Civil United Kingdom
Director of Public Prosecutions v Christopher Berntsen
Neutral Citation Number: [2026] EWHC 2768 (Admin)
Case No: AC-2026-LON-001674
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
KING’S BENCH DIVISION
DIVISIONAL COURT
Royal Courts of Justice
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL
Date: 29 October 2026
Before:
LORD JUSTICE STUART-SMITH
and
MR JUSTICE JOHNSON
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Between:
| DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS | Appellant | |
| – and – | ||
| CHRISTOPHER BERNTSEN | Respondent |
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Paul Jarvis KC (instructed by the Crown Prosecution Service) for the Appellant
Jeremy Benson KC (instructed by Geoffrey Miller Solicitors) for the Respondent
Hearing date: 27 October 2026
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Approved Judgment
This judgment was handed down remotely at 10.30am on 29 October 2026 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives.
………………………..
Lord Justice Stuart-Smith:
Introduction
1. This is an appeal by way of case stated against two pre-trial rulings given in the Basingstoke Magistrates’ Court on 11 December 2025 by District Judge (Magistrates’ Court) Stephen Apted.
2. The appeal arises out of an incident on 11 June 2023. The Respondent, Mr Berntsen, was stopped by the police while driving his car and was subsequently charged by postal requisition with the offence of driving a motor car on a road with a proportion of a controlled drug, namely cannabis, in his blood, namely 3.9 UG/L, which exceeded the specified limit.
3. It was the Prosecution’s case that a Health Care Professional [“HCP”] called Ms Jambaya, who was the forensic custody nurse on duty at Southampton Police Station examined Mr Berntsen. She then informed PC John that Mr Berntsen had a condition which could be due to some drug because of his presentation upon arrest and his own admission to cannabis use prior to arrest. Ms Jambaya produced a witness statement evidencing that she had given that information to PC John. PC John produced a witness statement evidencing that Ms Jambaya had given him that information.
4. For reasons that we explain below, Ms Jambaya did not attend Mr Berntsen’s trial. By the two rulings that are in issue in this appeal, the Judge first ruled that the evidence of Ms Jambaya was inadmissible under section 116(2)(c) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003. Second, he ruled that PC John’s evidence that Ms Jambaya had given him the information was inadmissible hearsay because it was relied upon as to the truth of its contents. In the light of these two rulings, the prosecution offered no evidence and Mr Berntsen was acquitted.
5. The questions for the opinion of the High Court are:
(1) whether the Judge was right to find that the paucity of action by the prosecution to establish that it was not reasonably practicable for Ms Jambaya to attend the hearing to give evidence, either remotely or in person, provided grounds for determining that section 116(2)(c) had not been satisfied; and
(2) whether the Judge was right to find that evidence from PC John that Ms Jambaya had told him that the respondent’s condition “might be due to some drug” amounted to hearsay.
6. This is the judgment of the Court in answer to those two questions.
The factual and procedural background
7. The Case Stated provides very little detail about the factual circumstances in which Mr Berntsen came to be stopped or the procedures that followed.
8. Mr Berntsen entered a plea of not guilty in October 2023. A trial preparation hearing was held and a Preparation for an Effective Trial [“PET”] form completed which identified a long catalogue of issues. While no doubt a legal representative who specialises in such cases could envisage even more issues, it is not unfair to note that the PET list appears to have been an attempt to identify all possible issues that might theoretically arise: for example, the first listed issue as summarised in the Case Stated was “proof that the Respondent was driving” which cannot have been seriously in issue on the known facts of this relatively straightforward case. Taking the PET at face value, Mr Berntsen disputed that he had been lawfully arrested. He disputed that the interview summary was accurate. He disputed that the drug testing procedure was carried out correctly, and he disputed that exhibits and samples were collected and delivered as stated by the prosecution. He said that facts which were not in dispute could not be recorded in a written admission. Of more immediate relevance to the present appeal, in amongst the other alleged issues it was stated that the statutory conditions precedent to a requirement for blood were not met.
