Miscellaneous Etats-Unis

Desmond Kane Cosper v. the State of Texas

Official source
                          Court of Appeals
                   Tenth Appellate District of Texas

                              10-25-00452-CR


                           Desmond Kane Cosper,
                                Appellant

                                     v.

                            The State of Texas,
                                 Appellee



                             On appeal from the
                13th District Court of Navarro County, Texas
                   Senior Judge H. D. Black Jr., presiding
                     Trial Court Cause No. D42787-CR

JUSTICE HARRIS delivered the opinion of the Court.

                       MEMORANDUM OPINION

       Desmond     Kane    Cosper   was    convicted    of   possession   of

methamphetamine, under one gram, and sentenced to one year in a State Jail

facility.   The trial court suspended Cosper’s sentence and placed him on

community supervision for three years. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

BACKGROUND

       Officer Folsom, with the Corsicana, Texas Police Department, stopped
Cosper at about one in the morning because Cosper was riding a bicycle in a

neighborhood without a rear reflective light. The officer explained to Cosper

that a rear reflective light was necessary for his safety and for others

approaching him from behind at night. For officer safety, Folsom called for

backup. In the meantime, Folsom conducted a pat-down of Cosper and asked

him to empty his pockets. As he was doing so, Cosper dropped a cigarette case

which opened upon hitting the ground, revealing cigarettes and a folded piece

of paper.         By that time, Officer Brooks, also with the Corsicana Police

Department, had arrived, saw the opened case, and picked up the paper. Upon

opening the paper, Brooks discovered methamphetamine.

MOTION TO SUPPRESS

       Cosper first asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in denying

Cosper’s motion to suppress the drug evidence discovered by the officers and

introduced into evidence. We review a trial court's ruling on a motion to

suppress for an abuse of discretion under a bifurcated standard of review.

State v. Torres, 

666 S.W.3d 735

, 740 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023). While we afford

almost total deference to the trial court's determination of historical facts and

the trial court's rulings on mixed questions of law and fact, especially when

those determinations are based on an assessment of credibility and demeanor,

we review pure questions of law as well as mixed questions of law and fact that


Cosper v. State                                                          Page 2
do not turn on an assessment of credibility and demeanor de novo. 

Id.

 at 740–

741.

       When a trial court denies a motion to suppress and does not enter

findings of fact, as in this case, we view the evidence in the light most favorable

to the ruling and assume the trial court made implicit findings of fact that

support its ruling as long as those findings are supported by the record. Wexler

v. State, 

625 S.W.3d 162

, 167 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021); Herrera v. State, 

241

S.W.3d 520, 527

 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). The party that prevailed in the trial

court is afforded the strongest legitimate view of the evidence and all

reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence. Wexler, 625

S.W.3d at 167; State v. Garcia-Cantu, 

253 S.W.3d 236, 241

 (Tex. Crim. App.

2008).    Further, we should uphold the trial court's denial of a motion to

suppress so long as its ruling is correct on any legal theory applicable to the

case. McClintock v. State, 

541 S.W.3d 63

, 74 n. 20 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017).

       When Officer Folsom stopped Cosper on his bicycle, Folsom conducted a

pat-down of Cosper for officer safety. Cosper had said he had something

similar to brass knuckles on him and had a “hammer/hatchet” in his bag.

Folsom noticed a hard case in Cosper’s left chest jacket pocket which Cosper

said was his cigarette case. Cosper then revealed a previously forgotten heavy-

weight box cutter on his belt, which Folsom retrieved. When asked if he would


Cosper v. State                                                            Page 3
mind emptying his pockets, Cosper complied and either placed or dropped

almost everything he retrieved from his pockets on the ground.            When

reminded about the left chest pocket, Cosper said “sorry,” retrieved the

cigarette case, and dropped it to the ground. The case opened upon hitting the

ground, revealing cigarettes and a folded piece of paper which Officer Brooks

retrieved. Brooks asked Cosper if this was a piece of paper to which Cosper

responded, “I don’t know.” As Brooks began opening the paper, Cosper agreed

with him that people pretty much know what’s on their person.              Once

methamphetamine was discovered in the paper, Cosper was arrested. Cosper

specifically contends on appeal, as he did in his motion to suppress, that the

officers exceeded the scope of Cosper’s consent to search by obtaining the folded

paper from the cigarette case and opening it.

       However, a police officer in a public place has the authority to seize

anything he has probable cause to believe constitutes contraband. See Texas

v. Brown, 

460 U.S. 730, 738

, 

103 S. Ct. 1535, 1541

 (1983); Payton v. New York,

445 U.S. 573, 587

 (1980); State v. Dobbs, 

323 S.W.3d 184, 187

 (Tex. Crim. App.

2010). Probable cause exists where the facts and circumstances known to law

enforcement officers are “sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of

reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been or is being

committed.” Marcopoulos v. State, 

538 S.W.3d 596, 602

 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017)


Cosper v. State                                                          Page 4
(citation omitted). To determine whether an officer had probable cause, we

consider the totality of the circumstances. Wiede v. State, 

214 S.W.3d 17, 25


(Tex. Crim. App. 2007). We also take into account the training, knowledge,

and experience of law enforcement officials. Pugh v. State, 

624 S.W.3d 565

,

571 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021); Wiede, 

214 S.W.3d at 25

.

