Miscellaneous Etats-Unis

In Re: A 2nd Chance Bail Bonds

Official source
                               THIRD DIVISION
                                DILLARD, P. J.,
                             GOBEIL and PIPKIN, JJ.

                    NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be
                    received no later than 4:30 pm on the 10th day after
                    the decision was issued to be deemed timely filed.
                              https://www.gaappeals.gov/rules



                                                                 October 29, 2026




In the Court of Appeals of Georgia
 A26A1421. IN RE: A 2ND CHANCE BAIL BONDS.

      DILLARD, Presiding Judge.

      A 2nd Chance Bail Bonds1 appeals the denial of its motion to relieve it from

liability on a bond it insured that was forfeited after its principal failed to appear for

his arraignment. More precisely, A2CBB argues the trial court failed to comply with

the requirements in OCGA § 17-6-71(a). For the following reasons, we agree and

reverse the trial court’s ruling.

      Randal Youmans was charged—via accusation in the Superior Court of Clayton

County—with failure to register as a sex offender. The trial court set his arraignment

for September 6, 2024, but he failed to appear. As a result, on September 9, 2024, the


      1
       For ease of reference, we refer to A 2nd Chance Bail Bonds as “A2CBB”
throughout the opinion.
court issued a bench warrant for Youmans’s arrest. That same day, the court issued

an order, notifying A2CBB (as surety) that the $5,700.00 appearance bond was

forfeited and a hearing would be held on January 28, 2025—144 days after the failure

to appear—to show cause why a final judgment should not be entered on the forfeited

bond. Notice of the bond forfeiture and hearing was served on A2CBB on September

12, 2024.

      On January 28, 2025, Youmans again failed to appear at the hearing; and so, on

January 31, 2025, the trial court issued an order ruling the bond forfeited. But on April

3, 2025, A2CBB filed a motion for relief of liability on the bond, arguing that in

scheduling the hearing 144 days after Youmans’s failure to appear, the court failed to

comply with OCGA § 17-6-71(a), which required such a hearing to be scheduled not

sooner than 150 days after a failure to appear. Later, the court scheduled a hearing on

the motion for August 7, 2025. Even so, A2CBB tendered the total bond amount to

the Clayton County Sheriff’s Office on June 30, 2025.

      At some point before the scheduled hearing, Youmans was located, and on

August 5, 2025, he pleaded guilty to the charge in the accusation. Two days later, the

trial court issued an order granting A2CBB’s motion for relief on liability for the bond,


                                           2
canceling the forfeiture. But when A2CBB presented the order to the Clayton County

Sheriff’s Office for a refund, the sheriff informed A2CBB that the order needed to be

amended to an order directing remission.

       On September 15, 2025, A2CBB filed a motion to amend the earlier order to an

order of remission, with an attached proposed order to which the County attorney

consented. But in a departure from its previous order, on September 30, 2025, the trial

court denied A2CBB’s motion, ruling that setting the execution hearing date earlier

than delineated by the plain language of OCGA § 17-6-71(a) did not relieve the surety

of liability on the bond. This appeal follows.

       In its sole enumeration of error, A2CBB contends the trial court erred in

denying its motion to relieve it from liability on the forfeited bond, arguing that, in

doing so, it failed to comply with OCGA § 17-6-71(a).2 We agree.




       2
          Although the record before us indicates that A2CBB’s notice of appeal was
served on the district attorney for Clayton County, no appellee’s brief was filed by the
State. But given that this case is not an appeal of a criminal case, the State did not have
to file a responsive brief. See Ct. App. R. 23(b) (“Appellees are encouraged but, other
than the State in a criminal case, are not required to file a brief.” (emphasis added)).
                                            3
       We begin our analysis with “familiar and binding canons of construction.”3 In

considering any statute’s meaning, our charge is to “presume that the [legislature]

meant what it said and said what it meant.”4 Toward that end, we must afford the

statutory text its plain and ordinary meaning,5 consider the text contextually,6 read the