9. The case thereafter had a somewhat chequered listing history until it was eventually fixed for Monday 1 December 2025. The defence required the attendance of both Ms Jambaya and PC John at trial. Ms Jambaya initially indicated to the prosecution that she would be able to attend the trial. However, on Friday 21 November 2025 the prosecution was informed that there had been an unexpected death in her family and that she was to travel to Zimbabwe on Monday 24 November to attend the funeral. She was due to return to the United Kingdom on 7 December and would therefore be outside the country on the trial date. The Notice to Introduce Hearsay Evidence pursuant to section 116 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 was served that day, 21 November 2025, and stated:
“HCP Joyce Jambaya [h]as suffered a sudden death in the family and has had to travel back to Zimbabwe for the funeral. Therefore, she is not in the jurisdiction and it is not practicable for her to return.”
In the section of the notice asking for the facts relied upon and how they would be proved, the prosecution entered “NA”.
10. The defence objected. It requested further details concerning the date of death, details of the bereaved person and their relationship to Ms Jambaya, funeral and travel arrangements and submitted that the respondent would be prejudiced if unable to cross-examine Ms Jambaya. The specific matters identified as facts in dispute included the basis upon which she said that the respondent’s condition might be due to a drug, whether there was informed consent to taking the blood samples and whether the samples had been shaken or disturbed for 30 seconds.
11. At the hearing the prosecution accepted that no enquiries had been made to establish whether Ms Jambaya could have delayed her departure, whether she could return earlier, or whether she could give evidence remotely. There was no evidence of any further communication with her after the prosecution had been informed of the difficulty.
The Judge’s rulings
12. The Judge refused to admit Ms Jambaya’s statement. He found that the prosecution had adduced no evidence of any steps to secure her attendance. There was no evidence that the prosecution had considered an application for a live link or considered paying for the witness to return earlier, or whether she could return earlier.
13. In response to this ruling the prosecution indicated that it would proceed to seek to prove its case, and would rely on the evidence of PC John to establish that Ms Jambaya had advised him that the respondent’s condition might be due to some drug. The Judge held that Ms Jambaya’s communication was relied upon as to the truth of its contents and was therefore hearsay within the scope of sections 114 and 115 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003.
The legal framework
Requirement to provide a specimen of blood
14. It is an offence to drive a vehicle on a road when the proportion of a specified controlled drug in the driver’s blood exceeds the specified limit for that drug: section 5A(1) and (2) of the Road Traffic Act 1988 [“the 1988 Act”].
15. Section 7(1A) of the 1988 Act permits a constable, in the course of an investigation into an offence under section 5A, to require a person to provide a specimen of blood or urine for a laboratory test, subject to the conditions contained in the section.
16. Section 7(3)(c) provides that a requirement to provide blood or urine cannot be made at a police station unless:
“the suspected offence is one under section 3A, 4 or 5A of this Act and the constable making the requirement has been advised by a medical practitioner or a registered health care professional that the condition of the person required to provide the specimen might be due to some drug”.
Hearsay
17. Chapter 2 of Part 11 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 makes provision for hearsay evidence. Section 114 provides that “a statement not made in oral evidence in the proceedings is admissible as evidence of any matter stated” only in limited circumstances. Those circumstances include cases where section 116 of the 2003 Act makes the statement admissible. Section 115(2) defines a “statement” as any representation of fact or opinion made by a person by whatever means. By section 115(3), a matter stated is one to which the hearsay provisions apply only if a purpose of the person making the statement appears to the court to have been:
“(a) to cause another person to believe the matter, or
(b) to cause another person to act, or a machine to operate, on the basis that the matter is as stated.”
18. Section 116(1) and (2)(c) provides for the admissibility of a statement where the maker of the statement is outside the United Kingdom and it is not reasonably practicable to secure their attendance.
