect your insurance cover if you do not send this to them.”
17. By email dated 29 December 2019 from Mr Norbury to Mr Lucas of Protec, Mr Norbury wrote:
"Hi Elvin
I have attached a scanned copy of the claim being put in on behalf of Daniel Makin, this is in response to the incident which happened on 6 August 2017. I have been advised to contact you and ask for you to pass this on to your insurance also.
…”
18. On 2 January 2020, Mr Norbury further emailed Mr Lucas in the following terms:
"Hi Elvin
Is it possible to get the following sent across from the alleged incident cheers. Please ensure that you provide our adjuster with the following documents:
1) incident book entry
2) Witness Statement(s)
3) internal investigation report i.e. what went wrong? What measures have been out in place to prevent a reoccurrence?
4) A copy of the contract between yourselves and Protec
5) pre and post-accident risk assessment for assaults
6) CCTV
7) Any other relevant documents
…”
19. On 9 January 2020, Mr Lucas emailed Mr Norbury stating:
“At the time of the incident I was on annual leave. On my return I was contact by the police and I provided the incident reports which they will still have on their files. You may need to contact the police for the crime refence and the documents – under data protection you may need the signature of the two guards (and myself) to release the documents which we will be able to provide.
The two guards on duty at the time where Thierno Diallo and Gareth Coupe.”
A second copy of this email suggests that a variety of policy documents, risk assessments and similar were attached to it.
20. The first direct contact between Mr Makin’s solicitors and Protec came on 5 June 2020 when the solicitors sent a letter of claim to Protec headed “Letter of Claim – Catastrophic Injury”. It was in similar form to the letter that had been sent to The Restaurant in October 2019 including urging Protec that “your insurers will need to see a copy of this letter as soon as possible …”. The letter outlined Mr Makin’s injuries and alleged that Protec was vicariously liable for the incident.
21. None of these documents were passed on to QBE at the time they were sent to Protec, nor is it suggested that QBE had notice of a potential claim by any other means before July 2020. The first notice that QBE received was an email from Mr Makin’s solicitors dated 8 July 2020 enclosing the letter of claim that they had sent to Protec on 5 June 2020.
22. QBE instructed solicitors who enquired of Protec why the incident had not been reported sooner. In reply, Mr Lucas wrote on 13 July 2020:
“…The police fully investigated the incident at the time, and they were provided with all CCTV footage from 2 public houses, witness statements and statements from the two guards in question at the time of the incident, they were provided with the sign in book, all other relevant information and held all communications between Protec Security and the officers on duty.
The Police took all the evidence away at the time and after a full investigation they had declared that our guards operated correctly within the guidelines of their employment and the law, the claimant was reported to be under the influence of alcohol and drugs, but we cannot confirm this as this was in the police report. The police retained all the evidence and reported that there was no further action to be taken and the case was closed. No evidence has been returned to Protec Security and is still held with the Police with this in mind, we have no records kept with Protec Security.
As far as Protec Security was concerned with the conclusion of the police report we did not report this to the insurance as there was no case to answer, so no claim or further action was identified at the time.”
23. Mr Lucas went on to say that Protec had heard nothing from Mr Makin in the last 3 years and the first they had been aware of anything following from the “closed case” was the June 2020 letter from Mr Makin’s solicitors. The two guards had since left their employment. Protec had tried to contact them but they were now refusing to cooperate with them: their details were provided to QBE. Both had had proper SIA training.
24. On 20 July 2020 QBE reserved its rights under the policy. On 31 August 2020 Protec sent a further letter of explanation to QBE in which they made the following main points:
i) The police had attended the incident, having been rung by the guards on duty as Mr Makin was the aggressor;
ii) The police then investigated and closed the incident. They acknowledged that Protec’s officers had “acted according to their duties and no further action was to be taken;
iii) There was no RIDDOR (Reporting of Injuries, Diseases and Dangerous Occurrences Regulations 2013) report as there was no reason to believe it was a RIDDOR notification as Mr Makin did not have any injuries of that nature at the time;
iv) The original letter received by Protec from the Restaurant was addressed to the Restaurant and was not in connection to Protec, therefore they had no reason to believe they had to send to their insurers the information they provided to the Restaurant. There was then no further contact from the Restaurant;
v) Protec were not aware of any injuries at the time or subsequently after the incident before receiving the letter of claim in June 2020;
vi) All relevant information would be held by the police and not by Protec.
