Administrative United Kingdom
First-tier Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber), 1 November 2026, n° qrccbtn2
First-tier Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber)
Appeal Number: PA/81926/2024PA/81932/2024
THE IMMIGRATION ACTS
Heard at Hatton Cross
On 12 October 2026
Before
FIRST-TIER TRIBUNAL JUDGE T Watson
Between
KF, HS
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
First and second Appellants
and
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent
Representation:
For the Appellants: Mr Burrett, counsel
For the Respondent: Mr Mustafa, Home Office Presenting Officer
DECISION AND REASONS
1. The main appellant, is a national of Pakistan, born in 1986, and is aged 39. Her daughter, HS, born in 2011 and aged 14, is a dependent appellant. The appellant and HS entered the UK on 14 August 2023 and claimed asylum in the United Kingdom on 20 November 2023. Their protection claim was refused by the respondent in decisions dated 18 December 2024.
2. The appellant appeals against those decisions pursuant to section 82 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. This is the Tribunal's decision in the appellant's appeal against the respondent's decision dated 18 December 2024.
Anonymity
3. I have granted the appellant anonymity. This is a protection claim where the appellant claims that her and her daughter’s lives are at risk on return to Pakistan. The United Kingdom’s obligations under the Refugee Convention outweigh principles of open justice.
4. At the hearing I confirmed that the Tribunal may publish this decision, however the anonymity order would continue to apply. No representations were made on this issue.
Background
5. All references to the ‘appellant’ are to the main appellant unless stated otherwise. The appellant's case is that following her marriage in 2010, she lived with her husband and his family in Pakistan. In 2016, her husband moved to Dubai for employment, leaving the appellant and HS residing with her in-laws.
6. The appellant alleges that from 2016 onwards she was subjected to domestic abuse, controlling behaviour, and repeated sexual abuse perpetrated by her father-in-law and brother-in-law. She further claims that her movements were heavily restricted and that she lived effectively under the control of her in-laws.
7. The appellant further claims that she and HS travelled to the United Kingdom on a visitor visa in August 2023 in order to attend her niece's wedding. Following her arrival in the United Kingdom, HS disclosed for the first time that she had been subjected to sexual abuse by paternal relatives whilst residing in Pakistan.
8. The appellant's case is that HS's disclosure fundamentally altered matters and ultimately led to the asylum claim being made. The appellant contends that, upon return to Pakistan, they would face a risk of serious harm from paternal family members, that they would be unable to access effective state protection, and that internal relocation would neither be safe nor reasonable.
9. The respondent's position is that the appellant is not a credible witness in relation to the core allegations relied upon. The respondent relies upon a number of inconsistencies said to arise within the appellant's evidence and contends that the factual basis of the protection claim has not been established. Accordingly, the respondent does not accept that the appellant or HS face a well-founded fear of persecution on return to Pakistan.
The Hearing
10. The hearing took place face to face. It was recorded and that recording stands as the record of proceedings and should be consulted in the event of any dispute about what was said at the hearing.
11. At the outset of the hearing, Mr Burrett, on behalf of the appellant, made an application for a vulnerability direction in respect of the appellant. It was clarified that the application was sought for the purpose of appropriate adjustments during the giving of evidence and was not advanced on the basis that a vulnerability finding should necessarily influence my assessment of the appellant's credibility or reliability.
12. The respondent did not oppose the application. Having considered the application, I granted the direction having regard to the Joint Presidential Guidance Note No. 2 of 2010 (Child, Vulnerable Adult and Sensitive appellant Guidance) and bearing in mind the overriding objective.
13. In practical terms, I ensured that questions were framed sensitively, that compound questions were avoided where possible, and that any references to previous statements or interview records were either read out or shown to the appellant before questions based upon those documents were put to her.
14. I am satisfied that those adjustments were implemented throughout the hearing.
Issues
15. There are a number of matters that are not in dispute. The respondent accepts the appellant's identity and nationality.
