Miscellaneous Etats-Unis

Lang v. Platinum Nine Holdings, LLC

Official source
               FILE
                                                                          THIS OPINION WAS FILED
                                                                         FOR RECORD AT 8 A.M. ON
                                                                             OCTOBER 29, 2026

        IN CLERK’S OFFICE
SUPREME COURT, STATE OF WASHINGTON                                         SARAH R. PENDLETON
       OCTOBER 29, 2026
                                                                          SUPREME COURT CLERK




                 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

         MICHAEL J. LANG, individually, and as     )
         Personal Representative of the ESTATE OF  )
         FRANK E. COSTA, on behalf of the Estate   )   No. 104498-4
         and all statutory beneficiaries,          )
                                                   )   En Banc
                                     Respondents,  )
                                                   )   Filed: October 29, 2026
                 v.                                )
                                                   )
         PLATINUM NINE HOLDINGS, LLC, a            )
         Washington Limited Liability Corporation, )
         doing business as NORTHWEST               )
         AMBULANCE, a company,                     )
                                                   )
                                     Petitioners,  )
                                                   )
         and                                       )
                                                   )
         NORTHWEST AMBULANCE CRITICAL )
         CARE TRANSPORT, a company; and XYZ, )
         a fictitious entity or company; RUBATINO )
         REFUSE REMOVAL, INC., RUBATINO            )
         REFUSE REMOVAL, LLC, a Washington )
         Limited Liability Corporation; RUBATINO )
         REFUSE, LLC, a Washington Limited         )
         Liability Corporation; RUBATINO REFUSE )
         REMOVAL HOLDINGS, LLC, a                  )
         Washington Limited Liability Corporation; )
         RUBATINO LITTER SOLUTIONS, INC., )
Lang v. Platinum Nine Holdings et al.
No. 104498-4


a Washington Corporation; RUBATINO     )
HOLDING COMPANY, INC., a Washington )
Corporation; and RUBATINO              )
ENGINEERING, LLC, a Washington         )
Limited Liability Corporation; and XYZ )
Corporation,                           )
                                       )
                          Defendants.  )
                                       )

       MUNGIA, J.—The legislature granted emergency medical technicians (EMTs)

immunity from civil liability if they negligently provide emergency medical treatment

to a patient. In other words, if an EMT’s treatment of a patient falls below the

standard of care expected of a reasonably careful EMT under the same or similar

circumstances, the legislature enacted a statute that prevents an injured patient from

being compensated for that negligent treatment. However, in that statute, the

legislature immunized only acts of medical expertise. It did not immunize an EMT’s

acts that did not involve their medical expertise, such as driving an ambulance.

       Henry Shaw, an EMT, drove an ambulance into a highway divider while taking

Frank Costa to the hospital. Northwest Ambulance,1 Mr. Shaw’s employer, admitted

that Mr. Shaw was negligent and that his negligence caused the accident. The

Northwest Ambulance crew also failed to secure Mr. Costa to the ambulance gurney




1
 Platinum Nine Holdings LLC is a Washington licensed ambulance service doing business
as Northwest Ambulance and will be referred to as Northwest Ambulance throughout.
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with shoulder restraints. Northwest Ambulance admitted that the crew’s failure to

secure Mr. Costa with shoulder restraints was negligent.

       Northwest Ambulance argues that RCW 18.71.210(1) immunizes it from the

negligent acts of its ambulance crew because they were transporting Mr. Costa to the

hospital. The statute provides immunity to licensed ambulance services for any act or

omission done in good faith by an EMT rendering emergency medical services while

transporting a patient to a medical facility. However, RCW 18.71.210(2) limits the

scope of that immunity. The immunity applies only “in the performance of the actual

emergency medical procedures” and affords immunity only for acts or omissions that

are within the EMT’s field of medical expertise. RCW 18.71.210(2).

       Both parties moved for summary judgment as to whether RCW 18.71.210(1)’s

immunity applies to this situation. The trial court ruled in favor of Michael Lang, the

personal representative of Mr. Costa’s estate (Estate), finding no immunity. The

Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s ruling.

       We affirm the Court of Appeals’ holding that an EMT’s negligent driving is not

within the scope of rendering emergency medical services as contemplated by the

legislature. As discussed below, we do not reach whether failing to secure Mr. Costa

with shoulder restraints is within the scope of rendering emergency medical services.

We do not need to reach this issue because Northwest Ambulance did not propose a

special jury verdict form distinguishing between the two negligent acts. The negligent


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driving alone is sufficient to uphold the verdict. Accordingly, we hold that Northwest

Ambulance is not entitled to qualified immunity in this case.

                                         I
                          FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

          A.   Factual History

          Frank Costa, a patient, was transported by a Northwest Ambulance crew to a

medical facility. The Northwest Ambulance crew consisted of three people: (1) EMT

Jack Wilson, (2) EMT Henry Shaw, and (3) EMT trainee Katelyn Averill. 2

Mr. Wilson and Mr. Shaw secured Mr. Costa on a gurney using guardrails and two lap

belts positioned over his waist and knees. The EMTs did not use shoulder restraints.

Northwest Ambulance’s policy required the use of shoulder restraints. There is no

dispute that the EMTs violated the policy by not securing Mr. Costa with the shoulder

straps.

          After Mr. Costa was secured, Mr. Wilson and Ms. Averill remained in the back

of the ambulance to monitor Mr. Costa while Mr. Shaw drove. On the way to the

hospital, Mr. Wilson believed that Mr. Costa’s heartbeat was becoming irregular.

Mr. Wilson called an emergency code. An emergency code allows the driver certain

privileges not accorded to other drivers but with the restriction that the driver must



2
  In the record, Katelyn Averill is sometimes referred to by her married name, “Omo.” We
refer to her as Ms. Averill, the name she used at the time of the accident. No disrespect is
intended.
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always drive with due regard for the safety of others. The rules for driving emergency

code are set out in RCW 46.61.035:

       (1) The driver of an authorized emergency vehicle, when responding to
       an emergency call or when in the pursuit of an actual or suspected
       violator of the law or when responding to but not upon returning from a
       fire alarm, may exercise the privileges set forth in this section, but
       subject to the conditions herein stated.
               (2) The driver of an authorized emergency vehicle may:
               (a) Park or stand, irrespective of the provisions of this chapter;
               (b) Proceed past a red or stop signal or stop sign, but only after
       slowing down as may be necessary for safe operation;
               (c) Exceed the maximum speed limits so long as he or she does
       not endanger life or property;
               (d) Disregard regulations governing direction of movement or
       turning in specified directions.
               (3) The exemptions herein granted to an authorized emergency
       vehicle shall apply only when such vehicle is making use of visual
       signals meeting the requirements of RCW 46.37.190, except that: (a) An
       authorized emergency vehicle operated as a police vehicle need not be
       equipped with or display a red light visible from in front of the vehicle;
       (b) authorized emergency vehicles shall use audible signals when
       necessary to warn others of the emergency nature of the situation but in
       no case shall they be required to use audible signals while parked or
       standing.
               (4) The foregoing provisions shall not relieve the driver of an
       authorized emergency vehicle from the duty to drive with due regard for
       the safety of all persons, nor shall such provisions protect the driver from
       the consequences of his or her reckless disregard for the safety of others.

       After Mr. Shaw began to “drive code,” he noticed a garbage truck farther down

the road. Mr. Shaw stayed behind the garbage truck for a while but then sped up.