25. In answer to a later query from QBE’s solicitors, Protec said that they did not send the June 2020 letter of claim to insurers because they had “no recollection of the alleged incident at the time of receiving the letter and launched an investigation at our end as to what it was regarding, hence the delay.”
26. On 1 December 2020 QBE declined liability under the policy. The core of their reasoning was:
“It is plain that an incident which resulted in a complaint being made to the police as to the conduct of your employees and which was alleged to have caused a serious injury to Mr Makin was one which "may give rise to a claim" under the policy. In the circumstances, you had a duty to inform Sutton as soon as practical but in any event within 30 days from when you were informed of the police's investigation into the incident.”
The Judgment
27. HHJ Pearce addressed four issues.
28. Issue 1: was there a breach of the notification obligation under the policy? The Judge held that Protec was in breach of Claims Conditions 2 and 3.5 by failing to notify QBE of the incident at a point of time shortly after the incident and in failing to forward the email of 29 December 2019 and the letter of 5 June 2020 to QBE. In doing so he accepted in his consideration of Condition 3.5 that, judged at the time of the incident or its immediate aftermath, no reasonable insured could be expected to have formed the view that it involved circumstances that “may give rise to a claim” under the policy given that the Claimant was able to get up and walk away after being restrained: [J56] but he also found that:
i) “Given that the police would not be likely to want to interview the Second Defendant's employees unless something of note had happened, and given the clear recording of the incident by both the police and the door staff, I am satisfied that, well within the period of 30 days from the incident Mr Lucas was aware (or a reasonable insured would have been aware) that this was an incident where the door staff of Protec were at least potentially being criticised for injuring a customer with whom they had contact [J56]; and
ii) “… The matters of which I am satisfied that Mr Lucas became aware shortly after the incident were matters which were only likely to be consistent with a concern that there might have been fault on the part of the door staff [J57(ii)]; and
iii) “… [T]he material that was known to Mr Lucas either whilst he was on holiday or on his return from leave, particularly that the police wished to interview his door staff about an incident, was clearly likely to lead someone to think that there may be a claim against the Second Defendant in respect of which the insurance policy provided cover. This conclusion does not involve the court engaging in some kind of roving review of what it was that Mr Lucas knew as matters developed; rather it causes me to conclude that there was a clear point in time where the matters known to Mr Lucas included the fact that police wanted to interview members of his staff in respect of an incident where a person had allegedly suffered injury and gave rise to the duty to notify under Claims Condition 3.5”: [J58]. (Emphasis by italics added)
29. There is no appeal against the finding that the matters known to Mr Lucas included the fact that the police wanted to interview members of his staff in respect of an incident where a person had suffered injury. Although not specified by the Judge it is plain from the three passages that I have highlighted above that the “clear point in time” to which the Judge referred was a point that was either while he was still on holiday or shortly after his return from holiday and within the 30-day period identified in Condition 3.5.
30. In relation to Condition 2, the Judge held that reading the letter of 29 October 2019 made it clear that a claim may be made against someone. Further, “the only sensible reading” of Mr Norbury’s email of 29 December 2019 with its suggestion that Protec inform its insurers was that Mr Norbury considered that a claim might be made against Protec as well as against the Restaurant. “The reasonable recipient of Mr Norbury’s email would undoubtedly suspect immediately that a claim might be made to which an insurance policy of this kind might respond.” There is no appeal against that finding.
31. Turning to the letter of 5 June 2020 the Judge held that the failure to send the letter to insurers could not be described as sending it “immediately” as required by Claims Condition 2.
32. Issue 2: what was the effect of any breach of the notification obligation? The Judge held that Claims Conditions 2 and 3.5 were conditions precedent to liability. Protec’s breach of the conditions therefore entitled QBE to refuse indemnity under the policy as of right. The failure to label the Claims Conditions as conditions precedent was not fatal. There was no true ambiguity in the wording of the Claims Conditions. The use of the words “will entitle us to refuse to deal with the relevant claim” indicated an absolute entitlement to refuse to deal with the claim rather than merely a contractual discretion.
33. Issue 3: did QBE lawfully exercise any discretion to decline cover? The Judge held that, in the light of his findings on issues (1) and (2) this issue did not arise. But if it had done, QBE would not have been able to show that the decision to refuse an indemnity under either Claims Condition and in respect of any of the breaches was a proper exercise of any contractual discretion.
