Administrative United Kingdom
HM v The Secretary of State for the Home Department
First-tier Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber)
Appeal Number: PA/59622/2025
THE IMMIGRATION ACTS
Heard at Newport
On 22 October 2026
Before
JUDGE MCMAHON
JUDGE OF THE FIRST-TIER TRIBUNAL
Between
H M
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent
Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms Grubb of Counsel, instructed by Qualified Legal Solicitors Limited
For the Respondent: Ms Dosso, Home Office Presenting Officer
DECISION AND REASONS
Anonymity
1. I have decided to make an anonymity direction because the importance of facilitating the discharge of the obligations of the United Kingdom under the Refugee Convention in the circumstances of this case outweighs the principle of open justice.
2. To maintain that direction, I will refer to the Appellant’s family members by reference to their relationship with the Appellant.
Background
3. The Appellant is a 43-year-old national of Vietnam who is subject to an order for his deportation. He appeals against the Respondent’s decision of 6 March 2025 refusing his protection and human rights claim. The appeal is brought under sections 82 and 84 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (“the 2002 Act”).
The Hearing
i. Documents and witnesses
4. A face-to-face hearing took place at Columbus House, Newport. It was recorded via CVP, and that recording acts as a record of proceedings in the event there is any dispute about what was said during that hearing.
5. Both representatives confirmed that the relevant documents were contained in the stitched hearing bundle of 1662 PDF pages found on myHMCTS. In addition, the Appellant relied on two additional letters which were uploaded on 15 October 2026, which Ms Dosso confirmed she had received and had been given an opportunity to consider.
6. I heard evidence from the Appellant and his partner. Both relied on a Vietnamese interpreter who attended the hearing in person. The witnesses and the interpreter confirmed they understood each other at the start of their evidence, and no concerns about the interpretation were raised by either representative.
7. Two of the Appellant’s children also attended the hearing centre with the intention of speaking in support of their father’s appeal. With the agreement of both representatives, and mindful of the Tribunal’s duty to treat both as vulnerable witnesses on account of their ages, it was agreed that they would not be called to give evidence, but that their attendance in support would be noted by the Tribunal.
8. In addition to the documentary and oral evidence, I heard submissions from both representatives. I reserved my decision at the end of the hearing.
ii. The Appellant’s vulnerability
9. Both representatives acknowledged that the Appellant and his partner should be treated as vulnerable witnesses in accordance with the principles set out in Joint Presidential Guidance Note (No. 2) of 2010 because of the issues set out in the expert reports relied on by the Appellant. Accordingly, the issues were narrowed at the outset to avoid any unnecessary cross-examination and the format of the hearing was explained to the Appellant at the start. We took a break during the Appellant’s evidence, and no concerns were raised about the fairness of the proceedings or the Appellant’s ability to understand matters.
Preliminary issues
10. I raised four preliminary issues at the start of the hearing which had to be addressed by the representatives in preliminary submissions. I am grateful to both representatives for their assistance during that preliminary discussion and for their closing submissions. This decision records my conclusions on each of those preliminary issues as well as my substantive decision on the principal controversial issues in this appeal.
i. The relevant dates
11. There was some ambiguity about precisely when the Appellant lodged his further submissions which gave rise to the Respondent’s decision. After taking instructions, both representatives confirmed my preliminary view that it appeared the Appellant had lodged his further submissions with the Home Office on 19 January 2018. Consequently, both representatives agreed with me that it had taken the Respondent over 7 years to consider those further submissions before reaching her decision in March 2025.