              So, when an ambulance is going lights and sirens behind a trash
      truck going its regular speed[, that] is not really the speed the ambulance
      wants to go. So I was camping, waiting behind it for a while. And then
      it finally did start to—to head off and then that’s when I began to
      overtake—accelerate to begin to overtake it.
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Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 76.

       Mr. Shaw testified that while it looked like the truck was going to the right, it

then began to go back into the lane where he was driving. At the speed Mr. Shaw was

traveling, he could not brake without hitting the truck, so he swerved to the right.

       I hadn’t begun passing, but I was accelerating in order to pass. As they
       got back in front of me, I was at such a distance where they got in front
       of me that I engaged my brakes completely.
               And—and I noticed I was still traveling at such a speed that with
       my brakes engaged right now and at the speed I’m going, I’m going to
       hit this guy. I’m not—I’m not slowing down at a quick enough rate to
       avoid rear-ending this truck.
               So I swerved to the right because there was that shoulder there. I
       swerved to the right to get away from hitting him. And I couldn’t see it
       because of where the garbage truck was positioned to my—say my
       2:00—was positioned and then came back in front of me at my 12:00.
       And there was what’s called a gorder, which is those chevron dividers
       with like—a lots of times they have sand barrels behind them and stuff
       like that, that divide the exit ramp from the rest of the—the highway.
               And I hit that head on when I tried to go—I tried to go around him
       just to be able to get, slow down—have more room to slow down, maybe
       in the shoulder, or maybe I could commit to that ramp to start slowing
       down. But I just avoided him—basically slow down and then I hit that
       instead. I didn’t see it there and I hit it head on.

CP at 74.

       Mr. Costa was ejected from the stretcher into the ambulance wall, injuring his

head, neck, and arm. He died later that day.

       After the accident, Northwest Ambulance terminated Mr. Shaw’s and

Mr. Wilson’s employment. In the termination letter, Northwest Ambulance set forth

the bases for the termination.
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       This notice of dismissal is issued to you for violation of company
       policies and Snohomish county code policies which has led up to the
       decision to end employment at once effective today, November 24, 2020.

       The impact your behavior created is unacceptable behavior and dismissal
       for not adhering to the policies.

       Policies and Transport documentation:
              1) Insubordination of company policy in transporting patients
                  with proper restrains, [sic] calling code when essential and
                  lack of defensive driving which caused a preventable
                  accident.
              2) Excessive speed while driving code and above our policy
                  limit of 10 miles over posted speed limit. Per policy, “Any
                  speeding that exceeds . . . (10 mph code) over the posted
                  speed limit will be considered a violation of our policy”.
              3) Insubordination of the company Code of Conduct and
                  expectations.
              4) Insubordination of policy; Drivers must conform to all traffic
                  laws and make allowances for adverse weather and traffic
                  conditions.

CP at 132.

       B.    Procedural History

             1. The Estate’s Wrongful Death Case Against Northwest Ambulance
       The Estate brought wrongful death and survival actions against Northwest

Ambulance.3 The complaint alleged that the EMTs’ failure to properly secure

Mr. Costa to the gurney and failure to avoid the collision were the proximate causes of

Mr. Costa’s death. In its answer, Northwest Ambulance raised an affirmative defense



3
 The Estate’s complaint also named the company operating the garbage truck, Rubatino
Refuse Removal LLC, as a defendant. As Rubatino is not part of this appeal, this opinion
focuses solely on the claims against Northwest Ambulance.
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of statutory qualified immunity under RCW 18.71.210, arguing it was completely

immune from the Estate’s claims. Licensed ambulance providers are subject to

qualified immunity for an EMT’s acts or omissions while rendering emergency

medical services in good faith during transport. RCW 18.71.210(1); RCW

18.73.030(11).

            2. Summary Judgment Proceedings
       Both parties subsequently filed cross motions for summary judgment. The

Estate’s motion for partial summary judgment sought to strike Northwest

Ambulance’s qualified immunity defense. The Estate argued that Northwest

Ambulance was not subject to qualified immunity because the EMTs were not

rendering emergency medical services under RCW 18.71.210 when driving the

ambulance and securing the patient. The Estate asserted that those acts were not part

of any “ʻactual emergency medical proceduresʼ” within the EMTs’ field of medical

expertise, as is required for the immunity to apply. CP at 36 (quoting RCW

18.71.210(2)).

       In Northwest Ambulance’s cross motion for summary judgment, it argued that

it should be dismissed from the suit because it was subject to qualified immunity.

Northwest Ambulance argued that RCW 18.71.210 completely immunized it from

suit, not simply from liability for certain negligence claims.




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       The trial court denied Northwest Ambulance’s motion and granted the Estate’s

motion in part. The court concluded as a matter of law that Northwest Ambulance

was not immune from suit because “driving an ambulance is not emergency medical

service.” CP at 318.

       Northwest Ambulance later conceded that its employees acted outside the

scope of ordinary care by failing to fully secure Mr. Costa to the gurney and by failing

to avoid the collision. However, Northwest Ambulance denied any claims of gross

negligence and corporate negligence, reasserting that it was immune from all liability

under RCW 18.71.210.

            3.    Judgment and Appeal
       Before trial, Northwest Ambulance moved for a revision of the summary

judgment order on the issue of qualified immunity. The court denied the motion, and

the case went to trial. The jury later rendered a general verdict for the Estate. The

jury was not given a special verdict form directing it to state whether it found

Northwest Ambulance liable for the negligent driving or for the failure to secure.

Northwest Ambulance did not request such a form.

       Northwest Ambulance appealed, assigning error to the trial court’s order

granting summary judgment on the qualified immunity issue.4 Lang v. Platinum Nine




4
 The Estate cross-appealed to the Court of Appeals regarding a settlement issue, which has
not been raised for review by this court.
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Holdings, LLC, No. 86205-7-I, slip op. at 2 (Wash. Ct. App. July 28, 2025)

(unpublished), https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/862057.pdf. Northwest

Ambulance again argued that the trial court misconstrued RCW 18.71.210. However,

the Court of Appeals rejected its arguments and affirmed that Northwest Ambulance

was not entitled to qualified immunity. Id. at 3.

            4.    Issues Before This Court

       We granted Northwest Ambulance’s petition for review as to whether the trial

court properly granted partial summary judgment on the issue of qualified immunity. 5

       Today, we reach only whether an EMT and their employer are entitled to

qualified immunity for negligent ambulance transportation. We do not decide

whether securing the patient with all required safety restraints (here, the shoulder

straps) falls within the scope of rendering emergency medical services. We need not

answer that question because, here, the negligent driving was a sufficient basis for the

jury’s verdict. Because it went to its affirmative defense, Northwest Ambulance had

the burden to propose a special verdict form if it wanted the jury to consider the

negligent driving and the failure to restrain separately. Northwest Ambulance did not

request a special verdict form, so we need not reach both issues on appeal. See

Gerlach v. Cove Apts., LLC, 

196 Wn.2d 111, 135

, 

471 P.3d 181

 (2020) (“A party



5
 Washington Ambulance Association and Washington State Association for Justice
Foundation filed briefs of amicus curiae.
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challenging the validity of one theory supporting an undifferentiated verdict is not

entitled to a new trial unless it objected to the use of the verdict form at trial and

proposed a special verdict form to clarify the jury’s findings.”).