       3
        Holcomb v. Long, 

329 Ga. App. 515, 517

(1) (

765 SE2d 687

) (2014). Accord
Flanders v. Jackson, 

344 Ga. App. 493

, 495(1) (

810 SE2d 656

) (2018); In the Interest of
L. T., 

325 Ga. App. 590, 591

 (

754 SE2d 380

) (2014).
       4
       Deal v. Coleman, 

294 Ga. 170, 172

(1)(a) (

751 SE2d 337

) (2013) (punctuation
omitted). Accord Flanders, 344 Ga. App. at 495(1); Holcomb, 

329 Ga. App. at 517

(1);
Martinez v. State, 

325 Ga. App. 267, 273

(2) (

750 SE2d 504

) (2013).
       5
         Deal, 

294 Ga. at 172

(1)(a). Accord Flanders, 344 Ga. App. at 495–96(1);
Holcomb, 

329 Ga. App. at 517

 (1). See Tibbles v. Teachers Retirement Sys. of Ga., 

297 Ga.
557, 558

(1) (

775 SE2d 527

) (2015) (“A statute draws it meaning, of course, from its
text.” (punctuation and citation omitted)); Chan v. Ellis, 

296 Ga. 838, 839

(1) (

770
SE2d 851

) (2015) (same); State v. Able, 

321 Ga. App. 632, 636

 (

742 SE2d 149

) (2013)
(“A judge is charged with interpreting the law in accordance with the original and/or
plain meaning of the text at issue (and all that the text fairly implies)... .”); Singletary
v. State, 

310 Ga. App. 570, 572

 (

713 SE2d 698

) (2011) (“In construing these statutes,
we apply the fundamental rules of statutory construction that require us to construe
the statutes according to their terms, [and] to give words their plain and ordinary
meaning ... .” (punctuation omitted)).
       6
        See Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc., 

570 U.S. 10

(II)(B) (

133 SCt
2247

, 186 LE2d 239) (2013) (Scalia, J.) (“Words that can have more than one meaning
are given content, however, by their surroundings.” (punctuation omitted)); Deal,

294 Ga. at 172

(1)(a) (“[W]e must view the statutory text in the context in which it
appears[.]”). See also Tibbles, 

297 Ga. at 558

(1) (“The common and customary usages
of the words are important, but so is their context.” (punctuation and citation
omitted)); Scherr v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 

703 F3d 1069, 1077

(II)(C)(2) (7th Cir. 2013)
                                             4
text “in its most natural and reasonable way, as an ordinary speaker of the English

language would,”7 and seek to “avoid a construction that makes some language mere

surplusage.”8 In sum, when the language of a statute is “plain and susceptible of only

one natural and reasonable construction, courts must construe the statute

accordingly.”9

      Turning to the statute at issue, OCGA § 17-6-71(a) provides:

      The judge shall, at the end of the court day, upon the failure of the
      principal to appear, forfeit the bond and issue a bench warrant for the
      principal’s arrest. If the forfeiture and bench warrant are not issued and
      signed within ten days of the failure to appear, the surety shall be relieved
      of liability on the appearance bond. Upon forfeiting the bond, the judge shall
      order an execution hearing not sooner than 150 days but not later than 180
      days after such failure to appear. Notice of the execution hearing and a


(Manion, J.) (noting that in statutory construction cases, courts “begin with the
language of the statute itself and the specific context in which that language is used”
(punctuation and citation omitted)).
      7
          Deal, 

294 Ga. at 172-73

(1)(a). Accord Holcomb, 

329 Ga. App. at 518

(1).
      8
       In the Interest of L.T., 325 Ga. App. at 592 (punctuation omitted). Accord
Holcomb, 

329 Ga. App. at 518

(1).
      9
         Holcomb, 

329 Ga. App. at 518

(1) (punctuation omitted). See Deal, 

294 Ga. at
173

(1)(a) (“[I]f the statutory text is clear and unambiguous, we attribute to the statute
its plain meaning, and our search for statutory meaning is at an end.” (punctuation
omitted)).
                                            5
      copy of the bench warrant shall be served by the clerk of the court in
      which the bond forfeiture occurred within ten days of such failure to
      appear by certified mail, return receipt requested, or by electronic means
      as provided in Code Section 17-6-50 to the surety at the address listed on
      the bond or by personal service to the surety within ten days of such
      failure to appear at its home office or to its designated registered agent.
      Service shall be considered complete upon the mailing of such certified
      notice. Such ten-day notice shall be adhered to strictly. If notice of the
      execution hearing and bench warrant are not served as specified in this
      subsection, the surety shall be relieved of liability on the appearance
      bond.10


