Tax United Kingdom
Kabir Sharif v The Commissioners for HMRC
Neutral Citation: [2026] UKFTT 01498 (TC)
Case Number: TC 10080
FIRST-TIER TRIBUNAL
TAX CHAMBER
By remote video
Appeal reference: TC/2025/00585
Application for closure notice – Preliminary Issue – Whether 2 enquiries into the same tax year – No – Enquiry Notice valid.
Heard on: 15 October 2026
Judgment date: 28 October 2026
Before
TRIBUNAL JUDGE NEWSTEAD TAYLOR
Between
MR. KABIR SHARIF
Appellant
and
THE COMMISSIONERS FOR HIS MAJESTY’S REVENUE AND CUSTOMS
Respondents
Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Cowe, Tax Adviser
For the Respondents: Mr Bugg, litigator of HM Revenue and Customs’ Solicitor’s Office
DECISION
Introduction
1. This is the hearing of the Appellant’s application, dated 20 December 2025, to close an enquiry, allegedly, opened by an Enquiry Notice, dated 5 December 2023 (“the December Enquiry Notice”).
2. In summary:
(1) The Appellant contends that the December Enquiry Notice is invalid because it is the second enquiry opened by HMRC into the 2021/22 tax year, HMRC having opened an earlier enquiry on 10 May 2023 (“the 10 May Letter”) which was closed on 16 May 2023.
(2) HMRC denies that the 10 May Letter opened an enquiry and, consequently, denies that the December Enquiry Notice is the second enquiry into the 2021/22 tax year. Further, HMRC contends that there are reasonable grounds for not issuing a partial or final closure notice within a specified period.
(3) For the avoidance of doubt, the Appellant accepted that if, contrary to his primary position, I find that the December Enquiry Notice is valid then the enquiry should remain open.
3. In the circumstances, the parties agreed that the issue for determination by me at this stage was whether or not the 10 May Letter opened an enquiry.
Hearing:
4. The hearing was remote, conducted by video. The Appellant was represented by Mr Cowe, who was assisted by Mr Davies. HMRC were represented by Mr Bugg. I am grateful to everyone for their assistance and for the care taken presenting their respective cases.
5. I was provided with the following documents:
(1) HMRC’s Skeleton Argument.
(2) A Document Bundle of 625 pages.
(3) An amended Authorities Bundle of 130 pages.
(4) HMRC’s Application to Amend their Statement of Reasons.
(5) HMRC’s amended Statement of Reasons.
(6) Tinkler v HMRC [2021] UKSC 39.
6. The Appellant did not attend the hearing in person. He had not provided a witness statement. He did not give oral evidence.
7. HMRC had one witness; Mr John Page. He provided a witness statement, gave oral evidence, was cross-examined and answered my questions. Mr Pages was an entirely credible witness who was doing his best to assist. At the outset of his oral evidence, he referred to new matters arising since the filing of his witness statement. These new matters were contentious and, ultimately, both parties agreed to proceed on the basis that I disregarded these new matters, which I did.
Mr Page’s Evidence:
8. Mr Page’s position was that he couldn’t give very much information about the 10 May Letter as he was not a party to it. He believed that the letter was part of an educational exercise by a different area of HMRC that was looking at BADR / Capital Gains. He referred to the 10 May Letter as a one-to-many enquiry. He noted that it did not refer to any legislation. He clarified that this was an educational letter that told the Appellant that he may have exceeded his lifetime allowance for Entrepreneur’s Relief / BADR. Further, it explained that (i) if the Appellant had exceeded his allowance, he could amend the Return, (ii) if he hadn’t, he could contact HMRC and (iii) if he took neither step, HMRC may open an enquiry. He confirmed that the 10 May Letter did not cause him any problems in issuing the December Enquiry Notice, which he noted specifically referred to s.9A Taxes Management Act 1970 (“TMA”). He maintained that the 10 May Letter did not open an enquiry. Accordingly, he denied that the December Enquiry Notice was a second enquiry into the same tax year.