16. The respondent further accepts that, if the factual account relied upon by the appellant were found to be credible, the treatment alleged would be capable of amounting to persecution.
17. It was confirmed at the outset of the hearing, by the representative for the respondent, that it is accepted, in principle, that the claim is capable of engaging the Refugee Convention ground of membership of a Particular Social Group.
18. Against that background, the principal issues requiring determination are:
a. Whether the appellant has established the factual basis of her claim and that she fears persecution for a Convention reason.
b. Is it reasonably likely that the appellant would be persecuted for that Convention reason?
c. Is it reasonably likely there would not be sufficient protection available?
d. Is it reasonably likely that the appellant could not internally relocate?
e. Does the appellant face a real risk of suffering serious harm in her country of return?
f. Does the appellant face very significant obstacles to integration in the country of return?
g. Would the appellant's removal give rise to unjustifiably harsh consequences such that it is disproportionate and therefore unlawful under section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998?
Evidence
19. I have considered the stitched bundle of 276 pages together with the supplementary bundle of 21 pages. I heard oral evidence from the appellant, and the appellant's sister, SK, who gave evidence through a court-appointed Urdu interpreter. At the commencement of the hearing, and throughout the proceedings, no communication difficulties were identified. The interpreter confirmed that they understood the witnesses and could be understood.
20. In reaching my decision, I have considered all of the evidence before me, both oral and documentary, together with the submissions advanced by both representatives.
21. At the conclusion of the hearing, I reserved my decision. I now provide that decision together with my full reasons.
Legal Framework
22. To succeed in an appeal on asylum grounds, the appellant must show a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason (race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, political opinion). The burden of proof rests on the appellant. As the asylum claim was made on or after 28 June 2022, pursuant to s32 of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022, in considering whether the appellant qualifies as a refugee, I must apply a two-stage test. As per the guidance from JCK (s.32 NABA 2022) Botswana [2024] UKUT 00100 I must first determine the following matters on the balance of probabilities:
1. Does the appellant possess a characteristic falling within one of the Convention reasons, or would such a characteristic be attributed to them?
2. Does the appellant fear persecution for that convention reason?
23. If so, I must go on to determine whether it is reasonably likely that:
1. The appellant would be persecuted for that Convention reason;
2. There would not be sufficient protection available; and
3. The appellant could not internally relocate.
24. To succeed on an appeal on humanitarian protection grounds the appellant must not be a refugee; they must show substantial grounds for believing that they would face a real risk of suffering serious harm in their country of origin. The burden of proof rests on the appellant.
25. In so far as they rely on article 8 outside the Rules it is for the appellant to show that article 8(1) of the ECHR is engaged and if so, it is for the respondent to show that the decision was in accordance with the law, made in pursuance of a legitimate aim and that it was proportionate to the legitimate aim. The standard of proof is the balance of probabilities. Sections 117A to 117D of the 2002 Act are relevant to any assessment under article 8 of the ECHR outside the Rules.
Findings and reasons
26. I have considered all the evidence submitted before coming to my decision. The findings I have made were only reached after consideration of all of the evidence in the round and applying the burden and standard of proof from the legal framework above. I refer to the evidence where it is necessary to explain my findings and decision. Whilst I have necessarily recorded my findings one after another, I have considered all the evidence in the round and given it anxious scrutiny in order to determine these findings. The fact that evidence is not mentioned in the paragraphs below does not mean that I have not considered it as part of my overall assessment.
27. In considering the appellant’s credibility I have had regard to the principles in the relevant caselaw including KB & AH (credibility-structured approach) Pakistan [2017] UKUT 00491 (IAC) where the Upper Tribunal commended consideration of sufficiency of detail, internal consistency, external consistency and plausibility. I am also guided by MAH (Egypt) v SSHD [2023] EWCA Civ 216.