       Cosper was in a public place, a neighborhood street, at night-time, when

he was stopped by Folsom. Folsom was cautious with Cosper because he moved

around when talking to Folsom and regularly looked up the street. Based on

his training and experience, Folsom believed Cosper’s actions to be a sign that

Cosper was either going to run or had contraband on him. Because of this,

Folsom also called for backup.        Cosper then admitted to carrying a

“hammer/hatchet” and something similar to brass knuckles. He forgot he was

carrying a heavy-weight box cutter but then allowed Folsom to take it after

Cosper happened to sweep back his jacket, revealing the box cutter. Cosper

did not give Folsom an address of where he was staying in Corsicana when

asked but, instead, stated that he was remodeling a house either on 2nd or

28th street. Further, Cosper knew he had a cigarette case in the left chest

pocket of his jacket, but when he was asked to empty his pockets, he failed to

empty the chest pocket. After being reminded, he retrieved the cigarette case

and dropped it to the ground which caused it to open. Officer Brooks, who


Cosper v. State                                                        Page 5
arrived at the scene as Cosper was emptying his pockets, stated that, based on

his training and experience, the way the paper was folded up made him believe

that there was some type of narcotic folded up inside the paper.

       After reviewing the testimony of the officers and the video evidence

introduced during the motion to suppress hearing, and, based on the totality

of the circumstances and on the officers’ training and experience, the trial court

could have determined that Brooks had probable cause to open the paper

revealing the methamphetamine.        Thus, the trial court did not abuse its

discretion in denying Cosper’s motion to suppress on this legal theory

applicable to the case. Cosper’s first issue is overruled.

SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

       In his second issue, Cosper contends the evidence is insufficient to prove

beyond a reasonable doubt that he possessed methamphetamine. Specifically,

Cosper contends there was insufficient evidence to affirmatively link him to

the methamphetamine; thus, the State failed to prove that he knowingly

possessed it. Cosper's reliance on the affirmative links rule, however, is

misplaced.

       Under the “affirmative links” doctrine, the defendant's link to the

contraband must have been more than a fortuitous proximity. Evans v. State,

202 S.W.3d 158, 161-62

 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). It applies to instances when


Cosper v. State                                                           Page 6
the defendant does not have exclusive possession of the location where the

contraband is discovered. See Foster v. State, 

635 S.W.2d 710, 719

 (Tex. Crim.

App. 1982) (affirmative-links doctrine applies in absence of “direct evidence of

the defendant's exclusive possession” of contraband).           It does not apply,

however, when the contraband is discovered in a place exclusively controlled

by the defendant. See Deere v. State, 

631 S.W.3d 762

, 768-69 (Tex. App.—

Eastland 2021, pet. ref'd); see also White v. State, No. 01-23-00041-CR, 

2025

Tex. App. LEXIS 358

, at *31 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Jan. 28, 2025, no

pet.).

         Here, the State was not required to present evidence affirmatively

linking Cosper to the methamphetamine because it had come from a place that

he exclusively controlled—his own coat pocket. Furthermore, Cosper was on

his own bicycle with no one else around when stopped by Officer Folsom.

Under these circumstances, the affirmative links rule does not apply. See 

id.


Accordingly, any alleged lack of affirmative links does not render the evidence

insufficient, and Cosper’s second issue is overruled.

ARTICLE 42.07

         In his last issue, Cosper complains that the trial court erred in failing to

ask whether there was any reason why Cosper should not be sentenced as

required by article 42.07 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. See TEX.


Cosper v. State                                                              Page 7
CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 42.07. Cosper did not object to the trial court’s alleged

failure.

       A complaint about the court's failure to follow article 42.07 must be

preserved for our review. TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a)(1); see Tenon v. State, 

563

S.W.2d 622, 623-24

 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (holding that nothing was preserved

for review when appellant failed to object to the trial court's failure to follow

article 42.07); Hunter v. State, 

691 S.W.3d 247

, 253 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2024,

no pet.); Eisen v. State, 

40 S.W.3d 628, 637

 (Tex. App.—Waco 2001, pet. ref'd).

See also Webb v. State, No. 10-25-00160-CR, 

2026 Tex. App. LEXIS 8834

, at

*10 (Tex. App.—Waco Sept. 17, 2026, no pet. h.) (mem. op. not designated for

publication).

       Cosper acknowledges that he did not object at trial regarding this alleged

error. Regardless, he argues that we should reach the merits of his issue.

Cosper’s argument does not persuade us to bypass the established preservation

requirements. Accordingly, because Cosper did not object, his third issue is

not preserved and is overruled.

CONCLUSION

       Having overruled each of Cosper’s issues on appeal, we affirm the trial

court's judgment.




Cosper v. State                                                          Page 8
                                   LEE HARRIS
                                   Justice

OPINION DELIVERED and FILED: October 29, 2026
Before Chief Justice Johnson,
       Justice Harris, and
       Justice Westerfeld
Affirmed
Do Not Publish
CR25




Cosper v. State                                 Page 9

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