Findings of Fact:
9. I make the following findings of fact on the balance of probabilities.
10. On 29 January 2023, HMRC received the Appellant’s Self Assessment tax return for the year ended 5 April 2022 (“the Return”). In the Return, the Appellant claimed Business Asset Disposal Relief (“BADR”) on £652,245 of his total gain reducing his Capital Gains tax liability to 10%.
11. On 10 May 2023, HMRC wrote to the Appellant (“the 10 May Letter”) in the following terms:
“Dear MR SHARIF
Please check your Business Asset Disposal Relief Claim
We’re writing to you because you included a Business Asset Disposal Relief (BADR) claim in your 2021 to 2022 Self Assessment return. BADR was previously known as Entrepreneur’s Relief.
Our records show this claim for BADR has taken you over the lifetime limit of £1 million.…
What you need to do now
You need to amend your 2021-2022 Self Assessment tax return to reduce the BADR claim to the lifetime limit of £1 million or below.
…
Due to the change to your Self Assessment return, it is likely that additional tax will be due.
If you do owe us tax, we’ll charge interest on any tax that’s paid late….
If you think that you haven’t exceeded your limit
If you think your claim to BADR is correct, and hasn’t exceeded your lifetime limit of £1 million, please contact us by email or phone and give your reasons. We will consider any information you give us.
…
If you don’t contact us or amend your Self Assessment return
If you don’t contact us or amend your Self Assessment return by 9 June 2023, we may amend your Self Assessment return ourselves. Or we might open an enquiry, also known as a compliance check.
If our compliance check shows that additional tax is due, interest will need to be paid on any overdue amounts. We may also charge you a penalty…
Please remember, that it is your responsibility to make sure your Self Assessment return is complete and correct…”
12. On 15 May2023, the Appellant telephoned HMRC. There is no record of this telephone call. The Appellant did not give evidence as to the content of the call.
13. On 16 May 2023, HMRC wrote to the Appellant in the following terms (“the 16 May Letter”):
“Dear Mr Sharif,
Following our call on 15th May 2023 in relation to the letter to review the Business Asset Disposal Relief.
I reviewed the entrepreneurs and business asset disposal relief we hold are listed (sic) below:
2017/2018 Return: £270,000 which included Annual Exemption allowance £1,300 claimed in ER (actual relief received £258,700)
2019/2020 Return: £101,055 which included annual exemption allowance £12,000 claimed in ER (actual relief received £89,055)
2021/2022 Return: £652,245 business and asset disposal relief.
Therefore, our records show that a total of £1,000,000 has been claimed in Business Asset Disposal Relief.
Based on the above information no further action is required.”
14. On 5 December 2023, HMRC wrote to the Appellant informing him that they were opening a compliance check into the Return and providing him with the December Enquiry Notice which, so far as relevant, stated:
I am opening a compliance check into your Self Assessment tax return for the year ended 5 April 2022. I received this on 29 January 2023.
I am carrying out this cheque under section 9A of the Taxes Management Act 1970. This allows HMRC to check self assessment returns.
I am opening this check because I need to check your Capital Gains tax return for the year 20/21/22.
This check will help me to confirm the return is correct and complete.
During my check
I’ll look at your Capital Gains tax return. When I look at this I may find that I need to extend my check. If I do, I’ll let you know…”
15. Also, the December Enquiry Notice requested information and documentation.
16. Between 5 December 2023 and 25 September 2024, the Appellant and HMRC corresponded about the December Enquiry Notice. On 20 May 2024, 4 June 2024 and 10 June 2024, the Appellant provided some, but not all, of the items requested by HMRC. Further, on 12 June 2024, the Appellant spoke to HMRC by telephone.
17. On 25 September 2024, the Appellant raised an official complaint with HMRC on the grounds that HMRC had, wrongly, opened two enquiries into the same tax year; being the 10 May Letter and the December Enquiry Notice.
18. On 19 November 2024, HMRC wrote to the Appellant informing him that they were not upholding his complaint. Specifically, HMRC stated:
“My response
…Mr Page has checked our records and confirmed that a previous enquiry was completed under CFSS-6905450, but this enquiry was limited to whether you exceeded the £1 million Lifetime Allowance for claiming BADR.
