Administrative United Kingdom

DS v The Secretary of State for the Home Department

Official source

First-tier Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber)

Appeal Number: HU/58085/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Heard at Newport
On 27th October 2026

Before

FIRST-TIER TRIBUNAL JUDGE Boyes

Between

D S
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)

Appellant

and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT

Respondent

Representation:

For the Appellant: Mr Banham of Counsel

For the Respondent: Ms S, Home Office Presenting Officer

DECISION AND REASONS

1. This is the decision of the Tribunal in the appeal of the Appellant against the decision of the Respondent made on 6th June 2025.

Anonymity

2. In making this decision I have considered that justice being administered openly and in public is a fundamental tenet of the justice system but it may be qualified by the interests of the parties and family members. I have decided to make an anonymity direction because the case concerns matters relevant to International Protection claims. Whilst the claim, facts, decision and reasons are all in the public interest to be known, the specific identity of the appellant and his witnesses are not.

Background

3. The appellant claims to have entered the United Kingdom clandestinely by lorry on 29 December 2018. On 7 November 2019, he was convicted at Worcestershire Magistrates’ Court of producing a Class B controlled drug, namely cannabis. On 30 January 2020, Worcester Crown Court sentenced him to six months’ imprisonment. Whilst on remand at HMP Hewell, he was identified by the Home Office as an illegal entrant and, on 16 November 2019, was served with illegal entry notices. Incidentally, I have not been provided with the sentencing remarks.

4. On 5 February 2020, the appellant was served with a Notice of Decision to Deport and invited to provide reasons why he should not be deported within 20 working days. On the same date, having completed his custodial sentence, he was detained under immigration powers. No response was received to the notice and, as a consequence, a Deportation Order was signed on 16 March 2020. The Deportation Order and accompanying Decision to Deport letter were served on him on 18 March 2020.

5. On 3 April 2020, the appellant submitted a Rule 35 trafficking claim, following which a referral was made to the National Referral Mechanism (NRM) on 6 April 2020. A positive reasonable grounds decision was made on 14 April 2020. He was subsequently released from immigration detention on 28 May 2020.

6. A Letter of Authority from his current legal representatives was received on 23 December 2020. The appellant states that, on 6 March 2021, he complained about his previous legal representatives on the basis that they had failed to notify the Home Office of the reasons why he opposed deportation. Further representations against deportation were submitted on his behalf on 8 April 2021.

7. On 23 July 2021, the appellant applied for Further Leave to Remain on the basis of his private and family life in the United Kingdom. Additional representations in support of that application were submitted on 13 August 2021.

8. On 20 April 2023, a negative conclusive grounds decision was made in respect of his NRM claim. On 7 February 2025, an asylum claim was submitted on his behalf. The appellant asserts that the substance of this claim had originally been provided to former legal representatives on 10 March 2020, but that they failed to submit the information to the Home Office. He attended a substantive asylum interview on 18 March 2025.

9. The appellant has been convicted of a criminal offence and the respondent maintains that his deportation is conducive to the public good pursuant to section 3(5) of the Immigration Act 1971. It is on that basis that the deportation decision is maintained by the respondent.

10. The delay in this matter being decided and adjudicated was not explained to me. It seems an extraordinary length of time, given the date when the appellant first claimed following his conviction, about his claimed Convention fears. The length of sentence is not determinative of a delay or a factor which necessarily needs to be borne in mind but it does, given the absence of an explanation, impact upon the overall assessment of the proportionality of the process and of the decision to maintain the deportation order.

11. It may assist, in future cases, if an explanation or some reasons are provided when there is a delay such as this.

The Hearing

12. The hearing took place face to face. It was recorded using [the Cloud Video Platform. That recording is the record of proceedings and should be consulted in the event of any dispute about what was said at the hearing.

Issues

13. The parties agreed that the issues the Tribunal must decide are:

(a) On the balance of probabilities, does the appellant possess a characteristic falling within one of the Refugee Convention reasons, or would such a characteristic be attributed to them by an actor of persecution?

(b) On the balance of probabilities does the appellant fear persecution for that Convention reason?

(c) Is it reasonably likely that the appellant would be persecuted for that Convention reason?

(d) Is it reasonably likely there would not be sufficient protection available?

(e) Is there a part of the country where the appellant would not have a well-founded fear of persecution and to which they could reasonably be expected to relocate?

(f) Exception 1: Has the appellant lived lawfully in the UK for more than half his life?

(g) Is the appellant socially and culturally integrated?

(h) Does the appellant face very significant obstacles to integration in his country of return?

(i) Exception 2: Does the appellant have a genuine and subsisting relationship with a qualifying partner or qualifying child?

(j) Would it be unduly harsh on the partner if the appellant were deported?

(k) Are there very compelling circumstances over and above those described in Exceptions 1 and 2, such as to outweigh the public interest in the appellant’s deportation?

Evidence

14. The appellant provided a detailed witness statement which he adopted as his evidence. It is important to see his evidence; he appellant is an Albanian national born in 1994. He states that he is currently unemployed because of his immigration status and relies upon his protection and human rights claims to remain in the United Kingdom. He contends that he faces a risk of serious harm in Albania arising from both a longstanding blood feud affecting his family and his experiences as a victim of trafficking.

15. The appellant explains that the blood feud significantly predates his birth and originates from events involving previous generations. He states that, because the dispute arose long before his lifetime, he has limited knowledge of the individuals involved and cannot provide precise details about all those connected to it. He maintains that this lack of detail should not undermine his credibility, as knowledge of the feud was largely confined to older family members. According to the appellant, the feud re-emerged in recent years, resulting in threats being made against relatives and physical attacks upon him and his brother.

16. In response to concerns about inconsistencies in his account, the appellant states that he was extremely anxious during his asylum interview and focused on ensuring that the principal incidents affecting him and his family were recorded. He explains that he described attacks involving himself, his father and his brother but accepts that some incidents may not have been recounted in full detail. He attributes any omissions to fear, stress and the pressure of recounting traumatic events.

17. The appellant maintains that attacks connected to disputed family land were perpetrated by the rival family involved in the feud. Although he was unable to identify the assailants because their faces were covered, he argues that the context of the longstanding land dispute makes it reasonable to conclude that the attacks were feud-related. He further states that he witnessed violence against his father and that these events continue to have a profound psychological impact upon him.

18. The appellant also relies on his account of trafficking. He states that he met individuals who later trafficked him whilst he was in Belgium and had casual contact with them before exploitation occurred. He explains that he was taken to cannabis cultivation properties in the United Kingdom and was compelled to work there. He states that he escaped one property and travelled to Cardiff to stay with his girlfriend, believing he had reached safety, but was subsequently abducted by the traffickers and taken to another property, which was raided by the police on the same day. He accepts that parts of his account may appear inconsistent but attributes this to the effects of trauma, fear and the difficulty of recalling events chronologically.

19. The appellant states that he lived in Belgium for approximately one year but did not seek asylum there because he continued to receive threats. He claims that a relative residing in Belgium also received threats and that he did not regard Belgium, or Europe more generally, as a place where he could obtain effective protection. He therefore argues that his failure to claim asylum there should not adversely affect his credibility.