12. Regretfully, Ms Dosso was unable to provide any explanation for that delay. That is no criticism of Ms Dosso and the delay itself is not a delay of hers, but I must record at the outset that I simply find it astonishing that it has taken the Home Office over 7 years to reach a decision on the Appellant’s further submissions, the nature of which were not complex in law or fact.
ii. The relevant legal framework
13. It follows on from the above that, contrary to the assertions made in the Appellant’s ASA, his appeal falls to be determined in accordance with the law as it stood prior to the commencement of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022.
iii. The Respondent’s reliance on a 2016 conviction
14. The Respondent’s decision letter and chronology of events refers to the Appellant being convicted of an offence in Newcastle in June 2016. Despite these references, the Respondent has not provided any sentencing remarks relating to that conviction, any schedule of conviction, or a PNC printout recording such a conviction. The Appellant’s written and expert evidence records a consistent denial of any knowledge of such a conviction.
15. I raised this with the representatives at the start of the hearing. Ms Grubb informed me that it had been a matter that the Appellant’s representatives had raised on several occasions with the Home Office, without success. After taking instructions, Ms Dosso confirmed that she had access to a PNC printout, and, as a result of considering that printout and taking further instructions, did not seek to rely on any 2016 conviction.
iv. The application of Devaseelan
16. It is common ground that the Appellant appealed against the Respondent’s refusal of his earlier human rights claim in 2014. That matter was the subject of legal proceedings which culminated in a decision by the Court of Appeal in AJ (Zimbabwe) and VH (Vietnam) v SSHD [2016] EWCA Civ 1012.
17. I sought the views of both representatives on the application of Devaseelan (Second Appeals – ECHR – Extra-Territorial Effect) Sri Lanka * [2002] UKIAT 00702. Both representatives agreed that any earlier decision was of very limited relevance given the significant passage of time which had elapsed since those earlier proceedings and the absence of any clearly retained findings of fact by any court during those proceedings. I therefore proceeded on that basis with the agreement of both parties.
The issues
18. Ms Grubb on behalf of the Appellant –
(a) conceded that the Appellant is a “foreign criminal” within the meaning of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (“the 2002 Act”);
(b) accepted the Appellant was convicted on 3 May 2011 at Lincoln Crown Court of a single offence of producing cannabis, for which he received a sentence of 18 months imprisonment; and
(c) accepted that the Appellant had not been “lawfully resident” in the UK for the majority of his life.
19. Ms Dosso confirmed that the Respondent –
(a) accepted that the Appellant has a genuine and subsisting relationship with his partner, and genuine and subsisting parental relationships with his two biological children and his step-daughter;
(b) accepted that the Appellant’s partner and children are British citizens;
(c) accepted that it would be unduly harsh for the Appellant’s partner and children to relocate to Vietnam;
(d) accepted the Appellant’s account of his identity and nationality;
(e) accepted that the Appellant had received a conclusive grounds decision that he had been a victim of trafficking; and
(f) accepted the Appellant’s account that he had been trafficked from Vietnam and made to work in the UK by those traffickers.
20. In terms of the appeal on Article 3 grounds, Ms Grubb confirmed that the Appellant did not seek to advance an appeal on the basis of his health conditions or risk of suicide, but sought to argue it on the basis that the combination of the Appellant’s risk of trafficking, coupled with his mental health, would lead to him being destitute.
21. In terms of the appeal on Article 8 grounds, both parties agreed that the relevant legal framework was set out in section 117C of the 2002 Act. Ms Grubb conceded that the Appellant could not rely on the exception set out in section 117C(3) of the 2002 Act in light of him not being lawfully resident in the UK for the majority of his life, but sought to rely on the exception set out in section 117C(4) of the 2002 Act on the basis that it would be unduly harsh for the Appellant’s partner and children if he were removed to Vietnam, or in the alternative, because there would be very compelling circumstances over and above those exceptions.
22. Both representatives also agreed that a positive finding on the Appellant’s protection appeal would be determinative of his appeal on human rights grounds given the very compelling circumstances that would exist as a result of such a finding.
23. The representatives therefore agreed that the principal controversial issues the Tribunal must decide are:
(a) As far as the Appellant’s protection appeal is concerned –
(i) is it reasonably likely that the Appellant would be persecuted on any return to Vietnam?
(ii) does the Appellant face a real risk of suffering serious harm in his country of return?