…
From the information made available to me, I cannot see that we enquired into the same year twice as;
– CFS-1716055 – this was an enquiry into your SA tax return for year 2017 to 2018 and
– CFS-6905450 – this was a general enquiry to confirm you had not exceeded the lifetime limit for claiming BADR on Capital Gains.
…
Summary
I’m not upholding your complaint because the enquiry for the year 2021 to 2022 was an educational letter regarding the Lifetime Allowance and warned that an enquiry may be opened if the return is not amended. I do not believe that we have opened another enquiry…”
The Law:
19. The question as to whether the 10 May Letter opened an enquiry, as that term is used in s.9A TMA, is a question of law; Portland Gas Storage Limited v The Commissioners for Her Majesty’s Revenue & Customs [2014] UKUT 0270 (TCC), § 38 and The Commissioners for Her Majesty’s Customs and Revenue v Dr Vasiliki Raftapoulou [2018] EWCA Civ 818, §36 (“Raftapoulou”). Accordingly, the fact that the Complaints Officer in his refusal of the Appellant’s complaint and Mr Page in his oral evidence used the term ‘enquiry’ is not determinative of the issue.
i) The Self Assessment System:
20. “The central feature of the self-assessment system of taxation is that the taxpayermakes his or her own assessment of the tax due, and the payment of tax follows fromthat self-assessment. The corollary to self-assessment of tax by the taxpayer is thatHMRC are given powers to verify the accuracy of the self-assessment return byenquiring into it.” The Commissioners for Her Majesty’s Revenue & Customs v Michael Mabbutt [2017] UKUT 0289 (TCC), §15[1](“Mabbutt”):
21. The important functions of an Enquiry Notice and a Closure Notice, as acknowledged by the Upper Tribunal, were stated in Raftapoulou, §27 as follows:
“27….The well-informed or well-advised taxpayer will know that, with the opening of the enquiry, HMRC enjoysstatutory powers to call for documents and that the taxpayer will have the right torequire the enquiry to be completed within a reasonable time (sch 1A, para 7(5) – (7)).The issue of the closure notice starts the time for appealing against the conclusionsstated in it or the amendments made by it.”
ii) s.9A Taxes Management Act 1970:
22. S.9A TMA states:
“9A Notice of enquiry
(1) An officer of the Board may enquire into a return under section 8 or 8A of this Act if he gives notice of his intention to do so (“notice of enquiry”)—
(a) to the person whose return it is (“the taxpayer”),
(b) within the time allowed.
(2) The time allowed is—
(a) if the return was delivered on or before the filing date, up to the end of the
period of twelve months after the day on which the return was delivered…”
iii) the meaning of ‘Enquiry’?:
23. What does the word ‘enquiry’ mean?
24. The Upper Tribunal in Portland, §42stated:
“42. It is helpful to consider the ordinary meaning of “enquire” and “enquiring”. Wewere referred to various dictionary definitions. The words are synonymous with“inquire” and “inquiring” and it is clear to us that in the context in which we areconsidering the term, that is in relation to legislation that gives HMRC power toverify information contained in a return so as to ascertain whether the correct amountof tax has been paid, it must mean “examine”, “investigate” or “make an investigationinto”. Another synonym would be “scrutinise”. Ms Choudhury suggests that it means“an act of asking for information”.
25. However, the Court of Appeal in Raftapoulou at §41 cast doubt on the Portland definition and recommended adherence to the wording “enquire into” as follows:
“41. Ms McCarthy submitted, and I agree, that the UT in the present case misdirected
themselves by treating “enquire into” as denoting no more than “scrutinise” in the
widest sense of that word. I doubt the wisdom of searching for a substitute word for
the phrase “enquire into” used in the legislation and then testing the facts by reference to the substitute word. Most words have shades, or a spectrum, of meaning and “scrutinise” is no exception. By concluding that HMRC had “scrutinised” the taxpayer’s claim in the sense of reading it carefully and paying attention to its date as
against the statutory time limit, the UT has moved away from the phrase “enquire
into” and disengaged it from its statutory context.”
