Miscellaneous Etats-Unis

In the Int. of: K.C., Appeal of: Com. of PA

Official source
J-A12025-26

                                  

2026 PA Super 244



  IN THE INTEREST OF: K.C., A MINOR            : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :       PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
  APPEAL OF: COMMONWEALTH OF                   :
  PENNSYLVANIA                                 :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               : No. 132 EDA 2026

            Appeal from the Order Entered December 16, 2025
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at
                     No(s): CP-51-JV-0001219-2025


BEFORE:      LAZARUS, P.J., SULLIVAN, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E. *

OPINION BY LAZARUS, P.J.:                             FILED OCTOBER 29, 2026

       The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania appeals1 from the order, entered in

the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, Juvenile Division, granting

Appellee K.C.’s motion to suppress evidence. After review, we affirm.

       The Commonwealth filed a delinquency petition on October 20, 2025,

charging K.C. (born 12/08) with firearm violations and related offenses. K.C.

moved to suppress the firearm obtained during his arrest. On December 16,

2025, the trial court held a suppression hearing at which Philadelphia Police

Officer Daniel Breslin, K.C.’s arresting officer, testified. Officer Breslin testified


____________________________________________


* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.


1 The Commonwealth’s timely notice of appeal certified that the suppression

order substantially handicapped or terminated the prosecution. See Pa.R.A.P.
311(d) (providing Commonwealth may take appeal as of right from order that
does not end entire case, where Commonwealth certifies in notice of appeal
that order will terminate or substantially handicap prosecution).
J-A12025-26



that, on the night of October 18, 2025, he received a radio call around 7:30

p.m.2 regarding a gunpoint robbery3 at 10th and Cherry Streets in

Philadelphia, committed by three juvenile males wearing black clothing.

Officer Breslin began to survey the area in response to the radio call and

subsequently observed K.C., who was wearing a black sweatshirt, grey

sweatpants, and a black facemask, accompanied by another male wearing

black clothing at the intersection of 9th and Poplar Streets.4 When Officer

Breslin first saw K.C., he and his companion were walking northbound on 9th

Street, coming from the direction of 10th and Cherry Streets.

       Officer Breslin pulled his marked police cruiser over at the street corner

directly beside K.C. and his companion at exactly 7:30 p.m. 5 Officer Breslin

exited his vehicle to initiate a conversation with K.C. and his companion and




____________________________________________


2 Officer Breslin’s body camera footage shows that he saw K.C. and exited his

car at exactly 7:30 p.m., so we assume the call came in sometime prior to
then.

3 Officer Breslin testified that he did not know when the robbery occurred.
While the radio call detailing the robbery came in around 7:30 p.m., Officer
Breslin testified that, in his experience, the actual time of the occurrence could
vary significantly from when the radio transmission is received.

4 The intersection of 9th and Poplar Streets is approximately one mile away

from the 10th and Cherry.

5 At the time he pulled his vehicle over, Officer Breslin’s cruiser did not have

its lights or sirens activated.


                                           -2-
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immediately began walking toward K.C. with his flashlight trained on K.C. 6

Simultaneously with Officer Breslin exiting the vehicle and beginning to

approach K.C., K.C. began walking northbound across Poplar. Officer Breslin

approached K.C. with his flashlight out and aimed at K.C., walked ahead of

K.C., stopped in front of K.C. and turned to face him, pointed at K.C.’s

waistband, and asked him what the object was in his waistband. The way

K.C. began to fix his clothing and walk away led Officer Breslin to believe that

K.C. was illegally carrying a firearm, as Officer Breslin assumed, based on

K.C.’s youthful appearance, that he was too young to legally carry a firearm.

        Within seconds of Officer Breslin stopping in front of K.C., K.C. fled on

foot and discarded his weapon as Officer Breslin pursued him on foot. 7 Officer

Breslin ultimately caught up to K.C., tackled him to the ground, handcuffed




____________________________________________


6 The body camera footage shows that the street was well lit by various
streetlights.

7 Approximately eleven seconds elapsed between the time that Officer Breslin

stepped out of his vehicle and K.C. fled.