Giving evidence abroad by remote link
19. Section 51(1)(b) and (2) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 makes provision for a court to direct participation in a summary trial by a live video link. That includes participation by a witness giving evidence by a live video link. In deciding whether to give a direction, the court must consider any guidance given by the Lord (now Lady) Chief Justice: section 51(5)(a). At the time of the hearing before the Judge, the applicable guidance was that given by the Lord Chief Justice in July 2022. That states, at paragraph 18:
“Where the participant is abroad, then (depending on the country concerned) the court will wish to consider whether a live link would risk damaging international relations so as to be contrary to the public interest. The factors to consider, and the checks that can be made, are set out in Agbabiaka (evidence from abroad; Nare guidance) [2021] UKUT 00286 (IAC).”
20. With effect from 1 October 2026, the Lady Chief Justice provided replacement guidance. Although it was not in place at the time of the hearing before the Judge, it reflects the principles that are set out in Agbabiaka. It states:
“3. In considering whether to permit oral evidence from a participant in a foreign jurisdiction, the court must consider the issue of any permission needed from a court or other authority in a place outside the United Kingdom (CrimPR 3.36(2)(e)(v)). Law enforcement authorities should not make arrangements for a live link from a foreign jurisdiction without first consulting the relevant authorities for that jurisdiction.
4. The court should consider whether a live link can be arranged informally via police-to police processes with the foreign jurisdiction or whether it requires a formal mutual legal assistance (MLA) request i.e. a letter of request (LOR) to the host state.
5. An MLA request for evidence can be issued by designated prosecution authorities, or the Magistrates’ Court, Crown Court or High Court directly to the relevant judicial authority in countries that have implemented the relevant sections (Article 15) of the 1959 European Convention on Mutual Assistance, without the request going through a Central Authority in the UK. Where countries are not signatories then the request must go through the UK Central Authority. Some countries that are signatories have further rules and exceptions and so the relevant party should consult with the UK Central Authority. Further information on requesting MLA in criminal matters, including request templates, can be accessed in the Home Office’s Mutual Legal Assistance Guidance. A court may issue an MLA request on behalf of the defence. In such circumstances, it is for the defence to draft the request with all necessary annexes and translations in line with the MLA Guidance.
6. Technical and practical arrangements for use of a live link with a remote participant must be tested in good time, so that alternative ways of adducing the evidence can be considered if necessary.”
Submissions
First question
21. Mr Paul Jarvis KC, for the Director of Public Prosecutions, submits that the Judge adopted an unduly narrow approach to the question of whether it was reasonably practicable to secure the witness’ attendance. He says that the Judge should have considered the importance of the evidence, the extent of any prejudice to the respondent, the expense and inconvenience of securing her attendance and the reason for her absence, and that if he had done so he would have concluded that it was not reasonably practicable to secure her attendance.
22. Mr Jeremy Benson KC, for Mr Berntsen, submits that the prosecution bore the burden of establishing the statutory gateway under section 116(2)(c) of the 2003 Act. Although it knew of the difficulty on 21 November, three days before the witness was due to travel, it made no attempt to communicate with her or to investigate any means by which she could give live evidence. There was no evidence concerning the date of the funeral, whether the witness could delay her departure or return earlier, the availability of a live link or any actual legal or practical obstacle to receiving evidence from Zimbabwe. The prosecution had therefore failed to discharge its burden of proof.
Second question
23. In respect of the second question, Mr Jarvis says the relevant fact which the prosecution sought to prove through PC John was that he had been advised by Ms Jambaya that the condition of Mr Berntsen might be due to drugs. When that is understood, it is clear that his evidence does not amount to hearsay. The Judge erroneously proceeded on the basis that the relevant fact which the prosecution sought to prove through PC John was that Mr Berntsen’s condition was due to drugs.
24. Mr Benson submits that the evidence of PC John amounts to hearsay. The prosecution needed to prove that Ms Jambaya had formed the relevant opinion, and the purpose of communicating the opinion to PC John was that he should believe it and act upon it. Mr Benson says that treating the mere communication of an opinion as sufficient would enable a false or unreasonable opinion to bypass the statutory protection contained in section 7(3)(c).