iv) Any formalities for a notice of enquiry?:
26. It is settled law that a notice of enquiry does not require any specific form or formalities; Portland, §48 and Raftapoulou, §20. All that is required is “…a document in writing informing the taxpayer of HMRC’s intention to open an enquiry into a particular tax return…”Mabbutt, §44. This is to ensure that the taxpayer knows of the enquiry and has the chance to put their case; R (Sword Services Ltd) v Revenue and Customs Commissioners [2016] EWHC 1473 (Admin), §71 as cited in Mabbutt, §44.
27. However, the question of whether a notice suffices to make a taxpayer aware that HMRC intend to open an enquiry into a specific tax return is an objective one; Mabbutt, §45. Specifically:
“45. The test is whether a reasonable taxpayer, in the circumstances of the taxpayer in question, would have understood that HMRC intended to open an enquiry into a particular tax return. It is not a matter of the parties’ intentions or actual knowledge. We consider that this objective test applies as much to the question whether certain documents could be said to form part of the notice as it does to the question whether the notice itself sufficiently informed the taxpayer of the intended enquiry to be a valid section 9ATMA notice. (Emphasis added)
v) The Relevance of Subsequent Actions:
28. The Upper Tribunal in Portland referred to and relied on HMRC’s subsequent actions to demonstrate that HMRC opened an enquiry into the return, see §46. Due to Portland withdrawing itsapplication to reclaim the SDLT and acknowledging that the land transaction return was final, the Court of Appeal refused to proceed with the hearing of the appeal in Portland;Portland Gas Storage Limited v The Commissioners for Her Majesty’s Revenue & Customs [2015] EWCA Civ 559.
29. HMRC’s position in Raftapoulou was that they did not accept that the UT was right in Portland to hold that HMRC’s subsequent actions constituted an enquiry. However, as the issue did not arise for consideration on the facts, the Court of Appeal expressed no view on that question; Raftapoulou, §§39-40. In the circumstances, I am bound by the decision in Portland as to the potential relevance of subsequent actions when deciding whether an enquiry has been opened.
vi) Light monitoring versus an enquiry:
30. In Langham (Inspector of Taxes) v Veltema [2004] EWCA Civ 193, §31, the Court of Appeal considered the levels of scrutiny that HMRC could employ in respect of Self Assessment tax returns. Specifically, the Court of Appeal stated that:
“31. … This is subject to the exercise by the Inland Revenue of: 1) whatever routine or random checks that it sees fit to make as a form of "light monitoring" of self-assessment returns; 2) its statutory power of enquiry under section 9A where it considers it appropriate; and 3) in the absence of fraud or negligent conduct, subject to further scrutiny thereafter only in the event of newly discovered information and/or reasonably drawn inferences therefrom that the self-assessment was insufficient resulting in loss of tax.” (Emphasis added)
31. Further, the Court of Appeal in Raftapoulou, §43 maintained the distinction between informal enquires and the opening of an enquiry, in that case under Paragraph 5 of Schedule 1A TMA 1970, as follows:
“43. The approach of the UT is also at odds with the position explained by AuldLJ inLangham (Inspector of Taxes) v Veltema [2004] EWCA Civ 193; [2004] STC 544 at[31]– [32]. A distinction was drawn, in the context of self-assessment returns,between “light monitoring” by HMRC and the exercise of its statutory power ofenquiry under section 9A TMA 1970. Reference was further made to “an intermediateand possibly time-consuming scrutiny, whether or not in the form of an enquiry unders 9A” (emphasis added). There is a distinction between informal enquiries and theopening of an enquiry into a claim under paragraph 5 with its attendant statutorypowers.”
Analysis:
32. I have considered and applied the law, detailed at §§ 19 to 32 above, to the facts of this case.
33. I note that no formalities are required to open an enquiry. Simply, HMRC must have given to the Appellant notice of their intention to enquire into the Return within the time limit. For the avoidance of doubt, there is no dispute that the 10 May Letter and the December Enquiry Notice were both within time, being within 12 months of delivery of the Return; s.9A (2) (a) TMA. The relevant question is whether a reasonable taxpayer in the Appellant’s circumstanceswould have understood from the 10 May Letter that HMRC intended to open an enquiry into the Return.