28. I have also reminded myself of the guidance in HK v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2006] EWCA Civ 1037 and Y v Secretary of State for the Home Department[2006] EWCA Civ 1223, that caution is required before rejecting an account as implausible or inherently incredible. Plausibility must be assessed in the context of the relevant country conditions and with an awareness that experiences in asylum cases may differ significantly from ordinary domestic expectations.
29. I have also borne in mind the guidance in Chiver v SSHD [1994] UKIAT 10758. I have not approached the appellant's account on an "all or nothing" basis. Rather, I have considered whether the core elements of the account are established, having evaluated the evidence as a whole and in the context of all the material before me. I am also guided by the case of Tanveer Ahmed v SSHD [2002] UKIAT 439, when considering any documentary evidence in the round, against the entirety of all the evidence.
30. I begin by considering the appellant’s evidence and I remain mindful that asylum claimants are not expected to provide a perfectly consistent account and that some discrepancies may arise through misunderstanding, interpretation difficulties, the passage of time or the circumstances in which an account is given. Equally, where inconsistencies, contradictions or changes in an account relate to central aspects of the claim, they may properly inform an assessment of credibility and reliability. I have therefore considered whether any discrepancies are capable of innocent explanation and whether they detract from the core of the appellant's account.
31. At the outset, I note that in her screening interview dated 19 December 2023, the appellant referred to HS as facing the same risk as herself. I further note from the screening interview that when asked what she had told the immigration authorities upon arrival in the United Kingdom, the appellant stated that she had indicated that she would remain for one month. When asked whether she had come to the United Kingdom for any reason other than attending her niece's wedding, she answered no. However, when asked whether she intended to return to her country, she answered no but later stated that she had realised approximately one month previously that she could not return to Pakistan.
32. I also note that when asked during the screening interview to explain briefly why she could not return to her home country, the appellant stated that she feared her father-in-law, whom she described as a dangerous man. She stated that he had previously attempted to burn her whilst she was cooking and that he would kill both her and her daughter if they returned to Pakistan. I note, however, that this account did not include reference to the sexual abuse and wider controlling behaviour later relied upon as part of the claim.
33. The respondent challenged the appellant's evidence extensively in relation to her intentions when travelling to the United Kingdom. In her witness statement and oral evidence, the appellant maintained that she initially intended to attend the wedding and thereafter return to Pakistan before the expiry of her visitor visa. However, this sat uneasily with the aspect of her screening interview where she appeared to indicate that she did not intend to return to Pakistan.
34. When asked to explain this inconsistency, the appellant was unable to provide a clear or satisfactory explanation. At various stages she stated that she may have been stressed, that she had intended to return, and that she later changed her mind. I found portions of her evidence on this issue difficult to follow. Rather than engaging directly with the discrepancy identified, she frequently repeated her earlier account. I have remained mindful that oral evidence is not always given perfectly, I take into account that the appellant did appear to maintain in her answers that she always intended to return and that it was a month or so before the screening interview that she realised that she could not return. I also consider that the question, did you intend to return to your country can be easily mistaken for ‘do you intend to return to your country.’ Whilst I have borne the inconsistency in mind, I do not find the appellant’s evidence in this regard determinative of the entire claim.
35. Similarly, I note the respondent's challenge concerning the timing of HS's disclosure and the subsequent asylum claim. The appellant's evidence was that HS made disclosures concerning inappropriate touching prior to their planned return to Pakistan and that this disclosure caused the appellant to realise that they could not return. However, I note her answer in the asylum interview in which she stated that she spent time attempting to persuade HS to return and that this contributed to the delay before claiming asylum. Whilst the period involved from the reported disclosure by HS, to the asylum claim, is closer to two months than three, I nevertheless consider it legitimate to question why the appellant would seek to persuade HS to return to Pakistan if she accepted both the disclosure and the risk that she says existed from her father-in-law. When challenged on this issue, the appellant was unable to provide a satisfactory explanation and largely repeated her earlier account.