                                             II
     AMBULANCE TRANSPORTATION IS NOT COVERED BY QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

       We review a trial court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Keck v. Collins,

184 Wn.2d 358, 370

, 

357 P.3d 1080

 (2015). We uphold a trial court’s grant of

summary judgment when no genuine issue exists as to any material fact and the

moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 

Id.

 Here, the parties do not

present any genuine issue of material fact. Instead, they dispute whether ambulance

transportation is subject to qualified immunity as a matter of law. Accordingly, we

review the qualified immunity statute de novo to ascertain and carry out the

legislature’s intent. Dep’t of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, LLC, 

146 Wn.2d 1, 9

, 

43

P.3d 4

 (2002). We look at the plain language of the statute and consider related

provisions to determine the statute’s meaning. 

Id. at 10

.

       A.   Qualified Immunity Applies to Acts Done While Rendering Emergency
            Medical Services Within an EMT’s Field of Medical Expertise

       RCW 18.71.210 provides that a licensed ambulance service will not be liable

for any acts or omissions of an EMT “done or omitted in good faith while rendering

emergency medical service . . . to a person who has suffered illness or bodily injury.”

RCW 18.71.210(1). In other words, licensed ambulance services are entitled to


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qualified immunity for the ordinary negligence of its EMTs while rendering

emergency medical services. The statute specifies that

       [t]his section shall apply to an act or omission committed or omitted in
       the performance of the actual emergency medical procedures and not in
       the commission or omission of an act which is not within the field of
       medical expertise of the physician’s trained advanced emergency
       medical technician and paramedic, emergency medical technician, or
       first responder, as the case may be.

RCW 18.71.210(2). Accordingly, the statute limits immunity only to acts or

omissions that are part of “actual emergency medical procedures.” 

Id.


       It is undisputed that Northwest Ambulance is a licensed ambulance service

under RCW 18.71.210(1)(f) and that Mr. Shaw and Mr. Wilson were EMTs acting in

good faith while transporting Mr. Costa. However, the parties dispute whether

driving an ambulance is within the scope of rendering emergency medical services.

We hold that it is not. While “any licensed ambulance [provider]” is immune from

liability under RCW 18.71.210(1)(f), the scope of that immunity is limited to

“medical treatment and care,” RCW 18.73.030(11), and to “actual emergency medical

procedures.” RCW 18.71.210(2). Based on plain language and statutory context,

qualified immunity does not apply to an EMT’s negligent driving of an ambulance.

            1.    The Plain Language Shows That Driving an Ambulance Is Not an
                  Act Done While Rendering Emergency Medical Services

       Northwest Ambulance argues that driving an ambulance is within the scope of

emergency medical services rendered by an EMT. However, the definition of


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“emergency medical service” treats transportation as distinct from rendering

emergency services.

       “Emergency medical service” is limited to “medical treatment and care which

may be rendered at the scene of any medical emergency or while transporting any

patient in an ambulance to an appropriate medical facility, including ambulance

transportation between medical facilities.” RCW 18.73.030(11). Thus, only “medical

treatment and care” can be an emergency medical service. While the statute mentions

ambulance transportation, it does not define the act of transport itself as a form of

medical treatment or care. Instead, the statute uses the phrase “while transporting” to

describe when medical treatment or care may be provided.

       The dissent reads the definition differently, arguing that “the statute expressly

‘include[s] ambulance transportation.’” Dissent at 6 (alteration in original) (quoting

RCW 18.73.030(11)). However, the quoted portion of the definition—“including

ambulance transportation between medical facilities”—does not define driving an

ambulance as an emergency medical service. Instead, it makes clear that care may

still be considered “emergency” care even when given to a patient being transported

between facilities, not only between the scene of an injury and a hospital.

       In short, while medical treatment and care may be rendered during ambulance

transport, the act of driving is not itself medical treatment or care under the qualified

immunity statute.


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       The dissent further argues, “The majority’s interpretation defeats the purpose of

the immunity, which is to allow EMTs to think and act quickly in an emergency

without second-guessing themselves because of the risk of liability.” 

Id. at 5

. This

argument fails for two reasons.

       First, this argument ignores the plain meaning of the words the legislature used

in the statute. There is nothing in the statute to indicate that the legislature intended to

allow ambulance drivers to drive the ambulance below the standard expected of a

reasonably prudent ambulance driver and not allow an injured patient to recover for

that negligence. Likewise, there is nothing in the legislative history that supports this

assertion.

       Second, the dissent’s construction is undermined by the fact that the legislature

does not provide immunity from civil liability for the negligent driving of law

enforcement officers or firefighters. The legislature does not prevent people from

being compensated for injuries caused by the negligent driving of law enforcement

officers or firefighters when they are responding to emergencies. It would be

anomalous to believe that the legislature provided that immunity for an ambulance

driver who happens to be an EMT.

             2.   Reading the Qualified Immunity Provision in Context Further
                  Demonstrates That Transport Itself Is Not Covered

       Reading RCW 18.71.210(1) and (2) together further demonstrates that transport

itself is not within the scope of emergency medical services rendered by an EMT.
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RCW 18.71.210(2) clarifies subsection (1) by limiting qualified immunity to acts or

omissions done or omitted while performing “emergency medical procedures.” WAC

246-976-010(33) defines “emergency medical procedures” as “skills that are

performed within the scope of practice of EMS [(emergency medical services)]

personnel certified by the secretary under chapters 18.71 and 18.73 RCW.” 6 The

WACs set out the required training for EMTs to receive certification, including

training on various medical procedures. See RCW 18.71.205; WAC 246-976-

023(4)(a) (referencing the Washington State Department of Health (DOH) approved

skills and procedures list (DOH 530-173) for EMS training requirements); see also

WAC 246-976-182(1)(c) (providing that EMTs are authorized to provide patient care

only “[w]ithin the scope of care that is included in the approved instructional

guidelines/curriculum or approved specialized training and is included on the

department-approved EMS skills and procedures list (DOH 530-173) for the

individual’s level of certification”). Driving an ambulance is not included in an

EMT’s training or certification requirements as proscribed by the WACs.

       The dissent points out that Mr. Wilson and Mr. Shaw received some training on

how to drive an ambulance. First, this training is irrelevant to the central question in

this case: whether the plain language of the statute expresses the legislature’s intent to


6
 Since there is no statutory definition of “emergency medical procedures” as used in RCW
18.71.210, we look to the related preexisting regulatory definition for guidance on the term’s
plain meaning.
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grant EMTs immunity for negligent driving. Second, the state does not include

emergency vehicle driving training in any part of the EMT certification process. If

driving an emergency vehicle was meant to be considered “rendering emergency

medical service,” then training would be a required part of the certification process.

Third, there are no state standards for what training is required. Indeed, Northwest

Ambulance allowed Mr. Shaw to drive an ambulance with the barest of training.

       Mr. Shaw’s training in emergency driving was limited. Mr. Shaw testified:

              Q. Okay. For—for driving—and this—I'm somewhat curious
       about this because you go through all the training for the EMT. Do you
       guys have like driver training or is that just kind of on that third ride-
       along, there's like, “Hey, man, go ahead and drive”?

              A. Yeah. So the driver training is a—is a PowerPoint that we
       took in the classroom.

CP at 707.

       Mr. Shaw recalled that the PowerPoint training lasted “maybe an hour or two.”