20. The appellant contends that he remains vulnerable to re-trafficking on return to Albania. He describes himself as having limited education, poor economic prospects, a deteriorating mental state and little meaningful support beyond his elderly parents. He argues that these factors, when considered alongside the blood feud, increase his vulnerability and place him at continuing risk of exploitation.

21. Addressing the question of state protection, the appellant maintains that Albanian authorities would be unable or unwilling to protect him. He asserts that blood feuds are often treated as private disputes and claims that corruption is widespread. He further alleges that criminal groups are capable of obtaining information through corrupt means and that, if returned, his whereabouts would become known through official registration systems. He contends that relocation within Albania would not provide effective protection because he could still be traced by those seeking to harm him.

22. The appellant states that, although he has not received direct threats since arriving in the United Kingdom, this is because those who threaten him have been unable to locate him. He claims that threats and intimidation towards his family in Albania have continued and that his father continues to fear reprisals. He argues that both members of the rival family involved in the feud and those connected with his traffickers would retain an interest in locating and harming him if he returned.

23. The appellant is married to a British citizen. He states that his wife has experienced a difficult upbringing, has ongoing mental health difficulties and has previously attempted suicide. He explains that she has received therapy and achieved a degree of stability in the United Kingdom. He argues that it would be unduly harsh either for her to relocate to Albania or for the couple to be separated. He states that they provide mutual emotional support and that removal would have a profound adverse impact upon her mental health and wellbeing.

24. The appellant further submits that telephone and online communication would not be an adequate substitute for family life with his wife. He argues that their marriage depends upon living together and that separation would be harmful to both of them.

25. In relation to his criminal conviction, the appellant maintains that his involvement in the offence was a consequence of trafficking and coercion. He states that he was forced to participate in activities connected with cannabis cultivation and did not willingly engage in criminal conduct. He argues that he should be viewed as a victim of exploitation rather than as a willing offender.

26. The appellant concluded by asking that his personal circumstances, fears of persecution, experiences of trafficking, mental health difficulties, family life and relationship with his wife be considered in the round. He states that return to Albania would place him at risk, cause a serious deterioration in his mental health and permanently separate him from his wife, and he therefore seeks permission to remain in the United Kingdom.

27. The appellant was cross examined. He explained as follows he is a person whose immediate family in Albania comprises of his parents. His brother has left the country although he could not evidence it. He states that his mother is a housewife and that his father undertakes construction work and also works family agricultural land, including the cultivation of grapes and oranges. He explained that his father alternates between construction work and farming because he owns land in his village.

28. The appellant stated that he last spoke to his parents on his birthday, 30 August. He said that contact is now infrequent, occurring approximately once a month or once every two months. He acknowledged that he had previously stated that he spoke to them several times each week but explained that contact had been reduced because his parents had received threats. He described his parents as elderly and vulnerable, stating that his father is approximately 60 years old and his mother approximately 55 or 56.

29. The appellant said that his family remains involved in a blood feud with another family. He was unable to identify the rival family by name, explaining that they had moved away to a city and that he did not know them personally. He accepted that he had previously stated that his father knew who they were but explained that his father had not provided a statement because he had been seriously ill and communication with him had been limited. The appellant maintained that the feud began many years ago, around 30 years ago, and related to a land dispute. He stated that his grandfather killed two brothers from the rival family and that the dispute has continued ever since.

30. The appellant said that he had been assaulted on numerous occasions because of the feud. He stated that his father and paternal uncle had both been assaulted on the same day and that threats against the family continue. His paternal uncle remains in Albania. The appellant explained that he had not mentioned his uncle earlier because he believed questions about family referred only to his immediate family. He stated that the police were aware of the feud but had not taken effective action, although he did not know whether his father had formally reported incidents to the authorities.

31. In relation to the influence of the rival family, the appellant stated that they possess power and influence in Albania. Although he had previously said that he did not know the extent of their influence and that his father would know more, he explained that he had learned additional information after speaking to his father following an assault.

32. The appellant stated that a friend funded his journey from Albania to Belgium because he had no money. He lived in Belgium for approximately one year. During part of that time he was homeless and subsequently stayed with a Romanian woman. He did not stay with a cousin who lived in Belgium because he had no contact with him at the time and simply wanted to leave Albania. Although he had no direct contact with that cousin, he maintained that he knew the cousin had also received threats because the extended family remained in contact with one another. He explained that the cousin was the son of his father's first cousin.

33. The appellant said that he did not claim asylum in Belgium because he was traumatised and uncertain where to go, having fled Albania. He stated that he met his traffickers in Belgium but refused to disclose their names, maintaining that they remained dangerous and that identifying them would place him at risk. When challenged with his witness statement, in which he had stated that he did not know their names, he denied any inconsistency and maintained that he was unwilling to disclose their identities because of fear.

34. The appellant said that, upon arriving in the United Kingdom, he was taken to a cannabis cultivation property, which he believed may have been in the Islington area. He was unable to recall precise locations or dates, explaining that a significant period had passed and that his health had deteriorated. He stated that he eventually escaped but could not remember where he went. He accepted previous evidence that he went to Cardiff and stayed with his girlfriend. He stated that he was subsequently kidnapped by traffickers and taken to another cannabis property, which was raided by police on the same night. He explained that he did not seek assistance from the police after escaping because he was afraid of the traffickers.

35. The appellant stated that he first met his girlfriend, now his wife, in person after arriving in the United Kingdom and denied that they had known each other in Albania. When it was put to him that he had previously said they first met in Nottingham, he suggested that this may have been an error because she was from Nottingham. He maintained that traffickers had continued to make threats against him but accepted that he had no documentary evidence of these threats.

36. The appellant's wife is a dual Albanian and British national. He confirmed that she does not own property in Albania and has never lived there. He stated that she visited Albania earlier in the year because her father was in hospital and remained there for only two or three days. He did not know exactly where she stayed during the visit. The appellant said that he informed her of his precarious immigration status during the course of their relationship, although he could not recall precisely when. He stated that she could not relocate to Albania if he were deported because of her own personal experiences there.

37. The appellant stated that his wife works as a restaurant manager. The couple live together in the United Kingdom and had recently moved to their present address as housing arrangements were being completed. He maintained that both he and his wife would be unable to relocate permanently to Albania.

38. The appellant’s spouse gave evidence in support of his appeal. She too provided a witness statement which provided that she is a British citizen, born in 2000, and employed as a restaurant manager. She provided evidence in support of her husband’s appeal, stating that she wishes him to remain in the United Kingdom and that his removal would have a profoundly adverse effect on both of them.

39. She is aware of the appellant’s criminal conviction and describes it as wholly out of character. She states that he deeply regrets his offending, has accepted responsibility for his actions, and recognises the harm caused by criminal conduct. In her view, he became involved during a particularly vulnerable period in his life and acted under compulsion rather than from criminal intent. She emphasises that he has not reoffended since that incident and argues that his conduct since then demonstrates rehabilitation, maturity and respect for the law.