(iii) if so, could the Appellant obtain sufficient protection and/or internally relocate?
(b) If I find against the Appellant’s protection appeal, I must move on to consider the Appellant’s appeal on Article 3 grounds, and consider –
(i) is it reasonably likely that the Appellant will find himself living in conditions of such dire poverty that he would face ‘intense suffering’ or a significant reduction in his life expectancy?
(c) If I find against the Appellant’s protection and Article 3 appeals, I must move on to consider the Appellant’s appeal on Article 8 grounds, and consider –
(i) is the Appellant socially and culturally integrated?
(ii) does the Appellant face very significant obstacles to integration in Vietnam?
(iii) would it be unduly harsh on the Appellant’s partner and/or children if the Appellant were deported?
(iv) are there very compelling circumstances so that the public interest in deportation is outweighed by the level of interference with the Appellant's private and family life?
Legal Framework
24. To succeed in an appeal on asylum grounds, the Appellant must show a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason (race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, political opinion). The burden of proof is upon the appellant. As per the decision in Karanakaran v SSHD [2000] 3 All ER 449 the single standard of proof is a reasonable degree of likelihood. I must determine whether it is reasonably likely that:
(a) Taking the claim at its highest, there is a Convention reason;
(b) Considering the credibility of the account, the Appellant fears persecution for that Convention reason;
(c) The Appellant would be persecuted for that Convention reason;
(d) There would not be sufficient protection available; and
(e) The Appellant could not internally relocate.
25. To succeed on an appeal on humanitarian protection grounds the Appellant must not be a refugee; they must show substantial grounds for believing that they would face a real risk of suffering serious harm in their country of origin. The burden of proof rests on the Appellant.
26. Section 117C of the 2002 Act states:
(1) The deportation of foreign criminals is in the public interest.
(2) The more serious the offence committed by a foreign criminal, the greater is the public interest in deportation of the criminal.
(3) In the case of a foreign criminal ("C") who has not been sentenced to a period of imprisonment of four years or more, the public interest requires C's deportation unless Exception 1 or Exception 2 applies.
(4) Exception 1 applies where—
(a) C has been lawfully resident in the United Kingdom for most of C's life,
(b) C is socially and culturally integrated in the United Kingdom, and
(c) there would be very significant obstacles to C's integration into the country to which C is proposed to be deported.
(5) Exception 2 applies where C has a genuine and subsisting relationship with a qualifying partner, or a genuine and subsisting parental relationship with a qualifying child, and the effect of C's deportation on the partner or child would be unduly harsh.
(6) In the case of a foreign criminal who has been sentenced to a period of imprisonment of at least four years, the public interest requires deportation unless there are very compelling circumstances, over and above those described in Exceptions 1 and 2.
(7) The considerations in subsections (1) to (6) are to be taken into account where a court or tribunal is considering a decision to deport a foreign criminal only to the extent that the reason for the decision was the offence or offences for which the criminal has been convicted.
27. Paragraphs 46 to 50 of HA (Iraq) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2022] UKSC 22 explained very compelling circumstances. It is possible for the Appellant to succeed despite not satisfying Exceptions 1 or 2, or to succeed in a very strong claim that does satisfy Exception 1 or 2.
28. The question is whether the refusal breaches the Appellant's Article 3 ECHR right not to be "subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment". The burden of proof rests with the Appellant to show he would be exposed to such intense suffering or a significant reduction in life expectancy.
29. Section 55 of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009 (‘BCI Act 2009’) places a duty on the Respondent to ensure, when discharging her immigration functions, that regard is had to the need to safeguard and promote the welfare of children in the UK.
30. The best interests of a child in any assessment are a primary consideration and although they will not always determine the outcome of an immigration decision, no other factor should be given more weight. The best interests of a child must be considered first and are an integral part of the proportionality assessment under Article 8 of ECHR. A child must not be blamed for matters for which he or she is not responsible (ZH (Tanzania) [2011] UKSC 4; Zoumbas v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2013] UKSC 74).