34. For the reasons detailed at §§ 35 to 47 below, I have decided that a reasonable taxpayer in the Appellant’s circumstances would not have understood from the 10 May Letter that HMRC was intending to open an enquiry. In reaching this decision I have referred to and relied on the following primary points. However, the parties can be assured that I have taken all of their arguments along with all relevant matters into account in my decision making.
35. First, HMRC opened a compliance check, a term synonymous with enquiry, for the year ended 5 April 2018 because the Appellant failed to file a Self Assessment tax return by the statutory deadline. The missing return was filed on 16 August 2020 and, consequently, the check was closed. As a result, the reasonable taxpayer in the Appellants’ circumstances has experience of the practices and procedures associated with a compliance check/enquiry.
36. Second, prior to the BADR claim in the Return, the Appellant had made claims for Entrepreneur’s Relief (“ER”), the predecessor to BADR, in his 2017/18 Self Assessment tax return and in his 2019/20 Self Assessment tax return, see §13 above. The Appellant had received correspondence from HMRC about his ER claim in the 2017/18 Self Assessment tax return. Ultimately, this correspondence was closed without any further action. Accordingly, the Appellant knew that BADR claims attracted HMRC’s attention and had the potential to generate correspondence from/to HMRC. Further and in light of the compliance check for the year ended 5 April 2018, the reasonable taxpayer in the Appellants’ circumstances knew that there was a difference between a formal compliance check and targeted correspondence from HMRC.
37. Fourth, the 10 May Letter is a response to the Appellant’s BADR claim in the Return. It specifically refers to the Return. It invites the Appellant, in bold, to check his BADR Claim because HMRC’s records show that this claim has taken the Appellant over his lifetime limit of £1 million. Accordingly, HMRC must have identified the value of the BADR claim from the Return and then consulted their records to establish the Appellant’s previous ER/BADR claims and total them up. This invitation did not require an enquiry into the Return, instead taking the information in the Return about the BADR claim coupled with HMRC’s records at face value. The 10 May Letter does not refer to any ongoing investigations or enquiries and draws no conclusions.
38. I consider that there are similarities between the 10 May Letter and the letters in Portland and Raftapoulou, neither of which, on their own, were held to have opened an enquiry.
39. In Portland, HMRC were able to express a conclusion that the claim could not be accepted because it was out of time and this conclusion did not require HMRC to open an enquiry into the return as the date of amendment was plain on Portland’s letter, §43.
40. In Raftapoulou §37the Court of Appeal stated:
“…In terms, all that the letter stated was that HMRC had read the claim and decided, simply by reference to its date and the expiry of the applicable four-year period on 5 April 2011, that it was out of time. Nowhere does the writer of the letter state or indicate that he intends to enquire into the claim or that he has completed his enquiries nor does he state any conclusions resulting from his enquiry or amend the claim…”
41. Further, the 10 May Letter proceeds to set out 3 voluntary options; (i) amend the Return, (ii) contact HMRC and (iii) do nothing.
42. In respect of Option (ii), HMRC state that “If you think your claim to BADR is correct, and hasn’t exceeded your lifetime limit of £1 million, please contact us by email or phone and give your reasons. We will consider any information you give us.” I have carefully considered the wording “…We will consider any information you give us.” One potential reading of that wording is that HMRC were inviting information and confirming that, on the receipt of information, they would enquire into the BADR claim in the Return. Accordingly, one potential reading of this section of the 10 May Letter points towards HMRC giving notice of their intention to open an enquiry into the Return.