40. The witness describes the appellant as a law-abiding individual who now leads a stable and peaceful life centred on family and future aspirations. She states that he avoids negative influences, respects others, contributes to family life and poses no risk to the public. She considers him to be fully integrated into life in the United Kingdom, noting his command of English, familiarity with British culture and values, and positive relationships within his community. She states that he regards the United Kingdom as his home and wishes to continue contributing positively to society.

41. The witness supports the appellant’s claim that he faces danger in Albania as a result of an ongoing blood feud. She states that the dispute remains unresolved and that serious threats have previously been made against him and his family. In her view, relocation within Albania would not provide safety because it would be relatively easy for those involved to locate him. She believes that return would leave him without secure employment, accommodation or support and would expose him to destitution and exploitation.

42. She further states that the appellant suffers from symptoms consistent with post-traumatic stress arising from events in Albania and discussions about the blood feud. She considers that return would significantly worsen his mental health and force him to live in constant fear. She states that they wish to have children but do not believe this would be possible whilst living under the continuing threat posed by the feud.

43. The witness describes her role in providing the appellant with emotional support, stability and positive influence. She states that their relationship has given him purpose and encouraged him to focus on family life, rehabilitation and lawful behaviour. She considers herself central to his emotional wellbeing and believes that her support has assisted his integration and personal development.

44. According to the witness, the appellant cannot rely upon meaningful support from family members in Albania. She states that relationships there have been disrupted by the blood feud and that many relatives either fear being targeted themselves or have distanced themselves from the dispute. She therefore considers that his only dependable emotional and practical support network is in the United Kingdom.

45. The witness identifies numerous obstacles to the appellant’s reintegration into Albania, including the continuing blood feud, limited family support, psychological vulnerability, social isolation and reduced employment prospects. She also maintains that the Albanian authorities are unable to provide effective protection against such disputes and cites what she regards as the continuing prevalence of blood-feud-related violence in Albania.

46. The witness contends that it would be unduly harsh for her to remain in the United Kingdom without the appellant. She describes their marriage as genuine and based upon mutual emotional support and dependence. She states that he provides reassurance, companionship and practical assistance in everyday life and that separation would cause significant emotional distress, loneliness and deterioration in her mental wellbeing. She considers their relationship to be the foundation of her life and states that removal of the appellant would destabilise the life they have built together.

47. She also argues that it would be unreasonable and unduly harsh to expect her to relocate to Albania. She states that she was born and raised in the United Kingdom, where she has established her education, employment, property, friendships and family life. She asserts that she has only limited connections with Albania and would face substantial difficulties adapting to life there. In addition, she expresses concerns regarding safety, corruption and gender inequality in Albania.

48. The witness also relies on her own personal circumstances. She states that, when younger, she disclosed sexual abuse by a family member. According to her evidence, members of her extended family sided with the perpetrator, resulting in threats being directed towards her and the breakdown of family relationships. She states that she suffers from depression, has required antidepressant medication and therapy, and fears a significant deterioration in her mental health if required to relocate to Albania. She therefore considers the United Kingdom to be the only place where she can live safely, independently and with dignity.

49. The witness states that she is emotionally dependent upon the appellant and relies on him for reassurance, stability and day-to-day support. She says that he assists her in managing anxiety and depression and provides a sense of safety and security. Conversely, she explains that the appellant is emotionally and financially dependent upon her because his immigration status prevents him from working. She meets the household’s financial needs while he contributes by managing domestic responsibilities and supporting the running of their home.

50. In conclusion, the witness states that the appellant has established a peaceful and stable life in the United Kingdom, has shown genuine remorse for his offending, and is committed to living as a law-abiding member of society. She contends that return to Albania would expose him to risks arising from the blood feud, seriously damage his mental health and permanently disrupt their family life. She therefore asks that he be permitted to remain in the United Kingdom so that they may continue their life together.

51. In cross examination she explained that she currently resides with the appellant at an address where they have lived for a few months. She confirmed that she holds an Albanian passport but has not used it since childhood. The couple married in Bristol on 21 January 2020.

52. The witness stated that she was born and raised in the United Kingdom and has never lived in Albania. Although she travelled there earlier in the year, she explained that the visit was prompted by a request from the appellant’s parents, who informed her that the appellant’s father was seriously unwell. She travelled to Albania to see him and stayed with his parents. Whilst there, she underwent a medical scan, but stated that obtaining medical treatment was not the purpose of the trip. She does not own any property in Albania. When it was put to her that a divorce petition referred to an apartment in an Albanian village, she explained that the property belonged to the appellant’s parents rather than to her.

53. The witness is employed as a restaurant manager in Bristol and financially supports the appellant. She confirmed that she had also completed a law degree. She said she first met the appellant many years ago but could not clearly recall the circumstances because of the passage of time and the anxiety she experiences. Their relationship began through telephone conversations before they met in person.

54. In relation to the appellant’s account of trafficking, the witness stated that he did not come directly to her after escaping from those exploiting him. She explained that, at that stage, they had met only once and were not in a serious relationship. The relationship developed over the following years before they eventually married.

55. The witness maintained that the appellant has changed significantly since his conviction. She acknowledged that he had been convicted of cultivating cannabis but stated that this no longer reflected his character. She described him as a family-oriented individual who wishes to live a normal life in the United Kingdom, to work, and to start a family with her. Although she was unable to comment on the detailed circumstances of the offence, she stated that he had completely reformed and no longer had any connection with that lifestyle.

56. She stated that she became aware of the appellant’s lack of lawful immigration status after they resumed their relationship and were discussing marriage. She explained that immigration status had not been a consideration at the beginning of the relationship, as she had fallen in love with him before becoming aware of those issues.

57. The witness confirmed that she did not know the appellant in Albania. Her own parents continue to travel there regularly, visiting at least once a year. She believes that they own an apartment in Albania, located approximately 45 minutes by car from where the appellant’s family live, although travel times vary depending on traffic.

58. The appellant’s mother in law provided a witness statement in support of the appellant. She provided evidence in support of the appellant’s appeal and expressed the view that he should be permitted to remain in the United Kingdom.

59. The witness stated that she is aware of the appellant’s criminal conviction through discussions with her daughter, the appellant’s wife. She described the appellant as deeply remorseful about his past offending and stated that he frequently refers to it as the worst mistake of his life. In her view, his previous conduct does not reflect his present character. She described him as a caring, respectable individual whose ambition is to work, support his family and live a normal family life.

60. According to the witness, the appellant has explained that he committed the offence at a time when he felt trapped and without alternatives. She stated that he has repeatedly told her that he regrets his actions and would have acted differently had other options been available to him. She considers that he has learned from the experience and understands the consequences of his behaviour.

61. The witness stated that the appellant has integrated well into life in the United Kingdom. She described him as respectful of British values, traditions and social norms, able to communicate comfortably in English, and appreciative of the freedoms and opportunities available in the United Kingdom. She stated that he regards the UK as his home, respects public order, and wishes to continue contributing positively to society.

62. She further stated that her daughter has played an important role in encouraging the appellant to remain focused on his future and avoid further offending. According to the witness, the appellant understands that any reoffending could jeopardise both his immigration status and the future that he hopes to build with his wife. She described the marriage as genuine, loving and supportive, and stated that her daughter’s guidance and encouragement have reinforced his determination not to repeat his past mistakes.