Findings
31. I have given full and careful consideration to all the oral evidence, as well as the written and oral submissions from both representatives. Whilst I have necessarily recorded my findings one after another, I have considered all the evidence in the round and given it anxious scrutiny in order to determine these findings.
i. The Appellant’s background
32. I found from the unchallenged evidence before me that the Appellant was born in 1982 in Vietnam and that his parents died when he was very young, perhaps around 2 years old. I also found from the Appellant’s unchallenged evidence that, after his parents died, the Appellant was informally brought up by “a middle-aged couple” until he was around 5 years old. After that, the Appellant was effectively a ‘street child’ in Vietnam: someone who lived and worked on the streets without any adult or parental supervision doing jobs such as polishing shoes, begging and selling goods.
33. I found from the Appellant’s unchallenged evidence that he has never been in education, and is illiterate. I accept that he has no knowledge of any siblings or any other family members. Both matters are entirely plausible given the Appellant’s background as a street child, the absence of any family around him, and confirmed by the Appellant’s oral evidence which caused me to find the Appellant to be an entirely straightforward witness with limited understanding of matters in his past.
34. The Respondent accepts that the Appellant was effectively befriended in 2005 by an individual who helped him obtain work. At this point, the Appellant would have been a young adult. The Respondent accepts that this individual subsequently drugged the Appellant, and he was taken out of Vietnam before ultimately arriving in the UK sometime thereafter. There is evidence of the Appellant being fingerprinted in the UK during 2006, and I accept from this that the Appellant has therefore been in the UK for around 20 years.
35. Although the Appellant refers to fearing the individual who befriended him in 2005, I did not find any evidence before me of any communication from that individual, or indeed anyone acting on his behalf or linked to him, since 2009. Whilst I can understand why the Appellant may still be fearful of that individual, I did not find his fears of that individual or anyone who trafficked him to be well-founded given the significant passage of time which has elapsed since the last communication, the absence of threats, and the Appellant’s inability to identify any of those individuals by name, other than the person who befriended him.
ii. The Appellant’s criminal conviction
36. The Appellant’s criminal conviction from January 2011 is not in dispute. I found from the sentencing remarks provided that the Appellant exercised a “subordinate” role for his part in dismantling a cannabis growing operation, but one still regarded as “significant” by the judge sentencing the Appellant. The sentencing remarks record that the Appellant pleaded guilty, and his sentence reflects that guilty plea and the role he played in the operation.
37. I found from the evidence before me that the Appellant served 9 months in imprisonment, and was subsequently moved to immigration detention where he remained for approximately 9 months before being released on immigration bail. The Respondent and the Single Competent Authority have accepted that the Appellant was trafficked to the UK and it is against that backdrop that the Appellant committed the single offence for which he was convicted.
38. I did not find on the evidence before me that the Appellant has been arrested for, or convicted of, any further offending since this single offence in 2011. I have the benefit of an independent risk assessment undertaken by Ms Haque, an experienced probation officer who has assessed the Appellant’s circumstances. Although the Respondent’s review criticises elements of Ms Haque’s report because she was not given the full material on these proceedings, I do not consider those criticisms to fatally undermine what is a fairly uncontroversial conclusion that the Appellant poses a low risk of reoffending and harm which need not be evident from an expert’s opinion, but demonstrated by the lack of any record of offending for approximately 15 years.
iii. The Appellant’s family
39. I found from the evidence that the Appellant met his partner and began their relationship in 2009. I therefore accept that the Appellant and his partner have now been together for around 17 years, and, aside from the period when the Appellant was imprisoned, have lived together since 2010. I accept that the Appellant intended to regularise his status when he met his partner, but was unable to do so because he was subsequently arrested.
40. Together, the Appellant and his partner have two children of their own, a boy born in August 2011 (who I shall refer to as C15) and a girl born in December 2019 (who I shall refer to as C6). The Appellant’s partner also has a child from a previous relationship, born in March 2009 (who I shall refer to as C17).
