Administrative United Kingdom

Harry Apele Lambert, R (on the application of) v Senior Coroner for North London

Official source

Neutral Citation Number: [2026] EWHC 2763 (Admin)

Case No: AC-2026-LON-000342

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE

KING'S BENCH DIVISION

ADMINISTRATIVE COURT

SITTING IN LONDON

Tuesday, 27th October 2026

Before:

FORDHAM J

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Between:

THE KING
(on the application of HARRY APELE LAMBERT)
Claimant
– and –
SENIOR CORONER FOR NORTH LONDON
– and –
CHRISTOPHER HUGH LAMBERT
Defendant
Interested Party

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– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –

The Claimant appearing in person

Francis Hoar (instructed by Haringey Council Legal Service) for the Defendant

The Interested Party did not appear and was not represented

– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –

Hearing date: 27.10.26

Judgment as delivered in open court at the hearing

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Approved Judgment

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FORDHAM J

Note: This judgment was produced and approved by the Judge, after authorising

the use by the Court of voice-recognition software during an ex tempore judgment.

FORDHAM J:

1. This is a claim for judicial review at the permission stage. Having had the benefit of written and oral submissions from the Claimant and on behalf of the Defendant (“the Coroner”), I have been satisfied that it is appropriate to grant permission for judicial review, but only on one of the five grounds of challenge which were raised in the pleaded case. The circumstances are unusual. The ground which I am satisfied, in the interests of justice and applying the threshold of arguability, should proceed to a short substantive hearing is the legally insufficient enquiry ground (Ground 2). It comes to this, that the Coroner arguably should – in the particular circumstances of this case – have obtained and considered the medical records from the North Middlesex Hospital (NMH), relating to the time that the deceased Maureen Lambert, the Claimant’s mother, was at the hospital; first, between 14 and 18 September 2025, and then from 19 to 24 September 2025.

2. Linked to that Ground is a question about fresh evidence in judicial review, and whether the Coroner should now consider the medical records from NMH. The judicial review Court is conventionally concerned only with the material that was before the decision-maker at the time of the impugned decision. But there is scope for reliance by a judicial review claimant on material which would have been elicited by the very enquiry that the claimant says ought to have taken place. Also, it seems to me that it is arguable that there is scope, in the particular context of a coroner, for an ongoing consideration of further material, tested against whether the coroner is maintaining the impugned decision. That ongoing focus was seen in Touche v HM Coroner for Inner London North [2001] EWCA Civ 383 (see §§15 and 36 in particular), where the ultimate focus was not on the original impugned decision but on its maintenance in light of what had subsequently come to light.

3. The Coroner is the primary decision-maker, charged with the statutory function of answering the statutory question (Coroners and Justice Act 2009 s.1(2)(a)): whether there is “reason to suspect” that a deceased has died an “unnatural death”. In the present case, it is arguable that the Coroner – as primary decision-maker – ought to have considered, or alternatively ought now to consider, and so will be required by the Court to consider – the NMH medical records. It may be that the submission, powerfully advanced today by Mr Hoar on behalf of the Coroner, will prevail. Mr Hoar points to the high thresholds for the neglect (gross failure) and the “culpable human failure” categories of case, identified in Touche (at §29 and §§46-47 in particular). Mr Hoar submits that, even looking at the now available medical records from NHM, and even taking the case at its highest, neither of those tests can be satisfied. I have not been persuaded by that submission, as a knockout blow for the purposes of permission for judicial review.

4. There are, moreover, special features of this case which in my judgment make it particularly important that the disposition of this claim should take place at a substantive hearing on all the material; and not as a peremptory rejection at the threshold permission stage. First, the Claimant was strongly submitting to the Coroner, at the time when the impugned decisions were made in October 2025, that the medical records should be obtained and considered. Next, it has been belatedly disclosed in a witness statement from the Coroner that the Coroner’s office manager had indeed requested the hospital records from NHM on 20 October 2025. The decision-making Coroner has told the court, in his witness statement, that he did not request the hospital records, nor did he consider that they were necessary. The Court does not presently have a clear and complete picture of how it came to be that the hospital records were requested at the time, from within the Coroner’s office, unknown to the decision-making Coroner.

5. Next, there are some troubling features of the way in which this judicial review claim has been responded to, both at the pre-action stage and once proceedings were commenced.

6. At the pre-action stage, decision letters were written on behalf of the Coroner, in response to the Claimant’s pre-action letter of 16 October 2025, in which the Claimant had emphasised the importance of the Coroner getting the medical “notes”. The Coroner’s decision letter of 17 October 2025 stated that the Coroner “has considered the available information from Whipps Cross Hospital”, where Maureen Lambert was from late August 2025 to 6 September 2025. The decision letter of 21 October 2025 stated that the Coroner had “considered the notes concerning Mrs Lambert’s admissions to hospital prior to her death” and that “the notes referred to both Whipps Cross and North Middlesex”. The natural reading of both of those letters was that they were stating that “notes” or records from hospitals had been considered. In fact, what has been disclosed as having been available and considered are two referral documents, a Form HRF1 (sent to the Claimant on 13 October 2025) and a Death Report, both written by the medical examiner at NMH on 10 October 2025, with materially identical content derived from records at NMH. But not the hospital “notes” or the hospital “records” themselves. To illustrate the implications of that sort of assurance (ie. that documents were available and considered by the decision-maker), is this fact. When permission for judicial review was refused on the papers in this case, the Judge expressly recorded that “hospital records” and “medical records” had been considered by the Coroner, who had been looking at “records” from Whipps Cross and NMH. The Judge said this had been “confirmed” by the Coroner in the decision letter of 21 October 2025.