Contrary to the statute’s text, the trial court set the hearing on the execution for the

bond forfeiture for 144 days after the principal’s failure to appear, rather than the 150-

day minimum period provided for in the plain language of the text. And although it

initially granted A2CBB relief from liability, it later reversed its position, ruling that

only the ten-day notice provision in the statute required strict adherence. In doing so,

the court erred.




      10
           (Emphasis added ).
                                            6
      As we have held, the execution hearing “must take place within a window of

[150 to 180] days after the principal’s failure to appear.”11 Indeed, as we explained in

analyzing an earlier version of the statute, it is apparent from the plain meaning of the

statutory language that the General Assembly “provided the specific time frame for

the execution in order to give the surety a reasonable opportunity to find the

principal.”12 And this codified purpose, even under the earlier version, is “evident

from the statutory right of at least 120 days but no more than 150 days.”13

Significantly, over the years, this statutory time period “has been made specific rather

than open-ended, and it has been lengthened to the benefit of sureties.”14 In fact, only

one year before the trial court denied A2CBB’s motion, the General Assembly again

amended the statute to the benefit of sureties—lengthening the minimum number of

days before an execution can be scheduled from 120 to 150.15

      11
           Powell v. State, 

313 Ga. App. 535, 536

 (

722 SE2d 158

) (2012).
      12
         U.S. Bonds v. State, 

224 Ga. App. 758, 760

 (

481 SE2d 887

) (1997) (Beasley,
J., concurring specially).
      13
           

Id.

      14
           

Id.

      15
        See Ga. L. 2024, p. 505, § 9/SB 63 (effective July 1, 2024) (deleting “not
sooner than 120 days but not later than 150 days” and replacing it with “not sooner
                                            7
       Even so, in its order denying A2CBB’s motion, the trial court reasoned that its

failure to comply with the time frame for setting an execution hearing does not relieve

a surety of liability because the General Assembly only required strict adherence to the

ten-day notice provision in OCGA § 17-7-71(a). This is a perplexing reading of the

statute,16 and it runs afoul of the canons of statutory construction noted above.17 The

General Assembly’s decision to require strict adherence to the ten-day notice

provision in no way relaxes (or expands) the explicit statutory time frame—“not

sooner than 150 days but not later than 180 days after a failure to appear”—in which

a judge may order an execution hearing. This statutory text is not ambiguous. A trial

court may only hold an execution hearing within that specific window of time, and any

hearing held before or after that time frame is in violation of the statute. In sum, the

court’s interpretation of OCGA § 17-7-71(a) is untenable, and we reject it.18

than 150 days but not later than 180 days”).
       16
        This is an especially curious take when, as noted above, the General Assembly
just recently amended the statute to lengthen the minimum period before such a
hearing can be held.
       17
            See supra notes 3-9 and accompanying text.
       18
         See Mathis v. State, 

336 Ga. App. 257, 259

 (

784 SE2d 98

) (2016) (“[W]e must
construe statutes to give sensible and intelligent effect to all of their provisions and to
refrain from any interpretation which renders any part of the statutes meaningless.”)
                                            8
      Given these circumstances, the trial court erred in denying A2CBB’s motion

to relieve it from liability on the forfeited bond.19 As a result, we reverse the ruling

below and remand for the court to enter an order remitting the bond payment to

A2CBB.

      Judgment reversed and case remanded with direction. Gobeil and Pipkin, JJ.,

concur.




(citation and punctuation omitted); see also supra ns. 3-9 and accompanying text.
      19
        Anytime Bail Bonding, Inc.v. State, 

350 Ga. App. 288, 291

 (

828 SE2d 662

)
(2019) (declining to adopt the trial court’s interpretation of OCGA § 17-6-71(a) that
would render part of the statute meaningless).
                                           9

For advice on a matter of this kind in France, contact our criminal law attorney in Paris.


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