36. I further note inconsistencies concerning the extent to which the appellant was permitted to leave the family home in Pakistan. At one stage she stated that she was not allowed to leave the house. However, she also gave evidence that she visited a bank in connection with payment of school fees and that she would on occasion undertake this activity outside the home. When challenged with passages from her asylum interview, her explanations shifted. In interview she had stated that she would sometimes drop her daughter at school and attend the bank, whereas in oral evidence she initially stated that she did not take her daughter to school because a van collected her. She later explained that when she paid school fees, she would also accompany her daughter to school, however this did not seem to be a regular occurrence. I found this aspect of her evidence confused and lacking specificity.
37. I have, however, borne firmly in mind that giving evidence in a protection appeal is a daunting process, particularly where allegations of sexual abuse and coercive control are involved. I have also taken account of the fact that the appellant gave evidence through an interpreter and was questioned about events spanning a number of years. I therefore take care not to attach undue significance to every inconsistency.
38. The appellant maintained that she suffers from memory difficulties and that prescribed medication affects her recollection. I have considered that evidence and the medical notes provided carefully. There is evidence before me regarding her mental health issues and prescribed medication. It would appear that the appellant is prescribed anti-depressants. She is also prescribed medication for nausea/dizziness and for her mood. The appellant also appears to take anti-inflammatory medication. There is no independent medical evidence establishing any cognition difficulties, or that she lacked litigation capacity, or that her memory was materially impaired, or that her medication was likely to have caused the specific inconsistencies identified in her evidence. I therefore approach that explanation cautiously. Nevertheless, I accept that the circumstances in which she was giving evidence and the sensitive subject matter may have contributed to some degree of nervousness and confusion, particularly as I noted a pattern of the appellant seeking questions to be repeated and also required questions to be repeated with emphasis on what was being asked.
39. I also note the respondent's challenge concerning how the appellant was able to travel to Dubai in 2018 to visit her husband, attend Islamabad in 2023 in connection with her visa application, and thereafter travel to the United Kingdom, if she was living under such significant restrictions. In this regard, the appellant's account remained broadly consistent. Her position throughout was that these events occurred only because permission had been obtained through her husband from her father-in-law. Likewise, her evidence concerning her eventual travel to the United Kingdom remained that this was an exceptional circumstance linked to attending her niece's wedding and that permission had ultimately been granted following discussions involving her husband and daughter.
40. In respect of her going to drop her daughter to school on the rare times she went to the bank to withdraw money and pay her school account whilst not explained well in oral evidence, is not inherently implausible that on those occasions she also dropped her daughter at school, when coupled with the task of paying school tuition fees. She said that she would be followed on these occasions. There was broad consistency in this evidence between her oral and written account.
41. There were other aspects of the appellant's account which remained broadly consistent throughout. I note her evidence that authority within the family rested with her father-in-law, that her husband was himself afraid of his father, and that family members generally complied with his wishes. I note that this feature appeared both in her asylum interview and in her oral evidence. Similarly, her evidence that she eventually disclosed both her own experiences and HS's experiences to her husband, but that he refused to believe her because he could not accept that his father was capable of such behaviour, remained largely consistent.
42. Another feature of the appellant’s evidence that remained broadly consistent was the detail about her marital relationship over time, her evidence being that communication between herself and her husband significantly reduced over the years and that most contact was maintained between him and HS. I also note the written evidence outlines the miscarriage she suffered in years 2015, 2019, 2020, evidenced by medical records and that gradually her relationship with her husband appears to have become distant.
43. Notwithstanding these consistent features, I am concerned by other aspects of the appellant's evidence. In particular, I noted inconsistencies concerning what her in-laws knew about her plans to travel to the United Kingdom and when they became aware of those plans. Likewise, there were notable inconsistencies regarding communication between the appellant and her family members in Belgium.
