Miscellaneous Etats-Unis

In the Matter of Brian G. McDevitt, Etc.

Official source
               NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
              APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

                                   SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                   APPELLATE DIVISION
                                   DOCKET NO. A-3314-24

IN THE MATTER OF BRIAN G.                  APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION
MCDEVITT, ATLANTIC CITY                            October 29, 2026
POLICE DEPARTMENT.                               APPELLATE DIVISION



           Submitted October 19, 2026 – Decided October 29, 2026

           Before Judges Sabatino,        Perez      Friscia    and
           Torregrossa-O'Connor.

           On appeal from the New Jersey Civil Service
           Commission, Docket No. 2024-1913.

           Steven S. Glickman, LLC, attorney for appellant City
           of Atlantic City (Steven S. Glickman, Jeffrey J.
           Berezny, and Scott J. Krumholz, on the briefs).

           Jennifer Davenport, Attorney General, attorney for
           respondent Civil Service Commission (Deborah E.
           Wassel, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Brian
           D. Ragunan, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).

           O'Brien Belland & Bushinsky, LLC, attorneys for
           respondent Brian G. McDevitt (Mark E. Belland, on
           the brief).

     The opinion of the court was delivered by

SABATINO, P.J.A.D.

     This appeal presents a legal dispute over the relationship between the

federal Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act
("USERRA"), 

38 U.S.C. §§ 4301-4335

, and New Jersey's military-leave

statutes and regulations. Appellant, the City of Atlantic City, challenges a

final decision of the New Jersey Civil Service Commission reversing

respondent Brian G. McDevitt's removal from the Atlantic City Police

Department ("ACPD"), ordering his reinstatement, and awarding related relief.

         The principal issues presented on appeal are (1) whether USERRA's

five-year cumulative-service limit preempts more expansive state-law military-

leave protections, and (2) whether New Jersey law provides a public employee

with protected unpaid military leave beyond that five-year USERRA period.

         Based on the pertinent statutes and regulations and canons of

interpretation involving military status, we conclude that USERRA does not

preempt state laws that afford greater protection than USERRA's five-year

floor.     We further construe New Jersey law to provide such extended

protection to McDevitt, an Air Force veteran who the City discharged after his

military leave totaled approximately 5.43 years.

         We therefore affirm the Commission's final agency decision reinstating

McDevitt and providing him with other remedies to make him whole.




                                                                         A-3314-24
                                        2
                                      I.

       The material facts are undisputed.    Brian G. McDevitt has been a

member of the United States Air Force National Guard since July 3, 2000. He

began employment as a police officer with the ACPD in August 2012.

       During his ACPD employment, McDevitt was called to active military

service on several occasions, and he advised ACPD each time he was called

up.1    During those deployments, the City continued to make pension

contributions on his behalf to the Police and Firemen's Retirement System, and

McDevitt continued to accrue seniority for sick, vacation, and personal leave

under a collective negotiations agreement with McDevitt's police union.

       The City also granted McDevitt military leave with pay for up to ninety

workdays per calendar year, consistent with N.J.S.A. 38A:4-4, and paid him

the difference between his military pay and his regular ACPD pay for the

remaining portion of each deployment pursuant to City policy.

       Between August 15, 2013 and September 26, 2022, McDevitt accrued

1,982 days (or approximately 5.43 years) of military leave. By letter dated

December 13, 2022, the City advised McDevitt that his current military orders

1
  It is unclear from the record, however, the extent to which some, if any, of
McDevitt's military service was voluntary versus compulsory in accordance
with his service obligation.




                                                                          A-3314-24
                                      3
exceeded what it construed to be the five-year cumulative service limit under

USERRA and directed him to advise the City by December 28, 2022 whether

he would return to work, retire, or resign.

      By letter dated December 28, 2022, counsel for McDevitt responded that

McDevitt intended to remain an ACPD officer and to fulfill his military

deployment orders, asserting that his continued leave was protected under New

Jersey law and regulations. The City replied by letter, reiterating its position

that McDevitt had exceeded the five-year cumulative service limit under

USERRA and stating that he must return to work, resign, or retire by February

1, 2023.    Counsel for McDevitt again responded on January 31, 2023,

reiterating that McDevitt's continued leave was protected under New Jersey

law and that he intended to return to the ACPD upon completion of his

military deployment.