                                           -3-
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him, and arrested him.8 The discarded firearm9 was recovered and was the

subject of K.C.’s motion to suppress.

       Officer Breslin wore a body camera during the stop and arrest, and the

footage from his body camera was entered into evidence and played for the

suppression      court.    The video footage captured the officers’ encounter,

pursuit, and ultimate arrest of K.C.           When questioned regarding the area

where the arrest occurred, Officer Breslin testified that he had been involved

in a firearm arrest in the surrounding area the night prior to K.C.’s arrest but

otherwise had never made any arrests for firearms or robberies on the 900

block of Poplar Street.

       Following the hearing, the trial court granted the motion to suppress,

concluding that it did not see any blading of the body or furtive hand

movements as claimed by Officer Breslin, and finding that there was no

reasonable     suspicion     to   initiate     the   investigative   detention.   The

Commonwealth timely appealed, and both the suppression court and the




____________________________________________


8 The body camera footage corroborates much of Officer Breslin’s testimony;

however, the footage has no audio until Officer Breslin catches up to K.C. and
tackles him to the ground. See Body Camera Footage, Commonwealth’s
Exhibit 1, at 00:00-00:59. We note that this accounts for the first minute of
the footage; the remaining three minutes and twenty-four seconds have
audio. See 

id.


9 The firearm was a loaded, black Glock 22 with one live round in the chamber

and twenty live rounds in the magazine.


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Commonwealth have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. The Commonwealth now

raises the following issue for our review:

       Did the lower court err by suppressing the firearm [K.C.]
       voluntarily abandoned while fleeing from police, where the initial
       encounter between [K.C.] and the officers was a mere encounter
       that did not need to be supported by any level of suspicion, and
       where [K.C.’s] behavior during the encounter gave rise to
       reasonable suspicion that justified the police pursuit?

Commonwealth’s Brief, at 4.

       The Commonwealth argues that the trial court erred in suppressing the

discarded firearm because the initial interaction between Officer Breslin and

K.C. was a mere encounter, which did not require reasonable suspicion to

initiate.   See Commonwealth’s Brief, at 8.        Further, the Commonwealth

maintains that K.C.’s behavior during the mere encounter gave rise to

reasonable suspicion sufficient to support an investigative detention of K.C.

Id.


       Appellate review of a suppression decision is limited to the suppression

record, and we are bound by the facts as found by the suppression court so

long as they are supported by the record. Commonwealth v. Valdivia, 

195

A.3d 855, 861

 (Pa. 2018).       The suppression court’s legal conclusions are

subject to de novo review. 

Id.


       The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects
       private citizens from unreasonable search[es] and seizures by
       government officials. See Byrd v. United States, [

548 U.S. 395

,
       402–03] (2018). Not every encounter between a law enforcement
       officer and a citizen constitutes a seizure warranting constitutional
       protections. “Only when the officer, by means of physical force or
       show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a


                                       -5-
J-A12025-26


      citizen may we conclude that a ‘seizure’ has occurred.” Florida
      V. Bostick, 

501 U.S. 429, 434

 [] (1991) (quoting Terry v. Ohio,
      

392 U.S. 1

, 19 n.16 [] (1968)); see also Commonwealth v.
      Lyles, [] 

97 A.3d 298, 302

 ([Pa.] 2014) (recognizing [] central
      focus of [] determination of whether [] seizure occurred is whether
      [] individual is somehow “restrained by physical force or show of
      authority”).

Commonwealth v. Adams, 

205 A.3d 1195, 1199

 (Pa. 2019) (footnote

omitted).

      We recognize three levels of warrantless interactions between police

officers and private citizens:

      The first [type of interaction] is a mere encounter, sometimes
      referred to as a consensual encounter, which does not require the
      officer to have any suspicion that the citizen is or has been
      engaged in criminal activity. This interaction also does not compel
      the citizen to stop or respond to the officer. A mere encounter
      does not constitute a seizure, as the citizen is free to choose
      whether to engage with the officer and comply with any requests
      made or, conversely, to ignore the officer and continue on his or
      her way.      The second type of interaction, an investigative
      detention, is a temporary detention of a citizen. This interaction
      constitutes a seizure of a person, and to be constitutionally valid[,]
      police must have a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is
      afoot. The third, a custodial detention, is the functional equivalent
      of an arrest and must be supported by probable cause. A custodial
      detention also constitutes a seizure.