44. I turn in this regard to the evidence of the appellant's sister, SK. I considered her to be a genuine witness seeking to assist the Tribunal. However, I also identified difficulties with aspects of her evidence. In particular, her evidence suggested that she had informed the appellant's brothers and father in Belgium of what had occurred and that they had become aware of the allegations against the appellant’s father-in-law and brother-in-law. The appellant's own evidence was materially different and suggested a far more limited level of communication. Whilst neither witness always gave definitive answers, and certain responses were expressed tentatively, I nevertheless consider there to be a divergence in their accounts on this issue. I regard that as a factor adversely affecting reliability; however, I did not consider that it adversely affected the core of the appellant’s claim in respect of the treatment and abuse she was subjected to and I note that her account on that was not directly challenged.
45. I further note that SK referred in oral evidence to the appellant's father having suffered a heart attack following discovery of the allegations. This was not a matter referred to in her witness statement or that of the appellant, and she explained that the omission was due to the shock of events. I place some weight upon this inconsistency, although I do not regard it as determinative in isolation.
46. A further matter causing concern relates to the appellant's account as to who accompanied her to the airport when she departed Pakistan. In her interview she referred to this person as a cousin, whilst in oral evidence she variously referred to this person as her cousin, her husband's brother, and thereafter her husband's uncle whom she referred to as a cousin. Despite repeated opportunities to clarify the matter, including an explanation of the relation a cousin is, her evidence remained confused and unclear. This represented an example of shifting evidence on a matter that ought ordinarily to be straightforward.
47. I remind myself throughout of the need to approach credibility holistically and of the danger of rejecting a claim solely because aspects of a witness's evidence are inaccurate or confused. The issue is whether the core account has been established when all of the evidence is considered in the round.
48. The most significant evidence in this appeal concerns HS. I have considered her handwritten letter dated 24 June 2025. I note that the contents of that letter were not specifically challenged within the respondent's review, or during the hearing. Whilst I recognise that the letter was not tested in oral evidence, it nevertheless represents direct evidence from HS herself.
49. The letter contains a detailed account of inappropriate sexual touching and abuse perpetrated against her in Pakistan. It further describes the fear she experienced and her eventual disclosure to her mother whilst preparations were being made for the family's return to Pakistan. I find it significant that the account provided broadly accords with the core features of the appellant's claim.
50. Of even greater significance are the medical and safeguarding records relating to HS, before me. I note the GP entry dated 29 May 2025 recording HS’s low mood, intrusive thoughts regarding the past, thoughts of self-harm, and a possible diagnosis of PTSD. I further note that this led to safeguarding referrals.
51. I have also considered the Children’s Integrated Response Service referral material. The records refer to a vulnerable child with a history of sexual and physical abuse in Pakistan, signs consistent with PTSD, and referral to CAMHS. Significantly, the safeguarding material records disclosures apparently made directly by HS herself. Those disclosures included detailed allegations of how she had been touched inappropriately by family members in Pakistan, that she had been shown inappropriate material, that threats had been made to prevent disclosure from her, and that the conduct had occurred on multiple occasions.
52. I place considerable weight upon those records. They were produced in healthcare and safeguarding contexts rather than for the purposes of litigation. The disclosures are detailed and specific, and there is no evidence before me, capable of undermining the reliability of those disclosures.
53. Standing back and considering all of the evidence in the round, I am not satisfied that every aspect of the appellant's account is reliable. There are multiple inconsistencies and areas of confusion which I have identified and taken fully into account.
54. Indeed, had the appeal depended solely upon the appellant's evidence, I would have had substantial reservations as to whether the evidential burden had been discharged.
55. However, the evidential picture is materially altered by the evidence of HS. Her handwritten account, the clear disclosures recorded in the GP records of what she reports to have undergone herself. The safeguarding referrals appear to derive substantially from her own account and provide significant independent support for the core allegations relating to her, advanced in these proceedings.
56. Whilst I have identified concerns about the appellant’s evidence, I do not consider those matters sufficient to outweigh the substantial corroborative and supportive value of HS's evidence when viewed cumulatively alongside the safeguarding and medical material.