      On May 2, 2023, the City served McDevitt with a Preliminary Notice of

Disciplinary Action ("PNDA") seeking his removal from employment with the

ACPD.      The PNDA charged McDevitt with insubordination, conduct

unbecoming a public employee, and having "abandoned his . . . position" with

the ACPD, based on the City's position that, after being directed to return to

work, retire, or resign, he failed to do so and remained absent from duty. The




                                                                         A-3314-24
                                        4
letter further listed the "recommended penalty" as "Termination/Resignation

not in good standing."

      McDevitt waived his right to a departmental hearing, and on January 26,

2024, the City issued a Final Notice of Disciplinary Action ("FNDA")

removing him from employment.

      McDevitt filed a timely appeal of the City's FNDA decision with the

Commission in March 2024.       The matter was transmitted to the Office of

Administrative Law, where it was assigned to Administrative Law Judge

("ALJ") Tama B. Hughes. In a case management call with the ALJ, the parties

represented they intended to file cross-motions for summary decision. The

matter thereafter proceeded on stipulated facts and written submissions.

      On February 7, 2025, the ALJ issued an initial decision granting

McDevitt's motion for summary decision, denying the City's cross-motion, and

dismissing the ACPD's internal administrative charges against McDevitt. The

ALJ concluded that New Jersey's military-leave statutes and regulations

protected McDevitt's leave and were not preempted by USERRA. The City

then filed exceptions with the Commission.

      On March 20, 2025, the Commission issued a written decision adopting

the ALJ's determination, noting that, upon de novo review, it agreed with the

ALJ's legal analysis and conclusions.



                                                                           A-3314-24
                                        5
      As for remedy, the Commission reversed the City's removal of

McDevitt, and ordered his reinstatement with mitigated back pay, benefits, and

seniority, subject to the treatment of certain periods of military service as

approved unpaid leave after the ninety-day paid threshold in each year. The

Commission further awarded counsel fees. Although its decision would not

become final until any outstanding issues concerning back pay or counsel fees

were resolved, the Commission made clear that "under no circumstances

should [McDevitt's] reinstatement be delayed pending resolution of any

potential back pay or counsel fee dispute."

      Soon thereafter, the outstanding counsel-fee issue was resolved, thereby

rendering final the Commission's March 20, 2025 decision.            The City

appealed.

      In its brief on appeal, the City argues the Commission's decision should

be reversed because (1) USERRA preempts federal, state, and local laws as

they relate to USERRA's five-year cumulative service limit on employee

military-leave benefits; and (2) the terms of New Jersey's relevant military-

leave statute, N.J.S.A. 38A:4-4, do not provide for an unlimited cumulative

service limit that supersedes USERRA's five-year cumulative service limit.

      In our forthcoming analysis, we review the City's arguments de novo, as

they entail legal issues of statutory and regulatory interpretation. Cumberland



                                                                        A-3314-24
                                       6
Farms, Inc. v. N.J. Dep't of Env't Prot., 

447 N.J. Super. 423, 438

 (App. Div.

2016) (citing State v. Parker, 

212 N.J. 269, 278

 (2012)); see also Bd. of Educ.

of Sparta v. M.N. ex rel. A.D., 

258 N.J. 333

, 342-43 (2024) (explaining that no

deference is owed to a state agency's interpretation of federal statutes or

regulations).

                                      II.

      We begin with a discussion of USERRA. That federal statute explicitly

declares its purposes in 

38 U.S.C. § 4301

, as follows:

            (a) The purposes of this chapter [

38 U.S.C. §§ 4301

 et
            seq.] are:

            (1) to encourage service in the uniformed services by
            eliminating or minimizing the disadvantages to
            civilian careers and employment which can result
            from such service;

            (2) to minimize the disruption to the lives of persons
            performing service in the uniformed services as well
            as to their employers, their fellow employees, and
            their communities, by providing for the prompt
            reemployment of such persons upon their completion
            of such service; and

            (3) to prohibit discrimination against persons because
            of their service in the uniformed services.

            [

38 U.S.C. § 4301

 (emphasis added).]




                                                                         A-3314-24
                                       7
Given those purposes set forth by Congress, the operative portions of

USERRA most pertinent here are codified in Sections 4312 and 4302. Section

4312 mandates:

            (a) Subject to subsections (b), (c), and (d) and to
            section 4304 [

38 U.S.C. § 4304

], any person whose
            absence from a position of employment is necessitated
            by reason of service in the uniformed services shall be
            entitled to the reemployment rights and benefits and
            other employment benefits of this chapter [

38 U.S.C.
§§ 4301

 et seq.] if-

            (1) the person (or an appropriate officer of the
            uniformed service in which such service is performed)
            has given advance written or verbal notice of such
            service to such person's employer;

            (2) the cumulative length of the absence and of all
            previous absences from a position of employment with
            that employer by reason of service in the uniformed
            services does not exceed five years; and

            (3) except as provided in subsection (f), the person
            reports to, or submits an application for reemployment
            to, such employer in accordance with the provisions of
            subsection (e).