      No bright lines separate these types of encounters, but the United
      States Supreme Court has established an objective test by which
      courts may ascertain whether a seizure has occurred to elevate
      the interaction beyond a mere encounter. The test, often referred
      to as the “free to leave test,” requires the court to determine
      whether, taking into account all of the circumstances surrounding
      the encounter, the police would have communicated to a
      reasonable person that he was not at liberty to ignore the police
      presence and go about his business. Whenever a police officer
      accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he
      has seized that person.



                                      -6-
J-A12025-26



Commonwealth v. Anderson, 

276 A.3d 282

, 293–94 (Pa. Super. 2022) (en

banc) (quoting Adams, 205 A.3d at 1199–1200 (citations, brackets, and

some quotation marks omitted)).

       When analyzing if a seizure occurred or whether a reasonable person

would feel free to leave, a court may consider the following:

       [T] he number of officers present during the interaction; whether
       the officer informs the citizen they are suspected of criminal
       activity; the officer’s demeanor and tone of voice; the location and
       timing of the interaction; the visible presence of weapons on the
       officer; and the questions asked. Otherwise inoffensive contact
       between a member of the public and the police cannot, as a matter
       of law, amount to a seizure of that person.

Commonwealth v. Jones, 

266 A.3d 1090, 1095

 (Pa. Super. 2021) (quoting

Commonwealth v. Beasley, 

761 A.2d 621

, 624–25 (Pa. Super. 2000)). For

a mere encounter to turn into an investigative detention, the circumstances

must present some level of coercion, beyond the mere fact of the police

officer’s role, that conveys a demand for compliance or threat of tangible

consequences from refusal. See Commonwealth v. Luczki, 

212 A.3d 530,

544

 (Pa. Super. 2019).

       The trial court found that the totality of the circumstances demonstrated

that Officer Breslin’s actions amounted to an investigative detention, without

reasonable suspicion, and not a mere encounter, rendering the firearm the

fruit of that unlawful seizure. See Trial Court Opinion, 2/6/26, at 3-4. The

court reasoned that because Officer Breslin initiated the interaction with an

“investigative intent” and because “[a] reasonable juvenile . . . would not feel

free   to   ignore   an   officer   stepping   out   to   ‘converse’   under   these

                                        -7-
J-A12025-26



circumstances[,]” the interaction was an investigative detention due to its

coercive nature. Id. at 4. The trial court found that the interaction “was not

a consensual chat but an attempt to detain for investigation[.]” Id.

      The Commonwealth argues that Officer Breslin’s initial interaction with

K.C. was a mere encounter and, thus, did not require a reasonable suspicion

of criminal activity to initiate. See Commonwealth’s Brief, at 9-14. In support

of its position, the Commonwealth points out that: Officer Breslin approached

K.C. with his flashlight in his hand; Officer Breslin did not activate the lights

on his vehicle; no evidence was introduced suggesting that Officer Breslin’s

demeanor or tone were coercive or that the officers brandished their weapons;

and K.C.’s flight, in effect, evinced that he did not feel compelled to stay. Id.

at 10-11.

      The Commonwealth also claims that two cases, Commonwealth v.

Joyner, 

348 A.3d 230

 (Pa. Super. 2025), and Commonwealth v. Rice, 

304

A.3d 1255

 (Pa. Super. 2023), are instructive. Commonwealth’s Brief, at 11-

12. In Joyner, we held that where a police officer approached the defendant

in broad daylight with his vehicle’s lights and sirens disengaged and his

weapon harnessed, maintained a position that did not obstruct the defendant’s

ability to continue walking down the street, asked “do you have a gun” and

“are you sure[,]” and where there was no evidence that the officer’s tone of

voice or demeanor communicated to the defendant that he was not free to

leave, the interaction was a mere encounter. Joyner, 348 A.3d at 237–38.