7. Then, when proceedings were commenced, the Coroner put forward summary grounds of resistance with an acknowledgement of service, including a statement of truth. The summary grounds stated, in terms, that: “The Coroner reviewed the records from NMH as well as from Mrs Lambert’s earlier admission to Whipps Cross”. It went on to say: “The Coroner confirmed that he had reviewed medical records from WCH”. It is important that judicial review Courts can rely on what they are told by public authorities, including judicial public authorities. The Coroner has subsequently acknowledged that the factual contents of the summary grounds were erroneous, and gave rise to an erroneous impression, for which the Coroner has apologised.

8. Mr Hoar submits that any concerns relating to all of that could not, standing alone, be a basis for granting permission for judicial review. Whether he is right about that or not, in my judgment, these concerns are reinforcing features which serve to amplify why it is in the interests of justice in this case that there should be disposal at a substantive hearing.

9. The next point is this. The Coroner’s witness statement describes reliance having been placed on a letter which had been provided by the Interested Party. There had been a mention of correspondence between the Coroner and the Interested Party in the 17 October 2025 decision letter. But the witness statement, rather strikingly, takes this course. It says the Coroner took account of the letter. It then quotes from the Interested Party’s letter, but only part of the letter. It then goes on to provide a further description of the Coroner’s reasoning, using language not found in the October 2025 decision letters themselves, but rather language which replicates – virtually word for word – what is quoted from the Interested Party’s letter on which reliance was placed.

10. I was interested to know whether Mr Hoar, as Counsel for the Coroner, was in a position to assure the Court today that, after an exercise of due diligence, all materials have been disclosed at this permission stage which are capable either of supporting the claim for judicial review or undermining the defence to it. Mr Hoar told me he was not in a position to give me that reassurance. I am in no way criticising him for his answer. It was appropriate that the Court should have the assistance of a straight answer to that question. But the fact that I cannot be sure that the duty of candour has been discharged is another reinforcing feature which supports my overall evaluative judgment, that the justice of this case warrants ventilation at a substantive hearing.

11. It may be that there are points which will arise, linked to the medical records or to the Interested Party’s letter, which will be relevant to the Coroner’s decision-making process and its fairness. Mr Hoar accepted that, in principle, the Interested Party’s letter – which had been quoted in the Coroner’s witness statement – should have been disclosed. Fairness is not presently pleaded as a ground for judicial review. But the duty of candour extends, or can in an appropriate case extend, to material which would support the claim even on a ground which is not presently pleaded. Particularly so, in a case where the claimant is acting in person.

12. I have said that permission for judicial review will be granted on one of the five pleaded grounds for judicial review (Ground 2). As I see it, the Coroner’s error in referring in the decision letters to Whipp’s Cross (Ground 1) is not a point which retains traction in the circumstances. Putting it another way, the key point in the case is squarely covered by Ground 2 (legally insufficient enquiry). The Claimant invited me to grant permission on Ground 3, which relates in particular to the circumstances from 26 June 2025 to the end of August 2025. As to that, what is said by the Claimant is that Maureen Lambert’s circumstances – what he characterises as her de facto deprivation of liberty at a care home – is capable of having contributed to her physiological decline, in a way which could trigger an Article 2 ECHR enhanced inquest duty. I have not been satisfied that there is any viability in that claim on the material before the Court. The Claimant very fairly recognised that that was a weaker ground of challenge than the primary points which he emphasises, about NMH and its medical records. Although he has not formally abandoned Grounds 4 or 5, nor did they feature in his helpful draft order for the invited grant of permission for judicial review today. Ground 4 was an Article 2 “systems duty” point, but in my judgment that has no viability in the context and circumstances of the present case. Ground 5 was a point about the release for cremation of the body of the deceased. That is a point which has as its premise the unlawfulness of the underlying refusal by the Coroner to hold an inquest. I have been unable to see what it adds or how it has any freestanding viability. The Claimant was right in my judgment not to press his Grounds 4 and 5.

13. I mention that a delay point was taken by the Coroner, in response to the challenge. This point was not relied on by the Judge who refused permission on the papers, who said that he would not have refused permission on the basis of delay. Delay was not a point emphasised at today’s oral hearing on behalf the Coroner. I would not have been prepared to dismiss this claim by reference to delay, or lack of promptness, given the chronology of the case, the circumstances and the nature of the issues which arise.

14. I will hear from both sides about what else I ought to say by way of an Order of the Court. My provisional view is that the central issues in the case are susceptible to clear and succinct written and oral submissions, and the focus that the parties can bring to bear to assist the Court will enable the substantive hearing to be relatively short.

15. Having now heard from the parties, the time estimate for the substantive hearing will be half a day. There was agreement it would be appropriate for me to order disclosure by the Defendant of the Interested Party’s letter, and give the Claimant permission to rely at the substantive hearing on the NMH medical records. The Order also contained some conventional case-management directions.

27.10.26

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