63. Turning to conditions in Albania, the witness stated that the appellant would face substantial hardship if returned. She said that he had spoken to her about the blood feud affecting his family and the difficulties it would create in everyday life. According to the witness, the appellant fears being observed, reported to the rival family and located if he returns. She stated that he believes he would be unable to move freely, obtain employment or live a normal life because of the constant fear associated with the feud. In her view, return would have a significant adverse effect on his mental health and wellbeing.

64. The witness also stated that the appellant’s support network in Albania is limited. She said that his family relationships have been affected by the blood feud and that many relatives are either unable or unwilling to provide assistance because of their own safety concerns. She further stated that his elderly parents are not in a position to provide meaningful support. She expressed the view that state protection would be ineffective and that the appellant would struggle to obtain employment because of the ongoing threat against him.

65. The witness emphasised the importance of the appellant’s marriage. She stated that removal to Albania would place severe strain upon the relationship and could ultimately result in its breakdown. In her opinion, a long-distance marriage would not be sustainable, particularly given the couple’s shared wish to establish a family together.

66. She also stated that it would be extremely harsh for her daughter to remain in the United Kingdom without the appellant. She described him as a significant source of emotional support, stability and reassurance. According to the witness, separation would cause her daughter serious emotional distress and would undermine the settled and stable life they have established together.

67. The witness further argued that it would be unreasonable to expect her daughter to relocate to Albania. She stated that her daughter was born and raised in the United Kingdom, obtained a university education here, is employed, owns a home, and has all of her family and social ties in this country. The witness also referred to her daughter’s history of sexual abuse by a cousin in Albania and stated that the resulting trauma has had a lasting impact on her mental health. She explained that her daughter has suffered depression, required medication, and associated Albania with distressing memories. In her view, relocation would lead to a significant deterioration in her daughter’s mental health and wellbeing.

68. The witness stated that the combination of her daughter’s personal history and the appellant’s blood feud would expose the couple to fear, uncertainty and emotional harm in Albania. She therefore considered that Albania would not be a safe or suitable place for them to establish family life.

69. Finally, the witness described the couple as mutually dependent. She stated that her daughter relies heavily upon the appellant for emotional support, reassurance and stability, whilst the appellant depends upon his wife both emotionally and financially because he is unable to work. She stated that they have built a strong partnership in which each supports the other and that separation would be damaging to both.

70. In conclusion, the witness expressed the view that the appellant has rehabilitated, poses no risk to the public, and has established a genuine and stable family life in the United Kingdom. She stated that uncertainty regarding his immigration status has caused him considerable anxiety and that return to Albania would place him at risk, worsen his mental health, and separate him from his wife. She therefore urged that he be allowed to remain in the United Kingdom.

Legal Framework

71. To succeed in an appeal on asylum grounds, the appellant must show a well-founded fear of persecution for a Refugee Convention reason (race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion). The burden of proof rests on the appellant. As the asylum claim was made on or after 28 June 2022, pursuant to s32 of the 2022 Act, in considering whether the appellant qualifies as a refugee, I must apply a two-stage test. I must first determine both the following matters on the balance of probabilities:

(a) Does the appellant possess a characteristic falling within one of the Convention reasons, or would such a characteristic be attributed to them?

(b) Does the appellant in fact fear persecution for that Convention reason?

72. If so, I must go on to determine whether it is reasonably likely that:

(a) The appellant would be persecuted for that Convention reason; and

(b) Sufficient protection would not be available to the appellant.

73. I must also consider whether there is a part of the country where the appellant would not have a well-founded fear of persecution and whether the appellant could reasonably be expected to travel to and remain in that part of the country.

74. Section 117C of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 states:

(1) The deportation of foreign criminals is in the public interest.

(2) The more serious the offence committed by a foreign criminal, the greater is the public interest in deportation of the criminal.

(3) In the case of a foreign criminal ("C") who has not been sentenced to a period of imprisonment of four years or more, the public interest requires C's deportation unless Exception 1 or Exception 2 applies.

(4) Exception 1 applies where—

(a) C has been lawfully resident in the United Kingdom for most of C's life,

(b) C is socially and culturally integrated in the United Kingdom, and

(c) there would be very significant obstacles to C's integration into the country to which C is proposed to be deported.

(5) Exception 2 applies where C has a genuine and subsisting relationship with a qualifying partner, or a genuine and subsisting parental relationship with a qualifying child, and the effect of C's deportation on the partner or child would be unduly harsh.

(6) In the case of a foreign criminal who has been sentenced to a period of imprisonment of at least four years, the public interest requires deportation unless there are very compelling circumstances, over and above those described in Exceptions 1 and 2.

(7) The considerations in subsections (1) to (6) are to be taken into account where a court or tribunal is considering a decision to deport a foreign criminal only to the extent that the reason for the decision was the offence or offences for which the criminal has been convicted.

75. Paragraphs 46 to 50 of HA (Iraq) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2022] UKSC 22 explained very compelling circumstances. It is possible for the Appellant to succeed despite not satisfying Exceptions 1 or 2, or to succeed in a very strong claim that does satisfy Exception 1 or 2. The relevant factors to consider are:

76. the nature and seriousness of the offence committed by the applicant;

77. the length of the applicant's stay in the country from which he or she is to be expelled;

78. the time elapsed since the offence was committed and the applicant's conduct during that period;

79. the nationalities of the various persons concerned;

80. the applicant's family situation, such as the length of the marriage, and other factors expressing the effectiveness of a couple's family life;

81. whether the spouse knew about the offence at the time when he or she entered into a family relationship;

82. whether there are children of the marriage, and if so, their age; and

83. the seriousness of the difficulties which the spouse is likely to encounter in the country to which the applicant is to be expelled …

84. the best interests and well-being of the children, in particular the seriousness of the difficulties which any children of the applicant are likely to encounter in the country to which the applicant is to be expelled; and

85. the solidity of social, cultural and family ties with the host country and with the country of destination.

86. Seriousness of the offence is assessed by reference to the sentence imposed. If there is information showing the sentence was changed for reasons unrelated to seriousness, for example prior offences, personal mitigation or a guilty plea, these should be discounted from the level of sentence when assessing seriousness in the context of section 117C.

87. My approach to assessing credibility comes from KB & AH (credibility-structured approach) Pakistan [2017] UKUT 491 (IAC) where the Upper Tribunal commended consideration of sufficiency of detail, internal consistency, external consistency and plausibility. I consider any documents along with all the evidence in the round. I am also conscious that just because a person has lied about one thing does not mean he has lied about another.

88. Section 8 Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants etc) Act 2004 means that behaviour designed or likely to conceal information, mislead, obstruct or delay consideration of a claim, and claims made after a negative decision has been made or after there was an opportunity to make a claim in a safe country are damaging to credibility.

89. It is important, in this case, to observe the interpretation section of S.117

90. 117DInterpretation of this Part

91. (1)In this Part—

92. “Article 8” means Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights;

93. (2)In this Part, “foreign criminal” means a person—

94. (a)who is not a British citizen,

95. (b)who has been convicted in the United Kingdom of an offence, and

96. (c)who—

97. (i)has been sentenced to a period of imprisonment of at least 12 months,

98. (ii)has been convicted of an offence that has caused serious harm, or

99. (iii)is a persistent offender.