                                      -8-
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      In Rice, similarly, we held that where police officers pulled their car

alongside the defendant with their lights and sirens disengaged, did not

position themselves in a manner hindering the defendant’s ability to continue

walking, and did not otherwise convey to the defendant that he was not free

to leave, the interaction was a mere encounter. Rice, 

304 A.3d at 1262

.

      Both cases are materially different from the instant case. Here, unlike

in both Joyner and Rice, Officer Breslin positioned himself directly in front of

K.C., obstructing his ability to continue walking, and held a flashlight on K.C.

while questioning him. The Commonwealth argues that the trial court’s finding

that Officer Breslin blocked K.C.’s path was unsupported because “numerous

directions of egress [] existed during the encounter.” Commonwealth’s Brief,

at 12. This argument is unpersuasive, however, because our case law does

not require an officer to block every possible path available to a defendant for

an encounter to rise to the level of an investigative detention. Furthermore,

in Joyner, the police officers remained in their vehicle during the encounter.

Joyner, 348 A.3d at 234. Accordingly, we consider the officers’ actions in

Joyner and Rice distinguishable from Officer Breslin’s in the instant matter.

      Regarding Officer Breslin’s flashlight use, the Commonwealth cites

Commonwealth v. Au, 

42 A.3d 1002

 (Pa. 2012).             See Commonwealth’s

Brief, at 10. In Au, a police officer approached a vehicle with a flashlight

during the course of a mere encounter. Au, 

42 A.3d at 1003

. Without going

into detail regarding how the officer employed the flashlight, the Pennsylvania

Supreme Court considered the flashlight use as “in furtherance of the officer’s

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safety” and “within the ambit of acceptable, non-escalatory factors.” 

Id. at

1008

. Here, the lighting provided by streetlights weighs against the notion

that Officer Breslin employed his flashlight in furtherance of his safety.

Further, whereas in Au, the flashlight may have assisted the officer in seeing

into the vehicle he was approaching, Officer Breslin’s flashlight use did not

provide the same utility.10 Accordingly, Au is distinguishable from the instant

case.

        Taking into consideration the circumstances surrounding the encounter,

we conclude that the trial court did not err in finding that Officer Breslin’s

interaction with K.C. was an investigative detention. Officer Breslin first pulled

his vehicle up alongside K.C. and his companion on the street. Officer Breslin

and his partner then exited the vehicle, and Officer Breslin immediately trained

his flashlight on K.C. as he walked toward him and stopped in front of K.C.’s

path while questioning him about what was in his waistband. A reasonable

person, with his path impeded by a police officer, the officer asking him

investigative    questions     while   another     officer   stood   nearby,   and   the

questioning officer training a flashlight on him, would not have felt free to


____________________________________________


10 We consider Officer Breslin training his flashlight on K.C. while approaching

and questioning him, as well as stopping in front of him while keeping the
flashlight aimed on him, to have an impact more akin to that of an officer
activating his or her vehicle’s emergency lights. See Commonwealth v.
Livingstone, 

174 A.3d 609

, 620–25 (Pa. 2017) (holding that use of police
vehicle’s emergency lights was show of authority that would contribute to
reasonable person’s assessment that he or she is not free to leave interaction).


                                          - 10 -
J-A12025-26



simply leave the interaction.11 See Commonwealth v. Hampton, 

204 A.3d

452

, 458–59 (Pa. Super. 2019) (holding police officers impeding suspect’s

movement constitutes investigative detention) (collecting cases); see also

Livingstone, 174 A.3d at 621 (taking into account “consideration of the

realities of everyday life, particularly the relationship between ordinary

citizens and law enforcement”).

       Because Officer Breslin’s interaction with K.C. was an investigative

detention, for the stop to be proper, Officer Breslin must have had a

reasonable suspicion, based upon specific and articulable facts, that criminal

activity was afoot. See Commonwealth v. Lewis, 

343 A.3d 1016

, 1028–29

(Pa. 2025) (citing Adams, 

205 A.3d at 1205

). A reasonable suspicion analysis

considers the totality of the circumstances surrounding the stop and “afford[s]

due weight to the specific, reasonable inferences drawn from the facts in light

of the officer’s experience[.]” Lewis, 343 A.3d at 1029 (quoting Interest of

T.W., 

261 A.3d 409

, 423 (Pa. 2021)).