            [

38 U.S.C. § 4312

 (emphasis added).]

Section 4302 reinforces those rights, and their relationship with other federal

or state laws, as follows:

            (a) Nothing in this chapter [

38 U.S.C. §§ 4301

 et
            seq.] shall supersede, nullify or diminish any Federal
            or State law (including any local law or ordinance),
            contract, agreement, policy, plan, practice, or other
            matter that establishes a right or benefit that is more

                                                                         A-3314-24
                                      8
            beneficial to, or is in addition to, a right or benefit
            provided for such person in this chapter [

38 U.S.C. §§
4301

 et seq.].

            (b)    This chapter [

38 U.S.C. §§ 4301

 et seq.]
            supersedes any State law (including any local law or
            ordinance), contract, agreement, policy, plan, practice,
            or other matter that reduces, limits, or eliminates in
            any manner any right or benefit provided by this
            chapter [

38 U.S.C. §§ 4301

 et seq.], including the
            establishment of additional prerequisites to the
            exercise of any such right or the receipt of any such
            benefit.

            [

38 U.S.C. § 4302

 (emphasis added).]

      Meanwhile, in Section 4303(2), USERRA broadly defines the term

"benefit" in this manner:

            (2) The term "benefit", "benefit of employment", or
            "rights and benefits" means the terms, conditions, or
            privileges of employment, including any advantage,
            profit, privilege, gain, status, account, or interest
            (including wages or salary for work performed) that
            accrues by reason of an employment contract or
            agreement or an employer policy, plan, or practice and
            includes rights and benefits under a pension plan, a
            health plan, an employee stock ownership plan,
            insurance coverage and awards, bonuses, severance
            pay, supplemental unemployment benefits, vacations,
            and the opportunity to select work hours or location of
            employment.

            [

38 U.S.C. § 4303

(2) (emphasis added).]

      These statutory provisions within USERRA are explained in associated

federal regulations.   Specifically, 

20 C.F.R. § 1002.7

, entitled "How does



                                                                       A-3314-24
                                       9
USERRA relate to other laws, public and private contracts, and employer

practices?" clarifies that:

             (a) USERRA establishes a floor, not a ceiling, for the
             employment and reemployment rights and benefits of
             those it protects. In other words, an employer may
             provide greater rights and benefits than USERRA
             requires, but no employer can refuse to provide any
             right or benefit guaranteed by USERRA.

             (b) USERRA supersedes any State law (including any
             local law or ordinance), contract, agreement, policy,
             plan, practice, or other matter that reduces, limits, or
             eliminates in any manner any right or benefit provided
             by USERRA, including the establishment of additional
             prerequisites to the exercise of any USERRA right or
             the receipt of any USERRA benefit. For example, an
             employment contract that determines seniority based
             only on actual days of work in the place of
             employment would be superseded by USERRA, which
             requires that seniority credit be given for periods of
             absence from work due to service in the uniformed
             services.

             (c) USERRA does not supersede, nullify or diminish
             any Federal or State law (including any local law or
             ordinance), contract, agreement, policy, plan, practice,
             or other matter that establishes an employment right or
             benefit that is more beneficial than, or is in addition
             to, a right or benefit provided under the Act. For
             example, although USERRA does not require an
             employer to pay an employee for time away from
             work performing service, an employer policy, plan, or
             practice that provides such a benefit is permissible
             under USERRA.

             (d) If an employer provides a benefit that exceeds
             USERRA's requirements in one area, it cannot reduce
             or limit other rights or benefits provided by USERRA.

                                                                        A-3314-24
                                       10
            For example, even though USERRA does not require
            it, an employer may provide a fixed number of days of
            paid military leave per year to employees who are
            members of the National Guard or Reserve. The fact
            that it provides such a benefit, however, does not
            permit an employer to refuse to provide an unpaid
            leave of absence to an employee to perform service in
            the uniformed services in excess of the number of
            days of paid military leave.

            [

20 C.F.R. § 1002.7

 (emphasis added).]