Discussion and resolution – question 1
25. Mr Berntsen was required to conduct his case in accordance with the overriding objective and to comply with the Criminal Procedure Rules, practice directions and directions made by the court: rule 1.2(1)(a), (b). That duty required him to identify the real issues in the case. He did not do so. As we have outlined above, his completion of the PET form has the appearance of a largely boiler plate root and branch challenge to the entirety of the prosecution case. We are not persuaded that the real issues in the case were nearly as broad as the PET form would suggest. For example, there was surely no dispute that Ms Jambaya took blood from the respondent, and there is no dispute that the blood test results indicated that the proportion of cannabis in Mr Berntsen’s blood exceeded the level at which an offence under section 5A of the 1988 Act is committed. It is said on Mr Berntsen’s behalf that “[i]t was an issue in the case whether her opinion as to the defendant’s condition might be unreasonable and whether the blood sample was correctly taken and/or dealt with. They were important issues in the case.” However, Mr Benson has not shown that the reasonableness or otherwise of the nurse’s opinion that Mr Berntsen’s condition might be relevant to drugs was relevant to any issue in the case other than achieving compliance with the section 7(3)(c) requirement for a constable to be informed. Nor has it been shown that there was any relevant challenge to the manner in which the sample was taken or dealt with, save possibly for a contention that Ms Jambaya had merely “disturbed” the blood samples rather than shaking them.
26. If there was no relevant challenge to Ms Jambaya’s evidence, then the question of whether her evidence was admissible as hearsay would not arise. However, despite a degree of scepticism, we will proceed on the assumption that there was a relevant challenge to Ms Jambaya’s evidence. If there was, then her evidence was admissible if the test set out in section 116(2)(c) of the 2003 Act was satisfied. That contains two requirements: the relevant person must be outside the United Kingdom, and it must not be reasonably practicable to secure that person’s attendance.
27. The first requirement was established. Ms Jambaya was in Zimbabwe on the date fixed for trial. The issue, therefore, was whether it was reasonably practicable to secure her attendance.
28. The test is one of reasonable practicability, not impossibility. In R v Castillo [1996] 1 Cr App R 438, 442B-443B the Court of Appeal (addressing the materially identical provision of section 23(2)(b) of the Criminal Justice Act 1988) explained the matters that are relevant to the question of reasonable practicability:
“Mr Paul's submission, stripped to its bare essentials, is that if the witness says that he can come, then it is reasonably practicable for him to come, notwithstanding that there may be other good or powerful reasons why he should not do so. He has referred the Court to Maloney, an unreported case heard on December 16, 1993, where Beldam L.J., giving the judgment of the Court, on the question of what was practicable in section 23, said:
“The word “practicable” appears in many statutes as a qualification of duties or obligations imposed on those required to carry out the relevant acts by the statute. It is to be noted that in section 23, the statements referred to may be statements of the prosecution or of defence witnesses, and the obligation which normally attaches to those who are presenting cases in the Crown Court is to secure, so far as possible, the attendance of witnesses to give evidence orally in court, but the word “practicable” is not equivalent to physically possible. It must be construed in the light of the normal steps which would be taken to arrange the attendance of a witness at trial. Reasonably practicable involves a further qualification of the duty to secure the attendance at trial by taking the reasonable steps which a party would normally take to secure a witness's attendance having regard to the means and resources available to the parties.”
Therefore, in our judgment, the mere fact that it is possible for the witness to come does not answer the question. The judge has to consider a number of factors. First, he has to consider the importance of the evidence that the witness can give and whether or not it was prejudicial, and how prejudicial it would be to the defence that the witness did not attend. In this particular case, the attendance of Mr Tyler was simply to prove what he had been told by Mr Macie whose evidence we are concerned with in this matter.
Secondly, we have to consider the expense and inconvenience of securing the witness's attendance, which the judge took into account. It may well be that if a witness is part of the prosecution team, so to speak, that should not be a major consideration, but it is a matter of considerable expense to bring a witness all the way from Venezuela simply to give evidence on a matter which it seems to this Court could not seriously be challenged in cross-examination.