43. However, the 10 May Letter has to be considered in the round and in the circumstances of the Appellant. Of note, Option (iii), states “If you don’t contact us or amend your Self Assessment return by 9 June 2023, we may amend your Self Assessment return ourselves. Or we might open an enquiry, also known as a compliance check.” (Emphasis added) It is material that the 10 May Letter expressly states that if the Appellant takes Option (iii) then “…we might open an enquiry, also known as a compliance check.” This counterbalances the wording at Option (ii) that “…We will consider any information you give us…” and indicates that the 10 May Letter is not, itself, opening an enquiry, but that there is the possibility of a future enquiry. Further, the Appellant had been the subject of a compliance check in respect of his 2017/18 tax return. Therefore, the reasonable taxpayer in the Appellant’s circumstances would have known that the 10 May Letter differed, significantly, from a letter opening a compliance check, such that this difference militated against the 10 May Letter opening an enquiry.
44. Fifth, in Portland the Upper Tribunal placed reliance on HMRC’s subsequent actions to demonstrate that HMRC opened an enquiry into the return, see §45. As detailed above, I am bound by that approach. HMRC’s letter, dated 16 May 2023, is a potentially relevant subsequent action.
45. On 16 May 2023, HMRC wrote to the Appellant, following his telephone call on 15 October 2023, confirming that they had reviewed the Appellant’s ER and BADR claims, setting out the ER and BADR claims and concluding that £1 million (being the lifetime limit) had been claimed in BADR. Accordingly, HMRC stated that no further action was required. On one reading of this letter, it indicates that HMRC have enquired into the Appellant’s BADR claim in the Return and reached a conclusion. On another reading, HMRC have done no more than was done in Portland and Raftapoulou, namely expressing a conclusion on information plain on the face of the Return, when coupled with HMRC’s records, without opening an enquiry. I favour the latter reading because it is more consistent with my analysis of the 10 May Letter. Specifically, I place weight on the express wording in the 10 May Letter that, if the Appellant takes Option (iii) “…we might open an enquiry, also known as a compliance check.” In all of the circumstances, I am not satisfied that the 16 May 2023 letter effectively overrides the express wording in the 10 May Letter to show that the 10 May Letter opened an enquiry. I note that a single letter, such as the 16 May 2023 letter, cannot both open and close an enquiry; Raftapoulou, §47.
46. Sixth, in Veltema and Raftapoulou the Court of Appeal drew a distinction between informal enquiries or light monitoring and the opening of a formal enquiry, whether under s.9A TMA (Veltema) or other statutory provisions (Raftapoulou). I consider that the 10 May Letter, as detailed in §11 above, is more consistent with light monitoring, merely prompting the Appellant to check his BADR claim, than with the opening of an enquiry. Nonetheless, in the future HMRC may wish to consider either explicitly stating when it is simply making informal enquiries / light monitoring as opposed to opening a formal enquiry and/or avoiding the term ‘enquiry’ unless referring to a formal enquiry, thereby avoiding any unfortunate confusion.
47. Accordingly, it is my decision that the 10 May Letter did not open an enquiry.
Conclusion:
48. The December Enquiry Notice is valid.
49. As detailed at §2 (3) above, it is the Appellant’s position that, in these circumstances, the enquiry should remain open. Accordingly, it is unclear whether a further hearing is required. If, as intimated, HMRC considers that the Tribunal needs to decide for itself that there are reasonable grounds for not issuing a partial or final closure notice within a specified period then the parties must, not later than 63 days after this decision is sent to the parties, write to the Tribunal with, preferably, agreed directions for the progression of the appeal.
Right to apply for permission to appeal
50. This document contains full findings of fact and reasons for the preliminary decision. Any party dissatisfied with this preliminary decision has a right to apply for permission to appeal against it pursuant to Rule 39 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Tax Chamber) Rules 2009. The application must be received by this Tribunal not later than 56 days after this decision is sent to that party. However, either party may apply for the 56 days to run instead from the date of the decision that disposes of all issues in the proceedings, but such an application should be made as soon as possible. The parties are referred to "Guidance to accompany a Decision from the First-tier Tribunal (Tax Chamber)" which accompanies and forms part of this decision notice.
Release date:
28 October 2026
Notes
[1] See also Simon Langham (Inspector of Taxes) v Frederick Veltema [2004] EWCA Civ 193, §31 (“Veltema”).
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