Facts

100. The appellant failed to provide a coherent and reliable account of the alleged blood feud, including an inability to consistently identify the rival family said to pose a threat to him.

101. The appellant's evidence concerning the origins and history of the feud lacked specificity and contained inconsistencies regarding when the feud began and the circumstances surrounding it.

102. The appellant was unable to give basic details about the alleged founding incident of the feud, including the identities of those involved, which materially undermined the credibility of his account.

103. The appellant gave inconsistent accounts of incidents said to demonstrate the continuation of the feud, including differing descriptions of alleged attacks involving family members.

104. The appellant's attribution of assaults and threats to the rival family was largely based on assumption, as he could not identify the alleged perpetrators and provided no independent evidence linking them to the feud.

105. There was insufficient reliable evidence that the appellant remained of adverse interest to the rival family, and the evidence of continuing threats against family members was vague and unsupported.

106. The appellant's trafficking account contained material inconsistencies, including contradictory explanations about his knowledge of the traffickers' identities and differing narratives concerning events leading to his arrest in 2019.

107. The appellant's failure to seek asylum during approximately one year in Belgium was treated as a factor damaging his credibility, although not determinative of the claim.

108. The Tribunal attached limited weight to the expert evidence. While the appellant's account was broadly consistent with known patterns of Albanian blood feuds, the country expert report was found to lack critical analysis and did not provide a sufficient evidential basis for establishing risk.

109. The appellant failed to establish, even to the lower standard of proof, that he was the subject of an active blood feud, that he faced a real risk from alleged traffickers, or that the Albanian authorities would be unable or unwilling to provide protection.

110. The Tribunal accepted that the appellant was in a genuine and subsisting relationship with a British citizen partner and that separation or relocation would cause hardship and emotional distress, but found that the consequences would not reach the threshold of undue harshness and that deportation would remain proportionate.

111. Although the Tribunal found that the appellant had not established his protection, trafficking, Article 8, I ultimately concluded that the respondent had failed to demonstrate that the appellant's offending had caused "serious harm" within the meaning of section 117D(2)(c)(ii), with the result that the statutory basis for deportation was not made out.

112. I therefore treat that failure by the respondent as an exceptional circumstance.

Determination of the Issues

113. I have considered the appellant's account in the round, bearing in mind the lower standard of proof applicable in protection appeals and the need to assess the evidence cumulatively. Having done so, I have significant concerns regarding the reliability of the appellant's account, particularly in relation to the alleged blood feud which forms the foundation of his protection claim and in respect of his claim as to having been trafficked.

114. I find that the appellant was unable to provide a coherent or detailed account of the alleged blood feud. Although he maintained throughout that a feud existed between his family and another family in Albania, he was unable to identify that family by name reliably. At one stage he did give the name but consistently prior to that and in the hearing did not provide the name. His explanation was that the events giving rise to the feud pre-dated his birth and that he did not personally know those involved. Whilst I accept that younger generations may not possess the same level of knowledge as older family members, I nevertheless find it remarkable that the appellant was unable to name the family whom he claims continue to pose a real threat to his life. This is not a peripheral matter but lies at the heart of his claim. I conclude that the absence of even the most basic identifying information substantially undermines the reliability of his account.

115. I further find that the appellant's evidence concerning the origins of the feud lacked specificity. He was unable to state when the feud began other than that it started "many years ago" and at various points suggested both that it pre-dated his birth and that he was very young at the time it commenced. Those accounts are difficult to reconcile. Whilst I accept that he may not know the precise date of historical events, I would reasonably have expected him to possess a clearer understanding of the circumstances giving rise to a dispute which he claims has dominated the lives of his family for decades and continues to place him at risk today.

116. The appellant's account of the incident in which his grandfather allegedly killed two members of the rival family was similarly vague. He could provide no chronology for those events and was unable to identify the victims. He repeatedly stated that the matter occurred before his time and that his father knew more than he did. Whilst that may explain some gaps in his knowledge, I find that his inability to provide even basic contextual detail regarding the foundational event of the alleged feud materially diminishes the weight I can attach to his evidence. I find it difficult to accept that throughout the entirety of the time that the appellant lived at home with his parents that there was no imparting of the knowledge about this major family event to him. If it was such that he would be in mortal danger it is not unreasonable to suggest that or consider that he might know more.

117. I also find that there were significant inconsistencies in the appellant's account of incidents said to evidence the continuation of the feud. In his witness statement he referred to an attack involving himself and his brother when attending disputed land. During his asylum interview, however, the principal incident described concerned an assault upon himself and his father. Neither account contained a full description of the other event. Whilst I take into account the appellant's explanation that he was nervous and anxious during the interview, I do not find that explanation entirely satisfactory. These incidents were advanced as important examples of violence directed towards him and his family and I would reasonably have expected a consistent account of such significant events.

118. I additionally find that the appellant's attribution of those attacks to the rival family rests largely upon assumption rather than evidence. By his own admission, the assailants wore balaclavas and he was unable to identify them. His belief that they belonged to the rival family was based upon the existence of the land dispute. Whilst such an inference is possible, I am not satisfied that it is sufficiently substantiated. I therefore place limited weight upon the appellant's assertions that the attacks were perpetrated by members of the rival family.

119. The same difficulty arises in relation to other incidents relied upon by the appellant. He referred to a cousin being targeted by persons attempting to run him over with a vehicle, but again accepted that he could not identify those responsible. This amounted to no more than speculation that the perpetrators were connected to the feud. In the absence of supporting evidence, I do not find that this materially advances his claim.

120. I also place weight on the appellant's inability to provide persuasive evidence that he is presently of adverse interest to the alleged rival family. The evidence before me does not establish that there have been any killings associated with the feud since the incident allegedly involving his grandfather many years ago. There is no reliable evidence that the rival family have sought to contact the appellant directly since his departure from Albania. Although the appellant claimed that threats continued towards family members, the evidence concerning those threats was general in nature and lacked specificity as to dates, circumstances and perpetrators.

121. I find it notable that members of the appellant's immediate family continue to reside in Albania. Whilst the appellant asserted that his parents have received threats and that his father and uncle were assaulted, the evidence concerning those events was limited and unsupported. No statement was obtained from his father despite the contention that the father possessed the detailed knowledge lacking from the appellant's own account. Explanations were provided regarding the father's ill-health. I take those matters into account, but the absence of direct evidence from the principal source of information is nonetheless significant when assessing the claim as a whole.

122. Turning to the trafficking aspect of the claim, I find that the appellant's account also contained difficulties. He claimed to have spent sufficient time in the company of those who allegedly facilitated his journey and subsequently exploited him. However, his evidence regarding those individuals lacked detail. During his asylum interview he stated that he did not know their names. Before the Tribunal he appeared to suggest that he was unwilling to disclose their names due to fear. Those are materially different explanations. The inconsistency has not been satisfactorily resolved and further damages the reliability of this aspect of the account.