34. Issue 4: what is the effect of the judgment of HHJ Sephton KC? The Judge held that but for his finding on other issues, the judgment of HHJ Sephton KC would have been binding on QBE in the same manner in which it is binding on Protec. It would therefore bind QBE upon the issues whether Mr Makin had suffered personal injury as a result of the negligence of persons for whose negligence Protec was vicariously liable.
The Grounds of Appeal and Respondent’s Notice
Grounds of appeal
35. Ground 1 – Claims Condition 3.5
“The Learned Judge erred in concluding that Protec breached Claims Condition 3.5:
(i) Having (correctly) held that, at the time the incident occurred or in its immediate aftermath, no reasonable insured would have considered that it may give rise to a claim, the Learned Judge should have gone on to conclude that the notification obligation was not triggered.
(ii) Instead, the Learned Judge mistakenly judged the position at the later point in time when Protec’s director became aware of the incident, even though that was irrelevant for the purpose of Claims Condition 3.5.”
36. Ground 2 – Claims Condition 2
“The Learned Judge erred in concluding that Protec breached Claims Condition 2. … If the Judge had interpreted the clause correctly, he would have found that the notification obligation was not engaged since:
(a) neither the Claimant's letter of claim against the Restaurant nor his letter of claim against Protec was “in connection with [an] incident… that may relate to [a] claim under your policy”; and
(b) no reasonable insured would think that the letters of claim themselves might “give rise to a claim” under the policy.”
37. Ground 3 – the Claims Condition Clause
“The Learned Judge erred in his construction of the provision, “Breach of these conditions will entitle us to refuse to deal with the relevant claim.” … [T]he Learned Judge should have concluded that QBE’s right “to refuse to deal with the relevant claim” was only exercisable on rational grounds. Since, as the Learned Judge (correctly) held, there were no rational grounds for QBE to decline Protec’s claim, Protec was entitled to an indemnity.”
Respondent’s Notice
38. QBE relies on three matters identified in its amended Respondent’s notice.
39. In relation to Ground 1 QBE avers that the incident itself was one which may give rise to a claim and therefore the notification obligation under the policy was engaged.
40. In relation to Issue 4 (the effect of HHJ Sephton’s judgment), QBE takes two points:
i) Section 1(4) of the 2010 Act does not apply because HHJ Sephton’s judgment did not establish the issues of both liability and quantum; and
ii) The applicable law in England and Wales remains that summarised in Omega Proteins Ltd v Aspen Insurance UK Limited [2010] EWHC 2280 (Comm) such that HHJ Sephton’s judgment should not be regarded as determinative as to whether the loss and damage suffered by Mr Makin was covered by the policy. The Judge therefore ought to have held that QBE was entitled to dispute either that Protec was liable to Mr Makin or that Protec was liable on the basis specified in the judgment.
The statutory and legal framework
The 2010 Act
41. Sections 1 and 2 of the 2010 Act provide, so far as relevant to the present proceedings:
“1. Rights against insurer of insolvent person etc
(1) This section applies if-
(a) a relevant person incurs a liability against which that person is insured under a contract of insurance, or
(b) a person who is subject to such a liability becomes a relevant person.
(2) The rights of the relevant person under the contract against the insurer in respect of the liability are transferred to and vest in the person to whom the liability is or was incurred (the “third party”).
(3) The third party may bring proceedings to enforce the rights against the insurer without having established the relevant person's liability; but the third party may not enforce those rights without having established that liability.
(4) For the purposes of this Act, a liability is established only if its existence and amount are established; and, for that purpose, "establish" means establish-
(a) by virtue of a declaration under section 2 …,
(b) by a judgment or decree,
(c) by an award in arbitral proceedings or by an arbitration, or
(d) by an enforceable agreement.
(5) In this Act-
(a) references to an "insured" are to a person who incurs or who is subject to a liability to a third party against which that person is insured under a contract of insurance;
(b) references to a "relevant person" are to a person within sections 4 to 7 (and see also paragraph 1A of Schedule 3);
(c) references to a "third party" are to be construed in accordance with subsection (2);
(d) references to "transferred rights" are to rights under a contract of insurance which are transferred under this section.
2. Establishing liability in England and Wales and Northern Ireland
(1) This section applies where a person (P)-
(a) claims to have rights under a contract of insurance by virtue of a transfer under section 1, but
(b) has not yet established the insured's liability which is insured under that contract.