CP at 709. That was the extent of his training before he started driving ambulances

for Northwest Ambulance. 

Id.

 Despite the lack of training, Mr. Shaw was willing to

drive code and figure it out on the job.

             A. Looking back on it, looking back on it. At the time I didn’t—I
       didn’t—you know, I would never back down from—from—if
       someone—you know, at that time I’m a very impressionable EMT. If
       someone asks me to do something, I’m going to try to do it, whatever—
       to whatever extent—you know what I mean?

             So if they ask you to drive code, I’m going to figure out, even if I
       haven’t been trained. And I—I don’t want to speak for other people in

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      my position. But a lot of us were brand new EMT’s [sic] that were kind
      of gung-ho. We wanted to be the—you know, we wanted to be the [set]
      it and forget it person and—and be reliable. So we didn’t want to say,
      you know, “I can’t—I can’t do that.” You know, you figure out how
      you can do it and you do it.

CP at 710.

      The dissent asserts that Mr. Shaw took an emergency vehicle incident

prevention course. Dissent at 8. However, as noted by the dissent, Mr. Shaw took

that course after the accident at issue in this lawsuit. In fact, Northwest Ambulance

did not provide that training to Mr. Shaw; instead, Mr. Shaw received that training

from his next employer. CP at 744.

      The dissent asserts, “As the record shows, driving an ambulance requires

specialized training beyond that of an average driver.” Dissent at 8. Just the opposite:

the record shows that Mr. Shaw was an average driver who was put in a position of

driving an ambulance in an emergency situation.

      RCW 18.71.210(2) does not provide immunity for the “commission or

omission of an act which is not within the [EMT’s] field of medical expertise.”

Although an EMT is trained to perform emergency medical procedures during

ambulance transport, as noted, there is no requirement by the State or Northwest

Ambulance that the driver receive specialized training for emergency driving.

Moreover, driving itself does not involve any medical expertise. An EMT who is

driving cannot also attend to patient care or render medical services. Indeed, RCW


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18.73.150 provides that if there are two or more EMTs operating the ambulance, the

nondriving EMT must be with the patient attending to their care. That was the case

here. Northwest Ambulance EMTs operate ambulances in teams of at least two, with

one EMT responsible for providing patient care while the other EMT drives.

Accordingly, an EMT driving an ambulance is not performing an emergency medical

procedure within their field of medical expertise.

            3.    Subsection (4) Expands Qualified Immunity to Acts or Omissions
                  Done or Committed in Good Faith During Transport to Certain
                  Nonmedical Facilities. It Does Not Expand Qualified Immunity to
                  Transport Itself

       Contrary to Northwest Ambulance’s main argument on appeal, RCW

18.71.210(4) does not establish that transport itself is subject to qualified immunity.

Instead, subsection (4) reinforces our conclusion that ambulance transport is different

from the emergency medical services rendered by an EMT. The subsection provides:

       This section shall apply also, as to the entities and personnel described in
       subsection (1) of this section, to any act or omission committed or
       omitted in good faith by such entities or personnel involved in the
       transport of patients to mental health facilities or chemical dependency
       programs, in accordance with applicable alternative facility procedures
       adopted under RCW 70.168.100.

RCW 18.71.210(4).

       Subsection (4) was adopted to expand qualified immunity to acts or omissions

done or committed in good faith during transport to certain nonmedical facilities.

However, the provision does not expand qualified immunity to transport itself.


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       A brief history of the law makes this clear. At the time the legislature

established qualified immunity under RCW 18.71.210, ambulance services were

statutorily allowed to transport patients only to medical facilities. The legislature later

amended chapter 18.73 RCW to allow ambulance services to also transport patients to

certain nonmedical facilities, such as mental health facilities and chemical

dependency programs. RCW 18.73.280. When the legislature made that amendment

to chapter 18.73 RCW, it also amended the qualified immunity statute to cover

emergency medical services rendered during transport to such nonmedical facilities

through subsection (4). LAWS OF 2015, ch. 157, §§ 4, 5; RCW 18.71.210(4).

Accordingly, subsection (4) did not carve out qualified immunity for transport itself.

Instead, it extended qualified immunity for an EMT’s ordinary negligence while

rendering emergency medical services during transport to medical and certain

nonmedical facilities alike.

       B.   Ambulance Services Are Not Subject to Immunity for an EMT’s
            Negligent Driving. Instead, EMTs Are Subject to a Standard of
            Reasonable Care for Emergency Vehicle Drivers

       Altogether, the plain text of the statute and related provisions demonstrate that

ambulance transportation itself is not covered by the qualified immunity statute.

While we need not look further under our plain text analysis, two other statutes

support the conclusion that the legislature did not intend to provide qualified

immunity for negligent ambulance transport.


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            1.    The Legislature Knows How To Provide Immunity for Ambulance
                  Transportation but Did Not Do So Here

       First, the legislature has established qualified immunity for emergency medical

transportation in other contexts, unlike here. Specifically, RCW 4.24.300(1) provides

qualified immunity for volunteer providers of emergency or medical services “in the

rendering of such emergency care or in transporting such persons.” In that statute, the

legislature specifically carved out qualified immunity for volunteers for the distinct

acts of care or transportation.

       By contrast, in the statute at issue here, the legislature limited the scope of

qualified immunity to an EMT’s acts or omissions done while rendering medical care

and treatment. RCW 18.71.210. We must assume the different language in the two

statutes shows a different legislative intent. State v. Roberts, 

117 Wn.2d 576, 586

,

817 P.2d 855

 (1991). Volunteers are immune from liability for care and

transportation alike while EMTs are immune only for care.

             2.   The Legislature Has Established That Drivers of Emergency
                  Vehicles Are Required To Act with Ordinary Care. Providing
                  Qualified Immunity for Negligent Ambulance Transportation Would
                  Create a Statutory Conflict

       Second, it makes sense that the legislature did not carve out qualified immunity

for ambulance transportation since it has already established a standard of reasonable

care for emergency vehicle drivers. The statute on driving emergency code, RCW

46.61.035, provides certain privileges for drivers of authorized emergency vehicles


                                            20
Lang v. Platinum Nine Holdings et al.
No. 104498-4


when responding to emergency calls, including allowing ambulances to disregard

certain traffic rules while driving code. However, the statute makes clear that the

driving privileges “shall not relieve the driver of an authorized emergency vehicle

from the duty to drive with due regard for the safety of all persons.” RCW

46.61.035(4). Accordingly, ambulance drivers are not immune from liability for

negligent driving but are held to the ordinary standard of care for emergency vehicle

drivers.

                                            III
                                        CONCLUSION

       The legislature granted EMTs immunity from liability for their negligent acts

or omissions while rendering emergency medical services. This immunity includes

their rendering medical services while the patient is being transported. However,

Northwest Ambulance contends that the legislature, in enacting RCW 18.71.210(1),

intended to give ambulance drivers who are EMTs something that the legislature has

not given law enforcement officers or firefighters—the right to drive negligently and

not be held responsible for that negligent driving. Its argument fails. A plain reading

of the statute demonstrates that the legislature granted EMTs immunity from civil

liability for their negligent acts only in providing medical treatment, not for negligent

driving. Indeed, the plain language of the statute and related statutes shows that EMT

ambulance drivers have a duty to drive with due regard for the safety of all persons.