41. I found having considered all of the evidence that the Appellant is, in effect, a ‘stay-at-home’ father, while his partner is self-employed and runs her own business and, to borrow her words, acts as the “breadwinner”. I found from the evidence that the Appellant’s role involves the tasks generally expected of a parent. There is no suggestion that any of the children have any developmental issue or medical concern which means they require additional care or support.
42. C15 and C17 have provided letters to the Tribunal to explain the nature and extent of their relationship with the Appellant. Unsurprisingly, both speak about the love and affection they hold for the Appellant, and the part he plays in their daily lives. I give significant weight to these letters because they have clearly been written by the Appellant’s children and provide a first-hand explanation of the impact that the Appellant’s removal would have on their lives.
43. By way of further evidence about the Appellant’s family life, reliance is placed on a report prepared by Mr Laurence Chester, a qualified social worker who observed the family and spoke to them in the preparation of his report. To a large extent, Mr Chester’s report does little to further this case. That is no criticism of Mr Chester but because the Respondent accepts that the Appellant has a genuine and subsisting relationship with his family, and two of the three children involved have provided their own evidence about the nature of their relationship with the Appellant and the impact his removal would have on them.
44. I have no hesitation in considering all the evidence that it would be in the best interests of all three children that the Appellant remains in the UK. He is described consistently throughout the evidence as the ‘stay-at-home’ father, and it follows from that role that it is the Appellant who provides the primary care for all three children, and undertakes the general day-to-day duties that a primary carer would. Given their ages, all three children will know nothing different to a home life where the Appellant is present, and therefore his removal from that home and the UK would have a significant adverse impact on the lives of all three children. However, I do not find on the evidence before me that the impact of the Appellant’s removal upon his partner or children would go beyond the ordinary consequences of deportation.
iv. The Appellant’s cultural and social links to the UK
45. I found that the Appellant has lived in the UK since 2006. There is no suggestion that the Appellant has ever been granted any formal leave to remain in the UK throughout this period. That being said, it is fair to note that during the period between 2012 and 2016 the Appellant had a pending human rights claim or appeal, and it took between 2017 and 2025 for the Home Office to determine the latest claim giving rise to this appeal. Whilst I therefore conclude the Appellant has not had leave during his time in the UK, I did not find this to be a case where the Home Office have sought to progress the Appellant’s removal with any sense of timeliness and, as I have already noted, I am frankly astonished it has taken the Home Office 7 years to consider these latest submissions.
46. There is no evidence or indeed suggestion that the Appellant has left the UK at any time during this period. As already noted, the Appellant’s partner and three children live in the UK, but there is no extended family.
47. I did not find on the evidence before me that the Appellant has undertaken any paid employment in the UK. Both the Appellant and his partner were clear in their evidence that the Appellant had not done so, and to have done so would have been inconsistent with the consistent account given by the Appellant’s partner that she has been the “breadwinner” and been in paid employment, or self-employment, throughout their relationship.
48. There is some limited evidence (at PDF page 168) that the Appellant has been involved in voluntary work during his time in the UK, and some letters of support from various individuals who are friends of the Appellant and his partner. Although the authors of these documents did not attend the hearing, I give some weight to the contents of the documents when I consider all of the evidence because they are contemporaneous records provided by different individuals over a period of a few years.
v. The Appellant’s health
49. The Appellant relies on a report prepared by Dr Pates at PDF page 109. Dr Pates is a chartered psychologist who assessed the Appellant in August 2025, and has provided his opinion on the Appellant’s mental health conditions and the impact a removal to Vietnam might have on those conditions.
50. I found I could give significant weight to this report. There is no suggestion that Dr Pates lacks the qualifications or expertise to provide the opinions set out in that report. Dr Pates clearly recognises his duties to the court, and has been furnished with sufficient information to enable him to reach the opinions contained in that report. Although there was some ambiguity about whether Dr Pates had been provided with the Appellant’s medical records, I am satisfied from the contents of the report that the level of detail set out within the report could have only come from a detailed review of the Appellant’s medical records.