(2) P may bring proceedings against the insurer for either or both of the following-
(a) a declaration as to the insured's liability to P;
(b) a declaration as to the insurer's potential liability to P.
(3) In such proceedings P is entitled, subject to any defence on which the insurer may rely, to a declaration under subsection (2)(a) or (b) on proof of the insured’s liability to P or (as the case may be) the insurer’s potential liability to P.
(4) Where proceedings are brought under subsection (2)(a) the insurer may rely on any defence on which the insured could rely if those proceedings were proceedings brought against the insured in respect of the insured's liability to P.
(5) … .
(6) Where the court makes a declaration under this section, the effect of which is that the insurer is liable to P, the court may give the appropriate judgment against the insurer.
(7) Where a person applying for a declaration under subsection (2)(b) is entitled or required, by virtue of the contract of insurance, to do so in arbitral proceedings, that person may also apply in the same proceedings for a declaration under subsection (2)(a).
(8) …
(9) When bringing proceedings under subsection (2)(a), P may also make the insured a defendant to those proceedings.
(10) If (but only if) the insured is a defendant to proceedings under this section (whether by virtue of subsection (9) or otherwise), a declaration under subsection (2) binds the insured as well as the insurer.
(11) In this section, references to the insurer's potential liability to Pare references to the insurer's liability in respect of the insured's liability to P, if established.”
42. QBE accepts that its policy is capable of responding to this claim pursuant to the provisions of Standard Clause 19 (Criminal Acts) of the policy. It is also agreed that Mr Makin is a “third party” and that Protec is a “relevant person” within the meaning of section 1 of the 2010 Act. Mr Makin is therefore entitled to rely upon the provisions of the 2010 Act, his rights transferred under the 2010 Act being no better or greater than those that would have been available to Protec as QBE’s insured. By their respondent’s notice, QBE raises issues about the status of Mr Makin’s claim to which I return later.
Construction of the policy
43. The applicable principles are well known and do not require to be set out in great detail here: see Rainy Sky SA v Kookmin Bank [2011] UKSC 50; Arnold v Britton[2015] UKSC 36 [2015] AC 1619, and Bellini (N/E) Ltd v Brit UW Ltd[2024] EWCA Civ 435, [2024] Bus LR 1611 at [18]-[24] amongst many other closely related statements of principle of high authority. I shall attempt to apply those principles throughout.
44. It is common for policies of insurance (as for any other type of contract) to be poorly drafted to a greater or lesser extent. This policy is no exception. Where deficiencies of drafting are encountered, it remains the Court’s primary objective and obligation to identify what a reasonable person who has all the background knowledge which would reasonably have been available to the parties in the situation in which they were at the time of the contract would have understood the parties to have meant.
45. Correction of the contract by construction is permissible only in closely defined circumstances where two conditions are satisfied: first there must be a clear mistake on the face of the instrument; secondly, it must be clear what correction ought to be made in order to cure the mistake: see the citation from East v Pantiles [1982] 2 EGLR 111, 112 in Bellini at [19].
46. An instructive insight into the approach to be adopted in a case such as the present was provided by the Supreme Court in the covid test cases Financial Conduct Authority v Arch Insurance (UK) Ltd and Others[2021] UKSC 1:
“77. …the overriding question is how the words of the contract would be understood by a reasonable person. In the case of an insurance policy of the present kind, sold principally to SMEs, the person to whom the document should be taken to be addressed is not a pedantic lawyer who will subject the entire policy wording to a minute textual analysis … . It is an ordinary policyholder who, on entering into the contract, is taken to have read through the policy conscientiously in order to understand what cover they were getting.”
47. The form of the contract and its terms were generated by QBE so that, as a last resort in a case of ambiguity, the contra proferentem principle may become applicable. That said, the Court should not strain to find ambiguity where none really exists.
Conditions precedent and exclusion/exemption clauses
48. It is common ground that a clause in a policy may be a condition precedent to insurers’ liability despite the label “condition precedent” not being used. “Little more can be said than that it is a matter of construing the policy as a whole”: see Cox v Bankside Members Agency Ltd [1995] CLC 180, 203 per Phillips J. To similar effect see Aspen Insurance v Pectel [2009] 2 All ER (Comm) 873 at [62] per Teare J. In this policy (which Counsel described as a “pick and mix” policy because it is evident that different sections or clauses have different origins) I would attach little or no weight to the fact that the term “Condition Precedent” is used elsewhere in the policy but not in the passages and clauses with which we are primarily concerned: see [10] above.