       We affirm.
                                            21
Lang v. Platinum Nine Holdings et al.
No. 104498-4




                                             _______________________________


WE CONCUR:




                                                        Melody, J.




                                        22
                                   No. 104498-4

      MONTOYA-LEWIS, J. (dissenting)—The legislature granted civil immunity

for an emergency medical technician (EMT) or paramedic’s acts or omissions

“while rendering emergency medical service.” RCW 18.71.210(1). I disagree with

the majority that only medical procedures that require medical expertise are

immunized and that “rendering emergency medical services” does not include

operating an ambulance. Majority at 11-12. The legislature broadly defined

“emergency medical service” to include the services provided by operating an

ambulance. RCW 18.73.030(11). Further, “actual emergency medical procedures”

“within the field of medical expertise” recognizes that different types of emergency

medical service providers are licensed to perform varying levels of medical skills

and procedures, and the immunity applies when those providers perform medical

services for which they are qualified. RCW 18.71.210(2). I would conclude

summary judgment should have been granted to Northwest Ambulance because

RCW 18.71.210(1) expressly immunizes it from liability for injuries resulting from

the ambulance crash. I dissent.
Lang v. Platinum Nine Holdings, LLC, No. 104498-4
(Montoya-Lewis, J., dissenting)

                               FACTUAL BACKGROUND

      Frank Costa was a cancer patient at Genesis HealthCare Center in Everett.

After Mr. Costa’s lab results came back abnormal, Genesis determined that

Mr. Costa needed to go to the emergency department at Providence Medical Center

to receive medical treatment. Genesis requested an ambulance to transfer Mr. Costa

to the hospital. Northwest Ambulance sent an ambulance staffed by Jack Wilson

(lead EMT), Henry Shaw (driver and EMT), and Katelyn Averill (EMT in training).

For transport, Mr. Wilson and Mr. Shaw secured Mr. Costa on a gurney using

guardrails and lap belts secured over both his waist and knees. Although

Northwest Ambulance’s policy required the use of shoulder restraints, the EMTs

did not strap Mr. Costa’s shoulders to the gurney with the third strap.

      En route to the hospital, Mr. Wilson evaluated Mr. Costa in the ambulance

and noticed that Mr. Costa was presenting with an irregular heart rate.

Mr. Wilson determined that Mr. Costa needed further emergency evaluation and

assistance because his abnormal heart rhythm could have been a symptom

of a possible cardiac issue, and he instructed Mr. Shaw to “driv[e] code.”

3 Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 772, 929; 1 CP at 154. Mr. Shaw complied and used the

ambulance control panel to turn on his lights and sirens. He increased their speed

and engaged in defensive driving to get the patient to a medical facility swiftly.

The ambulance crashed when Mr. Shaw attempted to overtake a garbage truck


                                            2
Lang v. Platinum Nine Holdings, LLC, No. 104498-4
(Montoya-Lewis, J., dissenting)

on the highway. Mr. Costa was ejected from the stretcher and struck the wall

of the ambulance, injuring his head, neck, and arm. Another ambulance transported

Mr. Costa to the hospital, where he died.

                                PROCEDURAL HISTORY

       As personal representative of Mr. Costa’s estate, Michael Lang sued

Northwest Ambulance for wrongful death and survival actions. Mr. Lang alleged

Northwest Ambulance negligently failed to secure Mr. Costa to the gurney and

failed to avoid the collision. The complaint did not allege gross negligence.

Northwest Ambulance raised statutory qualified immunity under RCW 18.71.210

as an affirmative defense. Northwest Ambulance subsequently admitted

ordinary negligence and proximate cause, but it continued to deny gross negligence

and to assert immunity under RCW 18.71.210. A jury rendered a judgment

for Mr. Lang. Northwest Ambulance appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.

                                       ANALYSIS

       The meaning of a statute is a question of law, reviewed de novo to ascertain

and carry out the legislature’s intent. Dep’t of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, LLC,

146 Wn.2d 1, 9

, 

43 P.3d 4

 (2002). The plain meaning of a statute is derived

from what the legislature has said in the statute and related statutes.

Id. at 11

.   “[W]hen    we    interpret   statutory   language,   ‘[e]very   provision

must be viewed in relation to other provisions and harmonized if at all possible.’”


                                            3
Lang v. Platinum Nine Holdings, LLC, No. 104498-4
(Montoya-Lewis, J., dissenting)

Associated Gen. Contractors of Wash. v. State, 

2 Wn.3d 846, 863

, 

544 P.3d 486


(2024) (second alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)

(quoting In re Est. of Kerr, 

134 Wn.2d 328, 355

, 

949 P.2d 810

 (1998));

Quadrant     Corp.     v.   Cent.   Puget    Sound      Growth    Mgmt.   Hr’gs     Bd.,

154 Wn.2d 224, 238-39

, 

110 P.3d 1132

 (2005). We read statutes as a whole and

“should     not      interpret   statutes   in      a   way      that   would     render

any language ‘meaningless or superfluous.’” Wash. State Ass’n of Counties v.

State, 

199 Wn.2d 1

, 12-13, 

502 P.3d 825

 (2022) (internal quotation marks

omitted) (quoting State v. J.P., 

149 Wn.2d 444, 450

, 

69 P.3d 318

 (2003)). Courts

presume the legislature did not intend absurd results. Spokane County v. Dep’t of

Fish & Wildlife, 

192 Wn.2d 453

, 458, 

430 P.3d 655

 (2018).

      RCW 18.71.210 grants immunity to an act performed in good faith by an EMT

“while rendering emergency medical service.” The act must be “in the performance

of the actual emergency medical procedures,” and it must be “within the field of

medical expertise” of the EMT. RCW 18.71.210(2). That immunity does not apply

to any willful or wanton misconduct or acts that constitute gross negligence.

RCW 18.71.210(5).

      The majority conflates these provisions to offer immunity only for an EMT’s

acts that are part of “‘actual emergency medical procedures.’” Majority at 12

(quoting RCW 18.71.210(2)). It holds that the “act of driving is not itself medical


                                            4
Lang v. Platinum Nine Holdings, LLC, No. 104498-4
(Montoya-Lewis, J., dissenting)

treatment or care under the qualified immunity statute.” 

Id.

 This assertion conflicts

with the statute’s plain language. “Driving code” is a type of driving unique

to operating emergency vehicles, as part of the performance of an actual medical

procedure. The skill of driving code is part of the training and expertise of an EMT

and requires medical experience, training, and knowledge. The majority’s

interpretation defeats the purpose of the immunity, which is to allow EMTs to think

and act quickly in an emergency without second-guessing themselves because of the

risk of liability.

       Reading       the   statute   as   a   whole,   the   plain   language   indicates

that “emergency medical services” include operating an ambulance and

securing a patient. RCW 18.71.210(1) states in pertinent part, “No act or omission

of any . . . emergency medical technician or first responder, . . . done or omitted

in good faith while rendering emergency medical service . . . shall impose any

liability upon” an EMT or licensed ambulance service. (Emphasis added.) In the

context of ambulances, transportation and medical treatment are integral

to rendering emergency medical service. Further, the context of each of its

provisions and related statutes demonstrates the legislature’s intent to offer

protection to EMTs providing emergency medical services, which includes

transporting patients. For these reasons, I would conclude the EMTs’ conduct fell




                                              5
Lang v. Platinum Nine Holdings, LLC, No. 104498-4
(Montoya-Lewis, J., dissenting)

within the scope of immunity under RCW 18.71.210 and summary judgment should

have been granted to Northwest Ambulance.