Thirdly, the judge has to consider the reasons put forward as to why it is not convenient or reasonably practicable for the officer to come. This is a question of fact, and this Court does not lightly interfere with findings of fact by the trial judge. This is not a case where any credibility arises but, nevertheless, the judge had to make a decision as to what was reasonably practicable, and unless Mr Paul can persuade us that the judge erred in principle it is a decision which, in our judgment, should stand. We have not been persuaded by Mr Paul, despite his attractive argument, that the judge erred in principle here, or that the mere fact the witness said that he could come means that the judge's conclusion was wrong.” (Emphasis added)
Those considerations were endorsed in the context of the 2003 Act in R v Yu [2006] EWCA Crim 349.
29. There is no dispute that it was only shortly before the trial that the prosecution became aware that Ms Jambaya would be out of the country at the time of the trial. The prosecution were first alerted to the problem on Friday 21 November and they were then told that she would not be here for the trial. Even if they had wanted to and on the assumption that it was proportionate to do so, the time between Friday 21 and Monday 24 November (when she flew out of the United Kingdom) rendered it impractical for the prosecution to have compelled her attendance. That meant that it was not reasonably practicable to secure her attendance at the trial unless she was willing to fly back to the United Kingdom for it or it was reasonably practicable for her to give evidence remotely from Zimbabwe. The prosecution had only a working week before trial the following Monday.
30. We deal first with the suggestion that it might have been reasonably practicable to secure her attendance by some form of live link. We note in passing that it was not suggested in Mr Berntsen’s counter notice that it would be reasonably practicable to arrange a live link. That said, if Ms Jambaya was to give evidence remotely then it would have been necessary to take the steps identified in Agbabiaka and in the Lord Chief Justice’s (now the Lady Chief Justice’s) guidance. That included consulting the authorities in Zimbabwe. It was plainly not reasonably practicable to do so in the time available: evidence to that effect about the time it would take to make such arrangements is well within the knowledge of the court and was not necessary.
31. Turning to the suggestion that it was reasonably practicable to secure her attendance at the Basingstoke Magistrates’ Court on 1 December, the Judge’s finding and reasoning was set out at [15] of the Case Stated:
“In the absence of any evidence as to whether it was or was not reasonably practicable to secure the witnesses attendance, the District Judge (Magistrates’ Court) ruled the evidence of HCP Jambaya inadmissible under section 116(2)(c) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003.”
32. Although it was correct that the prosecution had not made further enquiries of Ms Jambaya, it did not follow that the principles summarised in Castillo and endorsed in Yu were inapplicable. In some cases, it might be said that such an enquiry should be made, for example if the witness is of central importance to a case of the utmost seriousness and where it would be highly prejudicial for the evidence to be given as hearsay. Here, however, the respondent has not explained with any clarity precisely why Ms Jambaya’s evidence was challenged or why it would be prejudicial for her evidence to be given as hearsay. To the extent that there was an issue as to whether she had sufficiently “disturbed” or “shaken” the blood sample, then it appears from the PET form that Mr Berntsen could give evidence on that issue. He was not therefore prejudiced by the witness’ absence.
33. The Judge did not address the importance (or otherwise) of Ms Jambaya’s evidence. In this he was not helped by Mr Berntsen’s blunderbuss approach to the identification of issues. Nor did he address the question whether or to what extent it would be prejudicial to Mr Berntsen’s defence if she did not attend. As we have indicated above, had he done so, it is not clear that he could or would have identified any significant prejudice. Turning to the second of the Castillo features, he did not consider the expense and inconvenience of securing Ms Jambaya’s attendance (on the assumption that she was willing to return to the United Kingdom for the trial); but it would have been considerable both in absolute terms and in the context of this relatively straightforward case. It is no answer that in the event of conviction the prosecution would have been able to apply for its costs from Mr Berntsen.
34. Third, Ms Jambaya was an experienced health professional who had previously indicated that she was willing to attend trial. There was evidence of a compelling reason for her inability to do so: an unexpected family bereavement and a funeral in Zimbabwe.
35. In our judgment, by focusing exclusively on the absence of further evidence and in failing to take into account the relevant features that we have identified, the Judge erred and that, as a result his conclusion cannot stand. We consider that, if he had addressed those features he should and would have found that the prosecution had established that it was not reasonably practicable to secure the witness’ attendance.