       The trial court found that Officer Breslin lacked reasonable suspicion for

the investigative detention. See Trial Court Opinion, 2/6/26, at 4-5. It found

the match between the description of the suspects and K.C. and his companion

to be lacking because the radio call’s description of the three suspects did not

provide physical characteristics of the suspects, the description did not say in
____________________________________________


11 Although we do not rely on or endorse the trial court’s rationale regarding

Officer Breslin’s intent in initiating the interaction, we may “affirm a valid
judgment or verdict for any reason appearing as of record.” Commonwealth
v. Allshouse, 

36 A.3d 163, 182

 (Pa. 2021).

                                          - 11 -
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what direction the suspects fled, and K.C.’s grey sweatpants and grey

backpack did not match the description provided. See id. at 5. It also found

that the Commonwealth did not establish that the arrest occurred in a high-

crime area. See id. As for the K.C.’s behavior, the trial court reasoned that,

even if K.C.’s behavior was suspicious, this conduct only occurred after the

investigative detention began, and the Commonwealth “cannot bootstrap

suspicion for the initial detention.” Id. Furthermore, the trial court found that

there were no other indicia of criminal activity present, such as blading of the

body, furtive movements, visible weapons, or erratic behavior. See id.

       In its brief, the Commonwealth takes the position that the interaction

between Officer Breslin and K.C. was a mere encounter until K.C. fled and

Officer Breslin pursued him.           See Commonwealth’s Brief, at 15.      The

Commonwealth maintained that Officer Breslin had the reasonable suspicion

required to pursue K.C. and initiate an investigative detention because K.C.

partially matched the radio call’s description, K.C. was grabbing at his

waistband and shielding his body away from Officer Breslin when he

approached,12 Officer Breslin had experience with firearm arrests and knew

that individuals often carried unlicensed firearms in their waistbands, and K.C.

fled when Officer Breslin asked him if there was an object in his waistband.

Id. at 15-16.

____________________________________________


12 We note that the suppression court explicitly disagreed with this description

of K.C.’s actions after reviewing the body camera footage.


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       Here, based on our review of the record, we find the trial court’s factual

findings to be supported by the record and do not discern any errors of law in

its rationale.13   We have found reasonable suspicion lacking in prior cases

where a defendant only somewhat matched the minimal description of the

suspect provided. See Commonwealth v. Berrios, 

263 A.2d 342, 344

 (Pa.

1970) (stop of defendants, twenty minutes after shooting occurred and three

blocks from shooting, based on general description that suspects were two

black males in dark clothing and one Hispanic male in light clothing,

insufficient to constitute reasonable suspicion); see also Commonwealth v.

Hicks, 

253 A.2d 276, 280

 (Pa. 1969) (stop of defendant, black man in his

thirties wearing beige or white coat without a mustache, based on general

description of black man in his thirties wearing brown coat with a mustache,

insufficient to constitute reasonable suspicion).

       At the time he initiated the encounter, Officer Breslin knew only that he

was looking for three juvenile males wearing black clothing. When Officer

Breslin came upon K.C. and his companion approximately one mile away from

the robbery, he found two juvenile males wearing some black clothing. This

sort of incomplete match, without more, is insufficient to constitute the

reasonable suspicion necessary to initiate an investigative detention.       See

Berrios, supra;

 

Hicks, supra.

____________________________________________


13 Because we held that the interaction was an investigative detention from

the outset, we do not consider K.C.’s flight as a factor supporting the initiation
of the investigative detention.


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     Therefore, Officer Breslin was not justified in subjecting K.C. to an

investigative detention, and the evidence obtained through that detention was

properly suppressed. See, e.g., Wong Son v. United States, 

371 U.S. 471


(1963) (dictating suppression of prosecution’s evidence when fruit of the

poisonous tree).

     Order affirmed.

     Sullivan, J., Joins this Opinion.

     Stevens, PJE., Concurs in the Result.




Date: 10/29/2026




                                     - 14 -

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