      A.     Ambulance Operation

             1.     Plain Meaning

      RCW 18.71.210 immunizes EMTs’ good faith conduct “while rendering

emergency     medical    service.”    “Emergency    medical   service”   is   defined

as “medical treatment and care which may be rendered at the scene of any medical

emergency or while transporting any patient in an ambulance to an appropriate

medical facility, including ambulance transportation between medical facilities.”

RCW 18.73.030(11); RCW 18.71.010(2) (“emergency medical service” has the

same meaning in chapter 18.71 RCW as in chapter 18.73 RCW). While the majority

asserts that the phrase “while transporting” means medical treatment is distinct

from transportation, the statute expressly “include[s] ambulance transportation.”

Majority at 13; RCW 18.73.030(11).

      The majority separates medical services and transportation and its holding

depends on that distinction. The primary purpose of an ambulance is to transport

patients who need emergency care while en route to a care facility.

RCW 18.73.030(11). Transporting the patient and providing medical treatment and

care cannot be mutually exclusive; to read these as separate acts creates

a legal fiction unnecessary to interpret this statute. See RCW 18.73.030(4)


                                            6
Lang v. Platinum Nine Holdings, LLC, No. 104498-4
(Montoya-Lewis, J., dissenting)

(an ambulance is designed to treat patients before and during transportation),

.150(1)(a) (“a nondriving [EMT] shall be in command of the vehicle”). Northwest

Ambulance operates ambulances in teams of two EMTs, who take turns as driver

and lead medical provider. 3 CP at 909. Those teams collaborate to provide

emergency medical services. The provider in the back with the patient makes

immediate medical decisions and, in consultation with the driver, makes decisions

about when to elevate a transport to a code. Medical decision-making in ambulances

requires not only the skill to drive the ambulance at high speed but also to make

driving decisions based on the medical condition of the patient. These decisions

happen in tandem, in real time. Any conclusion otherwise imagines a separation of

tasks that does not happen on the ground.

      Ambulances provide one major function: transporting patients who require

medical care during transport. Driving an ambulance and transporting patients

are integral to the emergency medical services that EMTs provide. EMTs can

recognize symptoms of a medical emergency, render emergency medical services

during transport, and make medical judgments about how quickly the patient needs

to get to the next medical facility. Id. at 902; see RCW 18.73.030(4) (ambulances

are designed “to transport the ill and injured” and “to treat patients before and

during transportation”). Ambulances are equipped to provide medical care and

transportation under the care of “someone trained to recognize certain signs and


                                            7
Lang v. Platinum Nine Holdings, LLC, No. 104498-4
(Montoya-Lewis, J., dissenting)

symptoms.” 3 CP at 902. Ambulances must be operated by sufficient personnel for

adequate patient care, at least one of whom must be an EMT. RCW 18.73.150(1)(a).

If there are two or more EMTs operating the ambulance, the nondriving EMT is

“in command of the vehicle” and is responsible for the “operation” of the ambulance

and “the care of patients both before they are placed aboard the vehicle and

during transit.” Id. The plain language of these statutory provisions indicate that the

legislature understood ambulance operation as integral to the work of emergency

medical service providers such as EMTs. These statutory provisions demonstrate

that the legislature recognized the specialized nature of the work provided by EMTs.

Carving out the operation of an ambulance from the statutory immunity defeats the

purpose of this statutory scheme and requires the conclusion that driving

an ambulance is the same as driving any other vehicle. Such a conclusion not only

contradicts this statute—it ignores the reality of what this work requires.

      As the record shows, driving an ambulance requires specialized training

beyond    that    of   an   average     driver.     Northwest   Ambulance     provided

new EMT employees, including Mr. Wilson and Mr. Shaw, with classroom and

field training on driving an ambulance and operating its lights and

sirens. 1 CP at 287-90; 3 CP at 707-08, 900-01, 953. This training covered

acceleration and hard stops in a weighted vehicle and driving defensively

in anticipation of other drivers’ reactions to lights and sirens. 1 CP at 287-88.


                                            8
Lang v. Platinum Nine Holdings, LLC, No. 104498-4
(Montoya-Lewis, J., dissenting)

Mr. Wilson also drove an ambulance in an emergency vehicle incident prevention

course; Mr. Shaw took a similar course after this collision. 3 CP at 744-48, 901.

      “Driving code” requires specialized knowledge: the ambulance was equipped

with a mapping and communication system, allowing the driver to divert to a fire

station or other nearby facility if the lead EMT determined the patient’s

medical emergency needed to be addressed by a paramedic before they could reach

the hospital. Id. at 711-14. The driver’s area of an ambulance is furnished

with a console of buttons for lights, a dial to produce different siren patterns, and

a computer to communicate with dispatch and map the locations of fire stations and

other medical aid providers. Id. In this case, Mr. Shaw drove code for the first time

as a trainee, under the supervision of a field training officer, and he estimated he had

driven code at least 30-40 times before the day of this incident. Id. at 706-07, 840.

The ambulance was operated by two EMTs: Mr. Wilson and Mr. Shaw. Ms. Averill

was in training and not yet certified as an EMT. Consistent with RCW 18.73.150(1),

Mr. Wilson was the lead EMT responsible for the operation of the vehicle and

the care of the patient, and Mr. Shaw was the driver—an EMT who drove the vehicle

at the lead EMT’s command.

      Mr. Wilson exercised medical judgment in deciding whether to call

for Mr. Shaw to adjust from normal transport driving to code driving. To be sure,

Mr. Wilson was also rendering other medical treatment and care at the same time he


                                            9
Lang v. Platinum Nine Holdings, LLC, No. 104498-4
(Montoya-Lewis, J., dissenting)

was responsible for the operation of the ambulance, assessing Mr. Costa’s heart rate

while Mr. Shaw was driving the ambulance. See RCW 18.73.150(1)(a)

(lead EMT is responsible for operating the ambulance and patient care).

But Mr. Shaw’s driving of the vehicle was part and parcel of the EMTs’ operation

of the ambulance and their “medical treatment and care” during Mr. Costa’s

medical emergency requiring code driving to transport him to the hospital quickly

for further treatment. RCW 18.73.030(11). Mr. Shaw’s speed and maneuvering

of the ambulance may not have been consistent with his training, but that is

a question of negligence—whether he acted with due regard for safety, in good faith,

or with gross negligence—not whether driving and operating an ambulance is within

the scope of the statutory immunity. Compare RCW 18.71.210(1) (providing

immunity for ambulance services), with .210(5) (excluding from immunity acts or

omissions constituting gross negligence). I would hold that the statutory immunity

included the driver of the emergency vehicle.

      Driving an ambulance must be covered by the statute because it requires

medical training and expertise. The only circumstances in which an ambulance

may be lawfully driven by a person without medical or first aid training

are in ambulance services established by a volunteer or municipal corporation or

an association made up of two or more municipalities in rural areas, with approval

of the Department of Health. RCW 18.73.150(2). Average drivers of motor vehicles


                                           10
Lang v. Platinum Nine Holdings, LLC, No. 104498-4
(Montoya-Lewis, J., dissenting)

are not required to get an additional level of approval from the Department of Health

to drive a vehicle. Thus, there must be a distinction between driving an emergency

vehicle and an average vehicle. Further, even in the case of such volunteer or

rural emergency service provision, the legislature anticipates that the driver might

be called on to assist in medical care because it permits that type of driver

to “only provide[] medical care to patients to the level that they are trained.” Id.