51. Dr Pates considers that the Appellant is currently suffering from severe depressive disorder, severe generalised anxiety disorder, and severe post-traumatic stress disorder. Dr Pates’s report has provided detailed reasons for reaching these clinical conclusions, and Ms Dosso in her closing submissions did not seek to dispute that the Appellant has been diagnosed with these conditions. In any event, given Dr Pates’s expertise and the reasons provided within the report, I have no reason to doubt these conclusions and I find that the Appellant is currently suffering from these conditions.
52. Dr Pates considers (at paragraph 51) that the Appellant is “at high risk of ongoing psychological deterioration”, observing the risk of suicide and self-harm. He is described as a “highly vulnerable individual whose mental health remains fragile and unstable”. Dr Pates also notes the limited support network available to the Appellant, and his “precarious” wellbeing, and considers his reliance on his current GP treatment and limited family support network to be “absolute”.
53. I found that the Appellant is currently receiving medication to support his mental health, and has also been receiving counselling sessions. Those sessions were paused over the summer on medical advice, but I see no reason on the evidence before me why they would not continue at some point in the near future.
vi. The Appellant’s links to Vietnam
54. I have already found that the Appellant has not returned to Vietnam for over 20 years. I have no reason to doubt his consistent account of not having any relatives in Vietnam. As already mentioned, that is entirely consistent with the Appellant’s broader account of being a “street child” and experiencing the loss of his parents at a very young age.
55. I found from the evidence given by the Appellant’s partner that she has returned to Vietnam on two occasions since 2022. During that second period of return, the Appellant’s partner remained in the country for around 3 weeks. On both occasions, the Appellant’s partner stayed with a friend who was a university student who had visited the UK to study. There is no evidence before me that this friend and the Appellant have ever met one another, and I found the friendship to be a limited one which involved the Appellant’s partner rather than the Appellant himself.
56. There is no evidence before me that the Appellant has any broader ties with anyone in Vietnam, nor is there any evidence of any contact with anyone in the country. That being said, he is clearly someone who continues to speak the language used in the country, and I found from the amount of time he would have spent in the country together with his account of socialising with the broader Vietnamese community in the UK that he would be broadly familiar with culture in the country and societal norms.
vii. The Appellant’s risk on return to Vietnam
57. I am required to assess whether the Appellant would face any risk of persecution or serious harm on any return to Vietnam, and, if such a risk would exist, whether it would be possible for the Appellant to obtain sufficient protection from the authorities, or relocate elsewhere to avoid that risk.
58. In dealing with this issue, I have considered the country background evidence relied on by the Respondent which is found in the CPIN: trafficking, Vietnam, February 2025, and the expert evidence relied on by the Appellant and found in the report of Dr Tran at PDF page 271, along with the addendum report at PDF page 80. The Respondent’s review criticises elements of Dr Tran’s report. However, having considered those criticisms, I found many of them to be misplaced: contrary to the Respondent’s claim, Dr Tran does consider the Respondent’s CPIN (see paragraphs 4.7 and 6.7 and the confirmation at PDF page 101); the core of the addendum report (which was the only report filed after the making of the 2024 Practice Direction) does not in fact exceed the page count limit; and I found Dr Tran’s assessment has been based on facts largely accepted by the Respondent.
59. There is no suggestion that Dr Tran lacks the qualifications or expertise to provide the opinions contained in that report, and I found that I could give significant weight to Dr Tran’s report given it is a bespoke risk assessment which considers the Appellant’s circumstances against the latest country conditions. The Respondent’s CPIN, meanwhile, is a generalised risk-assessment and does not engage with the particular facts of this case.
60. Collectively, I found from the country background evidence relied on by both parties that trafficking takes place in Vietnam, and that there is a risk of re-trafficking for those previously trafficked. The Respondent’s CPIN (at paragraph 3.1.4) identifies various factors that the Respondent considers might increase the risk of re-trafficking, and I found Dr Tran’s report that whilst there exists “comprehensive” legislation aimed at protecting individuals from re-trafficking, “enforcement of the legislation is extremely weak”.