36. We therefore answer the first question: No. The paucity of action and evidence on the part of the prosecution did not provide a proper basis for concluding that section 116(2)(c) had not been satisfied.
Discussion and resolution – question 2
37. In order to decide whether the evidence of PC John is hearsay, it is first necessary to identify the relevant matter that the prosecution sought to prove: R v Twist [2011] EWCA Crim 1143; [2011] 2 Cr App R 17 per Hughes LJ at [17].
38. The starting point for identifying what relevant fact was sought to be proved is the language of section 7(3)(c) of the 1988 Act. The relevant statutory condition is that “the constable making the requirement has been advised by … a registered health care professional that [Mr Berntsen’s condition] might be due to some drug”. The statutory language is directed to advice received by a constable. It does not depend on whether the advice was correct or reasonable, only that the advice was given. Mr Benson submits that this provides inadequate protection because it would mean that advice that was false or unreasonable would suffice. It was, however, for Parliament to determine the appropriate threshold, and it is not for the court to re-write the statutory test. The statutory test is clear, and it does not involve any enquiry into the reasonableness of the advice given by the healthcare practitioner to the police officer.
39. In the language of section 114 of the 2003 Act, PC John’s evidence that he was advised by Ms Jambaya that Mr Berntsen’s condition might be due to some drug was evidence of “a statement” (that is the advice given by Ms Jambaya) “not made in oral evidence in the proceedings” (because Ms Jambaya was not present to give oral evidence in the proceedings).
40. It was not, however, sought to be admitted “as evidence of any matter stated”. Specifically, it was not sought to be admitted as evidence that Mr Berntsen’s condition was, or might have been, due to some drug. That is because the question of whether Ms Jambaya’s opinion was correct, or was reasonably well-founded, is not relevant to the statutory condition that arises under section 7(3)(c) of the 1988 Act. The evidence was sought to be admitted only to establish that Ms Jambaya had advised PC John in those terms. That does not amount to hearsay within the meaning of section 114(1) of the 2003 Act (or at common law) because PC John’s evidence of the out of court statement was being given only to prove that the out of court statement was made. It was not being given to prove the truth of the content of the out of court statement. The occurrence of the communication was established by PC John’s direct testimony.
41. It is true that Ms Jambaya intended PC John to act upon receiving her advice, and that he did so. That does not by itself make the evidence hearsay. As Twist makes clear, it is necessary to distinguish between an intention that the recipient should act upon a message and an intention that the recipient should act upon the basis that a matter stated within the message is true. More fundamentally, the question is tied to the particular fact for which the evidence is tendered.
42. The Judge’s reasoning treated the relevant fact as being whether the respondent’s condition might have been due to a drug. It followed from that premise that Ms Jambaya intended PC John to act upon the matter stated. But that was not the fact which the prosecution sought to prove through PC John for the purpose of section 7(3)(c). The Judge was therefore wrong in law to exclude PC John’s evidence upon that basis.
43. We answer the second question in the case stated: No.
Conclusion
44. Our answers to the questions stated are therefore:
(1) No. On the evidence placed before him, it was not reasonably practicable to secure Ms Jambaya’s attendance, and the Judge was wrong to decide otherwise.
(2) No. PC John’s evidence that Ms Jambaya advised him that the respondent’s condition might be due to some drug was not hearsay when tendered to prove that the advice required by section 7(3)(c) had been given.
45. We therefore allow the appeal. We set aside the acquittal, and remit the case to the Magistrates’ Court for trial. Two final observations may be made for the avoidance of any doubt. First, at the remitted trial, it will be open to the prosecution to call Ms Jambaya should they choose to do so. Second, had we answered the first question in the affirmative but the second question in the negative, we would still have remitted the case to the Magistrates’ Court for trial and it would still have been open to the prosecution to call Ms Jambaya. That is because the Prosecution were prepared to continue after the Judge made his first ruling and we could not be sure that the prosecution would have failed in the absence of the second ruling. Otherwise, we express no view on the merits or demerits of the prosecution.
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