      The City argues that USERRA and the companion federal regulation

preempt the ability of New Jersey state law to provide job protection to

servicemembers on military leave greater than the five-year cumulative period

set forth in 

38 U.S.C. § 4312

. This preemption argument is plainly incorrect.

      The law recognizes three different kinds of federal preemption:        (1)

"when Congress explicitly preempts state law" (known as express preemption);

(2) when federal regulation is "so pervasive that no room remains for the

States" (known as field preemption); or (3) when "state law actually conflicts

with federal law" (known as conflict preemption). In re Alleged Failure of

Altice USA, Inc., 

253 N.J. 406

, 417 (2023) (internal citations omitted). As the

Commission correctly reasoned, none of those three species of preemption

apply here to prevent New Jersey law from affording greater military-leave

protection than the five-year minimum federally prescribed by USERRA.




                                                                         A-3314-24
                                      11
      First, without question, USERRA does not expressly preempt State laws

that provide greater, rather than lesser, protection than the five-year period set

forth in Section 4312. In fact, just the opposite is true, as reflected in the text

of Section 4302 we quote above.

      Literally, as Section 4302(a) states, "[n]othing in [USERRA] shall

supersede, nullify or diminish any . . . State law (including any local law or

ordinance), contract, agreement, policy, plan, practice, or other matter that

establishes a right or benefit that is more beneficial to, or is in addition to , a

right or benefit provided for such person in [USERRA]." The preemptive

language that follows in Section 4302(b) plainly only "supersedes any State

law (including any local law or ordinance), contract, agreement, policy, plan,

practice, or other matter that reduces, limits, or eliminates in any manner any

right or benefit provided [by USERRA]." 

Ibid.

 The City's argument in its

brief asserting—without citation—that "the expansion [of] USERRA benefits

by States, municipalities, and/or employers does not permit those entities to

expand the 5-year cap" is wrong.

      Second, there is no basis for the application of field preemption here.

"Field preemption" does not apply because Congress expressly left room in

USERRA for supplemental state protections.           The Commission correctly

applied in this regard the "presumption against preemption" applied in Kansas



                                                                            A-3314-24
                                        12
v. Garcia, 

589 U.S. 191, 208

 (2020) and the related principle that "pre-emption

is not to be lightly presumed." See Ridgefield Park v. N.Y. Susquehanna & W.

Ry. Corp., 

163 N.J. 446, 454

 (2000) (quoting Franklin Tower One, L.L.C. v.

N.M., 

157 N.J. 602, 615

 (1999)). There is no textual or analytic basis here to

overcome the well-established "assumption that the historic police powers of

the State [are] not to be superseded by [a] [f]ederal [a]ct unless that was the

clear and manifest purpose of Congress." Altice, 253 N.J. at 426 (quoting

Altria Grp., Inc. v. Good, 

555 U.S. 70, 77

 (2008)) (alterations in original).

      Third, there is no actual conflict between New Jersey law and the federal

statute.   As we will discuss, infra, in Part III, the applicable New Jersey

statutes and regulations do not authorize employers in this state to afford

servicemembers less than the federal five-year minimum.

      Case law from the federal courts similarly refutes the City 's preemption

arguments. For example, in Gross v. PPG Indus. Inc., 

636 F.3d 884

 (7th Cir.

2011), the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit stated that USERRA does

not "supersede, nullify, or diminish" any benefit, and "establishes a floor, not a

ceiling." 

Id.

 at 891 (quoting 

20 C.F.R. § 1002.7

). Similarly, in Crews v. City

of Mt. Vernon, 

567 F.3d 860

 (7th Cir. 2009), the Seventh Circuit held that




                                                                            A-3314-24
                                       13
"USERRA also encourages military service by authorizing employers to go

above and beyond the minimum requirements of the statute."2 

Id. at 867

.

      For these abundant reasons, we affirm the Commission's sound rejection

of the City's preemption arguments.

                                          III.

      We turn to the City's alternative argument that New Jersey law does not

protect a servicemember from discharge once that employee has passed the

federal five-year minimum mandated by USERRA. The relevant New Jersey

statute and regulations are as follows.

      In N.J.S.A. 38A:4-4, our Legislature provided that:

            a. A permanent or full-time temporary officer or
            employee of the State or of a board, commission,
            authority or other instrumentality of the State or of a
            county, school district or municipality who is a
            member of the organized militia shall be entitled, in
            addition to pay received, if any, as a member of the
            organized militia, to leave of absence from his or her
            respective duties without loss of pay or time on all
            days during which he or she shall be engaged in any
            period of State or Federal active duty; provided,
            however, that the leaves of absence for Federal active
            duty or active duty for training shall not exceed 90
            work days in the aggregate in any calendar year. Any

2
  We recognize an additional purpose recited in USERRA is "to minimize the
disruption to the lives of persons performing service in the uniformed services
as well as to their employers." 