In rural ambulance services with nonmedically trained drivers, injuries caused

by the operation of the vehicle should be covered by the same immunity under

RCW 18.71.210 because an EMT is “in command” of the ambulance and

has “responsibility for its operation.” RCW 18.73.150(1)(a). Concluding otherwise

defeats part of the purpose of the statute, which is to ensure that volunteer and

rural emergency services can provide those services without the specter of liability

looming when they are providing those services. The majority’s conclusion puts

the provision of rural emergency medical care in real peril.

             2.     Harmonizing the Statutory Provisions

      Our canons of statutory interpretation require us to read statutes

as a whole and harmonize provisions. Associated Gen. Contractors of Wash.,

2 Wn.3d at 863

; Quadrant Corp., 

154 Wn.2d at 239

. We must read subsections

(1) and (2) “as a whole so that, if possible, ‘no clause, sentence, or

word shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant.’” Ralph v. Dep’t of Nat. Res.,


                                           11
Lang v. Platinum Nine Holdings, LLC, No. 104498-4
(Montoya-Lewis, J., dissenting)

182 Wn.2d 242, 248

, 

343 P.3d 342

 (2014) (internal quotation marks omitted)

(quoting State ex rel. Baisden v. Preston, 

151 Wash. 175, 177

, 

275 P. 81

 (1929));

Wash. State Ass’n of Counties, 199 Wn.2d at 12-13; Spokane County,

192 Wn.2d at 458. Reading subsection (2) as the majority does creates unnecessary

inconsistency in the statute and renders subsection (1) void and insignificant.

      The majority determines that the second subsection of the statute limits

the first by narrowing the scope of immunity from all emergency medical services

to only medical procedures and only those that require medical expertise.

Majority at 12-14. The opinion’s conclusion that driving an ambulance is not

a medical procedure and does not require medical expertise claws back the immunity

created by subsection (1). I disagree with both conclusions.

      “Emergency medical service” (in subsection (1)) is a defined term, while

“actual emergency medical procedures” (in subsection (2)) is not defined by the

legislature. If a term is defined, we will use that definition; if a term is undefined,

we will use its plain and ordinary meaning. United States v. Hoffman,

154 Wn.2d 730, 741

, 

116 P.3d 999

 (2005). Plain and ordinary meaning of an

undefined term is gleaned from the context of the statute, not in isolation, though we

may consult a dictionary definition. Campbell & Gwinn, 

146 Wn.2d at 11

;

State v. Roggenkamp, 

153 Wn.2d 614, 623

, 

106 P.3d 196

 (2005);

Columbia Riverkeeper v. Port of Vancouver USA, 

188 Wn.2d 421

, 435,


                                           12
Lang v. Platinum Nine Holdings, LLC, No. 104498-4
(Montoya-Lewis, J., dissenting)

395 P.3d 1031

 (2017). Although the legislature has not defined “emergency

medical procedures,” Department of Health regulations provide a definition

of   that   term   as    “the     skills   that    are   performed   within   the   scope

of practice of EMS [(emergency medical services)] personnel certified

by the secretary under chapters 18.71 and 18.73 RCW.” WAC 246-976-010(33).

Under those regulations, the scope of practice for EMS personnel means they

are “authorized to provide patient care” “[w]ithin the scope of care” for their “level

of certification” “[i]n a prehospital emergency setting,” “[d]uring interfacility

ambulance transport,” and other specified settings and when following protocols.

WAC 246-976-182(1)(a)-(d). Thus, “actual emergency medical procedures” “within

the field of medical expertise” of the EMT refers to EMTs conducting the medical

care for which they are licensed, and not those skills that are beyond their level of

certification. RCW 18.71.210(2); WAC 246-976-010(33), -182(1)(a)-(d).

      Emergency         medical     service       providers   perform   varying     levels

of medical care depending on their specific classification and license.

See, e.g., RCW 18.73.030(13), (15). Reading subsections (1) and (2) together, the

statute immunizes the conduct of EMTs when they perform within the scope of their

training, but not if they attempt medical procedures they are not qualified to perform.

RCW 18.71.210(1), (2). I agree with the majority that subsection (2) limits the scope

of immunity provided to EMTs; subsection (2) limits the scope of immunity


                                              13
Lang v. Platinum Nine Holdings, LLC, No. 104498-4
(Montoya-Lewis, J., dissenting)

to negligent performance of emergency medical service within the provider’s

qualifications.

       I disagree, however, that subsection (2) limits the scope of immunity to only

“medical procedures.” If subsection (2) limited the entire immunity to medical

procedures, it would contradict subsection one, which plainly provides immunity for

acts    and   omissions     “while         rendering     emergency      medical     service.”

RCW 18.71.210(1). Contra Wash. State Ass’n of Counties, 199 Wn.2d at 12-13.

“Emergency medical service” is not limited to procedures; it is defined as “medical

treatment and care” that can be rendered at the scene of an emergency or in an

ambulance. RCW 18.73.030(11). If the immunity applies only to “medical

procedures,” it cannot also apply broadly to any acts and omissions while rendering

emergency     medical     service,        which    has   a    more     expansive    meaning.

RCW 18.71.210(1), (2); RCW 18.73.030(11).

       I would hold that subsection (2) acknowledges that EMTs, paramedics, and

first responders may be licensed to perform specific medical procedures and

extends the immunity to those procedures only for which they have the appropriate

expertise. Interpreting the statute as the majority has renders subsection (1) and

the    enumerated    definition      of    “emergency        medical   service”    void   and

insignificant. The legislature expressly immunized an EMT’s ordinary negligence

and broadly defined “emergency medical service”; limiting that immunity to cover


                                              14
Lang v. Platinum Nine Holdings, LLC, No. 104498-4
(Montoya-Lewis, J., dissenting)

only medical procedures makes the protection covered in subsection (1) void and

the broad language insignificant. As a whole, RCW 18.71.210 functions to limit

liability; subsection (2) recognizes that emergency medical service providers

should not attempt to perform a medical procedure that exceeds their training and

expertise, and immunity for negligently performed emergency medical service

extends only to those medical procedures they are qualified to perform.

             3.     Related Statutes

      We also look to what the legislature said in related statutes to discern

legislative intent. Campbell & Gwinn, 

146 Wn.2d at 11

. The legislature addressed

medical and emergency transportation in several other statutes that provide

immunity for volunteers, allow for EMTs to disregard traffic safety laws when

responding to emergency calls, and provide immunity for EMTs while transporting

people to nonemergency medical facilities. See RCW 4.24.300; RCW 18.71.210(4);

RCW 46.61.035. A review of these sections demonstrates this point, conclusively.

      First, RCW 4.24.300(1) provides qualified immunity for volunteer providers

of emergency or medical services “in the rendering of such emergency care or in

transporting such persons.” The majority asserts that the differences between the

language of these statutes indicates intent to immunize volunteers for care and

transportation and EMTs only for care. Majority at 20. As discussed above,

volunteers do not have statutory authority to render medical care or transport


                                           15
Lang v. Platinum Nine Holdings, LLC, No. 104498-4
(Montoya-Lewis, J., dissenting)

patients. When a layperson volunteers to help in an emergency where they otherwise

have no duty to do so, RCW 4.24.300(1) removes the disincentive of the possibility

of a civil suit to encourage people to volunteer to help others. In contrast, EMTs

have a duty to provide emergency medical services and transportation as their job;

RCW 18.71.210 immunizes good faith emergency medical service to allow EMTs

to do their job without second-guessing for fear of a civil suit for an ordinary

mistake. Transportation is immunized when EMTs are also providing medical care

because both go in tandem as emergency medical services. RCW 18.73.030(11).