49. The general approach to be adopted when interpreting exclusion or exemption clauses was set out by Longmore LJ in the context of a reinsurance dispute in Dornoch v Royal and Sun Alliance [2005] 1 CLC 466 at [19]:
“A reinsurer of a reinsuredʼs liability to a third party is prima facie liable to the extent of his subscription once it is ascertained that the reinsured is liable to that third party. A condition precedent to the liability of the reinsurer operates as an exemption to that prima facie liability. It is a well-established and salutary principle that a party who relies on a clause exempting him from liability can only do so if the words of the clause are clear on a fair construction of the clause: … .”
Ground 1: Claims Condition 3.5 – discussion
50. It is common ground that the obligation to notify insurers under Claims Condition 3.5 only arises if the insured has sufficient knowledge (referred to during submissions as “threshold knowledge”) that would cause a reasonable insured to form the view (in the case of damage, bodily injury, incident, accident or occurrence) that it may give rise to a claim. It is also common ground that the word “may” means that there is a real as opposed to a fanciful risk that it will give rise to a claim.
51. Relying upon the decision of the Court of Appeal in Zurich Insurance plc v Maccaferri Ltd [2016] EWCA Civ 1302, [2018] 1 All ER (Comm) 112, Mr Makin submits that the Judge was not entitled to take into account knowledge acquired by Protec after the incident. It is submitted that the Judge effectively imposed an obligation upon Protec to carry out a rolling assessment of whether the incident may give rise to a claim.
52. I am unable to accept Mr Makin’s submission. The artificiality of his position became clear during submissions when Mr Bagot KC was constrained to accept that, if Mr Lucas had acquired threshold knowledge on his return from holiday a short while after the incident, the obligation to report would have been triggered. There is, to my mind, no rational reason or interpretation why it should matter whether he had acquired threshold knowledge (from whatever source) one, two, five or ten days after his return, provided it was within the 30 days period that the obligation to notify could subsist.
53. I would accept that Claims Condition 3.5 does not impose an obligation on the insured to act positively by carrying out a rolling assessment of an incident even if at the time of the incident or its immediate aftermath no reasonable insured could be expected to have formed the view that it involved circumstances that may give rise to a claim. However, the natural meaning of the clause is that, if the insured acquires threshold knowledge (from whatever source and whether they have gone looking for it or not) within the 30-day period during which the clause is applicable, then the obligation to report is triggered. This approach avoids the commercially dubious extreme alternatives that (a) the obligation to report is only triggered if the circumstances of the incident as known to the insured at the time or immediately after its occurrence demonstrate that a claim may arise; or (b) the insured is required to conduct a rolling review even if there is initially no reason to believe that a claim may arise.
54. Here the Judge has found that Mr Lucas had threshold knowledge either while he was still on holiday or shortly after his return from holiday and within the 30-day period identified in Condition 3.5. That is a finding he was entitled to make and there is no appeal from it. In those circumstances, I would hold on the natural meaning of Condition 3.5, Protec’s failure to inform Sutton Specialist Risks was a breach of the Condition.
55. Mr Makin seeks to avoid this conclusion by reference to Maccaferri. There the clause at issue and its context were similar but not identical to Clause 3.5:
56. Clause 2 in Maccaferri stated:
“The Insured shall give notice in writing to the Insurer as soon as possible after the occurrence of any event likely to give rise to a claim with full particulars thereof. The Insured shall also on receiving verbal or written notice of any claim intimate or send same or a copy thereof immediately to the Insurer and shall give all necessary information and assistance to enable the Insurer to deal with, settle or resist any claim as the Insurer may think fit. …”
57. I set out clause 3.5 of the present policy again for convenience:
“You or any other party insured by your policy must inform Sutton Specialist Risks … [3.5] within as soon as practical [sic] but in any event within thirty (30) days in the case of any other damage, bodily injury, incident, accident or occurrence, that may give rise to a claim under any your policy [sic] but not separate [sic] specified above.”