Section 8
57. I have also had regard to section 8 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004. In particular, I have considered the respondent's reliance upon the appellant's entry to the United Kingdom as a visitor, the inconsistencies concerning her intentions upon arrival, and the period which elapsed between HS's disclosure and the lodging of the asylum claim on 20 November 2023. These are matters capable of damaging credibility and I have taken them into account as part of my assessment of the evidence.
58. I do not disregard those matters. Indeed, they form part of the concerns I have identified regarding aspects of the appellant's evidence. Applying the balance of probabilities standard to my factual findings, I accept that the matters identified under section 8 are factors weighing against the reliability of the appellant's account.
59. However, section 8 is not determinative. Having considered the evidence in the round, and in particular the disclosures made by HS, the GP records, and the safeguarding documentation which I have discussed above, I am satisfied that the section 8 factors do not outweigh the substantial corroborative value of that independent evidence. I therefore treat the section 8 considerations as adverse factors, but not factors sufficient, either individually or cumulatively, to undermine the core factual account which I have found established on the balance of probabilities.
60. Accordingly, taking the evidence as a whole, I find on balance, that the core elements of the appellant's and HS’s account have been established. I find that both the appellant and HS were subjected to abuse within the family environment in Pakistan and that those responsible included the appellant's father-in-law and a further male relative identified within the evidence.
61. I therefore find it reasonably likely, that both the appellant and HS would face a real risk of serious harm and persecution if returned to Pakistan.
Refugee Convention
62. I note that the respondent accepts, in principle, that should the appellant's factual account be accepted, the Refugee Convention reason of membership of a Particular Social Group ("PSG") would be engaged.
63. I have nevertheless considered the issue for myself. Applying the balance of probabilities standard to this aspect of the analysis, I am satisfied that the appellant falls within a Particular Social Group for the purposes of the Refugee Convention.
64. In reaching that conclusion, I have had regard to the Country Policy and Information Note, Pakistan: Women Fearing Gender-Based Violence, October 2025, which recognises that women in Pakistan face societal, cultural and structural barriers affecting their autonomy, access to justice and ability to secure effective protection from gender-based violence. I further note that women in Pakistan have long been recognised as capable of constituting a Particular Social Group for the purposes of the Refugee Convention.
65. I also bear in mind the decision of Islam (A.P.) v Secretary of State for the Home Department; R v Immigration Appeal Tribunal and Another, Ex parte Shah (A.P.) [1999] UKHL 20, in which it was recognised that women in Pakistan may constitute a Particular Social Group because they share an innate and immutable characteristic, namely gender, and are perceived as a distinct group within society.
66. I therefore find that women in Pakistan constitute a Particular Social Group within the meaning of Article 1A(2) of the Refugee Convention.
67. Having regard to my factual findings as above, I am satisfied that there is a sufficient nexus between the harm feared by the appellant and HS and their membership of that Particular Social Group. The evidence demonstrates that the abuse and control directed towards the appellant and HS was due to their gender. I consider that the fear they face on return is connected to their membership of the particular social group of women in Pakistan. I further find that the risk faced by HS arises from the same family circumstances and gender-based dynamics underpinning the abuse relied upon by the appellant and HS.
68. Accordingly, I find that the Refugee Convention reason of membership of a Particular Social Group is engaged in this appeal.
69. I turn next to consider whether the appellant and HS would have available to them a sufficiency of protection from the Pakistani authorities and, if not, whether internal relocation would be both available and reasonable.
Sufficiency of Protection
70. I must now consider whether there would be available to the appellant and HS, a sufficiency of protection in Pakistan.
71. I have had regard to the respondent's submissions and to the relevant country material. I note that the Country Policy and Information Note (CPIN), Pakistan: Sufficiency of Protection Version 5 (September 2026), states that, in general, a person fearing harm from a non-state actor is likely to be able to obtain protection from the Pakistani authorities and that Pakistan operates a functioning legal system for the detection, prosecution and punishment of criminal conduct. The CPIN also refers to the country guidance in AW (sufficiency of protection) Pakistan [2011] UKUT 31 (IAC) and notes that a general insufficiency of state protection has not been established.