123. I also find that the appellant provided inconsistent narratives regarding events leading to his arrest in November 2019. His witness statement described an escape to Cardiff, a period spent with his girlfriend, and a subsequent kidnapping by traffickers before being taken to another cannabis property. That sequence did not emerge clearly during his asylum interview. I accept that traumatic experiences may affect recollection. Nevertheless, these were central events in the appellant's narrative and I would have expected a clearer and more consistent account if the events had occurred as described.

124. I have also considered the appellant's failure to claim asylum whilst residing in Belgium for approximately one year. I accept that a failure to claim asylum elsewhere is not determinative of credibility. However, I find that the appellant had access to a safe European country for a significant period prior to his arrival in the United Kingdom. His explanation that threats were received by telephone does not satisfactorily explain why he was unable or unwilling to seek the protection of the Belgian authorities. I therefore treat this as a factor that damages, albeit does not determine, his overall credibility.

125. Having considered all of these matters cumulatively, I conclude that the appellant has not provided a sufficiently detailed, coherent or consistent account of an active blood feud affecting him personally. The central elements of his account are characterised by a lack of specificity, significant evidential gaps, reliance upon assumption, and material inconsistencies. I therefore do not accept, even applying the lower standard of proof, that the appellant has established that he is presently the subject of a blood feud giving rise to a real risk of persecution or serious harm on return to Albania.

126. I place weight on the fact that the Appellant received a negative Conclusive Grounds decision through the National Referral Mechanism, which is a significant indicator that his claim to have been trafficked has not been substantiated. I therefore find that the trafficking aspect of the claim has not been established to the lower standard applicable in international protection appeals.

127. I find that the Appellant has sought to address a number of credibility concerns raised previously and has provided an account in both his oral and written evidence. I have considered those explanations in the round. However, I am satisfied that the mere provision of responses to credibility concerns does not in itself resolve those concerns. I have therefore assessed the reliability of the account against the totality of the evidence before me, including the objective material and expert evidence.

128. I find that the expert evidence confirms that the Appellant's narrative is broadly consistent with known patterns of blood feuds in Albania. I accept that such consistency is capable of lending support to an account. However, I am satisfied that external consistency is not determinative of credibility. An account may be consistent with known country conditions without necessarily being true. I therefore approach the expert evidence as one component of the overall evidential picture rather than as proof of the facts asserted by the Appellant.

129. Turning to the country expert report. This is a difficult one given that I am sorry to say I did not find the report overly helpful or insightful. For a start there was no numbering of paragraphs. It made it incredibly difficult to read and cross reference and use. Why there was no numbering is lost on me. It may seem a minor point but one which impacts on the credibility and reliability of the report in general.

130. The report also failed to provide any meaningful analysis and intellectual engagement with the claims made. It is not sufficient to simply acknowledge the claims and the account and thereafter reach conclusions on the basis that all that was said is accepted or proven. There is no challenge to the appellant’s claims and it is almost a placid acquiescence by the author that if the appellant says he is in trouble and all the factors which he claims are aligned are in place then he would be in danger. There is no assessment of the multitude of factors which point to there being no risk at all such as the length of time, the distances involved in terms of internal relocation, that there has been no harm meted out to anyone, that the appellant lived his whole life there without any attempt on his life, that there is no credible evidence of any connection to the state or increased power, that blood feuds are very rare amongst a multitude of other factors.

131. The only real aspect of the report which I found helpful was the expert's acknowledgement that it is difficult to assess accurately the extent of any risk that the Appellant would face upon return. I find that this concession necessarily limits the certainty with which future risk can be assessed. Whilst the expert expresses the view that the Appellant may face a significant risk of harm, I am satisfied that this conclusion is, to some extent, contingent upon acceptance of the underlying factual account and involves an element of prediction rather than direct evidence. A factual matrix and evidential landscape which was poorly engaged with in my view.

132. I also find that the expert report does not engage in any detail with recent judicial consideration of protection and return to Albania. I am satisfied that findings made by higher courts concerning the availability of state protection and the operation of domestic institutions in Albania are matters to which significant weight should be attached. I therefore consider it relevant that judicial authority has found no general basis for concluding that the Albanian state is unable or unwilling to provide protection from non-state actors or that removal to Albania would ordinarily expose an individual to treatment contrary to Article 3 ECHR.

133. Having considered the evidence as a whole, I am not satisfied that this case discloses features that justify departure from those broader findings concerning the availability of protection in Albania. I find that the evidential basis for concluding that the Albanian authorities would be unable or unwilling to assist the Appellant is limited. I am not satisfied that he has demonstrated that any request for protection would inevitably be ineffective or futile.

134. I find that the Appellant is in a genuine and subsisting relationship with a British citizen partner who resides in the United Kingdom. I am satisfied that the relationship is longstanding and genuine.

135. I find, however, that the relationship was established and developed at a time when the Appellant had no lawful immigration status in the United Kingdom. I am satisfied that the Appellant has never enjoyed settled status in this country. Consequently, I find that family life was created in circumstances where the parties were aware, or ought reasonably to have been aware, that the Appellant's position in the United Kingdom was precarious.

136. I find that the Appellant's partner has stated that she would not wish to relocate to Albania and has identified personal difficulties and concerns associated with return there.

137. I accept that relocation to Albania would be disruptive and unwelcome. I further accept that such a move would require considerable adjustment and would involve separation from established family, social and community ties in the United Kingdom.

138. I have had sight of a report by Mai Kelly, a counselling psychologist. Unfortunately, I can place little weight on it;

139. Firstly, it was not explained how one conducts a psychological assessment and diagnosis and assessment in a dual interview with both persons present. That is how the report reads. I cannot see how that is possible and there is no demarcation or delineation as to whom said what or how one supports the other if they are both present. How does one preserve the integrity of a statement if, for example, it is corrected by the other. If that is not what happened then the author does not make it clear that separate interviews were held as the only date and time is given as one sitting.

140. Secondly, I mean no overt disrespect to the author but it was not explained to me how a counselling psychologist, in light of her CV as provided (more of that later) allows for the diagnosis and assessment of the appellant and his partner.

141. The CV provided by the author is wholly lacking. There is no chronology or specific identification of academic courses, specific training courses, anything other than general qualifications such as ‘diploma’ and Bachelor degrees and a MA which is not specified or the location of such study. The basis as to one’s employment at a University and the subjects taught and examined, any postgraduate and doctoral supervision and authorship of any peer reviewed articles, book chapters, conference or symposium papers would also have been necessary. The number of expert reports written and any judicial endorsement and criticism is important.

142. Given that the appellant is not fluent in English and used an interpreter to conduct his evidence it is not explained in the report how the evidence from him was obtained and what verification was undertaken as to meaning or context or how he was able to undertake what are complex psychological assessments such as to create reliable results in a language in which he does not have fluency.

143. The report author is provided with a long list of matters which are not accepted and which go to the heart of the issues in the case and impact heavily on the psychology. None of those matters feature in the assessment made by the author.