61. Dr Tran’s opinion about the enforcement of legislation is consistent with the Respondent’s own CPIN. The headline in that CPIN (at paragraph 4.1.1) is suggestive of a state that is “willing and able to offer effective protection”. However, it is clear that the same CPIN also observes how the Vietnamese authorities “did not fully comply with the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking”, while referring to the findings of the US State Department’s 2024 Trafficking in persons report which recorded limited evidence of investigation and prosecution of trafficking matters.
62. Dr Tran’s initial report and addendum report also identifies a further issue in relation to the Appellant’s circumstances. According to both reports, Vietnam operates a household registration system which requires citizens living in Vietnam to register themselves, which in turn enables access to basic public services such as healthcare and education, and be able to conduct activities such as registering a phone or vehicle, or operating a business. Dr Tran describes this registration as a “significant matter” which has many implications for a person’s ability to get by on a day-to-day basis.
63. Whilst Dr Tran’s initial report reveals that some of these difficulties might be capable of being overcome by bribing officials, it is clear from the reports provided that the registration is a fundamental issue to enabling a person to get by in Vietnam.
64. The addendum report identifies legislative changes in Vietnam which compound this matter further. I found from the report that Vietnam legislated in 2020 to introduce citizen ID cards, which links with the household registration system and contains additional information. Dr Tran’s opinion – which is supported by reference to news reports from within Vietnam and extracts of the legislation itself – makes clear that the Appellant is “not likely” to be issued with a new ID card because of his lack of knowledge about his family background, absence of any known family members in the country, and the significant passage of time which has elapsed since the Appellant was last present in Vietnam.
65. Although the Respondent’s CPIN (at parts 14.3 and 14.4) acknowledge the existence of the household registration system and citizen identity cards, there is nothing in the Respondent’s evidence to contradict the assertions made by Dr Tran. In addition, and contrary to the Respondent’s assertions in written and oral submissions, the Respondent’s own CPIN makes clear that neither the household registration document or the citizen identity cards can be obtained from embassies or consulates.
66. Drawing all the above together, I find that the Appellant would be returning to Vietnam as someone with significant mental health difficulties, no family or formal support network. The Appellant has certain characteristics – namely as someone who the Respondent accepts has already been a victim of trafficking, and someone who I have found to have been a ‘street child’ since he was around 5 years old. The Respondent accepts that it would be unduly harsh for the Appellant to return to Vietnam with his partner and children, so he would therefore be returning alone. Although I have found the Appellant’s partner has a friend in Vietnam with whom she has stayed, I do not find it reasonably likely that this unnamed friend would be someone who would be able to effectively act as the Appellant’s entire support network. It is simply not plausible that such an informal associate would be able to act as the Appellant’s entire network on any return to a country he has not returned to in over 20 years.
Application of the Law to My Findings
67. I bring forward all my findings of fact and apply them to the law as set out above.
The Refugee Convention
68. I must decide whether it is reasonably likely that the Appellant would be at risk of persecution or serious harm on any return to Vietnam. The Immigration Rules require me to treat any past persecution as a 'strong indicator' of future risk. However, the fact that there has been past persecution is not determinative, and I must assess matters at the date of the hearing.
69. Although I have accepted that the Appellant is still fearful of those who trafficked him previously, I do not find on the evidence before me that the Appellant would be at risk of persecution or serious harm from those same individuals on any return. The reality is that over 20 years have now elapsed since the Appellant was trafficked by those individuals, and around 17 years since the Appellant last had any contact from them. There is no evidence before me that those individuals would have the motivation or wherewithal to track down the Appellant on any return to Vietnam, less still become aware of such a return.