72. I further note the respondent's reliance upon the fact that the appellant never reported the abuse to the police and therefore did not test the availability of protection.
73. I also remind myself of the guidance in Horvath v SSHD [2000] UKUL37 that the question is not whether the state can guarantee protection, rather that the state has an effective system of protection against persecution, including laws and mechanisms to detect, prosecute and punish perpetrators, together with a reasonable willingness to operate that system. I also bear in mind whether sufficiency of protection would be available to this particular appellant and HS in the circumstances I have found established.
74. I accept that Pakistan has implemented a number of measures aimed at addressing violence against women, including women-friendly police help desks, Gender Protection Units, Gender Based Violence Courts, helplines and shelters. The country material also refers to women-only reporting mechanisms and measures to improve reporting and investigation of gender-based violence.
75. Nevertheless, both, the 2026 CPIN as above and further, the CPIN, Pakistan: Women facing gender-based violence Version 6. October 2025 identifies significant limitations. The CPIN on women fearing gender-based violence records that gender-based violence remains widespread, reporting, prosecution and conviction rates remain low, implementation of protective legislation is inconsistent, and survivors may face stigma, victim-blaming and pressure to remain silent.
76. I note in particular the evidence that police responses can be affected by entrenched patriarchal attitudes, that perpetrators have in some cases successfully bribed police to avoid action being taken, and that women frequently encounter barriers when seeking justice. The CPIN further records extremely low conviction rates for gender-based violence offences, including rape and domestic violence.
77. I also note that the broader CPIN on sufficiency of protection records concerns about police corruption, deficiencies in investigations, low conviction rates, witness intimidation, delays in the judicial process, and limitations in victim-support and witness-protection mechanisms.
78. Against that background, I bear in mind the particular circumstances of this appellant and HS. I have found that the abuse occurred within the family environment over a period of time and that the perpetrators were members of the husband's family. I have also accepted the appellant's evidence that she occupied a subordinate position within that family structure and that her father-in-law exercised significant authority and control. Further, I have accepted that when the allegations were disclosed to the appellant's husband, he did not support or believe either the appellant or HS’s account.
79. Whilst I have not been provided with cogent evidence establishing that the perpetrators possess national influence or reach, I accept that the appellant genuinely perceives them to be wealthy and influential individuals. More importantly, I find that if the abuse were reported, the appellant and HS would thereafter be required to live independently of that family network and without any reliable support from either the husband's family or, on the evidence before me, from the husband himself, and that there were no family members within the appellant’s own family in Pakistan who could help or support her. I consider that even if a complaint were made, I find that the appellant and HS would be unable, in practical terms, to access and sustain effective protection because of their particular circumstances.
80. Considering the evidence as a whole, I am not satisfied that state protection would be sufficient for this particular appellant and HS. Whilst protection mechanisms exist, I find that the combination of the appellant’s and HS’s vulnerability, in light of the nature of the abuse and the absence of meaningful support, together with the limitations in state protection would not establish a sufficiency of protection for the appellant and HS.
Internal relocation
81. I have next considered whether the appellant and HS could relocate elsewhere within Pakistan.
82. I acknowledge that the CPIN Pakistan: Internal Relocation Version 3, September 2026 statesthat in general, a person fearing a non-state actor is likely to be able to relocate internally, particularly to large urban centres such as Karachi, Lahore and Islamabad. Pakistan is a large and populous country, freedom of movement is generally respected, internal migration is common, and major cities may provide a degree of anonymity.
83. I further note the respondent's submission that no persuasive evidence has been provided demonstrating that the perpetrators possess the means to trace the appellant throughout Pakistan.