144. However, I am not satisfied that the evidence demonstrates consequences reaching the elevated threshold of undue harshness. I find that the obstacles identified are primarily those ordinarily associated with relocation to another country. I am satisfied that relocation would be difficult and undesirable, but I am not satisfied that it would be severe or bleak to the degree required by the applicable authorities. She can speak the language, has visited there this year and stayed in her family’s apartment. She has an Albanian passport or at the least entitlement to one.

145. Accordingly, I find that it would not be unduly harsh for the Appellant's partner to relocate to Albania if she chose to accompany him.

146. I have carefully considered the psychological evidence concerning the Appellant's partner. I find that she experiences significant mental health difficulties, including symptoms of depression, anxiety and trauma-related distress.

147. I accept the expert evidence that a permanent separation from the Appellant would be likely to cause emotional deterioration and increase psychological distress. I am satisfied that the prospect of deportation has caused her considerable anxiety and uncertainty.

148. However, I find that the evidence does not establish that she would be left entirely without support. I am satisfied that she has an existing support network in the United Kingdom comprising friends, family members and wider social contacts. I further find that she would retain access to medical treatment and mental health services.

149. Whilst I accept that separation would be painful and would have significant emotional consequences, I am not satisfied that the resulting hardship would cross the high threshold required to establish undue harshness. I find that the difficulties identified, whilst serious, fall short of demonstrating consequences that could properly be characterised as exceptionally severe.

150. I therefore find that it would not be unduly harsh for the Appellant's partner to remain in the United Kingdom without him. Drawing these matters together, I am satisfied that the requirements of the family life exception are not met.

151. I begin by recognising the significant weight Parliament has attached to the deportation of foreign criminals. I am satisfied that the public interest in deportation is substantial in this case, having regard to the nature of the Appellant's offending, the societal harm caused by drug-related crime, and the fact that the Appellant's residence in the United Kingdom has been unlawful throughout.

152. I have carefully considered the psychiatric and psychological evidence relating to the Appellant himself. I find that he claim to experience symptoms consistent with severe depression, severe anxiety and trauma-related difficulties. I accept that he has reported suicidal thoughts and has a history of significant mental health concerns.

153. I am satisfied that removal from the United Kingdom would be distressing for the Appellant and would likely have an adverse impact upon his mental health. However, I am not satisfied that the evidence establishes that his treatment needs can only be met in the United Kingdom or that appropriate treatment would be wholly unavailable in Albania.

154. I find that the medical evidence does not provide a detailed assessment of the availability of psychiatric or psychological treatment in Albania. Consequently, I am not satisfied that the evidence demonstrates that removal would give rise to consequences of such gravity as to amount to very compelling circumstances.

155. I have also considered the Appellant's length of residence in the United Kingdom. I find that his residence has been relatively short and entirely unlawful. I place limited weight upon private life established during a period when the Appellant's immigration status was unlawful and precarious.

156. I find that there are no children whose interests fall to be considered within the balancing exercise. I accept that the Appellant has not reoffended since the index offence and appears to have remained out of trouble. However, I am satisfied that compliance with the law following conviction is the minimum expected of any individual and is not, without more, a factor carrying significant weight in the assessment of very compelling circumstances.

157. I further find that the Appellant's partner would not face insurmountable obstacles to reintegration in Albania and that, whilst separation would be difficult for both parties, the consequences of deportation do not go beyond those ordinarily associated with the deportation of a foreign criminal.

158. Considering all factors cumulatively, I find that the Appellant enjoys a genuine family life and has established a degree of private life in the United Kingdom. I accept that deportation will interfere with those rights. However, I am satisfied that the interference is proportionate to the legitimate aim of immigration control and the prevention of crime.

159. Standing back and viewing the evidence in the round, I am not satisfied that the Appellant has demonstrated very compelling circumstances over and above those described in the statutory exceptions. I find that the considerable public interest in deportation outweighs the Appellant's private and family life considerations.

160. I turn now to a distinct issue which is that of serious harm. In order for the matter to be proportionate, as a whole, the appellant must have caused serious harm by his offending. The Appellant was sentenced to 6 months imprisonment. The Respondent has therefore sought to argue that he has been convicted of an offence which has caused serious harm. It is argued that the Respondent has erred and has failed to demonstrate that the Appellant’s offence has caused serious harm (Mahmood, R (on the application of) v Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) & Ors [2020] EWCA Civ 717 (05 June 2020)).

161. The principles of Mahmood are as follows; First, generalised societal harm cannot, without more, establish that a particular offence caused serious harm. The evidence must relate to the offence in question. Paragraph 66 is particularly clear on that point.

162. Second, the Tribunal does not invariably require direct evidence of a specific injury, an identifiable victim or the precise extent of the harm. Paragraphs 40–42 and 62 establish that harm may be apparent from the nature and circumstances of the offence, and that common-sense inferences and judicial notice may be sufficient in an appropriate case.

163. Third, the Secretary of State must prove serious harm on the balance of probabilities, but the evidence required will depend on the circumstances of the case. Paragraphs 47, 51 and 56 make clear that the Secretary of State's assertion is not conclusive, but neither is there a universal requirement for a particular form of evidence.

164. The distinction is therefore between evidence that establishes the general harmfulness of a type of crime and evidence that enables the Tribunal to find that the particular offence caused serious harm. The latter may be direct or circumstantial, and the Tribunal must evaluate it in the round. However, even if circumstantial, there must be something. I refer back to earlier in this judgment where I highlighted I was not provided with any information about the offending and not provided with the sentencing remarks.

165. The case of Mahmood was followed by the judgment of Lane J in Wilson (NIAA Part 5A; deportation decisions) [2020] UKUT 350 (IAC), [2021] Imm AR 329. He held as follows;

166. 53. The current case law on “caused serious harm” for the purposes of the expression “foreign criminal” in Part 5A of the 2002 Act can be summarised as follows (drawing predominately from the judgment of Simon LJ in R (Mahmood and others):-

167. (1) Whether P’s offence is “an offence that has caused serious harm” within section 117D(2)(c)(ii) is a matter for the judge to decide, in all the circumstances, whenever Part 5A falls to be applied.

168. (2) Provided that the judge has considered all relevant factors bearing on that question; has not had regard to irrelevant factors; and has not reached a perverse decision, there will be no error of law in the judge’s conclusion, which, accordingly, cannot be disturbed on appeal.

169. (3) In determining what factors are relevant or irrelevant, the following should be borne in mind:

170. (a) The Secretary of State’s view of whether the offence has caused serious harm is a starting point;

171. (b) The sentencing remarks should be carefully considered, as they will often contain valuable information; not least what may be said about the offence having caused “serious harm”, as categorised in the Sentencing Council Guidelines;

172. (c) A victim statement adduced in the criminal proceedings will be relevant;

173. (d) Whilst the Secretary of State bears the burden of showing that the offence has caused serious harm, she does not need to adduce evidence from the victim at a hearing before the First-tier Tribunal;

174. (e) The appellant’s own evidence to the First-tier Tribunal on the issue of seriousness will usually need to be treated with caution;

175. (f) Serious harm can involve physical, emotional or economic harm and does not need to be limited to an individual;

176. (g) The mere potential for harm is irrelevant;

177. (h) The fact that a particular type of offence contributes to a serious/widespread problem is not sufficient; there must be some evidence that the actual offence has caused serious harm. (my emphasis)

178. The Secretary of State led no evidence of any harm. Instead, she made bland and unsupported assertions about harm and referred to a speech made by the then Prime Minister Gordon Brown at a Labour party conference in 2007. In September 2007, at the Bournemouth Labour Party conference the then Prime Minister, Gordon Brown, made a commitment that those foreign nationals involved in gun crime or the production, importation and supply of drugs would not be allowed to remain in the UK (Bournemouth commitment). That is not sufficient to fill the evidential gap.