58. The main differences between the clauses (leaving aside their wider context) are:
| Maccaferri | QBE |
| “as soon as possible” | “as soon as practical but in any event within 30 days” |
| “after the occurrence of any event” | “in the case of any other damage, bodily injury, incident, accident or occurrence” |
| “likely to give rise to a claim” | “that may give rise to a claim under your policy” |
| “with full particulars thereof” | |
| No time limitation | In any event within 30 days. |
59. The lack of any end date in the Maccaferri clause enabled Zurich to argue for a rolling obligation including an obligation proactively to investigate and review and that, if the insured did not know of the event when it occurred he must nevertheless give notice of it to insurers as soon as he became (or should have become) aware of an event that was likely to give rise to a claim. Zurich submitted that it also meant that the obligation to notify arose when the state of knowledge of the insured was such that it was, or should have been, possible to do so. The obligation to give full particulars was itself submitted to be consistent with a duty on the part of the insured to be pro-active in making inquiries and signified that the notice might fall to be given some time after the event when such particulars are available: see Maccaferri at [20].
60. In rejecting Zurich’s submissions, Christopher Clarke LJ held that the wording in Maccaferri was unclear. He did not identify the respects in which the clause he was considering was unclear or ambiguous, merely asserting that it was “far from clear” that Zurich’s was the right interpretation and, given the nature of the clause, the ambiguity must be resolved in favour of the insured. While recognising that some clauses may impose an obligation to carry out something of a rolling assessment, he said that they were not in this form and, if that was what Zurich intended, they could be expected to have spelt it out.
61. In this case there is no submission that Protec were under an obligation to carry out a rolling assessment. I agree that none is indicated by the terms of Clause 3.5 either viewed on its own or in its wider policy context. To my mind the three features that distinguish Clause 3.5 from the Maccaferri clause are (a) the temporal limitation to 30 days, after which Clause 3.5 is inapplicable, which removes the open ended character of the Zurich clause; (b) the lower threshold for reporting under Clause 3.5 (“may” rather than “likely”); and (c) the obligation in Maccaferri to give full particulars when reporting to insurers, which is not present in Clause 3.5.
62. In my judgment, if and to the extent that I have set out a different analysis above from that of Christopher Clarke LJ in Maccaferri, it is permissible and right to distinguish Maccaferri. Furthermore, it is plain that Christopher Clarke LJ was not attempting to set out any universally applicable response to clauses such as those in Maccaferri and Clause 3.5. Two things are clear: first, whether the event was likely to give rise to a claim was assessed by reference to the insured’s state of knowledge: see Maccaferri at [34], [37] and [40]; second, even on the Maccaferri wording, the occurrence of the event is not necessarily a single moment as it is “an occasion not limited to the exact moment.”
63. In any event, even adopting the most rigorous interpretation of Christopher Clarke LJ’s analysis, the Judge’s findings that I have set out at [28] and [54] above, satisfy the requirement that Mr Lucas acquired threshold knowledge either when on holiday or immediately on his return. Given his role as sole director and shareholder of Protec I would hold that this falls within the phrase “an occasion not limited to the exact moment.” The notification obligation was triggered by Mr Lucas’ threshold knowledge and there was a breach of Claims Condition 3.5 because it was not notified.
Ground 2: Claims Condition 2 – discussion
64. The Judge held that:
i) The reasonable recipient of Mr Norbury’s email of 29 December 2019 would undoubtedly suspect immediately that a claim might be made to which an insurance policy of this kind might respond. Protec was therefore under a duty of notification under Claims Condition 2 in respect of the email of 29 December 2019 forwarding the letter of claim addressed to the Restaurant dated 29 October 2019;
ii) The failure to forward the letter of claim sent to Protec on 5 June 2020 meant that it had not been forwarded “immediately”;
iii) Protec was therefore in breach of Claims Condition 2 in respect of both documents.
65. Before the Judge and before us, Mr Makin suggested that there were three ways of parsing and construing Claims Condition 2.
66. As recorded by the Judge at [J38] the first suggestion was:
“You must not respond to any letter, writ or summons or other document sent to you:
(a) in connection with any accident, incident or occurrence that may relate to any claim under your policy or
(b) which may give rise to a claim under any Section of your policy.”
This suggestion was said to be “problematic” because it supposed that a letter might give rise to a claim under the policy whereas it is only the underlying accident that could give rise to a claim.
67. The second suggestion was:
“You must not respond to any letter, writ or summons or other document sent to you in connection with any accident, incident or occurrence
(a) that may relate to any claim under your policy or
(b) which may give rise to a claim under any Section of your policy.”
This was said to be problematic because “it is difficult to conceive of an “accident, incident or occurrence” which relates to a claim under the policy.”