38 U.S.C. § 4301

(a)(2). But that passage
continues with the goal of providing the servicemembers prompt
reemployment "upon the completion of such service." 

Ibid.

 (emphasis added).


                                                                          A-3314-24
                                          14
            leave of absence for such duty in excess of 90 work
            days shall be without pay but without loss of time.

            b. Leave of absence for such military duty shall be in
            addition to the regular vacation or other accrued leave
            allowed such officers and employees by the State,
            county or municipal law, ordinance, resolution, or
            regulation.

            [N.J.S.A. 38A:4-4 (emphasis added).]

      Notably, the text of this statute expresses no temporal limitation on the

length of military leave it protects. The words of the enactment dictate that a

servicemember "shall be entitled" to a leave of absence "without loss of pay or

time on all days during which he or she shall be engaged in any period of State

or Federal active duty."   N.J.S.A. 38A:4-4(a) (emphasis added). There is no

reference to the federal five-year floor of USERRA, or that it should somehow

be treated in our state as a ceiling, only that leave in excess of 90 days is

without pay (unless, as here, the employer by policy or contract provides

additional benefits).

      Additionally, both the Commission and the former New Jersey

Department of Military and Veterans' Affairs3 ("DMAVA") have issued

regulations implementing this statute. The DMAVA regulations, at N.J.A.C.


3
   In 2026, the former New Jersey Department of Military and Veterans'
Affairs was split into two separate departments, but that occurred after these
regulations were enacted.


                                                                        A-3314-24
                                      15
5A:2-2.1, state in relevant part that certain employers, including municipalities

within the state, "are required to grant leaves of absence to members of the

organized militia in accordance with N.J.S.A. 38A:4-4," and that "[a]ny leave

of absence for such duty in excess of 90 work days shall be without pay but

without loss of time." (Emphasis added).

      Although the administrative history of this DMAVA regulation does not

expressly address the question of whether or not service members are entitled

to unlimited-duration unpaid service leave, it is stated under the "purpose"

section at 34 N.J.R. 2890(a) (2002) that the "State of New Jersey is committed

to the accomplishment of the State and Federal mission of furnishing trained

National Guard units and individuals as an integral part of the first line of

defense of this State and Nation in accordance with State and Federal Law."

Ibid.

 Although the regulation also "clarified the existing obligations of public

employers," 34 N.J.R. 2890(a), its manifest primary focus was on benefiting

servicemembers.

      The Commission's separate regulation, N.J.A.C. 4A:6-1.11, essentially

states that, with respect to government employees, (1) National Guard

members are entitled to 90 days paid military leave; (2) Reserve members are

entitled to 30 days paid military leave; (3) employees who enter service "in

time of war or emergency" are entitled to "leave of absence without pay for the



                                                                           A-3314-24
                                       16
period of such service and three months after discharge,"4 and, importantly,

that (4) "[a]n employee is entitled to a leave of absence without pay for such

other military duty not covered by [(1), (2), or (3)] above." (Emphasis added).

        Consistent with these regulations, the proper reading of the text of

N.J.S.A. 38A:4-4 is that it specifies no limit for unpaid military service leave,

because it provides for such leave without mentioning a limit, as it does for

paid leave.

        That said, we need not decide in this case whether the statute or

regulations must be read to confer unbounded leave and a perpetual right of

reemployment.     All we need to resolve here is whether, on these facts,

McDevitt's additional 0.43 years of military leave above the USERRA five-

year minimum justified the City's discharge of him because of supposed

"insubordination" and "conduct unbecoming a public employee." Those inapt

characterizations of his absence while he was serving our country are

antithetical to the declared purposes of our federal and state military leave

laws.




4
    Although McDevitt's leave occurred during the still-ongoing "National
Emergency by Reason of Certain Terrorist Attacks" pursuant to Presidential
Proclamation 7463 issued September 14, 2001, he joined the Air Force before
that emergency. No party has raised this issue.


                                                                          A-3314-24
                                       17
      The determinations of the ALJ and the Commission restoring McDevitt's

employment and benefits were manifestly correct, and we affirm them in all

respects.

      Affirmed.




                                                                     A-3314-24
                                    18

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