      A person volunteering medical assistance does not have the same inherent

authority to provide medical care and transportation as does an EMT; transportation

is not within the field of expertise or medical care of a volunteer because they have

none, the legislature expressly granted that protection. Thus, RCW 4.24.300 does not

lend itself to an interpretation of RCW 18.71.210 that carves out protection

for an EMT’s negligent driving; RCW 4.24.300 demonstrates that the legislature

intended driving and operating an ambulance to be included in an EMT’s provision

of emergency medical services.

      Second, RCW 46.61.035 provides for the traffic procedures and

safety protocols for authorized emergency vehicles when responding to emergency

calls. This statute allows ambulance drivers to exceed the maximum speed limit,

proceed past red lights, etc., providing that the privileges granted do not “relieve the


                                           16
Lang v. Platinum Nine Holdings, LLC, No. 104498-4
(Montoya-Lewis, J., dissenting)

driver of an authorized emergency vehicle from the duty to drive with due regard for

the safety of all persons.” RCW 46.61.035(1), (2), (4). According to the majority,

these provisions mean that ambulance drivers are held to the ordinary standard of

care for emergency vehicle drivers and are not immune for their driving decisions.

Majority at 20-21. However, RCW 18.71.210 does not set out a different standard

of care for authorized emergency vehicles; EMTs operating ambulances must still

practice ordinary care when responding to emergency calls, RCW 18.71.210

immunizes only that EMT’s ordinary negligence. This immunity will apply only

to acts or omissions done in good faith, and not conduct that amounts to gross

negligence or willful or wanton misconduct. RCW 18.71.210(1), (5). Reading these

statutes together, I would conclude that EMTs must act with ordinary care when

operating an ambulance; ordinary negligence while driving an ambulance in good

faith is subject to civil immunity, but gross negligence is not.

      Third, the same entities and personnel immunized under RCW 18.71.210(1)

are also immunized when they are “involved in the transport of patients to mental

health facilities or chemical dependency programs.” RCW 18.71.210(4).

The majority contends that subsection (4) “extended qualified immunity for an

EMT’s ordinary negligence while rendering emergency medical services during

transport to medical and certain nonmedical facilities alike.” Majority at 19. Since,

as explained above, I would hold that RCW 18.71.210(1) and (2) offer qualified


                                           17
Lang v. Platinum Nine Holdings, LLC, No. 104498-4
(Montoya-Lewis, J., dissenting)

immunity for providing medical services as well as transporting patients while

providing those services, subsection (4) offers the same immunity for an EMT’s

ordinary negligence when providing care while transporting patients to mental health

facilities, etc. RCW 18.71.210(4); LAWS OF 2015, ch. 157, §§ 4-5 (authorizing

ambulance transport to facilities other than hospitals and amending RCW 18.71.210

to immunize medical personnel and entities involved in the transport of patients

to nonmedical mental health facilities or chemical dependency programs); see also

FINAL B. REP. ON SUBSTITUTE H.B. 1721, at 2, 64th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2015)

(“Immunity from liability that generally applies to emergency medical services

providers is extended to acts or omissions by those providers when transporting a

patient to a mental health facility or chemical dependency treatment program.”).

      Accordingly, driving an ambulance is within the scope of the conduct

that is immunized by RCW 18.71.210. The legislature broadly defined

“emergency medical services” to clearly include transporting a patient and

has established that transportation is a foundational function of ambulance services.

Further, driving an ambulance in response to a medical code requires medical

knowledge, training, and expertise that is within an EMT’s field. Subsection (2)

works to ensure that EMTs are providing only services that they have been trained

and certified to do; it does not limit the scope of the immunity to cover only




                                           18
Lang v. Platinum Nine Holdings, LLC, No. 104498-4
(Montoya-Lewis, J., dissenting)

medical procedures. Thus, I disagree with the majority that driving an ambulance

is not immunized by the statute.

      B.     Securing the Patient

      Additionally, physically securing a patient is part of “rendering emergency

medical service.” RCW 18.71.210(1). As noted, “emergency medical service”

may occur “at the scene of any medical emergency or while transporting any patient

in an ambulance.” RCW 18.73.030(11). Mr. Wilson testified that he was trained on

loading patients in and out of ambulances on gurneys and that the first thing he did

after the collision was secure Mr. Costa’s spine. 3 CP at 900, 936. In depositions,

Northwest Ambulance employees discussed their training and experience securing

patients and operating ambulances. Northwest Ambulance’s designee said

company policy required the use of all straps on a stretcher or gurney, including

shoulder straps. 1 CP at 111-12. It terminated Mr. Shaw and Mr. Wilson for violating

this policy as well as a policy requiring defensive driving to prevent collisions.

Id. at 85-87, 111-30, 132-36; 3 CP at 823, 828, 944-45. All three employees involved

in the collision had experience operating gurneys and securing patients, although

none knew of the company policy requiring restraints or recalled specific training

on restraints. 3 CP at 766-67, 946-55, 1034. Mr. Wilson and Mr. Shaw

had been trained on loading stretchers and gurneys in and out of ambulances.

Id. at 851-53, 900, 954-55. Both believed the standard practice was to use the waist


                                           19
Lang v. Platinum Nine Holdings, LLC, No. 104498-4
(Montoya-Lewis, J., dissenting)

and midleg belts but not the shoulder straps, which they thought should be used only

for patients in specific conditions. Id. at 768, 955-56. Ms. Averill believed there was

a debate among EMTs whether all the straps were important and that many EMTs

thought    patients    would      be    secure      without   the   shoulder    straps.

Id. at 1006, 1024, 1042-43.

      Thus, securing a patient is part of the emergency medical services an EMT

renders at the scene. Securing a patient requires training and medical knowledge that

is within the field of the EMT. Whether the EMTs in this case were adequately

trained or followed their training regarding the use of restraints is a question of

negligence, not whether securing a patient is part of rendering emergency medical

services. See RCW 18.71.210(1); RCW 18.73.030(11). Given the legislature’s

decision to define that term broadly, I would conclude that securing a patient is part

of rendering emergency medical services and covered by the immunity.

                                       CONCLUSION

      The dual function of ambulances to transport the ill and provide medical

services cannot be separated. Doing so, as the majority does, ignores the reality

of how emergency services are provided throughout the state. RCW 18.71.210

immunizes EMTs’ ordinary negligence when rendering emergency medical

services. This immunity intended to ensure that those who are making quick

decisions to save people’s lives are not punished for mistakes that they may make


                                           20
Lang v. Platinum Nine Holdings, LLC, No. 104498-4
(Montoya-Lewis, J., dissenting)

when working for the best interests of the patient, using their training, experience,

and expertise. The legislature’s express broad grant of immunity in this area should

not exclude an integral and basic part of providing emergency services.

      I respectfully dissent.



                                                _______________________________



                                                ____________________________________




                                                 ____________________________________
                                                           Madsen, J.P.T.




                                           21

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