68. The third, which appears to have been the Judge’s preferred approach, was:
“You must not respond to any letter, writ or summons or other document sent to you
(a) that may relate to any claim under your policy or
(b) in connection with any accident, incident or occurrence which may give rise to a claim under any Section of your policy.”
This, it was submitted, involved an impermissible redrawing of the policy.
69. The Judge concluded that the third suggested approach was the only one that made sense of the words used in Claims Condition 2 [J62]. Adopting this approach he considered that both the failure to forward the letter of claim sent to the Restaurant and forwarded to Protec on 29 December 2019 and the failure to forward the letter of claim sent to Protec on 5 June 2020 were breaches of Condition 2.
70. Before us, Mr Makin submits that the Judge was wrong to adopt the third suggestion because it involved an impermissible rewriting of the Condition. He should therefore have chosen between the first two suggested approaches and, since both were available and therefore the Condition was ambiguous, should have implemented the contra proferentem rule and chosen the first suggested approach as it is less favourable to QBE. Had he done so he should have held that there was no breach of Claims Condition 2 because:
i) The letters of claim sent to the Restaurant and Protec were not “in connection with [an] incident … that may relate to [a] claim under the policy” since Protec had not yet made a claim under the policy; and
ii) A reasonable person would not think that the letters themselves (as opposed to the incident referred to in the letters) might “give rise to a claim” under the policy.
71. QBE submit that the Judge’s approach and conclusion should be upheld because his approach did not involve rewriting the clause. The condition therefore obviously covers the forwarding of letters relating to incidents for which a claim under the policy had already been made or which might give rise to such a claim under the policy. In contrast, Mr Makin’s suggested interpretation would mean that an insured would not be obliged to forward a letter of claim if no claim had previously been notified in relation to an accident.
72. Adopting the principles that I have outlined and referred to above, I consider that the meaning of Claims Condition 2 is entirely clear even if the drafting is verging on the chaotic. The Condition consists of four elements. The first element is that the insured “must not respond to any letters, writs, summonses or other documents sent to the insured” if they fall within the categories established by the Condition: such documents must immediately be sent on unanswered. What then are the categories of documents to which the condition applies? The second element is that they must have been sent to the insured “in connection with any accident, incident or occurrence.” The third and fourth elements define the two subsets of such documents to which the condition applies, being (a) documents that relate to any claim under the policy; and (b) documents which may give rise to a claim under any section of the policy. Once one stands back and looks for the meaning that emerges from the condition, the fact that it is an incident and not a letter as such that may give rise to a claim pales into insignificance. The condition means that documents that are sent in connection with any accident, incident or occurrence must be forwarded unanswered if either (a) they relate to a claim that has already been made under the policy or (b) the contents of the letter indicate that a claim may arise under the policy.
73. I have no doubt that this paraphrase or explanation reflects how Claims Condition 2 would be understood by a reasonable person (not a pedantic lawyer) who, as an ordinary policyholder, has read through the policy conscientiously in order to understand what cover they were getting. Adopting a slightly different formulation, it is what a reasonable person who had all the background knowledge which would reasonably have been available to the parties in the situation in which they were at the time of the contract would have understood the parties to have meant. No correction of the contract is required. It is unambiguous despite the deficiencies in drafting that can be identified on a minute textual analysis that seeks to discriminate between the incident and a letter relating to that incident.
74. On this basis, but by a different process of reasoning, I consider that the Judge was right to hold that Protec breached Claims Condition 2 both in relation to the email of 29 December 2019 with the letter of 29 October 2019 copied and in relation to the letter of claim dated 5 June 2020.
Ground 3: conditions precedent – discussion
75. This ground focuses intensely on the words “Breach of these conditions will entitle us to refuse to deal with the relevant claim.”
76. Mr Bagot submitted with impressive perseverance that the words “will entitle us” only gave QBE what he described as a contractual discretion such as was recognised in Braganza v BP Shipping Ltd [2015] UKSC 17,[2015] 1 WLR 1661. He submitted that the words “will entitle us” meant that avoidance or refusal to deal with a claim was not the automatic consequence of breach; rather, there was an intermediate step that QBE had to take in any given case, namely deciding that they would rely upon their contractual entitlement. He then asserted that QBE’s freedom to choose to rely upon their contractual entitlement was to be described as a “discretion” and, as such, was fettered. The precise nature of the supposed fetter did not emerge clearly from his submissions, though in his written submissions it was contended that QBE’s freedom to choose was “fettered by the requirement to do so rationally or on reasonable grounds.”