70. However, that is not the end of the Appellant’s case. I must also consider whether it is reasonably likely that he would be at risk of being re-trafficked on any return to Vietnam. In this respect, I remind myself that the Respondent has accepted that the Appellant has already been trafficked from Vietnam. I also take into account the unchallenged evidence that the Appellant was raised as a “street child”, has no known relatives in the country, is illiterate and has lacked any sort of education, and has not been in the country for over 20 years. The Respondent also accepts that the Appellant is someone who suffers from severe depression, severe PTSD, and severe generalised anxiety disorder.
71. Alongside all of the above, I must also take into account the country conditions as I have found them to be. There is some evidence of a legislative framework in Vietnam designed to tackle trafficking and prevent re-trafficking, but the overwhelming evidence is that the implementation and enforcement of that legislation is woefully inadequate. Coupled with the above is the registration difficulties the Appellant would face on any return. He does not have any identity documents, and I have found on the evidence before me that it is highly unlikely that he would be able to obtain such documents, either prior to any return or on his arrival in the country. That poses consequential difficulties as the absence of such registration would practically limit, if not prevent, the Appellant from accessing basic public services, accommodation and employment.
72. So what will he do on any return? In my judgment, it is plainly obvious that the Appellant would fall back into a trap of being re-trafficked. He would have no employment or means to lawfully make a living. He has no education or vocational skills to rely on. He would have no accommodation. He would be unable to access basic public services on account of him lacking the appropriate identification to do so. He would have no family or support network available to him. The Respondent suggests that the Appellant’s partner could provide him with financial assistance. However, such assistance is only likely to take the Appellant so far: it would not, in my judgment, enable him to lawfully obtain accommodation, and the means to access basic public services depends not just on funding, but also registration. No amount of financial assistance is going to be able to resolve a fundamental issue that the Appellant simply does not have the relevant documents or information to enable him to obtain the registration he would need to get by. He would, for all these reasons, be at significant risk of falling back into being re-trafficked.
73. I do not find that there would be sufficient protection to prevent the Appellant from being re-trafficked. The expert report relied on by the Appellant speaks plainly about the significant inadequacies in the practical enforcement of legislation in Vietnam. Given the Appellant’s particular characteristics as accepted by the Respondent and as I have found them to be, I do not find that the Appellant would be able to obtain sufficient protection. Finally, the Appellant cannot escape to a different part of Vietnam to remove or change the personal characteristics identified above. They would accompany the Appellant wherever he lived in Vietnam. It is impossible to see how any internal relocation would remove the risk that the Appellant would face.
74. There is no section 72 certificate in place. Given these findings, I accordingly conclude that his removal would cause the United Kingdom to be in breach of its obligations under the Refugee Convention.
Humanitarian Protection
75. I have considered this aspect of the appeal separately from the asylum appeal. Given my findings that the Appellant qualifies for protection as a refugee, he does not, for this reason alone, qualify for humanitarian protection.
ECHR
76. On the facts as established, I find that if the Appellant is returned to Vietnam, there is a real risk that he will suffer a breach of his protected rights under Articles 2 or 3 of the ECHR for the reasons already set out.
77. It also follows from the above and the Respondent’s concession as described in paragraph 22 that the Appellant’s entitlement to protection under the Refugee Convention is also determinative of this appeal on Article 8 grounds because that such protection would give rise to very compelling circumstances over and above the statutory exceptions.
Notice of Decision
The appeal is allowed on asylum and human rights grounds.
ANONYMITY ORDER
Unless and until the Tribunal, the Upper Tribunal, or, a Court orders otherwise, pursuant to rule 13(1)(b) of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Rules 2014, the Appellant and his family are granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal either directly or indirectly any information, including their names or their addresses, that is likely to lead members of the public to identify them. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.
To the Respondent – Fee Award
As I have allowed the appeal, I have considered whether or not to make a fee award. I have decided to make no fee award because the appeal succeeds in light of evidence produced during the course of proceedings.
Signed Date 2 November 2026
Judge McMahon
Judge McMahon
Judge of the First-tier Tribunal
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Open Justice Licence (The National Archives).