179. It was incumbent upon the Secretary of State to fill the evidential gap. A short statement from a civil servant about the effects of drugs or a standard few paragraphs statement from a Police officer about the harm caused by drugs and the production of cannabis would have been more than sufficient.

180. It follows though that the requirements of the deportation are not met. There is no evidence of serious harm and I cannot infer any in these circumstances given I know nothing about the offence itself other than what the appellant was convicted of and the sentence. There is no evidence of the amount produced, the monetary value or anything which could allow one to infer serious harm.

181. I say however, obiter, that there remains, arguably, some issues with that enunciated in Wilson above in respect of this case.

182. One problem with paragraph (h) is that, although it correctly distinguishes between the general harm associated with a particular type of offending and the harm caused by the individual offence, it risks being interpreted too restrictively. Section 117D(2)(c)(ii) requires the Secretary of State to establish that the particular offence has caused serious harm. It is therefore insufficient to rely solely on the fact that a particular category of crime is generally harmful to society. However, it does not follow that the Secretary of State must necessarily identify a particular victim who has suffered a demonstrable injury or loss. The relevant question is whether the evidence establishes that the particular offence caused serious harm, not whether a specific victim can be identified.

183. A second issue is that paragraph (h) does not adequately explain what constitutes sufficient evidence of actual harm. Paragraph (f) expressly recognises that serious harm can be physical, emotional or economic and does not need to be confined to an individual. Nevertheless, paragraph (h) could be interpreted as requiring evidence of a specific consequence, such as physical injury, psychological damage or financial loss. That would risk overlooking circumstances in which the nature, scale and circumstances of the offending provide a sufficient evidential basis for concluding that serious harm was caused. For example, in a drug-supply case, the quantity and nature of the drugs, the appellant's role in the operation and the circumstances of their distribution may all be relevant to whether the particular offence caused serious harm, even where there is no evidence that an identifiable purchaser suffered a specific injury. Those factors are what was missing in this case.

184. There is also a potential difficulty in distinguishing between the mere potential for harm and evidence from which actual harm can properly be inferred. Paragraph (g) states that the mere potential for harm is irrelevant, while paragraph (h) requires evidence that the actual offence caused serious harm. Those propositions are not necessarily inconsistent, but the distinction requires careful application. The fact that an offence could have caused serious harm is not, without more, sufficient to establish that it did. Equally, the absence of evidence of a particular injury does not necessarily mean that serious harm was not caused. A judge must consider whether the circumstances of the particular offence, together with the available evidence, support a finding that serious harm actually occurred. The nature of the offence may be relevant to that assessment, although it cannot simply substitute for evidence of the harm caused.

185. A further difficulty is that paragraph (h) could be understood as requiring a particular type of evidence, when the question should be whether the evidence as a whole establishes serious harm. Relevant evidence may include the sentencing remarks, the factual circumstances underlying the conviction, the nature and scale of the offending, evidence of its consequences and any victim impact statement. Paragraph (c) recognises the relevance of a victim impact statement, while paragraph (d) makes clear that the Secretary of State does not need to call the victim to give evidence before the First-tier Tribunal. It would therefore be inconsistent with the overall guidance to treat the absence of a victim impact statement, or direct evidence from an injured person, as determinative. The absence of such evidence may be relevant to the assessment, but it does not necessarily prevent serious harm from being established by other evidence. Again, there was no other evidence in this case.

186. Paragraph (h) must also be read in the context of the burden of proof. Paragraph (d) expressly places that burden on the Secretary of State. The appellant is not required to prove that the offence caused no serious harm, nor should an evidential gap in the Secretary of State's case be filled by the appellant's failure to produce evidence demonstrating the absence of harm. If the evidence is insufficient to establish that the particular offence caused serious harm, the Secretary of State has failed to discharge the burden. Conversely, where the evidence does establish serious harm, the absence of evidence from a particular victim does not necessarily prevent the judge from reaching that conclusion.

187. The underlying distinction is illustrated by Mahmood and Wilson. The relevant principle is that the seriousness of the general social problem associated with a category of offending cannot, without more, establish that every offence within that category caused serious harm. However, that principle should not be extended into a requirement for direct evidence of a particular injury or consequence in every case. The nature and circumstances of the particular offence, and the evidence of its actual consequences, must be considered together. The Secretary of State's assessment is a starting point rather than a conclusion that binds the Tribunal, and the judge must reach an independent decision on the evidence.

188. The strongest criticism of paragraph (h), therefore, is not that it requires evidence of actual harm. That requirement is inherent in the statutory wording, which asks whether the offence has caused serious harm. Rather, the difficulty is that the paragraph does not sufficiently distinguish between requiring evidence capable of establishing actual harm and requiring direct proof of a specific consequence. The former is necessary; the latter is not invariably required. Paragraph (h) is defensible if understood as preventing generalised assertions about the social consequences of crime from being treated as sufficient proof. It becomes problematic if applied as a rule that serious harm cannot be established without evidence of a specific, identifiable injury or loss. However, in this case, evidence of specific harm of this offence was required and sadly for the Respondent, it was not forthcoming.

189. Given that the overarching concepts of the deportation are not made out it would not be proportionate on a general overarching level to deport the appellant. The Secretary of State has not satisfied the required test due to not presenting the required evidence.

190. Should it need to, I find that this amounts to a very compelling circumstance over and above the statutory exceptions. It is very compelling in that it would be wholly disproportionate and unlawful for the SSHD to deport persons without satisfying the legal tests to do so.

191. However, for the sake of clarity, I am not satisfied that the appellant has established that he faces a real risk of harm from alleged traffickers on return. The evidence concerning those individuals, their identity, their influence, and any continuing interest in the appellant was vague and inconsistent. I therefore conclude that the appellant has failed to establish a real risk of persecution or serious harm on that basis. I am also not satisfied that he faces any risk at all on account of the claimed blood feud for the reasons given above.

192. The appeal is therefore allowed pursuant to S.117C(6) NIAA 2002

Notice of Decision

193. The appeal is allowed

ANONYMITY ORDER

194. Unless and until the Tribunal, the Upper Tribunal, or, a Court orders otherwise, pursuant To rule 13(1)(b) of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Rules 2014, the appellant [and/or any member of his family, expert, witness or other person the Tribunal considers should not be identified], is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal either directly or indirectly any information, including their names or their addresses, that is likely to lead members of the public to identify them. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

To the Respondent – Fee Award

No fee is paid or payable and therefore there can be no fee award.

Signature

Signed IB Date 2nd November 2026

First-tier Tribunal Judge Boyes

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