77. Despite Mr Bagot’s perseverance, I consider his submission to be wrong at every stage. First, the words “will entitle us” are not qualified in any way. Second, there is no basis for eliding the words “choice” and “discretion”. Of course, in general parlance, where the insured has breached conditions it is open to insurers not to refuse to deal with the relevant claim. In that sense, they have a “discretion” about what they shall do; but that is legally uninformative and does not suggest that their choice is fettered in the sense advocated by Mr Bagot. Third, I reject the submission that the words “will entitle us” are unclear. They are not, and they do not require any further addition, amplification or explanation to render the nature of insurers’ entitlement clear. Fourth, Mr Bagot was unable to explain why or how a Braganza-type duty might arise. He referred to the judgment of Leggatt LJ in Equitas Insurance Ltd v MMI Ltd [2019] EWCA Civ 718, [2020] QB 48 at [148]-[156]. But fundamental to that passage was an explanation founded on the implying of a term on the basis that the implication was necessary to give business efficacy to the contract. That is to be tested by asking whether, without the implied term, the contract would work in the way the parties would reasonably have expected it to work. Application of that test in the present context provides no support for the implication of a fettering term. To the contrary, without the implication of any term, the contract works satisfactorily and in the way the parties (and a reasonable person in the position of the parties) would reasonably have expected it to work.
78. I take some marginal support for this approach from the consistency of the use of “will entitle us” in the context of the General Conditions: see [11] above.
79. For these reasons, Claims Conditions 2 and 3.5 are to be treated as conditions precedent. It is common ground that, in that case, there is no need for QBE to demonstrate that their insureds’ breaches of condition caused QBE to suffer prejudice.
Respondent’s Notice – discussion
80. In the light of my conclusion on Ground 1, QBE’s first issue raised by the Respondent’s Notice does not arise.
81. The first of the two issues concerning the 2010 Act raised by the Respondent’s Notice proved to be relatively uncontroversial. Section 1(4) of the 2010 Act provides that “a liability is established only if its existence and amount are established.” It follows that, since HHJ Sephton did not assess quantum, the liability is not established within the meaning of section 1(4). However, QBE recognise (correctly) that if there were subsequently to be a hearing that determined the quantum of the liability, the existence and the amount of the liability would be established and so (subject to the next issue raised by the Respondent’s Notice) would the liability itself.
82. The second of the issues raised by the Respondent’s Notice in relation to what was Issue 4 is more substantial. Put shortly, QBE submits that Sections 1 and 2 of the 2010 Act provide two alternative routes or gateways to establishing the ultimate liability of insurers. Section 1 largely replicates the position as it obtained under the Third Parties (Rights Against Insurers) Act 1930 [“the 1930 Act”] whereas section 2 establishes a new route.
83. Under the 1930 Act, a judgment against the insured alone was not legally determinative of the liability of the insurers, though it often had the desired effect in practice because the insurers might look at the judgment and decide it was not in their interests to take matters further: see Omega Proteins Limited v Aspen Insurance UK Limited [2010] EWHC 2280 (Comm) at [49] per Christopher Clarke J. QBE submits that section 1 of the 2010 Act is subject to the same principles as applied under the 1930 Act. Mr Withington KC made submissions to us as to why that should be so.
84. The Judge, however, accepted Mr Makin’s submissions on what was Issue 4 before him and followed a decision of the Inner House in Scotland Gas Networks v QBE UK Ltd [2024] CSIH 36 to the effect that compliance with section 1(4) of the 2010 Act removes the ability of insurers to challenge the amount of the liability that is held to be proved in a judgment (or an arbitral award or an enforceable agreement) pursuant to that section.
85. Our attention was directed to R (Jwanczuk) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions[2025] UKSC 42 at [100]-[101] concerning the approach to be adopted where an appellate court considers that the decision of another appellate court is wrong. However, since any decision we made on the issue would be obiter, I consider that the best course is not to seek to decide the issue and to leave its determination to a case where it must be decided. I therefore express no view on it one way or the other.
Conclusion
86. For the reasons set out above, I would dismiss this appeal. I express no view on the Scotland Gas Networks issue.
Lady Justice Cockerill
87. I agree.
Lady Justice King
88. I also agree.
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