84. I accept that proposition to an extent. The evidence before me does not establish that the perpetrators enjoy nationwide reach or influence. Accordingly, I do not find that the appellant would necessarily face a continuing real risk from those individuals in every part of Pakistan.
85. However, the question remains whether relocation would be reasonable and not unduly harsh having regard to the individual circumstances of this appellant and HS and applying the guidance in Januzi v SSHD [2006] UKHL 5. I have also considered the guidance in SM and MH (lone women – ostracism) Pakistan CG [2016] UKUT 00067 (IAC).
86. I have regard to the guidance contained within the CPIN Women Fearing Gender-Based Violence. Whilst the CPIN concludes that relocation may be reasonable for women who possess family support, a male guardian, or independent financial means, it also recognises that relocation is significantly more difficult for women without such support structures and that each case must be assessed on its own facts.
87. The appellant would, in effect, be returning as a lone woman with sole responsibility for a teenage daughter. I accept that she has no meaningful support network available to her in Pakistan. Her mother is deceased. One brother remains in Pakistan, but the evidence of both the appellant and her sister was that the relationship is distant and largely estranged. Her father and two other brothers reside in Belgium. Her sister resides in the United Kingdom. I therefore find that she would not have available to her any meaningful family support upon relocation.
88. Further, I accept that the appellant has never worked outside the home, has limited education, and has no demonstrated employment history. Whilst I acknowledge that employment opportunities exist in Pakistan, particularly in larger cities, there is no evidence before me that the appellant possesses the qualifications, skills, finances or support mechanisms that would realistically enable her to establish independent accommodation and financial security whilst also caring for HS.
89. I have also considered the evidence relating to shelters and temporary accommodation. Whilst such facilities exist, the country evidence indicates that places are limited, facilities are variably resourced, some require court involvement, and concerns have been raised regarding long-term sustainability and the absence of safe transitional accommodation. The country material further notes that women leaving shelters may remain vulnerable and that, in some instances, women have faced renewed violence after leaving them.
90. I have also considered the evidence relating to HS. She is presently a child, remains in education, and has presented with mental health difficulties following her disclosures. Whilst I accept that educational provision and healthcare exist within Pakistan, the country evidence demonstrates that access and quality vary significantly and that women frequently face social and economic barriers when attempting to secure support.
91. Accordingly, although I accept that relocation within Pakistan may in principle minimise the immediate threat posed by the perpetrators, I am not satisfied that relocation would provide a viable or reasonable solution which would not be unduly harsh. My finding is not based upon risk from the perpetrators throughout Pakistan but upon the reasonableness of relocation in light of the appellant's circumstances.
92. I therefore conclude that internal relocation is not a viable alternative for the appellant or HS who would be returning to Pakistan as lone females.
93. I therefore find that the appellant and HS have established a well-founded fear of persecution for a Refugee Convention reason and that there would not be a sufficiency of protection available, nor would reasonable internal relocation be available to them. Accordingly, the appellant’s asylum claim succeeds.
94. In light of my findings above, had the appellant and HS not been entitled to refugee status, I would in any event have allowed the appeal on humanitarian protection grounds for the same reasons.
95. Further, in light of my findings allowing the appeal on asylum grounds it is unnecessary for me to determine the remaining human rights grounds.
Notice of Decision
96. The asylum appeal is allowed under the Refugee Convention.
ANONYMITY ORDER
Unless and until the Tribunal, the Upper Tribunal, or, a Court orders otherwise, pursuant to rule 13(1)(b) of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Rules 2014, the appellant, HS and their family are granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal either directly or indirectly any information, including their names or their addresses, that is likely to lead members of the public to identify them. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.
To the respondent – Fee Award
As I have allowed the appeal, I have also considered whether or not to make a fee award. I have decided not to make a fee award as there was supplementary evidence provided by the appellant that was not before the respondent’s decision maker at the time of the refusal letter and review.
Signature
Signed Date 1 November 2026
T Watson
First-tier Tribunal Judge T Watson
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